Dr Greg Bahnsen - Critical Thinking: Fallacies Part 2 (Part 9)

Okay, before we change the tape, we were on number nine pointing out that the expression the end is equivocated upon two different senses are given to it. The end of a thing is its perfection, means the purpose of a thing is what makes it perfect. Death is the end of life means not the purpose, but rather the terminal point, the end point. And so to say that death is the profession of life is cute conclusions, but drawn from an equivocation on the term. Okay, let's look at number 13. If you can tie a knot, you can make a beautiful deep pile rug.

I said this one was fastest composition. Just because you can do one part of the other one, you can make the whole thing.

I agree. It's something. True of a part must be true of the whole. Good. Number 15. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor. What fallacy could arise from this?

That could definitely be a case of accident.

Yes. In fact, you've probably heard people do that. The Bible says you shall not bear false witness against your neighbor, but you can go ahead and bear false witness against people that live across town or in another state or something. Right. So this is not a fallacy in itself. It could lead to a fallacy depending on how you accented. So you missed the point. Okay, let's take one more of these. Number 19. You have believed a lie that you cannot get. Well, the truth will make you free. Love nature. She is gentle and holy. To obey her is to live.

Hypostatization.

Hypostatization.

I'll get that Right.

Yeah. Okay, What. What term is hypostatized?

Nature.

Nature. That's right. Treating a series of events as though it were a concrete entity. All right, that's enough. On the fallacies of ambiguity, let's look at how Engel summarizes the fallacies of presumption. And you will find the summary on pages 120 to 122, where there's a similar chart that lays it out very nicely for us. Here he gives just the individual fallacies, which I want to look at, and then I want to look at the way he breaks them into different categories. First of all, the fallacy of sweeping generalization. Applying a fair generalization, one that is usually true to an exceptional case, by ignoring the peculiarities of the case, it is treating a generalization like what was universally true rather than just generally true. Here's the example. Since horseback riding is helpful exercise, Harry Brown ought to do more of it because it will be good for his heart condition. Well, to say that in general, horseback writing as a healthy exercise doesn't mean that it's universally true, just means it's generally true. So when you say that a person with heart condition should do it, that doesn't necessarily follow. Everyone understand the sweeping generalization. It treats the generalization as though it were a universal truth instead of a general truth. There are exceptions to generalizations. Now, hasty generalization is the opposite. Instead of moving from a generalization to a particular, this moves from a particular to a generalization using insufficient evidence or an isolated example as the basis for a widely general conclusion. And so here's the example. I had a bad time with my former husband. From that I've learned that all men are no good. That's a hasty German that's too quick to generalize because you haven't got enough evidence here. Or you may have evidence of unique cases. You can't tell, so you shouldn't have generalized. Everyone understands sweeping and hasty generalization in the different direction they move. Hasty means taking a few examples that may be unique and treating them as though they're the general rule. Sweeping generalization is treating the generalization as something more than a general truth, that as a sweeping or universal truth. The next fallacy of presumption is bifurcation. I've always called this false antithesis, by the way. I don't know if that helps you at all, but it's laying out this or that as though those were the only options. He calls it bifurcation, considering a distinction or classification, exclusive and exhaustive when other alternatives exist. Notice he says other names for it. Either or fallacy, Black and white fallacy, false dilemma. No, I didn't put down false antithesis. That's the way I like to call it. Anyway, here's an example. You're either for me or against me. Is that true? Let's forget Jesus for a minute right now. Is that true? No. I might. I'm asking you to support my candidacy for student body presidency, either for me or against me. Well, no, as a matter of fact, I might be against your candidacy, but very much in favor of you. I mean, I like your Supreme. I just don't think you'll be a good president. Okay, people get the feeling we say this either or false antithesis sort of thing. Now, when Jesus said this, he who is not for me is against me. Of course that is true. In terms of your ultimate commitment in life, you're either going to be following Jesus or you're not following because he doesn't take anything less than wholehearted Single minded devotion. In that case, it's not a false antithesis. Do we see here again how fallacies are affected by one's worldview and presupposition? Begging the question in three forms. First of all, one can offer as a premise a simple restatement of the desired conclusion. A because of where B is the same as A. That circular reasoning on your outline I think is what I put it to help distinguish it. Miracles are impossible because they cannot happen. Well, impossible and cannot happen mean the same thing, so that's not much of an argument. Here's another form of begging the question. A circular argument, more complex than one, but eventually justifying the conclusion with itself. A because of B, where B is dependent on A. And here he gives us an example. God exists. How do you know? The Bible says so. How do you know what the Bible says? It's the word of God. That is a form of circular reasoning as well, where it's not based on the terms mean the same thing. But what you're appealing to depends on your conclusion being true. In a third form, subsuming a suspect particular under a generalization that is even more problematic, A because of B, where B is even more suspect than A. The evidence you cite to prove a conclusion should be more certain than the conclusion itself. Clearly he's an atheist. He's a philosopher, isn't he? Which depends on what? The wider generalization that all philosophers or atheists. Okay, another fallacy presumption is the question baking epithet. This is not treated separately by Kofi using strongly emotional language to force home an otherwise unsupported conclusion. As you build into the way you describe the situation of the person, the very thing you're supposed to be proving. So it's question begging, by the way you emotionally slant your description. The scheming, bigoted efforts of the Board of Education have finally come to fruition. Well, it also calls mudslinging, name calling using slanted jargon, whatever. Notice that the question begging epithet doesn't have to be negative, it can also be positive. The eulogistic epithet. Surely there can be no question. Ed's our man, he's just a great guy. So you don't prove the point here, you just redescribe Ed with that slanted language. Okay, now the complex question which we studied before, the interrogative form of begging the question. That is, you ask the question in such a way that you're assuming something one way or the other without having to support it. The purported question bringing an assumption with it that needs to be Questioned. Notice he puts here do not call an example a complex question unless it has a question mark in it. Complex question only appears in the form of a question. Is what he thinks. Well, some people get mixed up. You have to remember we've already been taught that grammatical form is not the same as function. But here it is specifically a question that veils the begging of the issue. Why is it that women are more interested in religion than men? Well, first of all, is that true? And then what's the answer to the. I mean, how do you explain it if it is shouldn't be taken for granted. Special pleading. I love this one. Applying a double standard that is exemplified in the choice of words. Horses sweat, men perspire, women glow. Like conjugating an irregular verb. Right? I am firm, you are what has it. No, no, you are stubborn. He is pig headed. Something like that. That's special pleading. Not looking at it the same way. Looking at things impartially, but applying a different standard to yourself. It might be helpful for me to point out my work in evangelical theology, apologetics and ethics would lead me to say, as a generalization and I don't think a hasty one, that probably this is the most common fallacy committed by theologians and amateur theologians who wannabe theologians who think they can criticize something. And you come back and say, well now, did you apply that standard to your own school of thought or to yourself? And let me ask you a few questions and you find out that it's a pure case of special pleading. Well, I'll get off the subject by giving you an example. Just I want to warn you that Christians are real prone to double standards.

