Dr Greg Bahnsen - Theonomy and it's Critics: Meredith Kline (Part 1)

It will be my intention in the six Sabbath evenings that we'll be studying together to take what I consider relatively significant major criticisms made of my book Theonomy and Christian Ethics, and to lead you in something of a discussion of them. And I encourage you at any time to break in and ask me to clarify or fill in or. Or challenge what I'm saying. Or we can wait until certain points and I request questions. But the fact that I'm standing behind the podium ought not to stop you from interrupting me. I'm going to take tonight as the first example of a theonomic critic, and one that, at least in our reform circles, is duly respected. Meredith Klein, whose criticism of theonomic ethics can be found in two forms. One, an indirect form form in the Structure of Biblical Authority, his book where he argues his own position on the intrusion ethic of the Old Testament, which would indirectly be a criticism of the theonomic approach or in a more direct form, his review of my book in the Westminster Theological Journal, which appeared last summer. Can I assume that we all have a general understanding of Klein's position on the intrusion ethic of the Old Testament or I wouldn't be surprised if I were. Okay. Well, then let me say just a word or two about that. Dr. Klein tells us that in the Old Testament we find an order of things, an ethical order which is somehow not congenial to the way we do things today, an order which calls for some kind of rationale and explanation. People are treated in a way in which we don't believe they ought to be treated today. One thinks of the Holy War of the Testament as one example, and he reasons that the explanation for this strange order of events is that God intruded the consummation justice of the final day into history at particular points in the experience of Old Testament Israel, which called for a suspension of the common grace order in favor of the consummation order. And consequently Israel, for instance, will to seize the Promised Land and to destroy the Canaanite tribes by the direct command of God, and that foreshadows in a very significant way the coming of Jesus Christ and judgment upon the earth. And it's that kind of justice that God was administering rather than ordinary, if you will, day to day garden variety justice that you see from age to age. Dr. Klein goes on to argue that a further the imprecatory psalms are another example of this kind of phenomenon. Dr. Klein finds in the Old Testament. This is not the sort of thing that you ought to say about your neighbor today. It is rather the inspired declaration of God's servant expressing his consummation, justice toward the enemies of the kingdom of God. And then Dr. Klein goes on to say that as another example of this kind of intrusion of the consummation order, the intrusion of the final day into history, we see the Old Testament penal sanctions. Okay, so this is his general idea of the intrusion in the Old Testament. And the first portion, indeed the major portion of my remarks tonight is going to be a challenge to the whole idea of an intrusion of justice. And my point will simply be that the idea of the intrusion of justice is a contradiction in terms, if you will. It's a conceptual contradiction to say that justice, by its very nature, can be an intrusive notion. But as we go along, I trust you'll catch on to my point. Okay, let me begin my argument toward that conclusion by pointing out that morality, and we're all going to agree, and I think Klein would agree here, too, morality requires objective standards. Morality must be something that is transhuman. It's beyond all social groups, and its referent point is going to be the eternal God. NHG Robinson, in his 1971 work the Groundwork of Christian Ethics, puts it this way. The basic issue between subjectivism and objectivism concerns the interpretation of the ordinary morality with which we are all familiar. The mass of opinions, judgments, and other elements which we use the word morality to indicate, and of which one indispensable feature seems to be, in the broadest sense of the word, some kind of standard or standards of judgment and evaluation. Any attempt to interpret this morality is bound sooner or later to face the question, is this underlying standard? Or are these underlying standards purely subjective relative to the individual or the social group in which they are found, variable with different individuals and groups, and expressing no more than the subjective likes and dislikes, subjective preferences for this rather than that? Or is there, behind all the undeniable variation, something objective, something independent of the moral agent alone or in the mass which he, in his moral judgments, endeavors to grasp and apply? In other words, is morality a purely human phenomenon? Or does it have an indefeasible transhuman reference, a reference beyond all actual men and empirical groups to which they belong, by which both men and groups are in some sense finally judged? And his answer, the Christian answer, is obviously, morality is an objective matter of standards that go beyond any particular group, any particular individual like or dislike. Morality means restraint upon our activities. It means the reform of our activities. Morality is not doing just whatever you wish to do or whatever you are inclined to do it means restraint and reform, or it means nothing. Now I'm going to go on to make a second point from that elementary observation. The ought of morality. When we say one ought to do or one ought not to do. The ought of morality, the obligatory character of morality, is by its very nature uniquely categorical, non arbitrary, absolute and universal in character. Let me say that again. The art of morality has a uniquely categorical, non arbitrary, absolute and universal character. This principle of universality is a precondition of moral reasoning. I'm going to contend. Let me explain. That it's a precondition of moral reasoning. There can be sensible and fruitful disagreement about matters of morality within the field that is delimited by this principle of the universality of moral principles. But I'm contending there can be no sensible and no fruitful disagreement about that principle itself. It is both necessary and fundamental to moral reasoning that when somebody says one ought to do something, it is universal in character. Now, I'm just going to take some time here. I hope it will not bore you terribly, but I think it's valuable to take some time and just explain that even Gentiles, even the pagans who are engaged in moral philosophy, recognize the necessity of the universality of morality. Okay, I'll begin with a quote from Bernard Mayo. These are scattered a number of places. Forgive me while I find them. Mayo, in his book Ethics and The Moral Life, 1958, says, A moral judgment universalizable in the sense that it applies not only to me, but to you. Not only to you, but to me, not only to us, but to everybody. This is involved in speaking of moral principles as opposed to maxims or private principles, policies. When one wants to speak of a moral principle, it must be universalizable. If you cannot make it universal, it is not in its very nature a moral principle. Don Locke, in his article on universalizability, expresses that point by saying that morality is no respecter of persons. Indeed, the one philosopher that you would most expect to be antagonistic to this principle of the universalizability of morality. Jean Paul Sartre, the existentialist himself, grants this very point. Even Sartre is sensitive to the fact that morality must entail universal law. And I'd like to give you a quote or two from Sartre to that effect. Sartre himself is a universalist in the sense that I'm arguing here. He says in one of his writings, I bear the responsibility of the choice which, in committing myself, also commits the whole of humanity. He goes on to say, in this sense, we may Say that there is a human universality, but it is not something given. It is being perpetually made. He gives the example of a young man who has to decide whether to join the resistance movement or to stay home and take care of his mother. And he says the young man was obliged to invent the law for himself. But Sartre's point is, once the existentialist makes a decision for himself, it's not a given, it's not predetermined. Once he makes the decision, he has made the decision for the whole of humanity. Anybody in exactly the same situation should make exactly the same decision. In that sense. Even the existentialist argues that a moral decision is universal. Of course, when we speak of universality of moral judgments, remember not all moral principles apply to everyone, but only to those under its range of application. To say that the principle wives be in submission to your husbands is. Is universal. It's not to say everybody must be in submission to everybody else. It's to say that universally it's true that wives must be in submission. Okay, that seems like an obvious point, but a lot of people misunderstand when you say universal moral principles. They think that means. Well, there can't be any delineating of one class of people over against another in the mention of this moral principle. But that isn't what we mean. We mean that all those under the range of application carry the same obligations. So a moral judgment is universal in the sense that it is applicable to all who fit its specific intent. All in those classes which are mentioned by the principle itself. I'll give you another example of a moral philosopher arguing in this way. A rather well known book about 1961 came out in Philosophical Ethics by Marcus Singer entitled Generalization in Ethics. And in this book he says, let me see, I don't want to read all of this because I think it's going to be more involved than necessary. He speaks of the principle that what is right or wrong for one person must be right or wrong for any similar person in similar circumstances. He says, for obvious reasons, I shall refer to this principle as the generalization principle, even though it has traditionally been known as the principle of fairness or justice or impartiality. The principle of justice. What is right or wrong for me is right or wrong for everybody else in similar circumstances. Not necessarily. Fletcher might say, as Sartre could say, anybody who is in this exact same situation would have to do what love dictates for that situation. The problem is, dictates differs from situation to situation. But Fletcher, by his principles could say that anybody who's in the same situation as you are being tempted to either run over the old lady in the street or help her across the street. Street. Whatever love requires in that situation, it requires for everybody. In identical circumstances. He would probably immediately want to say, but the situation never is identical. Okay, so there always is variation. But he would not, by his principles, have to say that it's not universal.

