Return fire: Iran’s missile attacks

Hey, Ryan Reynolds here wishing you a very happy half off holiday because right now Mint Mobile is offering you the gift of 50% off unlimited. To be clear, that's half the price, not half the service. Mint is still premium unlimited wireless for a great price. So that means a half day. Yeah, give it a try@mintmobile.com Switch upfront payment of $45 for three month plan equivalent to $15 per month required new customer offer for first three months only. Speed slow 135 gigabytes of network busy taxes and fees extra. See mintmobile.com. Hello and welcome to the Intelligence on Economist Radio. I'm your host, Jason Palmer. Every weekday we provide a fresh perspective on the events shaping your world. After nearly a year and two general elections, Spain has at last cobbled together a government, a coalition unusual in Europe, between two left leaning parties. Can that government hold together? And even if it can, will it get anything done? And the game of darts has historically been confined to pubs in Britain where local leagues battle it out over quite a few pints. But after a bit of a television transformation, the sport became more glitzy and dramatic and now it's heading to America. First up, though, From the moment news emerged on Friday that Iran's military commander, Qasem Soleimani, had been killed in an American drone strike, talk has been of how Iran would retaliate. Now it has. In the early hours of this morning, Iranian state television showed missiles flying in the region of the Al Asad Air base in Iraq, which houses American and coalition troops.

Iranian forces launched more than a dozen missiles into Iraq, two sites, one Erbil and the other the Al Assad air base.

Edward Carr is deputy editor of the Economist.

And they struck there. They claimed to have killed at least 80American soldiers. The signs are that's nonsense. The signals come out of the United States so that probably no Americans have been killed, though we haven't had that confirmed yet. So what looked like at first sight a huge escalation, the kind of big attack that everyone was dreading, actually might turn out to be something far smaller than that. And some of the indications are that both sides want to slightly draw a.

Line at this point that stands in sharp contrast to the heated rhetoric of recent days.

The first sign coming out of the United States was Trump's tweet in which he said that all was going very well and he'd give a press conference today. But it was the signs that he did not want to respond, in spite of having been very belligerent in the days preceding this Iranian missile strike. So I think it looks as if, because we think there were no American military casualties, if that's indeed the case, that the United States will not respond. And that's interesting, because in the lead up to this, there was enormous speculation about how to stop this escalating out of control in the very short run, and a great fear that neither side would be able to calculate correctly about how to save face as far as they were concerned, at the same time as not leading to the next response. And it may be that Iran has managed to do something very public that it can boast about at home to all the millions of people who turned out for the funeral and memorial of Soleimani at the same time as not provoking the United States response.

And so by that rationale, you think then, that this may be the end in the short term for Iranian aggression against America?

Well, it may be the end of the overt response, but most people's calculation about how Iran might respond was that it had all sorts of subtle, underground, covert ways of responding. For instance, cyber attacks, assassinations, swarms of boats attacking shipping in Iranian waters and around Iranian waters. Now, you'd think that the sort of more overt of those things may be off the table, but the subvert ones, which can happen over a period of months, there's no reason to think that those won't happen, in spite of the fact that the Iranian foreign minister has sort of signalled, as these missile strikes went off, a signal he does not want a war with the United States. But there's a lot of things that Iran can do short of war, that it will hope will not lead to war, that will still punish the United States for what it sees as a gross offensive.

You say that Iran could do that. Is that to say that you expect that it will?

It's very hard to know. I think it probably will because that has been its pattern of behavior in the past. But what was interesting before this United States response was that America's had this policy of maximum pressure, which is really putting strain on the Iranian economy. Iran was. Was responding in a number of ways. One of those was to begin to loosen the shackles of the nuclear agreement. But others were to start to launch attacks, shooting down American drones in what the United States claimed was American international airspace rather than Iranian airspace. Attack on Saudi oil installations in Abqaiq. This is not covered, even though the Iranians denied responsibility in the Abqaiq case and said that it was in their airspace in the case of the drone. These are getting more overt and bigger and more strategic and more threatening gestures from the point of view of Iran. So I think that if it forces Iran back into the channel of cyber attacks and stuff like that, that is a change in Iranian behaviour that's accomplished by killing Soleimani.

So as much as the suggestion that the killing of Soleimani was an overreaction or reckless, it may have had the intended effect.