What is the difference between part begging the question number three and.

The ad.

Hominem of origin or circumstance in the way it's presented?

Begging the question number three says you subsume a suspect particular under a generalization that is even more problematic. You can't prove a point by arguing from the obscure to the more obscure. That's not the same as looking at the circumstances. Okay, turn the page. We have another fallacy of presumption and false analogy. Reaching a conclusion by likening or comparing two significantly incomparable cases. And you take some slight comparison and make that the basis for an argument. But it doesn't. It's not really significant, or it doesn't prove similarity in the relevant way in which the argument would require. Typically, the two cases used will be similar, but not in the respect that would warrant the conclusion in question. And he gives the an example. How can you Tell your children not to take money from others when the government they live under does it all the time. Assuming what? That there's an analogy between what stealing, between children taking money from others stealing and what the government does through legitimate taxation. There is a trifling comparison. Money is exchanging hands, but not in the relevant respect. And that's kind of like saying that in the Old Testament, a bride price was paid, a dowry was paid for a bride, and the civil government fines were assessed or restitution had to be made. Therefore your daughter can that marriage was seen as a form of criminal penalty. There's an analogy, but not in the relevant respect. Okay. False cause is the fallacy of presumption, inferring a causal link between two events when no such causal connection has been established. And he uses this, his key example sequence alone is no proof of consequence, which is the one that we're familiar with, post hoc ergo propter hoc or whatever the Latin is after this. Therefore, because of this as example, have you noticed how the sales went up after we instituted our new advertising campaign? Our success is obvious. Well, there may be a causation here, but it's not going to be proven just by the sequence, the temporal sequence. Now, on the outline that I gave you, you will notice I gave three forms of false cause there at the bottom. Coincidence, succession and common cause via false cause in the form of coincidence, where it's just A. It just so happens happens that two things are happening at the same time. That doesn't mean that they were affecting each other. Succession is the one that we've been talking about. Usually that it happened after this and therefore that caused it. Then common cause is another form of false cause where what you have is one thing causing two things to happen. Let's say that A causes B and C. Since B and C are always found together, we assume. Well, then B must have caused C when in fact B and C were separately caused by A. So that's what I meant by those three different versions of false cause. Copy and Engel only give you one of those, the sequence version or succession version of it.

I think Engel does discuss this.

Oh, does he?

I'm pretty sure he does.

