Dr Greg Bahnsen - Critical Thinking: Language Part 3 (Part 6)

What I was saying at the point that we changed the tape is that the author points out that people sneak things into what looks like an objective discussion of things. You know, just the definition of terms. And what they're sneaking in is their own attitude or evaluation or the emotive impact that they want for a term as a way of persuading their hearers. We come to some exercises on page 138. I said in section one that I wanted you to create your own illustrations. The question comes up with respect to my assignment, whether you were supposed to give different kinds of definitions for the same word. And if you'll stop and think about it, that would be impossible, wouldn't it? Because a lexical definition is a word that's already in common use, and a stipulative definition will be given to a word that is newly created for a particular purpose. And so, no, the assignment could not have been to use the same word and then give it a lexical, A stipulative or precise, and a theoretical. There are some words that you don't ordinarily think a theory is associated with. You know, give a theoretical definition of bachelor. I suppose somebody. I take it back. Somebody might have a theory about bachelors and offer that this is part of their definition, though it's unlikely. Anyway, let's go through number one, then. I ask you to create your own illustrations for these five different kinds of definitions. And for the sake of time, I'm going to just be selective. We'll have do that. All of them. Mm.

I was afraid you were gonna say that. I don't know if I did this right. I didn't.

That's why we're going over it, so we learn. I want you all to get rid of any sense of pride or worry about this if you make mistakes. That's what I'm here to help you learn about. Be trained in. So go ahead.

Or lexical definitions. I wrote down deflagrate, means to burn or cause to burn with intense heat and light.

I have to take you at your word. I assume you got that from the dictionary. Yeah, okay. Exactly.

Go ahead. You want me to give both examples of what? Of the lexical definition.

Says two.

Didn't you decide to do one of each?

One of each? Oh, did you do two of each?

Yes.

Well, see, you're doubly smart today.

Or doubly stupid, whatever it may be.

Stipulative.

For a stipulative, I put down facs, and then we could stipulate that as being a facsimile. Like a fax machine would be a facsimile to shorten the word facsimile.

So give me your definition.

See, that's where I didn't. I just gave example. I didn't define them.

No, wait a minute. The example was supposed to be of a definition. Exemplify a definition for me. Now, that would be stipulative. Give me a word and stipulate its definition.

So would it be facts. And then another by the word facts.

I take F A, X. Yes. By the word facts, I mean facsimile.

We can't use the same.

But that would be stipulating the definition. It's a novel term. And you give the definition you want to it. By facts, I will mean facsimile. Okay. You seem hesitant.

I don't know why, because it's very foggy to me.

Well, okay, Stipulative definition is the easiest one because you get to make up the term and use it any way you want.

Okay, so would it be correct to say by facsimile or by facts? I mean facsimile?

That would be correct. Now let me tell you what's wrong with it. Okay. Or what's not as strong as might be as an illustration. The fact is that the word facts does have common usage. It may not be real old. I mean, only within the last, say, five years or something, but. So you've taken something and you've taken a term that is in common parlance. You probably should try to bring a completely novel approach. But you might say, well, I'm adding a new definition, a stipulative definition to it. We got to move on. Precising definition.

No, I did this all wrong. But I just gave an example of euthanasia.

How are you going to precise it?

Euthanasia means the point at which someone.

Decides.

Whether or not that person's life is worth living.

No, I don't think that would be a definition of euthanasia offering a more precise. I mean, you're talking, you're trying to describe what takes place in the case of euthanasia, but that's not a definition of euthanasia. The term euthanasia means what? And then if you're going to give a precising definition, what would the precising definition be? Youth.

Yeah.

Let me give you an example of a precising definition. Any of the rest of you struggling with this? Okay. I'm trying to figure out why that is. If the word pornography means the public portrayal of things that are considered obscene, A precising definition of pornography would be the public portrayal of obscene obscenity in the sex act itself. There are other kinds of obscenity. But somebody might say, for my purposes, when I use the term pornography today, I'm going to meet precisely now, just the portrayal of the sex act on the screen. And yet that isn't. Pornography is not ordinarily that narrow a term. So what I've done is I've precise, I've made more precise. Precise within the realm of standard usage. What I will mean, I will stipulate that in my lecture, I mean by pornography now, portraying the sex act in a movie, does that help to show the relationship between a lexical definition and a precising definition? The precising definition narrows the field within what a lexical definition to be.

So doesn't that relate to stipulative then?

Yes. And remember that in our explanation we said precising definition is a combination of stipulative and lexical. It's lexical in that it has to be a standard usage within the realm of standard usage. It's stipulative in that you choose, you stipulate to narrow it to a persistent precise point.

Like what's common in the catechism, like sin is that you could have a vague general interpretation of sin, whereas catechisms will precise it.

I would not have chosen that illustration. But as you've explained it, I suppose you could look at that as a precising definition. That is, you can say if you look at what sin is in Webster's dictionary, it can mean all sorts of things, including what is publicly reproachable and stuff like that. But the catechism wants to narrow it down. Although you know very well they weren't narrowing a lexical definition, they were really giving a theoretical definition of sin. Now, I want to make sure you understand this. Do you understand why that's better an illustration of a theoretical definition? Because they're laying out what from their perspective is the essence of sin, their theory of sin. Okay, A precising definition is one that is narrower than would be ordinarily found in common parlance or the dictionary. And you choose to narrow it for a special purpose.

They are narrowing it.

