Dr Greg Bahnsen - Critical Thinking: Language and Informal Fallacies (Part 7)

Let's begin with a word of prayer.

This morning.

Our Heavenly Father, we come into your presence again thankful that our Lord Jesus Christ opens the way for us and does intercede for us. We do pray that you would forgive our sins for the sake of the death of our Savior himself, that your wrath would be turned away from us because it was directed toward Him. And we do pray that his righteousness might be our own, imputed to us by faith, that we would stand before you acceptable and justified, and that you might fill us with your spirit today as we study, that we would not only have clear thoughts and might do well in terms of our studies, but that above all, we would glorify you. For we pray in Jesus name, Amen. All right, we're going to begin by reviewing Morris Engel's book with good reason, chapter two on the Medium of Language. And as we go through this chapter, we'll have some exercises that we stop and pay attention to make sure that we're understanding what he has said. Okay. On page 43, Engel tells us that certain features of language can aid or hinder clear thinking. And that's why we need to master the way language works and some of the pitfalls that arise from misusing it. He tells us that all language is symbolic, and language usage lies at the heart of many disputes. When we are confronted with an argument, we need to know whether it is clear. We must agree upon the meanings of all its words and phrases, singly and in combination. This is one of the first prerequisites. Critical thinking is that you explore an argument for its clarity. Is it using terms in different ways? Is the author of this argument clear as to what he or she means? Is he or she shifting between subtly different senses of a word? Is there an understanding of what the outcome or the results or, if you will, operational consequences of a word or a phrase or certain kinds of argument would be. We need to look for clarity in argument. First of all, if you turn the page, the first section of Engels discussion is on language and thought. And he suggests that language can hamper not only communication of thought thought, but can hamper thought itself. I think I can illustrate this in a way that might be surprising. I have found that when students learn grammar better, when they get better at grammar, their thinking process gets clearer as well. So the way in which we speak and the way in which we formulate sentences and a flow of communication will often affect the way in which we think and our ability to think clearly and cogently. Now, what is the Relationship between language and thought. Engel tells us there are two views on that matter. It's continuing debate. Some would say language is merely the vehicle of thought, that thought takes place maybe in some non linguistic medium and then language is given to it as its outer garb. On the other side of the debate, you have people who say thought is merely soundless speech, that thinking requires language, and what we are doing is when we are thinking is basically going through a speech pattern without uttering it outwardly. The problem with the second view, as much as there is in favor of it, as Engkel will go on to say, is that there does seem to be thinking processes we go through that are not linguistic. We think graphically or pictorially many times as well. Although I once once met a person who claimed that he didn't think that way, that he didn't know what we were talking about. It's kind of hard to find out though. Rather bizarre. You don't ever think in pictures. Well, anyway. Engel says more recently, research has tended to confirm the view that language and thought are intimately connected. And at least this much can be said. It seems we cannot have a clear thought without being able to express it in language. Or I can improve on that a little bit or clarify precise it a little bit more. We cannot have a clear line of thought where we move from one thing to another to a conclusion without using language.

On the top of page 45, he.

Suggests that thought comes to be shaped by the language in which it is conducted. This is a very interesting consideration that you go in and you study some linguistic community and you find out that they don't have a word for rabbit, but they do have a word for dead rabbit and running rabbit. That leads you to wonder, do they not think about the rabbit as a separate entity? Or do they only think in terms of dead rabbits and running rabbits? Do they have a different conceptual category or categorization of reality than we do? Well, we don't need to get into that and settle that for the sake of logic. A good observation is made, taken from George Orwell on the bottom of page 45, that clear thought about things. Orwell is interested in political realities. Clear thought about things is difficult because our language has been clear corrupted by rhetoric, hear the rhetoric of politicians. But it's not just in that domain that we have this problem. It's hard for people to think clearly about abortion because of the euphemisms and jargon that people will use. Jargon like fetus or euphemisms like pro choice will get in the way of people thinking clearly about this. This is the murder of a baby. All right? On the other hand, they would probably accuse me, you see, of using emotive language where something more neutral should be followed. But the fact is that people, you mustn't think that the problems of language are always just the deliberate, purposeful manipulation of the person who's offering an argument. Sometimes people can't think clear clearly because the way in which they come to speak about the issue gets in the way of how they understand the issue itself. Jargon and euphemisms. All right, section two begins on page 46. Signs and symbols. Engel points to the representational quality of language. Words are used to stand. Stand for something beyond themselves. Hopefully you can take that for granted. I mean, you would have known that already. Words are not the thing. Obviously, when I say cow, the word cow is not the thing that gives milk and goes move. Okay, what's the difference between a sign and a symbol? Well, a sign understood as a natural sign is anything we use to refer to or take as an indication of something else. So if I see bent grass as I'm walking through a meadow, I say, ah, there's a sign. The deer have been here already. Okay. On the other hand, a symbol is not something that you find in the natural world. It too stands for something else. But by convention rather than by some natural connection, symbols are signs for something else rather than signs of something else. We wouldn't want to say of the bent grass that I look at that, that's a symbol of the deer being here. It wouldn't make sense. However, if I put something up on the board, some configuration, I say, let that stand for seeing the deer in the meadow. I'm making that a symbol for something else. It stands for it rather than being a sign of it. Engel tells us without a system of arbitrary non imitative symbols, only the most limited communication would be possible. An imitative symbol is one where the word is supposed to very closely approximate the reality that it's about. And so onomatopoeia just love that. Say that 10 times when you wake up in the morning. Onomatopoeia. Today when we say buzz, we are referring to the sound made by a bee. And the word is supposed to sound like the very thing that it represents, represents. But apart from such limited onomatopoeia instances in our language, most language is non imitative language succeeds in labeling abstractions by making use of arbitrary non representational symbols. Language therefore, is essentially symbolic and we have A few exercises here to take a look at. Well, if you're all ready to go, We'll start with tap. This morning we are told that some of the following observations about language are famous. Others are less well known. Which of them would you be inclined to agree with and why? With which would you disagree? And again, why? Well, Pat, let's just take a stab at number one here. No two languages can say quite the same thing. You would not agree with that. And why not? The reason why?

Well, if a language has a symbol for something, then there's something that it respects. A merchant, you know, a word in Chinese and a word in English is still a symbol for the same object. The object doesn't change by the language. It's a symbol. It's a language that changed.

Now, what if you took a behaviorist approach to language where there are no propositions, no abstract entities that stand for the meaning or which are the meaning of the sentences that are used? Wouldn't a person who holds that view be inclined to say, no two languages can say exactly the same thing. They can only approximate the behavioral responses between two linguistic communities? Well, okay, now, if we don't take a behavioral approach, what if we take a view that would be more in tune with the Christian world worldview, where there are meanings, so propositions, things that are the meaning between two statements in different languages. On that approach, isn't it still the case that there are slight differences in, if nothing else, the emotive impact of words? Just some words are more cacophonous sounding, some words are more mellow, pleasant sounding. And so you can, you can try to approximate an equivalence between English and French, but there's always going to be slight variations in the way that it comes across. What's that?