Oh, okay, well, good. It's if I've forgotten that. And look at the section on false cause and see if he gives you all diversions in the summary. I notice he only gives you the sequence one. Let's move ahead. Slippery slope. The slippery slope is assuming unjustifiably that a proposed step will set off an undesirable and uncontrollable chain of events without justification. Assuming that taking one step means you're going to have to all sorts of steps, you might think, boy, you better not eat one burrito at Taco Bell, Dr. Bronson, because if you do, then you'll eat everything that they have there and you'll blow up. And no one would take that seriously. But that is a version of slippery slope. You know, you take one step, who knows, you might be able to stop. Let's look at his example and see if you have any questions. His example of slippery slope is today it's abortion, tomorrow it will be the mentally ill and then the infirm and the aged or anyone else considered undesirable. That slippery slope, because it takes for granted that abortion is not something that is done in itself, but is done only as the first step in a sequence. And therefore to take the first step means you're going to have to take all the other steps. You'll end up killing anybody. That's undesirable. Now, is slippery slope fallacious argument. What's it going to depend on? Well, in some cases it's going to depend upon your presuppositions about man, morality, about the nature of the world and things like that. Many slippery slope arguments are fallacious. I would even say this one about abortion, if you don't supply some other premises, is fallacious. The fact that a person believes in abortion does not mean that they are committed to wiping out anybody undesirable. But what we would argue, we could add some stuff to it to make that a good argument. And I think it is a good argument when you say if the principle that is taken away when you allow abortion is the respect for human life, once you remove that principle, you may not be willing to go all the way, but logically you have no reason to stop because you have just eliminated the reason why we don't kill anybody undesirable. Now do you see how it becomes not a fallacious, but a legitimate and I think a cogent argument? What we want to say is this must eventuate in that. No, what we're going to say is logically there's no reason to keep from going that way. And whether society moves that way or not would be another matter. And then finally we have the irrelevant thesis again. And I think we've had a little bit of confusion on that, so let's make sure we get it. Irrelevant thesis seeking, perhaps succeeding to prove a conclusion that's not at issue. And he says it can Take the form of either attacking someone else's claim irrelevantly. Like instead of proving your position, what you do is you show that someone else's position is bad. If a political candidate says, my opponent's program for helping the poor is full of holes, when what he was supposed to show is that he has a very good cogent program, he has not done that. That's an irrelevant thesis for the purposes at hand. Or secondly, defending a claim of one's own irrelevantly. So I'd like to prove that my program for helping the poor is a good one. And. And then you go on to give argument that shows that helping the poor is a good idea. That's your own thesis, but it's irrelevant to what you were supposed to be proving. An example of irrelevant thesis. The advocates of conservation contend that if we adopt their principles, we will be better off than if we did not adopt them. They are mistaken. For it is easy to show that conservation will not produce an Eden on earth. Well, it may not produce an Eden on earth, but we might still be better off with those principles than others. So that's irrelevant thesis. The second example, I fail to see why hunting should be considered cruel when it gives tremendous pleasure to many people and employment to even more. Well, I mean. But cruel things can give tremendous pleasure and employment to people. So you haven't proven your point at all here. It's an irrelevant thesis, much like missing the point point. You're not on the mark here. You're not on the real question. Before we do the exercise that having to do with fallacies and presumption, I would like to point out something about Engel's way of outlining and the difference that you have in the outline I've given you. First of all, you'll notice that under Fallacies of Relevance. Excuse me, Fallacies of Presumption, I have only two divisions, overlooking the facts and distorting the facts. Engel has three divisions. He has overlooking the facts, evading the facts, and distorting the facts. So the difference between Engel and Bahnsen's categorizations is that he has overlooking the facts and evading the facts. I only have overlooking. So the first thing we have to ask is, is there a difference between overlooking the facts and evading the facts? I find that a rather arbitrary distinction isn't evading and overlooking about the same thing. And when I look at the way he describes him in general, I still don't see that there's any great difference. His justification for that division is found on page 134 of your text. He says, in the second category, the fallacies of presumption, the error lies not in overlooking the facts, as in the first category, but in seeming to deal with all relevant facts without actually doing so. Which comes down to saying you've overlooked the facts, although it. It looked like you didn't, or it seemed like you didn't. And I just didn't think that was a big enough difference to qualify as a separate category. Again, cutting the cake is somewhat arbitrary for purposes, but I just couldn't follow him in that. And so that's why your outline is a little bit different. I think it's easier if you're trying to memorize this. Catch on. Someone overlooks the facts of certain sorts. Someone distorts the facts. And so I like to put it that way. And thus we have overlooking the facts about the uniqueness of things, about the options that are available, or overlooking the facts as a shortcut to your conclusion, like don't even bother to look at the facts, which he calls evading the facts. I think that's just another way of overlooking them as a shortcut. Now, there's one other difference you may want to notice here. As he creates his category of evading the facts that I think is just a version of overlooking the fact. He includes the fallacy of special pleading. And he has not convinced me that that's the most convenient place to put that fallacy on your outline. You'll see that I've put special pleading under the category of uniqueness, overlooking the facts about uniqueness. Now, this overlooks the facts about uniqueness in the sense that it affirms a uniqueness that doesn't exist. I'm in the unique situation. I specially plead for my case. I don't sweat, I glow. I never get angry. I'm always just indignant. Okay, so we have a special. Special pleading, meaning that you put yourself in a special category. So it seemed to me that it fits better to put that under overlooking the facts about uniqueness, whereas Engel puts it in evading the facts.

In the.

Same way that you're engaged in question begging. I can see a similarity between evading. Excuse me. A similarity between special pleading and question begging. But I think it's more. People engage in special pleading more because they think they're unique or there's an exception for them. So anyway, I do prefer my outline. But I want you to see that there's a difference between us. Now let's look at some exercises having to do with fallacies of presumption. And as we answer them, however, we'll answer in terms of Engels breakdown, not the one that you have here. I've just explained to you my outline and why I think it may be advantageous. But for our exercises, we'll follow his procedure. All right, let's begin on page 132, where Engel has his first subset of fallacies of presumption. He says identify the fallacy of presumption. It's either going to be sweeping generalization, hasty generalization, or bifurcation. Well, you can hardly miss it. Take a guess and have a 33% chance of getting it right. So I'll have to call on you to explain it. Okay, let's begin with number three. If we're going to buy a car, we have to buy either a good one or a cheap one. We can't afford a good one and we don't want a cheap one, so we'll just have to do without a car. What fallacies committed there?

