Dr Greg Bahnsen - Political Ethics: The Power Theory (Part 10)

Yesterday I completed my introduction to Political Ethics. We have studied the transformational need for a Christian political stance and looked at the three major issues in present day Christian political theory. One being the question what's the proper function of the state? The second being what is the place of the state in the ordering of creation? And thirdly, how do we discern God's will for politics? Or where is Christ polit politically working today? This morning's lecture is going to take up the second major section in our outline that deals with the philosophy of state. We're going to be looking now at the philosophical perspective on the state and the theory of the state. And my point is going to be that a philosophy of the state requires a Christian answer, a Christian position or perspective. And so this section of our course is more apologetical in orientation, although it does function to introduce us to some of the key issues and themes that have been pursued in the history of political theory as well. And I'm going to be using as the pattern for our discussion Abbott's book, a Preface to the Philosophy of the State, which you all have received by now, and I trust our reading, this is a fine little introduction that gives you a good historical background as well as dealing with some of the topics of central concern in political theorizing today. So I want to engage in a discussion and analysis of the basic question of political authority as it's been posed in the secular world, in the history of philosophy. And we're going to be looking particularly at eight different states, theories of the state, dealing with the political authority of the state. We're going to be looking at the power theory theory that's called traditionalism, the true self theory, the natural law theory, the classical contract theory, the contemporary contract theory, the anarchist theory and the Marxist theories of the state. And so be getting into those various theories in just a moment or two here. But first, a few remarks on Abbott's introduction or preface to the book Preface to the Philosophy of the State. Abbott points out there are two basic types of thinking about politics that person might be contemplating as he discusses the philosophy of the state. There's two approaches to the state. The one says that the study of the state should be a matter of the skilled manipulation of power, the skilled manipulation of power that what we should be studying here is how to get our way, if you will. We should be looking at methods of persuasion, of moving audiences, of getting the populace to vote in the way that you want, how to get people elected, how to, if you will, get along once you are elected. How to coordinate political efforts and to accomplish things as a political party. That is, political thinking is a matter of skilled manipulation. The second way in which people speak of political thinking, which is not nearly so popular or as lucrative, but nevertheless is important, is to ask evaluative and committal questions about politics, to evaluate what's happening in the political world, to ask questions about the political world, to evaluate it and see what commitments are the proper commitments for a person to have. And so instead of looking for skilled manipulation of power, the second approach to political thinking is interested in the discovery of norms, of moral norms for politics. It's not whether it's going to be popular to do such and such that's so concerned here, but whether it's the right thing to do, whether it follows principle, whether it has the proper moral foundation or not. So there are these two ways of thinking about politics. And I think one of the reasons people shy away from the idea of Christian politics is because they think of politics as being a matter of skilled manipulation of power. And that, at least for most moral individuals, for most principled individuals, is something repulsive. It's something that strikes them as being, taking advantage of people, something that's not quite moral. And consequently, the idea that a Christian would be interested in the skilled manipulation of power is all the more abhorrent. And thus the idea of Christian politics doesn't seem to fit in with Christian mentality and attitudes at all. However, political thinking and political theorizing also deals with these normative issues. As I've said, evaluative and committal questions about politics. And that's our interest, of course, in this course, is how do we evaluate what's happening in the political realm? What position should we be taking as Christians, and how should we try to influence and persuade our society? Now, Abbott points out that the philosophy of the state, when you start asking questions about the philosophy of the state from an evaluative standpoint, that this is going to involve, it's going to require, it's going to call for conceptual analysis and a good deal of clarification. You noticed the other day when we were studying natural law in our course on situation ethics, that it turned out that the phrase natural law can mean a wide, wide number of things. There's a real diversity of opinion as to what the phrase natural law should be taken to refer to. And this is going to be the sort of thing that this clarification, the breakdown of the meaning of words, to see how words are functioning in particular context and how they work within a philosophical system that's going to be important in the philosophy of the state. It's going to call for conceptual analysis and conceptual clarification. And so Abbott says, this is kind of an analytic task. It