The word there is quaint.

Okay.

The statement is, no, two languages can say quite the same thing. Okay. There could be some slight variations of the sort we talked about.

If you say two in French and two in English, it still has the same resemblance of two objects. There's no real.

Well, it may be referring to the same thing, but certainly the way in which you say it, I mean, just the way it comes across on the eardrum has some slight variation. I'm moving very minuscule here when we make that point. But translation is a tricky matter. What we usually settle for is translation that accomplishes a particular purpose. So if I want to refer to the deer in the meadow and I say that in English and then I say it in German, it is, from the standpoint of translation, adequate. Provided all I want to do is get across that there was a deer in the meadow, and I don't want all the poetic implications or impact of it and all the rest. All right, Jay, let's have you take number four. The question is, said, Alice, whether you can make words mean so many different things. The question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be master. That's all.

Alice, in my opinion, both parts of this are true in the sense that there's a certain formality in words. You can't just make one word mean anything you want in certain situations. Whereas what Humpty Dumpty is saying is that there are times when we can stick our own. Definitions for words because we're the ones that use them.

Okay. Humpty Dumpty is suggesting that since we're the master of language, we can stipulate the meaning of all of our terms. But is that true? Can we, if we wish to communicate with another person, can we stipulate the meaning of all of our terms? Many of them, maybe. But if we stipulated all of them, then we wouldn't have any basis to be to begin the communication process at all. So that's good observation, Melissa. Let's have you do number eight. How do I know what I think until I see what I say?

I agree with it because in the book it said that we can't have a clear thought without being able to express it into language.

Do you agree with that? That you don't know what you think until you actually say it?

Well, I guess you can know what you're thinking. Yes, you can know, but it's not a clear unless you're able to express it into words.

Yes, but do you have to actually utter something before you can see what you are saying, understand what you're thinking?

No.

You could speak silently to yourself. Right. Okay, so the possibility of inward dialogue then refutes what this statement asserts. How do I know what I think until I see what I say? Well, the answer is by thinking to yourself, speaking to yourself inwardly. Okay, let's move on. Section three, Words and things. Engel says the belief that there is a kind of inherent fitness between the word and the thing it represents is. Has long been curiously widespread. And he goes through some examples of that, of this tendency to identify words with things, as in magical practices and religious rituals. And then he uses as an example that certain words are so holy and sacred they're never to be spoken.

And.

And the ancient Hebrews would not utter the name of Yahweh. Now is God. His name. Is God. His name. No, stop and think about it. The Bible suggests that God is His name, that we hold up holy hand to the name of God, we pray to the name of God, we praise the name of God, and so forth and so on. The name of God is a special case, however, this can be said. God is not my utterance of His Name. And so the superstition that says I can't say Yahweh or Jehovah is a misconstrued, of course. Page 50. Go ahead. And he said to be an attribute of God, his name. No, his name stands for Himself, not just an attribute of himself. Holiness is an attribute of God. For some attributes of God are identified with God too. You know, we read that his name. That his name is jealous and he is his name. We'll have to get into a theology class to talk about the incomprehension character of God in the sense in which he names Himself. He is Himself and all of that. But the point here is that my utterance of God's name is not God himself. And Engel on page 50, says that the names we use to identify objects become, after long use, so associated in our minds with their objects that it's easy to forget for the moment that the name is not the thing itself. And he gives some humorous illustrations of that. He says the false assumption that the symbol equals the thing leads us into a second false assumption that the language we use somehow affects the thing we are referring to. Okay? And because of that false assumption, people are very prone to use euphemism. It's kind of like the thing won't be as bad if we don't speak of it quite as harshly. Something like that. He says in the middle of page 51. A euphemism is any agreeable expression that we substitute for one we find offensive. Okay, so then we come to some exercises on page 52. All right, Engel says the following advertisements try to exploit certain of our feelings by calling up associations in our minds. Analyze in each case what the association is and why it is or is not effective as a persuader. And we'll begin with Pete number 10. A great American soup. About as close as you can get to homemade with without making it yourself.

It refers to the homemade part.

People.

People conjure up ideas that homemade is always better and that it's also the great American soup. So if you're going to be patriotic and be American, you should have this soup.

Okay? I think on homemade, it's not just that homemade Is better. But doesn't that conjure up images of, you know, someone in the kitchen at home making the soup? Okay, Pat, let's have you take number 12. A pen can't tell you everything about a man, but it can tell you a lot. The Parker 75 classic ball pen.

It's saying here the idea that. That a pen can communicate an image. A pen can somehow establish your status.

Okay. So that if. And the suggestion is that what it's going to tell people about you is good. You know, you're a certain kind of man if you use this ball. Punta. That's silly. And yet you know that advertisements do this kind of thing all the time. Okay, Jay. Army. This is number 15. Army. Be all you can be.

That's the idea that if you go into the army, you're gonna.

You're gonna fulfill your dreams. And those who don't go into the army, they don't.

At least they don't fulfill them as.

Well as they could. Yeah, I'm not so sure it's dreams as it is. Potential, isn't it? Yeah. It's like become everything you can be. The army's going to draw it out of you, make you your best feel sorry for the people who believe that kind of thing. Okay, now, number four, the uses of language. All of this is becoming familiar to you from the lecture and from reading Cofie, I'm sure. But now Engel's way of putting it. He says one of the fundamental uses is to give information about the world. Another would be to express our feelings or to evoke feelings in others. And then two thirds of the way down the page, he says, in short, language can be used not only in feeling formatively, but also ceremonially, emotively and directively. Each use has its own legitimate domain. What can be objectionable, however, is confusing one use with another. And he uses the example you find in Kofi as well. Someone says, well, how are you today? And then you say, start to get, you know, blood pressure and temperature and all the rest. And that's just missing the point of what that kind of language was intended to be about. And page 54, he says the key element to isolate when ascertaining whether a given use of language is appropriate is its intention. And by this he means the primary purpose in the next paragraph adds something that we've talked about. The fact that emotional language is usually to be avoided in logic does not mean that it is in any way an inferior kind of language. And the bottom of the page, the emotive value of a speech or essay is, however, irrelevant to its logical value. When we are reading or listening critically from a logical point of view, we are interested only in the informative content of statements and the support some statements give to others. Remember what I said? Logic, the study of argument. An argument is where one proposition or set of propositions is given in support of another. That is asserted as proven by those other ones. And so Engel is right here that the motive aspect of language is valuable and is not inappropriate, but for logical purposes it doesn't affect whether an argument is sound or unsound, valid or invalid, so forth. Yeah, that's the last thing he says. The emotive force of an argument has no bearing whatsoever on its validity. And now we have some exercises. He says, in the following items, identify the chief purpose of the discourse. Is it to inform, to express feeling, to direct, to engage in a certain ceremony if there's more than one purpose, which is dominant. Finally, analyze whether the language used in each case is appropriate for the use. Okay, where did we leave off? Is it your turn, Pete? No, Melissa. Try number 21. It's a pleasure to meet you.

