Dr Greg Bahnsen - Philosophy of Christianity: Foreordination and Responsibility (Part 18)

Christians who have evangelical faith and therefore trust the teaching of the Scripture believe that in a genuine sense God foreknows whatsoever comes to pass. Consequently, if God knows in advance that a certain thing will happen, and if we. And if it's impossible that somebody should know something that is not first of all true and impossible that somebody should know something that is not justified, then we must say that at T1, at T1, it is justified to believe that X will take place at T2, it is justified to believe that X will take place at T2. In fact, at T1 it is true that X will take place at T2. Okay, so it is justified and it is true at T1, that X will take place at T2. If it is true and justify, that is to say somebody could know it for certain. That is, it is a matter of certainty, then what we have to say, as Jonathan Edwards points out in his discussion of this question, that it is certain in advance that what takes place will take place. It is certain in advance that what takes place will take place. Now, some people have said about this line of argumentation that God's foreknowing something doesn't make it the case. It's something being the case that allows God to know it in advance. The argument is God knows something does not mean that God causes it to happen, but rather the fact that something will be allows for God to know it. Now, Edwards points out in his discussion that if you just forget foreordination, our predestination for the time being, if you say that the fact of something, the certainty of something, allows for God to know it, and God knows it in advance of it actually taking place, then all the more, is it certain in advance that it will happen? It is certain in advance because it turns out that this thing that is going to take place is having an effect even before it occurs. What effect is it having? It is effecting the knowledge of God. God is able to know this because it is true, even though he has not caused it. But if he knows it in advance, this thing is having an effect even before it occurs. Well, if it's having an effect before it occurs, then clearly the occurrence is certain in advance. It's certain in advance of its actual occurrence. Now, this is just a theological way of putting points that we've been discussing thus far in our unit on omniscience, foreknowledge and human freedom. It would certainly seem to be the case that if a person is committed to the foreknowledge of God, he is committed to the idea that what takes place is certain in advance.

Now, what questions do you have about.

This up to this point? Would you be willing, for class purposes.

Or not, to put a raw bone syllogism on the board for Priorian syllogism and for the Edwardians? Remember my question at the end of the last class? Could you put fire in the form of the syllogism and then put Edwards in the form of a syllogism? Okay, that would help me personally, although they didn't discuss it in the form of astrogism, that reconstruction would help. I had the notes from last time.

If that would help. I don't think so. That's all right. And now both Edwards and Prior would agree that if X is foreknown, then X is not contingent. It is certain in advance. Okay, now Prior's line of argumentation would go something like this. First of all, the future is contingent. The future is contingent. If X is foreknown, then X is not contingent. Therefore, X cannot be foreknown. Edwards argues to the opposite effect. His first premise is that all things X is foreknown. And if X is foreknown, then X is not contingent. His conclusion, therefore, X, which is to say this future event, the future is not contingent. Edwards and Prior agreed. Then on the second premise, that if X is foreknown, then X is not contingent. If X is foreknown, then it's certain in advance that X will take place. Prior begins with the future is contingent. Edwards concludes, the future is not contingent. Edwards begins with X or all things are foreknown. Prior concludes that after all things cannot be foreknown. And so what you have here is a common axiomatic middle principle. And you have conclusion and major premise inverted between the two men with negation built into the inversion. You invert the major premise and conclusion, negate them both, and you have the other man's argument. You see, this conflicts with this. This conflicts with this. And they hold the middle premise in common. What questions do you have about Edwards in terms of events being certain in advance? Since God foreknows them? That they're certain in advance does not make them logical truths. Anthony Kinney is right about that. Okay, let us assume for the sake of discussion, that the Lakers will win the basketball game tonight. Okay, 10 years ago, God knew that the Lakers would win the basketball game tonight. Consequently, 10 years ago, it was both justified and true that the Lakers would win the basketball game tonight. That is simply to say that it is Certain that the Lakers will win the basketball game tonight even though it hasn't been played? It is certain because God knew it in advance and he doesn't know anything that is subject to being erroneous. He's omniscient. He never makes mistakes. He foreknows it. It will certainly come to pass. There's no question about it then. However, the fact that it is certain in advance that the Lakers will win the basketball game tonight does not mean that the proposition is the Lakers will win the basketball game tonight is a truth of logic. So that somebody who denies that is being self contradictory or is somehow violating the laws of logic. It is not a violation of any law of logic to say that the Lakers will lose the basketball game tonight. Nevertheless, it can be certain in advance that they will win the basketball game tonight. Certainty in advance does not make a proposition that refers to or expresses the event a logical truth. It's not a truth of logic.

Yes, maybe this is. Maybe we've already double checked this, so check that out. If it has shown that if God knows something in advance, then logically it will come to pass, is that correct?

Well, that is the same problem as we discussed for two days about this necessity. If God knows that something will take place before it does, then necessarily it will take place. Can it be taken to mean it's a necessary truth that if God knows it, it is true, or could be taken in the sense that if God knows it in advance, then it will take place necessarily. It does not follow that the event will take place necessarily.

If it comes to our knowledge that God knows something about the future, then doesn't it logically follow that that event.

Is a logical necessity, not a logical necessity? No, a logical necessity is the truth of logic. And there's no violation of any known axioms of logic in saying that the Lakers will lose tonight even though God perfect, well, perfectly well knows, provided of course it is true that they're going to win tonight. So it is not logically necessary that they win. Although it's a logical truth that if God knows it, it is true.

