Dr Greg Bahnsen - Political Ethics: Anarchism; Marxism (Part 13)

Pick up where we left off. In our last hour we have surveyed the power theory of political authority, the traditionalist theory of political authority, the true self theory, the natural law theory, the classical contract view and the contemporary contract view. And I didn't give you any opportunity for questions on the contract view. And I suppose I should start this hour by making that opportunity available. What questions would you like to ask about Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau or Rawls? Yes. Yeah. The question is whether the covenant idea in Christianity was influential on these people. And I do believe that without being able to trace the direct lines of how this gets into their thinking and convictions, that nevertheless there is a general social awareness of the covenant theologically. God's covenant with man and our obligations to God's covenant and submitting to his lawward and that sort of thing. The covenant idea of course, comes out of, is influenced in form anyway by the ancient Near Eastern treaties in the ancient world. And that comes down to us in Christianity and is carried on through, through Christianity and is found of course in the Scripture and therefore continues in human societies. And Christians very naturally would tend to look at society that way. And I think that it would be in the air, it would be a mentality or a mindset that would characterize the Christian civilization and its children, the heirs of Christian civilization that come down through history. And consequently, I believe that we can't dismiss the covenant as background to the contract theory. And certainly in periods in New England where there were strongly covenantal theologians, the idea of the state and the citizens being in something of a contractual arrangement is rather obvious. At the time of the Declaration of Independence, we see the notion that because covenant has been broken, that King George III has violated this, that and the other provision of the covenant, that therefore there is no binding relationship between the colonists and the king any longer. So there the covenant idea is very clear. And the covenant idea comes to expression again during the war between the States, when the southern states secede from the nation. The defense given, at least the more well thought out, consistent and principled defense offered by Dabney and others, is the same notion of the covenant that where the federal union has broken covenant with the individual states, therefore the states have the right to break their contract with the government, with the federal government. So historically we can see a long chain of, seems to me of covenantal thinking, contract type thinking in political matters. And Hobbes specifically dealt with Christian notions and Locke was a Christian, an Arminian Christian. So it doesn't seem to me that we can totally dismiss the idea that whatever they had heard or influence they had from reading the Bible of the Covenant was alien to their contract. Theories of politics. Do you have any information about working with a book by Hospers? The question is, where might you be able to purchase books by Hospers? There are a number that he has put out, the most important of which I think would be his book on ethics. And what is it entitled? Conduct. Moral Conduct. Ethical Conduct. Human Conduct. That's what it is, it's human conduct. And I believe that that is presently being rewritten. It's gone through two editions and I think he is doing a total rewriting of it now. And so it may not be available, but you can check with. I'd have to check the publisher. Come to think of it, I believe that it's Prentiss hall that published his book originally. Hospers, along with Sellers, has a book of readings on modern ethical theory. Some of the key articles in Ethics that have been published in the last 20 to 30 years. And that's entitled Readings and Ethical Theory, Readings and Ethical Theory. And it's a very important volume if you want a contemporary understanding of what's happening in the philosophy of ethics today. At the time that he was running for President of the United States, John Hospers published a book entitled Libertarianism, Libertarianism, and that lays out some of his own convictions and ethics as it comes to expression regarding politics. It's a very readable book, and much of it would coalesce with conservative and Christian convictions, although a good deal of it goes beyond and violates those convictions, too. The libertarian press, I believe, published that other one, the book on libertarianism. I'm afraid I just have to look it up. I can't, off the cuff, give you a better bibliography than that. Sorry. More questions about the contract view of justice and political authority before we go on. Well, if not, let's look at two final views that are discussed in Abbott's book, A Preface to the Philosophy of the State. Views where any consent given to the state is seen as a downright moral mistake. Not just that we downplay consent, saying the state has authority to rule our lives, but consent isn't crucial to that, and not a view where consent becomes essential to the state's authority, but a view where consent to the state's authority is completely wrong. The first would be. The first theory that holds this outlook would be the position known as anarchism. Anarchism. The illustrations of anarchism used by Abbott are the writings of balconin and crapotin. 