isn't simply an empirical task where we're going out to discover what is the case in the world or what has been the case throughout history. But this is an analytical task, a matter of clarifying and analyzing our concepts. Now, I'd want to add to this that conceptual analysis, the attempt to clarify what people mean by their language and how they're using concepts is not a neutral task. Abbott presents it in that light. He says, now, totally apart from your commitments to Marxism or to conservatism or what have you, we have to understand what we mean by our words and how our concepts are being used. And everybody can do that on a pretty much equal footing. We're on a par with one another. We can all agree on how phrases are being used and that sort of thing, and then we'll get around to deciding whether we agree or disagree with them. And so what he's trying to do here is to carve out a very small area of life that might be neutral, where we don't have to worry about our ultimate commitments or our religious convictions or our political commitments and what we're dedicated to in terms of our social outlook. But conceptual analysis, how you understand a phrase, what kind of reaction you give to a phrase, how it's to be clarified, how it's to be put to application, is not a matter for neutral undertaking. One is guided by his ultimate presuppositions, even in that area. An example of conceptual analysis, also an example that shows that neutrality is not really possible when you engage in conceptual analysis about the philosophy of the state, might be found in our attempt to understand the word right or rights. We speak of people having rights, having a right to do something in our society, or a political right, a human right. What do we mean by the word right? You notice when you talk to some individuals, usually of a more conservative mentality and outlook on the state, the word right means freedom. To have a right is to have a freedom to pursue something. So. So in the case of Carl Henry, the right to education would be understood as the freedom to pursue an education. If a person has that right, that means that others have the duty not to get in the way of his pursuing that if it should be in his interest. So a right to education means the freedom to education. Whereas if you talk to somebody that has a more liberal perspective, some to A Richard Mao. For him, the right to education might mean more the right to have education provided. It would be seen as a benefit right, as we've said before. So that if I have a right to education, that means the state has the duty to educate me. You see, there's quite a difference between having the freedom to pursue an education and the state having the duty to provide an education. And what you mean by the word right is going to be affected then by your worldview and by your ultimate commitments, by your religious and ethical outlook. So the philosophy of the state that we're going to be looking at is a discussion oriented toward evaluative questions, questions of commitment, and one which is not neutral, even though it does involve a great deal of conceptual analysis and clarification. With that background, then, the main problem that Abbott wants to set before us is the problem of authority and obligation. The problem of authority and obligation. He says we need to clarify the kind of authority that is under discussion when somebody's talking about philosophy or the philosophy of the state. What can the word authority mean? Let's think of some examples here. We, I trust, all heard or at least saw replays of the President of the United States yesterday say that if any American diplomat should be treated in the way that our hostages in Iran were treated, that there would be a swift and effective retribution. One of the news commentators looking at the replay of this says in response that Mr. Reagan demonstrated authority when he said that. Demonstrated authority. Now, what can that mean, that word authority in the sentence that the President demonstrated or illustrated great authority when he said that? Well, the word authority in that sentence, I would think, means something like he demonstrated convictional manner, as when he said it. He held his jaw firm. He had a very determined tone in his voice, and he was dead serious that we won't put up with this kind of thing anymore. And so he spoke with authority. Means there's a kind of convictional manner or fashion about the person as he speaks. Okay. The word authority can be used in another way, too. Let's say that you're having trouble with your car and you want to get the transmission repaired and you take it to a shop and you tell them the problem, and they look at the car and the shop tells you that has the authority to fix this kind of. And what would the word authority mean there? It would probably mean we have the credentials necessary to do this. We have the ability to fix this kind of thing. Another example of this use of the word authority. If you've ever been around school children, you Know, a teacher will give them some task that calls for them to exercise authority over their classmates. So that if you want to, for instance, be dismissed for lunch, you might be the lunch monitor. And when people are quiet enough, then you will dismiss them for lunch. Well, that gives you a certain authority, which is to say you have a certain credential right. The teacher has delegated to you credentials to release people for lunch. Another use of the word authority in the sense of influence or power. We might say that the friends of the President have the authority to bring about legislative change. And we mean by that that they are