Dr Greg Bahnsen - Normative Ethics: Critics and Criticisms of Theonomy Pt 4 (Part 18)

And I'll try to do my best to finish up my remarks on those critics during this lecture, if it's possible. The first thing we need to do is to make some final remarks about the position of John Zen, which has been popularized through the Baptist Reformation Review. Zens finally states his position in the following words, and I quote, I am not in any way denying the usefulness of the Mosaic commands in the Christian life, but these commands come to us through Christ. I'm going to read that again. I am not in any way denying the usefulness of the Mosaic commands in the Christian life, but these commands come to us through Christ. Those words are a real shock if you take them seriously. If Zen does not in any way deny the usefulness of the Mosaic Law in the life of the new Covenant believer, then why all the fuss and the controversy? Why all the articles? Why all the slogans? Why all the criticism? Why all the division between former friends? If his only concern is that the Mosaic commands come to us through Christ, then he should no longer have any concern over theonomic ethics. For what I've been saying repeatedly is that the theonomist goes to the Mosaic Law through heeding the words of Christ to do so. The moral demands of the new Exodus as set forth by the Covenant Mediator include, unless modified elsewhere, the moral demands of the old Exodus and Covenant, to use the terminology favored by Zen. If he agrees with this, then the theonomic debate can turn away from his criticisms of covenant theology. And if he does not agree with this inclusion, then he will need to offer biblical warrant for his assertion of excluding the Mosaic Law from the moral code of the believer. But if he does give that biblical evidence for excluding, then we have to wonder, what does he mean that he doesn't in any way deny the usefulness of the Mosaic Law? I think what we have here is another case of somebody who's very close to recognizing that he's been caught in a self contradiction, that he's trying to have his cake and to eat it too. Now, the last criticism made by Zinns in his paper anyway about covenant theology is that covenant theology does not allow for any other means of convicting men of sin than the decalogue. And there are some covenant theologians who would say that, Walter Chantry among them. However, that is not crucial to theonomy. And I for one don't hold that I think you can convict men of sin from creation ordinances. You can convict men of sin from the Sermon on the Mount, from the fruit of the Spirit, from The injunctions of Paul. I don't by any means think you have to preach decalogue for the conviction of sin before you can preach gospel. I'm not. I don't think in any way what is strictly speaking a preparationist in the presentation of the gospel, much less a decological preparationist. Now, the one place where Zenz has specifically sought to criticize the theonomic position which I myself have taught going beyond the broader position is in the Baptist reformation review for 1979. And in that issue he reprints the review article on theonomy from Meredith Klein and then adds criticisms of what he calls retrogressive ethics dealing with one of the issues of my monthly Biblical Ethics newsletter. Now, the fact that he has included Klein would indicate that his general line of criticism would be the same as Klein. And so that's where we're going to go as soon as I make some concluding remarks here, because that's the heart of the issue, is how does Klein deal with the theonomic position, the conclusion to which Zenz comes in his own treatment. Though theonomic ethics is a good indicator of or key to the problem we will have with his critical attitude, he says to refer the believer to the details of a terminated economy and not to the new and living way of grace and truth in Christ is manifestly retrogressive. Embodied in this criticism of theonomic ethics is a conspicuously false antithesis, the same one that I've mentioned now three times in my remarks about sin. Everything in theonomic ethics militates against the need to make a choice between Jesus and Moses. Again, we listened to Moses because we first listened to Jesus, Endorsing the validity of the Old Testament law says then the theonomist perpetuates the details of an economy designated as beggarly elements in the New Testament. Here he's making reference to Galatians chapter four, and the problem has already been indicated because I've dealt with Galatians, that the beggarly elements are the ceremonial law, not the judicial law that we are endorsing. Zen again misrepresents the theonomic position when he asserts that it equates a temporary and temporal earthly nation with the spiritual and eternal kingdom of Christ. Nothing could be more mistaken. However, I do not equate Israel with the Church in any strict way. I believe that the analogy is between Israel and the Church and that one is the functional equivalent of the other. Finally, Zen charges that theonomy perpetuates an economy which has been terminated and of course, if theonomists do that, then they would be making a grave mistake. The question is, where does the Bible teach that the Mosaic economy has been terminated? I'd like to just point out a few of the passages used by Zinn to make that claim. Zen's points to to the New Testament statement that Moses house has ended that in the book of Hebrews chapter 3 that Moses house has ended. He says, therefore theonomic ethics is mistaken to endorse the continuing validity of the rules that govern that house. That inference, however, does not follow until one expounds the implications of the house metaphor as presented by Scripture. After all, in our own experience we know that similar rules are indeed followed in the building and living different houses. When one turns to consider what implication follows from the scriptural figure of Moses house, he finds that Christ and Moses are part of the same house in Hebrews 3 related differently to the house as servant and son. And thus the premise of Zen's argument is faulty to begin with, When Zen turns to Hebrews 8. Six, he correctly observes that the New Covenant has been put into effect with the force of law. He uses the word found in Hebrews 8. 