Dr Greg Bahnsen - Philosophy of Christianity: God and Time: Indexical Reference Part 1 (Part 13)

At the end of last class hour, we were talking about the paradoxes of omnipotence. And we got just to the point of dealing with Nelson Pike's article, omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin. And what I'd like to do is just very quickly go over the last few pages of the article with you so that you at least comprehend the conclusion of this article. Now, pike wants to distinguish three different ways in which we want to say God might be unable to sin. God is unable to sin may be held, he says, because of the logical impossibility of God sinning. So the first interpretation that he has worked through is that of logical impossibility. Now, this will be familiar to most of you because in the paradox of the stone that we considered already, that was one of the main lines of attack, also our main lines of defense, actually, that it's no limitation on God that he cannot lift, that he cannot create a stone too heavy for himself to lift, because that's a logical impossibility. And it's no problem that somebody can't do what is logically impossible. Okay. The second interpretation that pike offers for God's inability to sin, however, is that he does not have the creative power necessary to bring about states of affairs, the production of which would be morally reprehensible, which, of course, is his longhand for expressing what it is to sin. And we may have a better conception of sin and a fuller, more biblically accurate conception of sin to offer. But I think that we can live with what he's saying here. He simply tried to communicate to other philosophers, especially unbelieving philosophers, you know, what it is that's evil. What would it be for somebody to do an evil thing to sin? Now, what he's saying is God does not have the creative power necessary to bring this about. Okay, so here we have a material concept that is, it doesn't have to do with logical impossibility, formal matters, but materially, God fails to have creative power, the creative power to bring that about. Yes, sir. On my understanding, his sentence, if I'm not following you right, is that he doesn't exercise that creative power. No, that comes next. God is unable to sin means he doesn't have what it takes to sin. He doesn't have the power to do it. God couldn't bring about a sinful, evil situation even if he wanted to. Now, pike says about this particular approach, this is 362A top paragraph, and about a little over halfway down in that paragraph, he makes the comment, insofar as the phrase perfectly good applies to the individual, that is God as an expression of praise warranted by the fact that that this individual does not sin. God could not be perfectly good if he does not have the ability to sin. You might want to reflect on that for a moment. It sounds paradoxical, but it's a rather good and I think, truthful remark that God would not be perfectly good if he doesn't have the ability to sin. If an individual does not have the creative power necessary to bring about evil states of affairs, he cannot be praised morally for failing to bring them about. If God fails to bring about sinful states of affairs, that's hardly praiseworthy if he doesn't have the ability to do it. Anyway, let's say that you praise me for having not taken all the gold out of Fort Knox. You're a very moral person, Dr. Bonson. Because you have not taken all the gold out of Fort Knox, you refrain from doing this evil deed. Well, that really wouldn't be all that meaningful in light of the fact that I couldn't even if I wanted to take all the gold out of Fort Knox. I had no idea how I'd go about doing it. I imagine there may be some criminal minds in the world that could, but I mean, I'm not one of them. And so it's no moral virtue in me that I have failed to do that. Now, if God has failed to sin, but he doesn't have the power to sin, then that's not saying very much for him. That's what pike is observing. And so you may be hesitant to affirm God's inability to sin on this interpretation. But then he offers a third, his own interpretation. And that's that God has the capacity to sin, but not the disposition. The way he actually expresses it is that God has the capacity to sin, but he never exercises that capacity. He has the creative power to. To do an evil thing, but he never exercises that power. And then he goes on to explain that as a kind of strength of character or a disposition. And so we can think of a man who just cannot be cruel to animals. Now, this man has the ability to kick a kitten, doesn't he? I mean, he has the muscles, the legs, the coordination and all that. If he wanted to kick a kitten, he could, but he has the character such that he never would do so. He'd never want to kick a kitten. And so this is the way he is interpreting God's inability to sin. God has the capacity. He has the power to kill the innocent. I Mean, God could certainly blast them if he wanted to. But God doesn't have the disposition. He doesn't have the moral character. His character prevents him from sinning. He is unable to sin in that sense. Here we have three different approaches. Then God's sinning is a logical impossibility. God's inability to sin is a material concept. He doesn't have the power to do it. Or finally, God doesn't have the disposition to do it. He has the capacity, but not the character. Okay, now, in the process of drawing out these three, you'll notice that pike points out problems in the approach of McHugh and also of Thomas Aquinas. Anselm included with the approach of Thomas Aquinas. And let's look at McHugh's problem. Bottom of 362. Okay, McHugh's conclusion. He says God cannot sin was thus intended in the first sense just mentioned, that is that it's logically impossible. But McHugh then went on to suppose that God cannot sin in a sense of this phrase that connects with the notion of omnipotence. This is the second sense mentioned above. This conclusion was not warranted. The individual who bears the title God may have the creative power necessary to bring about objects or states of affairs, the production of which would be morally reprehensible even though God sins, end quote, is logically contradictory. The conclusion is simply that if an individual bears the title God, he does not exercise this creative power. Now, what he's pointing out here is that McHugh begins by arguing the logical impossibility of God sinning. That's a contradiction in terms. We wouldn't call anyone who sinned God because we start a priority with the notion that God is morally perfect. But he goes on to argue that God cannot sin on the basis of some view of omnipotence. And pike correctly points out, well, that's a material concept. God fails to have the material power to sin. And therefore McHugh is confusing senses one and two. Now, what is Aquinas problem? Over on 363, he points out both Thomas and Anselm concluded that God's inability to sin has a direct connection with the notion of omnipotence. They begin with notion two. Here God is so powerful that he can't sin. In some sense, omnipotence. It is because God