Dr Greg Bahnsen - Philosophy of Christianity: Review: The Attributes of God (Part 12)

And If I'll ask Dr. Chris Rowell if you might start us with prayer, please. Let us pray. Lord God, we come to you in the precious name of Jesus Christ, our Creator Redeemer. How we thank you, Lord, for this privilege of studying the Word and the thoughts of men. In the light of it. We pray for this class and our teacher and for us who listen. Lord, help us to perceive your will and to work in this difficult area. Give us patience and that sanctification without which no man shall see the Lord, and we shall praise thee through Christ. Are we prepared to get the midterm exam and take it home and write it out? Well, let me help you kind of decide on that issue. What is philosophy? Anybody need not rush to answer after lunch. Do we know what philosophy is? What are we doing here? Well, that's one of the things we've studied in this class. Anybody tell me what the tasks of philosophy are? The search for some of the basic principles that give us a reason for being, a reason for our reality. Basic principles having to do with reality, knowledge and behavior. Yes. Okay. And also to integrate the various fields of learning into a coherent worldview. Okay, I said there are two basic approaches to philosophy. They're characterized in what ways? Belief and unbelief. Yes. And what is it that characterizes the believing approach to philosophy? Over against the unbelieving. Do they have different goals? I suggest only one seeks to glorify God. Do they have different standards? I suggest only one submits wholeheartedly to the word of God. Are they different procedures? Yes. What is the difficulty that I have maintained as generally associated with all unbelieving philosophy? Dialectical tension. Well, at least we're hard on that one. Okay. The rational irrational dichotomy in unbelieving thought is something that we pursued for a day and a half or so. Anybody generally characterized that dichotomy atomistic versus monistic? Oh, yes. Okay, now characterize it. The atomistic is breaking things down into forms or parts. To try to explain something hemonistic is to explain an event in terms of its larger context. Right. So you get to large understand what you're saying. Okay. Is there another way of describing the rational irrational dichotomy of unbelieving thought? We talked about it in terms of the need for omniscience. Some mind must know everything and the unbeliever can't provide a principle by which this principle is satisfied. And consequently he runs to irrationalism, the idea that the human mind is limited. But if the human mind is limited, then we can't know for sure. And so there's this back and forth between whether we know and whether we don't know. An unbelieving thought. You want to master these things. I can assure you that when I pass out the midterm on Wednesday, you'll find it mentioned. Okay, now, about Wednesday. It turns out last Friday was the day originally assigned for passing out the midterm, and we have fallen a couple of days behind in our reading, or at least I'm a couple days behind in my lecturing on what you should be reading about. And I've decided to keep the midterm at the same point conceptually in the course outline as I originally had planned. So it's not going to be at the same point as to the schedule, that is, as to the calendar, but it will be passed out after we've discussed the attributes of God. Now, you may be wondering, when are we going to discuss the attributes of God? I can hear that question coming. But we're going to talk about the attributes of God today, and we're going to talk about them on Wednesday. And after we're done on Wednesday, I'm going to be leaving for the airport again for another quick trip home. And I'm going to leave you with some thing to do while I'm gone. Okay? And remember, on that midterm, you can take until the day that the final exam is due to write it out for me. I don't think that's a good strategy, but you're certainly free to take as much time as you wish. And you're free to use any materials that you wish. You may get another student's paper and xerox it and turn it in. As I've told you, that will count as turning an exam. Will not count as a good exam, but it will count as an exam. Okay? Now, after we talked about the different approaches to philosophy, the obvious first question was the existence of God in terms of the Christian philosophy and outlook. And we examined the three popular or historical arguments for the existence of God. The ontological, cosmological, and teleological. All right, in the briefest conceivable terms, can you please encapsulate what is the instinctive about these three arguments? What is the basic structure of the ontological argument? Induces existence from conception. That's right. The existence of God from the conception of God. Very good. Cosmological. I didn't hear that. First cause. First cause. I think what you. That's all right. You want to say we're deducing the existence of God by appeal to the principle of causality in some sense. And then in the teleological argument. From design attempts to prove the existence of God from the position of a designer, someone having to make it all come to be. Okay. Now, on the arguments for God's existence, we have found virtues and defects in each of them and in the reading. I would suggest that as you prepare to write your exam, you pay special attention to the editor's introduction to the sections. The editor will do a good job. Brody is a fine philosopher. He'll do a good job of telling you the main point or points in each of the readings. I will expect you to have mastered that, that you'll at least know the editor's introduction that is his basic summary of the issues. And you will very likely be required to do some analysis of some of the articles and explain some of my interaction with them from your notes. But again, any interaction you do, you are free to use the book or any other source that you may have at your disposal. What is the basic problem with the theistic arguments as they've been historically formulated? The traditional attempts to prove God's existence make what basic mistake? They argue within the empiricist framework. Well, ontological argument doesn't do that. Well, they don't. Don't give up, though. Wait a minute. I want to prescribe through this. Your empiricism is one form of the problem. They don't argue from a Christian presupposition. Very good. Okay, so what somebody says. I mean, they don't. They don't assume what they're supposed to prove. Well, that seems to be a virtue. Some people would say, what's the difficulty of not assuming the existence of God? You don't assume the existence. Oh, go ahead. Well, they don't. Well, whatever they prove, they don't prove. Prove the Christian God if they do prove. That's one difficulty. That's right. But how are you going to prove anything if you don't assume the existence of God? What will be the standard of logic? What will be the assurance that causality holds in a universe of chance? Why should there be any order in our thinking at all? And the difficulty is that the argument are resting on the existence of God philosophically, even though they're attempting to prove the existence of God. And until that fact is made explicit, then it will not be clear to