6 in the Greek to point out that the establishment of the New Covenant has the effect of establishing it with the force of law. But of course that's true. We believe the New Covenant is law. It's just that we don't believe that the norm of the New Covenant law excludes the directions of the Old Covenant precepts. And so there's another non sequitur in his argumentation. Now, the only other passage to which Zen makes exegetical appeal in order to justify his view is 1 Corinthians 9, 20 and 21, where Paul says that he's under the law of Christ. But I've already dealt with that First Corinthians passage pointing out that what Paul means by being under the law of Christ is that he keeps the law of God under the authority of Christ. And when Paul says that he operated as though without law before some men, he means without the ceremonial law that separated Jew from Gentile. So all of this is rather hurried and a bit scattered in its presentation. I'm going to leave John Zen's behind at this point because he hasn't given us any New Covenant substantiation for his basic premise that says that the Old Covenant law has been entirely set aside. Do you have any questions on Zims? No questions on Zen. Okay, now I'm going to turn to arguments pertaining to God's Law and the State up to this point, all of the arguments have been dealing with the general continuity of the Old Testament law in the New Testament. And now we're going to be looking at the specific application of the Old Testament law to this thing. Some have argued that it's mistaken to see the civil aspects of the Old Testament law as binding on modern states because such a view overlooks the context of the Old Testament laws given to Israel as a redeemed nation placed in national covenant with God. Since modern nations are not in the same place or situation as Old Testament Israel not being redeemed for a national covenant with the Lord, it is thought that imposing God's civil law on those who do not participate in a redemptive covenant with God, on those who are not converted or joined the Church, would be to overlook the only proper context for such a law. But in reply, we can remind those voicing such a criticism that nobody advocates imposing the law on an unwilling society in the first place. We want to promote the law by means of persuasion and the preaching of God's word. Christian edification as secularists attempt to see their convictions influence civil law, we Christians want to see our influence on civil law not through the use of force, but through the use of reasoning and persuasion and preaching. Now, the redemptive history and national covenant enjoyed by Israel certainly did set the Old Testament Jews apart from modern nations as significant and as unique. But this does not mean that Israel was in every respect different from her neighbors or from nations. Today Paul teaches in Romans 1 and 2 that the same moral standards revealed to Israel through the oracles of God were more generally revealed to all men through general or natural revelation. Israel did not have a unique moral code, as the God operated with a double standard for Israel and the Gentiles. Moreover, Israel was not completely different from modern nations or her Gentile neighbors, for like these others, Israel faced historical and pre consummation problems of crime, social justice, and punishment. The law of the Lord directed Israel as to the requirements of divine justice in such situations and and that law ought to be the standard of justice for crime and punishment everywhere else as well, even in nations that did not or do not have a corporate or redemptive covenant with God. For you see, social justice in God's eyes is not racially variable or different from nation to nation. Justice is absolute. If the civil aspects of God's law were meant only for Israel, as critics say, then God then the critic should be asked to explain the New Testament's practice. Our apparent practice of taking the standards of political ethics from God's law. And the critic should be asked what the New Testament standard for political justice would be if it's not God's law. Now, these remarks have been particularly addressed to the type of criticism that we find in Meredith Klein's review article on my book, Theonomy and Christian Ethics. In that article, Klein says that the main problem with theonomy is that it overlooks that Israel was a typical nation set aside to be holy unto God, that Israel was typological of the coming kingdom of Christ, and that Israel was to be holy, a separate nation. Now, the first thing that can be said about this is that nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, in my response to Klein, I have cited page after page after page after page after page, in which I do in fact recognize the typological character of the Old Testament law and recognize that Israel was a unique nation in God's dealings in history and a holy nation. So Klein is first of all just mistaken. But now, having said that, that doesn't answer everything, because Klein could turn around and say, yes, you recognize both the theonomic thesis and that Israel was typical and holy, and in so doing you are inconsistent. The two can't be put together. Well, let's ask ourselves, why would Klein hold that these two premises are contradictory? The typological and holy status of Israel? Why would that be contradictory to the continuing validity of Israel's law code in the New Testament? Well, Klein might say that anything that is typological passes away. The moral validity of it passes if it's typological to begin with. However, he could easily be counterintuitive there, because Paul tells us that the relationship of husband to wife in the laws pertaining to monogamous marriage, if you will, typifies symbolizes the relationship