is omnipotent that he is unable to sin. And pike points out that this line of reasoning confuses the second and third senses of the statement God cannot sin. If we say that the individual who is God cannot sin in this second sense, in the sense that connects with the idea of creative power and thus with the standard notion of omnipotence. This is not to assign that individual strength. It is to assign him a very definite limitation, and this is what I mentioned just a few moments ago, that we're actually limiting God if we say he cannot sin in this sense. Okay, let me recapitulate what I'm getting at here. Pike has pointed out by analyzing and trying to be very clear in the way that we would talk about God's inabilities in the area of moral matters like sinning, that there are three different senses in which you might say God is unable to sin. McHugh confuses one and two, Thomas Aquinas confuses two and three. And you'll want to catch that. There's a shift between 1 and 2 in MacHugh's reasoning and a shift between 2 and 3 in Aquinas. And pike is trying to get this sorted out. He is suggesting that God's inability to sin means that he has not the moral disposition to do so, although he certainly has the power to do it. All right. Actually this is a rather clear article. I don't think there's too much controversial or anything directly germane to what I'm trying to get at in the class. Anyway, do you have any questions about it? Well, we've been looking at the attribute of omnipotence and as I said at the end of last class hour, to say that God is omnipotent may naively and very simply be to say that he can do anything. But obviously we want to qualify that so that we can explain exactly what we're getting at about the all powerfulness almightiness of God, that He can do anything. And then we give the qualifications. And if these paradoxes or alleged paradoxes help us to do that, then that's fine. But from a pastoral standpoint, I would point out to you that struggling through these philosophical problems in this particular case is not, I don't believe, really akin to struggling with challenges to the faith that are nearly so devastating as say, Anthony Flews or something like that. This really amounts to let's get straight on what the concept is rather than is it possible that such a concept could make sense or be true. Although some philosophers, to be sure, have thought that they have really gotten the tiger by the tail when they get onto these paradoxes. I just can't myself see that they amount to all that much. We'll be seeing a little bit more when we talk about omniscience. However, the paradoxes of omnipotence have been used to argue against the Christian faith. But I think for the most part, their function is to help clarify the meaning of the Christian faith when it claims God can do anything. Could you pick one of these, perhaps? Could you pick one of these? What does it mean God cannot sin? I agree with Pike. I think that the third is the preferable way. The third? Yeah. I think we should say that God has the capacity to sin. That is, in a sense, to liken it to us. He has the physical power to do evil things. He could blast the innocent. However, he does not have the moral disposition to do so. It would be a contradiction of his moral character to do so. I'm thinking of Shedd, for example. Shedd, who said Jesus could not have sinned. Most Reformed theologians said he could have, but didn't, if you're familiar with that controversy. Oh, yeah. The impeccability of Christ and especially in terms of the communicatio ideomatum, is. It's a good issue to ask people who are wanting to be ordained into a church because you can sort out very clearly whether they're Lutheran or Reformed in their outlook on that question. But that is not exactly the same. That is not the question we're dealing with here about the omnipotence of God or his ability to sin with respect to Christ. The issue is the relationship of the divine to the human natures. And this question up here is, what do we mean by saying God cannot sin? And then when God becomes man, then the issue is how can the God man sin? And that's an even more complicated, or not more complicated in the sense that it's more difficult. But it adds another wrinkle to the issue, and that's not what we're talking about here. Yeah, number one, logical impossibility. Didn't Aquinas. Wasn't that his definition of God was unable to sin? Aquinas actually took a slightly different approach on the area on the question of God's inability to sin. A little bit different from God's inability to do contradictory things like making square circles. And this is what pike is discussing in the article, is how Aquinas improves upon that. That isn't to say Aquinas couldn't have said or didn't say that God's inability to sin could be understood as a logical impossibility. We just don't use the words that way. God and sin. However, he did say other things that he connected it with the omnipotence of God. God's inability was actually a power on his part. And that's why pike is saying Aquinas seems to move back and forth between number two and number three up here. Even if the linguistic point can be made, it's not. The important point in Aquinas is, I guess what I want to say. So this thing I have in my mind, logical possibility would associate with. Yes, in the paradox of the. Not of the stone, in the paradox of the round square. Can God make a round square? That is exactly Aquinas position. It's a logical impossibility to make a round square. And therefore it's no defect that God can't do logically impossible things. And so you're right on and I commend you, that's accurate. However, when it comes to the inability of God to sin, he went on to say this has to do with the power of God, not simply with what contradictions are. Okay, now. Yes, sir. Is there any sense in which it's ever been suggested that God is evil in the sense that he condemns the wicked? Is there any philosophical. Well, sure, sure. The whole problem of evil is. That's, I mean, that's the part of the issue. The problem of evil, which we're going to come to after we finish this section in our, in our readings, contends that if God is all powerful in the fact that evil exists indicates that he can't be all good. Because if he's all powerful and he were all good, he would have the ability to keep evil from being in the world and he'd also have the will or the desire to do so. And since he has omnipotence, he has the power to keep evil from being in the world. And the fact that, and the fact that God has the power to keep evil from being in the world and that there is evil in the world, these facts combine to show that he couldn't be all good because an all good God would have exercised his power to keep evil from being realized. Okay, nothing that. How about. Does it suggest that because of his judgment, the creation of hell or whatever, that he's evil because of sinners being condemned to hell? It's been suggested that an all good God would not allow his creation to come to that point where anybody would have to suffer eternally. It's also been suggested that the idea of