Well, it may be reckless because I think it's very hard to calculate exactly what Iran will do. But if it is a response to increasing Iranian belligerence in Iran in order to re establish some sense of deterrence, that may be one of the effects it has, but it won't be the only effect. And the calculation of whether it was the right thing to do involves summing up all the consequences, which are very hard to know at the moment.

Well, one thing is it seems that civil and diplomatic dialogue is now entirely off the table.

I think it really is. If you remember, the rationale for pulling out of the nuclear agreement was to negotiate a better one, and one that included not just the nuclear program, but all the things that Iran was doing that were destructive in the region, including its missiles. And yet the idea now that you could negotiate anything seems to me ridiculous, really, when you've just humiliated Iran and you've shown that you're not a particularly reliable negotiating partner. So it means the American strategy's got one strategy in Iran, really, which is to strangle the economy and to threaten massive retaliation if it oversteps the mark.

But if at the same time, in humiliating Iran, the American administration has shown that it has little appetite for full on war, doesn't that leave more room for Iran to at least push at the edges of its nuclear program, to press ahead?

I think Iran now has two motives to pursue the nuclear program, both stronger than they were before the attack on Soleimani. One is that it's fairly clear that if Iran actually gets a bomb, it protects it to some extent. Just look at how US policy towards North Korea, which does have nuclear weapons, is different from policy towards Iran. One reason is that North Korea actually has got the weapons. But the second thing is that the nuclear programme itself becomes a form of escalation, a way in which you can put pressure on Trump to do something. Now, again, there are thresholds here, and it's very unclear where these thresholds lie. If Iran overstepped some threshold, whatever it is, then the United States and possibly Israel can respond with bombing campaigns and that will set the program back by some degree. I would argue that it sets it back a few years, but, you know, you can't bomb the contents of people's heads. Iran now has a lot of experience, it knows what it's doing, it's getting more experience all the time. And there's a certain amount you can set it back through destroying physical infrastructure, but you cannot eradicate a nuclear program. And if Iran is really determined to get there, it will get there.

So uncertainty in the short and the.

Long run, I'm afraid it is highly uncertain.

And so far this has been a story entirely and only about America and Iran. But what about Iran's greater regional ambitions, part of which have excited the interest of the Americans in the first place? Is this going to change the way Iran is acting in the region?

It's a very hard question. There are a couple of reasons for think it might inhibit Iran. One is to the extent that Soleimani himself was an unusually gifted commander. It sets that back. And the network was to some extent built on personal relationships. But that's a very unpredictable thing. There are plenty of commanders. This thing's been going on for a long time. It does have structures. The second aspect is interesting though, because as the Iranian economy suffers, there's a certain resentment domestically about the amount of money that all this stuff costs. Now, even though this is, in military terms, an incredibly cheap way of buying this much influence in the region, this combination of small expeditionary force and militias paid for by Iran, it's still quite a lot of money when your economy's shrunk because of sanctions and Iranians have noticed and they're cross about that. So the other question is really whether the new commander and future commanders of the Quds will be able to command the same share of the budget as Soleimani could. He was a figure of immense authority in Iran and inevitably his replacements will not have so much authority. Whether they'll be able to command as much money or not I think is an open question.

Edward, thank you very much for your time.

Thanks, Jason.

Alcandidato Don Pedro Sanchez Perez Castejon.

Lojari.

Applause for the formation of Spain's new government spoke of jubilation, but also relief. The country had been heading towards a year without a government. Since democracy was restored in 1978, Spain's politics have been dominated by just two parties. But recently that functional two party system has fragmented. Yesterday's vote allowed Spain's caretaker Socialist Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, to form a government in coalition with the far left party Podemos. It was a dramatic moment. Each Lawmaker revealing his or her vote. One by one, The no votes were ahead right until the end. At the final count, the proposed coalition passed by a margin of just 2. The agreement has outraged Spain's group of right wing parties, but it has the tacit approval of Esqueira, the largest party arguing for Catalan independence. The issue of whether the region can break away from Spain remains the most divisive in Spanish politics. But for now, the new government offers much needed stability.

Well, yesterday, after 10 months and two general elections, the Spanish parliament at last voted to allow Pedro Sanchez, the Socialist prime minister, who's been a caretaker for all that time, to form a government.

Michael Reed is a senior editor at the Economist.