of Christ to the Church. Does that mean that we are not really under obligation to follow the laws of monogamous marriage? Maclean wouldn't say that for a moment. And therefore you can have a law that has a typological element as well as an enduring moral element. Why could that not be true for all of the laws that we are endorsing today? What is the Bible teach us about the validity of the Mosaic Law today? Ultimately, the only way we can tell whether the implication of Israel's typological and holy status is that its law is invalid. Ultimately, the only way we can tell or determine an answer to that question is by looking at scriptural inferences. What does the scripture say? Is the inference from the fact that Israel's typological and holy character. Well, as it turns out in Deuteronomy, the fourth chapter, where Israel quite obviously is a holy nation and we see Israel in its typological form, Moses says that the laws given to Israel are a model of wisdom for all the nations. Roundabout, you see, the inference is not drawn that Israel's laws are to be kept only by Israel. Just the opposite inference is drawn. Just because of the holiness of Israel, all other nations should try to pattern themselves after Israel. Holiness does not mean in the Bible that the norms are different between one group and another. Holiness means that we are set aside from the unbelieving and sinful world, and therefore all sinners should try to emulate the holiness that God shows us. The Old Testament specifically says that holiness is supposed to con pervade all of creation. Even the bells horses are to have holy unto the Lord written on them and the Lord all the earth is to serve the Lord in holy array. The psalmist says. Consequently, even though Israel was holy, holy and set aside, the holiness of Israel was always intended to spread to earth's remotest end. And the standards of holiness, Israel's law therefore would be prescriptively binding for all other nations. Klein also argues in his book the Structure of Biblical Authority that the law of Moses should not be kept today in its social aspects because we are no longer under the canon of the Old Testament. Now Klein does rescue the redemptive features of the Old Testament, the stipulations regarding faith and the personal life norms of the Old Testament. And he says that the defining characteristic of a covenant document would be the public or community life norms. And if that's the defining characteristic of a covenant, not being under the Old Testament covenantal canon simply amounts to not being under the social or civil law of the Old Testament. Well, that argument is also very neat, but it gains its neatness from its au priori character. Klein has defined his terms in such a way that he can say what he wants in the Old Testament and reject the civil law of the Old Testament. He's not given exegetical support for that whatsoever. Another line of argument used by finding the structure of biblical authority is the line of plot that says the Old Testament Israelites were dealt with on the basis of an intrusion of God's principles. That consummation justice was exemplified in Israel's law rather than principles of common grace. Consequently, since we live under common grace today rather than the consummation principles of Israel, we cannot apply the severity of the Old Testament law in social matters. Well, I have real questions about the whole idea of intrusion. It may be a beneficial teaching device or metaphor, but it's certainly not something presented by the body. The Bible doesn't present the idea of last judgment breaking in on history ahead of time. The Bible does present certain aspects of the Old Testament or even New Testament as being typological of the coming judgment, however. And so if that's what Klein means, we're back to his typology argument that I've already reduced to absurdity because there are counter illustrations that can be given that he would not want to surrender. How about the claim that we are not living under common grace today, that we are living under common grace rather than the intrusion principles in Old Testament Israel? The difficulty is that to say this would be to assume that Israel was not living under common grace. And yet the biblical definition of common grace in Genesis 8, 9 is that God, God gives sunshine and rain and regularity of seasons to all men. As Klein mean to say that Israel didn't enjoy sunshine and rain upon the just and the unjust in regularity of seasons. I hope he doesn't mean to deny anything and to be so foolish as to say that. But if he has to admit that, he has to admit that what common grace is in biblical illustration was found in Israel, and if he means something other than that by common grace, that he's going to have to give biblical substantiation for his inferences to show that Israel was in some sense not under common grace, and that secondly, the common grace under which the nations operated defined their moral code. Which brings me to my final criticism of Klein. And that's Klein's assumption that justice can be defined in one way in Israel and defined in another way outside of Israel. The problem is that justice in the very nature of the case must be uniform. There's no such thing as tribal justice. I know that we speak of tribal justice. We mean the justice that is believed to be justice by the tribe or the justice that is practiced, the judgments that are practiced by a tribe or a unique social order. However, the Old Testament and the New Testament present the view which is common throughout the history of philosophy, and that's that justice is universalizable. When you change the names, only the treatment given to people in similar circumstances should be the same. If a rapist deserves one kind of treatment in Baltimore, he deserves that same kind of treatment in New York. When you simply change the geographical location or change the name of the criminal, that doesn't change the justice of how he should be Treated in fact, so pervasive an understanding is there of this that