in positions of authority because they're in positions of influence. Positions of power. But then again, the word authority can be used beyond all of these different senses. And we could multiply them. We could go on and on with illustrations. Authority in the political realm and when we're talking about philosophy of the state means the right to be obeyed. When a person has authority, that means he has the right to be obeyed. And this authority is usually mediated in terms of rules. A person who has the right to be obeyed, a person who has authority has, if you will, the prerogative to lay down rules that have to be strictly adhered to. Rules that will become the order of the day. Okay? So in politics, we're talking about the right to be obeyed. And the question naturally arises when somebody claims to have political authority and somebody claims to have the right to be obeyed, what justifies such a claim? On what ground could somebody justify the right to be obeyed? And now this is a general question. This is a general question to be set over against a particular specific applicatory question. We had an interesting situation a week ago when there was a change of guard, if you will, at the executive branch of our government when one man stepped down from being President and another man became the President at a set time, if I understand right, the new President took the oath of office two minutes before the time that the Constitution stipulates that the new President is to take over. Okay, now let us say, and I realize this is imaginative in the extreme, but it does help us test theoretical questions. Let's say that in that two minute period between the time that Reagan took oath of office and the 12 o', clock, when the Constitution says that he's to take oath of office, if in that two minute period, war had been declared on the United States and the President of the United States was called upon to make for some reason an immediate decision, mobilizing troops now. And let's say that in that two minute period. That Mr. Carter took it upon himself to make that decision. Okay? Now he directs the Pentagon and the generals there to mobilize our forces, forces in Europe to get the jets in the air. And they ask him now, looking at their watch, what right have you to command us? You claim to have authority. On what basis do you claim to have that authority? Now, in that context, what you'd have is the President appealing to a specific law or principle, something that is part of the positive law and direction of the land. He would say, the Constitution stipulates that I'm president until 12 o', clock, even if somebody else has already taken an oath of office. Now, that may be right and that may be wrong. I'm not really sure constitutionally how you should understand that, whether 12 o' clock is just the general time of day or whether it's right down to the minute of. So that you know in that two minute gap, who really does have the right to be obeyed. But that would not. That's not the type of question we're asking here. We're not asking in this course or in any genuine course on the philosophy of the state. We're not asking now in particular, why would a man have the right to be obeyed? That is, how do we understand constitutional law in such sticky situations? We're asking a far more general topical question. Question. We're asking, how does anybody under any circumstances come to have the right to be obeyed in the state? What general rule authorizes our obligation to obey the state? What is the rule that authorizes our obligation to obey the state? If somebody comes to you and says, I have the right to be obeyed, I am your leader, okay? I'm your president or your king or what have you, what rule is being appealed to here? I mean, if you have the duty to obey somebody, which of course you must have, if he does have the right to be obeyed. If I have the right, that means you have the duty. So if I have the right to be obeyed, then you have the duty to obey. What rule are we appealing to when we claim that I have the right and you therefore have the duty? Duty. When any human being or any group of human beings claims political authority, what authorizes their political authority? What general rule authorizes an obligation to obey the state? Now, please notice that this is a question of moral authority and is to be distinguished from a question of accepting a legal authority. Accepting a legal authority. The question of accepting a legal authority would be like the Joint Chiefs of Staff having to decide, do we obey Reagan or Carter in this two minute period, that would be a matter of, well, under what circumstances do we accept his legal authority rather than his legal authority? And again, we're not asking that. We're asking the general question of moral authority altogether. Why should anyone obey the state? Why should anyone obey the state? And that's what Abbott takes up as the question in his book. And we're going to survey the eight different theories that he proposes. It seems to me he's done a good job in choosing the theories, the theories which pretty much illustrate the main lines of thought in the key lines of the. The most influential lines of thought throughout the history of political theorizing. Why should anybody obey the state? That's the problem, the problem of authority and obligation. And Abbott proposes a breakdown, a threefold breakdown of his eight theories. He says some of these theories have in common, that the role of consent is played down in them. In some of these theories, consent of the governed is not a very important element in answering the question, why should anyone obey the state? Or what justifies