Objective standard in there. There's no way that a person on the outside could ever see what that is.

No, it's not predetermined. Fletcher, you're right. The situationism says that you never know in advance what's going to be required. You can't predetermine that. But having determined after looking at the situation and weighing all the factors, whatever is to be done in that situation ought to be done in a similar situation as well. And it's universal in that sense. As Singer said, it applies to all similar cases. It's universal that if it's right or wrong for me, it's right or wrong for anybody else in similar circumstances. Okay? Now, RM Hare, in his book Freedom and Reason, 1963, argued in a similar way, saying that it is a logical thesis that moral judgments are universalizable. He says the universalist is committed to a denial of relativism. And then he explains his position. And I want to give you a couple of quotes here. He says all the universalist is committed to in making a moral judgment is the saying that if there is another person in a similar situation, then the same judgment must be made about his case. Okay? It says when you're offering advice to somebody, this advice, though based on careful examination of the specific details of the case, will have to be such as we could give in any similar case, okay? And he goes on to argue that to say that people ought to act differently in similar circumstances is a contradiction. To say that one ought to do X under circumstance C is to say that anybody else who's in circumstance C ought to do X as well. But if you say that Mr. A ought to do X in circumstance C, but Mr. B ought to non X in circumstance C is to contradict yourself. It's actually to speak in a way which is inconsistent. Okay? And then I'd like to give you an even stronger quote from Kurt but Buyer, in a book that if you had studied metaethics, the philosophical history of ethics in this century, perhaps one of the most important recoveries from the long, sad road into the darkness of relativism and existentialism, the moral point of view in the early 1960s, 1958, as I recall. Beyer wrote his book as something of a counteraction to that progress of thought. And he likens what he calls the moral point of view. He's arguing this is a distinctive approach to issues. The moral point of view. This is not the historical point of view. This is not the artistic point of view. This is not the personal point of view. The moral point of view has the following characteristics. At one point in the book, he likens it to the God's eye point. The moral point of view is the point of view. If there were a God that he would have. He doesn't happen to believe in the Christian God, but if there were, that would be the moral point of view. He says that the moral point of view is beyond arbitrariness or personal decision. The moral point of view is beyond group legislation, beyond group custom. Because the moral point of view is invariable. It means acting on principle without making exceptions. And then I'm going to read you something of a lengthy quote here from his book. He makes the very telling point that the moral point of view is one which is meant for everybody and therefore entails a missionary spirit. And the moral point of view cannot be esoteric in its outlook. As I read this quote, remember what Dr. Klein says about the moral point of view in Israel be in fact limited only to the Israelites. Because that was an intrusion, a different form of justice than the garden variety justice that we expect in every other age and culture. Bayer says the point of view of morality is inadequately characterized by saying that I have adopted it. If I act on principles, that is, on rules to which I do not make exception, ever acting on them would frustrate one or other of my purposes or desires. He says it is characterized by greater universality than that it must be thought of as a standpoint from which rules are considered as being acted on by everyone. Moral rules are not merely rules to which a person must not make exceptions in his favor, but they are principles meant for everybody. The teaching of morality must be completely universal and open. Morality is not the preserved or privileged class or individual. People are neglecting their duties, for instance, if they do not teach the moral rules to their children. Children are removed from the homes of criminals precisely because they are not likely to be taught the moral rules there. An esoteric code, a set of precepts known only to the initiated and perhaps jealously concealed from outsiders, can at best be a religion, not a morality. Thou shalt not eat. And this is A secret. Or always leave the third button of your waistcoat undone. But don't tell anyone except the initiated. Members may be part of an esoteric religion, but not of morality. Thou shalt not kill. But it is a strict secret is absurd. You begin to see the point. Morality can't be esoteric in private and kept to the private preserve of some privileged class. It must by its very nature be universal. Thou shalt not kill. But this is a secret for outsiders. It's just absurd. He says. And then where was I? He goes on. Esoteric morality is a contradiction in terms. It is no accident that the so called higher religions were imbued with the missionary spirit. For they combined the beliefs of demons and gods and spirits characteristic of of primitive religions with a system of morality. Primitive religions are not usually concerned to proselytize. On the contrary, they are imbued with the spirit of the exclusive trade secret. If one thinks of one's religion as concentrated wisdom of life revealed solely to the chosen people, one will regard it as the exclusive property of the club to be confined to the elect. If on the other hand the rules are thought of, thought to be for everyone to obey, one must inconsistency. Want to spread the message, Begin to get the point. Morality by its very nature the moral point of view means you want this to be spread to everybody. It's for everybody. If it's wrong or right for me, it's wrong or right for anybody in similar circumstances. And to say no, it's only right or wrong for this particular people in this particular case is not to be talking about morality. It's to be talking about something very esoteric.

