Dr Greg Bahnsen - Critical Thinking: Language Part 2 (Part 5)

Right. As we get underway on another day of logic, let's have a word of prayer. We come to you again, our Heavenly Father, grateful that we have the privilege of prayer and that you have established a relationship between us by your grace. We thank you that you have taken the initiative in finding us and changing our hearts. We thank you that you took the initiative and laying down your life for us that we might live. We do pray that you would give us gratitude and joy today as we undertake our studies, that they would be done to your glory and for our good. We do ask especially that you would give us diligence and through the work of your spirit, clarity of thought that we might honor the truth and the one who calls himself the truth, our very Savior, Jesus Christ, in whose name we pray. Amen. All right, we're going to go over chapter two in Kofi the Uses of Language. And again, I'll just kind of fly through and give some summary remarks and we'll work through the exercises together. Kofi begins chapter two by discussing the three basic functions of language. He says we often lose sight of the multiplicity of the uses of language, and there can be a real danger in oversimplifying what language is intended to do. He takes the example of the person who thinks that asking, how are you? And then the bore who gives the medical answer rather than I'm fine, misses the fact that although it's in the form of a question, it's really intended as a social greeting or a formality. He says, now there's an example of someone who doesn't understand that language has many functions. He makes reference, as I did in my lecture yesterday, to Ludwig Wittgenstein, who pointed to the countless different kinds of use of what we call symbols, words, sentences, languages, language, utterances, the kind of human behavior intended to do many different tasks. Kofi suggests we can reduce those tasks to three categories, three very general categories. The informative function of language, the expressive function of language, and the directive function of language. In the middle of page 66, we see the first one. The first of these uses of language is to communicate information. Ordinarily, this is accomplished by formulating and affirming or, or on the other hand, denying propositions. Language used to affirm or deny propositions or to present arguments is said to be serving the informative function. And later in the paragraph, he talks about language being used to describe or to report. The second function of language that he mentions on page 66 is expressive. Kofi says language serves the expressive function whenever it is used to vent or to arouse feelings or emotions. On page 67 he gives an example that I do not appreciate. He says that the Lord's prayer and the 23rd Psalm are uses of language not intended to communicate information, but to express emotions, feelings, feelings or attitudes. Well, I think that it communicates information as well. Here you might get some insight into his religious prejudices. Maybe he doesn't think religious language is cognitively meaningful or something like that. Anyway, the next sentence is correct. He says Expressive discourse as expressive is neither true nor false. You may draw inferences from somebody's expressive discourse. Those inferences can be true or false, but the discourse itself as just an expression of feelings is not true or false. He points out in the next paragraph that expressive discourse can be used while one is alone, just to vent your own feelings or in the presence of others. Expressive discourse is used to evoke a similar attitude in someone else or in others. So he says, expressive discourse is used either to express the speaker's feelings or to attempt to evoke certain feelings on the part of the auditor. And he says, of course it may do both. Always the complication language is very flexible kind of thing. Thirdly, language serves the directive function when it is intended to cause or prevent overt action, the clearest examples being commands and requests. This is language that is used with the intention of getting results of some sort. On the top of page 68, our author reminds us that in its nakedly imperative form, directive discourse is neither true nor false. When I say close the door, that's not a statement that is true or false. It is an utterance of a command. On the same page, Copi says, in treating discourse of the kind that he's just illustrated as an argument, we regard the command that it contains as a proposition in which the recipients of the command are told that they should or ought to perform the action commanded. So if I give you an argument that is to the effect there are many Democrats in Virginia, the Republican candidate is clearly superior. Therefore, make sure you get out there and vote, you Republicans. That make sure you get out there and vote is a command. However, it is in the form of an argument. That command can be translated, therefore, Republicans should get out and vote so that we can analyze it in standard argument. Alright, now the messiness of language is recognized again in section 2.2 by Copie when he says that there's discourse that serves multiple functions. In fact, the opening paragraph he says almost any ordinary communication will probably exemplify to a greater or lesser extent all three uses of language so that most of the things we're going to encounter in ordinary life. May have a primary intention of communicating information, let's say, but will still to some degree have an emotive impact or an expressive impact as well as a directive thrust to them. It may be a very slight one. But even in the case of giving a directive. Where that's your main intention, some information seems to be involved. If I say close the door, you might at least draw the conclusion. There's a door around to close. That's some information. So most discourse serves all these functions to one degree or another. Or as he says on the top page 69, most ordinary uses of language are mixed. He has an interesting discussion for the rest of the page on what this mixture of functions means for us. At one point, he says, actions usually involve both what the actor wants and what the actor believes. So if you want to get somebody to do something, you're probably going to have to affect not only his beliefs but also his attitudes. And so you may use both informative as well as expressive discourse. In order to make your directive discourse effective. He says, consequently, we sometimes succeed in causing others to act. By evoking in them appropriate attitudes. And sometimes by giving them information that affects their relevant beliefs. You can't arbitrarily or artificially, is what I want to say. You can't artificially separate these different functions of language. He gives us two more examples of linguistic functions. Of the first one, he says, it's really just a combination of two that we've talked about already. That's his view. It is not your instructor's view. I suppose to a certain degree this is all a matter of how you want to cut the kids and for what purposes. I'm not going to say there's an absolute right or wrong in that. But I think it's helpful to separate out the ceremonial use of language. Kofi says the ceremonial use of language can be regarded as a mixture of expressive and directive discourse. He says it can always be regarded rather than as a separate kind. And I'm not sure that's true. True. I'd be willing to say this is something of a category all its own ceremonial use. Like when you go to a party and say, oh, I really had a good time tonight. Now, sometimes you really did have a good time. And you're afraid that the person who put it on is feeling like, oh, I didn't have a good party. And you are trying to give some information. But ordinarily that's a way of saying goodbye. I had a good time. That ceremonial use of language, I don't think it's just expressive of an attitude, nor is it directing the person to act in a certain way. Seems to me that stands by itself. But Copie has his way of analyzing it. You need to see that he does give an example that I disagree with. Now, I've already told you I disagree with not making it a separate category. That's not that big a deal. But he uses as one of his examples, he says, the impressive language of the Marisol marriage ceremonies intended both to emphasize the solemnity of the occasion and to cause the bride and groom to perform in their new roles with heightened appreciation of the seriousness of their marriage vows. Now, maybe he hasn't been specific enough, but it seems to me that part of the marriage ceremony, the vows themselves fall into the category of what he goes in to discuss next. Performative language. You're actually performing a promise when you say, I do. Maybe he's just talking about all the other fancy language, you know, Ladies and gentlemen, we're gathered here in the presence of God and so forth. That solemn language may be what he's referring to. All right, then. Copi, on page 70, does refer to the performative use of language. And he says a performative utterance is one which, when uttered in appropriate circumstances, actually performs the act it appears to report or describe. And John Austin, he notes in a footnote, is one who's drawn our attention to this. Here are some examples. I congratulate you. Performs a congratulation, I apologize, performs an apology. I suggest that performs a suggestion I criticize in this ship, I accept your offer and promises, of course, are good example of performative utterance as well. Now, in this case, Copi says that performative verbs do not appear to be amalgams of the three major functions previously distinguished. So ceremonial. He doesn't want to make a separate category performative. He does. And as I've already told you, I'd be happy to make a separate. Both separate categories. In section 2.3, he talks about the forms of discourse, and his point is made very early in the opening paragraph. He says sentences are commonly divided into four categories. We speak of declarative sentences, interrogative sentences, imperative sentences, and exclamatory sentences. And we may be tempted to identify form, I.e. grammatical form, with function, as though, say, a interrogative sentence always functions only to ask a question. But you know that's not true. There are rhetorical questions that actually function to make an assertion or a declaration. Copi says that if you identify four with function, you'll often miss the point of what is being communicated. He goes on to illustrate and discuss that some more. On page 72, he tells us, Much discourse is intended to serve two, or possibly all three functions of language at once. And so, at the end of this first full paragraph, he says, to evaluate a given passage properly requires knowledge of the first function or functions it is intended to serve. If we're going to do good work in critical thinking, we have to be able to evaluate a passage for what the language in that passage is trying to do, what task it's trying to perform. And then I want to read almost all of this next paragraph. Truth and falsehood and the related notions of. Of correctness and incorrectness of argument are more important in the study of logic than are the others mentioned. Hence, as students of logic, we must be able to differentiate discourse that functions informatively from that which does not. And we must be able further to disentangle the informative function a given passage serves from whatever other functions it may also be serving. To do this disentangling, we must know what different functions language can serve and be able to tell them apart. The grammatical structure of a passage often indicates its function. But there is no necessary connection between function and grammatical form. Nor is there any strict relation between function and content in the sense of what might seem to be asserted by a passage. So here we have another indication. You may start keeping track of these things in your notes if you want another indication of what I told you before that to do. Logic requires sensitivity to language. There are no mechanical rules by which every argument can be evaluated. Because before you can even get to what an argument is, you first have to understand how language is used, can be used, and in a particular case, is being used. Kofi says, by the function of a passage, we generally mean the intended function. But it's not always easy to determine. Context is extremely important in determining the answer. That's what makes some of your homework assignment exercises difficult, because you don't have enough context to really be sure. By the way, Copie tells us the function of a passage. When he speaks of the function of a passage, he generally means the intended function. What's the word I gave you in lecture for that? The intended function of a piece of language or an utterance is its illocution. Is the intended function what it actually performs? Not always. And what do we call the function actually performed by a piece of language? It's perlocution. Very good. On page 73, he says it's also important to distinguish between the proposition that a sentence formulates and some fact about the speaker for which the utterance of that sentence is evidence. If somebody utters the sentence, the Dodgers are the best team in baseball, and they have more Christians on that team than any other team, there's one thing to talk about, the propositions formulated in that sentence and truths about the speaker of the sentence. If I utter that sentence, that is evidence of certain truths about me. But the sentence is not about me. It's about the Dodgers. So sometimes people make the mistake of thinking that we learn things about the speaker by his utterance, and so that's the meaning of his sentence. On the other hand, sometimes when I utter a sentence like that, I'm trying to tell you about me, not so much about the Dodgers. I want you to know what a dedicated Dodger fan I am. So I say something like that. All these distinctions that have to be drawn, we have to be very careful. Cannot automatically or mechanically say what a function is. Any particular piece of discourse. Okay. Then finally, on page 74. Oh, this is what Copie says too. There is no mechanical technique for recognizing the presence of an argument. There is no mechanical method of distinguishing language that is informative and argumentative from language that serves other functions instead. And here's the moral of the story. This requires careful thought and demands an awareness of and sensitivity to the flexibility of language and the multiplicity of its uses. That is the crucial point here. Logic can never be understood as simply a mechanical calculus because one can't even get to what an argument is in a particular passage without awareness of and sensitivity to the flexibility of language and the multiplicity of its uses. And that brings us then to the first set of exercises on page 74. And I think you are going to be ready to do the first 10 and then the first 10 of section two as well. In section one, Copi says what language functions are most probably intended to be served by each of the following passages. Let me take number one to get us started. The atrocious crime of being a young man, which the honorable gentleman has with such spirit and decency charged upon me, I shall neither attempt to palliate nor deny, but content myself with wishing that I may be one of those whose follies may cease with their youth and not of that number who are ignorant in spite of experience. I believe that this language serves an expressive function. I think the author here is giving us something of his attitude toward things and himself in particular. Now, it's a Starred exercise. Is that what the author says? Tim?

