Dr Greg Bahnsen - Philosophy of Christianity: Foreknowledge and Necessity (Part 15)

Well, we're turning today to a problem in Christian theology as well as Christian philosophical theology or apologetics, and that is traditionally known as the problem of God's foreordination and human responsibility, or as it's less exactly but more popularly called, predestination and free will. Now, in our textbook, the problem arises in terms of the omniscience of God as it implies the foreknowledge of God, which in turn seems to imply that what men do has been in some sense determined in advance. And there are a lot of different approaches to this, as you know, if you've done your reading. And I think the best approach to the subject is just to start at the beginning, where our textbook editor has begun with Augustine and with Thomas Aquinas and try to work through some of their answers to the difficulties posed as well as some modern commentary on them. So let me begin with Augustine and his discussion of free will. And Augustine will be looking at the foreknowledge of God and the free will of man over against the argument of one Avodius or Evodias, depending on your Latin. Following way, against man's free will, against.

The idea that we make voluntary choices. Whatever.

God foreknows.

Whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen.

All right.

Now from that it seems to be that if God. Foreknows that man will sin.

Or that.

A man will sin, Then he must necessarily sin. And of course, if a man must necessarily sin. But if a man must necessarily sin, then there is no voluntary choice in his sinning.

Now, how does Augustine hope to deal with this manner of argumentation to show that God does foreknow everything and yet that men voluntarily sin, that they do have free will? Augustine has two basic rejoinders to Avodius. The first one discussed at great length by Roe. Anybody, Dave?

Well, he says if man still wills or chooses to sin, then God foreknows what the man is going to choose.

Man still wills to sin even though God knows in advance that he is going to will to sin. That will be where Augustine comes around to that's right, he's going to argue that man must still will to sin. However, he doesn't do it in terms of even though in the first rejoinder. In the second he does in the first rejoinder, he doesn't do it in terms of even though God foreknows, he really doesn't pay any attention to foreknowledge. He simply pays attention to what it means to will to sin. He concentrates on this what it means to will to sin. And is it possible that my willing to sin not be voluntary? Is it possible that my willing to sin not be voluntary?

And Augustine's argument, his rejoinder, goes something like For a man's action to be free is to indicate that it's in his power.

That phrase in his power is going to be the crux of the argument. If a man freely does whatever he does or freely doesn't do whatever he doesn't do, then that's because what he does is in his power and what he doesn't do is in his power.

So now we are being told by Evodius that there is no voluntary choice in this sinning. At the end of this argument, what we're speaking of is no voluntary choice. And if it's not free, if it's not a free act, and what does that mean?

Given Augustine's understanding of freedom, that means that his sinning is not within his power or his not sinning, it turns out, would not be within his power. He doesn't have whatever it takes not to sin.

Now Augustine gives some illustrations of what.

It means for something to be in.

One'S power or not to be in one's power.

For instance, he says, if I decide not to age, not to get older, the fact that I get older anyway indicates that that is not within my power to not get older. Okay, there's an example of something that's not in my power, so I'm not free not to age. On the other hand, speaking positively, if I should decide to run the four minute mile, the fact that I decide it doesn't make it so. I go out on the track, I get all warmed up and I then go through this act of will and I say I'm going to run a four minute mile. I've decided to do it. Then the gun goes off and I run and lo and behold, it's a six minute mile. That indicates that my decision to run the four minute mile was not that running the four minute mile was not in my power. And so I'm not free to run a four minute mile. Now from such illustrations, although he doesn't talk about running the four minute mile, but from illustrations of this nature, we can derive what may be called a test form for something not being in your power.

Okay, I'm going to give you a test form for something not being in your power. And that test form runs something like this where X stands for any particular action that we're thinking of. X occurs even though. S, who is the subject Here, even though S does not will to X, okay? Aging occurs even though Sam does not will to age, even though he doesn't.

Choose to age, he ages anyway.

So obviously it's not something within his power. So anything that fits this formula here, anything that can be substituted for X in this formula and you get a true sentence will be something that is not in a person's power. Now, to make this complete, we have to give the other side of it. We can also say X does not occur. Even though S, the subject wills to X. Okay? So if X occurs even though S does not will to X, or X does not occur even though S wills to X, okay? By writing it in this way, I'm not confusing anybody I trust. You know, if you go down to the bottom line and you stay in the bottom line and you get here, kind of like reading a hymn book in church, you have to, you know, space out everything when you, when you're jumping stanzas. S occurs even though S does not will to X. X does not occur even though S wills to X. Okay? So running the four minute mile does not occur even though S wills to run the four minute mile.

So now we have a convenient little formula for testing whether something is not within my power, which is to say, testing whether I am free to do or not to do something.

Evodius has argued that my sinning is not my not sinning is not within.

My power, that I'm not free in the decision to sin. I'm not free in that decision.

All right, let's trace this out a little bit. If a man sins, presumably he decides to sin, okay?

He wills to sin. He makes a choice to sin. Now we want to know whether that's a voluntary choice.

But so S sins seems to be preceded by S's will to sin. Now, did God know in advance that S would will to sin?

God knows everything. Presumably he knows that too.

But if God knows something, it must necessarily happen. If God knows something, must necessarily. And if God foreknows that a man not only will sin, but wills to.

Sin, wills to will to sin, perhaps.