a claim to the right to be obeyed on the part of the state? In these theories, the role of consent is not a real important thing. And that would include the power theory of Thrasymachus, the theory of traditionalism in Burke and Oxshott, the true self theory in Hegel and Devlin, and the natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas. Okay, now for Thrasymachus, Burke, Oxshott, Hegel, Devlin and Aquinas, consent is not crucial to the state's rights to be obeyed. But then there are two views where consent is taken as basic as the heart of the state's right to be obeyed. And even, as you might guess from the way this is being introduced, they would be contract theories of the state where there must be consent, just like in a contract, there must be will and consent. There's the classical contrast theory of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, where people have tacitly consented to their states. And we'll be talking about that and how credible that is, that tacit consent has been given by everybody to the state. And then secondly, the contemporary contract theories of John, or contract theory of John Rawls, where consent is hypothetical in character. And the distinction between tacit consent and hypothetical consent is something we'll come to very soon. Well, the first group of theories, power theory, traditionalism, true self and natural law theories, play down the role of consent. The classical contract and contemporary contract theories make consent the basis for political authority, the right to be obeyed. And then we have two views where Any consent turns out to be a moral mistake, that nobody should consent to the right of the state. And those would be the views of anarchism represented in Abbott's book by Bakunin and Kropotan. And and then lastly, the view of Marx, a Marxist view of the state. Both anarchism and Marxism would say that any consent given to the state is a moral mistake. So does this help kind of get things organized in your mind? You realize that the whole notion of consent then is going to be the method of exchange here. This is the curve in which Abbott is going to deal, intellectually speaking, with the various theories. Consent being played down, consent being the basis for the state or consent being a moral mistake. And that defines the eight different. The eight different views. Well, before I. Before I jump into these individual theories, let me see if you have any questions you'd like to pursue with this introduction, anything unclear to you or remarks you'd like to make before we go on. It's early in the morning yet. Okay, well, let's begin then by going in order through these eight theories and see how far we can get. We begin with the power theory that is represented by Thrasymachus. Who was Thrasymachus? You all remember that Thrasymachus was spokesman in Plato's Republic. It was a sophist of his day. And Thrasymachus set forth the power theory of the state. The power theory of the state. The state is really organized power. And I think the motto or the slogan that best captures this very simple approach to the state. The state is whoever has the power to compel obedience, is the slogan might makes right. Or if you will, might is right. Right doesn't amount to anything else but the might to carry out things. Might is right. Right, said Thrasymachus. And so that justice is whatever is in the interest of the stronger. Justice is whatever is in the interest of the stronger. When laws are made, laws are going to be made to favor the ruling class in a society. And since justice is defined by law, it turns out that justice is whatever happens to serve the interests of the stronger in society. Now, that seems to be a totally unrealistic theory, right? I mean, there's nothing in the empirical experience of people in history, of their situations in the state, that would ever lead people to think that might makes right. No, there's nothing implausible about this. In fact, it's a very compelling theory. You don't have to say much about it. You don't have to lay out premises and try to draw down concepts, conclusions and persuade people. You simply have to say, look and see. I mean, who makes the laws in this country? Is it the poor and the oppressed? Those who are racially discriminated against? Is it the widows and the orphans? Do they make the laws in this country? No, it's the high and the mighty, the rich and the powerful, and who influences them. Do any of you have a personal lobbyist in Washington to make sure that that senators and congressmen are lined up on particular bills to vote in the right way either to favor or protect you? No, but you'd be very sure the oil companies have lobbyists all over the place. Might does make right. Laws are defined according to those who are the stronger in society. And that may lead you to cynicism. And you may not like the cynicism, but the facts are the facts. Even if somebody doesn't like the facts, your emotional reaction to the fact that power speaks in this country isn't going to alter it in the slightest. Thrasymachus says might does make right. And you say, well now wait a minute, we know better than that. So that if there are unjust laws, we can appeal them to the Supreme Court and there will be an impartial tribunal that will look at the merits of the case. Well, you can tell how much a person knows about the world in which he or she lives, the society in which he or she lives by the reaction that is given to the proposal that, well, we can always move it up to the highest tribunal of the land and then justice will be heard. Because on what basis do Supreme Court Justices make their decisions? Is it always just impartially