the unbeliever that we're really arguing worldviews. Really? Yes. It's a whole conception on life. If you don't believe In God, then you've got to believe this world. Sound and fury signifying nothing. And if that's true, then there's no argument at all. There's not even an argument whether it's a cloudy day because there's no sense to life, there's no sense to thinking. And there's nothing to guarantee that we aren't completely deluded. I mean, you can drive the person to skepticism and all the rest if he doesn't have the standards of logic, empirical knowledge and morality that are necessary to do philosophy at all. So we want to point out that we have to argue within a Christian world and life view or a non Christian world in life view, and then compare the benefits and defects of the two. Answer the fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own conceits. But then don't answer the fool according to his folly, lest you be like unto him. Okay, so you got to present your own point of view presuppositionally, not falling prey to the difficulties of autonomous thought. On the other hand, you've got to show the autonomous thinker the pool where his falling leads, lest he be wise in his own conceits. Okay, now how about religious language? We talk about the existence of God. Is it possible to say anything at all that is meaningful as religious people? Why would it be thought difficult to make any statements or claims as religious people that would be meaningful? What are two basic problems with the meaningfulness of religious language that we've now considered in the course of. Gotten over the hurdle of our basic approach to the issues? We've gotten over the hurdle of the existence of God. Now we're going to talk about it. Well, there were problems in our language with what I guess has been called verification or falsification of the word. What is the problem associated with those words. Before he says they don't have any meaning? Okay, why not? Well, they're not falsifiable. Okay, why does it mean they're not meaningful? They don't rule anything out because they're non falsifiable. Then they're not making any definite claim at all if it's their compatible. And if religious claims are compatible with everything, then they're not saying anything. Okay, and what kind of response can be made to this? The non falsifiability of religious claims. Class over nothing. I guess we can't say anything. Close down the seminaries, shut the Bibles, let's go home. I realize that it's after lunch and it's a drowsy day, but I mean, gentlemen, your eternal destiny is riding on the line. This is an important question. What are you going to say to Flu? And he says, look, you're not saying anything at all because you won't let your statements be falsified. You think every state of affairs is compatible with what you're claiming as Christians. Consequently, you're not saying anything at all. You don't even have the virtue of being wrong. You can see people who say things that are meaningful can be wrong, but you're not even saying anything meaningful. You're worse than wrong. You're meaningless, rather hard claim. And you're going to say in response to him now as the reason is asked of you for the hope in you. Yes. Some responses in terms of religious language employees. I think of a blick sort of thing. Who did that? Name of the poor guy. RM Hare. Got that right on your fingertips. RM hair. Okay, right here. Some problems with the blick approach to things. Absolutely. Okay, now what would you suggest is a good approach to it? I think the use of language in equivocal and uniform, both terms put a handle on the discussion. Very useful. The religious language is looking at a special category which is only open to those who are involved in it. That is, you cannot know what it means to be born again until you have. Okay, now this discussion of the meaningfulness of religious language within the community of faith comes up in the medieval. Well, the discussion that stems from the medieval issue of attributions to God. And I can see some connection between it and what we're talking about now. But I don't believe that's the direct line of approach that we'd want to make, or at least it wasn't the one that I made in flabby. The words that we use as God, words and religious language were given to us and their use can be deduced from context in scripture. Yeah, again, I think you're answering the second question. I think you're answering the second problem of meaningfulness in religious language and that having to do with attributions rather than religious claims. Flew says, religious claims are non falsifiable, therefore they have no meaning. Meaning whatsoever. The Christian says, well, now wait a minute, it isn't really true. These claims are completely without verification. We have to think everything in life verifies the claims. Now, we realize you don't see that, Mr. Flew, but we believe God answers our prayers. We believe that his son rose from the dead. We believe that the Bible is pretty strong verification that there's a God. All Right. So we believe there is this kind of evidence. So as it turns out, you haven't been true to the whole realm of descriptive phenomena. Religious language does resist falsification, but it also offers verification. How can it be both? Well, it turns out that religious language and its support has a circular epistemic structure. There's a kind of circularity about arguing for your ultimate standards. The empiricist believes his empirical standards to be right on empirical grounds. The rationalist believes his rational standards on rational grounds, the intuitionist on intuitionist grounds, and the biblicist on biblical grounds. And so we all seem to have these basic commitments that are unfalsifiable, and yet we believe everything in our experience tends to verify them. And so it is wrong for him to think that religious language has been quarantined over here in some special category. It isn't only religious language that shows this kind of feature. In fact, all basic commitment language shows this feature of being both odd and ordinary, both non falsifiable and verified in various ways. Lo and behold, Anthony Flew has the same situation. And remember the parody of the parable that I gave you that Flew himself has basic commitments that are going to resist falsification. I think it would be helpful also if you remember that I did something of a background and logical positivism out of which this criticism arises. And if you can show me how the logical positivist program failed, especially Dr. Popper's approach, Carl Popper's approach to falsifiability, then you will have undermined flu before he even gets off the ground. And so there are a number of ways to approach this issue. I hope you'll keep them in mind. I'm sure you'll keep them keep them in mind. As you're writing your exams, did you use the word episystemic or systemic? Maybe I misheard it. No, I said epistemological or epistemic. Epistemic, yeah. Having to do with knowledge. What is the difference between systemic and episystemic? That's not the word you're using. I'm not talking about episystemic. I'm talking about epistemic. Having to do with knowledge. Epistemological. Epistemological. That's the do with the theory of knowledge. Epistemic has to do with knowledge. Would you like