They're redefining the lexical based, not redefining, narrowing the definition by the theoretical more properly than.

It wouldn't be an example of precising, it would be more example of theoretical. Because they're saying the lexical definition, say Webster was wrong.

This is what it actually is.

It's not going?

No, actually, you see, Webster's Dictionary doesn't give you a theoretical definition of anything. It doesn't offer a theoretical theory or philosophical point of view explaining things. It tries to simply show the use of a term in a linguistic community. Webster's Dictionary is, in a funny sense, a history book. It's a report of how people have lived, how they have behaved, they have used this word in this way, this word in that way, and so forth. Now, a theoretical definition says, regardless of how people have talked about it, this is how you explain atoms. This is how you explain justice. And so you offer a theory on this subject in the form of a definition. This is how you should think of it. That's not a history of the word. That's a scientific account or a philosophical account of the word or the concept with the word names. Let's keep at this because we need to understand it. It's crucial. I don't know how many of you have read my book Theonomy and Christian Ethics. In my discussion of Matthew 5:17, I talk about this word fulfill. Jesus says, I didn't come to abrogate, but to fulfill. And then I go into a discussion of how that term should be precisely understood in this context. And I have said, I think the word fulfill in that context has the thrust up to confirm in full measure. Now, I've had critics say in response, and they've shown, I think, very little appreciation, whether they agree this or very little appreciation of what is being attempted here. When they make the criticism, they'll say, oh, no, the Greek word means fulfill. It doesn't mean confirm. I want to pull out my hair and say, I know the Greek word means fulfill. But of the many different ways in which fulfill is understood, which one did Jesus mean? I'm not now trying to redefine, play, race. I'm trying to precisely define, within the realm of possible uses for that Greek term, what precisely now does that help? That illustration? I'm taking a term and saying this is what it means precisely in this situation. I am stipulating, of course, I can't stipulate what it will mean when I'm doing biblical exegesis. But in a sense, I'm stipulating that what Jesus meant was confirm. Fulfill in the sense of confirm. I will stipulate for this afternoon's lecture that when I speak of pornography, I will not mean everything that people might use the word pornography for. I will only be referring to pornography as graphic portrayals of the sex act. And that's a precising definition of the word for pornography. It's partly stipulative, but I can't stipulate anything. I've got to stay within the realm of what the standard or lexical definition of pornography would be. Okay, Melissa, can you give me a theoretical definition?

I used Adam, but I didn't have science books to look it up, and it won the bibliography dictionary. So I just.

Wait a minute, wait a minute. You didn't want to look it up.

In the lexical dictionary because then it wouldn't be.

Then it wouldn't be theoretical. A theoretical. Okay, when you said you didn't want to.

I'm sorry.

I think what you should have said is it would do no good to look it up in a dictionary because that would give me the lexical definition. Okay, so what'd you give then?

I just said, as an amateur scientist.

What did you get?

An atom is made up of protons, neutrons and electrons.

Very good. It's not the most sophisticated, but it nevertheless is a theoretical definition of an atom.

What happens when the theoretical definition coincides with the lexical definition? Will it ever.

I'm worried that you asked that question because lexical definitions are a report on usage. Theoretical definitions give a philosophy or a scientific explanation of something. And so when you say, will they never coincide? Well, I suppose they could, but it would be very bizarre. It would be very unusual because dictionaries are not trying to give theories. Science books and philosophy books and theology books give theories. Dictionaries report on how people use terms. And people rarely use terms theoretically. They just use them in the ordinary, vague, general sense.

How would a dictionary define atom, then?

Probably something like the smallest unit of matter, something like that. But then the way in which Einstein would define an atom, Niels Bohr would define an atom theoretically would be different than some later scientists on some theories. An atom is splittable. Given the dictionary definition, it is by definition unsplittable. So isn't that a strange thing? Here is a theory of atoms such that the dictionary is wrong because it says it's the smallest. If it's the smallest, it can't be divided. So you see how theoretical and dictionary definitions really don't relate to each other very much. Now, there's some connection, because why would a scientist want to be defining an atom or matter? Or why would a philosopher want to define justice if we didn't talk about atoms and matter and justice? So they will be common terms rather than stipulated terms. Terms. But the attempt is now to give an account of and an explanation for what that concept is or what that thing is. Okay, persuasive definitions. Jay, give me one.

I took the word inertia, and I tried to basically give all five on it. And I said, when I say he has inertia, I mean that he's a lazy person. I don't know whether that would follow as a persuasive definition or not.

A persuasive definition would be. By inertia, I mean lazy. Yeah. Although I can't imagine very easily a sentence in which you would use inertia of a person like that.

Well, neither do I.

Well. But the assignment calls for you to give a persuasive definition. One that would be usable. It's not just any universe in which we're speaking, but in this universe, in our linguistic community, what would be a persuasive definition?

Pat, you just have a janitor. Sanitary maintenance engineer.

That's excellent. Excellent. Now, why is that? Well, it may not be excellent to. In terms of what you want to say, but as an example of trying to define something in a persuasive way, what has Pat done here? Has he built in some kind of emotive impact to his definition? Right. So he's not giving the genus and species of janitor. He's trying to make a janitor look better than what most people would say. So that's very good.

Kind of like when Mayor Rudin in Spectramento wanted to change the name of manholes to something like Percy Mal Entrance Ways or something strange like that.

I think that's probably more a humorous use of language than a serious attempt to persuade people by defining a term in a certain way. Melissa, what's your definition, your persuasive definition?