Okay, Does God know? Yes, he does.

How do I know that? Well, the Bible tells me so.

Okay, well, your authority is not.

The authority for believing. And foreknowledge is never logic for anybody. They've always got to have some conception of God supplied to them either from their own imagination or from revelation or something. And that's right. My authority is the word of God. But you see, some people have said the very concept of an omniscient God entails that God foreknows things. And there are people who would argue, no, an omniscient God doesn't necessarily foreknow things. What I want to say is the biblically omniscient God necessarily foreknows things because that's what's contained in the concept of omniscience according to the Bible, that he knows the future from the past and determines all things in advance. And so, consequently, while it's true somebody else can have a pagan concept of God that is omniscient, whereby. Well, wherein. He means that God knows everything there is to know, but there isn't anything about the future available to be known by anybody, much less by God. And consequently, omniscience doesn't mean foreknowledge, but omniscience in the Bible certainly means foreknowledge. And consequently, as a Christian, if I believe in foreknowledge, I must believe that God knows who's going to win the game tonight.

May I return to the syllogism?

If you want.

I want to pinpoint exactly, if I can, in form of syllogism, where the Calvinistic Armenian dilemma is on the relationship between foreknowledge and, shall I call it predestination, to use a biblical word. All Christians who read the Bible and believe it believe in foreknowledge, so they can start with Edwards here. It seems to me the difference, if we're going to talk about the Edwardian side, is the minor premise. If the future is foreknown, then the future is not contingent. That's where Calvinists and Arminians would differ. Am I right so far?

Yes.

If we start on the left side, the priorium logic, the priority of syllogism. A Calvinist can't even begin because he doesn't believe the future is contingent. Some Arminians could begin, but when they get to number two, they're going to have to define two in such a way that they cannot conclude three because they want to end up with foreknowledge. Isn't that correct?

If they define two in such a way that they are not led to three, then they've denied two. That's not redefining two, that's denying two.

Say that again.

There's no way to read. You can't redefine two so that three doesn't follow. It follows logically that if the future is contingent and if something is foreknown, it's not contingent. Therefore something is not foreknown. In the future.

Therefore, I come to my question. An Arminian, not even an Arminian can begin where Prior begins.

Well, no, I'd say many Arminians do begin where Prior begins, but then they run into problems because they want to get from here to here without. They want to have this and this. Without this. No, I'm sorry, wait a minute. They want to say the future is contingent and they want to have Edwards. The future is foreknown and you can't do that. It's logically incompatible to say that X is known in advance. Nevertheless X is not certain.

Let me ask a question. And they have no meaning. Okay, but I need to ask it. Do some Arminians begin where Edwards begins and some begin where Prior begins? And they all run into trouble in.

The minor premise, I think Arminians begin where Prior begins and where Edwards begins. They have both of those and then they have difficulty. They can't reconcile the two. Although there are plenty of Arminians that don't reflect on it. I mean, they go through their whole Christian experience saying God knows everything, everything in advance, and everything that takes place in the future is contingent and they never think about it. But the moment they think about it and what is involved in God knowing something in advance, then it must be certain that it's going to take place. And that's what they don't believe. They don't believe anything certain in advance.

I guess you've answered me that there's an equal ultimacy in their thinking here. Foreknowledge is equally ultimate in their values to contingency. They're kind of starting the focus.

That's a personal matter. Yeah, you know, he's scratching.

That's why I wonder.

One Armenian and he'll, you know, bleed one way and scratch another. He'll bleed another. I don't know. Some Armenians, if we're, if they were pressed to the wall, would probably say that I was wrong about the future. It's not contingent. It is determined by God and others. If you press them to the wall, would say, well, since it's so important that human actions be free, I guess God can't even. God can't know.

I've only met one evangelical Armenian in my life who denied foreknowledge in the name of consistency.

Well, that may be true, but I mean, in a philosophy class, I have no way of telling you statistically how many Arminians will go which way and which the other. All I'm saying is that logically they have to Give up one or the other.

A Christian one, with the prayer case. And what remains?

Well, we mean that taking our petitions before the throne of God changes the outcome of the way things appear. The way they're going to fall out. Okay.

God foreknows and settings. Then you pray and it changes.

What has changed the way things appear, they're going to be or the way things actually are going to be.

The way things actually are going to appear. If that doesn't change, nothing has changed.

Nothing can change the way things actually are going to be. Nothing can change the way things actually are going to be any more than anything can change the way things actually have been.

Now, what's the place of prayer? That's where I'm somehow lost.

Place of prayer? Place of prayer is if you want to get things changed. This is God's ordained way of bringing about changes. No, no, we're not done yet here. We're not going to let this one go until it's resolved somehow he feels.

That'S a communistic problem. It's a common problem.