eternal damnation for sins of a temporal and limited sort is in proportionate and consequently that shows the injustice of God. There's a Lot of different lines of argument that might be combined in what you're suggesting here. We're going to come to the problem of evil and spend a couple days, maybe I should say at this point, there's something about your poor professor's despair. A few minutes before I ate lunch and prepared to come down here, I just finally had to become realistic and see that I couldn't keep to my own time schedule for catching up. I had hoped that we. We get through completely the omniscience of God and the issues connected with omniscience today. And then I give you your midterm exam and explain it. And then when I got back next week, Monday and Wednesday of next week, we would be dealing with the problem of evil, because I want at least two full days on it. But it really is unrealistic. And so what I have decided to do is to do as best I can on the omniscience of God, those issues today and continue when I get back. However, I will give you the midterm exam so that you can at least get started on the earlier parts of the course and those questions that would be better for you. Although we won't technically have gotten through everything. Now, do your best to keep up with where I am. You keep a day ahead of me if you possibly can in your readings, so that you're always ready for whatever I do when I come in. And I will be making adjustments somehow to get caught up with the schedule as I gave it to you. It may be that I'll drop something later, although that is not my inclination. Everything is crucial, obviously, if it's been planned in there, but one way or another I will get us caught up. I can tell you for sure the unit on the nature of man will be cut down from three hours to two, but nevertheless we will still read the same material. Anyway, all this meandering to say we aren't going to get caught up today, but I'm going to try to do my best. Now we're going to turn to the omniscience of God and certain problems that have been seen in this particular attribute of God. And this is, I think, a little bit more difficult to follow. I'm curious. This is just for my own interest in choosing textbooks and all that. How many of you have read, and this is only for the sake of stylistic question, I'm going to get at in a minute. Don't feel bad if you haven't, although you should have got it done, I suppose. But anyway, how many of you have Read the article by. I always get Roe and Ross messed up. Rowe, on Augustine's view of foreknowledge and free will. How many of you have tackled that? Okay, well, I won't get very much help in asking my question, in attempting to simplify this in my lectures and so forth. I have run across one section of that article that I just. I'm convinced is either a misprint or mis expression on the part of the author. That confuses me. And if it's confused me and held me up for a while, my guess is it may do that to you. Although sometimes, you know, you can get into these things and your mind's working in a certain direction and you cause your own problems. So I do want to try to explain what Roe is getting at in my own words. And then when you read the article, if you run into difficulties, refer back to my interpretation of it. Okay. I'm sure that I'm interpreting him right, but I just have a hard time with one portion of a paragraph in it. But before we get there, we have to talk about indexical reference. Okay? If you have read the article by Kretzmann, you'll see that he is objecting to the idea of a God that is both omniscient and immutable. Okay? If God is omniscient, that means what? He knows everything there is to know. If God is immutable, that means God is not changing in any way. Kretzmann suggests that you can't have these two attributes brought together in one perfect being. And the reason for that is, if you're to know everything there is to know, then certainly you have to know the time of day. Rather much mundane sort of thing. What time is it? You look at your watch and say, well, it's about 1:35, 1:36, whatever it may be. And that's something that God should know. If I know what time it is right now, God should know what time it is right now. Obviously, he's much smarter than I am. He knows much more than me. If I know that, he knows that. However, if I know what time it is right now, so that at T. At T1, Bonsen knows that it is now T1 and not T2. What happens five minutes later when I look at my watch? Well, something has changed, right? It's still not 135. Now it's 140. Do I know that it's 140? Well, I. If it were, then, as a matter of fact, I would know it. And that's the Sort of thing. If God's omniscient, he would know it too, right? God knows everything I know. Okay, so at T2, T1 and T2 don't throw you. Obviously, T2 is the second time mentioned at T2. Bonsen knows that it is now T2 and not T1. Okay, I knew one time here and I knew another time here. That certainly suggests that what I know has changed. When I knew the time at T1, it was T1, I said it's now T1. When I know the time at T2, I say it's now T2. That suggests my knowledge has changed. And if God is supposed to know everything that I know, that means God's knowledge has changed. And if God's knowledge has changed, then it cannot be said that he is not changing. So it seems almost too simple, doesn't it? How can an omniscient God. How can an omniscient God be unchangeable? This is the challenge that Kretzmann is proposing. And he recognizes a number of objections that people might want to bring up against against this. And he raises the objections and deals with them, each in order and does a pretty fair job, I think, being clear and trying to express the sorts of things people would say against his point of view. The first objection is that a change in the object of knowledge does not entail a change in the knower. Okay? Somebody says, look, there's been a change in the object of knowledge. That is a change in the time of day. But that doesn't mean the knower has changed. And Kretzmann replies that the credibility of that point of view, of that objection depends upon an imprecise characterization of the object of knowledge. He says, I know that the Chrysler Building in Manhattan is 1046ft tall. If it is said that the Chrysler Building is the object of my knowledge, then of course, many changes in it and its tenants, its heating system, for example, do not necessitate changes in the state of my knowledge. If, however, it is more precisely said that the object of my knowledge is the height of the Chrysler Building, then of course a change in the object of my knowledge does necessitate a change in me. It says, if a 40 foot television antenna is extended from the present tip of the tower, either I will cease to know the height of the Chrysler Building or I will give up believing that its height is 1046ft and begin believing that its height is 1086ft. In the case of always knowing what time it is, if we are to speak of an object of knowledge at all. It must be characterized not as the state of the universe, but as the changing of