Buy the bullet: global defence spending

Hello and welcome to The Intelligence on Economist Radio. I'm your host, Jason Palmer. Every weekday, we provide a fresh perspective on the events shaping your world. The 1st of May brings out protesters all over the globe campaigning for better labor conditions. But in France, weekly demonstrations by the so-called Gilets Jaunes have been going on for months. Yesterday's May Day gatherings brought out a violent fringe that threatens the Gilets Jaunes' message and President Emmanuel Macron's attempts to address it. And we take a look at a new study that tries to measure which English-speaking country produces the most bullshit. But first— Last week, China's Navy celebrated its 70th birthday in grand style. As President Xi Jinping peered through binoculars into rain and mist, a flotilla swept through the South China Sea. "Nanchang DDG-101 is saluting you." Rows of white-clad sailors stood on warships and saluted Mr. Xi, who was aboard a brand-new destroyer. China has also boasted of its nuclear submarines and says it's building a new aircraft carrier. America sees China as a growing rival, not just a military threat, but also an economic one. And the contest is being felt by America's closest allies. In Britain yesterday, Gavin Williamson, the defense secretary, was fired by Prime Minister Theresa May. He was accused of leaking details of how the country plans to let Huawei, a Chinese tech firm, build part of its future 5G mobile phone network. In response, In response to that plan, America has threatened to cut back intelligence sharing with Britain. Beyond this, America and China are leading the world in a rearmament race, as a new report makes clear.

Well, essentially, the world is spending enormous sums of money on defense.

Shashank Joshi is The Economist's defense editor.

This is a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI. It's a Swedish think tank. And what it says this year is that global defense spending in 2018 was $1.8 trillion. $1.3 trillion. Now, obviously, that's a lot of money. To put it in context of just how much, it's the highest amount in real terms since CIPRI began this exercise in 1988 and collecting these figures, the end of the Cold War. It is 76% higher than 1998, which was the peak of the post-Cold War peace dividend when Western countries began slashing armed forces, slashing spending. So you can see just how far we've come in the last 20 years or so, just how much things have changed geopolitically.

And who's spending all of this $1.8 trillion?

Well, essentially two countries are spending, are leading the charge. That's America and China, unsurprisingly. America is head and shoulders above everyone else. It will spend about $716 billion this year. That's a significant increase from last year. It outspends the next 8 or so countries combined, which gives you a sense of just how far ahead it is. Now, China is well behind. It spends, you know, a fraction of that. But its military spending is growing very quickly. It grew at an average of 10% every year between 2000 and 2016. Between 2014 and 2018, it churned out more ships, ships with a greater tonnage than the entire Indian or Japanese Navy. So that gives you a sense of just how rapidly they're growing.

And is this growth spread also among other nations, or is it only America and China that are growing at such great rates?

Well, that's provoking a response, particularly in Asia. In Asia, for example, we're seeing huge spurts among other countries. India, for example, now spends more than any country in Europe. And I think Indians are very proud of the fact that they are outspending not only countries like France, Germany, but also their old colonial master, Britain. Our weapons are modern and invincible. Our skills are honed to perfection. Our resolution is to secure the Indian skies ever onwards.

But Asia surely isn't the only place where governments want to beef up their defenses.

No, un-martial Europeans have also been tooling up in recent years. They're obviously very worried by Russia, particularly after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. They've been spending substantial amounts, they're growing quite quickly. If Europe were one single country, its military spending would be 4 times that of Russia. In fact, it would be the second biggest military power in the world.

So back to China, which has been spending money hand over fist, as you say, but their capabilities are still much, much weaker compared to America's. Is there some sense of when China might sort of outpace America?

Well, it'll be many, many years before it can actually equal American spending. But I would say China gets to concentrate most of its military forces in its front garden in the Western Pacific. America has global commitments. So could we have a situation where Chinese forces in Asia outmatch American forces? Absolutely. And we could have that very soon indeed, depending on what America does, depending on how China stretches its capabilities.