2 Eastern European writers who hold that political authority is unjustifiable in itself because by its very nature it involves some kind of evil. Political authority is unjustifiable in itself by its very nature, because it involves some kind of evil inherently. The state always destroys genuine human value, according to these men. The state is a permanent conspiracy of the minority against the majority which it enslaves and then turns around and fleeces. The state is always taking advantage of the majority of the people for the sake of a minority of individuals who gain control of it. The primary aim of laws turns out to be to keep the vast majority of people in a society in moral and economic bondage and to maintain thereby the privileges of the class that's in position of force. The primary aim of laws is to keep the vast majority of people in moral and economic bondage and to maintain the privileges of the class that has possession of power. Even criminal laws preserve existing class structure, according to the anarchist, and. Deprives people of of equal opportunity in society. Most states have a police bureaucracy that ironically turns out to violate the law which it is supposed to be enforcing. And so the privileges of the class in possession are served by force. But the criminal laws themselves just preserve the existing class structure, deprive people of things, and tend toward a police bureaucracy that itself violates the system of laws to be enforced. The ideal society, according to the anarchist, does not rest upon the authority of law at all, but rather the ideal society is one that is bound together by voluntary cooperation. Voluntary cooperation where people enter into relationship and keep promises and observe duties because this is what they freely wish to do. They choose to do these things out of their own perceived best interest. The anarchist view would be very close to the libertarian view, by the way. Libertarians want to exalt above all personal liberties and freedom. And libertarians tend to have a cynical view of political society as serving vested interest of individuals, fleecing people through taxation to serve ends and programs that they're not interested in. So anarchism, as it's taught by Balconin and Croperton, would be similar to hospice libertarianism, although they're not identical. Now, what's wrong with this outlook? The anarchist outlook is that at base, this program views human nature as ultimately perfectible. Ultimately perfectible. Human beings are basically good people. The individual is moral, interested in justice. The free individual is going to use his freedom responsibly. He's a good person by nature, and what causes his problems in his corruption and his downfall are the external circumstances of the state. It's the state that corrupts people, it's the state that makes them selfish. It's the state that teaches them to steal from others in the name of justice. It's the state that therefore causes the problems, the moral problems in man. Man's human nature, ultimately perfectible and basically good, is brought down then by the external circumstances of the state. Well, that's problematic because the individual does not, as a matter of fact, gain his moral corruption from his external circumstances. Jesus says, out of the heart come the sins that infect the individual. Out of the heart of man there is all this wickedness abounding. The individual is selfish, totally apart from the state teaching him to be selfish. After all, what is the state but a group of individuals? And if the state is selfish, it must gain that characteristic from the individuals that comprise it. Moreover, even voluntary societies, even if the anarchists were to be given his words way, and what we had was nothing more but a voluntary society where people interact with one another on the basis of agreements and free decisions. Even people in voluntary societies need protection. Because there are going to be people in these voluntary societies that will prey upon other people in the voluntary society. Voluntary societies don't screen out sin and avarice, thievery and violence. And consequently, in a voluntary society, we're going to have to have some way of protecting people, a police agency, if you will, for protecting people against the sins, the crimes of others. And that is going to bring in the idea of a state, even in a voluntary society. So the anarchist is wrong that we can get rid of the state and only have voluntary relationship between people in society, because somebody's going to have to see to the protection of the free individuals. Moreover, there is no such thing as complete freedom. Complete freedom. We all are going to need rules of some sort to settle conflicts and disputes. Rules that are going to tell people in a society how they relate to one another, how they are to keep their contracts, how they are to keep their promises. And rules are going to have to be backed up with force. There is going to have to be some kind of enforcement for whatever rules you have. Now, the libertarian tends to say that the rules that you want to follow should be rules that you voluntarily adopt. That if you don't like the rules of this voluntary society over here, that you can just renounce your allegiance to it and join another voluntary society that has a different set of rules. Now, that voluntary society has its own police force, its own system of courts and justice and penalties. So that when you're on the turf belonging to these People, you follow their rules, and when