Dr Greg Bahnsen - Critical Thinking: Language Part 1 (Part 4)

All right, continuing with the new tape, the example given for this third possibility of one of the premises being false, but the reasoning being valid shows that you don't get a conclusion that's necessarily true. He says the conclusion may happen to be true, but we can't determine its truth within the terms of the argument. The argument doesn't supply us with good reason for believing it. And then fourthly, he says one or more of our premises is false and we reason invalidly from them. Here's his example. I like this course. All final examinations are easy. Therefore, I will receive a high grade in this course. Such a case, the argument is both invalid and unsound. Anybody understand that explanation, that illustration? I like this course. All final examinations are easy. That's false. Yeah. Well, the reason it's hard to understand is because it doesn't have a valid form and it has a false premise. And so it just looks kind of. That's the kind of thing you're going to run into in everyday life, though. This is the kind of thing more often than not, you get with people. Okay. And the author has, I think, a good discussion of why we are interested in arguments whose premises are false. Somebody might say, well, we're only going to pay. We should only pay attention to arguments in a true premises, then. Well, part of the difficulties we don't always know. And one of the ways in which we test is by following out the logical implications of a proposition that is set before us. And if it turns out that that proposition implies something that we know to be false, then we know the proposition itself is false. He discusses this in the middle of page 36. The technical term for that line of reasoning is. Is modus tollens. Okay, if P, then Q, but we know Q is not true, therefore P cannot be true. That is, it's kind of reasoning backwards from the implications of a statement. Or if I could put it in a straightforward fashion, we could say whatever implies what is false is itself false. And so sometimes we're going to test propositions to see where they would take us, where their implications will take us, what can be inferred from them. And if you can infer something that is false from them, then you know that the proposition that is being examined is false. I'm sorry, yeah. Another way of putting that is reductio ad absurdum. You can take what is being said here and from it prove something that is absurd or false. And so, as the author says, if we reason validly from truth premises, we must necessarily arrive at a conclusion that is true whether or not we can test its truth directly. Another advantage is that when you have a proposition that cannot be directly tested, let's say, empirically or whatever, but you know that proposition is the logical implication of true propositions. Then you know that it itself must be true also. Okay, so that by way of reviewing Engel, let's look at page nine now and see if we can go through some of the exercises real quickly. I ask you to do numbers 5 through 10. Where you're supposed to distinguish between the conclusion and the premise and the following arguments. Okay, let's take number six. Because only those who can quote large chunks of that material can pass a test on is useless for me to try, for I know hardly any of it by heart. I would suggest that here are the premises. Only those who can quote large chunks can pass. Second premise. I know hardly any of it by heart. Conclusion, it is useless for me to try on this test. Anybody have any disagreements with that? Okay, mistake number eight. Smith ought to exercise more. It would be good for his condition. Jay? Yes, because of the comparative more being in there. Good point. Pete, take number nine. Tom must have left already. He doesn't answer his phone. That's right, Pat. Number 10. I no longer believe those who say that a poor politician could be a good president if he could only be appointed to the job without the qualities required of a successful candidate, without the ability to rally support, to understand the public, to express its aspirations, without the organizational talent, the personal charm and the physical stamina required to survive the primaries, the convention and the election. No man would make a great president, however wise in other ways he might be. How many premises are there? Okay. And that one premise is to put in your own words. Does it look to you like the premise is another way of stating the conclusion? That. I mean, I'm going beyond what the assignment is. This seems to be an illustration of why he believes this rather than a proof of it. Okay, let's jump ahead here. All right? Now, on page 13, you're supposed to do numbers 14 through 19. And the exercise is which of the following are arguments and which are non arguments. Melissa, would you take number 14? We must stop the homosexuals dead in their tracks before they get one step further toward warping the minds of our youth. The time for us to attack is now. The enemy is in our camp. This from Jerry Falwell. Okay, let me suggest another perspective on 14. Maybe there is something of an argument here. The argument being the time to attack is now. And the premise being the enemy is in our camp. Since the enemy is in our camp, we need to attack. Now, everybody with me on that. Pete, let me have you take number 19. You shouldn't have legislation against the thing that the majority of the population does. And today the majority smokes marijuana. So marijuana should be legalized. It is an argument. Okay. What are the premises? Yes. Okay. Now to page 17. Rewrite the following arguments as concisely as possible, clarifying the meaning and arranging the premises and conclusions in their logical order. And I ask you to do three of them. 24, 26 and 28. Let's just take number 28 and have path help us out. Because the father of poetry was rioting, denominating poetry and imitative art, these metaphysical poets will, without great wrong, lose their right to the name of poets, for they copy neither nature nor life. What's the. What's the conclusion that's being