It did so in a rowdy session of a couple of hours, and it did so by the narrowest of margins, by 167 votes to 165, with 19 abstentions. There was a lot of emotion. I mean, Pablo Iglesias, who's a rather hard boiled far left politician, the leader of Podemos, which is the Socialist coalition partner, burst into tears, which is not something one has seen that often. And there were chants of yes, we can from the Podemos members. That's what Poremos means in Spanish. So Sanchez got his government. It's a controversial government. It's a coalition government. For the first time in Spain since democracy was restored in the 1970s, it's a left wing coalition. And to get there, because it doesn't have a parliamentary majority, it relied on the abstention of Esqueira, the largest Catalan separatist party.

And so why has it taken so long for Spain to form this government?

Well, Pedro Sanchez came to office in June 2018 by winning a censure motion against a conservative government. But it was a minority government. It only lasted until February of last year. He called a general election. The Socialists did much better in that general election, but they fell well short of a majority. He had various options for trying to form a coalition. Then he, inadvisedly, as it turned out, went for a repeat election in which the Socialists actually lost three seats and Poremos lost a lot of seats. But nobody in Spain wanted a third election. So Sanchez ended up swallowing many of previous statements and forming this government, which he had been pledged not to form with the far left and with the abstention of Catalan separatism, or at least some of them.

So, in essence, he has had to make quite a few concessions to his own promises, his own political predilections to get this to happen.

He's made a lot of concessions. I mean, when he called the repeat election, he said it was because he was searching for a strong government that would not be dependent on separatists. And we've ended up with a fairly weak government that is dependent on separatists. That said, it's important to point out two things. It's actually quite hard to overthrow a Spanish government because you need to line up an alternative majority behind a particular alternative prime minister. And that given that the opposition, most of the opposition is on the right, some of it is radical separatists and it's very hard to see them coming together. And the second thing is that because this government lacks a parliamentary majority, some of the more catastrophist comments from some business leaders and on the right seem a little overdone. How much this government will be able to do is open to question.

Well, quite. But let's take a look at the political spectrum as it now exists. I mean, this vote only succeeded because Mr. Sanchez secur the cooperation of the Catalan separatists. I mean they will surely want something out of that deal.

Yeah, I mean he reached a written agreement with Esqueira and the largest, but only one of the three separatist parties. And it's a study in ambiguity and both sides can say what they want about it. Mr. Sanchez says that open ended talks, which is what he's agreed to, will be within the framework of the Constitution, which does not allow regions to have referendums on self determination. On the other hand, Esquera are saying that the talks will involve all options being on the table and they will push for exactly that thing, a referendum on self determination. I think one can say that this agreement and the setting up of the talks may help to take some of the emotion and some of the intensity out of the Catalan issue. In the end, there are always going to have to be talks and there probably won't be any significant agreements in the short term.

And what about on the right? This sort of unlikely combination with the hard left Podemos Party, where does that leave those on the right of the political spectrum?

Well, they are furious, some of them say imply that it's an illegitimate government, which it isn't. It's a perfectly legitimate democratic government. And in some cases they denounced this government, but they could have offered support or abstention to Mr. Sanchez to avoid this government. So there's a degree of hypocrisy and political calculation. There is now a three way contest on the right. The big winner in the repeat election in November was Vox, which is a hard right party, which prevented the People's Party, the mainstream conservative party, from making more gains. So there's a kind of, you know, rhetorical competition on the right. But I think what this does show is that, and it's been true for much of this century in Spain, is that Spanish politics is marked by overheated rhetoric.

You mentioned that it may well, because of all of this infighting, be difficult for the governments to actually do anything. But what about its stability? Do you think that the coalition will stick around, that it's stable?

I think it will stick around for two or three years. It's quite hard to overthrow a Spanish government as long as they get a budget passed, which they will try and do as soon as possible. You can roll that over for another year or two. So for two or three years in all, I think the government can survive. Whether it can do a lot more than that remains to be seen.

Michael, thanks very much for your time.

Thank.

You. When you think of traditional British sports, cricket, rugby or tennis might come to mind. But one cult game with its roots in medieval England could be making it to primetime in America. Darts. The sport is widely played across Britain with local competitions often being played between competition, competing pub teams. Pub teams in this case being last night's league match between the Royal Oak in Fritham and the Hatchet Inn in Romsey, deep in the New Forest in southern England. These games have a bit of a boozy reputation. I don't think anyone will be that surprised by the fact it's in a pub. People are having a drink, it's a.