that state of the universe. To know the changing of anything is to know first that P and then that not P. And a knower that knows first one proposition and then another is a knower that changes. A knower that knows P and then knows not P is a knower who has changed. Seems rather obvious. First he knows P. Second he knows not P. And that's a change, not just a change in the object of knowledge. It's a change in him, because it's a change in what he knows. Okay, now that is the most serious objection, and it's going to be one taken up by a Castaneda in the next article. The remaining objections are worth reading. However, I'm not going to spend a good deal of time with them in class, because I think you should be able to follow without very much difficulty. The second objection is that a change in beliefs entailed by always knowing what time it is is that taking account of sort of change rather than a change of mind. The objection is there are two kinds of changes in knowers that we can see, and one of them is really quite trivial, taking account of changes in the world. And another is a change like changing your mind. You once knew something and then you find out you made a mistake, or you have a different attitude towards something. Now you've changed your mind. To this, Kretzmann simply says all you're telling us is that the change in God's knowledge is rather minimal rather than maximal. Well, that's fine. Nevertheless, a minimal change is still a change. Consequently, you don't have an immutable God. You may have a perfect God, as you have a God who doesn't have any defect in him just because he's gotten this change. But you can't say that he's immutable. His third objection. It's possible for an omniscient being to know the state of the universe at every instant, all at once, rather than successively. This is one that I'd like you to pay a little bit of attention to, because my guess is, as Christians, evangelical Christians, you've been captured by that kind of metaphor or image of God's omniscience. He knows everything like a movie director knows everything at once about the movie. But those of us who go to the movie theater have to wait for all the scenes to play out in the film to. To finally run down before we know what the movie director knows. And he deals with this metaphor or analogy of the movie director and the people watching the movie. And what he points out is that if we're claiming that God knows everything in the sense of knowing everything at once, like knowing the entire movie backwards and forwards, that his knowledge is really quite limited because it turns out that there's one thing the people watching the movie know that the director of the movie, the one who is most familiar with it, does not know. They know one big thing about it you don't know, namely, what is now going on on the screen. Okay, I may know Gone with the Wind better than anybody who's ever, you know, seen the movie. I may have directed it, I may have acted in it. I may know it backwards and forward. I may have memorized it. I may know what the clock on the wall says at every second of the movie. But I can't tell you right now what scenes showing if Gone with the Wind is showing somewhere in the world. And so what he's pointing out is that an omniscient God who knows everything at once still doesn't know what we know, and that is what time it is right? Now, I see some of you rather disgruntled with that because maybe you're familiar with the movie metaphor. But I must say your old professor's opinion is he's right. If that's all the omniscience of God entails, if that's all, then certainly God is limited. He doesn't know some things that we know, namely, what's happening right now. Does that help by saying that that's all? I mean, I certainly don't mean to deny that God does know everything in an intuitive flash, whatever metaphor you want to use. God knows it all at once, to be sure. But he must know more than that if he knows as much as we do, because we know what scenes are now showing in the world, too. Okay, the fourth objection, and this is a very popular sort of thing. I mean, I'm staggered at how easy Christians find it to say, well, God transcends space and time, and certainly he does. But I mean, the way we go about explaining that or ringing the logical changes on it to make all the difference in the world. Somebody says God transcends space and time, and therefore he's not subject to change, whether as a consequence of knowing what time is or for any other reason. God can't be a changing being because he transcends space and time. And therefore, if he knows what time it is, since he transcends space and time, he still can't be a changing object at the very bottom of the page, Kretzmann says, but under that interpretation, the doctrine begs the question. Rather than providing a basis for objecting to it, he says that's just a way of stating that God can be omniscient and immutable. But it doesn't tell us why he can be omniscient and immutable. That's just a way of saying that he's omniscient and immutable. But that's what I'm trying to challenge, and therefore you've got to say more. And so he suggests another interpretation of the transcendence doctrine, and that's that from God's eye point of view, there is no time. The passage of time is a universal human illusion. That is, we have the illusion of time and change, but from God's point of view, there is no change. There is no time at all. Well, does that help you out of the bind? Yes, it does. That solves the problem. Because what that shows is since time is an illusion, we don't know that it's 140 or 145 or whatever it's now become. We can't know that it's 140 rather than 145, because that's just an illusion. And you can't know illusions. They aren't true. Consequently, since we don't know what time it is, there's nothing we know that God fails to know. Therefore, the omniscience and the immutability of God have both been protected. They've both been guarded. But that's a pretty big price to pay, isn't it? That time is an illusion for all of us. As the author says, this interpretation preserves the immutability of a perfect being by imposing immutability on everything else. As a matter of fact, there isn't any changing going on here either. It just appears to be changing. So these are four objections that he brings against the idea. These are four objections that he imagines to be brought against what he has said and that he tries to answer. The last three objections deal with the concept of omniscience and immutability. I'd like you to pay special attention to objection g on page 375, where somebody might say to Kretzmann's argument, the kind of change entailed here in God, knowing what time it is from time to time to time, the kind of change entailed by always knowing what time it is, is a kind of change that surely cannot be construed. As deterioration. The argument shows that absolute perfection entails mutability and at least this one respect. But it's not detrimental because this kind of change is not a deteriorating kind of change. Now, Kretzmann says, however, the arguments that have been given