It's ceremonial, because that's what you would say, your person, even if you don't think it's a pleasure to meet them.

Okay. It's the sort of thing that's just used as a greeting. It's a space filler, really, for social purposes. Now, is that appropriate?

Yes.

Do you think that when we meet disagreeable people, we should tell them it's a pleasure?

Well, you don't know that when you first meet them usually, though.

Yeah, but what if you do? What if you know this person's reputation? You say, I really despise that person. And then someone at the party brings you, oh, I'd like you to meet so and so. And then you shake their hand and say, well, it's a pleasure to meet you. I don't know. I realize that I'm bordering on being one of these social bores that they talk about, but then that kind of bothers me a little bit. On the other hand, sometimes it really is a pleasure to meet someone. I mean, you're just really glad, and so you wish there were a way you could tell them that without it sounding like you're kissing up or something. Then you say, it's a pleasure to meet you. You don't want them to take it the ceremonial way. You want them to take it like, I'm really, you know, pleased. It's really an honor to meet you or something like that.

Isn't that where tone would come into effect?

Say what now?

Tone or accent?

Oh, I suppose you could affect it by emphasis. It really is a pleasure to meet you. It's a pleasure to meet you. Yeah.

Rather than.

Well, it's a pleasure to meet you. Okay, good. That's 21, Pete. What time you take? 25. I know that one's a starred one. Let's back up 24. I pride my poor eyes out over your horrid plague. Your heavenly plague, my dear. And now, how can I go out to dinner tonight? I must keep my blue glasses on all the while, for my eyes are puffed up and burning. But I can scarce keep from reading it all over again. Henry would not care for that play. I think. I know he would laugh. And that sort of thing makes him. Makes me hate him sometimes. Now, this is from a letter written by Ellen Terry to George Bernard Shaw in 1896 after she had read Shaw's Candida.

I said that was expressive because it shows her feelings. Her just her feelings.

She cried her poor eyes out. Is that informative? I hope not. She doesn't have eyeballs anymore. She cried her poor eyes. No. Yeah, this one's just. Just, you know, weighed down with expressive ways of putting her. Now. Now, is any information given, though, Pete?

She doesn't like Henry.

Yeah. That's one of her attitudes. Right. She doesn't evaluate him very highly. Is anything else told us here? Is there any information?

I would not explicitly know.

Doesn't it tell us anything about her. Her feelings about the play she likes?

She.

She loves the play.

Yeah. She obviously has a favorable reaction to the play. So there is some information. But the main use of this is expressive to get across her own emotional state about it.

But she also calls it a horrid play. So she says, you're horrid play. Your heavenly play.

Well, I. Okay. Isn't that a play on words? It's horrid because it's so heavenly that it makes me cry my eyes out. It's like too good to be true. Horrid in that sense. At least that's the way I read that. Okay, Pat, your party was out of this world.

Now be informative and also emotive, as you would say.

It would inform. What's the dominant use? Emotive. I would say emotive. Expressive.

Expressive, yeah, because expressing your feeling about how the party was, at the same time, it also be informative. Informing the person that they did a good job. It's giving them a Confirmation.

Yeah. But that, of course, would be indirect. The primary use of this is to say something about yourself and your own feelings. I had a good time. I really like this. Wow. Your party was out of this world.

Could it also be ceremonial?

Well, I thought about that when I first looked at it, but it doesn't seem to me that that is a social convention. Like, it's a pleasure to meet you. It's not common, although many people will say that they'll use that. But it's common to people who are trying to express a certain feeling rather than just the ceremony. Like, you wouldn't feel like you had been rude or a bore if when you leave, you failed to say your party was out of this world. Okay, that's not so much a ceremonial. It may be a rather stereotyped way of expressing a positive feeling, but that doesn't make it ceremonial in itself. Okay, Jay, let's have you do number 34. If you want to print with the NEC letter Quality printer, you must use the word star for any C spinwriter disc.

That's both informative and directive. It's informative in that it tells us that if we're going to print a letter, we have to use a certain type of equipment. This also direct. It's also directed by the same token. I am assuming from the fact that there's. There's no den in there or anything like that, it's probably more directed than informative.

Yeah, I was just going to say the informative part would be minimal. This seems to be directing you that if you have this goal in mind, you have to follow the following. You have to do it in this way. You must use the disc for the word star. Nec screenwriter. It would have been more informative. Correct.

If you want to do this, then you must.

That would have given it a more informative flavor or crust. I agree with you. But even then, that grammatical form could be taken just simply as a directive. If this is what you want, then that's what you do. Okay, let's move ahead now to section five, ambiguity and vagueness. Ambiguity and vagueness are alike in that they use imprecise language. The distinction between them, according to Engel, is that something's ambiguous if it has more than one distinct meaning. It's vague if its meaning is not distinct or it is unclear. Okay, I like the sentence beginning the next paragraph. While the meaning of vague words is doubtful, that of ambiguous words is double. That may help you draw the distinction. One has distinct meanings plural. The other doesn't have distinct Meaning is unclear. Or you could say one has double meanings or triple and the other has doubtful meaning. Often in the case of an ambiguous expression, the context will be important in determining exactly what was meant. In the next paragraph, Engel tells us some words are always vague regardless of context, for their meanings are not merely indeterminate, but indefinite. I hope you all catch the. There are some words which are always vague because of the indefiniteness of their meaning. An example that he gives is rich. That's always a vague term. You know, that guy's really rich. Well, you know, if you're a person who lives in some, you know, hut in South America, you could be talking about a person that gets to eat a meal three times a week. Conceivably you could say he's rich, but if you only ate three times a week in our culture, we wouldn't say you're rich. So it's indefinite what it's going to mean and will change from context to context. The next paragraph, he says that unlike ambiguity, vagueness has several causes. One of them is our own confusion. We vague because we're confused about something. Is it raining outside when it's misting? Well, there can be a vagueness about the verb rain. To rain if the mist is heavy enough, you know, to make your outer garments feel moist and yet it's not being formed into draw droplets where you can see them hit the ground. Is it rain or is it not rain? Well, that's the case. Yeah, I see some of you are shaking your head yes, no, but the reason for that is because the term is vague. Another reason for vagueness is the shop worn nature of language. Sometimes we use terms so much that this happens especially among teenagers. Some favorite expression for something is good. You know, it's boss. I remember the time where it's righteous, excellent, you know, it's hot, it's cold. I mean, no, it's cool. This is bad. Yeah, it's righteous. You know, they're both saying the same thing and yet, you know, the, the dictionary definition of the terms is directly opposite. But the point is, if you say, if we use a term like great, you say, that's great, this is great, he's great, and all that. Then the word great becomes fairly vague. And then he says another reason for vagueness is that terms acquire so many meanings. A good one here is democracy. And that's why people argue over, well, they're just not being democratic when they do that. Well, the term's so vague though. I mean, in some ways they are. Some Ways they aren't. And then he says, finally, there are some words which are both ambiguous and vague, which is a good point. Some terms which have many meanings, and the many meanings are vague. And he uses as an example the word artist. The exercise here, Here on page 58 says, make up a list of vague words indicating those which are vague because one, we ourselves are unclear. Two, they've been overused. Three, they've come to stand for too many things. And. Melissa, give me an example. One term that is vague because we're unclear about the things involved in using that term.