that word? I don't know what the word is. Yeah, 1s do with the theory and the other has to do with the thing theorized about as an ontic and ontological. Many People have ontological problems and there are a few people that have ontic problems too. Okay, I don't know. Are you really ready for this midterm, fellas? I don't want to prod or get hard nosed with or anything, but it's coming a little slower than it ought to. Let's talk about the problems of predication that arise from the medieval debate. Maimonides thought there was difficulty in talking about God since you can't make attributions to God of a positive nature, because if you do, then you're suggesting that God is a composite being, one that receives a combination of attributes. And so in order to get around this, he suggested that we can only speak of God in a negative way via negativa. We can only make negative attributions to God. Now somebody had a question about that. You want to pursue it now? Yeah. I was wondering what Maimonides then would have done with the scriptural admonitions or statements. The Lord is a living God, he is one. Yes, I'm sure Maimonides would take the approach. This is in the language of naive belief, in the ordinary religious person, in the language of religious devotion. It's fine to speak of God in this way, but if you want a precise and philosophical understanding of just exactly what you're saying, then you're going to have to get it right. And to say anything correct about God, you're going to have to phrase it in negative terms. You see what I'm getting at? Although I don't know, Maimonides own attitude or spirit of his heart. I think implicitly people who speak that way have a kind of intellectual arrogance about them that's very repugnant. At least it is to me the idea that, well, yeah, it's okay for the naive layman, they can go ahead and sing their silly songs and all that, but you know, we in philosophy, we're going to have to get it straight. Maimonides would say, well yeah, in religious devotion you can talk about God as living, but we all know that what that means is God is not dead. That's as if to say the Bible isn't good enough to use as its own standard, isn't it? Well, I think it amounts to that. Maimonides answer would undoubtedly be that God stooped to reach people who couldn't think philosophically what a quine said. And after all, if you can prove God's existence, that's better. But from Sophie the washwoman who can't quite do it, God gives the information to her directly. I just don't happen to believe that God's Word is the intellectual shortcut for the ungifted. It's pronounced the word of God, I think, is revelation, because no man would be able to come to the truth apart from God's aid. We're all in need of it. Okay, does that answer your question, then? Okay, let's go on. From Maimonides Applied has formulated the difficulty somewhat differently. What did he see the problem as being in religious or in linguistic predication about God? He said that when you assert a negativism, that in effect, you're really displaying that there's a positive attribute. How did he show that, though? It wasn't quite that simple. I mean, you're on the right track. Go ahead. That's right. That's right. A correct negative statement about God, Aquinas pointed out, is always going to be a comparative statement statement. For instance, if we say that God is. If we want to get at the fact. I'm going to get this right here. Don't want to confuse you with too many negatives. All right? We can say that God is not dead as a way of saying that he's living because he's not like dead things. But as it turns out, if you suggest that by being not dead he is similar to plants and animals, then you've misconstrued the nature of God. So Aquinas says you've really got to say God is more like not dead than he is like not living. There's a sense in which he's not living, too, in the ordinary plant, animal, human sense. Consequently, since you have to introduce comparative negative predicates, you're always going to be asserting something positive about God because he is more not dead. And Aquinas then says that's the same as saying that God's alive. Okay, Rather clever, kind of circuitous, but it gets to the point the negative attributes are not doing anything to keep God from being a composite being. Okay. Now, Aquinas sees the problem as how do you speak of God without falling into a univocal way of speaking or an equivocal way of speaking? If you speak univocally of God, then you draw him down to your own level and make him like a creature. If you say that attributes, when you apply them to God, mean the same thing as when you apply them to men, then you're saying God's just like a man. But on the other hand, if you say they're completely different, if you speak equivocally of God, then you have no knowledge of God whatsoever. And so you seem to be lost between pulling God down to the level of man or losing all contact with him, not knowing him at all. And Aquinas proposed the brilliant solution of analogy. We speak analogously of God according to proportion. And by that he meant that God holds this attribute either in a different degree or in a different manner than man does. So that we speak of medicine and urine both being healthy, Aquinas says, but we know that healthy applies to medicine as the cause of health, and healthy applies to urine as the sign of health. And likewise, if we speak of man as loving and God is loving, then loving is going to apply to them in different ways. In what different ways? Well, that seems to be up for grabs, that quite sort of clear. Aquinas, he can give illustrations on the temporal level, but when you try to use this analogy of proportion and apply it to God, we still are somewhat in the dark. And so most critics of Aquinas have said that what he has here is not really a solution to his problem, but simply an unstable mixture of the two sides of the difficulty. He has a little bit of equivocation and a little bit of univocal knowledge of God, and he wants to bring them both in. But there's really no way in which it's integrated. I suggested that there is a way around the difficulty of how we make predication about God. And if you'll remember that we don't begin by speaking of God on the basis of our own autonomous thinking. We don't start with ourselves and our own reason and then try to, from our experience, move from what's true and experienced to God. But rather we recognize that God himself is spiritual, specially revealed how we're supposed to speak of Him. Then we are given appropriate language and language which can also distinguish the creature from the Creator. Okay. The idea is instead of extrapolating from independent experience to how we speak of God, we rather let God tell us how to speak of Him. And then within the community of faith, the use of the Scriptures and the use of religious language are developed. And within that context, they certainly do have meaning, as it's been pointed out before. And then we had an article by. Who was the fellow who wrote the article defending the use of analogy in language? Ross. Ross. And his point was analogy applies to the double use of predicates throughout our language. We find that when we say that Johnny made a ship or Johnny made $10, the word made is being used in slightly