I had homosexuality. And my persuasive definition, was it a sin? A sin committed. A sexual sin committed with one person of the same. And another. I can't even. Let me do that. Right. With one person with two people of the same sex.

Okay, now why. Why is that a persuasive definition rather than, say, a lexical definition?

Because it's calling the sin.

Very good. I wasn't sure if you understood your own illustration, but you do. That's great. By building in the evaluation that it's a sin, then you have now a persuasive rather than a lexical definition. What would the lexical definition of homosexuality be?

1. One person who.

Sexual relations within one gender. So that someone could use the term homosexual and yet not be using it as though we're a sin. Many people do. But when Christians define homosexuality as the sin of doing the following. Now, they're using a persuasive definition, by the way. Does that make it wrong to do that? No, but if I get into an argument with gay rights activist or something, and I have defined homosexuality as the sin of having sex, you know, within your own gender, then obviously what he's going to say is, well, then there is no homosexuality, given your definition. There is no homosexuality. I'll say. You mean to say there's no sex going on within one person's gender? They'll say, oh, no, that is. But there's no sin going on of that sort. So you see, persuasive definitions have some value, but they also have a weakness that if you're going to try to resolve a dispute using a persuasive definition, it's not going to help you. Okay, Melissa, you have a question about these kinds of definitions?

Yes, the precising definition, I want to. I'm not sure I have it or not. With something like civil rights, the definition would be guaranteed to every person life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Would that be a precise definition?

What is the. You're defining civil rights and you're defining.

It as the guarantee to every person life, liberty in the pursuit of happiness.

Now you're reading that from the textbook?

No, that's my pencil marking.

Oh, I wasn't sure if there was an illustration I should be looking at the guarantee of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. I suppose the only reason I'm hesitant is that that's not very precise. But if you're thinking of civil rights as being something broader than that in common use, and now I'm just going to talk about it in this sense, then it would be precise. But you see, since it doesn't look very precise, I'm hesitant about your illustration.

Okay.

In section, go ahead.

Whereas something like adultery, which can have more than a sexual connotation, explicitly the sex acts between one and two people where one of them is married.

Exactly. Where the catechism, the Westminster Catechism, uses adultery for a broad range of sins, some sexual, some not. But even just thought of all sex sins is adultery, you could say. But when I use the word adultery, I'm going to mean between a married person and somebody that he or she's.

Not married to, Catechism definition would be more of a theoretical.

I'm not so sure whether that's offering a theory of adultery, trying to get at the essence of it, or explain it as it is trying to enumerate all the different ways in which it expresses itself. Section 2 on page beginning on page 138, discuss each of the following disputes. If it is obviously genuine, indicate each of the disputers positions with respect to the proposition at issue. If it is merely verbal, resolve it, explaining the different senses attached to the disputers by the disputers to the key word or phrase that is used ambiguously. If it is apparently verbal dispute that's really genuine, locate the ambiguity, explain the real disagreement involved and why don't I try to do one for you? Will that help? I'm going to you all have number one explained for you by the authority, so I'm going to avoid that one and do number three. I guess I'll just arbitrarily choose that day. Says Bob Jones is certainly a wonderful father to his children. He provides a beautiful home in a fine neighborhood, buys them everything they want, need or want, and has made ample provision for their education. Knight says, I don't think Bob Jones is a good father at all. He's so busy getting and spending that he has no time to be with his children. They hardly know him except as somebody who pays the bills. What we have here is obviously a disagreement over how the expression wonderful or good father is used. So you do have at least a verbal disagreement. Is it merely verbal? If we were to define wonderful father, probably they would agree on all the facts. He gives them a nice home, buys them everything they want, and as well, he's always working and he's never there for them. So it doesn't appear that they have a disagreement in belief about what actually takes place. They are using a term differently. But now if we just define good father in a certain way, will there be disagreement go away? I don't think so, because I think not only would they agree on the facts and how to use the term, they would disagree as to whether this is a good guy or not a good father or not. There would be a continuing disagreement as to attitude toward him. So I would say number three is apparently verbal but genuine. Did you all get the same thing when you tried to do your homework? Because if you didn't, I'd like to work through any glitches that you might have. Okay, since you did, let me call on one of you now to do one. Pete, would you please do number four for us? Amalgamated General Corporation's earnings were higher than ever last year. I see by reading their annual report. The other guy says, no, their earnings were really much lower than in the preceding year and they've been cited by the SEC for Issuing a false and misleading report.

I said that's a genuine dispute because they says earnings are higher and Naik says reports are false. So by simply.

But Pete, you gotta realize that though one says this and one says the other, why do they say one and the other thing? Because one is looking at the report and the other saying the report is faulty. Okay, so now with the person who says the report is faulty, say, oh, the report doesn't say that the earnings were higher. You're wrong. No, he would agree with them. The report does say that they're higher.

Okay.

Okay. So this is a merely verbal dispute. There's no reason for us to think that they have any remaining disagreement when we say we will define in the following way what it means for the earnings to be higher. Well, now come to think of it, they do know how to use the terms higher and lower. They're not disagreeing over them. They're disagreeing over whether they in fact were higher or lower. What's the answer you had given, Matt? I'm going to back up and maybe change.

I said it was a genuine dispute.