for the immutability of God are not simply that mutability shows deterioration, but as a matter of fact, in the history of philosophical theology, the argument has been that any kind of process, any in a perfect being, is inadmissible. Any kind of process at all. Not just deteriorating process, deteriorating change, but any change, any process whatsoever. Now, the reason I want you to pay attention to that is that while his objections are good objections, in light of that explication of the immutability of God, I for one am willing to ask whether these historic or historical explanations of God's immutability as found in Aquinas and Occam are the best we can do. Is it true that there is no process in God whatsoever? Does the immutability of God in the Bible imply that God does not undergo some kind of change? I believe, as difficult as it may be, and I'm not going to offer you the solution to this problem, at least not in this hour, there's some sense in which we want to talk of an analogy of change, an analogy of process in the person of God himself. The Bible indicates that God was once, if you will, independent, self contained, and the only existent, and that there was another time after time, before time. It's awkward to talk about it, isn't it? But nevertheless, there was a time after that when there was a world that God created. Moreover, if you want to talk about another major change in God, the Bible says that there has been a transition from wrath to grace in God's attitude toward his people, and consequently there is some process of change there. We know that God is working all things to the good for his people, and he's bringing about change within history for the consummation of Christ's kingdom. And we know there's going to be a separation of the sheep and goats, that is not the case right now on the final day of judgment. And so there are changes that the Bible speaks of within God. And we have to, when we explicate the notion of immutability, take that into account and yet not challenge what the Scriptures mean when they say the Lord changes. Not I'm suggesting that the traditional way of explicating immutability, such that there is no process whatsoever in God, is misleading. However, I am not suggesting that Kretzmann is wrong in what he says about those traditional views, that on those traditional views you cannot admit that God knows what time it is now, and then five minutes later, knows what time it is then too. But on those views, it seems like the immutability of God is ruled out by his omniscience. Okay. At the very end of the article, Kretzmann offers one final stab. You think it's been bad enough he's been arguing that an omniscient God can't be an immutable God? At the very end he adds, well, it actually turns out that. That an omniscient God could not be a personal God either. The doctrine that God knows everything is incompatible with theism, the doctrine of a personal God distinct from other persons. And he shows that in terms of these two sentences on page 376. Jones knows that he is in a hospital. Jones knows that Jones is in a hospital. Are those different statements? Are those different statements? Well, if possibly, then they are different statements. It may turn out that one person could say them both, but the fact is that they are not saying the same thing. Why are they not saying the same thing? Jones could know that he is in the hospital without knowing that he is Jones. Let's say a guy gets hit by a car, gets amnesia. The next day he wakes up and he says, I'm in the hospital. Okay, now it's Jones who's speaking. So we can say, truly, Jones knows that he's in the hospital. However, if he picks up a newspaper and reads Jim. Well, that's not what we want to say, is it? Richard Jones is in the hospital, he may say, wow, it's really too bad. I wonder who this guy is. May not realize that it's himself because of his amnesia. So it might be true that Jones knows he is in the hospital, but it's not true that Jones knows that Jones is in the hospital, that is that he is Jones. Now why are we pointing out this little truism here? Well, because, as Kretzmann points out, no one other than Jones can know whether what sentence one describes Jones as knowing. No one other than Jones can know what sentence one describes Jones as knowing. It says Jones knows that he is in a hospital. Only Jones could know what he is describing in saying that. It could be that he is saying Jones knows that Jones is in a hospital. Or it could mean something else too. Nobody else could know but him. Therefore, the kind of knowledge characteristic of every self conscious entity of every person, every person knows certain propositions that no Other person can know. Every person knows certain propositions, namely ones that refer to himself and his knowledge that no other person can know. And if that's true, then God cannot be omniscient. If theism is true, if God is a person, then he's not omniscient. And if God is omniscient, then he's not a personal God. Because this difference between persons, between persons, there are always going to be these statements with indexical reference in them where only you know what you're saying. Okay? So that's kind of a concluding barb that he throws. And not only do you is it difficult to bring omniscience and immutability together in one being, he doesn't see how you can have a personal God, a personal omniscient God who is. He doesn't say he can have an omniscient God who is a personal God as well. Okay, now Castaneda responds to Kretzmann's article. And Castaneda, by the way, among philosophers, is very well respected, one of the most clever and brilliant men writing and has done marvelous pioneering work in the area of indexical reference and the logical of self, logic of self reference and that sort of thing. He says that Kretzmann's arguments depend on certain features of indexical reference and that these features in the long run have not been construed properly. First of all, what is indexical reference? Indexical reference means reference to times, places, events, objects, or persons by means of demonstrative or personal pronouns or adverbs. Okay, Reference to. And then as he lists them, times, places, events, objects, persons, that is indexing comments within a sentence. Reference to anything that ties it down to a time or place or person. That sort of thing. Okay? Indexical references. Reference to times, places, events, objects, persons by means of demonstrative or personal pronouns or adverbs. Reference to these things by means of certain kinds of pronouns and adverbs. It turns out that Kretzmann's arguments with respect to omniscience and immutability turn on the use of indexical reference in his sentences. For instance, at T1. Vonson knows that it is now T1. You notice the word now is used, that is an indexical referencing word. It helps you to make reference to some time by means of a pronoun or adverb. The adverb now, okay? And the point is that the indexical reference now or indexical references to time are ephemeral at different times of utterance. Now refers to different times. So if I say it is now 2 