The author is very relative on these exercises.

Oh, he is. What did he say?

It can be all three.

He wants all three listed. And what we think the part of that is in terms of being expressive, what's it expressing? In terms of being informative, what is it. What is it informing us about?

That's why I thought it was hard, because some of them I didn't think were directive or expressive. So how could you get all three of them?

He said it was directive because he's telling them to stop talking about his age.

Okay.

It's informative because it admits that the speaker is a young man.

Yes, but I mean, on the other hand, most anybody would take that much for granted. So I doubt that he's standing up to concede his age. So I think the author is being a little strained here. But he's already told us it serves these different functions to a greater or lesser degree. So let's be content with that and move on. Number two, Pete, Judges do not know how to rehabilitate criminals because no one knows.

I said that was informative.

I would agree. I think that's a claim, a factual claim. It may be wrong, it may be right, but it's intending to inform us of something. Okay. Number three. Melissa. When tillage begins, other arts follow. The farmers, therefore, are the founders of human civilization.

I think that's informative also. Well, it can also be expressive, I think.

What's it expressive of?

It's expressive of his feeling that the farmers are the founders of human civilization.

Well, expressive of his feeling. That makes it sound like it's an informative function. I think it's expressive of his positive attitude toward farmers. That would be the way you put it, Number three. Jay. No. Number four. The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.

Well, I think this is both expressive and directive. Expressive and in the idea of.

His.

View of doing good and directive in that, in a way, it's telling us that we should do good and not sit back and do nothing.