argued? Number 28. Okay. In the premises. That's right. Premises Poetry is imitative. The poetry of these particular metaphysical poets doesn't copy nature or life. Therefore they will lose their right to the name of poets. On page 21, you were asked to do numbers 33 to 43. And the statements and arguments that follow underline and explain any suspect elements, illogical or ambiguous phrases, inapt illustrations, half truths, faulty analogies, etc. That may be important in determining and evaluating their meaning and soundness. Have everyone do one of these. I'll take number 33. Clean and decent dancing every night except Sunday. The problem here is with the grammar, the ambiguous grammatical or syntactical construction, which suggests that the exception may be to every night or to the clean and decent dancing. So that on Sunday clean and decent dancing is not necessarily to be found. Whereas what they obviously were trying to say is the dancing takes place every night except Sunday, and it's always clean and decent. Okay, number 35. Joint. If you can tie a knot, you can make a beautiful, deep pile rug. False analogy. Right. False analogy. Between tying a knot and putting together the pile rug. I don't know if it's a half truth, because if you can tie a knot, that's a full truth. The real question is whether tying a knot is similar to making a rug. Okay, Pat, number 38. Doctors are all alike. They really don't know any more than you or I do. This is the third case of faulty diagnosis I've heard of in the last month. Well, is that a premise or a conclusion? The conclusion. They don't know any more than you or I do. And what suspect about this argument. Why? What makes you faulty? Now, you can't beg the question by saying it's not true because it's not true. What makes it faulty? What in this argument is suspect? This person has three cases of faulty diagnosis. Doesn't that prove that doctors don't know any more than you or I do? They're just as faulty as you or I are. Does it relate? Is that what you're saying? No, it relates. I would say that's, you know, some inductive proof. The doctors are not as smart as they think they are. They're no smarter than us. It's some inductive. We want to say more than it doesn't relate to. I just want to say it doesn't offer very strong evidence for that conclusion. That it doesn't go nearly far enough. I mean, there's not enough instances there to draw such a sweeping conclusion about doctors. Right. The evidence is insufficient to support that conclusion. Am I confusing you? Well, it doesn't assume that it is. The premises are not comprehensive. But the conclusion is. Premises have to do with three cases. The conclusion has to do with what, what, 3 billion cases? And so it. It has not. There's not very much evidence provided to us in the premises for that conclusion. That's the suspect element. Well, then let's just take that and make it yours. Well, the author has already given you the answer to that one. Okay, let me work it out. On November 5, three of the accused met at the house of the fourth defendant, Smith. There, behind locked door and heavily curtained windows, these four conspirators begin to hatch their dastardly plot. There's no argument there. Now, what he says. Yeah, but what he's saying is he's using a rhetorical trick that is not logically sound. He's taking for granted that he's already proven that their conspirators. When that's what he's supposed to be proving. Correct. Well, we haven't let Pete do one, so let's have you do number 43. My gun has protected me and my son's gun taught him safety and responsibility long before he got hold a far more lethal weapon, the family car. Cigarettes can kill many times more people yearly than guns and unlike guns, have absolutely no redeeming qualities. Letter to the editor opposing gun control. Okay. Yeah, there's personification. Personification going on here. Cigarettes kill is personification as well. Well, maybe you could say cigarettes are the cause of death, and so in that sense, they kill. Is it maybe overstating the case to say that. Absolutely no redeeming qualities. I mean, depending on your perspective on it. The point is the argument needs to prove some of this rather than just to throw it out there and generalize. Okay, let's jump ahead now to page 27 where we're going to supply missing components. And begin with number 44. The speaker criticizes free enterprise. He must be a communist. What's the missing component there, Pat? He doesn't qualify communism. Now, what you're supposed to do here is give a premise that will make this argument work. You're supposed to add the missing component. Okay. We could, I think, tighten it up a bit, but you're on the right track. It might be something like this. Anybody who criticizes what Free enterprise is a communist. The speaker criticizes free enterprise. He must be a communist. Okay, J. Number 46. The energy crisis. Being man made can be man solved. Yeah, very good. That's pretty obvious. That premise may be faulty after all. Number 40. No. Number 50. Death cannot be an evil being. Universal. Melissa. Right. And again, you see what is faulty and that I mean it. This is really a good exercise because once you put the unstated premise in there and things look pretty shaky. And then. Pete, let's have union. Number 52. Pleasure is good since it is sought by everyone. Right. Everyone seeks pleasure, therefore pleasure is good. Very good. Now we have on page 31 some exercises. Determine whether each of the following arguments is deductive or inductive. Give your reasons. I'll take number 55. Tom must have left already. He doesn't answer his phone. Haven't we heard this one before? I thought so, yeah. Okay. This would be an inductive argument. And the easiest way to show that is that if you added more information, you can either strengthen or weaken the argument. Doesn't settle it. Okay. Number. Actually, you weren't assigned. Oh, you were assigned 55. Okay. I just wanted to make sure I was on the right track here. 57. Let's have Pat jump in because many drug addicts who came through the courts admit that they started on marijuana. Marijuana