you break their rules, you're judged by their justice. When you're on somebody else's turf, then you follow their rules and you're judged by their justice. And what you end up with then is what I have called a warlord society. Where you have just a bunch of mafiosa families or groups of animals who rule this turf or who rule that turf or rule another turf, with their own freely adopted systems of rules and courts and police and justice, punishment and all the rest. So in the name of voluntariness, the name of freedom of the individual, it turns out that the anarchists and the libertarians develop a warlord society that deprives the individual of freedom and tyrannizes the individual where there isn't room for voluntary cooperation. Because you have all these conflicting systems of rules and justice. Let's go to the other end of the scale, away from the anarchist view. To the other end of the pole, the Marxist view, Another view that believes that any consent given to the state is a great moral mistake made by men. Karl Marx shared the anarchist point of view that political power is merely the organized power of one class for oppressing another class of individuals. Marx shared the anarchist cynicism you see about political power. Very similar to the view of Thrasymachus that says power is just whatever is in the interest. I mean, justice is just what's in the interest of the stronger. Political power is merely the organized power, power of one group against another. The organized power of one class of people used for the sake of oppressing another class of people. And thus the passing away of economic classes, Marx said, would bring about the passing away of the state itself. For the state is, if you will, political power. And political power exists all only for the sake of one class oppressing another class. So if you get rid of various economic classes, there won't be one class oppressing another class, and there won't be any purpose to political power. So Marx felt that if he could get rid of economic classes, he could bring about the end of the state. We could see the state wither away. Political power is merely another label for oppression. And it's the very existence of the state that puts a mask upon the opposition of classes. The opposition between economic classes undergirds the very social fabric of our lives, of our civilization. And that opposition of classes is made to appear to be something noble and something else by putting the mask of political authority on it. Political power is a label, really a misleading label, something that says, well, this is really Honorable and noble and just and all the rest. But as a matter of fact, it's just serving oppression and class opposition. The actual class situation. Where there is advantage given to the owners of the factories. Over against the workers and all the rest. The actual situation, the relationship economically within a society. Is solidified into law. And it's just because the state solidifies these relationships. By a system of law that makes them permanent. That the state turns out to make oppression all the worse for people. The state is a facility of oppression. Rather than something that relieves oppression. Far from correcting the abuse in society, the conflict between the classes. The state turns out to facilitate that abuse by, if you will, hardening it into a system of laws. Now, Marx had a materialist conception of history. Materialist conception of history. Some men have said that history is developed and governed by ideas. That men's ideas, or in other cases, men's choices or significant individuals in history. Determine what happens and what the course of history will be. What pattern of events comes about, eventuates. But Marx took a materialist concept of history. Seeing the conditions of human production and the economic realm. As largely determining the various forms of human consciousness. The paradigms that people have, the worldview they have, the outlook they have on life. Having a materialist conception of human history. He said, what people think, the way people see the world, the way they view history. Is going to be conditioned by the circumstance of human production. For instance, let's say you have a circumstance of division of labor. Let's say that in your particular society. In your stage of civilization and its evolution. Division of labor characterizes things. Now, a division of labor separates the interest of individuals. From the interest of the community as a whole. A division of labor says that the whole pie is made up of the parts. And so we're going to divide the pie into these parts. The division of labor says all these various things have to be done. And they'll be done by this individual doing this and this individual doing that. And so. So that the interest of the individual. The particular individual. Is separated or segregated out from the overall interest of the community. In fact, the division of labor notion destroys the very possibility of community interest. Because all interests under the division of labor. Turn out to be non communal class serving interest. So that if your interest is, for instance, in being a stone cutter. Then that is serving that particular social class. You're interested in the needs of your fellow workers and people in your position. Rather than being interested in the overall picture. The total pie, if you will. There's no communal Concern if the division of labor controls society's economic production. And so, given a materialist conception