So beyond America and China, is there anywhere where this sort of frenzy of military spending will kind of change the league table?

I think we're seeing a few changes taking place. The Saudi Arabians in the Middle East have been spending huge amounts in the past 10 years to the point where they are now the third biggest spender in the world. That obviously is going to have a major impact on the Middle East. If you look at Turkey, I think they've also been on a spending spree. And I think in Europe, one of the most interesting countries in, is in Eastern Europe, which of course is closer to Russia, more worried about Russia's influence, and that's Poland. Polish spending has been rising very quickly. They've been buying lots of American weapons, including an American air defense system, and they have perhaps been at the vanguard of some of this military spending spree in Central and Eastern Europe that we've seen in recent years.

So looking at all of these numbers, is it a global trend? Is everyone spending more?

No, I think there are some pretty interesting places where spending is shrinking or stagnating. The first example is the Middle East. Having said that Saudi Arabia was on this spending spree for the last 10 years, that's slowing down. SIPRI says that military spending in the Middle East shrank by 1.8% in 2018. Saudi Arabia is planning on cutting spending after a number of years of growth. Iran is planning on cutting spending, although we don't have data for a few big countries like the United United Arab Emirates and Qatar. I think Africa's another good example. Military spending in Africa in 2018 shrank for the fourth consecutive year. And of course, as we know, there are big protests in Algeria and Sudan. The military is under pressure from protesters to give way to civilians. That could have an impact on military budgets. I think finally, the one I'd like to mention, which is perhaps really interesting, is Russia. Russia has modernized its armed forces over the last decade. It's invested in lots of shiny new weapons. CIPRI now says that is slowing down, that boom in Russia is coming to an end. Its calculations say military spending in Russia shrunk by 3.5% last year. Okay, some of that could be to do with the fall of the ruble. They're still probably spending a lot in ruble terms. But I think what we are seeing is that the years of Russia ploughing money into its military driven by oil, that is slowly coming to an end. And that will have an impact, of course, on the European military balance.

I mean, it's tempting to imagine that more spending on arms makes conflict more likely. There's just simply more guns and weapons in more hands. What's your take on that?

World War I really gave us a strong association between arms racing and conflict. We thought the Germans and the British and others were competing for supremacy in Europe, building up ships, building up weapons, and that played a role in contributing to World War I. I think the political science, the sort of social science around this is a bit more complicated. I don't think there is necessarily a clear connection between rapid arms racing and outright conflict. Some people would say actually, as countries build up weapons, they feel they can deter their adversaries, they feel more secure, they don't feel the need to be vulnerable and to lash out. So the association is complicated. What I would say is I think there's a kind of cyclical relationship between mistrust and building up arms. The more countries don't trust each other, like the US and China over China's island building and competition in Asia, the more they build up weapons to prepare for the possibility of a clash, the more they build up weapons, the less they trust each other.

Thank you very much for coming in.

Thank you very much for having me.

The picturesque streets of Paris filled with tear gas, trash can fires, and hurled rocks yesterday as May Day demonstrations turned violent. The annual march by union leaders to mark Labor Day was marred marred by outbreaks of violence. The clashes come at a time when France is already tense after nearly 6 months of weekly protests by the Gilets Jaunes. These demonstrators are angry with President Emmanuel Macron's economic policies, which they think harm the working class.

Yesterday was particularly violent. There was— the event was disrupted by all manner of different sort of groups.

Sophie Petter is The Economist's Paris bureau chief.

Partly these anarchists, uh, this sort of infiltrators known as Black Blocs who are clad all in black with balaclavas, often with gas masks, and who come to try and cause trouble. But also because of the Gilets Jaunes, the Yellow Jacket protesters who were joining in as well.

Sophie, there's been lots of unrest in France recently. Was, was this response on, on a, on a well-known sort of protest day entirely unexpected?