likely causes addiction to hard drugs. And what tells you so? Okay. A way of putting what you're saying is that the conclusion goes beyond information that's found in the same. But there may be an easier way to answer this one. Is there an indicator right in the statement itself that this is an inductive conclusion? The word likely, marijuana likely causes addiction. Tells you right away it's probable rather than necessary. So it has to be inductive. Okay, let's take number 59. We'll have Jay do that. Everyone in the chemistry class needed to have. Needed to have had one year of high school chemistry as a prerequisite. Since John is a member of that class, he must have had one year of high school chemistry. Okay. And it's deductive for what reason? Okay, that. That's the content of what's being said here. But what makes it a deductive argument? Okay. Or that the argument, the conclusion follows necessarily that no further information would weaken or strengthen the conclusion. Things like that. Okay, Melissa, let's have you do number 60. I'll do it. The house across the street has shown no signs of life for several days. Some rain soaked newspapers lie on the front steps. The grass badly needs cutting the pieces. People across the street therefore must be away on a trip. So it's highly probable more information might change your conclusion. Right? Like there are dead bodies in the house and that's why. Oh, I'm sorry, that's the horror story version. There are other ones as well, right? That they're not away on vacation, but they're just lazy. They're not picking up the newspapers or cutting their lawn or something. Okay, number 61, Pete. All life requires water. There's no water on the planet Venus, therefore there's no life on that planet. Deductive, because well, follows. Directly follows. How do you want to say that? Okay, with necessity. Right. That if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. And so it's a deductive argument. And then on page 36, finally you were to do some exercises. Which of the following statements are true and which are false And I ask you to do all of them in. So we'll just go around Robin here. I won't call on you. I'll read it and then you tell me your answer and I'll tell you if I agree with you. If the conclusions of our arguments have been derived validly from our premises, then we know that such conclusions are true. No, that is not true. Because there's a difference between truth and validity. If the conclusion conclusions are derived validly, that doesn't mean that they're true. It just means that they follow from the premises. But the premises may be false, in which case the conclusion would be false. It's real important that you go back and understand that one. That's one of the main points being made. Here's a difference between valid reasoning and truth. In either the premises or conclusion. 67 at the conclusion of our argument has been derived validly from our premises, then we know that this argument is sound. What else do you have to have in a sound argument? You have to have true premises as well as a valid argument. Number 68. If our premises are true and our conclusion has been validly derived from these premises, such an argument is called sound. That's exactly right. The point we've just made. Number 69, all valid arguments are sound. That's not true. Because a valid argument has to have true premises as well if it's going to be sound. Okay, Pat. All sound arguments are valid. Number 71. A conclusion validly derived from premises may nevertheless be false. That's correct. Because validity and truth. This is just different ways of driving home this point. Right. 72. A conclusion invalidly derived from the premises may nevertheless be true. Listen, that might just accidentally be true. It's just you haven't got a good argument for it. Number 73. Deductive arguments are either valid or inductive. Arguments are either strong or weak. That's correct. 74. In a valid defense, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. That's exactly right. That's what we're getting at when we say that it's valid and the premises are true. And then one more. In a strong inductive argument, if the premises are true, the conclusion is probably true. Underline the word probably. Probably. But more information might change our assessment of that. Okay, let me ask you. Do you have any questions on our first unit that having to do with what an argument is? Premises, inclusions, inductive, deductive, all of this range of topics and what you've read in Copie and Engel. Before I move on, do you want to ask me anything? Okay. I think it should be fairly clear. This is the starting point of a course in logic. Knowing when an argument is, what an inductive argument, deductive is, what premises and conclusions are. This is just like baby steps. Now we're going to venture into something a little more important and start enriching our concept of argumentation and communication by looking at a unit on language itself. Our new material for today has to do with with understanding language, which is necessary as preparation for argumentation in order to develop arguments in a cogent fashion and to understand what people are saying and analyze their arguments. It's important that we make some observations about the use of language. Why do we have to prepare in this way? Because if we don't understand the point being made by a speaker or a writer, if we don't see how language is being used, we will not be able to identify and Reconstruct the argument that we are considering or the speaker has proposed. Moreover, if we don't understand the proper use of language and the diversity of its uses, we will not be able to avoid fallacies in our own well, very easily. In fact, you'll find many people do fall into fallacious reasoning because they have misused language or been confused about the use of language. And so what we end up getting then is the ability to persuade people with the use of certain language, even though we are not reasoning in a cogent fashion. Okay, what are the functions? The point that I want to make here very simply is that the