I have brought. Although I believe in planning out the rest of my lecture, I'm going to start get quoting for you. I have probably 15 quotes from well known philosophers of politics and philosophers of law in our own day that indicate the objectivity and the universality of the concept of justice. What even unbelievers must recognize seems to me to have been overlooked by Klein when he assumes that God could give to Israel a just law for penal sanctions, but that that law would not be just outside of Israel. You see, on Klein's view, few people allegedly would be attracted to and would choose the Old Testament penal system. They would prefer the freedoms and the less stringent penalties of extra biblical modern law codes. The extra biblical systems would be seen as more gracious than the Old Testament penal code. Indeed, the harsh penalties of the Old Testament, according to Klein, suspend the common grace, the common generosity of God's way of blessing other nations. God has graced the other nations with a minimal law code. But he was harsh with Israel using consummation standards with respect to their criminals. The Old Testament penalties exemplify final judgment, not the desired gracious blessing that most people would want. The mitigated standards of the modern world. In non Israelite systems, Klein says the judgment of God is suspended graciously. The consummation justice of God is suspended graciously. And thus, if you just take an overall look at the way he presents his system, the Old Testament approach is less preferable as a social blessing is a unique moral order and shows that judgment and shows judgment from God instead of grace, because suspension of judgment is true of the other nations. So for Klein, the Old Testament system is less preferable, is unique, and is an instance of judgment, not grace. Well, when you see it that way, you see how clearly unbiblical. What Klein is saying is the Old Testament presents the law and it presents the whole law not as less preferable, but as a wonderful social blessing to be desired by all nations. The Old Testament presents the law not as a unique moral order, but as a model for all nations to follow. And the Old Testament presents the Mosaic Law not as judgment, but rather as God's gracious provision for the people's good. And so Klein, you see, at the most elementary level, has the wrong perspective on the Old Testament civil law. The only other criticism made by Klein that I think is worth noting real briefly in passing is that if we were to keep the Old Testament civil code today, we would the church in its Evangelistic desires and programs would be in head on collision with the state and its penal desires or programs, that is that the church, God's will for the church, that men be evangelized would stand over against God's will for the state where men be executed for committing certain crimes. There's a real problem here because Klein believes in execution of murderers. And if he believes in execution of murderers, then why isn't the idea of the Old Testament law for murder being kept today put God's will for the Church into conflict with God's will for the state? Until he can answer that problem for his own position, we don't have to answer that problem for our position either. However, I don't believe that there is any conflict between the will for the church and the will for the state because evangelism and capital punishment are not contrary to one another in the first place. The most obvious sense, you can both evangelize and execute the same person, so they aren't in conflict. Obviously, there's an existential tension there. But what if the person doesn't accept Christ? By executing him, we put him beyond the pale of possibility of being converted. So that's all well and good, that's true. But after all, the sacred things belong to the Lord our God. Deuteronomy tells us that is what God's going to do in terms of converting them. And it's not our business. It's to reveal things that belong to us and to our children, to be observed in all generations. Moreover, Klein's criticism very neatly assumes, silently assumes, that evangelism was not part of the Old Testament program. Because if evangelism was part of the Old Testament program and the Old Testament clearly endorsed the use of the penal sanctions of the Mosaic Law, then there would have been a conflict in God's will in the Old Testament. So all we need to do is point to the evangelistic thrust of the Old Testament. And I've done that in my response to Klein. And we see that the very logic of his criticism is mistaken. There is no conflict between evangelism and the penal sanctions of the Old Testament because both were true of the Old Testament itself. That probably doesn't do justice to everything that can be said about Klein. But I have in print anyway two articles on Klein, the Appendix in Theonomy and Christian Ethics, as well as my response to his review in the Journal of Christian Reconstruction. So I think I'll leave it at that. Unless you would like to make remarks or ask questions. Let me go further with respect to the social law of the Old Testament and criticism of the theonomic view thereof. Some people would have us believe that God's New Covenant revelation has no direction for political morality, that is that the New Covenant doesn't direct political morality, for it is bought. Social reform in an unbelieving society is not a proper task for the Christian. This truncated view of Christianity, however, stands opposed to the New Covenant revelation, where Christ is presented as the King of Kings, who in the future will judge all magistrates for their rule. Christians are told to be holy in all manner of life, even in their relationship to the powers that be. The church is commissioned to teach the nations whatsoever Christ has commanded. Christianity is to be salt that influences the earth and light that is not put under a basket. Christianity, to put it briefly, is a complete world and life view, not narrowly a religious message about the afterlife. And so