Struck out: A Hamas leader is assassinated

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The Economist.

Hello and welcome to the Intelligence from the Economist. I'm Rosie Blore.

And I'm Jason Palmer. Every weekday we provide a fresh perspective on the events shaping your world.

Nicolas Maduro has declared himself the victor in Victoria, Venezuela's presidential election, giving him a third term in office. But a number of exit polls suggest the opposite result. As protests erupt, our correspondent considers what might happen next.

And it's not only what you cook that can shorten your life. It's how you cook too. In much of the world, open indoor fires are to blame. The good news is that the death rate from household air pollution is falling. The bad is that it's still 4 million deaths a year.

But first, Early this morning, Ismail Haniya, the political leader of hamas, was assassinated. Mr. Haniya was in Tehran for the inauguration of Iran's new president. Hamas called the strike a treacherous Zionist raid. Israel has yet to comment. Just hours earlier, Israeli forces had reportedly killed Fouad Shuka, a senior commander of Hezbollah, the Iranian backed militia based in Lebanon. That followed a weekend rocket attack by Hezbollah which killed 12 young people in the Israel controlled Golan Heights. All of which brings an already tense region to a moment of even greater uncertainty.

Ismail Haniyeh wasn't actually in charge of everything Hamas did. There's some evidence for example, to suggest that he wasn't aware of the October 7th massacre until a few moments before it happened.

Greg Karlstrom is the Economist Middle east correspondent.

But nonetheless, he was the head of the group. He was its most important political figure abroad, and his assassination represents a big loss for Hamas.

That's amazing to hear that. He may not have known about the October 7th attacks. Does that mean he was more of a moderate, relatively speaking?

I wouldn't say he was a moderate. I mean, he's spent months celebrating those same attacks, which killed more than 1200 Israelis. But he was cut out of the loop, according to both Israeli officials and Arab officials that I've spoken to over the past 10 months. He was cut out of the loop in part because Hsinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, was worried about leaks, was worried about terrorism, telling the political bureau outside of Gaza that there was an attack coming. Those people are targets for surveillance by Israeli intelligence and by other intelligence agencies, and therefore it risked the news leaking. But nonetheless, he was someone who was a very important figure in the ceasefire talks with Israel over the past 10 months. He's someone who has been pushing for a while now for Hamas to make a deal to accept the ceasefire and the hostage deal with Israel. He's run into a lot of resistance from people like Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, but he has been a proponent of a deal for a number of months now.

Who do you think is likely to replace him?

It's hard to say. Normally, there would be a process of internal elections to choose a new Hamas leader, but that's going to be very difficult to do right now because so much of the Hamas leadership has either been killed over the past 10 months or is hiding underground in Gaza. People like Sinwar are very, very difficult to contact at this point. So I think temporarily, someone is going to step up and take the job. And I think one likely candidate for that will be Khaled Meshal, who was previously the leader of Hamas. He held Haniyeh's job before Haniyeh did, and he's someone who politically, I think, is somewhat aligned with Haniyeh. He's also someone who I would imagine would push for a ceasefire and would be more in that camp than in Sinwar's camp.

Do you think the timing of this strike was relevant? If Haniyeh had been living somewhat more openly than the other Hamas leaders, why did Israel go after him now?

Haniyeh has been on Israel's hit list since October. I remember speaking to Israeli officials a couple of weeks after the October 7th attack. And they all said they had a list of Hamas officials they intended to assassinate. And Haniyeh was on that list. But he has spent most of his time since October in Qatar, in Doha, where he lives. And that is a place where, I think Israel is reluctant to carry out assassinations. Qatar has been involved in trying to mediate ceasefire talks and a hostage release. They've been a very important diplomatic interlocutor for Israel. And the Israeli government, therefore, has been reluctant to carry out assassinations on their soil and to risk angering the Qatari government. Doing it in Iran is a different story. Obviously, it risks sort of escalation with Iran, Iran, but it's a place where Israel doesn't have the same diplomatic qualms about carrying out assassination. It's carried out a number of them in the past, aimed at both Iranian military leaders and Iranian nuclear scientists. And so there was an opportunity here, I think, because Haniyeh was in Tehran for the inauguration of a new Iranian president, that presented the Israelis an opportunity to do something that they had wanted to do for many months.