the merits of the case? Or do they ever have social reform in mind? Do they ever have programs and kingdoms that they are building? Are they ever influenced by their peers and who they go to dinner with? And you notice that not many Supreme Court Justices are spending a lot of time at Taco Bell, right? I mean, they are. Who are they hobnobbing with? Who is influencing them? Who are they hearing? Who do they have to give answer to? In whose presence do they have to maintain their self esteem and their dignity? Well, they've got an ideology, they serve. They too are prejudiced. They too have presuppositions. They too have a circle of influence around them, although we don't publicize it nearly as much as we do the lobbyists. And so might does make right. Isn't that true? Again, I don't give you premises, I just give you the world look and see, just look around you. Doesn't it stand to a reason that justice is simply whatever is in the power in the interest of the powerful? Thrasymachus was right, wasn't he? Well, there is a difficulty though, for all of that, the difficulty is that we're not talking about political history. Remember the introduction to this begin to wake you up to what you were missing while I was going through this boring introduction. I said we're talking about political legitimacy, not political history. We're talking about conceptual and normative questions. We're not talking about what actually happens in the world. Now in the end, we have to bring our norms to the world and make them applicable to the world. That's true. But what we are studying here is not a matter of empirical politics, the skilled manipulation of power to use that expression. Again, we're talking here about what ought to happen, what norms govern our situation, evaluations, commitments, what is right and is it right that might makes for right in society? That's the question. Is it the right thing to do and pursue? And so while Thrasymachus gives us a very plausible political history, he does not give us a very plausible theory of political legitimacy. Okay, if somebody says about IDI Amin, well, you can tell how much a person knows about the world in which he or she lives, the society in which he or she lives, by the reaction that is given to the proposal that, well, we can always move it up to the highest tribunal of the land and then justice will be heard. Because on what basis do Supreme Court Justices make their decisions? Is it always just impartially the merits of the case? Or do they ever have social reform in mind? Do they ever have programs and kingdoms that they are building? Are they ever influenced by their peers and who they go to dinner with? And you notice that not many Supreme Court Justices are spending a lot of time at Taco Bell, right? I mean, they are. Who are they hobnobbing with? Who is influencing them? Who are they hearing? Who do they have to give answer to? In whose presence do they have to maintain their self esteem and their dignity? Well, they've got an ideology, they serve. They too are prejudiced. They too have presuppositions. They too have a circle of influence around them, although we don't publicize it nearly as much as we do the lobbyist. And so might does make right. Isn't that true? Again, I don't give you premises, I just give you the world. Look and see. Just look around you. Doesn't it stand to A reason that justice is simply whatever is in the power, in the interest of the powerful, the stronger. Thrasymachus was right, wasn't he? Well, there is a difficulty, though, for all of that. The difficulty is that we're not talking about political history. Remember the introduction to this begin to wake you up to what you were missing. While I was going through this boring introduction. I said, we're talking about political legitimacy, not political history. We're talking about conceptual and normative questions. We're not talking about what actually happens in the world. Now, in the end, we have to bring our norms to the world and make them applicable to the world. That's true. But what we are studying is not a matter of empirical politics. The skilled manipulation of power, to use that expression. Again, we're talking here about what ought to happen, what norms govern our situation, evaluations, communications, commitments. What is right, and is it right that might makes for right in society? That's the question. Is it the right thing to do and pursue? And so while Thrasymachus gives us a very plausible political history, he does not give us a very plausible theory of political legitimacy. Okay, if somebody says about IDI Amin's regime, now, I wonder whether this is a legitimate political regime. And whether we ought to cooperate with it. And somebody answers that, hey, might makes right. You just line up and do whatever the king says, or the, you know, president and commander, blah, blah, blah, for life. Whatever he was then. It's not a, you know, you don't ask any further questions than that. Would that be an answer to the question, or would that be a suppression of the question? There's quite a difference. Somebody says, now, is Amin's rule legitimate? And somebody says, hey, he's got the power, and so it's legitimate. We can then reintroduce our question, can't we? And if you can reintroduce the question, it's rather obvious that the question hasn't been answered. Because it makes perfectly good sense to say, but is his use of power legitimate? And the fact that you can ask the question about any use of power, whether it is a legitimate use of power, indicates that power cannot legitimate the use of power. I'm not trying to engage in sophistry here. I hope that I haven't lost you in that. But