However, expressing the attitude that one should do good is almost true. By definition. That's what good means. The thing you should do. Primarily, number four, is directive, isn't it? It's trying to urge people to action to bring about a certain result. Hey, Number five. They have no lawyers among them, for they consider them as the sort of people whose profession it is to disguise matters.

Pat, you're being formative, saying that there are no lawyers. And then you could say it's also expressive. It expresses a negative connotation, shows a.

Negative attitude toward lawyers, as well as making a statement about what would happen in Utopia. I'll try another one. I'll take number six. Bran Blanchard. The nature of thought. Pleasure is an actual and legitimate aim. But if anyone says that it is the only thing men are interested in, he invites the old and legitimate reply that much of the pleasure they actually get would have been impossible unless they had desired something else. If men have found pleasure in fox hunting, it is only because for the time they could forget about hunting pleasure and hunt foxes. It's a clever way of making a good point, but it seems to me this is informative discourse. He's trying to inform us about the nature of. Of what men are interested in and pleasure in their relationship. It doesn't seem to be that he's trying to direct us to do this, that or the other. Nor is he expressing a certain. Well, he may be expressing his own ethical attitude that pleasure is not the primary thing that we should be striving for. However, at this point he seems to be saying more factually that is not true, that men always seek pleasure for itself. And so that's the way I'd evaluate that one. Number seven. We'll have Pete do. The bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry are decidedly of the opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good.

I said this was expressive because it shows contempt for the bad workmen. But it could really kind of be informative too, because it talks about the bad workmen who form the majority of the operative in many branches of industry.

It also reports the opinion of those people who are the majority. And so it does have an informative function as well. Melissa. Number eight. War is the greatest plot plague that can afflict humanity. It destroys religion, it destroys states, it destroys families. Any scourge is preferable to it.

This is expressive because it shows its disgust for war.

Exactly. That one should be pretty clear to all of us. Number nine. Jay. Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.

Expressive of his view of education and its directive. And he wants us to get educated.

Now, if you had to choose or support education, which is probably what's going on here, what would you say is the primary purpose of the passage?

Well, I would suggest that he's talking about wanting to support education as a opposed to letting everybody sit back and get dumb.

Well, okay, so is he being directive or is he expressing an attitude? Yeah, I would I would, too. I'd say this functions to bring about a result, support education. And then patent number 10, the man who insists upon seeing with perfect clearness before he decides, never decides.

That directive saying, don't wait for perfection.

Yeah, very good. I think it's telling us how to approach decision making or something like that. So it's directing us. All right, we turn to section two, then, where the instruction is for. The following passages indicate what propositions they may be intended to assert, if any, what overt actions they may be intended to cause, if any, and what they may be regarded as providing evidence for about the speaker, if anything. It seems to me that's what he was forcing you to do on the previous exercise. By the way, he answered number one. Oh, well, here's a question for you. When I say, oh, well, what function is that performing in language? Melissa?

Expressive.

Expressive of my attitude. Right. Oh, well, was not a piece of information, Wasn't directed. Now, indirectly, you might say, if the author had heard me say that, there would be a way of me trying to bring about the result of him changing his textbook. Okay, well, let's do the same thing on just a few of these, and we got to move ahead real quickly. Pete, take number one. I will not accept if nominated and will not serve if elected.

It asserts his unwillingness to cooperate if elected, and that discourages help for him. So that would be what the overt action would be. And it shows the speaker doesn't want to be a candidate.

Shows his attitude. Yeah, that's very good. Nicely done, Melissa. The government, in its wisdom, considers ice a food product. This means that Antarctica is one of the world's foremost food producers.

Well, it's during that.

What's it trying to do here?

And I know it's informative, but I'm not sure exactly what he's trying to assert. Just because Antarctica has a lot of ice that.

Well, I don't think it really needs to be said that's taken for granted. That's the background of the humor of this. So it's probably not primarily informative, although it does give us some information. What do you think primarily it's doing?

I'm not sure on that one.

Seems to me that what it's primarily doing is trying to bring about the result of changing a government policy where ice is classified as a food product.

Okay.

It to a certain extent expresses the attitude of the author, his disdain for the way in which government messes things up, too, I guess because of the humorous way in which he tries to put It. Okay, J number three. Criticism is properly the rod of divination. A hazel switch for the discovery of buried treasure, not a birch twig for the castigation of offenders.

I think what he's trying to say is that there's nothing really wrong with constructive criticism. But at the same time he's trying to discourage those people that engage in sharp, uncalled for, non constructive criticisms and that he believes that there is such a thing as good criticism.

Is he expressing an attitude then? Yes. Yeah. Is he trying to change people? Trying to change their attitude towards criticism so both expressive and directive? Okay, okay, let's have Pat do number seven, then we'll move on. Of what use is political liberty to those who have no bread? It is of value only to ambitious theorists and politicians.

He's asserting that politics are irrelevant to most people. His attention seems to draw support for other things or draw attention to social issues rather than political campaign. More of a dictatorship.

So the directive function would be to get people to pay attention to social rather than political morality. What do you think the primary purpose of this expression is?

Is to draw attention or to lessen the importance. They get a message across saying that politics aren't really as important as people.

Let me give you a hint here. Notice he says it is of value only to. And he says of what use is this seems to be the expression of his attitude toward something that he has real disdain for politicians since they don't pay attention, and this is his claim, they don't pay attention to the real issues.

So you're saying he's saying that not necessarily that politics is bad, but politicians are hypocritical. So he's trying to send a message to politicians that they need to get their eyes off politics and law.