He must necessarily sin. And if a man must necessarily do what God foreknows, then man must necessarily will to sin, and that indicates that he's not free, okay, Evotius draws the conclusion that man necessarily, because of the foreknowledge of God, man necessarily wills to sin. And because he necessarily wills to sin, that means his willing to sin is not voluntary.

It's not free. So here's Evotius, the bottom Line of his claim is given God's foreknowledge, a man does not voluntarily sin. He doesn't freely sin because he necessarily wills to sin. Now Augustine is going to use his.

Little formula, although he doesn't write it.

In the strict way that we are doing it. He's going to use this little formula.

To test the claim that a man might not voluntarily will to sin.

And he's going to try to show that that kind of claim cannot be true. To say that a man is not free in this sinning is to say.

That it is not in his power. Okay, so this willing to sin is not within his power. So let's use Augustine's test formula with respect to willing to sin. X then becomes not running the four minute mile, not aging. But now the test claim is willing to sin. Willing to sin.

Occurs.

Even though. Even though S does not will. Descend.

Okay, so as we run through the test formula in Augustine's reasoning we get.

Willing to sin occurs even though S does not will to sin.

Now Augustine says anybody can see that that's self contradictory because on the one.

Hand you have the claim that something's happening and on the other hand you say it's not happening. What's happening is not happening is what that amounts to.

Willing to sin occurs even though S doesn't will to sin. S wills to sin even though he doesn't will to sin.

Augustine says, since you have created self contradiction, this cannot be true. Now if this sentence here cannot be true, you are all following. If this sentence cannot be true, then it doesn't fit the formula, it doesn't give you a true sentence, it cannot be true. It's self contradictory. It doesn't give you a true sentence when you substitute in for X the action you're thinking about. And consequently if you don't have a true substitution here, then this does not count as something that is not within my power. If it doesn't count as something that is not within my power, then it is something that is in my power. And if it's in my power, then it's something that's done freely. Why do you have to say that the opposite in that case doesn't fit? That it automatically fits?

Because that's just what he means. I mean, to say that it's not.

True that it's not in your power is to say that it's in your power.

Power.

It's a double negation, right? Yeah, but why? I don't see how that plugs into the argument. Why, why couldn't you just say it's irrelevant, it doesn't work. Evodius say that. Why couldn't he Bodius say that it doesn't work? No, I couldn't. I mean, Augustine. Augustine wants the test form. He wants to. To find out. He wants to have some means by which he can decide events and activities which are in a man's power and those which are not. And so he has to have some criterion. He has to have some test. And he proposes this test form which, when I was giving it, nobody objected to.

Remember? And Augustine would say the same.

He'd say, you didn't have any problem with that. We all know that. That's what we mean by something being. Being in your power or not being in your power. So if this is the test form for something not being in your power, anything that doesn't fit here is not something that is not in our power. Which is to say it's not not.

In our power or it is in our power. All of it is logically very fine thus far. I mean, as far as I can see. But if you have an objection to it, go ahead. You may want to object to the idea that this is a test form.

For something not being in your power. But I mean, having granted that it is, the fact that something doesn't count.

Gives you a double negation.

And I think that you're stuck with the fact that it's in your power.

You're stuck with a conclusion. Yes.

In terms of the X that you made. If X is willing to spend on the first part, that's the last of the sentence. Substitute in just the word sin. Not willing to sin.

That's right.

It's precisely the argument that Rowe brings against Augustine. And it's elementary. And this is not one of Augustine's better moments philosophically because, you see, he just flipped completely. The reason I've written this on the board in the way that I did is because this is exactly what I want you to see. This observation. Observation is precisely right. I've underlined willing to sin over here. Okay? That's X willing to sin. And you notice X over here becomes sin or sinning. Of course, we're changing the grammatical form of the word to make it readable. But willing to sin becomes simply sin over here. And so Augustine has not used his test formula accurately. What we have to do now, and this is going to be our criticism of Augustine, is now put in here, willing to sin occurs even though S does not will to sin. Okay, now you have the same X Being used will to sin here and will to sin here.

Everybody see that. You see the difference. Now as you read the article by Roe, it may have been difficult because if you are tired where he starts saying willing to will to sin, you are reading willing to sin and you are saying, I can't see any difference here. The answer to that is don't read your philosophy homework after you have had lunch and it is a warm afternoon. Read it while you're fresh and you're going to pick up on every change of vocabulary. Okay, now let's ask ourselves whether we have a true or a false substitution instance. Is it true that willing to sin.

Occurs even though S does not will to will to sin, he does not.

Will to will to sin. Now, the first thing that Rowe points out in his discussion of this problem is that that appears a little senseless. And it is among some philosophers, the dogma that people do not will to will something, that that is just superfluous and repetitious that to say that somebody wills to will something is just to say that they will it. Because otherwise then it's conceivable that somebody wills to will to will to sin. But of course, if it's possible that you can make the decision to will to will something, then you can make the decision to will to will to will something. But if that's a legitimate decision you can make, then you can also choose to will to will to will to will something. Do I need to keep going or do you get the point?

A few more.

Okay, you can will to will to will to will to will something. As a matter of fact, I'm keeping up with all these wills, but it's very hard. You have to, you know, keep going, step back. So Rowe suggests that it's senseless, but then he says, ah, well, we want, we won't get rid of it that way.