Want you to be a problem. Okay. The way things are going right now. Waiting as going right now. Say you have a friend who is looking for work and he doesn't have work. The way things are going right now. It appears next Monday he's not going to be on the payroll anywhere. So you pray to God. Prayer changes things. Lo and behold, what appeared to be the future doesn't actually turn out to be the future. What actually turns out to be the case is that he gets a job next Monday. Prayer has changed things. Or you have a friend that has cancer. The way things appear right now, next Monday, he'll have cancer and perhaps be dead. You pray God heals him next Monday. Your friend doesn't have cancer and is not dead. Prayer has changed things, has taken away the cancerous situation in that person's body, has taken away his lack of a job, which is to say, has supplied a job. Prayer changes things. There's no question about that. Even though God has ordained what will actually take place, prayer changes things. And the reason for that I've been waiting for somebody to supply this premise is because prayer is also part of what God ordains. Let me give you a little thing that people from time to time throw up in opposition to Calvinistic soteriology, that God chooses those who will be believers and therefore will profit from the redemptive work of Jesus Christ. It is said, well, if God chooses who's going to become a believer, there's no need to evangelize, because that's already decided. But that's to say God chooses and ordains the end without ordaining the means to the end. Now, if we believe that God ordained the end without ordaining the means to the end, then we'd be fatalist. No matter what a man may do, whether he believes in Christ or not, he's going to be saved or lost. And therefore it doesn't make any difference whether he believes. There's nothing more contrary to the whole teaching of Scripture, but that it makes all the difference in the world. To say that it doesn't make any difference is contrary to the Bible. It makes all the difference in the world whether a man believes or not. And the reason for that is that God not only ordains the end, but he ordains the means to the end. And since God ordains the means to the end, I'm under obligation to evangelize people. And if I don't, then that means is not being supplied. That isn't to say that their end is going to come about anyway. The end is what I take to be the end will not come about unless the means to the end, that end is also supplied. Therefore, if God has ordained the end, he has ordained the means to the end. So I'm not absolved from my obligation to evangelize at all from the fact that God has predestined a man's end. Because if a man is to be saved, God is also predestined that somebody's going to preach the gospel to him.

And pray for him.

Yeah, I can pray for him. If my friend is going to be healed of cancer, God has probably ordained somebody who's going to pray for the relief of his cancer. So you see, the foreordination of God in Calvinist thought doesn't affect our moral duties, our responsibility in the slightest. Now, I'm going to say some hard things for a minute, okay? I want you all to understand that I'm not saying this to any individual, and I'm not saying it about any individual. And I'm certainly not saying it in order to make any individual upset. But as a matter of fact, and I think the Bible teaches this, it's not a matter of my experience, but the Bible teaches that God's foreordination of all things is a difficulty for people who are having trouble submitting their lives and thoughts to God. Now, I know the implication seems to be that Arminians who resist Calvinists are not as sanctified as Calvinists let me simply qualify that in this, this particular area, Calvinists are more sanctified than Arminians, that doesn't say a whole lot about the overall picture, does it? Arminians can be a lot more sanctified in a lot of other areas. But on this particular question, it simply has to be recognized that God's foreordination is a difficulty for those who are vessels of wrath. Exactly what Paul says. Paul teaches that God differentiates between the ends, the character of men. And then Paul says, but you'll say to me, who can resist his will? We can't be responsible. Why does he then hold us accountable? Paul immediately resorts to the rebuke, who are you to talk back to God? Now, if a person is living in a kind of lifestyle whereby his own salvation is questionable to him because of his lifestyle, living in unrepentant sin, or living out of close fellowship and harmony with God, doesn't have a life of prayer, life of personal devotion, is not in communion with the Church, hasn't taken the Lord's Supper in a proper frame of mind, these sorts of things are happening in a person's life. Then of course the doctrine of foreordination is a real threat. But as a matter of fact, the doctrine of foreordination in the Bible is never presented in a threatening way. And the reason for that is that those who are presenting the doctrine of foreordination are those who recognize first of all primarily their own unworthiness because of their sinful character and God's utter mercy in doing whatever takes place. And they recognize that the security of their salvation, based on the mercy of God over against their sin, the security of their salvation resides in the fact that He's Lord of heaven and earth. And if He's Lord of heaven and earth, that means he not only made everything, but he governs everything. Now, within that context of strong active faith, ordination is never difficulty. This is simply a matter of submitting your mind to what God has to say and thanking him for his mercy. In that, in fact our salvation is secure because of that foreordination, that nothing can separate us from the love of Christ, not anything in all of creation. But now, if God has not foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, then that is to say, some things in history take place completely, contingently, by chance. They're not under our control and they're not under his control. And I dare say that if there are some things that take place in history that are not under the control of God, then I have no assurance that there's nothing in heaven and earth that can separate me from the love of Christ. There might be. There might be one of these really strange things in history that so happens to work out that I am severed from the love of the Savior. But that, of course, is an abhorrent inference from the standpoint of biblical faith, which is simply to say that from the standpoint of the Bible's way of presenting predestination, it is never a doctrine that threatens. It's always a doctrine that comforts. Yes.

Were you able to be in a lecture this morning in the chapel about her death and dying?

No.

If you walk into a grieving situation, the emotion of the emojis don't have. Well, Doc, your son died, but it was God's will. Would you be able to say that to him?

Would I be able to? If I don't would be able to, I'd be very anxious to say it.

I said my one comfort in that moment would be that my son's death was not meaningless. If God does it, it's not meaningless, but somehow some neglected mine or of society. Wait a minute. If it was not some neglect of yours or of society, he still would die of God's will. A rape victim dies, it's God's will.

Sure.