Overweight, because you're not sure what determines what overweight is.

Oh, that's a good example. I mean, kind of sensitive for Dr. Balsam, but.

My aerobics.

Yeah, well, no, that. No, that's true. And again, I don't want to get real personal, but, like, when I go to the doctor, he's real happy sometimes with knowing I'm doing my weight, but I feel overweight and I need to be dieting and losing support. So that shows that the term overweight is vague. Good example. Pete, give an example of a term that is vague because it's overused in our language. Awesome. Ah, I like that. That's awesome, man. Heavy. Groovy. It's groovy. Yeah, that's right. Awesomeness. To mean so many different things because it's applied to so many different things that. Yeah. And then Pat will let you give us the last one. An example of something that is vague because it means too many things now has come to stand for too many things.

Preaching.

Preaching. The term preaching is vague.

Well, it's currently stand for too many things.

Explain that to me.

Well, you'd say a biblical view of preaching is learning from the word of God, whereas some people think preaching is storytelling and all the rest, and yet they'll call it preaching. A lot of things get under the guise of preaching. People will even speak in tongues and consider it preaching.

You know, I think I would have to discuss. Disqualify this example. I understand now what you are saying. I think you've misconstrued what it is for a term to be vague. What you're talking about is there are different theories of preaching, all under the general rubric of preaching. And you know that you and I probably agree on this. Some we wouldn't want to call preaching, but people do. That's a debate over the theory of preaching, if you will. But I think when we use the term preaching, most people know what you're getting at, even if you talk about that guy in the park is real preachy and the guy in church is preaching and the guy on the television. We all know that preaching amounts to some kind of exhortation, public exhortation or beseeching of some sort. And then there are good ones and bad ones. And that's what you're talking about, is that there are good ones and bad ones. What I want is term that has become vague because what's that?

Something that's vague, Kind of more vague to begin with.

Vague because it has acquired so many different meanings. Decency hasn't done that, I don't think.

Unfortunately, I'd say it's decent to allow.

Yeah, but again, Pat, you're making the same mistake you did in the first one. You're confusing a difference of opinion about something as what counts as decent or what counts as preaching. And you're then attributing that to the word being vague. It's not that the word is vague.

Since you can have a success.

It'S.

Not necessarily a matter of opinion, but it's a matter of you can have a success and failure. Either way, you have a success. But what really is a success?

Well, I don't know that success is a good example, but you're close. Successful would be a good example. We say, you know, he's successful. Well, that means so many different things. That's like saying they're Democrats over there. Well, maybe in some ways, yes, some ways no. Section six on verbal disputes. Engel says that we need to make a distinction between two types of disputes, real disputes and verbal disputes. Now remind me, how does Copie complicate that a bit? Copie says there's three kinds. Genuine, verbal, merely verbal, and apparently, apparently verbal. Okay, here we have the distinction between real and verbal. This author says real disputes arise when genuine differences of opinion exist regarding matters of fact. Verbal or linguistic disputes, on the other hand, occur when one party believes that a certain statement is true, while another party believes that another statement is false. This is a different way of explaining it, coming at it from a different angle. He says rather than a difference of opinion over a single statement, there's a different view of what is at issue in a verbal dispute. I'm not so sure that is helpful. I like copies when of putting it. But in the next paragraph, I do think Engel says something insightful. He says facts cannot settle verbal disputes. Where you have a verbal dispute, you can't bring more facts in and have the people then say, okay, well, now we have this disagreement goes Away top of page 59. Because of the manner in which each of them understands key terms in the dispute, they cannot tell what their dispute is really about. And then in the next paragraph, since the same words that convey information are sometimes used to express feelings and attitudes, occasions for verbal misunderstanding are frequent. So that you say something, intending it in an informative way, the person you're talking to takes it when or its emotive impact, the feeling that it expresses. And then you get into an argument, and you may not disagree over the facts at all. Engel says verbal disputes can arise in either of two ways. This is the bottom page 59. One, when both parties, although sharing the same emotional dimension of the issue, differ in their understanding of its descriptive dimension. They wouldn't want to describe it that way, even though they're both positive toward it. Or when both parties, although in agreement on the descriptive dimensions of the issue, have entirely different responses regarding its emotional dimension. They might agree in describing, you know, this is what took place on the screen. But one person calls it pornography and the other doesn't. And so there you have a verbal dispute.

Go ahead.

Isn't that what Kofi was talking about.

As being verbal but genuine?

Because they can agree on the definition.

But you still won't agree, right? This is what happens when you have two different approaches to something. If one guy cuts the cake in two pieces and another guy cuts it in three, then you're going to have that third category apply to some of the illustrations that are in the second category or the first for the different schemas, different way of schematizing it. Good observation. Page 60. At the very end, he says of the dispute that he's been discussing. Such a dispute is thus essentially verbal, for the argument produces the illusion of there being a difference on one issue between the parties, when in fact they are arguing separate issues. They're really talking about two different things. And then we have a couple of assignments here to go through. And Jay, I'm going to have you take number 38. Jesus said, oh, what are you supposed to do? Analyze the way in which the issues are or can be resolved. In the following passages. Jesus said, truly, truly, I say to you, unless one is born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God. Nicodemus said to him, how can a man be born when he is old? He cannot enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born can. Hey, Jenny.

Okay, this is what you call verbal dispute because they have different understanding of.

The word being born again.

And Christ does explain what he means later on in John chapter three.