Well, I think, you know, May Day protests in the last couple of years have been infiltrated and disrupted by these sorts of Black Bloc protesters. So, in some respects, it wasn't a surprise that there was violence. The Interior Ministry had warned that this was going to be the case. The police had reinforced its presence on the streets in Paris. There were over 7,000 policemen, riot policemen in particular. So, they were expecting violence. But I think that it's— there's a particularly sinister atmosphere in Paris during demonstrations at the moment. And it means I think it was worse than, in some respects, worse than people, those sort of scenes were worse than people had expected, certainly than I had.

You mentioned that violence has kind of become normalized. Why is that?

Well, I think it's been ongoing ever since the beginning of the Gilets Jaunes, these Yellow Jacket protesters, which started last November as a protest against the rise in the carbon tax. But since then, it has become a sort of an expression of rage by a lot of people who feel angry, angry at the government, angry at President Macron, angry at the cost of living, angry at the sense that they're not being taken— their concerns aren't being taken seriously. And there seems to have been, partly because it's been fed through social media— it's not necessarily a French phenomenon, but there's been a sort of legitimizing generally of expressions of hatred through social media, you know, around the world. But I think in France, it's encouraged and somehow has normalized this sort of both hatred and then a violent expression of that hatred.

But President Macron has been trying to address the concerns of these protesters. Are they clearly then not happy with what he's done?

Well, it's interesting because President Macron has held what he called a great national debate over 2 or 3 months at the beginning of this year, and he presented his conclusions to that last week. [Speaker:GHION.AI] The purpose, I think, was to try and take the heat out of the protests, but it was also to speak to the French more broadly. Not just those who are still demonstrating on the streets. The numbers on the streets have actually gone down significantly since last November. They're about a tenth of the numbers that turned out the first weekend. And public opinion as a whole has actually changed. French were very supportive for a long time of the, the protesters on the streets, and that's changed. Polls suggest that the majority of the French now do want these protests to come to an end. So I think what President Macron is trying to do is to— is not just to talk. He's not talking to those on the streets who are causing the violence. Those, those people, whatever he says and whatever he does, they're not going to stop. But it's to try and speak to the majority of French, to come up with some ideas. A lot of them are to do with income support, tax cuts, improving democratic process, cutting the number of parliamentarians. It was measures that have been suggested during the Great Debate, and have been— 2 million people in France have taken part in this. So it was trying to come up with some ideas and accept the ideas that have been proposed. Those who are causing violence on the streets, they are not going to be won over by anything that he says or anything he he does.

But there is something of a political dimension to what he's doing rather than just sort of speaking to the people's concerns directly. I mean, is— are Mr. Macron's opponents taking advantage of this, this unrest, this uncertainty?

Yes, almost all his political opponents. And he's facing the European election campaign for the end of this month, so France very much feels as if it's in a moment of political competition. In a way, I think what this comes down to, if you look at polls is a race between President Macron and Marine Le Pen of the— what used to be called the National Front, is now called the National Rally— on the far right. They faced each other in the presidential election runoff in 2017, and polls suggest that it's going to be a race between the two of them to come top of the European elections at the end of May. So this is not a new contest, but it is certainly a contest that is on both sides being seen as you know, a test of Macron's ability to hold the center ground against the populist extremes. And Marine Le Pen has seized every opportunity to suggest that this sort of unrest on the streets of France is evidence that Macron can't govern and has turned the country against him.

Is there a chance that in the minds of sort of right-thinking people that the violent fringe of this kind of takes away some of the support for Gilets Jaunes because they all get lumped together as, you know, as dangerous protesters?

I think what's happened is that if you look at the polling data, a majority of the French now want these protests to stop. And that is a sign that I think that the people have had enough of the violence. I mean, it's, you know, smashed up shops, restaurants, cafes, the violence on the street. You can't go out normally in Paris on a day like that. There's tear gas in the air. There's violence. People hurling cobblestones and projectiles in the streets on the Boulevard Montparnasse. This is right in the center of Paris, tourist Paris, where people live. And I think that there is a sense of enough's enough with that. It has discredited the movement. But, you know, there are two sides to this. And there are also images of violence on the streets and of the police using pretty hardline tactics, which mean that, you know, that there is some sympathy at the same time for the Gilets Jaunes movement. But I do think that over time that's sympathy, and particularly because of the violence, that sympathy has, has waned.