Let me clarify something the rabbi said this morning. You should not say the victim death of your child was God's will. It was a totally humanistic lecture from the beginning to the end. You should know that. Okay, now talking about Calvinism and hominity. Okay. It was not a Christian lecture at all. Deny the physical faith. Okay, now we come to this. I once heard of a Christian pastor whose daughter was raped and killed. Funeral home. One of the brilliant mourners came and said, God will. He screamed out, my God wouldn't will this for my God. But you put it that he comes to me. Okay, it's the same bit. Well, no. Would he come to you? Would he say to you it was God's will that you're so. I believe it all things were too good for in my life. Every little bit, including the rape of my daughter is somehow good in God's providence. You see, I thought different perspective. His will that that happen. He will that that daughter be raped. He willed that that child. Is that. I shouldn't be taking over your conversation, but can I respond to that? Is that what you say? Though I distinguish between God.

Are you not willing to say that?

You're not willing to say that? I'm not willing to say that because of my lack of understanding of God. I don't, I don't know all that.

He either do I.

And I know you're not assuming that either but I'm just having as a human being with a limited character, abilities that juggle that in my mind. Well, let me respond.

Consider the alternative.

Oh, the alternative is worse.

The alternative is that you live in a third universe where without God, without.

God, without God's control. I know that the alternative is worse. That's why I was waiting for you to something you ended on the last session. I'm sorry, I like getting to my. That was God's will. That's all right. I think we're going to hold you personally accountable for God. We are free. That God has determined this and that was something that you were going to resolve.

Yeah, and when we resolve that, I'm going to try to demonstrate that the rape of this, that girl in her death was the moral responsibility of her rapist and murderer. And that while it is part of the decreed will of God, nevertheless he does not have any culpability with respect to it. That no man can speak back to God and say why did you talk that way? Why did you do that way? Why didn't you do otherwise in the first place? Even if you could imagine, and I don't know anybody who can, philosophical grounds for reasoning in that way. We would never be in a position to speak that way to God because the creature never speaks to the Creator and says why have you done things this way? We always say your will be done. After all, Jesus, before the arch crime of history could pray thy will be done. Then how much more can I pray thy will be done even when it comes down to that terrible one. No. Well, I don't want to say no Calvinist any more than I want to say no Arminian would deny. I mean Calvinists and Arminians make sinful choices. But hopefully no Calvinist would ever say, well I mean don't have to worry about that.

It's part of God's will.

So just who cares? The Bible never does. And we weep with those who weep, right? We mourn with those who mourn and we rejoice with those who rejoice. But the alternative is this. If God wasn't in control of that event because that was a free act, then if I knew in advance, let's say that my daughter had been raped and she was in the hospital about to die, okay? Now at that point, does it make any difference to you that God's in control? If God's not in control, I dare say. You dare not pray because you can say God. Don't you hope that she lives too? I hope she lives. But now, who does God pray to and who do I pray to in order that prayer would do something about that? We pray to a God who sovereignly controls everything, so that if God is in control of every event, that God then can do something to preserve her life. Now, if I pray, God, please preserve the life of my daughter. And I pray in faith. I must pray as Jesus prayed before he went to the cross. Nevertheless, not my will, not my desires, because they may be selfish. I may just be emotionally consumed in my own grief right now. God, I may not be concerned for your kingdom and for the good that you wish to bring about in my life. For the life of your kingdom. Not my will, but thy will be done. Now, if I pray that way, I chose one that I believe God can do something about it, but that I'm in no position to tell him how he should do it. And consequently, it seems to me the alternative is much worse. Because what I have to tell a man who is grieving because of the loss of a child is, well, the sad thing about this all is that it doesn't serve any purpose whatsoever. It couldn't serve any purpose because even God couldn't have prevented it. And if you live in a universe where not even tragic events can serve a purpose, then you live in a third, absurd and despairing universe. I really believe at this point that while the Arminian on the surface appears to give a more loving and comforting doctrine, he in the end gives us something that is too horrendous to live with, that it's chaos and old night and not God's world, after all, not where God calls the shots, but where who knows what calls the shots. And after all, if this man says, I don't want a God who wills this sort of thing, and you know, I pray that, you know, in the saner moments, in less emotionally disturbed moments and all the rest, that he would not say that sort of thing. But if a person does say, I don't want a God who wills such a thing, then what will happen when God says, okay, your will be done, then you will not have me to be your God, because that is the kind of God I am. I do declare the end from the beginning, and my arm is not foreshortened that I should not accomplish my purpose. And so Paul tells us in Ephesians one that he works all things according to the counsel of his own Will he even works the death of my child. That's the only reason Romans 8:28 has any comfort to me. Because I know that if he was in control of it, then he can bring some good out of it. But if he wasn't in control of it, then in fact there are things that foreshorten his arm. In fact, he isn't the one who is, you know, declaring the end from the beginning. And if he doesn't declare the end from the beginning, if he's not controlling events, I'm not even sure that he can save me. Because when all is said and done, it may turn out that I may be lost anyway. For all of my efforts to believe in Jesus Christ, I may be lost.