Well, he does, yes. As Christians, we tend to be sensitive when these logic fellows grab a theological or a biblical issue. But now, is it right to say that at that point Nicodemus and Jesus had a verbal dispute? Again, dispute doesn't have to mean that they were contentious, but Jesus was speaking one way, and Nicodemus says, now that can't be true. You can't go back in your mother's womb and be born. Well, okay, so you have a verbal dispute. Can it be resolved? It can and it was. Did they really have a disagreement? And I think we could think of illustration where the same kind of discussion begins between, say, a Christian and a non Christian talking about being born again. And then after it's explained what it means to be born again, the unbeliever still has a negative attitude toward it. And so that would only be an apparently verbal dispute. On Kopi's way of looking at it, they can resolve their differences of linguistic behavior, how they're using their terms, or what they mean by their terms, but they have not resolved their disagreement on the issue at stake. Okay, now section seven on definition, since we see how troublesome language can be if it's unclear or ambiguous. Obviously, one way to make an argument clear is to give definitions of key terms. Engels, as a definition is a statement that one word or phrase has the same meaning as another word or phrase. Remember this, we do not say that the definition. We do not say that the words that follow the term being defined are the definition, are the meaning, but rather they have the same meaning as the word being defined. The bottom of the page. Engel distinguishes reportive definitions from stipulative definitions. The reportive definition can be judged as either true or false. It reports the conventional use of a term. Okay, what. What does Copie call the reportive definition? Pete? Engel calls something a reportive definition.

Copious.

Another way of defining, designating it. We don't want to get into a verbal dispute here after all. Tell me, what does Copie call the same thing that Engel is referring to as a report of definition?

What does Engel call you?

What does Copie call what Engel designates the reportive definition of a term?

You really caught me dreaming.

Sorry, Jay.

Lexical.

Lexical. That's right. The lexical definition is what we would call the dictionary definition. And this is reporting, giving the history of the term, if you will, reporting on it. So Engel likes to call it report definition. Now, over against reportive, we have stipulative definitions. In the stipulative definition, for your own purposes, you lay down or prescribe how you're going to use the term. And then, according to Engel, sometimes you can have a hybrid of reportive and stipulative. Okay. When you look at the report of.

Definition, what is found in the dictionary.

And then you stipulate that you're going to use it in a particular way, he calls that an explicit explicative definition. I got too many syllables in there. Explicative definition. And now I'm going to put the correct question to you this time. It's your turn, Pat. What Engel calls an explicative definition is what Copie calls a what definition?

Precising.

Precising. You're precisely right.

Yes, I like that. According to Engel, an explicative definition accepts the agreed upon usage of its defence, find expression, but goes on to stipulate how that expression is to be used.

In cases not made clear by dictionary reports.

And then he talks about another kind of definition. But here he moves from a kind of definition to a method of defining copi.

I think is a little clearer in.

This, in that he says there are five kinds of definition. And then in another section he talks about ways of doing a definition, and I think it's good to set those apart. Anyway, Engel's discussion of the definition per genus et differentia by genus and specie. Right. He says the marks of a good definition would be that the defining expression must be clearer to the audience or reader than the defined expression. Doesn't help to go from the obscure to the more obscure. The defining expression of any definition should be substitutable in any linguistic context for the defined expression. Substitutable salva veritate, as it's put in the literature. That is, if you take a sentence and you substitute for this word what you call the definition of the word, the truth value of the sentence should not change. If it's a true sentence, it should stay true. If it's a false statement, it should stay false, so preserving the truth value when you make the substitution. Now, what's deficient about that criteria alone anyway? Well, in any sentence where you read a creature with a heart, you could put in the expression creature with a kidney and you would never change the truth value of the sentence because those.

Two expressions denote the very same objects in the world.

So the sentences will always be true or false will retain their truth or.

Falsity with the substitution.

But that doesn't mean the two expressions.

Creature with a heart Creature. Creature with a kidney mean the same thing.

Thirdly, Engels says that a definition is accurate if and only if its defining expression applies to all and only the items to which its defined expression applies. And he tells us that the best way to test the accuracy of a definition is to put it to the test of instances. That is, just look at examples and try many instances. Find out if it can match up. On page 64, you are asked in the exercises to define the following terms. We'll take just a few of them. Melissa, let's have you do one. Define triangle.

Triangle means a shape with three sides and three angles.

Did you get that from the dictionary?

No.

You just made that up yourself.

It's not very elegant.

Three sides and three angles. Well, could you have one without the other?

Could you have something that has. Isn't it a joined. A figure. A connected figure that has three sides? Yeah, if it's connected, then it has.

To have three angles. Right. Okay, Pete, define love. Great.

The self giving action of caring for another and showing affection towards another.

Okay.

If someone were to hear that definition.

Would they be more familiar with the defining expression self giving and affection than.

They would with the term love?

No, probably not.

Oh, no. I don't know.

They might be as familiar.

Yeah, because that can really be benevolent folks too.

Self giving. So you added affection. Yeah. Okay. A person can be benevolent and yet not affectionate.

I think a lot has to do.

With whether you mean the expression of affection or the having of affection. Two people might love each other and never hug each other, might never show affection.

Well, we're going to move on.

The value of this assignment was just to show you how difficult definition can be. And I hope that when you did define these terms, you went back to look at the rules Engel laid down. For instance, in the case of love, it would be awkward, you know, from a semantic standpoint, but in every sentence where we find the word love, could we put in there self giving? Is that what you used?

Yeah, self giving.

Okay.

Self giving and affectionate. Could we put in there.

That expression in the sentence would always retain its truth value. That would be an interesting test. I don't know how it would come out. You might try that. The Art of Plain Talk. Clarity in the presentation of an argument cannot be achieved merely through the use of definitions. It also requires style. And I hope that you all mark that in your book. That is very important. Definitions can't do it all. And style is necessary for plain talk. And clarity, too. You can't define everything. Just remember that one impediment to good style, he says, is the cliche. A cliche is a trite expression so overused that it's become practically meaningless. And according to Engel, cliches are always dangerous for the inclusion. Encourage thoughtlessness by obscuring the fine points of an issue.

Cliches are overgeneral.

They can be vague qualifications in detail. The fine points are overlooked. The best defense against cliche riddled thinking is to remember that for every such popular maxim, another can be quoted which directly contradicts it. And then he says, secondly, a serious.

Impediment to good style.

The most serious impediment to good style.

Is jargon.

Those cliches that are peculiar to particular professions. Can Christians be prone to jargon? No. They sure can.

And then, of course, when we try.

To argue with each other, the jargon can get in the way. Or. Or worse, when we try to talk to those who do not share our.

Subculture, our jargon, you know, we start talking about substitutionary atonement.

Somebody has no idea what atonement is.

All about, much less substitution.

In a legal sense, our jargon.

Can almost be hideous.

It will not help to evangelize those who have not grown up in an.