functions of language are multiple. Ludwig Mittgenstein used a famous image with respect to the multiplicity of linguistic usage when he said, language is like a toolbox. What can you do with language? Well, what can you do with the toolbox? There's hammers, there's screwdrivers, there's pliers, there's all sorts of things you can do with language. Many people are misled because they haven't thought very much about this and they assume that language only does one kind of thing. So let's see if we can't classify some of the many things that people do. Many functions performed by language the first and most obvious is a reportive function. Language is sometimes used to report the facts, to make a statement. In this sense, language is directly informative. I say the Dodgers won the World Series or it's hot outside today, or catfish is really yucky. To me, those are all intention formative statements. I'm reporting something which is either true or false. When people have a simplistic understanding of the use of language, they often think that reporting is all language does. And so let's look at some non reportive functions of language as well. Sometimes we use utterances not strictly to report what is true or false, but to create an effect of some sort. And I'm going to give you three kinds of non reported functions of language. One would be expressive, the other would be directive. And the third would be performative, or what Engel will call ceremonial. I'm not so sure. Maybe it's now ceremonial is not performative for him. But anyway, these are all non reportive or if you will, non informative functions of language. The first is expressive. If I hit my thumb with a hammer and I go ouch, the expression of ouch is not reporting something. That's not the same as going to a doctor and saying, doctor, I am in pain, doctor, I broke my thumb. Those would be reported utterances. But when I hit my thumb and I go ouch. I'm expressing feeling, aren't I? Now that's the most obvious example, I suppose, of expressive discourse. But sometimes we use sentences that are intended to be expressive. I just love the Dodgers. That's not so much a matter of information, although conceivably it is supposed to be a statement about myself, information about myself. But usually that is being said to express my own attitude or to evoke that attitude in others. Kind of like when I say, oh, that Jerry Brown, what a space cadet. Now, is that a report of function of language? No, that's expressive. And in this case I'm trying to evoke that attitude in you that I have, which is basically despising a candidate for office or something so expressive. The expressive function of language can either be a way of revealing my attitude or trying to evoke that attitude in others. A second kind of non reportive function in language is directive. I say, pete, would you please stop using that pen? I'm not giving you a report that's true or false. I'm giving a directive, an imperative, a command. Sometimes language is used in direct other people. People watch out. That's not trying to report something, although indirectly, you might say that's a report of danger in your vicinity. Well, the direct use, the most obvious function of words at that point was to try to get something accomplished, to get you to do something. It's a directive. Another non reportive function of language might be called performative. Sometimes we use words to perform an action, not just to be expressive of our attitudes or trying to direct other people, but to accomplish some particular deed. The most obvious illustration of performative language in our culture is the I do at the altar. When in a wedding ceremony the groom says I do, he's not reporting something true or false. He's not expressing an attitude, he's not giving a directive. He's doing what he's actually accomplishing. What we call a public vow or commitment of wedding of marriage. There he's performing something by means of his language. Or maybe a ship's christening would be the same kind of thing I christened the aardvark, you know, is not a report, it's not a direction, it's not expressive. It's rather accomplishing something. It's bringing about the naming of this ship as the aardvark. So then back to my main point. The functions of language are multiple. Think of language like a toolbox. We do many kinds of tasks by means of language. Now, in everyday Use in concrete examples as we actually see language being used. Most of our utterances serve a mean mixed function. A mixed function, that is to say, I might report something to you in such a way that I indirectly express my attitude as well. When I say, you know, that candidate is really pink headed, am I being expressive? Am I just trying to tell you? Am I just kind of like letting off steam that I don't like this guy, or am I reporting something? Well, it could be a combination. I might say he's pigheaded because I'm looking at the fact that he just holds tenaciously to his views under cross examination. But since I don't like his views or I don't like him personally, I call that pigheadedness. There would be a case where the function of my language is really blended. I mean, there's an expressive as well as a report of function going on. The mixed function of language in ordinary usage is what makes it so difficult to analyze arguments and to resolve disputes between people. Moreover, in ordinary language, in the actual use of language, you will find it necessary to distinguish between what a speaker intends to do with his language and what he ends up doing or what he actually accomplishes. This is ordinarily designated the distinct between elocutionary and perlocutionary force in an utterance. The illocutionary force of an utterance that's spelled I l l o C u t I o n a r Y il locutionary. See locution there in the locution in the utterance, what was the speaker intent intending to do? That's his illocution or the illocutionary force of what he says. Let's say that the illocutionary force of what I say to you is to tell a joke. Now, the perlocutionary force is what task is actually performed. What task is actually performed