I would just like to add to that, since you started with me here, the distinction between prescriptive will and the creeked will. God's prescriptive will is Thou shalt not rape, thou shalt not murder. They've broken God's commandment. This decreed will is that he decrees history. We're talking about the certainty of history, all events. And while I would say I would look at my dead great daughter with a mixed emotion, I would have the terrible hurt that someone had sinned against me and her and had grieved God's heart at the same time. I could read meaning into that moment because I knew that God must overrule the tobo, that this is something good that has come into my life. All things, without exception, work to good to those who love God, who those of the call according to his purposes. And the only way I could face that death is if I knew it came from the loving hand of my Father. That's the only way I could accept it. I came to this years ago in the ministry. As this class knows. I was a Wesleyan pastor for four years. And it was through my preaching that I realized I didn't have a complete gospel at that point. So I didn't speak this morning in chapel. But my whole body was vibrating at what he was saying. Amen. It was a word of Satan. It came from the pits of hell. It was not a word from God. That's my testimony. As much as I admire his person and his speaking ability. And I learned about the miracle today, about technique. I don't believe we always hit people with God's decrees. We deal with them where they are and they're hurt. But his bottom line is not my bottom line.

Yes, if we say that X is certain in advance, let's try to follow this out and find out why somebody would hold that X could not be a morally culpable act. That is at all moral responsibility has been was removed from X. The line of thinking seems to be this X is certain in advance. Therefore. I'm going to do this just a little bit different so I can put in some distinctions for you. We say it is certain in advance that S S will X. If it's certain in advance that S will X, then S cannot do other than X. If S cannot do other than X, then S is not responsible or X. I suggest that this is the line of reasoning with respect to human freedom, since we know human beings are responsible for their acts and therefore in that sense free. If it is certain in advance that S will X, S cannot do other than X and S is not responsible for X because the condition of responsibility is ability to do otherwise. Now, there may be some of you in here who are Arminians in the sense that you don't hold to foreordination. There may be some who believe in foreordination, but this is not a question of nose counting or anything from that matter. We're simply trying to discuss the issue. Does this not seem to you to be the reasoning of those who do not think that God can foreordain whatsoever comes to pass? Because if he does, then it's certain in advance. And if it's certain in advance, S can't do otherwise. And since that ability to do otherwise is a condition of responsibility, S is not responsible for what he did. Since we know S is responsible for what he did, S could have done otherwise. And that means it was not certain in advance. I am not. This is not the spider and the fly routine. I'm not trying to trap anybody. But that to me is the clearest way of explaining the logic of anti foreordination. But I'd like to look at the premises and see whether we have to be committed to this line of thinking. After all, if it's certain in advance that S will do X, I will agree that S cannot do other than X. The cannot here, you must remember, is defined by this certainty that with respect to the certainty spoken of, S cannot do X other than X. Does not have the ability to do other than what God foreordained. So to fill out the sentence S cannot do other than X is to say cannot do other than what God ordained. Now you don't have much difficulty with that statement. As it stands, does anybody want to say s cannot do other than what God ordained? Can we resist the will of God? Am I talking about his prescriptive will. He says, don't commit adultery. We certainly have the ability to violate that will. But when God decrees that something's going to take place, can we resist that? Can anybody do other than what God has ordained? No. And so it's certain in advance that S will X means S cannot do other than what God has ordained. From that filled in proposition, it is inferred that if F cannot do other than X in that sense, F cannot do other than X in any sense. It's what is called a hasty generalization, generalization moving from one particular to a generalization. That if in the particular sense spoken up here, that S cannot do other than X, if it's true that S cannot do other than what God has ordained, then S cannot do other than X in any sense. But you see, the ability to do otherwise that we're talking about here may very well be harmonious with or may very well comport with God's ordaining whatever takes place. If X can do other than X in this moral and responsible sense, then we have no difficulty. Now, what is the sense in which we hold a person responsible for doing what he's done? What ability do we presume him to have to do otherwise? Basically, what we are saying in that S has the ability to do otherwise is that S was not coerced. Was not coerced. That is a condition of moral responsibility. That what you do, you do. Nobody coerced you to do this. Nobody pushed you into it. Nobody slapped a gun in your hand and forced. Pulled the trigger for you. You picked up the gun, you aimed, you pulled the trigger. It wasn't coercion. Yes.

What is the force of the decree then?