of history, Marx said, whatever ideas influence people. Are going to be ideas that themselves are controlled by the conditions of human production. A society that's characterized by division of labor. Is going to have people who fail to have a communal interest and outlook. Moreover, private property, according to Marx. Is one of the greatest dehumanizing forces for man. Private property dehumanizes men. For, it turns out, to devalue the worker. In direct proportion to increasing the value of things. The worker is devalued. The worker as an individual, as a person, isn't important. What's important is the thing that he makes. Private property says, what's important is the value of things. Rather than the value of people. The workers devalued. And that in proportion to the increasing value of things. And so Marx develops his theory of estranged labor. Alienated by a condition of alienation. Where men are estranged from their labor. Where the worker, you see, is divided from the product of his work. Where he's estranged from his work itself, he's estranged. And the worker is alienated, first of all from his product. Because he's a slave to its survival. He's a slave to it. For his survival. The worker must serve the product. Because the product brings in the money that enables him to buy food. And all the rest that's necessary to live. And so now the worker, Rather than loving the product of his hands. Rather than being sympathetically involved in his work. Caring for the outcome of his work. Taking pride in the outcome of his work. Is now alienated from the product of his work. Estranged from his work. Because that work is something that he has to serve. If he's going to survive. Secondly, estranged labor alienates the worker from his laboring, from the working that he does itself. Because, you see, the laboring that the worker goes through. Does not amount to his own acts. It's not really. The things that he is doing are not him. They are not his doings. They are not his acts. They only have meaning in relationship to the product, to the product. He is a slave to the product. And therefore the work he does in the factory. To make these shoes or brooms or what have you. That work isn't something that he creatively enters into, freely enters into. That isn't his work. That's the work owned by the capitalist, by the entrepreneur, by the bourgeois. That's the work that's owned by somebody else. And is compelled out of slavery to the product. And so he isn't doing what he really wants to do. He isn't engaging in creative freedom. He's just putting out this external labor. You may notice that somebody that has a hobby of fixing clocks. Or building clocks. Or building TVs and radios. Can put in a lot of hours every night after work. And yet he doesn't consider it wearisome or laborious. That is internal work. It's work that arises from his own heart and interest and desire. Work that he freely engages in. But when you go to the factory. And you've got to punch the clock. And you got to put in so many hours just sewing these shoes. Or putting brooms or what have you. That's external labor. That's labor that comes from external conditions. And is forced upon you. Not out of internal free choices. But out of an external slavery. So the worker, according to Marx. Is alienated from his product. He's alienated from his laboring. And thirdly, he's alienated from his human consciousness. This is another difficult notion. Let me try to explain it. We're alienated as workers from our human consciousness. Which is to say, from our. Another way to translate this phrase is specie being. We're alienated from our specie being. Because capitalism denies the worker. The opportunity. To rise above other animals. To specifically, human consciousness. Of modifying nature for his own ends. The specie being of an individual human being. The specie being of the human being. Is to rise above the other animals. And to modify nature for his own purposes. To use nature, you see, to advance his human goals, purposes and interests. That's what makes man different from the animals. He rises above the animals. He's not just of part part, you see, of nature and subject to its conditions. But he rises above it. And uses its conditions for his own ends. But capitalism, private property. Alienates the worker from his human consciousness. Makes him just another animal subject to external conditions. Doesn't allow him to rise above the conditions of nature. And give him the opportunity to modify nature for his own interest. And then fourthly, finally, Marx held that private properly estranges a laborer's work. Alienates his labor. Because it alienates him from other persons. It alienates him from his product. It alienates him from his laboring, from his working. It alone. Alienates him from his human consciousness. Makes him less than a human being. And fourthly, alienates him from other persons. You see, private property destroys genuine social relationships. Because when there's a relationship between people. Characterized by private property. That means that you are limited in your options. What other people are, what they have limits you in the options that you can pursue as a free individual. And as such, limits your chances for survival. Let's say that you own the orange grove, okay? That's down the street here. Now, if you own the orange grove, the very fact that that is your private property is going to limit, first of all, going to limit my options. I can't walk from here to the store through your orange