If it's senseless, does it count or.

Not count as a substitution instance? Hard to say. Somebody might argue since it's senseless. Augustine, it shows that you have not disqualified it. Okay, so what you're getting at can't even be argued about. Rowe doesn't go into that, but he says since it's senseless, we have some question as to whether Augustine is right or wrong. But as a matter of fact, G.E. moore once wrote that it's possible that in some cases people go through an effort of they go to some effort to bring themselves to will something. Now, I'm not sure whether I agree or disagree with Moore, but I can give you Some idea of what he's talking about. I realized that I am not going to. I am not going to be willing to go out and weed the garden this Saturday unless something really changes in me. Because as things now stand in my being, I'd much rather go to the beach. In fact, I'm so self indulgent, you can almost count on the fact that I'm not going to weed the garden if it's a sunny day on Saturday. And so now I wake up on Saturday and it's a sunny day, and I know my duty. And so what I have to do is to go through some effort to make myself willing to weed the garden. Not just some effort to weed the garden. I mean, that's difficult enough. And it's just because it's difficult that I'm not too interested in it. I don't want to do anything difficult on Saturday. I want to go to the beach. Okay? So G.E. moore suggests that sometimes we do go through an effort to make ourselves will to do something. We don't just go through an effort to do something. We go through an effort to make ourselves will to do something. Now, if that's true, if it's true that there's such a thing as making an effort to will to do something, then that might be the way we would translate this willing to will, or that S does not will to will something.

So, Alice, let's give ourselves a little translation here. This first instance of the word will is going to become, in my interpretation, a matter of effort of some sort. Okay? So that he does not make an effort. Let's say does not will amounts to does not make an effort. Okay, now, can that sentence be true?

Now let's read it with all the changes having been made. Willing to sin occurs even though S does not make an effort to will to sin. Or if we can condense that beginning, we can say, ask wills to sin sin even though he doesn't make an effort to will to sin. And that seems very true. I mean, it seems very possible, doesn't it, that somebody could just, if you will glibly sin, doesn't sit around saying, boy, I'm going to try so hard to make myself willing to commit adultery. No, he just wills to do it. He doesn't make an effort to will to do it. He just does it. He just willingly engages in the act.

And so S wills to sin even though he made no effort to become willing to sin. And since that sentence is true or can be true, therefore it is a valid instance of this test form for.

Not being in your power. Consequently, it can very well be the case that willing to sin is not in someone's power. And since willing to sin can count as something that is not in your power, willing to sin can be involuntary.

And Devotius has not been refuted.

Then see, we haven't escaped devotees because we're right back here.

Whatever God foreknows, if he foreknows that.

I'm going to will to sin must necessarily happen. Therefore. Therefore, when I will to sin, I don't have any voluntary choice in my.

Willing to sin over you. Have we shown that willing to sin is necessary or nearly possible possible beyond our power?

What we have shown here is that Augustine cannot claim that willing to sin is always in someone's power.

Sometimes it may be beyond your power.

That's right, that's right. It doesn't make any difference in a particular case. The point is Augustine has attempted to get around Devotius not by dealing with his premises but by saying that I can take on your conclusion and refute it head on. That is the most effective way of refutation, but it's also the most difficult. Usually you have to take an opponent on in terms of his premises and show that the either false or they don't lead to the conclusion. Augustine says well if they lead to that conclusion, I can show you just without consideration of your premises that the conclusion is wrong. The conclusion is self contradictory because your conclusion amounts to saying that a man wills to sin when he doesn't will to sin. But as a matter of fact, Augustine didn't successfully show that because we've now demonstrated a true use of his test formula amounts to saying that a man wills to sin even though he doesn't make an effort to will to sin. And that can certainly be true. And since he has not shown that it's self contradictory Evotius conclusion stands. All I'm saying here is not anything more but that Augustine failed to refute his opponent's point of view.

Could you be accused of equivocation by substituting etc for will?

No, because if a person doesn't like that then they're stuck with this senseless idea of willing to willing to willing to willing to will to sin. And so if they don't want that.

They'Re going to have to come up.

With something better or be stuck with the infinite regressive wills.

Simplification of the statement might be possible. Tend to agree with but our desire to sin is at times is considered sin.

Yes, but that would Be equivocating. Because in this case we're only talking about willing to sin and not the sinfulness of the will to sin. The sin in mind here is something apart from the will to do it, although it's true that the will to do it would be sinful.

Also, if you reduce the sense formula, it says sin occurs even though S does not will to sin. Are quite on the contradiction.

I'm not following you there.

Who are you?

First of all, identify who you're going to be arguing for. Avodius, Augustine or Rome.

I think it ends up being four.

Okay.

Sin occurs even though S does not will.

Okay, you're changing X. You're forgetting the willing part of it. Okay. Sin occurs even though S does not will to sin. My educated guess is that Augustine would say, no, it's not sin sinful. If it was unwilling, then it's constrained. As a matter of fact, you can't sin unwillingly. You can't sin against your will.

Because.

Then it's not sin. It indicates that you weren't attempting to break God's law. So I think Augustine would have a theological way of rejecting. Of course, the way I put it up here is a logical way of rejecting the test formula. But I think to your way of putting it, Augustine would simply say that isn't the biblical conception of sin. Sin in the nature of the case is voluntary or willing. I don't want to get too many words. It does. Yeah. You're satisfied with that. Okay.