And kind of taking in all of this, this heady mix, I guess the question would be the degree to which Mr. Macron is better off or not better off. I mean, we've been talking for a long time about how popular sentiment has been slipping against him. Is he, is he better off now than he was a few months ago?

I think you have to look at a couple of measures of this. If you look at his polling data, he had, um, he is not, he's not popular, but his poll ratings have recovered now to where they were before the religion protests started. I think people recognize that he has made an effort to listen and to respond to the grievances. Actually, at the moment, his party is polling top, so there is also a sense in which there isn't really any more credible alternative to Macron. And the party polling second is Marine Le Pen's party. So I think that you have to put this in some sort of context, that people may be fed up, he may not be a popular president, but The political landscape is such that there isn't a credible mainstream opposition leader who is offering something that the majority of French think is a better option.

Sophie, thanks very much for your time.

Thank you.

More and more Americans think the people around them, their friends, their coworkers, people in the street, are not telling the truth. In 1984, about half believed that most people could be trusted. Today, that number is just 30%. And they might be right. But not all fibs are created equal.

So the difference between a lie and a bullshit, as was explained by Harry Frankfurt, a philosopher, in his book On Bullshit, is that liars consciously conceal the truth. They are deliberately misleading people with what they say. Bullshitters don't really care about the truth. They just say whatever they want to believe.

James Tozer is a data journalist at The Economist. He claims anyway to have been looking at the stats. A new study has shown that some untruths might also fool the teller.

A new study of students in 9 different English-speaking countries suggests that actually bullshitters are much more prevalent than you think, and especially in North America. The academics found that a large number of students, particularly in America and Canada, were willing to lie when it came to asking them whether they'd heard of particular mathematical concepts. So the academics listed 16 mathematical ideas, some of them very familiar like polygon or probability, and some of them completely bogus like proper number, subjunctive scaling, and declarative fraction. And what they found is that there are quite a large portion of people who were perfectly willing to say that they were very familiar, in fact experts, with these made-up concepts. And from that they were able to work out what the bullshit quotient was of people in any particular country or demographic profile.

And what do those results look like? How does that break out? You say North Americans are most prolific?

Yes, North Americans are most prolific, especially when compared with Brits. The Scots and the Irish are very happy to admit their ignorance of mathematical concepts they've never heard of. Americans and Canadians are insistent that they know what these things are. Unsurprisingly, men, or rather boys, because we're talking about 15-year-old students, were much less willing to admit their ignorance than women. The rich tended to be more boastful than the poor. And another interesting finding was that immigrants were more likely to bluff than native students were, although the effect size of that differed from country to country, so that might not be a consistent pattern.

Any guesses as to why it's broken out this way, except for the fact that boys often think they're right when they're not?

Well, the interesting thing is that the academics also asked the students whether they had skipped school recently, and there was no sort of differences between the bullshitters and the non-bullshitters on that question, which suggests they weren't necessarily trying to impress the questioners. It seems more likely that they genuinely believed that they knew what these things were. They couldn't possibly conceive of a world in which they didn't. And that suggests that really bullshitting is almost an unconscious habit that people of a particular background gradually work their way into. It just turns out that rich male Americans are especially good at believing their own fantasies, and I'm sure we'd struggle to think of anyone who fits that profile.

What if the study's authors themselves are bullshitters?

They would have pulled off an extraordinarily comprehensive hoodwink because the questionnaire that they used is actually administered by the OECD. So if they are bullshitters, they've fooled far more people than this single gullible journalist.

James, thanks very much for coming in.

Thank you very much.

That's all for this episode of The Intelligence. If you like us, give us a rating on Apple Podcasts, and you can subscribe to The Economist at economist.com/radiooffer. 12 issues for $12 or £12. See you back here tomorrow.