grove without your permission. My options have been cut down since that's your property. Moreover, it's limiting my chances for survival. Because if I need something to eat, I could go into your orange grove and take oranges and eat. And that would satisfy my life. It would make me strong. It would give me the vitamin C I need to survive. But since you own the oranges, I don't have the right to take them without asking or without your permission. And again, my chances for survival then are cut down. My options are cut down, my chances for survival. Moreover, it doesn't promote harmony and social interests between us that I have to come to you and ask. I mean, I have to come and demean myself and be in this position of assault. Hoping that you might be interested in my free options and my survival. What if you're not? If you're not, then there's obviously a condition of tension and warfare and alienation between us. Because I say you don't care for me, then you don't care that I don't have oranges that are necessary to life. On the other hand, even if you do care, I have to be somewhat less than you in conception. I've got to be of lower value than you. Because I've got to come to you and ask your permission to eat your oranges or to walk through your orange grove. And so private property destroys social relationships, limiting people's options, limiting their chances for survival. And for that reason, Marx held that a communist society was to be a socialist society and an apolitical society. True, communism must be socialist in that there is no private property. Everything is held in common. That is, the social ownership of everything rather than the private ownership of everything. And secondly, it must be apolitical. As the state survives out of concern to protect the interest of the ruling class. The state only solidifies the competition and the alienation between various economic classes in society. A true communist order is going to be socialist and apolitical, therefore. And for that reason, Marx moved in the direction of eliminating private property and wrote in the hopes that the state would one day wither away. That through the dialectical step of history. We would move to the dictatorship of the proletariat. And from that to the stateless society altogether. Well, we need to respond to this before we end today. Just like we have responded to all the other theories that have been advanced. The communist idea here of the state. Where consent to the state is condemned out of the interest of the communist goal for society. Is nothing less than an idealized and romantic portrait of human nature. It's just as romantic, just as idealized, just as unreal. Come to you and ask. I mean, I have to come and demean myself and be in this position of a suppliant. Hoping that you might be interested in my three options and my survival. What if you're not? If you're not, then there's obviously a condition of tension and warfare and alienation between us. Because I say you don't care for me. Then you don't care that I don't have oranges that are necessary to life. On the other hand, even if you do care, I have to be somewhat less than you in concept. I've got to be of lower value than you. Because I've got to come to you and ask your permission to eat your oranges. Or to walk through your orange grove. And so private property destroys social relationships. Limiting people's options, limiting their chances for survival. And for that reason, Marx held that a communist society. Was to be a socialist society and an apolitical society. True, communism must be socialist. In that there is no private property. Everything is held in common. That is, the social ownership of everything. Rather than the private ownership of everything. And secondly, it must be apolitical. Because the state survives out of concern to protect the interest of the ruling class. The state only solidifies the competition and the alienation. Between various economic classes in society. A true communist order is going to be socialist and apolitical, therefore. And for that reason, Marx moved in the direction of eliminating private property. And wrote in the hopes that the state would one day wither away. That through the dialectical steps of history. We would move to the dictatorship of the proletariat. And from that to the stateless society altogether. Well, we need to respond to this before we end today. Just like we have responded to all the other theories that have been advanced. The communist idea here of the state, where consent to the state is condemned out of the interest of the communist goal for society. Is nothing less than an idealized and romantic portrait of human nature. It's just as romantic, just as idealized, just as unrealistic. Just as, if you will, failing to be down to earth and practical, empirically accurate, as is anarchism. Human nature is not this good. Human nature does not cooperate willingly. The problems between men are not created by external conditions of economic competition. The problems that men have stem from their heart, from their own avarice, from their own envy, from their own unwillingness to pursue things in a just, lawful way. We have to ask ourselves, even going beyond the idealized romantic portrait of human nature in communism that's so unrealistic. Can a totally deregulated society ever be conceived of, one that is totally unfettered by any external conditions? But is it realistic to set as your goal the society that is unregulated, where you don't even have to have the