At the first statement you had up there, I can see how that very basically itself supports the loading and goes against.

The willing to sin.

Yeah. Because the fact that you're saying willing to sin occurs even though I am not willing to sin, it goes back to say, okay, then God or somebody else lets me go of it. You don't?

No, because Augustine says that's self contradictory. Doing what I'm not doing is self contradiction. Isn't that right? If somebody says I am now not speaking, is there any way he can that his sentence can be true? And it can't be true either that a person wills to do what he's not willing to do. He can do what he's not willing to do. Like when a man puts a gun in his belt and says, walk buddy, he can also. He can do things contrary to his better nature, but he can't will to do things that he doesn't will to do. Just like you can't jump when you're not jumping. Can a man run who is not running. Can a Man will who is not willing. St. Augustine's point is fine there that you've got on the surface of it a self contradiction. The difficulty is that he only achieved that self contradiction by not filling in his formula correctly. Okay.

Were you saying that will and make an effort?

I'm saying that the only way you can, not the only way, but the most obvious way that you can understand willing to will to sin is making an effort to will to sin. I've got to get myself in such a mind that I will to weed the garden. Or it may be because this is a person of a monkish character, that he must really make an effort to make himself willing to commit adultery. But on the other hand, there are a lot of people who don't go through the effort to be willing. They just find themselves willing to do it.

So you're not saying you could go back to that sentence and say making an effort to sin occurs even though Sam does not make an effort to make an effort to sin. You're not making mistakes like that if.

You are making an effort to sin. S makes an effort to sin even though he does not make an effort to make an effort to sin only reproduces the difficulty. We now have to find another sense for making an effort where one can make an effort to make an effort.

That's why I don't see how that helps the first one.

Well, it only helps it in the sense that the first one is senseless. And so if you don't find some variant sense for the word will the first time it appears on the board, then you won't have a sentence that you can test at all, because then you have willing to will. And that then suggests that a person can decide to will to will, which is to say he can will to will to will. And we're right back into the infinite regress. Is it really true that we go through an infinite regress of wills every time we're willing to do something that does seem to be a priori absurd. Now? I mean, I can imagine certain creative philosophers coming up with arguments even in favor of that. All I'm saying is that for the most part, it does appear on the surface to be absurd that we go through an infinite number of wills in order to get to one will finally? I mean, you can almost create Zeno's paradox, right? I'll never get anything done because it's going to take me forever to will to get to the point where I can finally get the thing willed because I'm willing to will to Will to, will to, will to, will to, will to, will. And, and on and on and on it goes. So we know better than that. So the suggestion is to keep some sense in this. We can dismiss Augustine out of hand that way. But if you're doing good philosophy, you usually don't do that. You try to do the best for your opponent. You know, put him on the very best terms conceivable, and then you go for his juggler. And so using this idea of making an effort as an explication of the first sense of willing, we can then make sense of the sentence. But now I don't know what it is to make an effort to make an effort.

That's why I think I'm wondering if that even helps.

It keeps Augustine in the ring a little bit longer.

Oh, but we still end up staying thought of saying it doesn't work.

We end up being able to say that his sentence is true and therefore his conclusion is false, rather than saying his sentence is senseless and therefore he hasn't said anything at all. It does enable us to dismiss him in another way. Instead of dropping him down the hole of senselessness, we just shove him out the exit of false. You know, you're just wrong, Augustine and the other way people say we don't even know what you're talking about. Willing to, will to sin. I'm being a little less precise here in favor of communicating the truth a little more clearly. That's a paradox. Okay, where have we heard that philosophy before? Now there's a second way that Augustine attempts to deal with Evotius criticism. We're going to turn to the second way. Now. Somebody likes to express the second way of critiquing Evodius. Now Rowe seems to think in this.

Case that Augustine's successful. Nobody.

Augustine uses an ad hominem form of argument because he knows that Avodius grants that we sometimes know by way of prediction what men will do. Augustine says, since we sometimes can foreknow the decisions of men without thereby rendering such decisions involuntary, I mean, nobody thinks the fact that I can predict what you are going to be doing makes what you are doing involuntary. Since we sometimes can foreknow the decisions of men and those decisions are voluntary decisions, why can't God also foreknow those decisions as voluntary decisions? That's in the form of rhetorical question and reduct you out of surdive. What he's saying is, if I take what you will grant, I can demonstrate that you shouldn't have any problem with my position. What special problem is there regarding divine foreknowledge? The critic must provide a reason for saying that there's a special problem when it comes comes to divine foreknowledge. Even though he's willing to grant human foreknowledge of voluntary decisions. Have you ever been able to guess what somebody you know very well is going to do? I shouldn't even say guess. Have you ever been able to know. Have good evidence that under such circumstances, this person is going to react in the following way? Okay, we know very well if we play a practical joke on the. On the dormitory grump that he's going to come flying out of his room yelling, okay? Now, lo and behold, we play the practical joke and we sit around and here he comes yelling we knew he would. Does that mean that he didn't freely do it? That there were forces beyond his control? No, it just meant that we know him well enough to be able to anticipate what he's really going to do. Now, did our foreknowledge of what he would do preclude his doing it voluntarily? No. Why then is it thought that God's foreknowledge of what he would do precluded his freely doing it? That's an ad hominem argument against somebody who would grant that we can know the voluntary foreknow, the voluntary decisions of our friends or relatives. Okay, now, Roe says that this is a good argument. It's a good reductio ad absurdum. Well, as reduct. Excuse me, a good ad hominemo argument. As ad hominem arguments go, it turns out that depending on how much you want to achieve with them, I think we can see some value to it. But as a matter of fact, I can imagine some difficulty with this rebuttal. And the difficulty goes something like this. I know.