different ways and yet not Completely different ways. There's analogous use of the word made. And since that's a common feature of our language, the fact that religious language employs analogy cannot be a defect in it, cannot be a special defect in it. Anyway, okay, we've gone through the problems of what approach we take to philosophy. Philosophy, thinking a while. We've gone through the problem of how we know about the existence of God, and we've gone through the problem of how we can speak of God. Two different ways of looking at that problem. Now, today we come to a new unit having to do with the attributes of God themselves. Now, we're not talking about whether God exists. We're not talking about the nature of the language by which we refer to God. We're going to be talking about the person of God, his characteristics, his attributes. Okay? We're not talking about attribution. That's a linguistic question. We're talking about the attributes, which is an ontological question, okay? And the first attribute of God that is raised for philosophical discussion in our text is that of his omnipotence. Somebody just very simply tell me what God's omnipotence means. He's all powerful, Almighty. Okay, Translate these into a claim or a statement, an assertion. What does it mean about God? That he. Can do anything. That's right, he can do anything. As the traditional way of understanding the predicate omnipotence, obviously from Potent's power and omni all. God is all powerful. He can do anything. All right, now that is a Christian dogma that God is all powerful. And it's a Christian understanding of the dogma that he can do anything. However, having proposed that idea about God, it does seem that certain paradoxes rise from the idea itself. And I'd like to look at a couple of those paradoxes. In fact, we've got to get through them all today unless we're going to fall behind even more. First of all, the paradox of whether God can do things like making a round square. Now, while Aquinas does not make use of this illustration, that's one defect in the reading that he doesn't give you anything to latch onto. He does deal directly with this kind of problem. Somebody says, well, if God can do anything, then he can make a round square. But of course, nobody can make a round square. So it does appear that he really can't do anything. Okay, now how does Aquinas deal with this? That goes against the basic nature of God. No. Okay, so what? It's logically impossible. If there's something that is logically impossible. God cannot do that if he doesn't. Ah, good. That's the statement I was looking for. The key is, Aquinas says God does only the possible God can do anything possible. Okay. This is how he modifies the kind of simplistic expression of omnipotence. God can do anything possible. Making a round square is logically impossible because it turns out that the subject in principal predicate are not compatible. Logically impossible. And so making a round square is not some possible thing that God can't do. It's not a failure in God's abilities. It's not some possible thing which he cannot do. He can do all possible things. This is not a possible thing. Therefore, there's no failure in his ability. So he is still almighty, all things powerful. He can do anything possible. Okay, does anybody have any questions about this? Yeah, well, there's an objection to that because it's possible to sin, and yet it says God's not. It's not possible for God to sin. Okay, very good. As it turns out in the development of the text that comes up last. And so I'm going to do something, and I'm just going to shelve that problem over here, okay? And we'll come back to it before the hour's up. I want to make sure everybody gets this right in their notes. Aquinas says God can do anything possible. That's not a possible thing. Therefore it's no problem that he can't do it. But somebody says, hey, well, sin's possible. And yet we say he can't sin, so he can't do everything possible. Seems to be a very good counterinstance to that. Pointus has an answer for it we'll talk about later. Yeah. This doesn't take into account, though, at least the definition we've given to omnificence, that God can do anything. He can do anything. It doesn't matter whether it's logically possible or not. God should still be able to do it. Very good. Right. I know some of you have done your reading, because who is it that raises that objection? Forget it's Frankfurt, Perry Frankfurt. And I'll tell you what, after we look at George Mavrodi's approach to the difficulty, then we'll come to Frankfurt and look at it too. Mavrodi says that that's fine as far as it goes. However, somebody can formulate the problem in a way which isn't so easy for a pointus to get out of, instead of talking about some. Something that's clearly logically impossible. A round square. Mavarotti suggests that we talk about the paradox of the stone. Okay, y' all know the paradox of the stone. You've heard it in really intelligent undergraduate philosophy classes. I'm sure God can do anything. Can God make a stone so heavy he can't lift? Well, if he can make a stone so heavy that he can't lift, lift, then of course there's something he can't do. He can't lift the stone. And if he can't make a stone that's so heavy that he can't lift, and there's something he can't do, he can't make it. Ergo, one way or another, there's something God can't do, which is to say he can't do anything, and therefore God is not omnipotent. Mavarotti says Aquinas does not get out of the difficulty nearly so easily. Why not? Doesn't he raise the issue of why should God be limited to doing only the things which are logically possible? No, no, no, no. That is not Mavroti. In fact, that's one of the critics of Mavrodi's, that he should have taken that into account, and he didn't. So don't get that confused. We'll get there. Mav Brody says this is the first bigger problem for Aquinas, because while a round square is obviously a logical contradiction, there's no obvious logical contradiction in somebody making something so heavy they can't lift. Haven't you ever done that? Mavarotti says, I've made a boat so heavy I can't lift. It's obviously not logically a contradiction to do that sort of thing. Making a round square would be a logical contradiction. Sure, but how about making something so heavy you can't lift? It's not logically a contradiction. So how do we get out of the paradox? Anybody want to suggest it? Mavrodi says that although that is not obviously a logical contradiction, it is implicitly a logical contradiction nonetheless. And the reason for that is, he says, assume that the God you're talking about is not omnipotent, then obviously the problem is a big problem. What does it prove? It proves that God's not omnipotent. But since that's the conception of God with which you started, that's rather trivial. And besides, we're really trying to talk about the Christian conception of God, so you can shelve that. Now, let's begin with the idea that God's omnipotent, okay? Now here we have the assumption God makes a stone so heavy that God, which is to say the one who can do anything, who can lift all stones. All right, that's what we mean by God, the one who can lift all stones. And on and on and on and on, we can lift the rest of the things that his omnipotence gives him. Here