Evangelical setting by going out and using.

Using the jargon. Are you under the blood? Right. I mean, that kind of expression is just going to be gruesome to people who aren't familiar with it. And there's many other examples, too, but every field has it.

I used to be real sensitive to.

The fact that Christians use so much jargon.

Well, lawyers use jargon and doctors use.

Jargon, and athletes use jargon.

So it's just part of living together.

Linguistic communities develop jargon, but jargon can get in the way of clear expression and clear thinking and reasoning as well. Okay, from page 67, I'd ask that you offer 10 cliches and the exercise there just so we'll be familiar with what a cliche is.

Okay, let's have a cliche from each one of you.

Pat, you can't throw salt on every snail.

You can't throw salt on every snail. Well, not one that I'm familiar with, but that's a cliche that you run into a lot.

Yeah, it's a Dutch cliche. The idea is when kids burst salt on snails, they shrivel up and die. And there's more things they do during the day than going around throwing salt on the snails and watching them triple up.

Wow. Okay, now how effective is that as a cliche? If you have to explain it. That's right. A cliche in one community might not.

Be a cliche in another.

Okay, Jay, which one do I want to use?

How about you snooze, you lose.

You snooze, you lose?

Okay, Melissa, there's a sucker born every day.

Every day or every minute?

Oh, I've heard every day. But it can be different, I guess.

I guess you run into more suckers in my community.

Pete, of familiarity breeds contempt.

Yeah. So that's, I think, one that we've all heard and probably is used pervasively. Familiarity breeds contempt. What's wrong with that?

Well, because there's another one that misery loves company.

Yeah, that's good. Okay, so we know how cliches are not going to be helpful in trying.

To do clear thinking and argumentation, vague.

Words and ambiguous words or not. And I trust that this chapter reinforced things that we've already learned from Kopi and from lecture. All right.

As we move into a new unit of our course on critical thinking, it'd be good for us to step back for a minute and get an overview of what we've been covering and where we are going. I don't want you to lose track of how we're progressing toward a particular goal here, covering what is necessary for critical thinking. I told you at the beginning of this course that critical thinking will sharpen your thinking ability. And even though we're not quite halfway through with it, I think you can see that already. How? Just learning about what argument is, premises and conclusions, and the use of language will begin to sharpen your thinking ability. Critical thinking studies the reasoning process by which conclusions are drawn when all is said and done and the components in critical thinking. At least one man's way of putting it. This man's way of putting it would include an understanding of one argumentation. Getting clear on that. So that was the first thing that we considered in this course, argumentation. And under this category A, we studied argument itself. I gave you a definition of it. We considered premises and conclusions. What's the difference between them and certain misconceptions of argument. For instance, that it's contention or conditional statements taken as arguments or causal explanations confused with arguments in favor of the truth of a conclusion. We learned what a proposition is, so that'll be me on your outline. We defined what a proposition was, distinguished it from sentences, and distinguished the proposition from the argument, too. Arguments are made up of propositions, but a proposition itself is not an argument. We looked at the metaphysical challenge that some people give to propositions. Thirdly, we consider truth and validity, the difference between them. Truth pertaining to propositions, validity pertaining to the manner of argument or the structure of the argument. We also looked at the nature of necessity with respect to drawing conclusions. And then fourthly, we tried to understand the difference between a deductive and an inductive argument. The crux of the issue between these two is how is the strength of the conclusion affected by further possible evidence? In a deductive argument, it's not affected at all. It's settled. You know, it's either valid or invalid. In an inductive argument, further evidence can weaken or strengthen. Strengthen the conclusion. And we also talked about sound arguments. A sound argument is one that is deductively valid and has true premises. And then finally, under our introduction to Argumentation, we looked at what logic is. One sense, this course might be called a course in logic, but I see it as broader than simply logic, as what you have in the textbook. Logic is the study of argumentation, or the study of how to distinguish between correct and incorrect reasoning. I pointed out that it's a second order discipline. Logic reflects upon argumentation. People argue even if they haven't studied logic. People are logical even if they haven't studied logic. And we looked at certain inadequate conceptions of what logic is. And then finally we went over what I call a theology of logic. And ask ourselves the question, is logic a neutral tool? Tried to clarify the answer to that. We secondly pointed out that logic is an indispensable tool to the Christian, and then considered a biblical justification for reasoning, consistency, implication and argument forms. We turn to a brief survey of logic and argument in the history of redemption. Before the fall, after the fall, and then after regeneration. And then I summarizing some material from John Frame, pointed out that logic is valuable and yet it is limited. Logic is subordinate to Scripture. There's fallibility in our application of it. There are historical disputes in logic. There is always the incompleteness of regimentation. After all, we've only regimented words like some, all, not if, then, and, or, and others are being worked on. Logic doesn't cover everything by any means. Proofs can't tell us everything that we know. There are apparent contradictions in our thinking, especially in theology. And there's always the need to translate accurately into a technical apparatus for logic to be useful. So logic is valuable, however, it is limited. Then we looked at how Frame discusses logic as the science of argument and the science of commitment, and concluded with five biblical warrants for using logic as he himself lays them out, so that by Way of review. That was our introduction to argumentation. After that we turn to a second major component in critical thinking. And I am calling that component analysis. We have to understand argumentation and we have to understand or gain skills in analysis and under the analysis aspect of critical thinking. First of all.

A.