That Picassola will yell, okay. If we do such and such to.

It, he'll come running out of the classroom screaming bloody murder. Okay, Obviously to Kicasola, we don't know.

I mean, it's an imaginary Kickasola. There's only one. Okay, what does it mean that I know the Kickosola will yell okay, under the following circumstances? Well, it means that I believe. It means that it's true. And it means that we have justification for believing it.

That's what knowledge is justified true belief. When a man believes something and has good reason to believe it and it turns out to be true, then he knows it.

Okay, we know that Kickasola will yell. Or I know, because one we believe it, that is to say, we go out, we sit in the hall, and.

We wait for the results of our.

Practical joke to come about. They do come about. We believe it, show that we believe it by our sincerity, waiting to see the results. It turns out to be true, and we have justification for it.

But now let's ask ourselves as human beings, how strong is our justification? What is our justification?

Let's say our justification is that the Kickosola in our imaginary world is somebody who doesn't like people, who is a hot head, who doesn't seem to be able to let down his hair, who this, that and the other, okay? In addition to that, we can add 10 out of 13 times when something close to a practical joke is not a practical joke, joke has been made in his class. He runs out of the room yelling. What I'm getting at is that when you look at the justification of our knowledge of what other people will do, it is not a certainty of what other people will do. It is a very high probability of what other people will do. I know that very probably, very probably.

Kickasola is going to come running out of the classroom yelling, very probably. And that very probably doesn't have to grant a whole lot of leeway for error. I mean, it can be an extremely high probability. But does it ever attain the status of certainty? Can I ever be absolutely certain? Well, I can't be certain because, well, he might have a heart attack and.

Die before he gets to the point.

Of running out the room. He may have had a change of heart. He may be on excessive blood pressure medicine and not have the will to go and run out the room. I mean, there may be any number of reasons why, although in all past cases you could, he did, and you should, you know, be able to expect it, you'd be justified in expecting it. Nevertheless, something could keep him from not doing it. Maybe Kickasola comes to his senses, this imaginary kikasola, and says the best way to get at these guys who are giving me a hard time is not to let him see that. It riles me. And so all of a sudden, he starts to get mad, and then he just kind of controls himself and he says, no problem. I don't mind what's going on in my classroom, okay? And so he really, it shows that as much as you could expect it, you couldn't be certain. There's always something that could change it. Now, what I'm getting at here is my foreknowledge of another man's free decisions is never a certainty. As to what this man will do. And therefore to say that my foreknowledge of this man's free decision is not incompatible with his freely deciding what he does doesn't really help us decide in the case of God, because as a matter of fact, God is always certain of what we're going to do. And God's never wrong. And there can't be an instance where God is wrong. God's knowledge is certain. Now, is it true that if I am certain as to what you will do that you freely do it? Now, what am I certain that somebody will do? I am certain that If I shoot a.44 Magnum through your heart, you will die. Is that something you can voluntarily do? No. Totally. The only reason I'm certain is because there are factors well beyond your control that are going to bring it about that you die. You see what I'm getting at, the kind of certainty. When I can have certainty, it seems to be under conditions where your freedom has been violated. Because as long as you are free, I can never be certain that you're going to do what we can very well be justified in expecting you to do. We can have a high probability, but not certain. But now if God is certain that. That I'm going to do such and such under these circumstances, it would appear that there is something getting in the way of my voluntary choice. Okay, I'm not going to say any more at this time about that line of argumentation. I'm only giving that as going beyond Rowe's skepticism about Augustine's first argument to point out that there can be some skepticism, at least the problem facing skepticism about Augustine's second rejoinder also questions.

Yeah, does this make a difference if the. If the individual knows that God has the final knowledge of what he's supposed to do, does it make infer if the. And that's what you expect of you.

The Lakers are playing the 76ers. Okay. The game's going along in such and such a way. Timeout is called. The 76ers. Coach says we're going to go into a new configuration for the last few seconds of the game. Now, this configuration, as a matter of fact, has a real big problem with it. It has a weak spot at the strong post position that's going to allow Jabbar to be just stuffing the ball every time he gets hold of it. However, because we've been playing them the entire game another way, they will not come out of the timeout expecting that and the clock will wear out by the time they Figure out what we're doing now. Would it make a difference? You think that Jabbar overheard what that coach said? We're just certain that we're going to win the game if we go to this new configuration. Only problem is that counts on the other team not knowing what we're certain of. Yes, as a matter of fact, in human relations, my knowing what you're expecting can very often make a difference. I can make what you expect false just by my perversity. I'm going to show this guy's not so smart after all. I'm not going to do what he thinks I'm going to do. Yeah, it would make a difference. I would think now it wouldn't have to. It may be that the kick of soul in this imaginary world is just such a hothead that he doesn't even have enough sense to think about that. That he just cannot get beyond his blinding rage whenever anybody pulls a joke on him. I mean, I'm saying. I'm not saying that it has to make a difference. All I'm saying is that very likely it will will, and it certainly can make a difference. Yeah.