Yes, I agree with you that it has that directive implication. Trying to bring the result that they'll change the focus of their attention. But I'm suggesting, and I could be wrong, we have a short statement here. I'm suggesting that the primary purpose is really to express an attitude disdain for politicians who don't pay attention to true social issues. All right, we're going to continue with section 2.4 on emotive words. The author distinguishes between literal meaning and emotive meaning. Or sometimes the literal meaning is called cognitive meaning. Over against the emotional impact of a word. The literal meanings and the emotive meanings of a word are largely independent of one another. That's an important observation and that's what gives rise to the fact that the same thing can be described the same referent can be described with words that have a widely different emotional impact. As he says on the top of page 79, one and the same thing can be referred to by words that have very different emotive impacts. An interesting observation is made at the bottom of the page that the attempt to move from less comfortable to more comfortable terms is usually only temporarily successful. And as much as I don't like Germaine Greer very much, I think this observation is probably true, that it's the fate of human euphemisms to lose their function rapidly. And that's because if you have some kind of unpleasant situation in the world or personality or what have you, that fact doesn't go away just because you describe it differently or euphemistically. The author tells us on page 80, language does have a life of its own, independent of the facts it is used to describe. And so the attitude toward certain facts may remain the same or change, but the language that is used for describing those facts can sometimes have one kind of emotive impact and other times a different kind of emotive impact. Moreover, the emotive meaning of a, of a word or phrase sometimes arises from the context in which we first learned it or encountered it, so that it's not the thing itself, but maybe the unpleasant circumstances or pleasant circumstances under which we first learn to use a word. And he even countenances the fact that sometimes there's a private emotional suggestiveness to words that though in general I might use an expression for a crowd of people that would not have, let's say, a particularly nostalgic emotive impact on them. Maybe my words strike a certain chord in you, I mean individually, because of some unique experience or background that you have. And then he talks about this conjugation of irregular verbs. You know what an irregular verb verb is, you understand? What's being cutesy about this? Irregular verb has a different form in each of the three persons. As I understand it, every one of at least the Indo European languages has irregular treats. The to be verb in an irregular way. I am, you are, he is, so you have M R, E and that's all the same verb. That's an irregular verb. Well, now, in a real cute way, Bertrand Russell said that we could conjugate some other irregular verbs. The one that I like the most is I am firm, you are obstinate, he is a pig headed fool. You may be talking about the very same thing, but your perspective on it changes. You know, it's honorific for yourself, neutral for the person you're talking to, but completely critical of a third party. Okay, so these exercises in conjugating irregular verbs on page 81 are for the purpose of learning that language has this varying emotive impact and to be sensitive to it. Before we do the exercises, I should note also on page 81 that the author does a good job of showing how important the emotive coloring of words can be. He does that by taking a piece of poetry and translating it into more neutral language. And of course, it loses its purpose as poetry. It just doesn't have the impact that is intended Sometimes. He says it's the very emotional coloring of the words that gives the beauty to a passage. That's another good point. Well, let's try some of these irregular verbs. I ask you to conjugate three on your own. So we'll begin with Pat. Would you give us one irregular conjugation as an illustration of our point?

I am colorful. You have a strong personality, and he's obnoxious.

Okay. I am colorful. You are.

You have a strong personality.

You have a strong personality. He is obnoxious. So you have. Okay, I'm just. I'm looking for what the continuum is between those three things. Give me.

They're all relating to personality.

Well, but what kind of personality?

A colorful or strong personality? Colorful personality.

Okay. A person with a strong personality is somebody that's aggressive, extrovertive. Is that what you're thinking of?

I would think colorful or strong personality is somebody who's got a lot of. Of multiple personalities.

Multiple personalities. That's a psychological problem.

My interpretation of strong personality, I guess, was the idea that a strong personality is somebody who's colorful and cheerful and sad and can show different extremes in their personality.

Well, we haven't got into the definition yet, but I think I might challenge that. That's not the established usage for colorful. When you get to your third one, you have somebody who's obnoxious. I was thinking that by strong personality, then you mean somebody who's outgoing and aggressive. And in that case, calling yourself colorful doesn't quite catch that. You want to find a positive way to say, you might say, I am outgoing. You have a strong personality. He is obnoxious. Now, those three would seem to get at the same point, but from different perspectives. Let's see if Jay can give us one.

I am fascinating. You are interesting. He is a dull boar.

I don't think that works. To say, I am fascinating and he is a boar.

Is that too much?

Opposites? Well, yeah, I have Some others here. It's not like a matter of degree here. Now, you have two different qualities altogether. Fascinating and boring. So the idea of conjugating irregular verb remember is to have the same sort of thing described, but in different ways. Not just because there are different attitudes toward it, but because we have a different relationship to the speaker.

I should go with this other one then. I am a descriptive writer.

You are a lengthy writer.

And you are a much too wordy writer.

Okay, I think two of those run together. The first one probably doesn't fit in real well. I am descriptive. You are wordy. Not sure that's talking about the same thing. Now, the second one was lengthy. Lengthy.

In other words, we're taking a paragraph that someone's written and it's long. In one case, we're saying the guy's okay.

A nice way of saying that is you're thorough. Okay, so I am thorough. You are wordy. That's kind of negative. You are wordy. But then the third would be. You talk. The third is. But he talks too much. He says too much, or something like that. The goal here is to have the very same thing. Not have. It's not that you have opposite attitudes. It's that you have degrees of a certain attitude moving from favorable to unfavorable. Melissa, you give us one.

Okay, I am large. You are plump. He is obese.

Okay, fat would be good. And the last one too, right? Yeah, because that has real negative connotations. Okay, Pete, you give this one.

I am trying to make ends meet. You are trying to get ahead. He is the lover of money.

Yes, I think the same thing could be described in all. All those ways. Although, again, it comes close to the border of. Between the first and the third, you know, really being opposite attitudes towards something rather than just different feelings or evaluations of the same thing. Because it may very well be that you are scraping to get by and the other guy is, you know, really greedy. But I am responsible with respect to my money. You're trying to get ahead. He's positively selfish. And yet we may all be doing the very same thing, trying to build up a bank account or something like that. Okay, let's move on. In section 2.5, the author talks about kinds of agreement and disagreement. The same state of affairs can be described in different words. The that express widely divergent attitudes toward it to the extent that anything can be described by means of alternative phrases, one of which expresses an attitude of approval, another an attitude of disapproval, still another, a more or less neutral attitude. There are different kinds of agreement and disagreement that can be communicated about any situation or activity. Two people may disagree as to whether or not something happens, happened, and when they do, they may be said to have a disagreement in belief. And then at the end of that paragraph, he says the disagreement manifested is rather a difference in feeling about the matter. When that's the case, it's a disagreement in attitude. And so with respect to any matter, two persons may agree in belief and disagree in attitude, or they may agree in both belief and attitude. And it's possible as well for people to agree in attitude despite disagreeing in belief. So again, we see how we draw distinctions when we learn to think critically. And we're now drawing a distinction between what is believed and what the attitude is toward that belief. And you can have attitude to attitudes that are the same toward something, even though there's a different belief about it. You can have two beliefs that are the same and different attitudes about it. And then the author says there's a fourth possibility also in which the disagreement is complete. We don't agree in belief, and we don't agree in attitude either. Now, if we're going to resolve disagreements, then between arguing parties, it will be our goal. If that's our goal, he says, we must attend not only to the facts in a given case, but to the varying attitudes of the disputants toward those facts. It's a crucial skill in logic, then, in critical thinking, to be able to distinguish a disagreement as to what actually happened, a descriptive matter over which people disagree, and a disagreement in evaluation or response to what happened or did not happen. The author says disagreement in belief can best be resolved by ascertaining the facts. That's what, you know, the various sciences in different fields of study basically try to do. That isn't so much the logician's task. On the other hand, if there's a disagreement in attitude, he says on page 83, the techniques appropriate for settling it are rather different and not nearly as neatly put together as you might find in a defined science like biology or history or whatever it may be. That isn't to say that changing or resolving the disagreement in attitude will not make any reference to persuading people or something like that. In the middle of the page, he acknowledges something that I just want you to be aware of, that some people say that ethical terms and discussion have. Have no literal meaning, that ethical language is always of the directive and emotive or expressive type. And others, such as your own teacher, would vigorously disagree with that. In fact, if you go back and look at your notes for the ethics course I taught you, we dealt with one way in which people try to undermine moral absolutes today, and that's through what is called emotivism, the view that ethics does not have an informative function. I'm wondering, do any of you remember that? Good.