Yes, John Klein says that the moral law is universal.

We'll get to that. We'll get to that. I'm setting up the conditions for what is going to be the horns of the dilemma.

But you're not saying that he's implicitly committing some of these fallacy values. He's restricting that he would agree with you on the moral law, but not on a civil law.

Let me tell you my strategy. I don't like to go behind the meet and between potatoes and take you into the kitchen to show you how it's coming out. Basically what I'm doing here is I'm going to be setting up a situation where Klein has only one way out of the absurdities of what Bayer's talking about. It will turn out to be the way out that he wants to take. I will quote him as showing that is his way out. And then when I Go ahead. And I try to contradict or refute that way. The point is, he's left with nothing else. Okay, I'm leaving him only one exit, and then I'm going to argue that that exit's not available. Okay, what we're getting at here, then I'm driving at this point and stressing it over and over again, is that the moral point of view is universal. It's not esoteric.

Okay, your question.

Is everybody has their own moral code. Contradiction in terms. Sure. Because morality, by its very nature is not relativistic. It's universal and invariable. That's the point I'm getting at, is that that's not just a uniquely Christian observation. Everybody from Sartre through the analytic philosophers that I'm quoting will say that justice means doing similar things in similar situations. The same obligations rest upon the same people or different people who are in similar circumstances. And now, that being true, you can't have an esoteric morality, which is precisely what relativism is to say, do your own thing. But that means there is no restraint on your behavior and there's no guidance to your behavior. That just undermines the whole purpose of morality.

So to say that there is morality is to say that everyone cannot do their own thing.

That's right. That's what the moral point of view requires. And for all of the popularity of the do your own thing philosophy, it's just absolute absurdity when it comes to philosophical analysis, and everybody seems to know it. You don't find people teaching in competent philosophy departments that'll say that. They may get around to the same conclusion, you know, going around the bar in different ways. But nobody can directly say, yeah, you have your morality, I have mine, and that's just great. Morality by its very nature doesn't tolerate that what is right or wrong for me is right or wrong for you, too. Morality is no respecter of persons. Let me give you just a couple more quotes here. One of the leading legal philosophers of our age, HLA Hart, in his book Punishment and Responsibilities Essays in the Philosophy of Of Law, has this to say in his article Prolegomena to the Principles of Punishment. He says principles of justice, however, are also widely taken on the amount of punishment in at least two further ways. The first is the somewhat hazy requirement that, like cases be treated alike. He goes on to say, if a certain offense is specially prevalent at a given time and a judge passes heavier sentences than on previous offenders as a warning, perhaps some sacrifice of justice to the safety of society is involved. Now Hart thinks that's all right. I mean, I don't want to misrepresent him, but I want you to notice that even he, very much even he recognizes that he is sacrificing principles of justice. When he allows a judge to give heavier penalties in some ages or periods of time than in others, he says justice, a principle of justice is that, like cases be treated alike. And then also in Joel Feinberg's book Doing and Deserving, the chapter entitled Crime Clutchability and Individuated Treatment, the opening statement of his article is that justice consists in treating similar cases in similar ways. And dissimilar cases in dissimilar ways is one of the oldest philosophical truisms. Okay, that's why I said competent philosophers. We're not going to make these kind of remarks. Justice consists in treating similar cases in similar ways and dissimilar cases in dissimilar ways.

And you gave us that long quote before and asked us, listen to the similarities to crime. Were you talking about moral similarities or justice similarities? You tend to use morality and justice coterminously.

That's right. I'm using them as equivalents.

Klein does not.

Now he doesn't.

He does not use morality and justice because terminus is synonymous.

Can justice be immoral? No. Can morality be unjust?

Justice can be postponed, says Klein.

Well, but if it is the age.

Of the Gentiles as a postponement, that's right.

But if it's just to forestall justice, then it is moral to forestall justice. God is not immoral to do that, nor is he. Okay, so even he uses them the.

Same way, but they're not the same.

Well, in some cases he may use the word justice for judgment, which is just the mistake of the English language. If he means that justice means simply judgment, justice means morality in the broadest sense, too. It means what is right and what is wrong, giving people their due.

I for one, didn't see the similarity of the quote. Klein is saying all over the place, morality is universal, justice is not.

No, I don't believe that's true. I think what he says here is that the Jews had a particular form of morality that we aren't to follow today.

Almost perfect justice.

Yeah, a different form of justice. And I'm going to argue that that's a contradiction in terms.

But I still didn't see it in the quote. What should I have said? I feel like I've missed something.

Okay, let's go back and look at it. Right at the very end of it is where I Thought the screws started turning. Esoteric morality is a contradiction in terms. Yes, and the only way he's going to be able to agree is by the 1x that I'm going to give him in a minute. No, he's going to do it by saying, you will argue that justice requires similar treatment in similar cases. But the cases are not similar. The conditions have changed. That was an order of consummation justice we live in an order of common grace justice. And that is the way Klein is going to get out of the absurdity. But he comes very close to sounding like this. If one thinks of one's religion as concentrated wisdom of life revealed solely to the chosen people, one will regard it as the exclusive property of the clerk to be confined to the elect. I mean, he comes very close to saying that these principles of justice are for the elect people, the Jews, but for nobody else and in the church. But of course, we don't have the sword today. If, on the other hand, the rules are thought of to be for everybody to obey the theonomic position that the Gentiles around Israel should obey them too, one must, in consistency, want to spread the message.