Yeah, genuine dispute. And the reason why I jumped in there and I think I made this mistake is it appears that because they're using a different standard of judgment that you could resolve their dispute. The person who says, no, they really didn't have higher earnings would be willing to say, oh, yeah, the report said they did. But then they go on to say, I have more information the report is faulty. So back that out. I'm going to go with your first answer. I think that it is a genuine dispute as to the facts. Okay, Melissa, why don't you try number six? Ann is an excellent student. She takes a lively interest in everything and asks very intelligent questions in class. The other side says, ann is one of the worst students I've ever seen. She never gets her assignments in on time.

I think it's a merely verbal argument because they disagree on what the student is. And I think if that they might.

Agree they don't disagree on what a student is.

What? Excellent.

Excellent student.

Okay, excellent student. And. Well, then it possibly could be genuine one. Considering excellent students.

Do they disagree as to the facts?

Yes. I think it's no.

They could both say she takes a lively interest and asks good questions. And they could both say she doesn't get her assignments in on time. But they do have a disagreement as to whether that makes her a excellent student. Right. So do they have a verbal dispute? Merely verbal dispute?

I think so.

I think it's apparently Verbal, because after they resolve the disagreement over how they're using the term, I think one will still say one's evaluation or attitude is positive and the other is evaluation or attitude is negative. So they have a disagreement in attitude about Ann.

Why would that be different than being merely a verbal dispute?

Because when it's merely a verbal dispute, once you clear up the ambiguity, there's no disagreement left at all. And I'm saying we could clear up the ambiguity on the expression excellent student. And you would still have a disagreement here.

Oh, it's apparently verbal different than verbal but genuine.

Apparently verbal is the same thing as. How did you put that?

Maybe I missed verbal but genuine.

No, it can't be verbal but genuine. It has to be apparently verbal but genuine. So that's what this would be. This is apparently verbal but genuine. Because once you take away the ambiguity, I think there's a remaining dispute. I'm open to hear you. I mean, you've seen I make my mistakes. Jumping in here too quick. Have I missed something here? If not, then I'm gonna have Pat do number nine. Betty finally got rid of that old Chevy of hers and bought herself a new car. She's driving a Buick now. The other guy says, no, Betty didn't buy herself a new car. That Buick is a good three years old.

This is a verbal disagreement. Pivots operating what the definition of a new car.

Car.

New car is declaring.

You don't think that they have a remaining disagreement if that dispute is cleared up, over how to use the expression new car? No. Very good. I'm just doing that because I want to see if I can push you off your answer. Yeah, this is a good illustration, it seems to me, of what is only a verbal dispute. Merely verbal dispute. Okay, let's move ahead. In the book, section 4.3 deals with denotation and connotation, or, if you will, extension and intention. The author says he now wants to look at the literal meaning of terms, but specifically general terms, class terms. And he says the objects to which a term may be correctly applied. The set of objects to which the term may be correctly applied is called the extensional meaning of the term or the denotative meaning of the term. All the objects within the extension of a given term have a common attribute or attributes that leads us to use the same term to denote them. And since we have this common attribute or characteristic or set of characteristics, we may know the meaning of a term without knowing its extension. I may know the meaning of a term that applies to a particular kind of animal, but not know the objects or the number of objects you know to which it applies. I may know the characteristics that are given to define that thing. The intentional or connoted meaning of the term is the totality of attributes shared by all and only those objects within a term's extension. Bottom Page 141. The totality of attributes shared by all and only those objects within a terms extension. And on page 142, it discusses the relationship of extension to intention. And just above the middle says, any term with a changing extension must have a changing int. Intention also. And if you change the class of objects to which a term applies, then you've changed the meaning or intention of that term or expression. Then he says, note that the extension of a term, the objects to which it applies, is determined by its intention. The common characteristics of that are stated, but the reverse is not true. The extension is determined by intention, but intention is not determined by extension. And to be cautious here, we should remember that terms may have different intentions and yet the same extension. Terms may have different intentions and yet the same extension. For instance, the term creature with a heart and the term creature with a kidney have different intentions, don't they? I'm not talking about the same characteristic. And yet they have identical extents because all creatures with hearts are creatures with kidneys. So again, terms may have different intentions and yet the same extension. Creature with the heart, creature with the kidney have different intentions, but they apply to the same objects. On the other hand, terms with different extinct extensions cannot possibly have the same intention. So if we have one group of people over here that includes Dr. Bonson and then another group of people that's identical to that first group, except that it excludes Dr. Bahnson, then the way in which you describe or define those groups cannot be identical because I'm excluded from one and included in the other. Terms with different extensions cannot possibly have the same intention. You have two different ways of describing those groups. That should be pretty obvious. When attributes are added to the intention of a term, we say the intention increases. One thing to talk about cows, it's another thing to talk about black cows. Doesn't need to talk about black cows In Michigan. We keep increasing the intention, and then the suggestion has been made that extension and intention always vary inversely. The extension of the term cow will decrease when I add the intention black cow. So extension gets smaller as intention increases. The author points out that's not entirely correct, though. The extension might not decrease, but could remain the same. So that possibility is there too Notice Also on page 143, he says the extension of terms can sometimes be empty. Isn't that right? I can have a term that has plenty of meaning, has intention, and yet doesn't extend to any objects at all. Fairy giraffes with butterfly wings. You know what I'm talking about. But there aren't any fairy giraffes with butterfly wings to which that applies. You get the point. And he adds here, it does not follow simply from the fact that a term has connotation or meaning that it denotes or points to anything. I was on a. Pardon me, a radio talk show a few months ago where representatives of different religious perspectives are there answering questions. And I was supposed to be the Protestant that night, but they happened to invite two Protestants, so they had me plus another fellow who was a Baptist preacher and a Jewish fellow, Catholic. And at one point, calling person wanted to know why we believe in God. And so we were all giving our answers. Well, the Baptist fellow offered an answer that was just positively embarrassing to me. But he said to the caller, he said, well, what do you mean by the term God? So the guy gives some, you know, characterization or definition. He says, well, then how could you talk about it if there isn't a God? I sat there and I wanted to go, I cannot believe this guy's doing it. Well, the mistake he's making is what's referred to right here. It does not follow simply from the fact that a term has connotation, that it denotes anything. So later in the program, in an attempt to be gentle, you know, and to dismiss that kind of thing, I said, well, you know, we can define terms like Santa Claus, and that doesn't mean that there's something it actually points to. So the author is just, you know, you can have a term like unicorn, and there's nothing in that class of unicorns. Let's just remember then that connotation does not prove that there is factual denotation. Now, we have some exercises on page 143. We are to arrange each of the following groups of terms in order of increasing intention. And let's just take one of these, get done with it real quickly. I'll take number three as intelligence Illustration. We have the terms athlete, ball player, baseball player, fielder, infielder, shortstop. Oh, I hope this is easy for you. I mean, is it? Did anybody have trouble with this? I don't want to. I'm not trying to make fun of anybody, but I mean, this is almost like when you were a kid learning to put the smaller you know, cup inside the bigger cup inside the bigger cup. Right. So what's the biggest cup here or the biggest class here? It would be athletes. Now, let me increase the intention. This is supposed to be increasing intention. So we go from athlete to ball player. If this isn't hard, they put it in increasing intention. For you, it's athlete, then ball player, athlete, then baseball player, ball player, athlete, then fielder, baseball player, ball player, athlete, then infielder, shortstop. So the term shortstop has greater intention than does the term athlete. You all get the point. This is easy. Let's move on. 4.4. Extension and denotative definitions.