there's a very important logical issue at stake here. When we say that, we can ask the question, is the use of power legitimate? Now, let me see if I can draw an analogy for you to show you how that would be an Illegitimate way of asking a question. Take a phrase or take a term that has one unitary sense. We're using it in the same sense of the same meaning. I can ask of you, is the bachelor a bachelor? Now does that make sense as a question? Well, I mean, it makes sense in that you know what's being asked. But I mean, there's nothing to the answer. I mean, there's no effort involved unless you think somebody's playing with words. For instance, I might say, you come across me someday and I'm really deep in thought and I say, well, is business business? You know, my employer has just told me when I balked at going through some shady deal on the inventory, he says, look, business is business, just do it. And there I'm thinking, what is business? Business? Now on that question, you know very well the word business is being used in two different ways. And the strength of the defense business is business is that, well, obviously A is A. Nobody would deny a law of logic like that, right? But of course it isn't A. Asa, you have A and B both using the word business for concept A and concept B. But if somebody says, well, this a bachelor, a bachelor, okay? Unless I think bachelor is being used in some metaphorical sense for, you know, somebody who really is emancipated inside and is single hearted and free and somebody say, well, is somebody who isn't married really single hearted and free? Unless I think somebody kind of poetic or metaphorical literary use of the word bachelor is being employed, I'm going to say, well, obviously a bachelor is bachelor, okay? Now what if I ask is the morning star the evening star? That's not quite the same because morning star and evening star means something different. Morning star meaning the star first to appear in the morning or is it last to appear in the morning? The one that. Anyway, an evening star is the same either the first or the last. I think it's the first to appear in the morning and first to appear in the evening, okay? So somebody can say, is the star that appears first in the morning the star that appears first in the evening? Okay, so there is some sense to the question. But then again, if you know that morning star and evening star are but historical and traditional and romantic ways of designating the planet Venus, then that's like asking, is Venus Venus? And so in that sense it's an easy answer. Although it does make sense to ask the question. Now, is the use of power legitimate? Now is that business is business question, bachelor is bachelor question or morning star is evening star question or Is it a question like is a Corvair the fastest car made in the 1960s? They say that's a straight out empirical question, isn't it? One that happens to have, if you know anything about cars, a rather obvious answer. Corvair was not the fastest car made in the 1960s. So you have one designation fastest car of the 60s and another designation Corvair. And it makes perfectly good sense scientifically, empirically, technologically to ask the question, is this, this is the Corvair the fastest one, power made in the 1960s? Is the use of power legitimate? Now on the power theory? Now to get away from all of our linguistic analysis here on the power theory, that should not make any sense. To ask that question, that should be like asking is a bachelor a bachelor? Or at best, is the evening star the morning star? Because power just is right, might is right, might makes right, might is right. Power and justice are interchangeable, or at least they're co extensive, just like morning star and evening star. Those terms are not interchangeable because you wouldn't have gone out this morning and said there's the evening star. The properties says there's the morning star in the morning rather than evening star. Although it would have been correct if that that thing that is being seen in the morning is also seen in the evening under the designation evening star. So power, you could say that it makes sense to ask, is power legitimate in the way that you ask is the morning star or the evening star? But we get the feeling, don't we, that when we ask about the legitimacy of ed and means power, that we're asking far more than just is this the same thing under different labels? We're asking, is that really the fastest car of the 1960s? I mean, is it right that this man should exercise power in this way? And so there's a deep seated logical problem in the power theory. I believe the power theory of politics gives us a plausible political history, but does not give us a theory of political legitimacy. In fact, the possession of power upon reflection is neither necessary nor sufficient for having the right to demand obedience. The possession of power is neither necessary nor sufficient for having the right to man obedience. Okay, first of all, the possession of power is not necessary. Lets say that you're the father of a 22 year old son and that in the course of biological development your son has grown to be much bigger than you. And moreover, he played football for USC and is very strong. And now he's at home and you give him an instruction, a directive to do something and he says, no, he will not do it. Now, do you have the power to compel him to do it? Well, as I've laid out the story and I could embellish it if you're not convinced yet, certainly there are circumstances under which a father does not have the power to compel his son to do something. Does he have the right to compel his son to do something? Does he