If I grant the likeness of the that to Klein, would you grant me that? Klein does make a distinction between morality and justice.

I just can't do that. I just don't see that he does. I mean, I'd be willing to. It's not perverseness on my part, it's maybe blindness.

But he makes a real distinction between the moral law and the civil law. And that's predicated upon the distinction between morality and justice.

Well, now if you want to say he distinguishes moral law and civilization, civil law, I would agree with that. It's just that the word justice and morality cannot be used in that diverse way. You can't have immoral justice or unjust morality.

He would grant that.

Okay, well, if that's true, then my point continues. I'm talking about principle of morality, principle of justice in the same breath here. Because both must be universal.

That's this whole point about the delay.

It's perfect morality delayed. No.

I don't see Klein ever advocating a different morality for the Gentiles. He's advocating a different dealing, a different justice.

Was immoral for David not to execute murderers.

It was immoral and it was also unjust.

Okay, was it, Is it immoral for us to not exercise murderous.

It is not immoral, but it is unjust. I mean, it is.

Not. What you're running into is the impossibility of trying to use these terms in by putting a watershed between them. They can't be. Justice and morality have got to be harmonious.

I'm just trying to be fair to Clyde. I think he would say, well, I'm.

Not going to be unfair to him. I'm going to read right from him and show you his way out. I mean, it's not. I think you can count on the fact that I wouldn't have spent all this time just for a semantic argument with the man. If he wants to distinguish the terms, let him and then I'll use his terms. The point is, whatever counts as just or moral or whatever has got to be universal. The point being here. Now, the conclusion of this line of thought is that a moral judgment is universal. Ceteris paribus. Terrible Latin, but at least you can spell it that way. Ceteris paribus means if all other relevant factors remain un. A moral judgment is universal if all other relevant factors remain unaltered, that is, if all morally relevant circumstances are unchanged. Because obviously somebody could say that from person to person, there's always some difference because it's different people. But the whole point is the difference between a white man and a black man doing things, or between an older man and a younger man, or between my social group and your social group, whatever that may be, is not morally relevant. And so a moral judgment is universal if all other morally relevant circumstances are unchanged. I'm not going to get into all of this. My question is going to become this. Now, if we have. If we have established that moral judgments are universalizable for everything within their mentioned scope, if all morally relevant circumstances are unchanged, if we've established that, then one has got to wonder how Dr. Klein doesn't feel it is right for all civil magistrates to execute rapists, for instance, or idolaters, if that is a principle of justice, justice or of morality, that the civil magistrate ought to do that, how can Dr. Klein say that it applies to the Old Testament Jews but not to others? We have just said moral judgments are universalizable for everything within their mentioned scope if all morally relevant circumstances are unchanged. Well, in the first place, I want you to notice it's very important. And here's where I think we're going to be scratching where Joe is itching. We want to be fair to Klein. He believes we have the same moral standards today. Page 160 in the structure of Biblical Authority. Klein says this concept of intrusion ethics is not prejudicial to the permanent validity of the moral law of Moses. The Distinction made is not one of different standards. He says we have the same standards today as we had in the Old Testament. This is not prejudicial to the morality of the moral law of Moses. Klein says we have the same moral standards, but unlike the theonomist notice, Klein will not say that the state may use the sword in the way that the Old Testament did. In fact, he says the state may not use the sword today as it was used in the days of the old testament. Page 166, Klein says, in the area of penal sanctions against offending covenant members, the intrusion principle again manifests itself. In the present age, such violations are subject to ecclesiastical discipline, but the sword may not be wielded by either church or state in punishment of such offenders. Okay, same moral standards, but the sword may not be used in the same way today. That would seem to indicate that Klein either thinks that the justice of the Old Testament was an esoteric justice and not universalizable, or that it was just universalizable, but it only mentioned under the scope of those to whom it applied. It mentions only Jews. Or he thinks that there are changed circumstances which are morally relevant. Let me read you my conclusion of the line of thought a minute ago and show you how this comes in. There are three junctures at which Klein might try to opt out and justify the idea that the sword was used one way in that age, but not used that way today. That does seem to appear to be a double standard of morality. After all, it's right to do it once here, but it's wrong to do it over now. Doesn't seem quite right given the universalizability of morality. No, because there's a question of the justice of the punishments too.

Again, the just punishment is delayed. I don't follow why that couldn't logically be.

Was it right for David's test, take the life of a rapist?

It was right and it was just.

Is it right today to take the life of a rapist?

No, it is moral, but it is in just.