I was thinking about that.

That's great. That's great. So what you're learning here, obviously, is tied together. This is what he's referring to. Briefly, that theory that I was criticizing. Okay. He makes another comment, comment that should be remembered, that not every attitude of approval or disapproval means moral approval or disapproval. There are different kinds of values, aesthetic values, personal values. So if I express an attitude of preference for chocolate milkshakes over against strawberry, I'm not necessarily making an ethical evaluation and doing that. Then on page 85, he draws the moral from this discussion. He says, when two parties appear to disagree and formulate their divergent views and statements that are logically consistent with each other, both being perhaps literally true, it would be a mistake to say that the parties do not really disagree or that their disagreement is merely verbal. We shouldn't, you know, too easily say that the disagreement is merely a verbal disagreement. They're really saying the same thing in different ways. Because when they appear to disagree, it could very well be that what they are saying, what they are describing might be literally true and logically compatible with each other, and yet they have different attitudes toward what they are describing. Then we have some exercises beginning on page 85. I ask you to do the first 15. All right, let me take number three to begin with. Opportunity knocks but once, and somebody says it's never too late to mend. I think this is not a disagreement in belief. Possible that A and B would agree with each other in their beliefs, but they do seem to have a disagreement in attitude. One recommends jumping in, the other recommends caution. So they. They have a difference of attitude. Anybody see that?

Otherwise, I kind of thought that one believes that opportunity will always be there, and the other believes that opportunity will only come but once.

Well, the second one is not saying that opportunity is always there, is it? The second one seems to be saying that if you.

If opportunity passes you by, keep going.

Well, I think what it says is if you jump in and take an opportunity and mess things up, you can always correct it. Or maybe what it's saying is you can always go back and pick up the opportunity that you lost. I mean, you can mend that bad decision. Kind of hard to tell what the same Second one is getting at it's never too late to mend. What is that telling us? Isn't that recommending that you should correct yourself? Be willing to go back? Opportunity knocks, but once is urging someone to not let an opportunity pass by. So it seems to be a disagreement. Well, maybe it's an agreement in attitude. Maybe that's the way to approach it. Yeah, I think, okay, I called it a disagreement. Probably they run together. Somebody says, hey, go ahead, take the chance while it's there. Another person says, yeah, that's fine because if you goof, you can correct it later. So they have an agreement in attitude. I'm going to change my. I've talked myself into a new answer. Okay, let's take number four, Pat. A stitch in time saves nine. Better late than never.

In both of them, they agree that the loss of time is bad and they come up with two different ways, both preventative and just kind of a statement. But both of them agree that the lateness is bad and that time is valuable.

Well, are they agreeing in belief or disagreeing in belief?

They're agreeing in belief.

What's the belief? They agree on the time is valuable. I don't think time's value in an absolute sense is the issue here at all. Maybe in a relative sense, time versus other things. And they would say time is not the most valuable thing.

So this would be disagreement, saying. The first one would be saying that time is valuable, the second one saying time is not the most valuable thing.

If you expend effort now, you will save time later. The first one says. And the second one says it would be better to lose time than to not do something at all. Better late than never. Kind of tricky here. So they're not talking about some factual situation that they agree or disagree on. Right. This is going to be an agreement or disagreement in attitude. It seems like moral philosophy. Well, or evaluation. And do they evaluate things the same way?

No.

One says you should avoid wasting time later by taking preparatory steps. The other says, if you haven't taken preparatory steps, it's still better to do it after the fact, but better late than never. So it's. Is that an agreement or a disagreement in attitude?

Well, it would be an agreement if you take it that way.

I think it's a disagreement, isn't it?

Or to meet agreement that.

In the.

Same way as the last one we did, telling the person to go ahead and take precautionary measures. But then it's giving them confidence that even if they don't succeed, there's still, there's still room. I mean, life isn't over if you lose time. Life isn't over. Better late than never. It's not the end of it. You take precautionary measures and expect. Hope the worst, hope the best, expect the worst.

This keeps slipping away from me. Better late than never. A person who says better late than never is minimizing the fact that you didn't take precautions. The person who says a stitch in time saves nine is criticizing you for not taking precautions if you don't. So I think it's a disagreement in.

Attitude, an agreement in belief or disagreement.

I don't think it's a question of belief at all here. I think it's just a disagreement in attitude toward an attitude of taking precautions or preparing yourself, getting things done on time. I grant you, that's a slippery one. Number five, Jay. Absence makes the heart grow fonder. Someone says, out of sight, out of mind.

I say it's both disagreement and attitude in belief.

What do they disagree as to belief?

They disagree as to belief as to what's going to happen when something's not around.

Okay.

And they disagree in attitude as to how. What you're going to think about it.

Well, that. That would be a disagreement as to belief, how a person will respond to the absence. So. But that's not a disagreement, that attitude. Somebody might say, out of sight, out of mind. That's really too bad. Another person might say, yes, out of sight, out of mind. That's pretty good. So they aren't expressing a disagreement in attitude at all, necessarily. What they're saying is absence has this effect or absence has that effect. It's a disagreement in belief, not a disagreement and attitude.

It's just operating on the assumption that we had to say they either agreed or disagreed in attitude as well as belief.

It says, identify the kinds of agreement or disagreement.

I assumed we had to do both.

Sometimes you can't tell from the little bit that's given you here.

Would it be correct to say.

They.

Both agree on the belief that something is missing?