regulation as to what side of the street you will drive on, where there are no conditions that limit, for instance, fraud or breaking of contracts. Or a failure to respect human dignity and the value of human life? I mean, can we get rid of all regulations? Can we get rid of the state? State completely. Is human nature so good that we can do that? Not at all. The thesis that human nature is fully human only when it is completely unlimited, except by whatever constraints are self imposed. The thesis that the very concept of the state is inherently the problem with man is a thesis that is assumed by Marx without any proof whatsoever. That's just an ideology that is asserted, it's just posited, and it's never proven by Marx. He never gives us grounds to accept that as being warranted by the facts, as being some kind of necessary inference. Marx never shows us why we should believe that the state is the problem. That inherently the state, the very concept of the state, is the problem with man. And that if man could just be completely unlimited by the state, he'd be all right. That's just an arbitrary opinion. Fourthly, my fourth criticism is the very notion of political obligation does not, as Marx seems to portray it, include inherently and automatically the idea of oppression. The very notion of political obligation does not include automatically the notion of oppression. Only certain evaluative assumptions that are brought to bear on the question could lead a person to think that that is inherent in the notion of political obligation. One must have, if you will, a preconceived idea as to how people are dehum, dehumanized. And a person must take that idea about how people are dehumanized and build it into his notion of political obligation before he can infer from political obligation automatically the concept of oppression. And so the ultimate question that we have to ask about anarchism and communism. Libertarianism and communism is the question of human nature. What is human nature? Well, let me survey very quickly the positions we've looked at and the underlying issues for those positions, the options that we've seen. First of all, the role of consent is down, as we've said over and over again by Thrasymachus and the power theory of the state. It's played down by Burke and in Traditionalism. It's played down by Hegel and Devlin in the true self theory of the state and played down by Thomas Aquinas in the natural law view of the state. Consent, on the other hand, becomes the very basis for the state in Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in their classic contract views of tacit consent given by the governed and it's the basis of the states authority and John Rawls hypothetical consent view, his contemporary contract theory of the state, on the other hand, any consent given to the state is completely a moral mistake according to Anarchism, Balcony and Cropatin, and consent is a moral mistake given to the state according to Karl Marx as well. Notice that there are certain connections, certain themes that run through many of these theories of the state according to the power theory of the state, the anarchist view of the state and the Marxist view of the state. All three of these hold in common the premise that political authority is hypocritical and is a conspiracy of some against the others. Political authority is a conspiracy where some individuals, the popular, powerful, the elite, the economically advantaged, take advantage of the majority, take advantage of the rest of people. So here political authority, hypocritical and conspiratorial is the view of the power theory, anarchism and Marxism. Secondly, there's a connection to be drawn between Rawls, Rousseau and Hegel, Rawls, Rousseau and Hegel, all of which hold that not each and every desire of man is a rational desire and therefore the state must come in so that man's true self can be realized. There is a true self theory of the state favored in Hegel obviously, but also in Rousseau and Rawls, which are members of other schools of thought as well. And what they hold in common is the view that not all desires are rational desires. Now there are also some contrasts that are worthy of noting in our little survey here. First of all, there's a contrast between Hobbes on the one hand and anarchism and Marxism on the other. The contrast has to do with the view of human nature that is being advanced and the need for an absolute power to deal with human nature. Hobbes says, human nature is basically warlike and corrupt, and therefore we need absolute power in the state to keep humans in line. Whereas the anarchists and the Marxists hold that human nature is basically good and therefore we don't need the state at all and we shouldn't give consent to the state state. Another contrast that is of interest is the contrast between the natural law theory and the theory of Marx. A contrast as to how natural the state is, how natural the state is. Thomas Aquinas says, the state is very natural. It's exactly what you would expect to take place. The development of the state. There's this naturalness of the state emphasized as being part of the order of things. Whereas for Marx, the state is not natural, it's artificial and it must pass away in the dialectic of history. So we've been going over this very quickly, but I hope that you're alert to what I'm pointing out. I'm really, if you will, drawing out the main lines of political questioning. The main lines of questioning in political theory. What is the role of consent? That's