In the present age, such violations are subject to ecclesiastical discipline, but the sword may not be wielded. It is not moral. It is not just. It is immoral and unjust to take the life of a rapist by the sword. Sword today. Klein does not say that is an option open to us but not required as it was in Israel. He says it is prohibited to us today. Okay, now doesn't that sound like a double standard of justice when you say, david, you ought to punish rapists with a sword? Carter you may not punish rapists with a sword. Does seem to. You have similar circumstances on the surface, but you're saying two different things. And I'm saying on the surface, I'm not going to leave him in this dilemma long, but on the surface, it looks like a double standard. All right, now, if our principle is moral judgments are universalizable, he might disagree with that. He might say, no, it's esoteric. But I said moral judgments are universalizable for everything within their mentioned scope. My second point, he might say, well, the mentioned scope was only Israel, or they're universalizable for everything within their mentioned scope. If all morally relevant circumstances are unchanged, he might say the morally relevant circumstances have changed, which is, by the way, the way he's going to answer it. But let's go through the three options. He might say that, no, this is just an esoteric form of justice, not universal justice. But if he were to say that, he'd be making ethical nonsense. That's the whole point that, you know, redeemed and unredeemed, regenerate and unregenerate philosophers recognize that morality must be universal. Even Sartre knows that. And so we don't want to say Klein is falling into that trap, but just blatantly saying, that's right, it's a double standard. Do your own thing. The Jews did it one way, we do it our way, and it's a double standard. I don't think he wants to say that. Well, then does he want to claim that the moral judgments are universalizable for everything within their mentioned scope? And as a matter of fact, the Old Testament civil laws only mentioned Israel and therefore only apply to Israel in the same way that we say wives, be subject to your husbands is universal. Only for wives, however. Okay, well, if he were to claim that sort of thing, which I don't think he does, I think he'd be making a very obvious mistake. Because you will never find in the Old Testament law anything to the effect that says you punish rapists in this way only if you're a Jew. Okay, that's just not the reading of the Old Testament law. Somebody might want to argue it's the intent of the Old Testament law. But nobody who can read the Old Testament or at least competently read it, is going to say that that's what the words say. There is no restriction in the giving of the law in that way. In fact, you find just the opposite. What you have is the Old Testament being imbued with a missionary spirit. Isn't that right? In Deuteronomy 4, Moses says, and this is your wisdom in the sight of all the nations round about you? And the nations will say, what other nation has laws so just and righteous as these? There is a model morality. David wanted to make all the nations round about him subject to his theonomic rule. Klein will grant David had to rule in a theonomic way. The important thing to notice is that David wanted to make all the nations round about him subject to his rule, which must mean subject to the law of God, because that's the way he ruled, or was to. Isaiah says in the 51st chapter that the justice of God's law is a light to the nations. Daniel ruled according to the law of God even as a dignitary in Babylon. All right, if Klein says that God's law is to the effect only you Jews should execute rapists, I think he'd simply be making them a certain we see in the example of Sodom, of Sodom, in the example of nineveh in Romans 1 and 2, that the principles of God's law applied to all the nations, even outside of Israel, before and after the giving the Mosaic law. Indeed, Leviticus 18. I think maybe this is a good passage to read so that we really get this firmly in mind. I want you to notice how the judgment coming upon the Canaanite tribes is described and what warning is given to Israel in Leviticus 18:24 27. Defile not yourselves in any of these things. For in all these the nations are defiled, which I cast out from before you, and the land is defiled, therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it. And the land vomits out her inhabitants. Why is God vomiting out of the land the inhabitants? Because of all these defilements. And he says, you don't commit these defilements. Verse 26. You therefore shall keep my statutes and mine ordinances, and shall do and shall not do any of these abominations, neither the homeborn nor the stranger. Universal standard of justice Stranger or the homeborn. For all these abominations have the men of the land done that were before you, and the land is to follow that the land vomit not you also out when ye defile it, as it vomited out the nation that was before you. Why were the Canaanite tribes cast out of the land for their abominations against the law of God? Same standard of justice, and notice the same penalty. And if you commit these abominations, I will vomit you out of the well. So there's Clearly a missionary spirit, a universality about these laws that we can see on the surface of things. And we have to recognize that Ezra, in the seventh chapter of the Book of Ezra, we find, recorded his praise of God. That God should put it into the heart of Artaxerxes. To have the law of God enforced in all the region beyond the river, even to the point of the death penalty as specified by the law of God, doesn't mean Artaxerxes was regenerate, doesn't even mean that Artaxerxes understood the full implications of his decree. But Ezra praised God, that that sort of thing would be put in the heart of a pagan king to have God's law enforced. So, no, I don't want to make Klein out to make the obvious mistake of a double standard of justice, esoteric morality. I don't want him to commit the obvious exegetical mistake of saying that only Israel is mentioned in the scope of the law, and so there's only one other way out. Changed circumstances are morally relevant. Does Klein want to say, then that morally relevant circumstances for sociopolitical ethics have changed so that what was to be done to rapists and homosexuals and kidnappers in the Old Testament ought not to be done to them today? Does he claim that the genuine differences between the covenants, whether they be redemptive differences, cultural differences, historical differences, racial differences, geopolitical differences, does he want to say that those genuine differences between the covenants, things that I don't deny for a moment there are differences, does he want to say that those differences are morally relevant for no longer keeping the just laws of the Old Testament? Do these kinds of changes entail changes in moral obligation? Well, if they do, how do we know that they do? Who can say what are morally relevant circumstances? Obviously the lawgiver himself. And so if those changes, changes of culture, changes of covenant, changes of geopolitical entity, changes of race, changes of history, if those changes are morally relevant, we can only know that because God himself tells us that they are morally relevant. And consequently, it is incumbent upon Dr. Klein to show us that Scripture itself reveals the moral significance of those changes. It's not enough for anybody to come along and say, but now wait a minute, things are different between Old Testament Jews and New Testament Americans because everybody in his right mind's going to grant there are plenty of differences, differences of culture, differences of race, differences of history. The question is, are those morally relevant? And you can only know they're morally relevant if the word of God says so. And here I'm Relying upon the cardinal doctrine of the Reformation sola scriptura. Only God's word can offer that kind of distinction. And here's where I think Klein is at his weakest point. For he has offered not one passage from Scripture that teaches the relevance of such covenantal changes for a moral difference in socio political affairs. I know that he offers an intrusion ethic framework, but he offers no exegesis for it. But now let me back up just for a minute. What if I grant intrusion ethics? As a matter of fact, I do believe there are typological foreshadowings in the Old Testament. I'm willing to say the penal sanctions. I say right in theonomy, the penal sanctions foreshadow the final judgment in some ways. So I'm willing to grant an intrusion or typological approach to some of these things in the Old Testament. But even if you grant this, one has got to ask what counts as an intrusion so that it doesn't apply to other people. Even if you say the intrusion principle is true, then what falls under the principle? Klein says the invasion of Canaan. I would say that's right. Klein says the imprecatory psalms. I'm inclined to say that's right. Klein says the penal sanctions of the Old Testament. And I say, why do you make that claim? You see what I'm getting at? Klein has not given himself near enough defense. He hasn't offered one scriptural text to defend the intrusion idea or the moral revolution relevance of these changes. But even if he did, he would have to go beyond that scriptural evidence and offer further scriptural evidence. The penal sanctions fall within that category and he hasn't done that. So my argument here is that he is twofold short of offering what God's word would tell us we have to have before we believe what he is saying. Only Scripture can make the point that these changes are morally relevant. And as a matter of fact, Scripture says just the opposite. My third point is, you see, not that he doesn't simply offer the Scripture evidence, but I've got plenty of scriptural evidence to the opposite effect. The Creator's law is absolute. The Bible teaches that in both Old and New Testaments, because the law reflects the standards of the Creator, and that Creator is unchanging in his moral character. The covenant stipulation itself is you shall not take away from the law of God. And so God's own law forbids dropping anything from God's law without God say so. Jesus says that there's a presumption of continuity because Prima facie evidence about the character of the Creator, about the stipulations of the covenant, the declaration of the Messiah, and the use of the New Testament authors that show that the law of God is continuous through the ages.