o', clock, and later on I say it is now 2 o'. Clock. Only one of those statements is correct, unless I wait 12 hours, because the word now refers to different things, even though the word's the same. Whereas if you say Bonson knows that it's now 2 o' clock and Bonson knows that it's now 3 o', clock, the word bonsen and the word no have the same meaning throughout, but now has a different reference in each case. And that's what he's getting at when he says it's ephemeral. It has an ephemeral character at different times of utterance. It refers to different times. Let's get to the heart of this. Is Kretzmann correct that if God knows that it is now such and such a time, and that later God knows that at such and such a time that this involves a change in the knowledge of God? On page 379, Castaneda says we must investigate whether or not X can know at T1 the proposition that Kretzmann expressed by his use of the clause it is now T2. Obviously, if the indexical reference of Krebsman's statement at T2, it is now T2 cannot be captured intact at time T1, then at T1 this statement cannot even be formulated, let alone be known by X or by Kretzmann himself. What he's getting at is this. If the indexical reference of the statement made by Kretzmann at T2, namely it is now T2, cannot be captured intact, if you cannot capture it as an indexical referent at time t1, then at t1 that statement cannot even be formulated, much less be known. And so it would appear that, correct Prince one is right. We have these indexical references. How could I at T1 capture the indexical force of the statement it is now T2? At T1 we cannot capture the indexical character or force of the statement it is now T2. Is that obvious to everybody? I mean, on the surface, is it rather plain why at two o' clock we cannot capture the indexical force of the statement it is now 2:30, because at 2:00 clock it's not 2:30, that's why. And so to say that it is now T2 at T1 loses the indexical force of this statement it is now T2 now. Castaneda suggests, however, that there's been a serious and subtle difficulty with Kretzmann's argument. He says it is Kretzmann's own indexical proposition that it is now T2 that. How can I put this now? Don't want to confuse you. In ordinary usage. In ordinary usage, an indicator, an indexical reference like now is used to make indexical references by the speaker. You notice that the indexical force of the word now is made by the speaker of the word now. So that when Kretzmann suggests as these problems, what do we know? What can God know? He suggests that it is now T1 and it is now T2 are illustrations of things we can know but God cannot know. It turns out that if God knows all these things, then his knowledge is changing. According to Kretzmann, that rests upon the idea that the indexical reference now in the statement it is now T2 cannot be captured at T. You cannot state the word now as you use it in the phrase it is now T2 at T1 with the proper indexical force. But what Castaneda is showing is that that is true only for the speaker. That is only true for the speaker. That indexical force has that property. I mean, the indexical reference has that characteristic for the speaker. And as 379 says in italics, it leaves it open whether the person spoken about refers to the same objects indexically or not. A speaker will say it is now T1, it is now T2 as something that he knows. But we might refer to somebody else knowing the same truth. But there's nothing about. If I say Kikasola knows that it is now T2, I'm using an indexical reference for myself. Okay? Even if I say Kickasola knows that Kickasola knows at T2 that it is now T2, the word now is being used as an indexical reference with respect to the speaker. However, it may be that Kicasola, what he knows can be expressed without any indexical reference at all. And he gives this illustration. Privatus believes that I weigh 150 pounds. Okay? When I say privatus believes that I weigh 150 pounds, I do not imply that Privatus has made an indexical reference to me. If I'm going to say what Privatus knows, I've got to use an indexical reference. I've got to say Privatus knows that I weigh 150 pounds. But do you think that Privatus has to use the indexical reference I when he expresses his knowledge? When I express it, I have to use that reference, that indexical reference. When he expresses it, he doesn't say what I know is that I weigh 150 pounds. Referring to me. Very obvious. There's nothing subtle about this. The indexical reference is not used by the person spoken about. Now, if I speak about Kickasola's knowledge, I use the indexical reference now. But there's no reason why the one about whom I'm speaking has to use the indexical reference. And that's the force of that statement on page 379. Having noticed that, then we can put this piece in place. Kostaneda indicates that God might very well know at T1 might very well know at T1, both that it is now God may know at T1, that at T1 it is now T1, and He might also know that at T2 it is now T2. The difficulty we had originally with that is that this word now seems to invalidate knowing that it's now T2 at T. But what Hasden Nita has pointed out is that the fact that I have to refer to this state of affairs as the speaker using an indexical reference doesn't mean that the one who knows doesn't mean that the person about whom I'm speaking has to use indexical reference. Kretzmann's argument has turned on the fact that the word now seems to tie this down to T1 and T2 and therefore a change. However, the fact that we have to use indexical reference doesn't mean that the one we're speaking about is using indexical reference and what he knows. And so If God at T1 knows at T1 it is now T1, and at T1 knows at T2 it is now T2, then there's no change in God's knowledge at all, is there, from T1 to T2? Yes. Give an example of person with the knowledge saying what he knows without using an index reference. I know that it's two. Well, yeah, I just say it's two o'. Clock. And how is that different from saying it is now 2 o'? Clock? So that is what it meant. The one uses indexer for reference and the other doesn't. Okay, that's the only difference. That's a big difference. Very big difference. Because the word now, you see, I can say it is 2 o' clock and be correct. And I can say it is 2 o' clock at another point and not use the word now and still be correct. If, for instance, I'm using it in indirect speech, or I remember Kikasola said it is 2 o' clock and it was correct. Something like that. But if it's now 2 o'. Clock. Then that can only be true at 2 o'. Clock. All right. The idea in Kretzmann now let's back up to the critic was if God knows what time it is, it's going to be expressed in this form. It is now 2 o'. Clock. What Castaneda has pointed out to this point in the article is that at T1 it might very well be that God knows. At T1 it is now T1, and at T2 it is now T2. He even knows the T2 information at T1, because indexical reference may not be necessary for the knower, even though it's necessary for us to express what the knower knows. Is anybody lost? It's better to admit that