in speaking P E r L o c u t I o n a r way r y per locutionary, the locution actually performs what task? Now back to my example. If the elocution was to tell a joke, does that mean that the perlocution is that the audience is laughing or considers it humorous? No. I might intend to tell a joke. My language was meant to, you know, pick you up, make you laugh. It may have the effect of making you disgusted. This happens sometimes. I noticed recently Jay Leno was trying to make a joke about Silence of the Lambs and this horrible mass murderer. Jeffrey Dahmer, Michigan I guess Milwaukee. And they Were just going over flat. I mean this, the audience, you know, considered it kind of ugly. That wasn't really taken in a light hearted way. So here's a real good example of the elocution and the perlocution not matching each other. What do you try to do with your language? What is the speaker intending? That's his elocution. What the language actually performs is its prologue. One last comment then, about the multiple functions of language. The intended function of some discourse cannot be definitively discerned by the grammatical form or the semantic content of the expression. The grammatical form doesn't automatically tell you. For instance, if I say, will you please bring me a glass of water? The grammatical form is a question, isn't it? A question mark ends that sentence. But it's not a question. I mean, it might be a question. I mean, it might just say, I'd like a piece of information. Will you do the following? Actually that is intended, the elocution there is to make a request or to direct you to get a glass of water. So this is what makes life so interesting. How language is used so many different ways, how these functions often are mixed together, how you cannot tell for certain just from the grammatical or semantic form what the function is and how the elocution and the perlocution don't always match up. Any questions about what I've just said? The multiple functions of language, the toolbox image language can be reportive, expressive, directive and performative. I think your textbook writers might cut the cake a little bit differently, but that's okay. I just want to introduce the subject to you right now. Okay, well then the next thing I want to turn to with respect to language is not just its multiple functions, but I want to draw some important distinctions with respect to words. I want to draw some important distinctions with respect to words. When we look at words themselves, we distinguish between, first of all, the use of the word and the mention of the word. The use of a word and the mention of a word. If I say Boston has a smelly port, On the other hand, I say Boston has six letters. Clearly, Boston is being used in two different ways. When the word is being used, I'm talking about it's referent. And so let me write this up on the board. Boston has a smelly port. Here the word Boston is being used to name a place that has a port that's smelly. Boston doesn't have any identifying grammatical marks. But now I'm going to write another sentence. Boston has six letters. In this case, this Sentence is technically mistaken. The city of Boston doesn't have six letters, but the word Boston does. Ordinarily, you will find this. Put in single quotes to set it off and indicate that we're talking about the word. It's not in double quotes because we're not actually quoting anybody as having said the word Boston. Actually, we're talking about the word as a word here. Boston is mentioned. I'm mentioning the word Boston and saying of it that it has six letters, which is true. The elocution of that remark was to make you laugh. The prolocution was quite different. In the first sentence, Boston is a smelly port. The word Boston is used. In the second illustration, Boston is six letters. The word Boston is mentioned. Does that make sense to you all? Not too difficult, right? So that's the first distinction with respect to words. There's a difference between using a word and mentioning a word. Go ahead. When you say Boston is a city, you are using the word Boston. You're not mentioning the word Boston. If you say the word Boston means. Or if you say the word bachelor means, then bachelor is being mentioned, not used. Bachelors are unhappy is a sentence that uses the word bachelor. Bachelor means unmarried male mentions the word bachelor. Okay, the second distinction, When you mention a word, you should put it in single quotes. Now, not everyone follows that convention. I'm just telling you in philosophy that's fairly standard to do it. That would indicate that we're talking about the word here, not what the word names. This is the second distinction is between the sense of a word and its reference. The sense of a word and its reference. In terms of. Well, if we think of general terms like bachelor terms that name a class of things, the reference of the term is its extension, that is, all the things that are named by it to which the term extends. The extension of the term is what it refers to, what it denotes. And so what is the reference of the word bachelor would be all the people who are unmarried males, the class of unmarried males. The intention or sense of the term, though, is its meaning or connotation. And so the definition of bed bachelor as an unmarried male gives its sense, whereas the class of all the men who are not married gives its referent. Now, a common illustration for showing the necessity of distinguishing between sense and referent would be a sentence like this. The morning star is identical with the evening star. Warning star equals evening star. Is this true or false? It's both. It's true if you're talking about red referent. It's false if you're talking about sense or meaning. What is the referent of the expression morning star? Does anybody know what is the morning star? It's Venus. Okay, so that's the referent. That's what it points to. What does evening star point? Point to? What's. What is the evening star? It's Venus. Okay, so morning star points to the same thing that evening star points to. In this case, Venus. But does that mean that the sense or in intention or connotation of the two expressions is identical? No. Morning star means the last star visible in the morning. Evening star means the first star visible at night. So they don't have the same meaning. They do have the same referent. Or how about this? Mark Twain, Samuel Clemens. Are they identical as to sense? No, they are not identical. They are two different names. One is somebody known to have all these different functions in the world. Another man is known as the author of certain pieces of literature. But as to referent, are they identical? Yes. Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens are identical as to referent. So hopefully that helps you understand the difference between the sense of a term or expression and the referent of that term. Expression. Let me make some comment about the relationship of sense to referent. Well, actually, before I do that, I'll put up here on the board some things that run together. We can speak of the referent reference of a term. We speak also of its extension. All of those things to which it can be applied or extended to, or it might be called its denotation. And then, as I've said, we can also talk about the sense of. Of a term which would be not its extension but its intention. Instead of denotation, it would be its connotation. Now, what is the relationship between sense and referent? First of all, sameness of reference does not guarantee sameness of sense. We've already seen that morning star, evening star refer to the same thing. They don't have the same meaning, though, or the same sense. Secondly, you should put in your notes that extension is determined by intention. Intention, The class to which the term bachelor applies is going to depend on how you define bachelor. The intention thus determines the extension of a term. And then thirdly, you should note that increasing intention means decreasing extension. Increasing intention means decreasing extension. Maybe I can illustrate that for you. Let's take the term bachelor. Now, you know the intention of bachelor. Unmarried male. What's the extension of the term bachelor? I'll just put a circle up here on the board and say that corrals all the unmarried males in the world. Now, If I increase the intention, put more meaning content into that by say, making it now American bachelor, what happens to the class that of all those people to whom the term applies, it was bachelor. And so this circle was put up there to represent that. Now if I say American bachelor, does this circle get bigger or smaller? Smaller. So now we just have a subset of bachelors. So increasing the intention means that you decrease the extension. What if I put American bachelors who are Dodger fans now it gets smaller, Right. Now what if I say American bachelors who are Dodger fans that live in Orange county, then it gets smaller. To be more precise, I should say it either gets smaller or stays the same. Increasing the intention never increases. The extension almost always decreases. It may be that all of the Dodger fans who are bachelors live in Orange County. So there you wouldn't have any change of extension. But ordinarily the extension decreases as the intention increases. That was my second point about the relationship of sense to reference. The first was sameness of reference. Reference doesn't guarantee sameness of sense. The second point is extension is determined by intention. You can't find out the extension of a term unless you know its intended meaning. And then thirdly, increasing the intention of an expression will mean, mean the non increasing of its extension and usually decreasing of it. In this portion of my lecture, I've said I want to give you some distinctions about words. The first was the use of a word in the mention of a word. The second is the sense of a word and the referent of the word. The third point I want to make is that you should note that words carry emotions, motive, suggestiveness or can be value laden. Words are never purely unemotional, value neutral tools. Words carry emotive suggestiveness and can be value laden. That means that the same situation or event can be variously described with words that have different emotive impacts depending on the literary context or the social context. I go on the Phil Donahue show and they're going to debate someone who's a homosexual. Now, I can refer to the this person as gay. I can refer to this person as an invert. I can refer to this person as a homosexual. I can refer to this person as a queer. Are all those terms equal in their emotive suggestiveness or value ladenness? Absolutely not. You know very well that if I went on there and I said, well, you're, you know, you're just a queer, that that would carry a certain kind of very negative, you know, punch, which may be appropriate. I'M just trying to make a point about language. Whereas I went on and was more distant emotionally by saying, well, the homosexual lifestyle that you exemplify, okay, Words carry emotive suggestiveness and can be value laden. And thus the same situation or event can be variously described with words that will carry a different impact. Emotively honest and effective communication calls for choosing a vocabulary that minimizes the emotive explosiveness of our terms. When we are strictly. When we are interested in the strict analysis of a reasoning process, it will not help us to weigh that down with the motive. Explosive, emotively explosive terms. As logicians go now, we're not only logicians, we're also people who try to persuade. We're involved the lives of other people. So this is not the be all and end all. But as logicians, we should seek to have arguments formulated or reformulated in the least provocative way possible. We should strive for choosing vocabulary that minimizes the emotive explosiveness. What we're saying. In analyzing the way language is used, we're going to have to distinguish between a disagreement that two people have over a description and a disagreement two people have over a value or an attitude that they have toward what is described. A good example is pornography. You know, you see a movie, I see a movie, and