Bifurcation.

Bifurcation.

A good and cheap are not incompatible terms necessarily.

They aren't opposite, or might we want to say both are relative terms, and so it's not either. Or you might find one that's fairly inexpensive but still kind of good, not absolutely good, not absolutely inexpensive. So, yes, it is what I call the false antithesis, a false either or here. Another way of putting the answer is there's a third alternative. An inexpensive car that isn't great, but it's okay. Number 12, they just don't care about traffic law enforcement in this town, so they let ambulances go at any speed they like and let them run red lights, too. I love it. What they cared about if they wouldn't let those handbrake do that. What fallacy are we talking about here?

I said hasty generalization. I thought they applied a case.

Hasty generalization. Oh, they're taking the case that ambulances are allowed to run red lights and then generalizing that they just don't care about law enforcement. Is it hasty or is it a sweeping generalization? Sweeping generalization that there's a speed law out here that should be kept and so ambulances should be keeping it as though they're not an exception to the rule. I suppose you could look at it either way, couldn't you.

Using an isolated example of the basis for a widely general conclusion.

But what lies behind this seems to me the idea, the understanding that traffic laws are universal rather than general. So I'm not going to say, you know, that that's wrong to say you could look at it either way. We all get the point, though. Obviously ambulances are an exception to the rule. So if you're gonna. If you're gonna take the ambulance example and generalize, then you have a hasty generalization. Or if you're going to expect that traffic laws have no exceptions, though ambulances are not an exception, then you have a sweeping generalization.

Actually, I took it to mean that they don't care about traffic laws because they let traffic do that.

Okay, so in that case, it would be hasty generalization. 15. Let me warn you that you will find in the world a certain few scoffers who will laugh at you and attend to do you injury. They will tell you that John D. Rockefeller was a thief, that Henry Ford and other great men are also thieves. Do not believe them. The story of Rockefeller and of Ford, the story of every great American. You should strive to make it your story. Like them, you were born poor and on a farm. Liked them by honesty and industry you cannot fail to succeed. Well, you can get really worked up on this. What's the fallacies of is degeneration? Okay, explain.

Because he's saying, well, they were poor and on a farm you're poor and on a farm, therefore you can succeed because they succeeded.

Yeah. Or what you're taking is a couple of illustrations of poor boys who made good and saying, okay, any poor boy can make good. Well, that's a real hasty generalizing from what may be very unique illustrations for all we know. Okay, let's turn to page 147. Looking at Engel's second division of fallacies of presumption. He says, identify the fallacy begging the question. Question begging epithet, complex question or special pleadings that is committed and explained. And we'll begin with number 21. The world was not created by God, for Master has always existed and therefore the world must have always existed. I've heard unbelievers say that kind of thing. What is the fallacy here?

Begging the question.

Begging the question. Exactly. If God created the world, then matter is not eternal, has not always existed. So that's taking for granted what's supposed to be proven. Are on the other side.

This here.

Let's jump to number 33. This measure ought to be deplored by all right thinking people. Question begging epithet. And why is that so? I agree with you.

Go ahead and see why it was so.

Help me push it out. No, in other words, you didn't understand the answer.

I didn't understand necessarily why it was More advantageous.

But that's what this form is all about, is seeing why it's assigned to it. It's a question begging epithet. Because here you have slanted language being used to beg the question. To say that to take my side on this, to deplore this measure, is to be a right thinking person. That assumes that you are right in what you're saying. And so you're saying anybody who's right thinking will agree with me. Well, instead of proving that you're right, you're just saying that you should agree with me because I'm right.

It's inspiring.

Weren't you.

Flying implying what somebody ought.

To do based upon. It's implying that I am right and right thinking people will agree with me. That if you're a right thinking person, you'll agree with me. That assumes that you're right. You're supposed to be proving that you're right. Why should you agree with me because you want to be right thinking. Well, but are you right? That's the question. So, yes, it is a question of making epithets. Okay, one more. Number 36. Let's stock up before the hoarders get here. It's kind of funny, isn't it? People stocking up before others get there. Usually what you call hoarding, isn't it? Anyway, let's stock up before the hoarders.

I thought that the question bringing epithet too, because they're. I said it because they're kind of like mud springs.

I don't think it's so much a question begging epithet. Because it's not as though he's assuming. Well, no, he is. I don't want to put it that way. Calling them hoarders might seem like a. A question begging way of doing it, but it's really special pleading. You're doing the same thing. You're doing the same thing. They are. They're hoarders. You're stocking up. Okay. Yeah, exactly. Okay, now turn to page 167 for his third category of fallacies of Presumption. He says identify the fallacy. False analogy, false cause. Wolfrey, sweet or irrelevant thesis? Oh, you know, irrelevant thesis is another difference in our outlines I should have told you about a few moments ago. I put irrelevant thesis under fallacies of relevance. I think it should be obvious why to do that as you're not on the point. One is irrelevant appeal, trying to cite evidence that's not really evident and the other is an irrelevant conclusion arguing for something that's not on the point. Whereas Engel makes This a fallacy of presumption. And again, he was my teacher and I, you know, I don't have a book out like he does, so there's reason to respect him. But I do think I'm right in this case. It's easier to think of irrelevant conclusion as a fallacy of relevance than a fallacy of presumption. But for these exercises we will use toothbrake. False analogy, false cause, slippery slope or irrelevant thesis. One of those four. And let's take number 42. An electrical power failure in the Southwest is eminent. UFOs have been seen over Boulder Dam just as they were seen over the Niagara Powerhouse shortly before the great New England blackout. What fallacy is that?