But as you say, it was on Iranian soil. Do you think this makes it more likely that Iran may respond directly and attack Israel?

There's certainly a risk of that. This is humiliating for the Iranian government to have someone who was their guest at a presidential inauguration assassinated in a very sort of public fashion just a few hours after that. It's embarrassing, and it points to, I think, how deeply penetrated the Iranian security services are by Israel and by Israel's allies. At the same time, though, Iran has made it very clear over the past 10 months that they don't want to go to war directly, go to war on behalf of Hamas right after October 7th. Hamas was expecting to get very strong support from Iran and from Iran's allies across the region, and they were disappointed at the relatively tepid response from the Iranians. And the only time we'd seen Iran directly attack Israel since October was in April, after Israel assassinated an Iranian general at Iran's consular building in Damascus. So it was an attack on an Iranian on Iranian soil that was what prompted an Iranian response. This time, I think there's going to be an effort to try and downplay this. The Iranian Foreign Ministry put out a statement shortly after the assassination this morning that made a point of not blaming Israel, not attributing blame for this. And I think Iran is going to try to avoid ascribing blame, to take away some of the pressure for a big direct response.

There's been Another provocation as well, which was that just hours before the attack on Haniyeh, Israel also reportedly killed Fouad Shukr, the senior commander of the Iran backed Hezbollah in Lebanon in a strike. How big a victory for Israel was that?

We're still not certain if Shukr is dead. The Israeli army has said that he is. Hezbollah put out a statement on Wednesday morning saying that he had been in the building that was targeted, but not confirming one way or the other whether he was alive or dead. It fears that he was certainly an influential military figure within the organization, someone who was a military advisor to Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, also someone who was wanted by the United States for his role in the bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut in the 1980s. So an important military figure, but of course a military figure who can also be replaced. I don't think killing these sorts of people does irreparable damage to Hezbollah. I think the more important utility in this for Israel is that it sounds a message to Hezbollah that they too are quite penetrated weeks within their security apparatus and that if this guy had a target on his back, probably all of the senior leadership of Hezbollah has a target on its back. And I think that's the message that Israel was trying to send here.

And where does all this leave the ceasefire talks?

It's too early to say. And you could argue it either way. You could say on the one hand that Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, now has a victory image that he could sell to Israeli voters. He could say we've assassinated the leader of Hamas and this gives us an opportunity to go ahead and make at least a temporary cease fire in Gaza. Netanyahu has spent months going back and forth about whether or not he wants to do a deal. He talks about wanting to do one, but he's done a lot to undermine the ceasefire talks in recent months. He could, if he wanted to use this as political cover to do a deal. At the same time, you could say there have been internal tensions within Hamas over a ceasefire. Haniyeh was a strong advocate for a deal. Yahya Sinwar in Gaza has spent months refusing to make a deal. And so killing Haniyeh. Getting rid of an influential advocate for a deal might empower Sinwar, might make him more obstinate, and might make Hamas less willing to agree to a deal. So really not sure yet what the impact is going to be. And I think we have to wait and see who takes his place within Hamas and then what both Israel and Hamas decide to do. In the coming days.

Greg, thank you for your time. Really appreciate it.

Thank you.

In Venezuela yesterday, thousands demonstrated in the capital Caracas for a second day. There are reports that more than 10 people have died across the country and hundreds have been arrested. The uproar followed Sunday's election in which President Nicolas Maduro declared himself the victor, giving him a third term in office. Maduro decried the protests as a massive criminal attack. But Edmundo Gonzalez, the avuncular 74 year old opposition candidate, accused Maduro of rigging the election. All the rules have been violated, said Gonzalez. So why were there fireworks for Maduro and jubilant dancing crowds?

The fireworks and the crowds looked staged. They looked like they had been set up well in advance, ready to celebrate an inevitable victory for Maduro.