No, I think what they're saying is what will be the effect if something is missing. There's nothing here that is between them in terms of a question or a debate over something being there or not being there. Okay, Pete, why don't you try. Number 8? War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to face it. Someone else says, war crushes with bloody heel all justice, all happiness, all that is Godlike. In man in our age, there can be no peace that is not honorable. There can be no war that is not dishonorable.

I would say that's a disagreement and attitude.

Yes, obviously one thinks war has favorable consequences and the other says no, it has unfavorable consequences. Do they have a disagreement as to belief or an agreement as to belief? Oh, you were going to say they do.

I have.

I have.

That they agree that there is war, but they disagree about their attitude.

Yeah, well, that's similar to what you said in the previous one. I think understood that's. That's really too, too trivial point that they agreed that there is war.

Then I'd have to say that no, they don't agree in beliefs.

What belief did they not share the value of war? Well, the value of war means it's an attitude difference. I'm not sure that I see a disagreement as to fact. They may agree entirely as to what war does and so forth, but now they're evaluating it in a different way.

It might actually seem that there are risks. If you talks about bringing up to its highest tension all human energy.

And.

He says that war crushes.

Yeah, but I don't think they disagreement as to the facts of warfare. I just think they see them differently. Okay, Melissa, you enjoy these. Let's try number 10. Belief in the existence of God is as groundless as it is useless. The world will never be happy until atheism is universal. Somebody else says nearly all atheists on record have been men of extremely debauched and vile conduct.

I think it's an agreement in attitude.

Agreement in attitude? Well, the one says atheism brings happiness. Oh, and the other says atheism brings debauchery and vileness.

I thought I said it was not universal. I'm sorry, no. Then I definitely disagreement in attitude and disagreement in belief too.

How so?

Because one believes that. Because there's a difference in belief of what? Oh, well, no, he's not. There is. They probably believe that God belief in God is the same thing. Or atheism is the same thing, not a belief in God. Both of them probably agree on that.

Yeah, I think so. Atheism is defined as not believing in God, so I don't think they have a disagreement in belief, but they do have a disagreement as to the value of atheism.

Copie said that there was a disagreement as to the truth of atheism and therefore was a disagreement.

Well, Kopi said that. Here's a man I have a lot of respect for him, writes a Wonderful book on logic and all, but it seems to me you can't. I mean, obviously atheist and a theist disagree over, you know, whether God exists, but that isn't specifically what they're arguing here. They're not arguing the truth of whether God exists. They're arguing about what the effects of atheism are. And on that, seems to me, even if God doesn't exist, you could have that argument. And if God does exist, you could have that argument. So I disagree with Copeland once again. Let's try one more of these. They're a lot of fun. Let's do number 13 and Pat will have you tackle that. Someone says the right of revolution is an inherent one. When people are oppressed by their government, it is incorporated natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable. And then someone else says inciting to revolution is treason, not only against man, but against God.

It would be a disagreement in belief. And one assumes that since man is autonomous, revolution is man's deserved justice or right, privilege. And the other one says that there's.

A.

Man is bound to a high.

Well, again, I don't see how that's a disagreement and belief about what is the case. What would they describe differently? They say one person says this is what happens, or this is what is the case, or this is how I describe reality or history or this situation. And someone else says, no, you're wrong about that. It really should be described this way. That's a disagreement in belief as to what actually happened.

So they both have the same idea.

That.

Revolution involves treason. But what one's saying treason is the attitude toward is treason. One says treason and revolution is a right. And the other one says.

One is saying revolution is acceptable under certain circumstances. The other seems to be saying it's unacceptable.

So there would be an attitude and then if it was a belief, they would have a different interpretation of what revolution actually is.

Well, but it actually does. No, I think that when they disagree as to whether it's treasonous or not, that is itself another way of putting their disagreement and attitude. You don't call it treason if you think that it's legitimate. You call it treason if you think it's vile or sinful. So that would be a disagreement in attitude toward the right to take up arms against your government, let's say. Okay, go ahead.

How would you make that? How or could you make that a disagreement and belief?

How could you do it how could.

You do it or couldn't you? If you wanted to make this a disagreement in belief and a disagreement in attitude, how would you do it?

What could we add to it? Yes, I suppose you could make it a disagreement in belief by having one person say the standard of ethics is what God says in his word, and God's word says you may never revolt. And another person would say, no, the standard of ethics is not what is found in the Bible. Or another person would say the standard of ethics is what's found in the Bible and it doesn't teach that revolution. Evolution is always wrong there. They would have a different belief as to what is the final standard or how to interpret it. That would not be a difference of attitude in attitude, though it would lead to many different attitudinal different attitudes, different evaluations.

Belief belongs more primarily to belief.

What is the case?

Not so much as but belief as a perspective kind of.