Can I?

Or did I?

Or can. Can you? I don't know if I can. Why would you want me to? What? We're talking around manipulation. I haven't used the word yet. That's right. Well, then, what are you getting at? That is, on practical jokes and other things, are we talking about manipulating circumstances so that they come out in particular way that we desire? Well, I don't know. That all depends on what you mean by manipulation. Are we manipulating or not? I'm not suggesting we're manipulating and therefore I'm not too constrained to give a definition of manipulation.

But if you're suggesting we are talking about manipulation, then. Then you say you'll have to tell us what manipulation is. I've avoided that on purpose because as a matter of fact, I don't think that helps these debates over free will. Manipulation is just a roundabout way of saying that I don't think we have free will, but I'd like to know what amounts to free will and all that. So if you don't mind, I think we'll go on. Well, now, what does Roe think we should do about Evodius argument?

Well, he suggests something that turns up in Aquinas and turns up in Kenny and turns up in Prior. And so there's a long history to this approach. Remember, one of the premises that we found in Avodius is that whatever God knows, Whatever God knows must necessarily.

Happen.

Now, from that kind of premise of Odious went on to say, if God knows that I'm going to sin, then I necessarily sin.

And if I necessarily sin, then it's not something that's voluntary.

Rowe points out, however, that that form of argumentation really depends on how you interpret this statement on the board. There are two ways of interpreting this statement on the board. It has two interpretations depending on what the necessarily is applying to. Okay, the necessarily can apply to the statement, By the way, in logic, the statement that the kind of statement it.

Is is conditional statement. If this, then that.

And so if you're reading Roe, I.

Don'T want you to get misled.

He says that this necessary could apply to the conditional.

And I can imagine those not trained in logic reading that and wondering what he's talking about. How can it be necessary if it's conditional?

He means this statement that's in the.

Form of a conditional okay.

The necessary can apply to the condition conditional statement, or it can apply to the consequent of the conditional statement. If X, then Y, Y is the consequent. It can apply to the consequent, which amounts to the event that is being mentioned there. Okay, so this is the conditional statement. This is the consequential event. That's just to help your reading. Let's. Let's put these two interpretations. If it applies to the conditional statement, then what we're saying is that. It is necessary. That. And now what follows the that is a proposition, A conditional statement. If God or nos.

P, P will happen. I'm going to do this again.

Okay, the necessary can apply to the statement as follows.

In the following.

It is necessary that if God foreknows that P.

Will happen.

However, the necessity can apply also to the event being mentioned and not to the a statement, in which case what we get is the following interpretation of the premise on the board. If God foreknows that PP will happen necessarily. I trust you can see why I erased and started again. I want to make it very clear the difference here. What is common is this part, the statements, the two interpretations have in common.

That if God foreknows that P P will happen.

But on the one interpretation, again, we're talking about variant interpretations of this premise.

Up here at the top of the board. Whatever God knows must necessarily happen might be taken to mean it is a necessary truth that if God foreknows that P P will happen.

Or it might be interpreted as saying.

If God foreknows that P P will happen necessarily.

The one is the necessity of a truth. The other is the necessity of an event. This will happen necessarily, whereas this is talking about this whole statement, this conditional.

Statement, as being necessarily true.

So Rowe is pointing out that one of the premises in Evotius argument is subject to. It's a crucial premise, subject to two interpretations. Now, as it turns out, the interpretation.

That is necessary to Evodius case is.

The second one, that if God knows that PP will happen necessarily.

Because he goes on to say, if God knows that I will sin, if God foreknows I will sin, then I sin necessarily, which is to say I don't have any freedom in it. I don't voluntarily do it.

It happens necessarily. It happens without any freedom being involved.

That is the interpretation he requires. And Rowe's point is that classic theology, by which he means the theology of Thomas Aquinas, interestingly, you have to notice the special pleading there that classic theology does not hold to statement two. The classic theology rejects the statement that if God foreknows, that will happen necessarily. Well, as a matter of fact, this is going beyond your reading. As a matter of fact, I do not reject that statement, and nor do any of my Calvinistic forefathers reject that statement. We all happen to think that if.

God foreknows something, it will as a matter, happen necessarily, and not just that.

It'S a necessary truth, that whatever God knows is true.

Okay, all I'm saying here is that Roe points out very properly that this statement does not imply this statement because it could simply imply this statement. And secondly, he says the second statement, the second interpretation, is not necessary to classic theology.

Well, I guess it all depends on what you take as classic theology. Whether you follow Aquinas or whether you follow Calvin. And I mean, you have to make your bed and sleep in it on other grounds than simply somebody writing that classic theology says such and such and so on separate grounds. I'm willing to say that if God foreknows something, there's a sense in which it does happen necessarily. I also happen to think that it.

Happens voluntarily, and we'll get into that later.

I mean, that seems to be the troublesome point between Arminians and Calvinists. And as I've explained in another class, I happen to think it's a pseudo question. It amounts to a misunderstanding of the use of language. And a whole history of theological debate has been as not unoften the case been predicated on a verbal dispute. But we're not to that point yet. Nobody has to accept it. When I get to it, either. But you certainly don't have to accept it. Now, I'm not giving you any reason for it. All I'm saying is this is Rowe's point.