False cause.

False cause. Right. UFOs were seen prior to something over here, so UFOs caused it. Now we've seen UFOs in another place. So they're going to cause this as well. Exactly. False cause. Of course, there are also problems in that you're accepting the validity of the sighting of a ufo. But even if you grant that, this argument's not a good argument. Okay, number 45. How can nuclear energy be so bad if it is our best source of energy?

I said that was an irrelevant thesis because just because it's our best source of energy doesn't mean that it's good.

Exactly. So you're proving one thing when you're supposed to be proving another. Supposed to be proving that it's not bad when what you really prove it that it's the best source. Shall we stop for a minute on that one, Pat? Do you understand irrelevant thesis yet? It's when you're arguing for something that's not on point. And here the person trying to say how can nuclear energy be so bad, they're trying to prove that nuclear energy is not bad. And they do so by saying it's our best source of energy. So there. It's not bad. Well, being the best source source doesn't prove that it's not bad though. And now number 51. I look upon Franz Place, which is a legal brothel in Nye County, Nevada. I look upon Franz Place as a kind of insurance policy for the safety of young women and children in this area. As long as there is a kind of safety valve, sort of a place where men can go to. My 15 year old daughter Hillary can walk home at night in perfect safety. The argument is I support a legal brothel so that there'll be a place that men can go to satisfy their sexual urges and therefore my daughter can be safe when she walks home at night. What's wrong with this argument? Slippery slopes? No, I don't think so. But why don't you explain what the slippery slope is?

Well, he's saying if one thing is one factor is eliminated, therefore all factors are eliminated. His wife can walk home safely from without actually worry about being sexually threatened. But he's excluding all the other things.

That are involved in safety. I agree with you.

Eliminating one crime and all the rest.

Yeah, I. Well, okay. I don't think the person's saying that if we eliminate one crime, all the rest will fall away. And even if you were, that wouldn't be slippery slope. Slippery slope is if you take this step, you'll have to take a lot of other steps as well. And he's not saying if we legalize prostitution, then we're going to have to take all these other steps. Actually, it's the opponent of prostitution that would be inclined to commit the slippery slope fallacy. If you do this, then what's next? Then we're going to have child abuse and other sorts of things. That would be a slippery slope argument. This really is not slippery slope at all. What is the problem here? I agree with you that the person's thinking incorrectly. But why is it incorrect?

I had it as a false analogy.

That's exactly what it is. See if you understood why.

Because he compares a brothel with a safety, though, and the brothel is not a safety valve or as an insurance policy.

Let me expand on it and try to show what's buried in this. It's a good illustration. I think it's a false analogy between rape and prostitution. That is to say, his daughter is safe from rapists because men who want to have sex can go to a prostitute. As though frequenting a house of prostitution is the same kind of thing or the same kind of defect of personality or morality as rape, which it is not. As a matter of fact, houses of prostitution either encourage rapists to pay for their crimes or do not satisfy rapists at all. Now, granted, rape is not mentioned there, but what is being thought here is that there's an analogy between the rapist who might get his daughter and the man who goes to the brothel. It's a false analogy. Now, if you want to say a house of prostitution is like a safety valve, that's a false analogy. It really is based upon another kind of analogy that is a false one that I would see more as literary or rhetorical illustration. But the two tie together in one sense. A house of prostitution is not like a safety vow. Because it is not draining off the sexual energy of rape. It's only draining off the sexual energy of men who are willing to pay. So either way, you're right. False analogy.

Also, along with the false analogy, isn't there sort of a false cause is assuming, well, my daughter can walk home in safety because we've got this brothel place?

Well, that would be arguing that since we opened the brothel, women have been safe, therefore opening the brothel caused them to be safe. But that isn't what he says here. So there's no false cause he's arguing and faith of the measure as for its prospective value.

Because I figured I put down this false analogy, but I also quite put down a question mark about the false cause because it seemed to me that the place was there and he was saying.

He was implying that, yeah, you'd really have to have more in there, stated, not implied, in order to accuse him a false cause. He's not making a historical remark here. Okay, now page 171. Putting all of these together, all the categories together, identify the fallacy presumption that's committed in or could result from each of the following. Let's take 54. Since education results in improvement, everyone, irrespective of ability, should be given the advantage of a higher education.

I said that was sweeping generalization because just because it generally might be so doesn't mean it's universal. And that educational always resulting.

Sweeping generalization, you said, okay, takes the generalization that education results in improvement and applies it to a case that may be a special one, that is irrespective of ability, everyone should give it. Well, maybe some people are so ignorant that education will not be able to help them, although it generally does help them. That the form of your argument. Is that what he said, by the way, did you check? Is that what he said as well? Good.

He also made mention of the fact that there is a bit of a difference between education, education I.e. grades 1 through 12, and higher education. In other words, education in terms of general education might help somebody, but a specific higher education might not do anybody any good.