it's quite clear that Christians do need direction on political affairs. And if the New Testament doesn't provide that, the assumption would be that the direction comes from the Old Testament. Let me go on to say that those who press the argument that modern states are not bound to the civil aspects of God's law, so that was given in a national redemptive covenant with Israel, will find that they cannot long maintain with consistency any of the Old Testament commandments today at all. Not only were the civil aspects of the law revealed in the context of a national covenant with Israel, so also were the personal and interpersonal aspects of the law. So with the passing away of the national covenant means the invalidation of those moral standards revealed within it, then we would lose even the Ten Commandments. That is, such a line of argument proves more than the critic intended. The suggestion that the civil law of the Old Testament was a heightened standard of justice is contradictory to the very notion of justice, which means that you have one law for all people. And it's contrary to the teaching of Hebrews 2 that says that every transgression and offense in the the Old Testament received a just recompense of reward, not heightened justice, but simple justice. A line of criticism that I find fascinating for its fallacious criticism character is the one found in Lewis Nielsen's book God's Law and Christian Ethics. Nielsen says that he recognized. Well, first of all, it should be pointed out that Nielsen reduces the area of disagreement. What God's going to do in terms of converting the man, it's not our business. It's to reveal things that belong to us and to our children, to be observed in all generations. Moreover, Klein's criticism very neatly assumes, silently assumes, that evangelism was not part of the Old Testament program. Because if evangelism was part of the Old Testament program and the Old Testament clearly endorsed the use of the penal sanctions of the Mosaic Law, then there would have been a conflict in God's will in the Old Testament. So all we need to do is to point to the evangelistic throw of the Old Testament, and I've done that in my response to Klein, and we see that the very logic of his criticism is mistaken. There is no conflict between evangelism and the penal sanctions of the Old Testament because both were true of the Old Testament itself. That probably doesn't do justice to everything that can be said about Klein. But I have in print anyway two articles on Klein, the Appendix in Theonomy and Christian Ethics, as well as my response to his review in the Journal of Christian Reconstruction. So I think I'll leave it at that, unless you would like to make remarks or ask questions. Okay, let me go further with respect to the social law of the Old Testament. In criticism of the theonomic view thereof, some people would have us believe that God's New Covenant revelation has no direction for political morality, that is that the New Covenant doesn't direct political morality, for it is thought social reform in an unbelieving society is not a proper task for the Christian. This truncated view of Christianity, however, stands opposed to the New Covenant revelation where Christ is presented as the King, King of Kings, who in the future will judge all magistrates for their rule. Christians are told to be holy in all manner of life, even in their relationship to the powers that be. The church is commissioned to teach the nations whatsoever Christ has commanded. Christianity is to be salt that influences the earth and light that is not put under a basket. Christianity, to put it briefly, is a complete world and life view, not narrowly a religious message about the afterlife. And so it's quite clear that Christians do need direction on political affairs. And if the New Testament doesn't provide that, the assumption would be that the direction comes from the Old Testament. Let me go on to say that those who press the argument that modern states are not bound to the civil aspects of God's law, since it was given in a national redemptive covenant with Israel, we'll find that they cannot long maintain with consistency any of the Old Testament commandments today at all. Not only were the civil aspects of the law revealed in the context of the national covenant with Israel, so also were the personal and interpersonal aspects of the law. So with the passing away of the national covenant means the invalidation of those moral standards revealed within it, then we would lose even the Ten Commandments. That is, such a line of argument proves more than the critic intended. The suggestion that the civil law of the Old Testament was a heightened standard of justice is contradictory to the very notion of justice, which means that you have one law for all people. And it's contrary to the teaching of Hebrews 2 that says that every transgression and offense in the Old Testament received a just recompense of reward. Not heightened justice, but simply justice. A line of criticism that I find fascinating for its fallacious character is the one found in Lewis Nielsen's book God's Law and Christian Ethics. Nielsen says that he recognizes. Well, first of all, it should be pointed out that Nielsen reduces the area of disagreement between himself and the theonomist down to the penal code of the Old Testament. And at that he says it's not the entire penal code, but only punishment for religious crimes. We have to understand that we don't have to deal with all the broad issues of theology and normative ethics with Nielsen. He simply wants to dispute the penal sanctions for religious crimes today. And I'm suspicious that he wants to. After showing that point, he wants to open up the door and reason from that illustration to further instances of discontinuity. But he says that the only issue is the penalties for religious crimes in the Old Testament. Well, first of all, before he could even apply the idea that we shouldn't punish religious crimes today, he's going to have to do something to define a