we have God making a stone so heavy that the one who can lift all stones cannot lift it. Now you see the logical contradiction. And then Mavrones at that point, having refined the illustration, takes essentially the same line of escape as Aquinas when he says, since this is not a possible thing, since it's not an object of power at all, it's not a lack in God's power that he cannot do it. He goes on to say, and interestingly, it is the very omnipotence of God which makes the existence of such a stone abso. Absolutely impossible. While it is the fact that I am finite in power which makes it possible for me to make a boat too heavy for me to lift. Although he doesn't use the language here, if you want to in your margin, you might want to put down false analogy. What he's saying is the analogy is a false one. The critics analogy between Mavrodi's not being able to lift his boat and got making a stony can't live is a false one because it's Jeff on this point that the similarity would break down. It's just his lack of omnipotence that would put him in this situation. Okay, so then he says we can take the same way out as Aquinas, that it's no. The last paragraph says it very nicely. He says nothing I've said above of course goes to prove that God is in fact omnipotent. All I have intended to show is that certain arguments intended to prove that he is not omnipotent fail. Now listen, they fail because they propose as tests of God's power putative tasks whose descriptions are self contradictory. Such pseudo tasks. They're pseudo because their descriptions are self contradictory. Such pseudo tasks, not falling within the realm of possibility, are not objects of power at all. Hence the fact that they cannot be performed implies no limit on the power of God and hence no defect in the doctrine of omnipotence. Okay, so stylistically there's a difference between Mavrodes and Aquinas, but conceptually they're really answering the problem in the same way. But now Harry Frankfurt is really fascinating answer to this problem. As you can see, it's one of the shorter articles to appear in the philosophical journals. Just what, four or five paragraphs? Long paragraphs. What does Frankfurt say about this? Well, first of all, he points out a defect in Mavrodes and Aquinas when they argue that God can do anything possible. Now since contradictions are not possible, it's no defect in God's power that he can't do them. What's the problem with that? That he points out. That will turn out to be it? What he points out is that it's not uniformly agreed among theologians and philosophers that God is bound by the possible. That's what you're saying, that he's not bound by the laws of logic. And he gives the example in a long footnote of Descartes. And I guess I'm particularly interested in that because one of my longer graduate papers in graduate school is just on this concept in Descartes of whether God can do the impossible and whether God can violate the laws of logic and mathematics and all that. So Frankfurt, I think is absolutely right that it's not uniformly agreed among professing Christian thinkers that God is bound by the laws of logic. And therefore by adding this qualification, he can do anything possible, anything logically possible. We're really cutting short the discussion illegitimately. We should be talking about whether it's right to say of an omnipotent being that he is bound by the laws of logic. If God is not powerful enough to violate the laws of logic successfully, is he all powerful? Okay, you can't take the Thomistic way out. You can't say, well, God can only do the possible. What you're talking about is logically impossible. So it's no defect in God that he can't do it. But wait a minute, maybe it is a defect in God. From Descartes standpoint, God should be able to make the world that has other mathematical laws and other logical laws. So is it true that God is bound by something outside himself, the laws of logic? Could an all powerful being be subject to some condition outside of himself that's not all powerful? That's an excellent point. It's also a confused one, but I mean in terms of the discussion, it's the point that needs to be made. And how does Frankfurt advance the discussion? Now, having seen the problem, it turns out that there's a very simple solution to the paradox. Create a situation that would handle that problem and that would deal with it. Well, I'm not quite sure what you're getting at. I'm not sure that's what he's saying. Although, let's see here. Let me put it another way. Frankfurt says that if an omnipotent being, if a God who can do anything, okay, God who can do anything, if he can as a matter of fact make something he cannot do. I'm just going to simplify this. If a God who can do anything, if a God who can lift any stone can make a stone he cannot lift, Isn't that a logical question? Contradiction? Well, certainly it is. God who can do anything can make something that he cannot do. All right, Frankfurt says if we can accept this on the idea that God can do the logically contradictory, then what should keep God from being able to do another logically contradictory thing? Lift the stone he can't lift. And I don't know, maybe you don't see the humor in that. I mean, the smug thing about that is that once somebody wants to give up the laws of logic, then who can say how you know, how many times you can give them up? Frankfurt says, all right, you want to throw out the laws of logic, throw them out. Then obviously God can do anything. He can even do the impossible. He can even do the logically impossible. He can even lift the stone he can't lift. Now once the critic says, hey, that's logically impossible. Well, you're the one who said that God is supposed to be able to do the logically impossible. And if he can do the logically impossible on the assumption that he can do anything, then of course he can do it a second time too. The first logically impossible thing he did is he made the stone. And the second logically impossible thing he did is he lifted it and that's the end of it. I mean, the answer is right here in one long sentence on page 344. But if God is supposed capable of performing one task whose description is self contradictory, that of creating the problematic stone in the first place, why should he not be supposed capable of performing another, that of lifting the stone? So is God all powerful? Is there paradox there? No paradox at all. He's all powerful. He can do anything. He can even lift the stone he can't lift. Okay, very clever. However, Wade Savage in the next article in our reading in the Paradox of the Stone doesn't like Mavrodi's or Frankfurt's approach to the difficulty. And why is that? All right. Well, Dr. Savage believes that both Mavrotes and Frankfurt have assumed that it is self contradictory for God to make a stone which he cannot lift. They both assume that it's self contradictory for God to lift to make a stone. Please get that right. It's not lift, it's make that it's self contradictory to make a stone stone that he cannot lift, that the making of such a stone is self contradictory. And he says that it is not self contradictory. And he points this out in terms of a reformulation of the paradox on pages 346 and 347, where we take the name God out of all descriptions and we substitute X. And he's doing