Good laugh, but no, it's not, it's not too serious. It's more about the social side, I'd say.

They. Well, it's a pub sport, so it's going to have a bougie reputation.

Number one. Come on, Lee, have a piece of this.

Let's be honest here. It's, you know, silly sport in a pub. You know, 12bl sitting around having a laugh.

It's better than doing nothing and it's better than, you know, sitting in front of the TV on a Tuesday.

Spurs you the man. If you wander into many British pubs, you'll still find a few beer bellied blokes throwing metal arrows at a board.

Beau Franklin is an assistant news editor at the Economist.

But this peculiar British pastime is finding fans far outside the pub.

So how popular is it in the pub here? I mean, I've certainly been to pubs where I've seen people play. I have played myself As a matter of fact, not very well, but I mean, is it widespread?

Darts is still popular in pubs around the country, but it's long been on TV here in the UK as well. In the 1970s, there was a peak in which it was shown on the BBC. Millions of people would tune in. And then it started to pick up a kind of loutish reputation. There was a famous comedy sketch where two darts players were competing to see who could drink the most. That really undermined darts reputation as a proper sport, I think.

Well, but it is one that, as you say, has its roots in the pub.

It does, and I think it has a proud history there. But in the last few years, it's been elevated to something a lot more professional and a lot more serious in terms of sporting ambitions.

How do you mean?

So in the early 1990s, some players who wanted darts to be taken more seriously and were struggling to make a living playing darts broke away from the British Darts Organization, this stuffy organization that was in charge of the game in Britain. And they formed their own group, which became the Professional Darts Corporation. And they teamed up with Rupert Murdoch's broadcaster, Sky. And between them, the PDC and Sky have turned dartz into something between wwe, wrestling and a pantomime. It's no coincidence that the World Championship, dartz's most prestigious event, is on over Christmas and has heroes and villains appearing on stage, jeering from the crowd and outrageous fancy dress costumes.

And so in that sense, it's got rid of its sort of heavy drinking loutish history.

Definitely not. So you won't find players drinking anymore. It's strictly water when you're up on stage. But the fans definitely still go for a night out. And heavy drinking is a big part of that. Some of the fans that I spoke to freely admitted that they weren't really there to see the darts. They were just there for a night out. But the PDC embraces this. If they can host Britain's biggest party, they'll do that. And it'll have darts up on stage, but beer being served at the bars as well.

So fancy dress, big night out, heavy drinking all still sounds, if I may say so, still fairly British. I mean, how is it finding a wider audience than that?

There's definitely something undeniably British about the sense of going for a night out, drinking heavily, playing some odd games and then stumbling home. But those things, it turns out, are loved around the world as well. Darts is huge in Europe, especially in Germany and the Netherlands. The best player in the world right now is a man called Michael van Gerwen, who's known as the doyen of Dutch darts, which is a fantastically silly nickname. And he's drawn new fans in from all over the world. The BDC claimed that a third of the tickets from the last World Championship went to German and Dutch fans. And they're also trying to break new markets such as America. Darts isn't unfamiliar to Americans. Soft tip darts, a game played with plastic arrows, is traditionally more popular there. But darts has never really been seen as a spectator sport. It's been played in Las Vegas for a long time. The PDC have a big tournament there, but this year they're going to try and take it to New York. It's the PDC's first event at Madison Square Garden and they're hoping to draw much bigger audiences.

So as the game changes and its perceptions change and it gets this sort of glitzy sheen to it, are the people who are playing changing as well?

Yes, slowly. So you find big characters in all senses of the word playing, and traditionally it is middle aged men throwing the darts. But one of the big stories this year was a woman called Fallon Sherrick who was the first woman to win a game at the World Championship and actually went to the third round. Eventually she took home £25,000 and she's going to become one of the new stars of the sport, I think. And if she can show that women can stand up at the oky and take on men at the dartboard just as well as any other player can, then there's no reason why there shouldn't be more women darts players at the highest level.

Bo, this has been, frankly, all over the board. Thanks for your time.

Thanks, Jason.

That's all for this episode of the Intelligence. If you like us, give us a rating on Apple Podcasts and you can subscribe to the economist@exterator.com radio. Offer 12 issues for $12 or 12 pounds. See you back here tomorrow.