Two interpretations. This is the interpretation Evotius needs.

And there are some theologians who don't take that interpretation.

Okay.

Now, I don't happen to think this interpretation is necessary to this statement.

I don't happen to think that foreknowledge on anybody's part means that something happens necessarily.

I do happen to think that classic theology, as I understand it, believes that God's foreknowledge means that it necessarily happens. So you see, I'm adding a good deal to Rowe's commentary here, none of which amounts to the hill of beans as yet. Okay, I'm going to go on and say some more about this, but questions up to this point.

Yeah. Is that. Is he making reference to event in history as events, or as it applies to the individuals?

As it applies to the individual, yeah. Yes. Every, all of this is made meant in the terms of P being anything whatsoever. And so P here could be an individual act as well.

And that's what I was asking. What if the individual doesn't know that God has ordained it to happen? If he knows, maybe he could have reacted differently. But if he sins and he doesn't know that it is in the finality of what I should sin, one will make it to philanthropy and one will make it the other way around.

Let us say that I know that God foreknows that this class will end immediately at 2:15. Does that mean that I can do something such that the class will not end immediately at 2:15? Well, I mean, you have to understand that if I can do something such that the class will not meet at 2:15. God didn't know, did he? Because God was only guessing. And in this case he made a poor one. That isn't what we mean by foreknowledge, is it? We don't mean that God knows all the possibilities. We mean God knows what will actually take place. And so even if I know what God's foreknowledge is, I should say that if it's knowledge, it's going to be done. I don't happen to think it's going to be done against my will. But that's another question. In other words, I'm not asking you to take a pen. You don't have to as yet have any opinion on that. All I'm saying is that has got to be argued, has to be argued either against or for. But not on the grounds that are up on the board. Nothing on the board will determine this as yet.

There was a case of a Muslim driver in Islam who was involved in a manslaughter and he was taken to the court and he said the Allah ordained it, therefore he was not responsible. Therefore he was saying it wasn't a voluntary act, sort of anyway, and that is not responsible in any way. So if the individual knows that God has done, then it's not present responsible for the act and therefore it's not for action.

If the individual knows that God has foreknown it or ordained it. Which are we talking about right now? Are you speaking of the individual knowing of the foreordination of God or of the foreknowledge of God?

Foreordination.

Foreordination. Okay. Would you mind terribly if I ask you to renew that question once we get to that point in the discussion? Okay. I think it will amount to the same question, but that's because you're talking to a Calvinist. That's fine. But at this point in the classroom discussion, we're only talking about foreknowledge. And as yet we don't know whether foreknowledge entails foreordination. But maybe I can give you at least a glimpse of an answer in terms of the Moslem system of theology. The man was absolutely right. Right.

Islam teaches faith.

That's right. The Quran would support him. That he in fact did not do that voluntarily, that he did it as a puppet. And although that is what the critics of Calvinism like to pin on Calvinists, that is not what the Bible teaches and it's not what any Calvinist that I know of, although I do know one contemporary, Gordon Clerk Clark comes very close to talking like that. Nevertheless, I don't even know him. Admitting that you could go to court and blame it on God. Was there a question, Terry?

If I claimed number one, that did not claim number two, how would that itself make the case?

Okay.

Rose says, if you take interpretation one.

Here, that the necessity applies to the truth of the statement whatever God knows will happen. Because you can't know things that aren't true, that Emodius can't, then go on to the next premise in his argument. The next premise being, therefore, if God foreknows that I'm going to sin, I sin necessarily. That doesn't follow at all. What the next premise would have to be is if God foreknows that I'm going to sin, then it's necessarily true that If God foreknows I'm going to sin, I'm going to sin, but it doesn't say whether I sin necessarily or voluntarily.

You see, this takes it out of.

The realm of metaphysical speculation altogether because it doesn't talk about the conditions under which events take place. It only talks about the truth conditions.

Of a statement, if you will.

This is in the realm of epistemology and language, logic. This is in the realm of metaphysics.

And so this is.

I'm being sloppy here, but again, the imprecision is for the sake of clarity. This is, if you will, the epistemological interpretation of the premise. And this is the metaphysical interpretation that is placing necessity in the realm of truth, Necessity in the realm of events. No, not at all. No, not at all.

What is the logical outcome of number one?

Okay, you're taking this as separate, you mean.

Okay, the logical outcome of this is that since this is the necessary truth, it must always be the case. It must always be the case that whatever God knows is true. Whatever God foreknows will happen. But how does it happen? See, that's the issue. How does it happen? God may know it, and if he knows it, it's true. But does it happen necessarily? That is to say, does it happen without any contingency? Does it happen without voluntary choice on the part of the person involved? Well, this does not commit you one way or another. All this says is that necessarily if God does know it, then it's true. Now, the second one does commit you.

It says that if God does foreknow.

Something, then the way it's going to.

Happen is necessarily it's going to happen. It will happen without any contingency.

Okay, the first statement are many in this counting? Yeah, atheists could agree on that. Because knowledge has to be of the truth. And therefore if there is a God.

And if he does foreknow things, everything he foreknows has to be true.

Yes. Yes. Yeah, that's very good.

Right.