Well, again, actually, what's I think throwing you here is the way your author uses the labels belief and attitude. And he wants to say disagreements of belief pertain to things that have happened. A more descriptive or factual what is the case kind of disagreement and belief. Excuse me, disagreements and attitude have to do with what you think is right or wrong, how you evaluate this descriptive situation. Okay. 2.6. Emotively neutral language the author says the expressive use of language is just as legitimate as the informative. There is nothing wrong with emotive language. There's nothing wrong with language that is non emotive or neutral. So he's not trying to claim superiority. They each have their place and function. However, on page 88 he reminds us neutral language is to be prized when factual truth is our objective. You're trying to follow in an argument. Emotion can be a powerful distraction. So for the purposes of logic, we should aim for as much as possible. Emotively neutral language. Is any language completely emotively neutral? I wish he would recognize that more. When he says neutral language is to be prized, he should say language with which has a greater degree of neutrality in a particular given social setting is to be prized when factual truth and logic are what we're interested in. The bottom of page 88 it says if our aim is to communicate information, if we wish to avoid being misunderstood, we should use language with the least possible emotive impact. That's a better way to put it least possible given the circumstances, rather than talking about it actually being neutral. Top of page 89. It follows that whenever we encounter highly emotive language as we are investigating the literal truth or falsity of a view or its logical implications, our task will be facilitated if we translate those passages into formulations as nearly neutral as possible. As nearly neutral as possible. Often when I hear two people arguing and I'm trying to get them to hear each other and to get down to what they really disagree over, this is a technique that is helpful to say, okay, well, let's stop calling it this and stop calling it that. Let's see if we can use this kind of language and then find out, what are you disagreeing over now? And our author tells us something about human nature that's not very pleasant at the bottom of page 89. Playing upon emotion rather than appealing to reason is a common device of those who profit from the distortion of the truth. And he puts in here, as you might guess, politicians and advertisers, people who have a reason to put things in a certain way and kind of mislead us because they'll get something out of it. Now, we didn't have any exercises that you had to do at the end of this section. So we'll leave Copie, chapter two and move now to Cofie chapter four. Let's look then at Copie, chapter four on the subject of definition. In section 4.1, he talks about disputes, verbal disputes and definitions. Sometimes a dispute arises when there is no genuine disagreement in either belief or attitude, the parties being in conflict only because they do not realize that they are using an ambiguous word or phrase in different senses. Such disputes we call merely verbal. So here they don't have really any factual disagreement and not necessarily any attitudinal disagreement, but they're using the words differently. So they don't realize that they may in fact agree with each other. So it turns out that if words are used in a mistaken or careless fashion, language can get in the way, can hinder our logical work, our work in argumentation. And this especially happens, he says, on page 129, when the words used in discussion are ambiguous or excessively vague or imprecise or emotionally loaded. So here are four ways in which language can get in the way of clear understanding of argument. If the language is ambiguous, vague, imprecise, or emotionally loaded. Notice in the next paragraph that Copie reminds us that a factual dispute may be about words, and it may be about attitudes. A factual dispute may be about words. That is, how do you spell the word? And it may be about attitudes, that is, whether somebody is generous or charitable or shy or what have you. That's a disagreement about attitudes, not so much a disagreement in attitude. In the case of a merely verbal dispute, he says on page 130, no new facts are required to resolve the dispute. What is needed to resolve the dispute is a distinction between different meanings of key terms that are being used in the argument. So the example of whether we go around with the squirrel that's on the tree that moves around, do we go around the squirrel? Does the squirrel go around us? It all depends on what you mean by going around. And so by distinguishing the meanings, then you can get rid of the appearance of a dispute. However, on page 130, he says it sometimes happens that while confusion stems in part from the party's mutual misunderstanding of their uses of words or phrases, more is involved in the dispute than words alone. He calls this an apparently verbal dispute, but one that is really genuine. In such a conflict, resolving the ambiguity will not settle the dispute, for there remains some genuine disagreement. So here you have a case where they are using their terms differently, some key term. However, getting rid of that difference does not get rid of the dispute. They still have something they disagree over. So then we have a nice summary of all of this on the top of page 131. In an obviously genuine dispute, there is no ambiguity present, and the disputers do disagree in belief or in attitude. In a merely verbal dispute, there is ambiguity precedent, but no genuine disagreement at all. And in an apparently verbal dispute, there is really genuine. That is really genuine. There is ambiguity present, and the disputers disagree in attitude usually. And then for exercises, I ask you to create your own illustrations Here on page one, page 31, create an illustration of a disagreement that's genuine, one that is merely verbal, and one that is apparently verbal but really genuine. And Melissa will let you start this time. Give me an illustration of a disagreement that is genuine.

Well, I said that abortion can be considered one because people. People may agree that abortion is killing human life, but still think. One party may think that it's okay to do that and another party may think that it's not okay.

So what is the disagreement over? What's. What's the genuine disagreement? Just put it briefly.

What's the genuine disagreement?

What is their genuine disagreement?

That. That one person has a right to do that and another person, they use.

The language of our textbook. Now, it's a genuine disagreement in. Is it belief or attitude?

Oh, okay. That's what you're looking for in.

In attitude. That's right. They both agree as to the fact that a human baby is being killed. But they have a different attitude toward that, different moral evaluation of it. Now give me a disagreement that's merely verbal.

This is the one we have trouble. I think if you said something like that tree is old, you could have a disagreement because of that, because you don't. Because of the definition of old may be different to one person.

Yeah. Well, now state what one party believes and the other party believes so that we can see this now illustrate a merely verbal disagreement.

One party says that tree is old. Eric Part said that tweet is new because they disagree on their belief of.

Old is they disagree over the use of the word old is what you want to say. Okay, now the exercise said to give illustrations from current political or social controversy. So can you give me a merely verbal disagreement from current political or social controversy?

I couldn't. I really couldn't.

Well, these. This is where there's so many that it should have been real obvious to you. So you didn't do that.

I. I didn't get one for that.

How about arguments over whether the former Soviet Union has now adopted democracy? Some people say that it has, some people say that it hasn't. That all arises because we're using democracy, the word democracy, in different ways. Okay, Jay, give me a disagreement that is apparently verbal, but really genuine.

Taking a social issue. There is disagreement as to rock and roll being really music, but whether it's just noise. And this would be a disagreement of attitude. Even though you might come to an agreement on the definition of what music is and what the definition of noise.

I think that's a good one. Someone says, that's not music. The other person says, yes, it is. No, it's not. Now, we could come to terms over what we mean by music. The person who doesn't like rock and roll will have to grant that it is music. But obviously they have a continuing disagreement of evaluation. One will say it's not music you should listen to, are not good music. And the other would say, you know, that it's acceptable or that it's good. Okay, Pete, give me a disagreement that is genuine.

Logic, is trivial and has no place in my beliefs is what someone may say. And then we could tell them that it is not useless or trivial, is inherent in your belief.

So what kind of disagreement is that?

That's a disagreement in belief.

No, no, it's a disagreement in attitude. They don't. They don't necessarily disagree as to what logic is, but they do disagree in their evaluation whether it's good or bad, useful or not useful. That's a genuine disagree with respect to an attitude, not a genuine disagreement as to belief as to what is the case or is not the case. You look confused.

Just by your statement.

Of.

Logic being trivial or useless.

Yeah, that's an evaluation. That's an attitude rather than a fact. A fact is logic studies argument forms. They may agree that logic studies argument forms, but they completely disagree as to whether that's valuable. Difference in attitude. Okay, Pat, give me a disagreement that is merely verbal.

One might say that the state has the obligation to protect the church because of the form of the separation of church and state.

Any other might say, what's the first position? That the state.

That the state should protect the rights of the church.

The state should protect the rights of the church. Okay. Then another person says what they say.

This would say that the. The church. The state should not intervene with the church whatsoever.

Okay, well, you haven't given a disagreement yet, though, because you use two different language. One says protect, the other says intervene. So what I'm saying is both sides could agree to both of those propositions. Give you a proposition that people.

One would say to allow an unlimited expression of church activity under the realm of religious freedom. The other would say extreme limitations. Freedom because of the separation of church and state.