I say, that movie was pornographic, and you say, no, it wasn't pornographic. I mean, it was very delicate in the way it introduced things and so forth and so on. We are probably going to not disagree in describing the movie. We both say, I saw the following take place on the screen. The difference we have is over the word pornography, isn't it? However, even if we agreed to define pornography in the same way, so it either is or is not pornography, the fact is we have a different attitude toward the movie. We have a different value evaluation of the movie. And so our disagreement could be over a descriptive matter. Did this movie have the following scene integration or not? Our disagreement may be over the use of a term like pornography. How should it be defined and used? Our disagreement may be a value or attitude disagreement over this fact out there, regardless of what terminology you use for it. And so this shows the various kinds of disagreements that you're going to read about in your homework. Genuine disagreements, which can be genuine disagreements as to fact or description or a genuine disagreement as to attitude toward a fact. And then thirdly, you have a verbal disagreement that is, it looks like you are arguing over something and when in fact you're just using the word differently. There's ambiguity in the Use of the term pornography. Copie will point out this is a nice little distinction. Verbal disputes, real disputes, or genuine disputes. He'll point out, however, that sometimes you have, apparently verbal disputes. That is, it appears that it's a dispute only over the use of a term, but after the term has been clearly defined and agreed upon, they still have a disagreement, usually about how to evaluate or what attitude to have towards something. Okay, the next thing I want to introduce about language, moving ahead quickly, are the different kinds of definitions that we find. A lot of people have the idea that definitions are what you find in a dictionary, but that's really too simplistic because many different kinds of definitions can be found in our linguistic culture. First of all, there are stipulative definitions where I stipulate that I will mean the following by this term, by snark, I will mean a dog that has lost its bark. That's what I mean by a snark. Now, is that a definition? Sure it is. Is it one you can find in the dictionary? No. Is it theoretically helpful in understanding the world? No. Is it being used for purposes of persuading people? No. I'm just stipulating that I need a term for dog that's lost its mark, and I will call it a snark. Secondly, we have lexical definitions, that is to say, definitions that report the established usage of a term. The lexical definition is what you find in a lexicon or a dictionary. This is not all that confusing, should be unproblematic. You know what a lexical definition is. What you may not know is following three points. There's a plurality of standard uses with most words. That is, the lexical definition of a term is not necessarily singular. Go home and look up the word word game G A M E in your Webster's Dictionary and see how many definitions you have there. So the lexical definition doesn't mean there's only one such definition. Moreover, correct usage is a matter of degree. It's something that is relative. When someone says, well, to use that word correctly means you should use it in terms of what Webster says. Says doesn't recognize the fluidity or evolution of language in a culture. Words come to have new meanings or slightly different meanings. And for somebody to say, well, that's not a correct use of the term is kind of artificial. And we have to recognize there's kind of a relativity about that. At one point in the life of a culture, a term might not properly be used that way. But then later, since it's, you know, picked up commonalities become conventional, it might become correct usage. And so thirdly, we have to distinguish between the erroneous use of a lexical definition and the deceptive use of a lexical definition. Sometimes the person's just wrong about this being the established usage. In another case, when we say, well, that's the dictionary meaning, it's not that that's wrong, but that's deceptive because it suggests that the word can't be used in other ways as well. I've only given you two kinds of definitions so far, stipulative and lexical. A third kind of definition would be a precising definition. This is one that goes beyond the ordinary usage and tries to focus now more precisely on a specific way of using a term. That is, the precising definition aims to reduce vagueness. So when I use the word game, what I will mean is what a hunter shoots out in the forest. I do not mean rules for playing with a ball game like that. A precising definition goes beyond the ordinary usage and tries to reduce vagueness. Fourthly, we can refer to theoretical definitions. A theoretical definition is an attempt to give a characterization of something to help explain it. Theoretical definitions are found in philosophy and in scientific disputes all the time. How do you define energy? Usually the answer to that is going to give you a theory of energy. How do you find matter? How do you define time? How do you define love? Those sorts of things are often. That is, the definition for those sorts of things often amounts to a theory about those sorts of things offers a characterization. And then fifthly, in logic, we talk about persuasive dis definitions. And by that we mean a word, definitions offered for a word in order to influence the attitude of people. What do you mean by unemployment? I mean the economic policies of George Bush. Is that a lexical definition? If you looked up unemployment in the dictionary, define it. Is that a stipulative definition? Is this a person seriously wanting to say, I now want to use the word unemployment for whatever economic policies? No, it's not stipulating, it's not lexical, certainly not precising or theoretical. It's an attempt to be persuasive. You know, that can be done with good intention and with bad intention. I just want to remind you, the fact that