have the right to command him to do something? Yes, he does. So you see, the possession of power is not a necessary condition of having a right. A person can be in the right and have authority without having compulsive power. Moreover, the possession of power is not sufficient to say that a person has the right to demand obedience. If a thief breaks into your home, he may have power over you, but he does not have the right to do what he's doing. He doesn't have the right to demand obedience. And so I have to conclude that force does not mean right. Power does not legitimate the use of power. At best, what Thrasymachus has offered is a history of power politics, and he has not given us then a theory of politics. I'm not going to say much more about Thrasymachus. I think this pretty much scuttles the theory, what little we have said. But I'd like to see if you have any questions you'd like to pursue or remarks to be made. Couldn't somebody possibly raise the objection to God's authority on that same basis that he is able to do what he does because he has the power to enforce his authority. But that doesn't necessarily make it right. My objection, that they don't feel that God has given us a sense of fair play. The question is, could somebody not use the same line of credit critique as I've used to Thrasymachus, and use it against the Christian notion of God, who has the power to back up his commandments and to bring about the Day of Judgment and that sort of thing? Well, I don't believe so, because the Christian does not hold, after all, that God's right, God's might. We don't say that whatever God does is right because he is the power to back it up. Now, we do say he has the power to back it up. And if somebody, let's say you get into a protracted debate with somebody as to whether they should be engaged in adultery or whether they should remain faithful to his wife, and you've counseled and counseled and counseled, and this person says, well, I just don't agree that it's right to say that love, sexual love, has to be within the boundaries of monogamous marriage. And that's an archaic outlook. And as much as you try to persuade this person not to ruin his marriage and not to do this and all the rest, he says, well, I just don't say that it's right. Well, I could see you coming to the point and say, well, you may not think that it's right, but you better know that there's a day of judgment coming and God will hold you accountable. Now at that point the person would say, ah, there you go trying to use strong arm tendencies. You can't convince me that it's right. So now you're saying you're just threatening. You know, well, of course that isn't what God does. God gives us a law that is for our good, that reflects his character. And God's right over us is first of all a right of ownership. God owns us, okay? He made us. And just because we are, you know, pots in the hands of the potter, and just because we are the potential possession of the Lord, he has the right to say to us what he does. Now, God also adds to that. He backs that up with the sanction that he will judge those who will not recognize sensibly that they owe him allegiance. But the fact that we appeal to might does not mean that we make God's might the same as God's right. His right is something beyond his power to confess, compelled. This may be an interesting way into another question that often troubles people in Christian ethics. And that's the question of positive law or volunteerism is another way it's put another way. This theory is expressed, it is thought by many people, as I told you already, Hobbes and others, that justice is defined by the laws of the land. And therefore it doesn't make any sense to ask about the justice of the laws, because the laws define justice. And logically it's beyond any dispute, therefore, that the laws which define justice could themselves come under judgment as to their own justice. And that is a voluntaristic view of civil law, meaning that if it's the desire of the king or the desire of the parliament or the congress, what have you, if they make the law that makes it just by definition. And so in one society it may be unjust to take advantage of a widow, and in other society it may be unjust not to take advantage of a widow. And so what you have is it's right in one place and wrong in another. Just because the various laws built upon just the desire or whim of the legislature will change. And so a person holding to thrasymachus power theory of the state might very well hold to a positivistic view of law, saying that justice just is what the law says. Now, some Christians portray the law of God in the same way that what's right about the law of God is just, that God said it. There's kind of a voluntaristic character to the law of God. So that if God had wanted to command murder and adultery as being good and their opposites being bad, that he could have as easily willed that nothing bound his will. And that law is simply based on the voluntary, arbitrary, positivistic will of God, that God's law is just a higher form of positivism. You see, you have the theory of positivism transferred into the theological realm when you say that God's right is God's might. And the only reason we believe that we shouldn't commit adultery is because God says so. And the way we avoid that is by pointing out that although we do what God says we are to do, in our knowledge of what is right is based on whatever God says and wills about it. Nevertheless, God's will is not an arbitrary will. His will is built on his own character. And it's because God is the kind of God he is that adultery is wrong for his creatures. The type of God he is makes it