Is it proper to say increasing extension?

Well, you can. There's a way to increase the extension by decreasing the intention. So I go from baseball player to athlete, and all of a sudden I have increased the extension of what I'm talking about. Okay. 4.4. Extension and denotative definition. Denotative definitions rely upon techniques that identify the extension of the general term being defined. To define denotatively is to give examples, and we do that many times, right? We give examples of things to tell people how we're using a term or what it means. So by athlete, what I mean is baseball players, football players, hockey players, skiers, skaters, boxers. Now do you understand what I mean by an athlete? Somebody says, yeah, I kind of get the point. However, there are limitations to defining things by example or denotatively. The author says, even if we could give a complete enumeration of the objects denoted by one of those general terms, the denotative definition would fail to distinguish it from other. From the other term that denotes the same object. That is, the defect in a denotative definition is that after I've given a list of things, there may be another way of describing the same things that are in that list. And so I have two expressions. Now, if I can give you an example. What? Well, the obvious example is the creature with heart, creature with kidney, one that we used previously. What do you mean by a creature with a heart? And we say, oh, okay, well, I mean, cows and human beings and aardvarks and on and on and on. Let's say I gave a complete enumeration of every creature that has a heart. The problem is that enumeration would not distinguish it from creatures with kidney, because all creatures with hearts have kidneys as a natural fact. And so then we wouldn't be able to distinguish between the term or expression creature with the heart from the expression creature with a kidney. But even beyond that, see, that's assuming that we have a complete enumeration. The authority says very few terms can have their extensions completely enumerated. There are very few things that you can enumerate every single object in that class. What if I were to try to enumerate the class of men? Well, of course I couldn't do that. I couldn't even enumerate the class of automobiles or puppy dogs or numbers. On and on and on. So what do you do when you can't enumerate the entire class? Well, then you give a partial enumeration. And that creates the same kind of problem that I've just mentioned, but even greater when you give a partial enumeration. The fact of the matter is that there are other terms that might denote the class of those very things you've enumerated. Okay, so here I'm going to give a partial enumeration of the term human being. A human being. I mean, like Dr. Bronson and Pete and Melissa and Jay Pat, somebody says, oh, I understand what human beings are. They're people that meet in a certain room and study logic every morning, You know, oh, well, now I know. Human being is the same as Presbyterian theological conviction or something of that nature. The point is, whatever is true of all of us is not going to be just one thing. It would be very unlikely. And so people with hair on their head, that's what you mean by human being, right? No. So a partial enumeration leaves us in a situation where we can't distinguish the meaning of one term from another. It's inadequate as a definition to use a partial enumeration. On page 145, the author talks about another kind of a special kind of denotative definition called demonstrative or ostensive. Here I define by pointing at things, by cow, I mean, and then I point, point, point, point. What's wrong with defining by ostension or by pointing using some gesture? Well, you have not only the problem we just mentioned that if I point at three cows, somebody will say, oh, you mean objects in a field. There are other ways of describing those three things at these right here, because obviously there are church pews elsewhere. Also, perhaps more devastating, is the fact that gestures are invariably ambiguous. What I mean by paper is this right here. I make the gesture pointing to this. Now, because you already know what paper is and you know how gesture is used, that's not going to be a problem for you. But think about it. If you didn't know those things, if I said, I mean by paper, you might think I'm referring to book instead of what makes up the book. But worse, if I say paper, you might think that this is paper if you don't know the gesturing conventions in our culture. Isn't that right? I mean, if I go like this, is this being used to point out what the paper is, or is this being used to point out what the paper is? Ludwig Wittgenstein, you know, once put it this way. It seems humorous, but it's true. When you look at an arrow, how do you know which way it's pointing? Because of a social convention. You know, we could have a convention that indicates that this lays out, as it were, like a ballpark, the field of consideration. And this is the pointer so that the arrow is not pointing that way, but actually the opposite. It could be used as a pointer this way, right? Kind of like a little deleted points. Instead, we put the arrow, the head of the arrow on it like that. That's a social convention. So gesturing will only help define something if you already understand the gesturing technique. And so since gestures themselves must be learned, obviously no one can learn learn all of their language the definition of terms by gestures. And the author points out, children do not learn everything by gestures. When we point at a ball, you know, for our child, and say ball, how do you know they're not learning the color when you point at it instead of the shape, the object itself? And he says on the top of page 146, the primary way of learning to use language is, is by observation and imitation, not by definition. And then one final defect, he says, there are words which, although perfectly meaningful, do not denote anything at all and therefore cannot be defined denotably. Denotatively. Try defining unicorn denotatively. Now you can think, well, okay, I can draw a picture of one. But then again, what's on the paper is not a unicorn. That's supposed to be a picture of a unicorn. But nevertheless, things that are meaningful but do not exist cannot be pointed to. And so, having shown the defects of denotative definition, the last sentence is crucial. He says, clearly, intention is the real key to definition, and to it. We turn in the following section. We've gone through this primarily to see the inadequacy of denotative definition. On page 146, I ask you to do numbers 1 and 2, Roman numerals 1 and 2, paying attention to 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9. Okay? The assignment calls for you to define certain terms that are given here by example, enumerating three examples for each term. And then on the other hand, for that Term, find a non synonymous general term that your three examples serve equally well to illustrate. Okay, so this will help drive home the lesson. And I'm just going to take a couple of them. Just work through it. Let's take number three. And Jay, would you please be the guinea pig?