So that would still be sweeping generalization, saying something in a general sense and then trying to apply it to unique categories. Or would that be hasty generalization, saying what's true of elements? Elementary school is true of college and everything else. Again, it all depends on what you think the direction of a person's thought is. It's not going to be important when you get out in the world and you start analyzing arguments. The point is you're going to be able to tell better than the illustration here will give you and so you don't have to don't get all hesitant and so much well, it's just sweeping or is this hasty sweeping? Make sure you understand the direction of the argument and then just use the appropriate term 57 why isn't a nice person like you married? It's.

Question begging epithet because he's assuming that nice people are married well then.

It'S not a question begging epithet. He's not trying to prove complex question there's two questions here basically well let me think.

Well because it's not he's not asking her are you a nice person Right. That's why I said it was a.

Question bringing emphasis or it may be taking it may be question begging it may be complex question because it's by implication saying you're not a nice person because all nice people are married so I'm asking why in your case it.

Can go both ways.

Yeah again it's a slight difference what does he say? I probably should have looked at it this way 57 is that the number? He says it's complex question this question implies that only nice people are married. Huh. Good. But I do think that in a sense a question begging epithet in there and if you're saying this person's not nice by this it's a complex question.

Could it be a sweeping generalization that all nice people are married therefore yes.

It could be all of this are related in that the same kind of mental mistake or reasoning sake is made but it has to the specific form of putting two issues into one question so it's a complex question but it.

Could be considered an insult too and consider maybe the person doesn't want to be married nice person could be married and you're not a nice person.

Yeah that's what tempted me to think maybe Jay was right in calling it a question begging epithet but the point is you have to read nice person as sarcastic in order to make it question begging epithet and it's not so I mean the nice person here I don't think is sarcastic certainly not in explicit semantic sense 57 now 60 the United States had justice on its side in waging this war to question this would give comfort to our enemies and would therefore be unpatriotic irrelevant thesis irrelevant thesis the fact that it would get cut comfort to our enemies doesn't prove that we were just in what we were doing. This is not the best answer but I'm wondering indirectly if it's not also A form of appeal to the mob. Emotional appeal. We haven't gotten into those with anyone yet.

What about slippery slope? That to question this would give comfort to our enemies and would therefore be unpatriotic.

Those are not separate things. Giving comfort to our enemies is what's called unpatriotic. That's not like a third step down the line. That is just a way of describing giving comfort to our enemies. So it's not flippish slope. Okay, now let's look at Engel's third category, which are fallacies of relevance, and you'll find a nice summary on page 186. His fallacies of relevance are the genetic fallacy, abusive ad hominem, circumstantial ad hominem, tu quoque, poisoning the well. Mob of and we'll do our exercises. Genetic fallacy, he says, is attacking a thesis, institution or idea by condemning its background or origin. Example, America will never settle down. Look at the rabble rousers who founded it. Attacking an institution because of its genesis, its origin. The abusive ad hominem, attacking the character of the opposing speaker rather than his thesis. He should clearly not be our leader. He's admitted to being homosexual. Remember my lecture, though? I said, well, by itself that is fallacious. But if you could go on to show that there's a connection between his perversion and the thesis and so forth that he's arguing for, then maybe that isn't fallacious. Circumstantial ad hominem. Attacking the opposing speaker by implying vested interest. Sure, he opposes rent control. He owns two apartment buildings, doesn't he? It's kind of like, well, he must be rationalizing them. Two quoque. Attempting to show that an opponent does not act in accord with his or her thesis, which is fallacious if it means to prove that the thesis is in fact false. But it's a legitimate consideration from the standpoint of Christian morality. When you say you ought to live by the same rules you're preaching, you ought to take the log out of your own eyes before you take the speck out of mine. Anyway, how can she tell me to exercise more when I know that all she does is sit behind a desk? Well, okay, so she's not morally in a position to give this criticism, but maybe you should exercise more anyway. Poisoning the well, attempting to preclude discussion by attacking the credibility of an opponent in his explanation. Remember in the chapter, Engel points out that you poison the well when you've cut off your opponent from any possibility of a defense because anything he Says will be an. People will tend to look upon that as showing that he's doing the very thing you say. If I say, you know, you talk too much. And then you try to say, really I don't. So there you go, you're talking some more. You talk too much. I poisoned the well. His example. This man has lied his way out of far tougher situations than this. Why should we listen to him? The poor guy tries to respond, yeah, you're just lying some more. You poisoned the well against him. Because there's no way out. And that's unfair because you're not considering the evidence. Mob appeal. Using emotion laden terminology to switch people en masse. I appeal to you as the most downtrodden and abused people on this earth. Rise up and follow me. Mob appeal. Try and have this emotional appeal so that the crowd will follow you. Appeal to pity. Seeking to persuade not by presenting evidence, but by arousing pity. I don't think we need to spend time on that. That's easy. Appeal to authority. Seeking to persuade not by giving evidence, but by citing an authority. And then he has various kinds. The appeal to the one that is one person as the authority. Or appeal to the many. That would be a statistical kind of thing. How could 6 million Americans be wrong? Appeal to the select few. That's the snob appeal. I mean, if you want to be one of the hoity toity, then you ought to do this. And then four, appeal to tradition, which is another form of authority. Finally, appeal. No, there's two more. Appeal to ignorance. Emphasizing not evidence for a thesis, but lack of evidence against it. There must be extraterrestrial life. No one has proven there isn't. And he points out those are almost always reversible arguments. No one has proven that there is, so there mustn't be. And then appeal to fear. And I don't know why he separates that from the appeal to pity and mob appeal. But he has seeking to persuade through fear. The threat that Santa Claus will not bring the presents if you don't go to bed on time and so forth. The way in which I've organized these will hopefully help you remember them a little bit better. The outline that I gave you we have irrelevant of appeals and irrelevant thesis. The irrelevant thesis we've already discussed. Not arguing on point. Irrelevant appeal can be to emotion, to authority, to ignorance, or against the man himself. And then you have various kinds of emotion. Harm, the appeal to force, pity, the appeal to sympathy, popular emotion. The mob appeal. The various kinds of authority. Irrelevant expertise would Be the one. That's what Engel calls the one. Tradition is the same as he calls tradition. Bandwagon is what he calls the many. Sometimes it's called irrelevant appeal to the bandwagon or the consensus appeal. We're all agreed there's so many people behind this measure, it can't be wrong. And then the snob appeal is what he calls appealing to the select few. And then to ignorance is clearing up the ad hominem breaks down into abusive, genetic, circumstantial, poisoning the well and tu quoque. So when a person is trying to support a conclusion in an irrelevant way, he or she will appeal to emotion, authority, ignorance, or against the person. Now let's do a few exercises. Page 221.