On your outline will be an understanding of language. We talked about. One, I'll just number these. We can get through it quickly. The necessity of understanding language and how it works, why it is necessary. Two, we talked about the multiple functions of language. We classified them as reported, expressive, expressive, directive, ceremonial and performative. We noted that ordinary usage has mixed functions. We distinguish perlocution from elocution and made note that the grammatical form is not the same necessarily as the function of a particular utterance. Thirdly, under our discussion of language, we drew certain distinctions regarding words. We distinguish between the use of a word and the mention of a word. We distinguish between the sense of a word and its reference. And we also noted that words carry emotive impact or can be value laden. So that's 1, 2 and 3. Underneath this division of one language, the fourth thing we looked at definitions. First of all kinds of definitions and secondly methods of defining. Under kinds of definitions we noted there are stipulative, lexical, precising, theoretical and persuasive. I follow Copie there. It's a pretty nice outline. Secondly, the methods for defining words break down into denotative and connotative. But the denotes certain limitations. And so we turn to the connotative that is defining the sense of a term. And there are three basic methods using synonyms or operational definitions. And finally genus, specie, manner of defining. And then the last thing we considered under language in our understanding of analysis was kinds of disputes that people get into. Genuine, merely verbal or apparently verbal. Genuine, merely verbal and apparently verbal. Now I wanted to just fly over that outline so that you would know where we are in the course as I now enter another phase of our course discussion. B. Underneath analysis will be a study of ordinary language fallacies. Ordinary language fallacies. When we get done with the ordinary language fallacies, we're going to turn to formal reasoning. So I want you to see how this balances out. C will become formal reasoning. Formal stands over against ordinary language, I.e. reasoning in a formal calculus, something that looks like algebra. So we stress just the logical relations, the truth value relationship coming from words like and, or if then not some. And all that will be part of our formal logical training. Right now we are still in ordinary language. Natural languages, Chinese, German, English, whatever it may be. So we studied language. Then we're going to study how fallacies enter ordinary language disputes. And then we're going to look at formalized languages as well as part of our schedule, skills of analysis. And then I don't know how this is going to work out in terms of my being with you before I go back, whether we finish the class later or do it by tape, whether maybe we can finish on time. But after analysis, we're going to look at explanation as part of critical thinking. Fourthly, we'll look at presuppositional influences on argumentation and reasoning. And finally, I'd like to talk to you a bit about what's involved in proof, rebuttal, and things of that nature. So we really round out your concept of critical thinking and give you all the skills necessary to develop your critical abilities. Any questions about where we are, where we're going? Okay. Well, then what I'd like to do is introduce the ordinary language fallacies. And to do that, I'm going to begin by characterizing an informal fallacy. I'm just telling you where we're going to go over the next few minutes. And then I'm going to talk about the value of fallacies that seem a little strange. That is, though most logic books lay out the fallacy and just tell you, well, then you don't want to do that, reject that, try to show you there are in some ways value to these fallacies. And then we'll look at the types of fallacies. And I've given you an outline where I've kind of combined both copi and Engel for you into a certain way of remembering the different fallacies. So we'll go over the types of them and I'll say a word or two about recognizing and avoiding these fallacies and how sensitivity will be necessary in doing that. The first thing we need to do is to explain what an informal fallacy is. An informal fallacy is a mistake in reasoning that is common in ordinary language, a mistake in reasoning or commonly made in ordinary language. The fallacies study unsound argumentation, sometimes called non sequiturs. The Latin expression non sequitur means does not follow. When someone reasons fallaciously, they draw a conclusion that does not follow from the premises. Okay? So that can be called a non sequitur. It's often called a fallacy. Basically, it's just an instance of unsound argumentation. But here it's called informal because the argument, the reasoning mistake, was made in ordinary language. A Natural language rather than a formal language. A formal language is what you find in algebra and math and logical notation. An informal language is what you use in day to day speech.

Be like English or French or what have you.

In the informal fallacies that we should master for the sake of critical thinking. The deceptiveness of the argument rest not in the form or structure of the argument, not in the form, but in the material content of of the argument. And because it pertains to the matter of the argument rather than the form of the argument, it's called informal. It's not in a formalized language, it's not a mistake made in a formalized language, and it's not a mistake with respect to form, but rather a mistake that arises because of the deceptiveness of the content, the material content. An informal fallacy is deceptive but unreliable. That is, it's a kind of reasoning that is deceptive. It can be persuasive, people will be moved by it and will be convinced by it, but the reasoning is unreliable. And the reason why the reasoning is unreliable in each of the cases that we're going to be studying studying is that the premises that are used and the kind of reasoning employed do not imply the conclusion, do not imply the truth of the conclusion. Or we can put it this way. In the case of the informal fallacies, the conclusion could be false even if all the premises were true. Of course, that's what we mean by invalid. You can have true premises and a false conclusion, so it's got to be invalid. And that's the case in all of the informal fallacies, with the possible exception of begging the question, which is a special case, as we'll see. Okay, so we know what an informal fallacy is. It's a fallacy made in ordinary life language. Not just any mistake of reasoning, but one that is common to ordinary language and has a certain persuasiveness or deceptiveness about it and yet is unreliable because such premises do not imply the truth of the conclusion. The main reason we study informal fallacies is to reject them in ourselves and in others. The main reason we study them is to reject them. But I want to, before we look at the fallacies themselves, point out that they can sometimes be valuable. When somebody's involved in fallacious reasoning, there is still sometimes value. And then what are in some cases, the commonly identified fallacies are not always fallacious. We need to realize there's sometimes value in them, not value for establishing their conclusions. I mean, that's why they're called Fallacious. You cannot prove a conclusion with a fallacious line of argument. But there are other kinds of value that we might see in them, and I'm going to mention two here. First of all, when people commit these fallacies, that sometimes reveals their underlying presuppositions, or if you will, the basic fundamental or paradigmatic structure of their thinking and beliefs. Sometimes the use of a fallacy tells you what are some of the fundamental, basic commitments in a person's thinking process. It will sometimes reveal his or her underlying presuppositions. And because of the particular outlook or commitments or presuppositions of the person, it's the unsound element in the thinking process that makes it so persuasive to them, though it is unsound for convincing others, given their way of looking at the world and their way of reasoning, the. The unsound element is what gives it its persuasiveness. Now, that has got to be striking to you that some people would look at an argument and say that element there is unsound. And it turns out it was just the unsound part of it that made the person using the argument persuade. That's what gave it its persuasive power force for that person. It's not as though all this other stuff in the argument was good and he just didn't notice this element of the argument. It's rather that very element of the argument is what gave it punch for him. Now, when that happens, I'm saying, though, you have to call it down as a fallacy that does not establish the conclusion, you should probably say to yourself, this reveals something about the appreciation presuppositions or the paradigms in terms of which this man thinks. Secondly, the informal fallacies turn out to be in some cases the beginning of a good argument, or at least the beginning of an important consideration. If more premises were to be brought in and more information considered by themselves, they may be fallacious, but if they were to be expanded, we might see in them the beginning of a consideration worthy of being reflected on as we consider some topic or controversial question. And what I'd like to do is. Give you a few examples of the value fallacies. If you look at your outline that I passed out, by which I tried to bring together a list of copies fallacies and Engels fallacies, I'll go down the list here and just illustrate. Underneath the fallacies of ambiguity, you find B1.equivocation. The fallacy of equivocation. Equivocation. Well, as you know, equivocation is a fallacy that arises when words are used, when a word is used in two different ways. One way in the premise, another way in the conclusion. So this arises from a failure to define the terms clearly or to stick to a definition of a particular term. What is of interest, though, more broadly from a philosophical standpoint, is that systems of thought determine the meanings of words and the relationship between the meanings of words. Identity of meaning. Difference in meaning often has to do with a particular way, a particular philosophy of life or way of looking at the world. Presuppositions or systems of thought will determine how words are used and how they are related to each other. So in many cases, when you have an equivocation, determining whether it's an equivocation or not, whether it's an appropriate way of using language or not, will come down to your more fundamental beliefs about reality, knowledge, and human conduct. Your philosophy of life might affect, then, the way in which meanings are determined and related. It's hard to see that when the simple illustrations are given, all of us can think of how a term is being used in two different ways. Okay, some dogs are brown. My dog is brown. Therefore, my dog is some dog. Obviously, the word some is being used in two different ways there. So if we have, you know, those clear, elementary illustrations, we know equivocation is something that can be identified by all parties, should be. But the problem is that many alleged equivocations really come down to fundamental convictions about life and knowledge and conduct, and they cannot be identified, or we will not come to an agreement as to what is an equivocation just right off the face of the page, as it were, just off the surface of the words. So equivocation is an example of where presupposition sometimes will affect what is identified as an equivocation, what isn't? Look at Roman numeral 2 on that outline. Fallacies of relevance. Well, just notice that these are considered errors in reasoning that arise from consideration of relevance. But the fact is, there are degrees of relevance. Everything's related to everything in some way or another, temporally, spatially, conceptually, practically, causally. I mean, you can think of all kinds of relationships, right? Everything's related to everything, so there are degrees of relevance. If I make that general observation, then you should know that all of those fallacies underneath this rubric will be debatable depending on what the degree of relevance or irrelevance is considered to be. For instance, here is an irrelevant appeal to fear of harm, an appeal to force. The fact of the matter is that systems of thought, presuppositions, philosophies of life create communities with a shared way of life. Our Christian presuppositions create a community, right? A Christian community that has a certain way of life, a way of doing.