Well, that's what we're coming to. Do you all understand that the responsibility, the moral responsibility of man means that man is not coerced in what he does. Okay, I assume that you all do. Now, if it should be the case that God's ordaining whatever comes to pass is not contrary to the condition of no coercion, that is to say, if we can hold that ordination, God's ordaining X does not imply that he coerced X. That is, if somebody can hold that ordaining something does not imply coercing it on the part of God. Therefore, it is logically compatible. To say these two propositions are logically compatible. X was not coerced, therefore could do otherwise and was morally responsible in that sense, even though he could not have done otherwise in the sense that he could have frustrated the will of God. If you have any trouble following this, you shouldn't. I'm not suggesting there's anything subtle or hard about it, but if I've lost you somewhere, it's this phrase, cannot do other, cannot do otherwise, that I'm looking at. And what I'm suggesting is, in one sense he cannot do otherwise, in another sense he can do otherwise. And that those two senses are logically compatible. And they are logically compatible because we do not believe that the ordaining of something by God implies the coercing of something by God. Somebody's going to say, how can God ordain something, make it certain in advance, and not coerce it? Please turn tape over at this time. My answer to that question is I don't know. And I don't own an answer to that question. I don't know how he does it. I don't know how God parted the Red Sea either. I don't know how he brought Jesus back to life. I'm not really sure how he's going to bring about the new heavens and the new earth. I'm not sure how God does a lot of things. That doesn't make them logically impossible. It just means that God knows a whole lot more and has a lot more power than I do. That is to say, God can do things that I can't do. For instance, if I want to make it certain in advance that Kickasola is going to shoot his wife. I'm talking about certain in advance. The only way I can make it certain in advance is to coerce him. That's the only way I can make it certain. Now, I can make it very, very, very, very likely. If I knew techniques of psychological manipulation got him to think that this, that and the other about his wife put the gun within his reach, drugged his mind. I mean, we could do all sorts of things to make it just about as likely as possible. Still is not certain. The only way I can make it certain in advance is if I coerce it. I put the gun in his hand and I pull the trigger. I coerce him to shoot his wife. But now, what that is to say simply is that I cannot make things certain in advance without using coercion. Does God have the ability to make things certain in advance without coercing them? Well, how would we know the answer to that question? How do we know what God can and cannot do? What is the logic of God's power? Well, I mean, we could take a poll, right? We could go out and ask people, what do you think? Do you think God can do that sort of thing? That wouldn't be much help, would it? We could sit down and reflect on it and say, now, whatever gods there may be, whatever powers there may be, and whatever the world is like, and, you know, on and on and on. I wonder what all the possibilities are and which one is actual. That isn't going to help in the end. We only know what kind of logic of God's omnipotence and foreordination is going to be by looking at what God says about it. I'm saying on this particular question, it's not a question of logic, it's a question of metaphysics. What does God say about ordination? Does God say ordination implies coercion? He says, no, it doesn't. No, it doesn't imply coercion. Let's fill in something for X here. Give me just a little while. It was certain in advance that the Roman soldiers would crucify Christ. Do you all agree that it was certain in advance the Roman soldiers were crucified Christ? It was prophesied in the old testament.

Samuel 2, Isaiah 53.

Obviously it's taught in the Bible. Okay, is it the case that the soldiers could not do other than crucify Christ? At that point you're going to say, well, in one sense, yes. In one sense, no. They couldn't frustrate the will of God. But could they have done otherwise? Could they have done something else at that particular moment? Did they have the ability to do otherwise? Yeah, they have the ability to do otherwise. Now, even if you want to say, well, the soldiers were under orders and so forth, so they didn't have the ability, of course they had the ability to violate their orders. We could then just transfer the question to Pilate. Did Pilate have the ability to choose otherwise than to crucify Christ? Well, certainly he did. I mean, Pilate could have washed his chariot that afternoon for all we know. The soldiers could have gone home and thrown a party. They had the ability to do a lot of different things. They had the ability to sit still and they were told to nail the nails into his hands. They had the ability to do otherwise. Were they coerced? Did God thrust the hammer into their hands and forced them against their will? They said, no, we don't want to nail the nails into the hands of the Lord. No, the Bible says they did it by wicked hands. Wickedly they did it. They did exactly what they wanted to do. They had the ability to do otherwise. They were not coerced and therefore they were responsible for it. And you know, they were responsible because the Bible says they did it wickedly. If it had been coerced, it wouldn't have been wicked. Or what would have been wicked is the one who was coercing them would have been wicked. But the soldiers would not have been wicked if there was nothing they could do about it. But there was plenty they could have done about it. They could have said, no, we won't do this. No, this man's innocent. No, no, we're going to go do something else. There was no reason why they had to be going through the motions of crucifying Christ on that particular afternoon prior. They could have done otherwise in one sense. They couldn't have done otherwise in another sense. But to answer the question, that goes to show you the ambiguity of that word can. When you say, can somebody do something? You have to say can. With respect to what? Can I go to california today? Not at all. All the willing of that in the world won't get me to California today. It's not within my physical abilities to get to California today. What am I getting at when I say that? I'm saying that over against the conditions, you know, the friction of the world, the strength in my legs and so forth. Even if I run as fast as I possibly can, I can't get to.

California by midnight tonight.