I have a question.

Go ahead.

How much different is poisoning the well from abusive ad hominem?

Poisoning the well is specifically an attempt to cut off any possibility of an answer rather than saying that a person has a bad character, saying, well, he's a communist, so you can't believe what he says. Poisoning the well is an attempt to show that if he answers, the only answer he can give you is poison. I mean, you've made the. There's no source of an answer a communist could appeal. He said, okay, well, I'll just, I'll quote capitalist authors to prove my point. You haven't cut him off from an answer by calling him a communist. You've just disparaged his character. When you poison the well, it, more specifically, it tightens it. More than that, any, any move the guy makes is going to be suspect because of what you said about it. And that these are all very subtle differences, by the way, is seen in the fact that Kofi does not distinguish them. Do you remember Copie puts poisoning the well under abusive ad hominem. And so this is another way of speaking of it. So what you have in the case of Engel, it's kind of like if you go into one paint store, you notice they have 80 different colors. You go into another paint store, they may have 240 because they've drawn sharper distinctions of shades and so forth. And so what you have in Kopi is you have the 80 paint swatches and angle gives you 240. So you are right, they're very related. But if you want to draw that subtle distinction, I think it would be drawn the way I've just given you. Okay, page 221. Let's do a few of these and then call it a day. We are asked to identify the Fallacy of relevance, which is going to be one of the personal attack, mob appeal, appeal to fitting, appeal to authority, appeal to ignorance, or appeal to fear. Mistake number four. Know if you don't mind losing a tire, going off the road and maybe killing yourself, you don't need a new tire. Look, does that prove that you need a new tire in a fallacious way?

Yeah, it's appealing to fear, saying that you're going to die if you don't do this.

That's right. The appeal to fear. Is the appeal to fear legitimate? Sometimes. If it is the case that without a new tire you're going to go off the road and maybe kill yourself, it seems to me that's a legitimate thing to say. That it doesn't by itself prove that you need a new tire, that I can make you scared that there's the possibility you'll die. Number eight, Congress shouldn't bother to consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff about military appropriations. As members of the armed forces, they will naturally want as much money for military purposes as they think they can get. What kind of fallacy is it.

They use? It's a fallacy. Abusive ad hominem.

Not abusive. It's not saying they have a bad character.

Circumstantial.

Circumstantial. The same. Given their circumstances, of course they would say that. All right, number 12. All loyal Americans will deplore the passage of this bill.

That sounds to me like a. Either an appeal to authority because all loyal all Americans will deploy, or more likely appeal to mob appeal.

It's mob appeal. Exactly. Because the mob is going to be stirred up by thoughts of loyalty. Number 12. Oh, that's the one we just did. Number 20. I'm on probation, so if I don't get a good grade in this course, I won't be able to stay in school. Please, could you let me have at least a C?

The appeal to pity.

No fooling, rather blatant, right? It's like, I deserve a C because it's pitiful if I don't get one and you should pity me in this situation. Number 32, Black says, well, anyway, when we're silent, nobody is playing games. White. Silence itself may be a game. Red. Nobody was playing games today. White. But not playing games may itself be a game.

That's an appeal to ignorance because they're talking about something that isn't proven because it's not proven. So it must be because white is arguing that way.

Yeah, I do think that's the thrust of it. This was a tricky one. When I looked at it last evening, but I think it comes down to saying, well, we don't know otherwise. So maybe not playing a game is a game. So it's kind of like you can't show that it wasn't. So maybe it is kind of a strange argument, isn't it? Number 36, let's get down to brass tacks. None of us here is a Philadelphia lawyer. We're just plain folks trying to see our way clear. There's been a lot of highfalutin talk about economic implications and such like. But the plain fact is that if they build that dam here, it will cost us money we just don't have. I'm against it. We're all against it.

I was really confused by this point. I don't know.

That's why I read it the way I did. It's just so blatant.