you are than to try to go on. I can paraphrase it linguistically. The difference between the direct and indirect speech is we needed relativizing. What you need is an indexical reference. I don't want to get away from that language because it's going to be throughout the article. Okay. Thus far, Castaneda has pointed out that Kretzmann cannot prove his point because, as he says, 379, the use of these indexical references are Kretzmann's own indexical propositions, and they leave open whether the person spoken about refers to the same objects indexically. We've got to refer to the object of knowledge indexically. But it may be that God can refer to the object of knowledge without using indexical reference. Okay, if that's true, then it's possible that at one time at T1, God knows both these things, although we can't express that by use of indexical records, because we have that contradiction that the word now creates. And so Castaneda says we have to reformulate what Kretzmann is getting at. And what he suggested here is we reformulate his argument using quasi indicators rather than straight indicators. Quasi indicators will enable Kretzmann's argument to be stated in a way that will pinch. We have indexical reference, and now we're going on to quasi indicators, quasi indicators of indexical reference. And he defines a quasi indicator on page 380, almost at the bottom, as having three characteristics. It's appearing in oblique discourse mainly in a clause subordinated to a verb expressing a propositional attitude. For those of you who don't understand that a quasi indicator appears in a clause followed by a verb like believes or knows, propositional attitudes, believes, knows, hopes, so forth. Okay, so a quasi indicator appears in a clause that follows such a verb as believes or knows. Secondly, it's having an antecedent not in the same oblique discourse, okay? S knows that. Okay? This is the oblique discourse following the word nose. Now this indicator, this quasi indicator, must appear in this phrase here, following knows, beliefs, hopes, etc. Moreover, it must refer to something outside of the phrase. It must have, it has an antecedent not in the same oblique discourse. And then finally, and this is an important quality, the quality of not being replaceable by its antecedent with preservation of the proposition or statement formulated with the whole sentence. That is, when you substitute the antecedent up here for the quasi indicator and rewrite the whole sentence, you get a different sentence, one that has a different meaning. Now, anything that matches those three characteristics is a quasi indicator. You don't really have to master all of that. But it's just that when he refers to a quasi indicator, I want you to know that he's not just making up some word and then going on with his argument. There is some rule governed way to determine whether you're using a quasi indicator or not. Now he wants to reformulate Kretzmann's argument by use of these quasi indicators. The quasi indicator that he suggests is the word then. Then @t1x knew that it was t1, @t1. Wait a minute, I'm not reading the right thing. Okay, it's 4B that I want to read. At T1 x knows that that it is then T1 but not T2 and at T2 later than T1, x knows that it is then T2 but not T1. Just so you don't get frustrated here, all he's changing is the word now to then. Okay, Kretzeman has formulated his argument about knowing that it's now T1 and now T2. Now the word now is an indexical reference word. And it turns out that because indexical reference refers to the speaker, that is, it's always in terms of the speaker's frame of reference that the person spoken about need not use indexical reference to express this knowledge. Therefore, Kretzmann's argument doesn't work with the use of indexical reference. However, if he uses the quasi indicator, then the word then instead of now at t1, x knows that it is then t1 and at t2 x knows that it is then t2 that you can apparently make the argument a little more uncomfortable for those who believe that an omniscient God is unchanging. And the reason why this is uncomfortable and the other one is not has to do with the third characteristic that is mentioned. Let me see if I can read it for you. He says that its characteristic C about quasi indexical references. That makes this more difficult deal with. Whereas the use of now in the sentences that Kretzmann formulated cannot be used by him to make exactly the same statement at times other than T1 and T2. If I say it is now T1, I can't make the same statement using the word now. If I use it at T2, whereas that's true, I can use the word then to make the same statement at T1 it is now T1. Okay, that's fine. However, I cannot say at T2 it is now T1. I cannot make the same statement using the word now. The word then allows me to make the same statement at different times. Times. However, at t1 it is then t1, at t2 it was then t1. Somebody can say that at t1 it was then t1 and at t2 we can say it at t2. The word then can be used to express that what was known at T1 is that it was then T1. The one thing that I'm a little fearful about as your instructor is that you're looking at this and thinking this is terribly hard. The fact of the matter is it is terribly easy. What he's getting at here is so simple. You may not understand all the fancy language and the A, B and C of qualities and characteristics, but all he's saying is you can't use the word now except at the very time that now refers to. But you can use the word then. Okay? So right now at 2:20 I can say that at 2:00 Bonsen knew that it was then 2: O'. Clock. I cannot say at 2:20. At 2:00 Bonsen knew THAT it was now 2: O'. Clock. That's something that you all can follow. It's just a question of how you use the word now and then. The upshot of it is this. If Kretzmann formulates his argument in terms of at t1x knows that it is then t1 and at t2x knows that it is then t2. It will appear that you have a change in what is known from T1 to T2, you can express it without falling into the problem of indexical reference we had seen. And consequently God's knowledge has changed and God has changed. If we can use these quasi indicators in this way, it would not appear that at t1 God knows both that it is at t1, that at t1 he knows that it is, then t1 and at t2 he knows that it is, then T2. Maybe it would be helpful for. I wrote all of these sentences down for you. Okay. At T1x knows that it is, then T1. I'm not going to add the negatives each time he makes two statements in each case, four altogether. But our point can be expressed by keeping it a little simpler. At T1x knows that it is, then at T2x knows that it is, then T2 and obviously that it's not T1 and therefore there's been a change. Now, our defense of the omniscience of God in light of his immutability has been that at T1 God knows that it is, then T1 and at T1 God knows that it IS, then T2. At T2 that is, if we could say that God knows both of these propositions at the same time, there would be no change in his knowledge from T1 to T2 because he would have all of these. It is what he would always know the