what is the logically intelligent thing to do? He says either X can create a stone which X cannot lift, or X cannot create a stone which. Now what is it that makes this a more elegant argument? There's no reference to God without any of the conceptual trappings of omnipotence. And you know that there's no logical contradiction here because he's speaking simply of an X. You could be the X. Now, can't you make a boat which you can't lift? Yes. Alright. Either you can create a stone which you cannot lift, or you cannot create a stone which you cannot lift. If you can create a stone which you cannot lift, then there's something that you can't perform. And if you cannot create a stone which you cannot lift, then there's something you can't perform. Therefore there's at least one thing which you cannot perform. Now why does he use X here? Because it will be true for any entity that is without considerations of extraneous matters. Anything else true about the entity? No. X can fit the description that X can do anything. That's true. Then the concept of an omnipotent God is logically contradictory. He says, now you fill in your name for X. You see, this is true, okay. That you cannot be omnipotent. Okay. You fill in the name of somebody else's. I'm filling in the place the name of somebody else and somebody else and somebody else. Turns out everybody you try doesn't fill the bill. And now when you put God in there, the same thing should be true. And so he points out there's no logical contradiction in this because of the ability to formulate the argument in terms of totally neutral blank, the idea of using X anything or any one. And so that when Mavrodes tries to. So that Mavrodes out of the problem, his escape from the paradox that the task mentioned is self contradictory, it turns out that this formulation of the argument does not make itself contradictory. And so then if Mavrod Brodies assumes the omnipotence of God. It turns out that he is begging the question if he assumes that God exists. The whole point is nothing could exist that is omnipotent, therefore there can't be an omnipotent. And so Savage has, I think, reformulated the difficulty in much more stringent terms. But having done so, he then answers the problem, doesn't it? He answers the problem by saying, well, I'm going to get to the heart of it here. This statement is not self contradictory. This statement is crucial to the paradox and it's not self contradictory. So Mavrodi's you can't throw it out just like that. Frankfurt. You just can't do this number about God doing self contradictory things because it's not self contradictory. X cannot create a stone which X cannot lift. It's not self contradictory. Just put your name in there. Okay, if we put God for X, then we're saying God can't do something. It would appear that if God cannot do something, that God is not omnipotent. Because by omnipotent we mean he can do anything. God cannot do this. Therefore God is not omnipotent. Savage points out, however, that this statement X cannot create a stone which X cannot live does not entail that there is a task which X cannot perform. And my worry is that those of you who haven't read a lot of philosophy or logic will read that and say what he says. If you look at that statement, that statement does not imply that there is a. Can you imply from this there is a task God cannot do? He says, no, that doesn't follow from the statement. And I think very quickly we should show you why that is. He says the phrase cannot create a stone seems to imply that there is a task which X cannot perform and consequently seems to imply that X is limited in power. But this illusion vanishes on analysis. X cannot create a stone which X cannot lift. The statement up here can only mean if X can create a stone, then X can lift it. I'm going to give you another translation of this now in logical terminology. If X can create a stone, then X can lift it. To say that X cannot create a stone which X cannot lift is simply to say that any stone he can make, he can lift. That is logically the same thing. You're not agreeing with that or you are agreeing with that? I'm absolutely agreeing with it. Precisely right. You have time to discuss it. I can conceive of myself not being able to make a boat. I don't have the skills to make a boat. And I certainly conceive of myself not being able to lift the boat which I cannot make. Do you agree that Kickasola cannot create a boat which Kickasola cannot lift? I say that is a false statement because I cannot make a boat. And I can conceive of myself not being able to lift the boat. Wait a minute, Dr. Kikasola, are you saying this is a false statement about you, that you cannot create a boat which you cannot lift? That is false because. Good. Is it false about God? Oh, but you said X. You didn't say God. I said. Now, when we put God in here, it would appear some people think we run into the problem that that implies there's a task God cannot do. But the upper X and the lower X down here, they are not the same to me. I'm trying to specify the logical implication of the word cannot with a God connotation? No, with any connotation. Because to me, if X is human, it will make no difference. Logically. X cannot create a stone which X cannot lift means, in terms of logical connotation, that if X can create the stone, then X can lift. Just doesn't follow to me. I'm just not following it. It's the opposite to me. But I don't want to take class time. I mean, in the first one, I can see. Let's say I don't have the ability to make. Make a boat. Okay? I can also conceive of myself not being able to lift the boat that I can't build. I know, but you see, that because that's. The phrase is not true for you. Then it's not the same as saying that if I can make a boat, I can lift it. We're talking about the logical implication of this statement just in case it's true. Now, as a matter of fact, you keep telling us that it's not true for you. We're all willing to grant that you cannot be in a position to make any boat in the world that you'll always be able to lift. But my point is, what is it you're not able to do? It is not true of Kickasola. Okay, so it is false of Kikosola and all other finite creatures that if Kickosola can create a stone, then Kickosola can lift it. Of course, you don't make stones, you make boat. So if Kickosola can make a boat, then Kikosola can lift it. Is that true that if you can. If you can make the boat, you can lift the boat? They're both faults. They're both false with respect to Kickosoa? Yes. Are they saying the same thing? The same false thing about Kickosoa? That's what I say. I don't see them as saying the same thing. Okay, now you tell me why they are not saying the same thing. We agree they're both false. Yeah. They're true for God. Oh, I don't know about God. I just say for a human being, they're both false. Do you agree that they're logically asserting the same thing? I don't see that you're saying it. I want to see it, but I don't see it. Well, that's what I was trying to do in the lecture. I thought you had an objection to it. Do you have an objection to this? I. You said they are the same, and I am saying, show me how they're the same. I don't see how they. I'm not objecting, I'm pleading. Show me how they're the same. I don't see how they're the same. Well, I think the