Yeah, well, now give me a way in which they would argue with each other and not realize that it's only a verbal argument that they're having. How about if one party says, I believe in the separation of church and state, and the other party says, well, well, I don't believe in the separation of church and state. And it turns out they're using this expression, separation of church and state, in two different ways. The one party means I don't think the state should dictate to the church, and the other party means that the state ought to listen to the perspective of the church. It could turn out they would end up agreeing with each other. It's just that they were using that expression differently. The separation of church and state. That's a merely verbal dispute. It is important that you all catch on to this because so much of life is caught up in people not realizing they're using their terms differently. And that's why it appears they're disagreeing. Okay, Pete, we'll let you finish this with an example of an apparently verbal dispute that's really genuine.

I said the argument of censorship. One person may say we need censorship. Another person may say we don't need censorship. And even though they define censorship, they still might not agree on why we need it.

And why we don't need it.

Well, now you're changing it. They might agree or disagree as to why. How about they come to an agreement as to what censorship is, but they still disagree as to whether it applies to this particular movie or book or something. So that's an example where it appears that there's some ambiguity that needs to be cleared up. And yet after it's cleared up, the disagreement between the parties doesn't go away. Let's turn to section 4.2 kinds of definition in the resolution of disputes. Definitions can effectively resolve disputes that are merely verbal. Definitions can also expose and avoid the fallacy of ambiguity, which is one that we'll be studying when we go back to chapter three. And so it'd be good to learn something about definitions. Definitions are always of symbols for all. Only symbols have meanings for definitions to explain. You don't define this table, you define the word table. Is that easy enough to understand? You can't define an object, but you can define a word, a carrier of meaning. And then at the bottom of the page we find out that the symbol being defined is the definiendum. And the group of symbols used to explain the meaning is called the definiendum. Definiens. Do not make the mistake of saying that the definiens is the meaning of the definiendum. Here you have Webster's Dictionary open and you have the word chair. And then you have a number of other words over here next to it. Some people would say, well, these words over here, the definiens, are the meaning of this word here, the definiendum. But they are not the meaning. These are words. These are words. What you want to say is the meaning of this word is. Is the same as the meaning of these words over here. They have the same meaning, but one is not the meaning of the other, as it's again another group of symbols that have a meaning. And then the author goes through and tells us of five different kinds of definitions that I've already introduced to you. First of all, stipulative definitions, where you introduce a new symbol and have complete freedom to stipulate what the meaning of that symbol will be. The definition that arises from the deliberate assignment of a meaning is properly called stipulative. The term newly defined need not itself be entirely novel. It. It may be new only in the context in which the defining takes place. Now, why would we stipulate definitions like this? He says, well, there's a variety of reasons, sometimes to be used as a shortcut for a Longer expression. Sometimes for the sake of secrecy, you know, we'll have this kind of. This is what the word will mean for us sometimes for economy of expression. The author says that stipulative definitions will many times be useful in freeing us from the distraction of emotive associations with well known words. So at the top of 133 says new words can sometimes facilitate a more neutral analysis. Notice he says a neutral. He should say a more neutral analysis. And then he says on 133 as well that a stipulative definition is neither true nor false, neither accurate nor inaccurate. It's this helpful or unhelpful, preferable or not preferable, a stipulative definition doesn't function to inform us, but rather to direct us. Use language. Use this term in the following way. Now, stipulative definition doesn't resolve genuine disagreements between people, but sometimes we can clarify our discourse and remove the emotive impact of language that gets in the way of arguing with one another if we stipulate definitions. Secondly, there are lexical definitions. This is what most people think of as a definition, the sort of thing you get from a dictionary where the purpose of a definition is to eliminate ambiguity or to increase the vocabulary of the person for whom it is constructed. Then if the term being defined is not new but has an established usage, the definition is lexical rather than stipulative. A lexical definition reports a meaning the definiendum already has. And so in that sense, when someone claims this is the meaning of that term, that can be true or false. Stipulative definition is neither true nor false, but a lexical definition. The offering of a lexical definition can be. The author reminds us on page 134 that many words are used in different ways, and there's a plurality of standard meanings for words. But there's also unorthodox uses of terms that sometimes become more orthodox. At the bottom of the page, he says literary and academic vocabularies tend to lag behind the growth of living language. Unorthodox usages have a way of becoming catholic or universal. So definitions that report only the meanings countenanced by an academic aristocracy are likely to be very misleading. By the way, the use of the expression academic aristocracy is that purely neutral, or does that have emotive? Obviously he's trying to get away from the idea that person can say, well, this is what the word means when it's used properly. Oh, what academic aristocracy told you that? Thirdly, there are precising Definitions. The users of a term may in a sense know its meaning, yet remain unsure of the limits of its applicability. And when they're unsure of the limits of its applicability, precising definition will help out. Now, in order to make this point, he distinguishes between vagueness and ambiguity. Ambiguity comes up when you have more than one definition possible given a context or without consideration of the context. Vagueness arises where borderline cases cannot be determined. Does the term apply or doesn't apply? It's kind of too vague to be sure, that sort of thing. Page 136. To reach a decision about borderline cases, ordinary usage must often be transcended. A definition that can help to decide borderline cases will go beyond the report of normal usage. So when we take the normal usage of a term, but go beyond that and narrow it to make clear how borderline cases will be handled, we're offering a precising definition. Notice, a precising definition is not a new term, so it's not stipulative, and it must remain true to establish usage in that way. It's more like the lexical. And yet it does go beyond the established usage and stipulates a narrowing of it. So it's partly stipulative and partly lexical. And the author gives a nice illustration of how precise definitions are required in order that laws can be enforced fairly in society. You need to go beyond just common use, the vague use of a term, and make more precise what we're getting at. Even though we're using the lexical definition, we need to be precise so we know how to apply the term or concept in borderline cases. A fourth kind of definition is the theoretical. A theoretical definition of a term is a definition that attempts to formulate a theoretically adequate or scientifically useful description of the objects to which the term applies. This is tantamount to proposing the acceptance of a theory. When one sets forth a theory of energy, a theory of theology, God, a theory of ethics, theory of matter, then the theory itself is often treated as a definition. This is how we will understand the word atom. And then you give your theoretical construct for what an atom is. And we see this in philosophy too. He says definitions of knowledge or love or justice are often a person's theory of justice, theory of love, what have you. And then fifthly, there are persuasive definitions, definitions formulated in order to stir the emotions, to influence the attitudes of those who hear or read them. And then there's a warning on page 138 with respect to persuasive definitions, manipulation can also be more subtle. Emotive coloration may be slyly injected into the language of a definition that purports to be accurate and that appears on the surface. To be objective, we have to be very careful that sometimes people.