Okay, for examples for composers, I just took three musicians. Three composers. Bach, Handel.

I'm sorry.

And then for a new instance, pick those.

I picked the same one.

And for the non synonymous general term, I said they were also musicians, since it's not really synonymous.

Okay, very good. So here you have a case where you've enumerated certain members of a class and lo and behold, there's another term that they also would fit into. Very good. That's number three. Take number nine. Pat.

Franklin, Ben Franklin, Eli Whitney, Ben Newton.

Okay, so now you're defining, enumerating examples of inventors, Ben Franklin, Eli Whitney and Newton.

And then I, for my non synonymous general term, I put scientists.

Okay, that fits. They are three scientists. They're also three scientists who happen to be inventors. We also could have put down that they were English speakers or human beings or males, something like that. Okay, moving on to 4.5 intention and connotative definition. Now on page 147, about 2/3 of the way down, he says normally the term connotation is used to mean conventional connotation. Let's just remember that we're dealing here with what is ordinarily taken as the meaning of a term. Conventionally, how does one actually go about defining a word? What techniques does one use to identify its conventional intention? The agreed upon set of attributes common and peculiar to objects denoted by the word. And he offers three different ways in which this is done. First of all, synonymous definition. Trying to give two terms which are interchangeable. He says on page 148. Synonymous definitions are virtually useless in. In the construction of precising or of theoretical definitions that should be obvious to you. Synonymous definitions would be useless if you're trying to precise a term. Well, if the two terms that you're dealing with are synonymous, then one is not more precise than the other. A second way to define terms is operationally giving some describable set of actions or operations or restrictions, responses by which something is identified and used in a society. He says an operational definition of a term states that the term is correctly applied to a given case if and only if the performance of specified operations in that case yield a specified result. These will be public and repeatable operations. And we find operational definition utilized especially in the sciences, psychologists and social scientists have recently tried to do operational definitions. And when they do, they tend to be behaviorist in their theory of society or of human nature. Interestingly enough, the third way to define a term apart from synonymous synonymous expressions or operational expressions is to define by genus and difference. This depends on the fact, he says, that some attributes are complex, that we can analyze things into two or more attributes. Another way of putting it, he says. Page 149. Classes having members may have their memberships divided into subclasses. So here's where we get genus and species. The wider class is the genus. The subclass is the specie. Genus and specie are relative terms. Sometimes a term is a genus term, sometimes it's a specie term. A class is a collection of entities having some common characteristic, so that in general, all members of all species of a given genus share some attribute that makes them members of the genus. But the members of any one species share some further attribute that differentiates them. This is called the specific difference. If man is a rational animal, then we're saying that humans, bears, whales, and so forth have something in common, that they are animals. But the specific difference with respect to man is that he's the rational animal. So that's something that men have in common, but not the bears and the wolves, whales and the giraffes and so forth. Now, on page 150, he makes an important concession that there are limitations to definition by genus and specie. In the first place, it's applicable only to words that connote complex attributes. When you're dealing with something that is simple, that is to say, something that cannot be analyzed further or divided up further. Simple, unanalyzable attributes can't be defined by genus and species. Color words are often given as an example of that. Moreover, words that connote universal attributes, object, entity, being, because of their universality, cannot be defined by genus and specie because they aren't a specie of something even more general. Things that are in the very highest class and ultimate. Metaphysical categories, he says, cannot be defined this way. A metaphysical category be like substance and attribute, time, space. You can't define those by substance, something broader of which they are the part or the specific, offer a specific difference. Okay, we come then to page 150 and 151, and we have some assignments that we can work through. All right, Number one calls for giving synonymous definitions for the following terms. And I'll just go through a few of them. Let each one of you try them on Pat cemetery number Three, graveyard or.