Before you get away from the conquest, what would you say to the observation, was the conquest marked?

I would say yes, because God directed.

Why can't we have a holy war today?

Because God doesn't direct it.

So you do have the delay of the holy war.

Sure, yeah. If God were to tell Americans today, go kill the communists because they're an evil, degenerate people, it would be moral for us to do it. The reason? It's immoral and the reason I'm terribly upset when people make it out to be a whole cause against communism. In that sense, that we can take up the sword in aggressive warfare because God has not directed us to do so.

And it would not be immoral of God to say, stop capital punishment until the Judgment Day.

If the lawgiver said so. That would make it right. Sure. But you see, my point is that it's right. Klein offers, that's right. If the New Testament gave us reason to believe that had been suspended, I'd have no objection. And that's where there is, if you will, a principal difference between Klein and Murray. Murray is in principle a theonomist, because his procedure is theonomic. He wants to go to the New Testament and find reason why capital punishment's been suspended. I think he's wrong. I don't think he exegetes those passages in characteristically great Murray style. I think he's off at that point. But Klein doesn't do that. Klein doesn't look for specific New Testament texts. He says the whole structure tells us this.

And then he dares to say, it's obvious.

Yes, that any covenant child should be able to see it.

And anything else is Hitlerian.

That's right, yes. I will not mention names, since this is on tape, but people where I was recently lecturing of some stature were prone to say that. We can't even figure out what Klein is getting at in his intrusion ethic when you try to really nail it down analytically. And yet he has the audacity to say, any covenant child. This is obvious to any covenant child. It's not even obvious to the PhDs and the leading theological thinkers of our age what he's saying, much less to a covenant child. Well, let me go on. Klein has got to be saying then, that changed circumstances are morally relevant. But he doesn't give Any exegesis for it. And I can offer contrary exegesis, but I want to go beyond that. What could be the morally changed differences? I mean, what could be the differences which are morally relevant? Let me put that correctly. It's certainly not morally relevant that these standards of the Old Testament were followed in the locality of the promised Land. What if somebody said, but you see, the promised land had this special feature that that's what justice was called for in that locality, but not outside of. Was not given to outsiders to follow also. Well, but you see, it was given to outsiders to follow. That's what all that evidence is about, being a model of justice, David. Wanting the nations to keep it and so forth. Besides, do we really want to say that God was left with this absurd situation that we find in dry counties around the United States today? If you travel through Texas and you go through a dry county and then come into a wet county, you don't know the dry, wet county distinction. If you travel out of a dry county into a wet county, what is the first building you find on the other side of the county line? Liquor store. Young people being brought up in the locality of that situation learn to do what to the law? They despise it. This is ridiculous. People are not supposed to drink in this county, but it's all right over here. So they just go across the county line and it's all right? Apparently. Well, is that what it was in Israel? God said, you shall not have these homosexual abominations within the locality of Israel. But if you step across the county line, it's okay? Of course not. I mean, so there cannot be moral significance to the fact that the Promised land is where the law was to be kept.

Tallit is on the prayer shawl. They were not moral.

That's right.

They were not moral.

Yeah, that's right. But it had nothing to do to the promised Land. Yeah. All I'm arguing now, I'm putting up some trial balloons. What if Klein said, here's the morally relevant change. They were in the promised land, were not. And I'm saying, but you see, the promised land had nothing to do with the morality of those laws.

Law changes, the people change or the situation changes.

That's right. And I'm looking for a change.

He certainly would not espouse the other two.

It's not morally relevant that these standards were given earlier, before Christ either. For Christ himself endorsed those standards till the end of the age. Besides, Christ is a king over all men. He's the reconciler of all things. In creation and the judge over all. So there's no reason to think that because God gave these standards to Old Testament Jews, those standards don't apply to us. Paul in 1st Timothy 1 appeals to the political use of these laws. As a matter of fact. Well, if it's not morally relevant that the promised land has changed or that the ages have changed, is it morally relevant these laws were given to a particular political body or institution and not given to us? Well, we've already gone over the evidence against that. Deuteronomy 4 says it's a model code for all societies. Deuteronomy shows judgment against the nations because they didn't follow that law. In Psalm 2 David says that all the kings of the earth should accept the instruction of Jehovah. Psalm 119David says he would speak God's law before kings. We had the prophetic denunciations in the Old Testament against the non covenantal nations for violating the law of the covenant. And so if anything, the intrusion in the Old Testament is not an ethical intrusion and it is an epistemological intrusion. God did not intrude new moral standards. He simply intruded a better way of knowing the moral standards. He gave special revelation of what all nations should have known through general revelation. The intrusion is epistemological. The discontinuity is special revelation over against general revelation. But it's not a different thing that is revealed. God reveals it in different ways. There's an epistemological intrusion, but he does not reveal different ethical standards. Well then what is the answer? What approach does Klein take? Well, as it turns out, Klein's own answer is that the morally changed situation. Oh, by the way, I want to read for you. That is what he says, that it's because of changed circumstances that that the law doesn't apply today. He says the distinction made is not one of different standards, but of the application of constant standard of a constant standard under significantly different conditions. Okay, so out of his own mouth he says that is the way I'm going to get out of this double standard thing. It's the same standard. I don't believe in two standards the same standard, but there are significantly different circumstances today. And then Klein defines those Circumstances on page 166 very well. When he says in the present age such violations are subject to ecclesiastical discipline, but the sword may not be wielded by either church or state in punishment of such offenders according to the principle of common grace. He says it is then common consummation justice that was intruded when death was prescribed for religious offenses in Israel. But today we live not under consummation justice, we live under common grace. We've narrowed it down. This is Klein's way out. He doesn't appeal to exegetical support. He doesn't appeal to the land, to the difference in people, different in race, different in history. He appeals to the fact that common grace is now the order, order today. And if I could just take a few minutes and then I'll be done, I'd like to show the inadequacy of appealing to common grace in the first place. The appeal to common grace is thoroughly ambiguous. What on earth does that mean? Anybody who's done reading in the Reformed controversy over common grace in this century knows that there are scads of definitions and concepts of common grace. And so when Klein says it's common grace that makes the difference, one has to say, yeah, but that's like saying the snark makes the difference. What do you mean by snark? What do you mean by common grace? Indeed, if you take the approach of Dr. Van Til to common grace, which is only one of many, the one I think is most adequate, but nevertheless only one of many. But if you take his approach as Klein seems to think he does, you notice that Dr. Van Till insists that common grace does not break down the antithesis between redeemed and unredeemed approaches to life. And yet Klein tells us that common grace means we have to have a common standard of morality. Isn't that ironic? Common grace, according to Van Till, means we must keep up the antithesis. We must keep up the antithesis. Whereas Klein says, no, we now have to be in socio political matters, in community life norms, and in dealing with common grace, the common standards that we can get to with the unbelievers in our society. And so it's not only thoroughly ambiguous, I think it's suspect on a ventilian approach.