I gave you maybe an unhappy illustration or one that irritates you, doesn't mean that all persuasive definitions should be ruled out. And then the last thing we'll talk about with respect to words is how to define them. There are different ways of defining words. The two major ways of defining words are referential and intentional. Or maybe I should have said extensional and intentional. Another way to put it. Denotative, connotative. Am I going too fast confusing you here? Remember those? I had two sets of expressions. Those are two ways of defining words. The denotative or referential way to define a word is by pointing. What I mean by book is this. And then I hold up a book and I show it to you. Or I might say, by book I mean all the members of the following class. That would be an extension or denotative way of defining the term. As an aside, could I just mention that this is not the way children learn language? Many people think that children learn language by, you know, you hold up some say ball or mommy, whatever it may be. We think that children just kind of like this, get this filing cabinet in their head. You know, ball, mommy, door, hungry, so forth. That's a very primitive and simplistic understanding. Children do not learn language in a simply referential way. If they did, there would never be creativity. They never form new sentences. But that's an aside that was. That was a freebie. Referential definition or denotative definition is defining by pointing or setting out a class. Intentional or connotative definition is an attempt to get at the sense of a term. And there are three ways in which such a definition can be given or ordinarily would be given. The first is one word synonyms. Okay, so if I want to define a bruin, I would say bruin is a bear, a one word synonym. Another way to define a term is through an operational definition. By a bruin, I mean the brown hairy thing that walks on all fours and eats fish and climbs trees, or, you know, whatever has claws. Operational definitions are often used for procedures or feelings and so forth. An operational definition of love is like love is walking hand in hand. Love operates in the following way. Maybe that's too emotive and subjective. Example. Scientists use operational definitions, okay? Then define things in terms of their behavior and our response to that behavior. And then finally, there's definition by genus and specie, sometimes called definition by division. Bachelor means unmarried male. Notice that's not synonymous. Definition in the sense of one word, synonym. Because there's more than one word. Unmarried male. I take a genus, a general class, males. And then I search for, specify. I give the species of the unmarried males, the unmarried ones, excuse me, I take males as the genus, the general class. And then the specific portion of that class, the specie is the unmarried ones. So that's defining by genus and species. And there are five rules for defining terms when you're using the genus species. The first such rule is that you should aim to state the conventional connotation of the term. That is, when you define it, you should take it as it is conventionally understood. Secondly, your definition should not be circular. Obviously, you can't define a term and use that term in the definition itself. Thirdly, you should try to make your definition neither too narrow nor too broad, lest you leave out legitimate things that the term applies to or includes things that would not be the term would not be applied to. Fourthly, a genus and specie definition should not be expressed in ambiguous, obscure or figurative terms. You should aim to be as literal as possible and as precise. And fifthly, where a definition can be put in the affirmative, it should be rather than in the negative. Negative. Try to avoid negative characterizations when you use the genus and specie approach to definition. Let's review what we have learned today and then I'll give you an assignment to follow up. We've been concerned to be introduced to the subject of language and how it functions. Because if we don't understand language, we will not be able to reconstruct arguments correct, will not be able to avoid fallacies, and will fall into mere persuasion rather than true reasoning. I said next that language has multiple functions, not just one function. We talked about reportive, expressive, directive and performative functions. We noticed that in ordinary usage of person's language will serve a mixed function, that more than one thing is being done at once, ordinarily, and that what is intended to be done by your language, your intended function, is not always what it ends up performing as its function. And then we looked at words in particular, and we drew a distinction between mentioning the word and using the word. We drew a distinction between the sense or connotation or intention of a word and its referent, that is its extension or denotation. I observed that words can carry emotive suggestiveness or be value laden. And that's why the same thing can be variously described with a different emotional or value impact in argumentation. We should try to be. We should try to minimize the explosive or emotive explosiveness of our terms. And then we looked at how we define terms and we notice there are different kinds of definitions, definitions that serve different purposes, be they stipulative, lexical, precising, theoretical or persuasive. And then finally I pointed to different ways of defining words that's different from different kinds of definitions. Now we're talking about the manner in which we perform the defining task, different ways to define words, referential by pointing to things or observing a class, and then the connotative for indigenous intentional way to define words, either through one word synonyms, operational definitions, or genus and specie. Following up on this introductory lecture on language, I'd like you to read COPI chapters two and four. Skip chapter three for right now. COPI chapters two and and as well, read Morris Engel's book With Good Reason, chapter two, which is on the subject of language as well.