tape will reveal you began with an objection for a plea for further. That's what I was giving is further explanation. So let's go on. Oh, okay, let's read on. It says this illusion vanishes on analysis. X cannot create a stone which X cannot lift. Can only mean if X does not. Excuse me, can only mean if X can create a stone, then X can lift it. And it's obvious, of course, that this statement does not entail that X is limited in power. That is, if we translate this into this language, then it simply means that God can lift any stone that he can create. Okay, now Savage goes on then, on pages 347 and 348, to show this in logical terminology, it gives a schematic representation, and if it'll help you at all, I'll read it for you very quickly and translate the logical schema for you. The crucial statement and a crucial point premise is number three. So let me just focus on number three there, C3, on page 348. What it says there is that it is not the case that there is a Y such that Y is a stone and X creates Y can create Y. I'm sorry? That X can create Y and X cannot lift Y implies that horseshoe there is the logical sign for implication that there is a Y such that Y is a stone. And it's not true that X cannot create Y. What's that? As you're rightfully in there. Okay, that last sentence it is not true that X cannot create. Yes. And what it says is it is not the case that X creates Y. That X can create Y. He's using modal terms, okay? He gives kind of an intuitive or English language approach to the same thing at the very end of the middle paragraph on page 348, where he says, but if X can create stones of any pounded and Y can lift stones of any poundage, then X cannot create a stone which Y cannot lift. And yet X is not thereby limited in power. Okay? Imagine there are two different people involved, and one of them can make stones of any poundage, and he can just keep going up, up, up, up, up, up. Okay? He makes the heaviest stone you ever thought of. He can make another one even heavier and even heavier, okay? And every time he makes a stone, Y comes along and lifts it. What's going to happen? An infinite series of people making stones and people lifting them, Right? So what? Somebody who's infinite power? That wouldn't be any problem. What he's pointing out here is logically. Logically, you can separate these so that if it's true that X cannot create a stone which X cannot lift, liken that to X cannot create a stone which Y cannot lift. He's unable to make a boat which some other person can't lift. You see no difficulty with that. That's simply to say that if X can make the boat, then somebody else can lift it. The statements are asserting the same thing. They are logically equivalent. Now, there's going to be a certain amount of faith involved in accepting that statement, I'm afraid. I can give you some logic text and you could try to learn how to work out syllogisms and stuff like that in the translation. But I can assure you that Mr. Brody would not have published this article. In fact, the Philosophical Review would not have. If the claim is not a credible claim, and you can take my word for it, or we can go over some more, or we can try to do this just in terms of a kind of intuitive approach to it. X cannot create or make a boat which Y cannot lift. There's an ability that is lacking in this boat maker. This boat maker is not able to make a boat which somebody else cannot lift. Turns out that every time he makes a boat, somebody can lift it. Now, you all understand this. Now down here we're translating it. I'm asking you, are we not saying precisely the same thing? We say that if he can make a boat, then somebody else can lift it, Right? Now, the point here is not truth. The point here is simply, is this logically the same as this? Now, since you see that with two people, Savage says, take the duality out of here. The problem, of course, is we have one person who's supposed to be able to do both these things. But the claim is, according to the paradox, the argument in the paradox, that God cannot create a stone which God cannot lift, Savage says, accept that. That's fine, because all that means is that if God can create the stone, then God can lift it. Now, what's the problem when you change two terms to one term? Logistically, is that legitimate? I mean, is that accepted? Well, sometimes it is. Sometimes it is. Oh, yes. Oh, yeah. Because that's just substitution of arbitrary integers. Oh, yeah, that's no problem. I only did that so that you'd be able intuitively to get to the point. If you look at the very end of Savage's article, you'll get the point. He says, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 lines up from the bottom of the article on page 349. On this supposition, God's inability to create a stone which he cannot lift is nothing more or less than a necessary consequence of two facets of his omnipotence. God can create any stone. God can lift any stone. Therefore, if God can create it, he can lift it. Okay, God's inability to create a stone which he cannot lift is nothing more or less than a necessary consequence two facets of his omnipotence. For if God is omnipotent, then he can create stones of any poundage and lift stones of any poundage, and God can create stones of any boundage, and God can lift stones of any poundage in tails entails. God cannot create a stone which he cannot lift. And that's the punchline. Savage gets down, and after doing all the logical work, he says, lo and behold, far from being a paradox that is entailed by the doctrine of omnipotence, there's no defect. We don't get a contradiction. It is logically consistent. It's precisely what we want to say. I realize that when you're talking to the guy next door and you tell him, of course, because God's omnipotent, he cannot make a stone which he cannot lift. He's going to say, well, it sounds like he's not omnipotent. The answer is no. All we mean by that is that if he can make the stone, he can lift it. And it's very clever. Very good. Now, we do have. Yes, sir. That leaves the word if there. And you said, if he can make the stone, then he can lift it. And I've always assumed that the argument meant he can make the stone. Can he lift it? Since he can, or because he can make the stone. Can he? Listen, you see what I'm getting at? Yeah. The point of the article is. Point of the article is the statement that the paradox requires is this one, that God cannot create a stone which God cannot lift. Okay, we're forced to that by the logic of the critic. He says, well, if God can do anything, then there can't be a stone that he can make that he couldn't lift. Therefore God cannot create such a stone. Moses said, that's right, he can't. Now, what is that to say that God cannot create a stone he cannot lift? It's simply to say that if he can create the stone, he can lift it. Can you substitute then the word or if? Am I. No, no, logically, since and if are different. Now, look, the problem with this. The problem with this is that people think it implies that there's some task God can't do, but it doesn't imply that there's any task he can't do. I'm going slowly. Wait just a minute. I to want. I want you to catch this. The cannot here. This is going to get to the sense if problem you're having. The cannot here translates into a hypothetical. And just because it