Give me more definition on consummation justice.

Consummation justice is the justice we'll see on the day in which God consummates history on the final judgment. Okay, My second point against Klein's appeal to common grace is that as I see it, common grace is creation grace. That is, this is the grace that is given to maintain and preserve the creation order. Until all the gods redeemed are in and God winds up history at the consummation, creation will continue. And one of the orders of creation, not an order of redemption, is the state. And one of the ways in which God commonly graces people and the way God commonly blesses people is by giving them civilizations and societies in which there can be elementary principles of fair play and justice enacted. Consequently, the law of God for sociopolitical matters is a clear example of common grace. It preserves the creation order until the end of time. And in that sense, Klein's appeal to common grace proves just the opposite of what he thinks it proves. It proves that we must keep the penal sanctions of the Old Testament, you see, because theonomists feel that the penal sanctions are God's common grace. But let's go beyond this now. Let's press. This is going to be a little bit. We're getting progressively tough on Klein. Okay? What is common grace? Thoroughly ambiguous. Take a Vantillian approach. Incline's wrong. If you take a theonomic approach, see common grace as creation grace, then I think he's wrong. But even given there are all these differences in conception of common grace, all theologians must grant that common grace involves sunshine, rain and crops. Standard examples in the Bible of God giving common blessing to all men. God's common grace is seen in sunshine, in rain and in crops. Klein says the Old Testament was not an order of common grace. We are in order of common grace today. Does he mean to say, therefore, that in the Old Testament in Israel there was no sunshine, rain and crops? Do you see the scriptural impossibility of this claim? He can't distinguish our circumstance today as one of common grace over against the Old Testament. Because it's obvious in the Old Testament, God's common grace was seen in sunshine, rain and crops, the pervasive scriptural examples of common grace. And so it is just a complete category mistake for Klein to try to differentiate 20th century America from Israel before the coming of Christ on the principle of common grace. Obviously the Israelites had sunshine, rain and crops. So that can hardly be denied in Israel. You can hardly say it wasn't a common grace order. Therefore, moreover, where is it that the justice of the law of God, the justice of the penal sanctions of God's law, is tied to the notion of suspended common grace? Where is it? In the Old Testament you find anything approximating God saying you are to execute rapists because common grace is being suspended. Here in the Old Testament you have just the opposite. In Hebrews 2, 2 we read every transgression and offense received a just recompense of reward it didn't receive. What happens once common grace is backed off? It received just exactly what God's justice for all men requires, the just recompense. Besides, was this really an Intrusion of consummation justice. Have you ever stopped to think about that claim? On the face of it, it is just impossible. On the day of consummation, is it going to be true that some people are executed and others not? Will some sins not come under the judgmental sword of God? Of course not. On the day of judgment, of final judgment, every sin will be a capital crime. Precisely. Precisely. Lust as well as physical adultery. That's right. And so you cannot say that the criminal sanctions in the Old Testament were an example of consummation justice, because in that case everybody would have been subject to death. And so you see, on the face of it, the Old Testament was an order of suspended common grace and the intrusion of consummation justice. No sunshine, rain and crops. The Old Testament order was consummation justice. Can that be taken seriously when you understand the dimensions of the consummation judgment of God? You see, I think on the very face of it, Klein is making a mistake to make this claim. And then finally, and this is, this would be my last point, notice these three characteristics of Klein's view. On Klein's view, few people today would be attracted to and would choose the Old Testament penal system. They would prefer the freedoms and the less stringent penalties of extra biblical modern law codes. That's what Klein's getting at. That that was too stringent. That was the consummation stringency that we see in the Old Testament. But today we live under common grace. So people would not be attracted to the Old Testament penal system. They would prefer the less stringent penalties of modern law codes. The extra biblical systems are, on Klein's view, more gracious than the Old Testament because now we have common grace there they had consummation justice. And so it is more gracious. It's a suspension of God's judgment when we don't have to execute these people today. On Klein's view. And so extra biblical systems are more gracious than the Old Testament. Indeed, the harsh penalties of the Old Testament have been suspended under the common grace of God for us today, the common grace with which God blesses other nations, the Old Testament penalties exemplify final judgment. They don't exemplify desired gracious and blessing. And so in non Israelite systems, in Gentile systems, this judgment is being graciously suspended today. As grace was suspended in the Old Testament, judgment is suspended in the New. That is true to Klein's own wording of the situation, consummation justice intruded in the Old Testament, common grace given in the New. Our common grace for all nations and only seen in some nations in the Old. Therefore, the Old Testament system is, on Klein's view, at least three things. One, it is at least less preferable as a social blessing than other available systems. Less preferable. Two, it is a unique order not meant for everybody. And three, it is judgment instead of grace. It is a suspension of grace just so that judgment might be seen. And so when you look at Klein's view in that way, less preferable, unique, and judgment instead of grace, then you see how totally wrong this is on a biblical view, because the Old Testament presents the law and it presents the whole law without distinction. I would remind you the Old Testament says that this is a wonderful social blessing to be desired by all men, not something less preferable than common grace. It says it is a model for all nations, not unique to Israel. And thirdly, the Old Testament says it is God's gracious provision. Klein says this is not grace, it is judgment. But the law says it is grace. David says, grant me thy law graciously. So it doesn't seem to me that Klein's appeal to common grace for the eight reasons or 10 reasons I've offered you can by any means stand exegetical theological cross examination. But as I've already said, that's the only exit he had left, the only one left to him. And in that case we must simply conclude that the notion of an intrusion of justice is a conceptual contradiction.