Things and seeing things, and creates a.

Certain criteria for membership within the community too. Now it's formalized in the case of Christians, we don't see it quite that formal outside of church settings. Although, you know, there is a form of life in academia, the medical profession and things like that. But what I'm getting at here is that systems of thought create communities. You have, for instance, atheists form a kind of community life, but not everyone wants to be a full blown atheist. You have some people who do not affirm the Christian God, but they don't want to be atheist. And they want to have some kind of civic morality and some kind of decency, some kind of value in the arts and sciences, but they don't want to go all the way to secularism. Well, that outlook creates a certain kind of community with a shared life and criteria for membership and all that. Okay, all I'm getting at is that presuppositions created linguistic communities that have a certain way of life threats may sometimes show that the crucial presuppositions for that community are now at stake and that the person who is reasoning in this way, that person's membership, if we can put it that way in the community, is going to be suspect if he keeps reasoning in that fashion. And I'm using a almost tongue in cheek, but what we're saying is there's the possibility of discipline here if you keep reasoning that way. If somebody stands up in a Calvinist community, has taken ordination, vows to uphold the confession of faith, and then he starts arguing or laying out lines of thought which would be contrary to the confession, somebody might say to that person, you know, if you keep that up, your presbytery may discipline you. Now the person could say technically, well, that's an appeal to force. It's kind of like I'm wrong because somebody might discipline me. Well, no, it doesn't quite show that you're wrong, but it does have the value of saying you may be getting close to the presuppositions by which membership in a community is defined and disciplined. That's a kind of polite example. A worse one would be in the former Soviet Union, a student disagreeing with, say, the Marxist point of view being threatened that the police are going to beat you up. That's gross. That's not the polite One that we just had, but it has the same kind of structure. You're now getting close to the pre. Presuppositions that define this community and this way of life. And your membership in it will be threatened in the sense that you're no longer a person who gets to walk the street safely. The police may come and beat you up. All I'm getting at here is that in what is a real obvious informal fallacy of reasoning, nevertheless, there's value for understanding the presuppositions of two people. Or how about the appeal to pity, the appeal to sympathy? Is that irrelevant? Well, the Bible uses appeals to Christian charity, doesn't it? The Bible appeals to love. Of course, you can say, well, but you can make that argument sound by pointing out one ought to love. The Bible appeals to love, and way therefore one ought to do that. I understand it. But nevertheless, in considering subjects, we sometimes appeal to love as another dimension, something that tempers our approach to issues, even tempers our approach to argumentation with each other. Not all appeals to pity are as irrelevant as others, is what I'm saying. Not all appeals to love would necessarily be ruled out and say, bring that into the. That's irrelevant. Well, as a Christian pastor, I'm saying love is irrelevant to anything we do. Now, come on. It's not. It may be irrelevant for proving the truth, but it's not irrelevant altogether for how I approach a subject or how I argue. How about appeals to popular emotion? Mob appeals? Well, yeah, they're fallacious, but such appeals show why a position will appear to be persuasive or unpersuasive. It sometimes gives us insight into the way people think and what their value structures are. Another example here, the fallacy of appealing to authority, or what I call irrelevant expertise, not, we have to say, irrelevant, because not all appeals to authority are falling fallacious. Even Copie acknowledges that. By the way, I'm pretty sure there has been a change from when I was in college and had an early edition of copy. Maybe I'm wrong, but as I recall, he didn't make it irrelevant or inappropriate authority, really. But he's now altered that. And that's good, because appeals to authority are valuable if the person we're appealing to knows more than we do. Obviously, appeals to Scripture are not seen as fallacious within the Christian community. Now, if I appeal to the Bible, arguing with an unbeliever, he might say, fallacious appeal to authority. But it's not fallacious within my community of thought because the Bible has legitimate authority. So there it comes down to an argument over does the Bible have authority or not. How about the alleged fallacy of appealing to ignorance? You haven't disproven my position, so my position is true. In many cases that is fallacious, but in other cases it isn't. It all comes down to who has the burden of proof. Who has the burden of proof? Think about the way in which which paedo Baptists argue with believers. Baptism Only the paedobaptists will say, God has established that the mark of the covenant is to be given to the children of believers. He established that in the Old Testament. Now the non paedobaptist, the person who's called a Baptist in our culture, will say, well, that's not in the New Testament. Although I happen to think there is something to be said for that. Let's just assume that's right. That's not in the New Testament. Now, does that prove or disprove pedobaptism, that it's not in the New Testament? Well, it all depends on who has the burden of proof. If the Baptist has to prove that the New Testament changes things, then it's not being in the New Testament proves the Paedo Baptist position. If the paedobaptists must show that the New Testament repeats it and it's not in the New Testament, then the silence in the New Testament disproves the paedobaptist position. So who is appealing to ignorance here or silence? Well, one person's doing it legitimately and the other is doing it illegitimately, depending on who you think has the burden of proof. So again, here's a case where what is called a fallacy actually may be an incident to the presuppositional structure of a person's thinking. Also, as another example here, appeals to ignorance are valid from a defense standpoint in a court of law. Okay, if the prosecution doesn't prove its case, then you're to take the opposite position and say, this man's innocent to proven guilty. Does that mean he didn't really do it? No, but in a court of law, the appeal to silence, or you didn't prove your case is a valid appeal.