a major question. Is political authority a conspiracy and therefore hypocritical? Are all desires of human beings rational? Is the state the true context for the individual? Is human nature basically good or basically evil? State a natural product, or is it unnatural and imposed consent? The hypocrisy of authority, the rationality of desire, the true context for the human being, the basic character of human nature and the naturalness of the state. These are all crucial fundamental statements, systematically basic issues for anybody's theory of the state. The main underlying issues, it seems to me, revolve then in any normative discussion of the state. The issues are going to revolve around these questions. The question of consent and governmental authority, the favoring of oneness and unity over against the distrust of the many individuals, the favoring of many individuals over against the distrust of the state. Fourthly, the goodness of human nature and the need for the state. And finally, the naturalness of the state. Those are the crucial questions in political theory. Now, consideration of the various options for answering the question why ought anybody to obey the state in general? And our criticisms of them have helped to clarify and to narrow down more exactly what the fundamental issue is before us. What is the answer to why should anybody obey the state in general? The answer is not because of history. We've seen that we don't find the basis for the authority of the state in tradition. The reason why people should obey the state is not found in the origination of the state in natural law. It's not found in the expertise of the state. It's not found in the state's being a safeguard function against specific immorality, such as rationalizing our selfish interests. It's not found in the conventional response of people. It's not found in the survival value that is afforded us. The authority of the state is not found in majority opinion. It's not found in some different moral obligation, some tacit obligation to keep our promises, for instance. It's not based on what I would have done hypothetically if I'd been given the choice. The answer is not to be found in the abuses of power that we can easily discern in the state. It's not to be perceived in the potential threats to personhood which the state lays upon us. That is, the options all the way from power theory to Marxism cannot answer the question why should anybody obey the state? But rather we must say that our obligation to obey the state. State is a fundamental question of ethical authority in general. What is the meaning and justification for any moral claim? Will be the only way we can answer the question why should anybody obey the state? That is, there isn't any way of answering that question short of having a complete moral theory. You cannot have a political ethic without a nurturing, conditioning context of a general human ethic. One must have a foundation for ethics in general before he can answer the fundamental question why should anybody obey the state? Now, apologetically, I'd like to say that only the Christian can answer that fundamental question about the authority of the state. Only the Christian can answer the question why should anybody? Why ought anybody to obey the state in general? My argument has been none of the eight common theories of politics have been able to supply an answer as to why we should obey the state. We see that you can only answer that question by being driven to a more general conception of ethics. You must know why should any obligation be observed in life? What is the meaning and justification of any moral claim that is fundamental to answering the question about statehood? And on that fundamental question, only Christians have an answer. The Christian can say that God's law is unconditionally binding because God has sovereign authority over us and just because God is sovereign. God's law can be specific, specific and clear, coming right into our lives, right into our environment. God can speak relevantly and give us concrete directives for our life. So God is authoritative, unconditionally authoritative. Whatever he says is binding, and what he says can be very concrete, can give specific guidance for our lives. On the other hand, the non Christian will always have to hold that the moral law, in virtue of the fact that it's going to be absolute and universal, the moral law will have to lack specific content. It cannot be clearly revealed what the moral law is because nobody can have a God's eye point of view. The non Christian must say that the moral law, whatever is authoritative in binding, absolutely must be gain that binding authority in virtue of its generality rather than its specific relevance. Nobody can have such a general universal view as that is claimed for God. On the other hand, human values will be treated by the non Christian as final. Man will be the ultimate authority for the non Christian. Nobody can know for sure in terms of absolutes. But when it comes to concrete God guidance, when it comes down to the relevant decisions that to be made in life, human value will be treated as final. We will treat my reasoning, my decisions, my goals, my desires, my calculations as final. So you notice that on the one hand the Christian has a transcendent authority in ethics, but he also has relevant content for his ethic and the two work together. God is the sovereign authority and he can come right into our lives with directives that are relevant, specific and give