Birthplace or burial place.

Birthplace. You've been watching too many horror movies. Burial place. Okay. Jay, do number seven. Garrett.

Garrett is the top room of the house.

Maybe the attic. Okay, so your synonymous definition is upper room, attic, something. Okay. Melissa, infant child. Small child.

Small child.

Yeah. Young child.

Talking to Jay. Talking to jay.

Pete, number 19. Scoundrel, villain. Very good. Let's go to section two. Now, construct definitions for the following terms by matching the diffi definiendum with an appropriate genus and difference. This shouldn't be too difficult for you. We were to do the even numbers, so let's go the other way. Now, we'll start with Pete. Would you please do brother.

Male sibling.

Okay, so you have sibling as the genus, and the specific difference is the male sibling. Yep. Then let's take a U and I'll have you do it. Melissa.

Ha ha ha. A female sheep.

Female genus.

They forgot to add was person.

Because.

In giant you can't use any of those words.

But we're not. We're not on giant. We're on hue. Right. Now, let's finish this. You said the genus is.

Sheep.

Is sheep. Okay, so you mentioned the difference before the genus, and that's fine. I just want to make sure you know which is which. So the broader class is sheep. Then you're distinguishing male, female sheep.

Right.

And then what's the problem with giant now?

Well, they. They need to add in the word person on the genus because you can't. You can't say any of the other words to mean giant or midget for that matter, even though midget we didn't have to do. But see, you couldn't.

Why can't you use man?

Well, you could use giants.

Not for a midget, though, could you?

Why not? Because all midgets aren't men, and they're all giants. What are they?

All giants aren't. Aren't. Oh, okay. I'm thinking.

Are you confusing male and man? Man.

There's man and woman. There. The choice, so.

Oh, I see. Well, but you could take the word man in the general or the specific way. Maybe that's the trick there.

Yeah.

Did you look back, what he says in the back?

He says person in the back, too. So that's what I was.

He says person in the back, he messes up his own assignment. I would rather think that by man, you can take it generically or in the gender sense. And so then a giant is going to be a very large man.

He's this very large person and a very small person. So that's why I was confused why they didn't add it.

See, if you hadn't looked at the back, you would have, you know, found it easier. I'm gonna add person here.

I had. Well, I had man. And then I didn't think it seemed weird that you, the giant could be.

Well, it's man. You only thought of man in the specific sense because you saw a woman on the same list. I understand. Jay, let's have you do number 16. Mother.

Genus is parent, and the difference is female.

Very good. Parent. The female parent. Okay, then, Pat, would you do number 24, wife? Okay. A wife would be a woman that is married. The genus would be woman. The difference would be a married woman is a wife. Okay. Anybody have any questions about these exercises? In 4.6, the author gives us rules for definition by genus and difference. Because obviously these easy ones we've just had don't exhaust everything. And some of the ones that are offered are not real helpful. Difficulties can be encountered. So let me just state the rules. I think his explanation should be clear, clear enough for anybody who's read it. I'll state them and then we'll do the exercises. Rule 1. A definition should state the essential attributes, not just accidental characteristics. 2. A definition must not be circular. Can't use gambles when you're trying to explain what a gambler is. Rule 3. A definition must be neither too broad nor too narrow. It's got to include everything that the term applies to, but only those things the term applies to. For a definition must not be expressed in ambiguous, obscure or figurative language. Because then of course, it's going to call for a further definition. And then Rule 5. A definition should not be negative where it can be affirmative. And that's because there are many more things which do not fit into a class than those that do fit into into a class. But think about it. The class of red objects includes the class of black objects, white objects, green objects, and so forth. And so if you define red in the negative way, then, or if you say it's not this, not that, and so forth, it's not going to be clear what you're left with. The assignment is found on page 155 to 156. I ask you to look at section two. Do the first 20. The book calls for you to criticize the following in terms of the rules for definition by genus and difference. After identifying the difficulty or difficulty, state the rule or rule violated. If the definition is either too narrow or too broad, explain why we'll do just a few of these so we get the hang of it. I'll begin for you. Knowledge is true opinion. The problem with that is that there are true opinions that don't amount to knowledge. I might have the opinion that, say, Duke is going to win their basketball game this Saturday. That may be true. It's an opinion, a belief that is true. But we wouldn't say that. I know that. And what do I lack? Proof or justification. So this is too broad. I think it violates rule number three. Did you all get the same answer? Too broad?

I said it was Rule 4.

Rule 4 says a definition must not be expressed in ambiguous, obscure or figurative language. Well, there's nothing figurative there.

What about. What about ambiguous?

What's ambiguous?

True.

True is not ambiguous. One of the clearest words in our language. There are different theories of truth. That doesn't make it ambiguous. We know what true means corresponds to the facts states. What is the case now? I don't think there's any figurative or ambiguous defect in this. It's just that it's too broad.

And is opinion the essence of knowledge?