translates into a hypothetical, it does not imply that there is actually a task God cannot do. Now, if you say since God can create a stone that he cannot lift, then, excuse me, then God can lift it. What you're going to be saying is there is a task God cannot do, he cannot lift it. But the only point Christians are making is that if any stone he makes, he can lift. If he can make it, he can lift it because he's omnipotent. And that's all we're getting at when we say God cannot create to stone which he cannot live. That's just a logical implication of his omnipotence. He's taking this thing out of the paradox. He's saying, far from being paradoxical, it's just very consistent with our beliefs. So the answer to the question for your neighbor is, that's right, God can't make a stone he can't lift. So that's a limit on his power. Because what we mean by that is that if he can make a stone, he can lift it. So obviously you can't make a stone you can't lift. Look, when we're talking about round squares, does that bother you? Does it bother you to say God can't make a round square? No. Why should it bother you to say that he can't make a stone that he can't lift if all it means is that if God can create a stone, he can always lift it? That's just logically the other side of this thing. Now you seem to say that, but this one bothers you. They're logically equivalent. Savage does, I think, get at the point. This is really a lot more of a kind of a connotation. He does say, well, this seems to sound like God can't do something. But it's not saying he can't do something. It's just saying that if he can do something, he can do something else about it. Okay, now let me say something of some pastoral help to you before we throw we in today. Probably before you came into this class, for those of you who haven't done the reading and at least whenever you were doing the reading, for those of you who did before that reading or coming to class, I doubt very seriously the omnipotence of God was much of a problem for you. Never crossed your mind that there could be any kind of logical contradiction involved, any kind of philosophical problem to get through and all that. Now, the fact that a Christian is not disturbed by a problem when it's staring him in a face is to prove that the problem is non existent. I'm not counseling you to think that, well, I mean everything that seems all right and your theology is all right in your theology, but I am counseling you this, that whenever something seems to make perfectly good sense in Christian discourse and reasoning and conception, and then we run into problems that you're wondering, why are people getting all upset about this? You should at least stand back and ask yourself whether the whole project here, whether the whole, the whole exercise has not been one of simply explicating what we mean by the omnipotence of God. See, rather than saying, well, there's a problem in the concept, what we want to say is it's just simply a matter of being precise and stating what we mean. And my own personal conviction is as much as this is short and not as technical as most of my answers to the problems in classes, that's all we've got going here. When this is posed to me in graduate school about the paradox of omnipotence, the answer is simply, well, if you want to know what the Christian concept is, ask some questions and I'll Try to give you a clear conception of it. Where does the problem arise from the simplistic explanation that omnipotence means he can do anything. Was there any reason why we can't explain omnipotence with the qualifications written in? For instance, if you follow Thomas and Mavrodes, you can say he can do anything logically possible. Or if you don't follow them, you say God can do anything whatsoever. He can even do paradoxical things. If that happens to be your theology, I'm not counseling you to have that one. But what I'm saying is there's no reason why you simply can't explain omnipotence in such a way that the open endedness of, of this simple description of a doctrine isn't closed up. And once you do that, then you don't have to worry about all these other things over here. Now, I think there's value, in fact, I think there's some things learned about the nature of logic and about philosophy and conceptions and so forth that is important in this reading. But it turns out that this is a long and the editor himself says this. It seems to be an exercise in simply making clear what we mean by our doctrine. And that's valuable to make it clear. The reason that's pastoral advice is that I know that some of this can be very frustrating. You say, well, I either don't see the logical entailment or I don't see why somebody's having trouble with it and all that. Well, the reason you don't have trouble with it is because it's not really a problem. Solving the problem comes in making our language clear, making our expression understandable, rather than taking a concept that the Bible presents and finding there's some paradox involved. After all, the Bible gives us a concept of God. If you accept it whole, that is to say you accept the concept of God is whatever the Bible says. And all that the Bible says about God, there certainly isn't any paradox in prayer. Is there any limitation on the might of God? No. He's almighty according to the Scriptures. There's nothing that will shorten his arm. There is nothing that will stop him from doing what he wishes to do. You might think that nothing includes logical contradictions, or you might not. But the fact is the Bible says nothing can stop the Lord. You can do whatever you want. Now the Bible also says that whatever God does, he does according to his character. So there are certain things he can't do. Also he can't deny himself. He can't do other than what he actually is. That brings us to the final problem and we're out of time and I'll stop. And that's Can God Sin? Can God Sin? The article by Nelson Pike, Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin. I really would like you all to do your reading. I hope you are getting that point by now. But if you will, pages 361, 363. The last section of it explains most of what he's been getting at before. If you master those few pages, you'll be able to master the main point. Pike Sundays there are three different senses in which you might say God cannot. You might say that God cannot sin because it's logically impossible for a perfect being to do an imperfect thing. He says, secondly, God cannot sin might simply mean he doesn't have the ability to bring about a state of affairs that is evil. He just doesn't have the material ability to do it. Or thirdly, he might mean that God does have the material ability, but God has such a character that he's not disposed ever to do it. He has the capacity, but he's disposed never to use the capacity. The reason the third alternative is the one that he thinks you have to prefer, is what I'd like you to make sure you find out on your own and come back and answer when we begin on Wednesday. And when we come back, we're also going to be looking at a difficult question about the omniscience of God and whether God's knowledge is un. Unchangeable. So please do your reading. It's going to be tough if you don't. Thank you. I'd just like to announce if any of you want to ride to Oberlin tonight, come to.