Kinley Salmon is the Economist Latin America correspondent.

The vote itself also looked suspicious. Early on we saw the usual signs. There was relatives triumphantly saying they'd won before any results came out. There was sort of wink, wink, nudge, nudge messages from the campaign manager for President Maduro. And there were observers complaining of big worrying irregularities in the count. And there was this long delay. And then the election commission came out and said that Maduro had won with 51% of the vote and Gonzalez got just 44. In the end, they claimed a comfortable victory for Maduro. But frankly, there's little doubt that this election was rigged.

What hard evidence is there for the fact this election was rigged?

The claimed result, frankly, biggest belief. One exit poll by a reputable company put Edmondo Gonzalez's share on the election day at 65%. A thumping victory and miles from the official results. The opposition has also been trying to tally up from individual polling stations what the results might be. And they say similarly that Gonzalez got 70% of the vote. Printed results from every polling station are meant to be available for the opposition to verify, but the government sought to block them doing that at every turn. And they've now gathered, they say, a majority of the polling station results, some 70 plus percent. And they say that those too show a thumping win for Gonzalez. And that fits with other counts. Photos that I've seen of results at polling stations from a representative sample collected by an NGO show Gonzalez also winning by a thumping margin. All of this really leaves only one conclusion.

Okay, so your conclusion is that Maduro didn't actually win at the election. Why don't people like him?

Frankly, Maduro has overseen the ruin of Venezuela. There's been gross mismanagement of the state, oil sector of the economy, private enterprise throttled Rampant inflation for much of his time and power, even if it's fallen down to a still high 50% a year now, there's huge cronyism and corruption. The economy in the eight years to 2021 shrank by three quarters. I mean, these are staggering numbers. And we know he's not popular because a quarter of Venezuelans in the past decade have immigrated because of the misery and despair of life under Maduro. I think there's little doubt that people are utterly fed up.

So how has the opposition responded to the official election results so far?

Well, Maria Corinna Machado, she's the main opposition leader. Even though she was barred from running, she says she will defend the truth of an election won in reality by the opposition. Edmundo Gonzalez, the opposition candidate, declared that we will not rest until the will of the people of Venezuela is respected. He said lies have short legs. Quite strikingly, initially, as these results were announced, Mr. Gonzalez didn't call for mass protests. He seemed to want to avoid feeding the narrative that Maduro's government has spent much of the campaign making up, which is that the opposition is bent on bringing chaos and violence. And so they've been trying to sidestep that and instead focus on building proof that the election was stolen.

So we have nevertheless seen some protests so far. How do you expect those to go? What might the impact of those be?

Well, that's right, there have been pretty notable protests that seem to be spontaneous. They began there was sort of pot banging right across Caracas, a deafening noise of protest, and then people started to come out onto the streets. There were tires burnt, which for a period blocked the road to the main airport in Caracas on Monday. And we saw, I think, most notably people coming down from some of the most populous poor neighborhoods of Caracas, which were once really the bastions of chavismo, of this movement, in protest at the result. We've seen Chavez statues toppled, one of them with the head decapitated, and then dragged through the streets as crowds cheered. These are pretty extraordinary scenes for Venezuela. But look, the regime clearly isn't backing down. They've fought back with arrests, with intimidation. Maduro keeps promising there will be no weakness this time. He's already expelled diplomats from other Latin American countries who've questioned the results. So the stakes are high. The opposition leaders yesterday called for peaceful celebrations in the morning, and the government responded, calling for counter protest immediately afterwards. So the sort of battle for the streets, I think, is only going to accelerate in the coming hours and days.

You say the stakes are high for Venezuela what might the stakes be beyond the country for the region or further afield?

Well, I think they're also very high for the region. I mean, those seven plus million Venezuelans that have left the country in the last decade have for the most part gone into other Latin American countries. In many places they've been welcomed, but of course, that has put huge press on those economies, on society, to integrate those people. That is, of course, increasingly controversial in some places. And it has put pressure on the southern border of the United States of America, where many Venezuelans have also headed. So if there's chaos, and in particular if after that chaos, Maduro is still in power, I think we could expect to see much more of that kind of exodus out of Venezuela.