religious crime in a biblical and non circular, non question begging way. Because after all, all crimes are religious in character. Murder is an attack on the image of God. Rape is an attack upon the purity of the male female relation, which is in itself supposed to be symbolic of the relationship of Christ to his people. All sins are religious in character because all sins are against God. Remember Psalm 51 where David said, against thee and thee only have I sinned and done these things. And so all sin is religious in orientation. To say therefore that we shouldn't punish religious crimes is to say we shouldn't punish any crimes taken one way. But on the other hand, what would be an independent definition of a religious crime? The temptation, I think, is for Nielsen to go and to pick out the crimes he doesn't want punished today and then call religious. But what is it that makes those crimes religious crimes? I mean, how does he know they qualify as religious and the others aren't? Until he gives us the principle of distinction, we can't test his hypothesis to see if maybe other sins belong there, whether the ones that he's talked about really do belong there, and whether there's consistency in his treatment of these matters. But even forgetting the indefinability of what a religious crime would be, we must look at the method by which Nielsen wants to dismiss the Old Testament civil law against religious religious crimes. Nielsen says that there's a prima facie plausibility to the theonomic point of view. If you look at certain theonomic texts in the New Testament, then you get the impression that maybe we should do these things. But are those texts being properly interpreted? Well, here's how he decides he's going to test the proper interpretation of these texts. He says, let's look at the New Testament with those theonomy supporting, or apparently theonomy supporting texts removed. Let's ask ourselves, what impression do we get from the New Testament when the theonomy texts have been taken out now? And it should probably come as a real big surprise when you take the theonomy text out. The New Testament doesn't seem to teach theonomy. Now, the next step is since the New Testament as a whole doesn't seem to teach theonomy. Obviously, if the New Testament is to be interpreted in a uniform way, if there's to be an analogy of faith, that every text has to be interpreted in light of what's taught in all the other texts. Therefore, the apparent theonomic texts have not been interpreted right. Because when you look at the other texts apart from the theonomic text, you don't get the impression of theonomy. What is distressing to me is that this is a lawyer who is arguing this way. Can you imagine going into a court of law and defending a client by saying to the jury, now, I realize that the prosecution has presented numerous lines of defense, I mean, numerous lines of accusation against my client. But what I want you to do is to consider the whole evidence with the counter evidence removed. Obviously, the impression you get of him is that he's very innocent when all of the evidence against him is taken away. Therefore, he really must be innocent. The whole point of the analogy of faith is that you take all the evidence together, apparently favorable and apparently unfavorable, and try to bring it together. You don't just say, well, this is the one that's in question. And then you go to the evidence that you think is clear. Moreover, to complicate the terrible treatment that this argument is receiving from Mr. Nielsen, he tells us that when you look at the New Testament apart from the theonomic point of view, you don't get a theonomic impression and therefore there's a conflict between the theonomic texts and the other texts. Well, no, that's not true at all. If you look at the other passages apart from theonomy, it's just silent on the question. Well, you don't get a conflict between silence and the theonomy sounding text. You get a conflict only if the other texts seem to go against theonomy. Now at the point that he recognizes that and says, well, these other texts seem to say that we shouldn't execute people for religious things crimes. How does he argue that those texts show us that we shouldn't do it? Does he have any particular text that teaches it? No, he says these texts seem to teach that because of their silence on the question. I mean, if it isn't bad enough that he's made all these logical blunders up to this point, he adds to it an argument from silence. And then he says that what you have to do is you have to take the general feeling you get from all of the texts on the basis of silence and use this silence based subjective feeling for the direction of the text to judge the theonomic interpretation of the other text. Well, one begins to wonder if we're ever going to return to objectivity and historical grammatical exegesis as the foundation for our ethical opinion. I guess I've ranted and raved enough about that. Nielsen's whole approach is just skewed from the beginning because his methodology is an unacceptable theological methodology. We don't argue from silence, we don't argue from general impression. We don't argue by subtracting some of the evidence and getting the impression we get from the remainder and then bring the other evidence in. Well, my remaining time let me deal with some arguments dealing with church and state in particular. Recently it's been suggested by Palmer Robertson, Old Testament instructor at Covenant Theological Seminary, that membership in the Old Testament Jewish state was co extensive with membership in the Old Testament Jewish Church. For according to his claim, circumcision and participation in the Passover was required of all citizens in Israel. And so since the church and the state were merged, Robertson wants to claim the laws given to this merged church state would not necessarily apply in a circumstance where the church and the state are no longer merged as in the New Testament. Well, even if he proved his initial premise, of course it wouldn't