So you see, my thing that I can or cannot is always can over against one what conditions? Okay? Now somebody says, well, of course you can get to California tonight. You can get on a plane and you'll get there on time. And that person who says, yes, you can is speaking of can over against another set of conditions. Right. Over against another boundary, if you will, of conditions, Namely, the conditions that you have a mechanical device that can go so fast and it's in good working order and you get to the airport on time and all that. Can you? Well, yes, you can. Can you? Well, no, you can't. These people do not have to be differing with each other because they're talking about different senses of can. Can with respect to an airplane in mind, yes. Can with respect to the physical ability of my legs. No. All I'm pointing at now is that the word can is an ambiguous kind of word. Can has got to be understood over against its conditions. Over against the limits that you have in mind when you ask the question. So when you ask the question, can the soldiers have done otherwise? I say, with respect to what? With respect to the will of God? No. Can they do otherwise with respect to all other creation? Factors, that is the causal factors in their environment, of their own personality, of their psychology, chemical determinism, whatever it may be. Could they have done otherwise? Well, of course they could have. They certainly had the ability with the muscles in their arms and legs to have not been at Gallica that afternoon, to have been doing something else. There was nothing in their psyche that made them do that. You know, they could have been of a different heart about the matter. And it's not as though the equipment was somehow damaged. It's that the equipment was not used in the way it should have been used. And that's what we mean by moral responsibility over against all other factors in our environment. Were we coerced? No, we were not coerced. Therefore we were responsible. So now I've gone over two different ways and what I'm suggesting is when we say a man cannot do otherwise, we have to understand that in two different ways, or probably many more. It all depends on what sense of the word can you're utilizing. So according to the Bible, man cannot do other than what God has ordained. But according to the Bible, man can do other than he has actually done, that is with respect to his own desires, with respect to his own abilities on a creaturely level. Now, the Bible also says that the one sense in the which man cannot do otherwise does not logically conflict with the other sense in which he can do otherwise. That is to say, the Bible teaches ordaining does not amount to coercing. We follow all this. There's maybe one more way I can put my point. It is certain in advance that F will X. We can add this further qualification. It is certain in advance that X will freely X. The Bible tells us that what God foreordains is that men do things freely. God foreordains that men do things freely. Now, before you are tempted to jump in and say that's a contradiction, it can't be foreordained and a free act, then what we want to say is what? Well, all depends on what you mean by prove. It's certainly a contradiction to say that it is certain in advance that X will. It is ordained in advance that X will not do what was ordained. That's a contradiction in terms. One is not free to not do what God has ordained. But by free, if you mean free in the morally responsible sense, then certainly God can ordain that people do things and meet all the conditions of moral responsibility, namely not be coerced, have the desire to do such and such. Okay, so if the soldiers desire to crucify Christ and they have the ability to do otherwise in terms of the power in their muscles, if you will, the sociological conditions, all the rest, all the conditions, if you will. On the, on the level of creation, there was nothing coercing them in all the created order then they certainly freely did what they did. They wickedly did it. So, you know, they freely did it. So it is certain in advance that S will freely do X can be understood properly and biblically. And if that is true, then what I want to ask is why do Arminians and Calvinists have to argue about that point? Now, I'm not saying that resolves all theological contradictions or something about that, but on that particular point there shouldn't be any difficulty, and I'm not going to speculate now because I'm out of time as to where the difficulty actually does come in. I won't get into the psychodynamics of why Arminians and Calvinists have argued through the centuries, but philosophically there's no reason for them to do so because a person can hold the position that God foreordains whatever comes to mind. Pass. Whatever comes to pass happens freely. And there's no contradiction there as long as you draw the distinctions that we have been drawing. Here's the question. Can God ordain that I do otherwise than I actually do? Let me put this another Can God ordain that I do X even though I can do otherwise? I'm asking, can God do that? Does God have that ability? And we're right back to the question of, well, it all depends on what your source of theological knowledge is. If it's the Bible, the answer is yes, the Bible says God can do that. And I don't know how he does it. I confess that it's a mystery there that doesn't bother me in the slightest because the issue here is logical contradiction. There's no logical contradiction here. There's simply a mystery, a metaphysical mystery that God can so control events that I do exactly what he ordains, but I do so freely. Is it true that in Scripture moral responsibility presupposes the ability to do otherwise? Yes, the ability to do otherwise. When you're talking about all the conditions on the creaturely level, no, if you're talking about the ability to do other than what God has ordained. And for the life of me, I can't see why there's any contradiction left. And that's your professor's way of resolving the difficulty. I believe God is omnipotent. I believe that he's omniscient. I believe that he foreknows whatever comes to pass. And yes, that means he foreordains whatever comes to pass. And I don't believe that that is in any relevance, that is to say, scriptural sense, contrary to the conditions of moral responsibility and freedom. Now, one proviso, one last word. The unbeliever might say, well, for all I care, if God ordains it in advance, then I couldn't do otherwise and I don't consider myself responsible. He can have a different metaphysic, that's true. He may not take the Bible as his source of information about what God can do. He may say, as far as I'm concerned, if I couldn't do otherwise in any sense, then I couldn't do otherwise at all in any morally relevant sense. That is simply to say that he has a different standard of evaluation. He has a different source of metaphysical information. He has a different worldview. And on that point, you already know how we argue about worldviews. And I won't go into it again, but let's just start comparing the options. If that's the worldview he wants, that isn't to say there's a logical contradiction in mind. Just simply says he doesn't have to like my worldview. Okay, I'll entertain questions for just a minute or so right here.

Okay. The statement of ordination does not imply.

Creation or the statement coercion.

Coercion rather, for the statement up there, the denial of that would constitute a limitation on God's omnipotence.

Correct. To say that if God ordains things, he must bring them about coercively, I would suggest that limits God's ability. Yeah.

Okay. Someone in a discussion earlier on this question suggested that coordination predestination biblically is never in terms of individuals, but rather in terms of groups coordination.

Well, you're asking an exegetical question. I think there's no doubt about it that that's mistaken. It's Pharaoh's heart that was hardened, not some group of people that collectively were called Pharaoh. Okay.

This whole way, the syllogism will freely do access cannot go to the next, but God has. That's not responsible for it.

Does that hold?

Yeah, the way you've got it right now?

No, it doesn't. Remember, I put this up here as the hypothetical opponent.

And I'm saying when you added the freely, what I want to know is when you added the freely, what would have to be changed in that in order to make it?