wrong for us to engage in wanton killing so that we are not voluntarist theologically any more than we are positivist when it comes to the laws of justice. We believe that God's law reflects God's character, and that's why he wills what he wills. And so we wouldn't, in any sense, it seems to me, hold to the power theory, even with respect to God. That's a great question, though. Are there other questions you'd like to pursue? Okay, let's go to the second theory of the second political theory, the theory of authority in the political realm. And that is traditionalism. Traditionalism being represented by men like Burke and Ockshott. I should tell you that I'm not entirely convinced that I'm pronouncing Oakeshott's name correctly, but that is the way I will pronounce it. It's spelled O, A K, E, S, H, O, T, T, T. And he's a contemporary writer in the tradition of Edmund Burke. Okay. Traditionalism. According to the traditionalist, being under obligation. Being under obligation is just what we mean by being a member of a political community. To say that I'm the member of this political community is just to say that I'm under obligation to its authorities. To recognize the authority of the state is thus to view its rules as rules. To make this clear again, let me use a contrast. Let's say that I'm at Taco Bell and I'm buying my lunch and a four year old child comes along and says it's against the law for you to stand in line here. Well, I might think that's quite a mouthful for a four year old child. And I might think it's a rather strange thing to be telling me and I might even be amazed that somebody would approach a stranger with that kind of message. But one thing I would not do is view that as a rule. If a four year old child came and said it's against the law for you to stand in line here, I wouldn't even be initially inclined to say, oh, maybe there's a law somewhere that I'm breaking. You see, I wouldn't view what the child says as a rule. Now, does the child state this as a rule? Well, of course, the intention of the child is to state a rule or to reflect upon a rule to make application of a rule. And yet I'm not taking that child's remark in that way. I might take it as a joke. I might take that as a piece of rehearsed discourse. Child overhears somebody else like that now uses it in a new context. I might take it as some sign of mental precocity. I mean, there may be a number of ways to take it, but I wouldn't take it as a rule. But what Burke and the traditionalists say is that to recognize authority, the authority of the state, is to view its rules as rules. To recognize the authority of the state is just to recognize that when it speaks, that's a rule, to take it as a rule. Now, I don't take the four year old child's remark as a rule, but when Reagan says something, for instance, I take that as a rule and that means I recognize his authority. Moreover, I recognize what the state says as rules and not as instruments for something else. Rules rather than instruments for something else. Often we say something even if it has the form of an imperative to accomplish something else. I might say, would somebody please turn on the heat? Now it isn't because I think there's something immoral about the heat not being on, but rather I give that directive to accomplish some other goal. Maybe to warm up my feet in a cold room or something like that. So I'd say, would somebody please turn on the heat? That's not to recognize that as a rule and nothing but a rule, but simply to see that as a stepping stone to another end. But when you recognize the authority of the state, you recognize what it says as a rule and not an instrument. And so what this amounts to saying that being a member of a political community is being under that. Being under obligation. I'll get this right. Being under obligation is what we mean by being a member of a political community. And to recognize the authority of the state is to view its rules as rules rather than instruments. That amounts to saying the state has self authenticating authority. The state has self authenticating authority. We do not choose to be obligated to the state. We do not choose to be obligated to the state. Okay, you may choose what clothes you wear, you may choose what woman you marry, you may choose what vocation you'll pursue, but you do not choose to be obligated to the state. You ever notice that, you know, we don't take surveys, we don't go around asking people, well, have you chosen to be obligated to the status yet, you know, like we might ask people, have you chosen to follow Jesus Christ? Have you chosen to follow the state? You don't have to take any survey like that. You may want to take a survey as to those who have willingly obeyed the laws of the land, then rebelled against the laws of the land. But being under obligation to the loss of the land, you don't have to take a survey about it, because that's something, something that's just there. It's a natural condition. And so we uncover our relationship upon reflection, we uncover our relationship to the state, that we're under obligation to the state. It's not something that at some day, you know, say at 13 years old, a boy is to say, well, now, shall I be a member of a political community or not? Shall I be under obligation to the state or not? The traditional state. That doesn't make any sense at all. Nobody chooses to be under obligation. You just grow up and by reflection say, I am under obligation. You uncover the fact of your obligation. You don't come to the fact of your obligation and endorse it. You don't choose to be under authority. You simply discover that you're under authority. Okay, let's take a short break.