follow that we don't keep these laws today when church and state have been separated. For the fact is that cultures where there was, well, cultures outside of Israel, totally apart from the merging of church and state in those cultures, cultures outside of Israel were to keep the law of God. And so a culture outside of Israel today with its merged church state, allegedly that those cultures with the separation could also keep the law of God and would perhaps be under obligation to keep the law of God. So all I'm saying is that if we grant the historical premise that there was a merging of church and state in the Old Testament to Robertson, he still wouldn't gain his conclusion that therefore the civil law of the Old Testament shouldn't be kept today. But I don't want to grant his historical premise. I want to say, in fact, that people were citizens in Old Testament Israel, members of the state who were not circumcised and therefore did not bear the mark of belonging to the covenant community. Stop and think about it. Women were not circumcised in the Old Testament. Does that mean that they were not citizens in Israel? No, it didn't mean that at all. Women were not circumcised. And moreover, the sojourners in Israel were not circumcised. And yet they were citizens in Israel. They were citizens because they had the same law. They had the same privileges, the same responsibility and the same protections as anybody else in Israel. And the only difference between the sojourner and the native Israelite was that the sojourner could not take Passover until he became circumcised. Now, if Robertson wants to press that analogy, then, and I'm not pressing it, but I'm saying, to use his line of argument and logic, that is simply to say that people today would be citizens in the state having the same responsibilities and the same protection until they become baptized, in which case then they can take the Lord's Supper. Yes, I think they were specifically before the entrance into the Promised Land, when all of Israel was together. The statement is there, and unfortunately I don't have it in my notes before me. I have it in the longer version of this argument that all of Israel stood together and all of Israel and the sojourners in that passage before they entered the Promised Land. So I think the sojourners were numbered. With the native born, there was to be one law, and they had the same protections and the same obligations, which is what I understand the concept of citizenship to be. Do you feel otherwise? Is that why you're asking or just. So basically, the argument used by Dr. Robertson is doubly faulty. It begins with a historical premise which is inaccurate. Now you see, he can respond, though I should point this out for you. You learn something about logic and polemics here too. Robertson could come back and say, well, now wait a minute, you haven't disproven my historical premise because citizenship is something more than having the same law and the same obligations and protection. Citizenship includes being able to take Passover when you're in Israel. Well, okay, he can have the word citizenship. You see, he's built into the word by definition the conclusion that he wants to reach. He wants to say that everybody who was a citizen had to take Passover. But lo and behold, that's just the way he defines citizen as somebody who took Passover in Old Testament Israel. I should also point out that Robertson presses the idea that the Old Testament Passover was enforced by civil sanctions. Or he seems to suggest this. But I haven't been able to find in the Old Testament the corroboration of that. I'm not sure the state punish people for not taking Passover are not coming up to the three feet. And so that's kind of a question up in the air for me right now. Doctor Fowler argues that there was no separation between church and faith in the Old Testament because Israel was a priestly nation, whereas the church today and not America is the priestly nation. And so there's a difference between the church and America, whereas there was no difference between the nation and the church in the Old Testament. Yes, sir. Numbers nine, 13, it says a man who does not take the Passover. Yes, that's right. The passage cited in Numbers here says that you cut off a man who doesn't take the Passover. But it's not. It turns out that it's not just the missing. In all instances, there's some ambiguity. No, not ambiguity. There's some question from modern commentators as to what the cutting off meant, how it was accomplished. Sometimes cutting off is taken by something mean capital punishment, sometimes exile, sometimes ostracism. And then the whole question is how was this enforced? Was it civilly enforced? And what I suggested a few moments ago, I guess I would still stick with. I'm just not sure if the Old Testament teaches civil penalties for not taking the Lord's Supper or Passover. Excuse me, that New Testament anachronism, okay. Fowler says, getting back to that argument that Israel was a priestly nation and therefore did not observe a separation of church and state because the whole community was both priestly and national. The difficulty here is that what is true is that there was a religious mission for the corporate body, that the nation as a whole served a priestly function in history and in terms of the cultures of that day, and that that religious mission as a whole for the corporate body has now been given to the church, a different kind of body than to the nation of Israel. However, the the fact that the nation as a whole functioned in a priestly way in terms of the population of the world, does not show that within the nation there was no distinction between priest and king. After all, Israel, being a priestly nation, did not allow kings to make sacrifice to God as though they were priests. So Dr. Fowler's point is not well taken. I don't think. Time is going to be short here. We're going to have to finish up. One argument that I think is of some interest to us is the argument that the penalties of the Old Testament