And what do you think will happen if Maduro clings on?

Well, unfortunately, I think that's still the most likely scenario. The situation, though, is volatile. I think his position is more fragile than it's been for a long time. And the next few days are going to be really crucial. I think, though, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that if he does cling on, it is ordinary Venezuelans that are going to pay the price here in repression and in yet more economic despair.

It sounds pretty bleak.

Well, look, it is. But it's worth saying right through this campaign and this process, I was a skeptic that there was really any chance of a change. I thought that highly unlikely. But I think after the spontaneous protests, there is now just a glimmer of hope that this could be a moment of profound change in Venezuela.

Thank you so much, Kinley. Great to talk to you as always.

Thank you.

Foreign.

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The words air pollution tend to conjure up gray smoke from car exhausts or coal fired power plants. And that kind of pollution clearly is a public health problem. But there's another source of pollution that's killing millions of people around the world, and it's not to be found outside.

Many people around the world don't use stoves to cook. Instead, they heat their food on open fires inside their houses. And the toxic fumes that these fires emit are very damaging for people's health, especially because houses are often poorly ventilated.

Carla Subidana is a digital journalist at the Economist.

And as a result, indoor cooking leads to almost 4 million premature deaths each year, which makes it the third largest cause of early death worldwide. And this affects mostly women and children, because women are more likely to do household chores in the developing world and children are more vulnerable to these harmful smokes.

And presumably this is a bigger problem in the developing rather than the developed world.

Yes, poor countries are the most affected. So, for example, in North Korea, the death rate is 240 people per 100,000. It's the biggest in the world. And then other countries that are affected are the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, both in Oceania, which have rates of 146 and 140. And this is a huge number. So to contrast it, in the Americas, it's only 50 people per 100,000 who are affected, and in the US it's zero. And of course, this is not only a health problem, it also has environmental effects. So cooking with wood is one of the leading causes of deforestation in Africa. The International Energy Agency did a study, and it found that indoor cooking causes deforestation of land the size of Ireland each year.

And I feel like this has been an issue in particular in the developing world for some time. What's being done to address it?

Luckily, the number has been falling in recent years, mostly thanks to progress in Asia. So governments in China, Indonesia and India have cut the rates of extreme poverty in recent years, and this has has allowed them to subsidize cleaner cooking methods. So these three countries have more than half the number of people relying on dirty fuel since 2010. But in Africa, it remains a big problem.

And why is that? Why has Africa not caught up with the other countries that have been trying to address this?

Well, in part, it's because the population is growing very fast. So between 2010 and 2022, the share of people in sub Saharan Africa using cleaner cooking fuels increased from 8% to more than 50%. But at the same time, the total number of people without access to these cleaner methods rose by 220 million. But the main problem is a lack of funding. So it's not very expensive to subsidize cleaner cooking fields. But international organizations say that governments have never made this a real priority. And with the debt burdens rising so much in recent years, the situation is getting worse. And then a final reason is sex discrimination. So women are more at risk, but in most households, men control their finances, so investing in cleaner methods is just not a priority.

And you said that the sort of headline numbers seem to be getting better. I mean, what needs to happen for those numbers to get better more widely?

Well, the main thing is that fundraising should pick up both from Western countries and from the African governments. So on the positive side, there has been some progress recently. In May, the International Energy Agency organized the first Clean Cooking Forum, and it managed to raise more than $2 billion from countries all around the world. So Norway and the US Gave huge amounts of money, although this is only a fraction of what is needed. Maybe this means that the issue is coming further up the global agenda, but this should happen quickly because otherwise millions of people will continue to die.

Karla, thank you very much for your time.

Thank you very much, Jason.

That's all for this episode of the Intelligence. Subscribers can listen to the Intelligence and all of our shows ad free on the Economists app. Let us know what you think of the show. You can get in touch@podcastseconomist.com we'll see you back here tomorrow.