time of day, but he would know it at one time. At T1. If we could say that, then we could guard the immutability of God and His omniscience. But by use of the word then instead of now. We don't have the easy out that we had a few moments ago. Remember, we said the word now. The use of an indexical reference for my expression of what somebody knows does not commit the person that knows it to the use of an indexical reference. One more time for the sake of the illustration. Getting it into your head. We don't want to miss this. If I know. Excuse me. If Kickasola knows that bonsen can lift 150 pounds, that isn't to say that. Wait a minute. I'm going to get this right. If Kikasola knows that I can lift 150 pounds, that isn't to say that what Kikasola knows must be expressed by him with the use of the word I. I is an indexical reference. If I'm going to express Kickasola's knowledge about myself, I have to use the word I. If he's going to express what he knows, he doesn't have to use the indexical reference. Now, if we're going to express what God knows when it's 2:00' clock and when it's 2:30, we have to use the word now. But that doesn't commit God to having to use the word now and for that reason, we got out of the use of indexical reference. But these quasi indicators are another ball game altogether. It does seem that whether God or we express what he knows, that the word then would have to be incorporated. X knows that it is then t1 at t2, x knows that it is then t2. So it doesn't seem that we can combine both of these as being known at T1. It doesn't appear that way until Castaneda tells us that there is a very trivial principle about quasi indicators that has to be taken into account. And though it appears trivial, in fact it will appear irrelevant to you as you come across it. That's principle p on page 381. The use of that principle is going to destroy Kretzmann's argument. We've run out of time at a very crucial juncture. I almost wonder if somebody is committed and has to go. Please don't feel like you have to stay. But I do think I should say a sentence or two more just so we can get past this point. The principle P simply says that a sentence of the form X knows that Y knows that something. Okay, X knows that Y knows P. I'm going to use P for what Y knows that any sentence of this form implies that X knows P. Very simple principle of transference of knowledge. If X knows that Y knows P, then X knows P. With that principle, we have a very simple solution here. All we have to say then is, is that at t1x knows two things. At t1x knows two things. This is that 381 at the bottom, he knows both that it is then t1 and secondly, he knows that somebody knows or would know at T2 that it would then be T2. What Castaneda is inserting is that X knows that somebody knows in terms of the principle P, X knows that Y knows P implies X knows P. By inserting the statement that God knows at T1, two things are going to happen. T2 is not in here right now. At T1, X knows that it is then T1 and. And at T1, X knows that somebody knows at T2 that it is then T2. Very simple. God knows what time it is right now. He also knows that somebody knows at T2 that it is then T2. But now if God knows that somebody knows at T2 that it is, then T2. What does this principle prove? The transference of knowledge shows that if X knows that C somebody knows that at t2 it is then t2 that shows that x knows that it is then t2 at t2. See why Castaneda is so well respected? It's brilliant. I mean, that move alone just kills the argument by inserting this apparently trivial principle of the transference of knowledge. If God knows that somebody knows at T2 that it is then T2 and God knows that at T1, then it turns out that God knows at. And this is the crucial point, and I'll stop right here. The crucial point is that at T1, God knows that at T2 it is then T2 at T1, he also knows about T2 in terms of this transference through the. Somebody knows at T2 that it's then T2. So at T1, God knows that it is then T1, and at T, God knows that at T2 it is then T2. And since God knows both of those things at T1, then there's been no change in his knowledge from T1 to T2. The rest of the article is worth reading, especially in light of the ending of the article where Castaneda points out that to believe in an omniscient being therefore means. You don't think that every. Every proposition he knows is expressed in terms of indexical propositions and things like that. Some valuable things that we can go over when we get back together. But I really didn't want to take a long break from you without having finished the basic thrust of the argument. Can I ask you that for me? In the right hand corner, X knows that Y knows P. X knows P. Joe knows that Greg knows the answer, therefore Joe knows the answer. No, no, no, no, no, no. If you know that I know the answer, then you know. Wait a minute. X knows that Y knows the answer is to say that X knows. The slip in here is that your. That somebody knows the answer is the proposition rather than the answer itself. X knows that Y knows what? Okay. That Y knows what the answer is? Yes. Okay. X knows. This may. This may. Okay, we got to get the. Y knows what? I want to. What you may have done very nicely here is given another illustration such as he gives. He says that Kretzmann doesn't have any way to deal with this, but it's true that he does not offer the detaching expression rules. He says there are some cases where the detachment doesn't work. If the very last subordinate clause of the sentence of the form X knows that Y knows that contains quasi indicators, such detachment may lead to absurdity or to a fallacy. And he uses this. Mary knows that George knows that he is in Pain does not mean that Mary knows he is in pain because obviously she can't refer to herself as he. And so he says there are instances where this detachment is fallacious. And although there is something about your illustration that doesn't quite ring true with me, on the surface, it would appear to fit that. That X knows that Y knows the answer does not mean. See, there's a compression in there that is. That is bothering me. But anyway, let's assume that it's a felicitous example. And all that demonstrates is what Castaneda says, and that this doesn't always hold true. But it does. There's no reason for Kretzmann to argue that it doesn't hold true. Over here. How do we substitute God for somebody? I don't understand the substitution principle there. How do you just automatically, just by the rule of it, allow for. Well, that isn't to say that just anybody at T1 could know that somebody that T2, so forth. But. But since God is omniscient, we can say that he knows that somebody at T2 will know that it's then T2. Okay. No, no. I think Castaneda understands that not everybody will find fit the position of X, but X is understood as an omniscient being. The whole point of Kretzmann is that God couldn't do this and remain unchanged. Okay. And Castaneda saying, sure he could. In terms of these principles we've been looking at, God could know that somebody knows at T2, and therefore God would know it all at T1.