don't have to be kept today in the same way that they were in the Old Testament. It is sometimes hastily suggested that since the penal sanctions of the law are found among the case laws of the Old Testament, that is laws which are not universally binding in terms of their cultural details, that these penal laws do not have to be followed in the same way that they were followed in Old Testament Israel, that those laws simply teach that certain crimes should be punished, but do not teach what the punishment should be. So then the law you shall not allow a sorceress to live, and the law whoever lies with the beast shall surely be put to death, would simply teach that those who practice witchcraft or bestiality should be punished in some way, not that they must be punished in a particular way. It is the principle, allegedly merely, that these acts are punishable, which is taught. The death penalty would be a variable cultural deed. Now I think that would be an interesting line to pursue. If I were a non theonomist, I would try to take the logic of theonomy and show we can then draw conclusions about the FEMA sanctions that theonomy doesn't draw. But as attractive as this suggestion may sound to people and abstract after all, it would certainly make it easier to promote God's law in a secularized culture. It is clear that the suggestion cannot be defended in the face of particular textual and theological realities. For instance, the two texts that I've just referred to are specifically worded so as to require more than just any kind of punishment for those who practice witchcraft and bestiality. What is prohibited in Exodus 22:18 is that a witch should be allowed to live a Magistrate who merely finds a witch, a genuine witch as biblically understood, would transgress this prohibition, thereby allowing what the text forbids, namely that a witch should live. You shall not permit a sorceress to live, it says. Exodus 22:19 used an idiomatic Hebrew expression. It says, those who lie with beasts shall surely be put to death. Used an idiomatic Hebrew expression to communicate the certainty of the death penalty for someone committing bestiality, it says, they shall surely be put to death. The whole point here is that this crime is so heinous that only the death penalty is its just recompense. The arbitrariness of some commentators here is rather perplexing. R.A. cole writes in the Tyndale Old Testament series, our attitude to perversions of God's natural order can hardly vary from those of the law, while our treatment of offenders will be very different today. Yet you see, the Hebrew text teaches that our treatment to this crime must not vary. Surely an offender like this is to be put to death. If that is not the justice which we endorse, then we have to say that even our attitude toward the perversion itself has varied from that which is prescribed in the Old Testament law of God. It seems to me the only cultural variation that we would allow in terms of the case law nature of the penal sanction is the manner in which people are put to death. And as I think many of you will know, even some question about that, whatever method of execution you use, it must embody all of the features of the method prescribed in the Old Testament. For instance, the community involvement. And I'm not saying there aren't other ways to execute that incorporate that, but that must be incorporated in some way. Perhaps trial by jury and the jury itself performing the execution would satisfy the requirement. Although I'm not going to get into the precise detail right now, One last argument and then we'll just find finally at the stop. It has been suggested by some people that since the Old Testament penal sanctions did not render what the crimes really and fully deserved in the first place, that is every sinner should be put to death. And therefore the Old Testament law never was an attempt to give perfect justice. But therefore we don't have to follow perfect justice today either. The demand for doing perfect justice is illegitimate. Well, the problem with this is that it's a very confused line of argumentation. Perfect justice. The demand for perfect justice doesn't exclude distinguishing between perfect eternal justice and perfect social justice. And in the Old Testament, I don't believe that perfect justice demanded execution for every kind of sin. I don't believe that every sin is in fact socially punishable and therefore to say that if the Old Testament had been perfectly just, everybody would have to die is patently false. Moreover, it's a strange line of argumentation to say since perfect justice wasn't followed in the Old Testament, we don't today even have to do as much as the Old Testament did. I mean, the argument, even if it were a good one, against the perfect justice of the Old Testament wouldn't show that justice should be mitigated to the if anything, it should show that we should at least do the justice prescribed by God. Then where is the argument, after all, that says in the New Testament we are not to show that level of justice that was understood in the Old Testament? Wouldn't progressive revelation bring increased responsibility? If anything, will all of the rest of the arguments against the penal sanctions of in the law of God and use notorious fallacies and reasoning arguments from silence, appeals to emotion, appeals to abuse, arguments from tradition? And although something could be said, and I had prepared to say something about it, the error of that method of reasoning, I think, is clear enough that you'll do this fine without further exposition. Do you have any questions before before we end this lecture? The four lectures, this one and the three previous, have been intended to offer something of a summary answer to the various lines of criticism that are made of the theonomic position all the way from the elementary premise of continuity between the Testaments to the specific applications of social law and penal sanction. Any closing questions? Well then, we'll take another break and return.