Yeah, yeah. It's of the essence of knowledge is a belief or an opinion that is true and justified. This example will be a little bit difficult because obviously there are disagreements between philosophers as to what knowledge amounts to. But Plato covered too much when he said true opinion because not all true opinions are knowledgeable ones. And so that's why the answer I gave. I'm sticking by. It's a definition that's too broad. Okay, Pete, let's have you do number six. Honesty is the habitual absence of the intent to deceive.

I said that absence or the habitual absence tends to. Is more of a negative type definition. Therefore it violates rule number five.

Where did you put Jay?

That's what I had.

That it's a negative definition.

That and the fact that it's. Well, I was thinking that it wasn't really the way of describing what honesty is. So that would honestly be better defined as being truthful. Although I think that may be a little too broad there, but maybe not.

Okay, well, then you would think it violates Rule 1, that it doesn't state the essential attribute of the species. Right.

I put down both 5 and 1.

I think 5 is the better answer. That it has a negative cast to it rather than telling us specifically what it is. Go ahead.

My question is, can it violate more than one or is it just basically violating one?

Oh, I don't see any reason why it couldn't violate more than one. Ordinarily you would focus on one.

That's why I put down both of them.

Yeah. I do think that the exercise calls for you to identify one of the rules, the most obvious one, that it's broken.

Okay, so all of them have to be violating.

There should be a rule that's violated. Yes. And will this require one? Melissa, let's have you do number 12. A raincoat is an outer garment of plastic that rep water.

I think that that is a little too broad of plastic. Doesn't have to be in there.

Too broad or too narrow.

The definition doesn't need to have plastic in there.

You said it was too broad. You don't have to have plastic in there. What you want to say is it's too narrow because plastic is in there. By making it plastic, you're restricting what counts as a raincoat. There are some non plastic raincoats. Okay, very good. Go ahead.

Could that also violate rule number one, that the essential attribute isn't plastic?

No, I think the rule that we just talked about is what gets at that, that it doesn't have to be plastic, but it is essential that a raincoat be an outer garment that repels water. So it doesn't seem that number one has been violated. It's rather that it's too narrow a statement of the essence of a raincoat by adding something that doesn't have to be there. The plastic character of. Pat. Would you do number 13? A hazard is anything that is dangerous.

That would violate rule number three.

Too broad. Isn't it the case that everything that's dangerous is a hazard and everything that's a hazard is dangerous?

Yeah, as far as I can see it.

Well, then why'd you suggest that as the answer?

Well, I was assuming there were. I couldn't think of any examples, but I was assuming there were some cases.

Where.

Something is dangerous wasn't necessarily a hazard.

What would be dangerous that isn't a hazard?

Something that has the potential to be dangerous.

Then it's a hazard. It has the potential be dangerous.

The hazard is something that's been released or.

No, I don't think that's correct. You're not using the word properly. What is the problem with this one, Jay?

Circular reasoning.

That's right. Violates rule number two. A definition must not be circular. That is, when you offer a synonymous expression, you're not defining by genus and specie anything that is dangerous. The giveaway here is that you didn't have a broad class narrowed down. Okay. What you have here Is the reason why it's not too broad is because these two terms are used synonymously. Hazard and dangerous.

Not to get the wava said it was from osha.

Okay, I want to do a couple more, then we'll be done with this. Let's try Pete. How about number 18? A cloud is a large, semi transparent mass with a fleecy texture suspended in the atmosphere, whose shape is subject to continual and kaleidoscopic change.

I said that's very figurative.

Thank you.

Violence.

Yeah, that one should just jump out at you. The rule that you shouldn't use ambiguous, obscure or figurative language. You think many people would be helped by that as a definition of a cloud? Okay, Melissa, you do number 20. Health is the state of complete faith, physical, mental and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.

I said that it violates never remember the numbers five because it has the negative absence of disease or infirmity.

No, I don't think it violates Rule 5 because it says what health is and then adds not merely the absence. So what is the problem with this definition?

It should only state the essential attributes and doesn't need to add the rest.

Doesn't seem to me that this is just accidental or incidental. I think it is essential. We'll find out when we look at the back of the book. Seems to me, I mean, my first guess would be on initial contact with this, that it's circular. That it's using a synonymous expression, well being and health. What did the author say at the back of the book?

It's too broad.

Too broad? Yeah, that was another possibility. I know. Complete physical, mental and social well being.

He says it's too narrow. This is too broad.

Are we arguing over what the author says here? Yeah, I think this is going to be a visual dispute.

I'm looking at three. Wait, what number is this too?

We're looking at 20.

No, but Roman numeral. I was looking. Yeah, okay. He says too near. Okay, I was looking down here.

Then he gets this big olive quote from this guy.

Okay. Anyway, do you see why it would be considered too narrow? There are other forms of health that are not physical, mental or social. Okay, all right.

I guess that last part threw me off.

Spiritual health. What does the author say?

He says there are philosophical issues involved here.

Well, there always are. We don't have to bother to get into it if that's what he wants to talk about. Okay, well, that takes us through Copi, his two chapters dealing with language and definition. We're going to stop for today. And what I'd like you to do in preparation for tomorrow is to make sure you're caught up with the Engle assignment that was given on language last evening. That should already be done, but you can brush up on that. And then I'd like you to read QOPI, chapter three on fallacies. Copi, Chapter three on fallacies. And we'll go over exercises from that chapter tomorrow. The day following, we'll go over exercises out of Morris Engel's book. With good reason. And so you should be prepared. You should finish reading Morris Engel on fallacies for the day after tomorrow.