An Arminian, a classical Arminian or Pelagian.

Would have very hard time because most Arminians want to grant foreknowledge, but they don't want to grant foreordination. That's right.

Of course, you wouldn't have to grant coordination, would you? Because maybe God knows by looking down.

The corridors of history and just happens to know all the causal factors better than we do. Now, as a matter of fact, if that's the way God forms, knows. My argument is that Arminians take away.

Our free will much more devastatingly than Calvinists. Do.

Because that is to say not only is it not foreknowledge, it's post knowledge.

God knows after the fact, before the fact.

That is, God looks at all the factors and since he knows all the factors, he turns out to know what the bottom line is going to be. You know, he knows what my parental influence and what my environmental influence, my emotional influence and all these other things factoring into me are going to be. And so he can, you know, almost in algebraic certainty come out with the right answer. But that is to say that I am subject to forces beyond me. The Calvinist says no, God foreknows these things not because he can figure out all these causal factors that are over me, that even though my decision doesn't have a causal factor, even though it is my own self determined act, nevertheless it's under his point. And whether in fact God has the ability to foreordain the free acts of men is a question we'll leave to later on.

I happen to think that he's very able to do that sort of thing. I've been a little bit confused about something. Right from the beginning we listed the three things that Avodius said. Now going from step two, meaning if God foreknows that man will sin, then he must necessarily sin. Calling that step two, two, step three, if man must necessarily sin, then there is no voluntary choice. Okay, Another way of rewording that seems to me, or biopsy is to say that man in some sense was forced to sin.

Is that true?

And if. No, no. Okay, okay. Even if you don't say that is true, I still don't see how Evodius in presenting this argument, does he present proofs or some way in proving that? In other words, I see him making statements, but I don't see him qualifying the truth of the statements that he's making to begin with. And then he's asking whoever wants to take him on to say now disprove me.

No, although I have sympathy for why you would feel that way. In the way that it's presented in the text, we don't get Evodius. You know, in full strength, Evodius is really saying we all grant foreordination. Nobody is questioning that in our circles. Okay, now let's just start looking at the conceptual implications of foreordination. And what he's saying is unless somebody can show a logical defect in my argument, my argument must prove its conclusion by the strength of logic. These are all the conceptual implications of the notion of foreordination. And so it's not as though he's simply making unattested remarks and says, however, this will stand unless I'm refuted. He's saying, no, this, this as a matter of fact is a logical case for my conclusion. Unless you can show otherwise.

How can he say that someone. That if someone must necessarily sin, how can he say that's the same thing as saying that he had no choice in the matter? So I'm saying I don't see that he presents a proof or anything to back that aspect of the statement.

Well, in the sense that it has commonly been thought that if we freely do things, what we've done is not necessary. For if what I do is necessary, it doesn't seem that anything I'd say about it would make a difference. What I'm suggesting. In a sense, I almost want to. I want to grab on to what you're saying and run with it. Because in the end, as a Calvinist, I'm going to make a similar kind of remark, that there are different kinds of necessity and that if you draw the distinction between creature and creator, as Paul does, that you don't run into these difficulties. But on the other hand, to be fair to Euvotius, and I think in a sense to the truth too, unless we talk about different kinds of necessity, that's what we mean by saying that a man's action is free, that in some sense is not necessary, that he could have done other than he did. But since you say he couldn't have done other than he did, it is necessary, ergo, not free. Again, I think he's using words as they. I don't think he's smuggling in a whole lot. I think he's just using the words as they commonly are. Understood. Maybe when. Maybe when we get, you know, to the whole. To the end of our whole discussion of this matter, you'll be more satisfied with that. But if you're not, I welcome you to bring it up again. Okay. The reason I resisted your interpretation of he necessarily sins as he's forced to sin is that that is one. All Evotius wants to say is the options have been ruled out. Now, how they've been ruled out by force. We don't know whether it's been ruled out by force. And so you put necessarily, I mean, an unnecessarily derogatory slant on it. If you reinterpret him that way is what I'm afraid. And again, while I want to go for the juggler too, sometime we want to do our best for the opponent before we do. Well, I mean, that just makes your reputation all the stronger if you portray him in the best possible life.

We've run out of time.

I wanted to point out that Aquinas himself draws this distinction.

And I'll show you the two ways he does that next time we come. But you may want to get that.

In your notes before you leave.

Aquinas draws that distinction.

Roe, as you know, draws that distinction. And.

Let me see, Kenny agrees with the distinction, and Prior agrees with the distinction.

Okay? So it's a very important distinction. It's a distinction that a lot of people want to draw. Now, after we look at the way Aquinas draws the distinction, Aquinas also knows that he has to go on and consider another problem, and that's that if.

The first part of this is necessary, isn't the second part of this necessary? If it's necessary that God foreknows everything.

Including P, then isn't it also true.

That it's necessary that P will happen.

And Aquinas is a way of getting.

Around that in terms of God's eternal knowledge.

Okay. And Jonathan Edwards has another way of dealing with that. It's another reading assignment. And then you'll find both Kenny and Prior arguing in various ways against Kenny Aquinas way of dealing with the fact.

That if the antecedent is necessary, the consequent is necessary.

So that's just, if you will, kind.

Of a foreview, not foreknowledge, just a preview of what is coming up in your reading.

And on Friday, we'll try to wrap this up.