I said it was appeal to ignorance.

Oh, no, no. He's not arguing that my thesis is true because no one has proved else otherwise. What's he appealing to here? It's the mob, right? Hey, we're not highfalutin Philadelphia lawyers here. We're just plain folks. Kind of like we're all, you know, we're all together in this. I'm against it. We're all against it. I mean, there's such an obvious appeal to the crowd, to the mob. Okay. Well, I hope you enjoyed doing these informal fallacies. And again, don't let the fact that the exercises call for a particular answer. And in some cases, there might be, you know, one answer that's a little bit better than another. Don't let that intimidate you from. In this world, not only cleaning up your own act when you reason, make sure you don't commit these fallacies, but in finding them in others. And in the end, it's not going to be crucial that you remember exactly what the terminology is. Although I don't think you'll do a good job unless you master the terminology. The main thing is you see how your irrelevance, ambiguity and distortion enter into people's reasoning processes in ordinary language. At this point in the course, we're going to turn away from ordinary language fallacies. And we're now going to start looking at formal reasoning. Formal reasoning. And we're done with Engel be looking specifically at Copie. In Copie, we come to what he calls part two of his textbook deduction and what I will be calling in my outline, formal reasoning. Just to give you the lay of the land here, the study of Deduction will come down to a study of two kinds of argumentation, one that focuses on categories or classes, and another that focuses on connectives between propositions. When all is said and done, all we're going to be doing now is learning the logic, very strict, regimented logic of some, all and not. How those terms are used, how classes relate to each other, some of this, all of that, not this, not some, not all, how those expressions work in our language. And that is the first part of part 2, chapters 5, 6 and 7. Categorical syllogisms. Categorical syllogisms. However, at the end of chapter seven, he moves away from categorical syllogisms into arguments of the latter kind dealing with relationships or if, then. And that leads us then finally to symbolic logic, the method of deduction and quantification theory. But now, my main point here is just to make this very simple for you. We're going to study first of all the words some, all and not, that is to say, categorical syllogisms. What's the relationship of classes, the class of sailors, the class of drunkards? Are all sailors, drunkards, some sailors, drunkards, some drunkard sailors, all drunkard sailors, Some are not. It's not the case that all are. How do we relate classes to of things or categories of things? So the first part of deduction deals with categorical syllogisms dealing with some, all and not. Categorical syllogisms are tested in three ways. You'll get this in chapter six, sections two, three and four. The categorical syllogism is tested by logical analysis or analogy. Pardon me, logical analogy. That's discussed in 6.2 toward the end. And then the limitation of that is indicated or tested by Venn diagrams, a way of having intersecting circles to test the propositions if the conclusion really follows from them, and then finally tested by the rules for syllogism, which are given in 6.4. Let me say it again. The first of two kinds of, excuse me, deductive logic we're going to look at is categorical syllogisms that relate classes of things using the words all, some and not. And these categorical syllogisms are tested in three ways. Biological analogy, Venn diagrams, intersecting circle diagrams, and certain rules. Having said that, I am not going to teach you or require of you. The Venn diagram test for categorical syllogisms. It takes a long time. Many people find it complicated, it's awkward, and it's really not all that necessary. And I've rarely known people to use it after the taken a logic course as well. It's always there if you want to go back and look at it and teach it to yourself. If you're good at math, you should be able to figure it out the intersecting circles. And what you do is you fill in the one premise, what it means diagramically, the second premise, and then you ask, has the conclusion been diagrammed, incidentally, when you did that? But we are going to do that. We're only going to learn the test by logical analogy, which has its limits, and then finally to come down to the test of rules. So if you want to put it briefly, we're going to learn about the categorical reasoning of some, all and not, how classes relate to each other. And then we'll test them by certain rules of syllogism. Then the second part of deduction will deal with the relationship of terms or the logic of terms and, or not, if then, and, or not, if then or if you will, connectives between propositions. And that begins to be discussed at the end of Chapter 7 under Disjunctive and hypothetical syllogism. When Copi discusses disjunctive and hypothetical syllogism, he's discussing the relationship of or, and, if not and not, but in ordinary language. Here he's dealing with those connectives as they appear in ordinary language. We're going to put that aside, however, and start testing all such connectives of relationships in terms of symbolic logic and the method of deduction in chapters eight and nine. So you follow what we're doing then, what we're moving into. We're moving into deductive logic. First categorical, secondly connective or propositional. We're going to deal with the syllogisms having to do with sum, all and not, and how to test them by rules. And then we'll begin with ordinary language, but move quickly. The symbolic logic dealing with and or not, if then and how to test it in this algebraic fashion. Quantification theory will then bring together class logic, category logic and propositional logic. So you have quantification some and all, as well as the relationships of and or not, if then. So number 10 obviously is is in a formalized language and is much more difficult than the other chapters. Here's what I'd like you to do for our next class session. I'd like you to read copie chapters 5 and 6 and then do certain assigned exercises. Copie chapters 5 and 6, however, please skip. Please omit section 5.6, section 5.6 and 6.3. 5.6 and 6.3 deal with the diagramming of categorical propositions and testing syllogisms. And as I've said already, we're not going to go through that. So read chapters 5 and 6 with the iixon of 5.6 and 6.2.3, and then do your exercises and we'll work on those in class and hope understand them.