concrete guidance. So God is the authority and he can come into my life and say, you submit to the state. You submit because I have ordained that men rule over other men for the sake of preserving creation. Whereas the non Christian, his ethical transcendence and his ethnic eminence, his ethical authority and his ethical relevance are always conflicting with one another. Nobody knows for sure. But I'll tell you what to do. And it's just because the non Christian has that dialectical tension in his system of thought that he cannot answer the questions of political ethics. For the non Christian always has to say if anything's absolute. Nobody knows for sure. Nobody is the God's eye point of view. Nobody can know it everything. Nobody can have that universal perspective. The moral law must always, if it's absolute, be extremely general. Nobody knows for sure. But if nobody knows for sure, then why should I submit to the state? Well, if I submit to the state, it's always going to have to be on the basis of some individual's reasoning or power, then aren't I? I mean, they're going to have to buy Rosso's idea that it's in my genuine interest to do so. Hegel's idea of the true self. I'm going to have to bow to the fear in me that Hobbes speaks of. Or just admit that other people have might. And that makes right, as Thrasymachus said. I mean, I'm going to have to let human values be ultimately authoritative, even though I've said nobody can know for sure. And that's why in the midst of that dialect of tension of having only general authority or unauthoritative specifics, that the non Christian can't tell us why anybody ought to obey the state in the first place, because the non Christian can't say why anybody ought to do anything. The non Christian doesn't have an adequate ethical theory undergirding his reasoning and therefore it's no surprise that he doesn't have an adequate and cannot have an adequate social and political theory as well. I'm going to give you an example of this from Abbott himself, who is not a Christian. I want to give you an example in closing of this dialectical tension between authority, which is very general on the one hand, and relevance, specific relevance that doesn't have any authority on the one hand. Abbott demands a firm and final standard for political morality. He demands that there be a firm and a final stand standard. On pages eight and nine of his book. He says that people's well being should not be adversely affected and cannot be ignored. The moral perspective requires that one act suppose so as to treat humanity not ever as a mere means, but always as an end, no matter if it is your own humanity or that of any other person. A person of principle, he says, is committed to certain values even when it is against his or her self interest. Being a matter of principle, he says, we often claim that people's well being at as people, regardless of their legal or social status, is either not being served or is actually being violated. And so the well being of people must be taken into account. Human personhood and equality of treatment is an absolute, final firm standard for Abbott. So there he has his moral absolute. But on the other hand, you'll notice both in the preface and on page 131 of the book, Abbott insists that clear criteria cannot be laid down in political ethics. He says the question of what is basic and what is secondary is constantly open to criticism and revision. And he speaks of his beliefs being open ended. They are not principles in a dogma or canons in a code. Code he has beliefs, not tenets, that call for further analysis. You cannot be dogmatic, cannot be specific. These are not principles or canons in a code. They are open ended. Then on page 131. Abbott says, But we do not require exactitude. I'm beginning at the bottom of 130. But we do not require exactitude and once for all resolution of vagueness in our political and moral principles. In fact, there is a sense in which requiring such a thing makes the principles and the complex domains to which they apply unsuitable for use in practical discourse. There is an element of know how involved in in moral conceptions that cannot be reduced to stated principles. Perhaps this is why it is also natural to consider justice and equality to be ideals. They guide practices, but are not statements, no matter how complex, from which we can deduce social instances or by which we can completely embody perfect social and political arrangements. Abbott says specifically then that you cannot lay down clear criteria for justice and equality. So there's the non Christian. He has his absolute human personhood inequality, but when it comes down to what we do in concrete cases, he says, nobody can say for sure there are no clear criteria. And so the point of this morning's lectures has been that when you the fundamental issues of the philosophy of the state as they've been presented to us by Abbott in his book On A Preface to the Philosophy of the State. If you look at the eight major options that are given to us for answering why anybody ought to obey the state in general, the non Christian world does not have an answer. It is caught in a moral dilemma, a dialectical tension between wanting authority authority but wanting human relevance. The only way to answer the questions of political ethics is the only way you can answer any questions of obligation and ethics. And that is to say that God is the ultimate authority and His Word gives the specific relevance and directive to our lives. Thank you.