Well, my point is that this Comes down to the conclusion S is not responsible. What I'm saying is, since it is certain in advance that S will freely do X and F cannot do other than X in the sense what God ordained, then F is responsible for X. That is, by adding those provisos, I have in effect taken away the negation there.

With the understanding of coercion.

That's right. With the understanding that ordination does not imply coercion. So in one sense, future events are contingent, that is from the standpoint of creation. From another perspective, they are not contingent from the standpoint of the Creator.

Yeah, one more area. God's grace is for all. Mankind is great.

Do you mean by that all classes of men, rich and poor, fat and skinny, black and white?

I mean, like his love for the world?

His saving love is for every individual? No, I don't believe so. If his saving love were for every individual, then by definition every individual would be saved. Because nobody can frustrate the will of God.

I was going to follow that up by asking, how is his grace irresistible?

Well, we're saying the same thing because I believe his grace is irresistible. It cannot be for all men, because we know not all men will be saved. And nobody can frustrate the will of God. And so we must conclude it's not his will that all men be saved. Now, of course, we have to draw a distinction. It's certainly his prescriptive will that all men be saved. And there may even be another sense. I happen to think so, although there's dispute over it, that there's a sense in which we can say God emotionally wishes that all men would do the right thing. However, it is not his choice. It is not his decree that all men be saved. He has not foreordained the salvation of all men. He has prescribed the salvation of all men. He has indicated that he be pleased with the salvation of all men. But in some mysterious sense, the Bible says he has not decreed it, he has not caused it to be. Because if God causes it to be, it will be, and we know it will not be that all men are saved. We must conclude that it is not his will to save all men.

Then that is a hard point. Then. Then that means no matter how hard you try, they have been tested to rest.

No, it doesn't mean that at all. That doesn't mean that at all. What I have been saying for the last half hour is that no matter how hard they try is part of the means to the end. Christ says, all who come to me, I will in no Wise, cast out. So Jesus says, it makes a big difference how hard you try. If you come to me, you'll be saved, and all who come to me will be saved. There's no question about that. The very same verse, John 6:37, he says, and all that the Father gives me will come. You can hardly ask for a verse that more clearly brings together the responsibility and the ability to do otherwise. And the fact that prayer changes things and your ability counts and your effort counts with the fact that, nevertheless, whatever takes place is in the will of God. So what I'm saying is there is nobody who desires to be saved who is not ordained to desire to be saved. And there's nobody who is ordained not to be saved who has the desire to be saved. You see, that's going to be the greatest day of justice at all. In the day of judgment, when God says, depart from me, because he's going to say it only to those who all their lives have been saying, we want nothing to do with you. God will say, since you wouldn't have my will be done, then your will shall be done. You didn't want to abide with me. You shall not abide with me. There won't be anybody on the Day of Judgment who said I wanted to be saved that but you screened me out. So, no, I will not accept at all the idea that since God's grace is irresistible and God ordains whatever comes to pass and so forth, that no matter how hard we try, we might not be saved. Because that is a world that is outside of the control of God. Those who try to be saved in the genuine sense. Now, obviously there are people who try to save themselves illegitimately, but those who try to be saved, meaning those who believe in Jesus Christ and come to him, and all the rest will be saved. All who come to me will in no wise be cast out. And all that the Father gives me, all that have been ordained to life, will come likewise. John 3:16. For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish. That doesn't teach all the world will not perish. It teaches only that believers will not perish. The question is, what makes the difference between one man being a believer and another man not being a believer. For it is by grace that you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves. It is the gift of God. God gives faith. John 3:16 and predestination don't conflict in any sense whatsoever. Because all John 3:16 says is that all who believe will not perish. You have to go elsewhere to find out who will and who will not believe. And what we find elsewhere is that by the grace of God, faith is a gift. And therefore those who believe, those who are saved, are saved because of God's ordination to that effect. I honestly believe that all of this is perfectly harmonious with every bit of evangelical grace, faith, wisdom, love, evangelistic fervor, and anybody who says otherwise making philosophical mistakes of a rather heinous moral character. Philosophical mistakes that lead to very bad Christian living because we have bad attitudes or bad living. And as we say, we don't have to evangelize or we have to say, well, we don't want that kind of God or things like that. But those all originate in philosophical mistakes that don't have to be made. They don't have to be made from. Provided the governing epistemological principle of your life is sola scriptura.

Would you be willing to next time to discuss some.

Of the philosophical faults of Beza of.

Aza, who carried Calvin principles to extremes in the debate, the Armenian debate?

I really. I really have an interest in that, but I'm so far behind in my schedule that I just don't see that dipping into church history and looking at a particular debate would be all that helpful right here. Philosophically, the issues have been laid out. I'm not even sure that I want to grant that he took Calvin's principles to an extreme. I mean, I'm just not in a position to make a judgment on that question, because the issue here, in the end, is not what you make of Calvin or what you make of the Beza or even what you make of John Wesley. The issue here is what you make of Christ, and it's his word that we're accountable to. And so privately, if I had other time, I might go into it, but I really don't think I should take class time because we should have been talking about the problem of evil today. And so next time, be prepared for an opening 30 minutes where I'm going to blitz the problem of evil. I'm going to be talking about different. Different solutions and their difficulties. And then I'm going to look at the free will defense and what's wrong with the free will defense.