Could we add one other? Would you say this is fair to.

Crime.

Laws, people, situations? The laws have not changed, the people have not changed, the situation has.

We.

Come into the New Testament, the conquest is no longer moral because God no longer requires it. In fact, he predicts it being hunted. Punishments of the Old Testament have been suspended. Exegetically, you would say any child can see has been suspended. Therefore these Old Testament punishments are immoral. Justice has been suspended because God. God has taken the way temporarily. He's delayed the punishments, therefore it's immoral to carry them out. He bases that on. He has not exegetically demonstrated that. What I'm trying to say is if you destroy his argument from common grace, he's got one argument left. He can say to you, I will now show you those scriptures. But I said any child could see. Now, to satisfy you, he's going to have to show you scriptures where God changed the morality. In other words, where God says, okay magistrates, stop doing what you're doing. So where he is right is if God changed it, then it would be moral where he is. I wasn't going to say it's not wrong, but where he has been incomplete is that he has not demonstrated that. See, See, what we're saying is Klein okay, if you destroy common grace, we still haven't proven Klein is wrong. What we have proven is Klein has not yet given us the evidence. That's how I ended at Westminster Lecture. He's trying to make that point. He's given us a rationale, but he hasn't given us an argument.

I, I believe that you were. I think you were.

Okay, Klein, come on, give us the Scriptures. That it's not the. That it is not the magistrate's duty and in fact, it's not his privilege. Give us a scripture, sir.

Yes, and I think you were totally gracious in putting it that way. I'm going to take it a step beyond that and say I'm now convinced after studying this over and over and over again that Klein is saying he give us the Scriptures, that it is plain to anybody if he understands the relationship between common grace and consummation justice. Oh, I can show it to you right in his writings and look at the review of theonomy over and over and over again he makes these strong claims. Any child of the covenant can see it. It is a matter so broad, it's a matter of theological categories for Klein, not a matter of exegetical evidence. He doesn't need it.

Settles it.

Settles it. Well, that's what he says right here. He appeals to common grace, and he says that is significantly different. So we don't keep the penal sanctions today. It is common grace. Now, I will grant you that if he can go and do what Murray tried to do, I think unsuccessfully, but what Murray tried to do and find specific New Testament texts to turn it around, that'd be fine. But I think Klein is not a theonymous, even in the principal sense, because he doesn't feel obligated to do that. Murray did. And that's why I claim him as a theonomist, even though he doesn't go all the way on the conclusions. I think Murray and Klein have significant theological methodologies that are different.

I recently gave a final examination and I had to read one chapter of Murray, the Law and Grace chapter. And one of the dispensationalists in my class said, man, I don't even know where Murray's coming from yet. He had no difficulty with crying. And the weird thing that I observed.

Guilt by association, but that's okay.

But the thing that I observed is he couldn't understand why Mary would Want to insist on the perpetuity of the law, yet Mary. Yet Klein himself had mouthed the same thing, but it didn't come out. He didn't come off.

Yeah.

You see, he didn't feel the bite.

That's right.

When he got done with Klein, her fatuity was blurred, sure, but with Murray, it was hanging there and bothered him. The rent and seek, he said, I don't know why Murray would want to do that for a Christian. Why would he want me to feel obligated? So I'm convinced totally that there is.

A conciptual difference, a systemic difference. I think it's a matter of systems.

Right. Systemic. Good. Between Klein and Mary.

Yeah.

Ross, do you see the conquest motive kind of as a central point in Klein's thinking? If we would grant that Old Testament ethics should apply to a pagan culture, don't we have a form of conquest over that pagan culture which he says we no longer have the right to conquest any nation, and to go in there with biblical law and to put those into effect is a form of conquest? He's saying, no, you can't do that because we can no longer follow this conquest motif.

I can imagine somebody arguing that way. The obvious problem, of course, is that it entails a rather conspicuous equivocation on the word conquest. Because what Klein would properly show to be wrong is if we are trying to bring conquest in the law of God by means of the sword today, but we mean by conquest no more than what the Great Commission means, that we want to preach the word of God, the whole counsel of God to all nations so that they come to do what? Be the disciples of Christ and observe all things that he has commanded. That's conquest also. But the New Testament form of conquest is by the sword of the Spirit, not with the sword that you hold in your hand.

And the other point that comes out, conclusion that you're bringing up is more or less the subjective one that he says, which system is preferable? Which one is the higher of the.

Two, ethical or moral orders?

And he's saying grace over law. But I feel.

No, he's saying the opposite.

No, no, no. He's saying that we ought to prefer God's common grace to God's consummation, just justice. What I'm saying is temporarily, but what I'm saying is the Old Testament presents not the Old Testament law as something less preferable, but is in fact the highest form of social preferability. Well, I don't think he's considered it that way. That's the problem.

Law is a higher principle than grace, than Klein's covenant theology. We tend to think of law, law and grace as coterliness, as mutually co. Extensive. But he puts grace under law. In other words, why is Christ gracious to us? Because he has fulfilled the law, the law of Christ. See, the reason God can be gracious to us is because Christ fulfilled the law. That law is a higher principle. That God's grace stands stems from the fact that Christ has fulfilled the law for us.

And that just doesn't follow for me. Why he wouldn't want to see society push in the direction of establishing that law.

As a matter of fact, Ross, if you read Klein's book, after he says there's this great difference between old and new covenant, he wants to keep the personal life norms and the faith norms. And then all of a sudden, almost out of the blue, and I think Joe and I both have had that experience, he says the community life norms, they're gone.

No, I thought you were going to say he wants capital punishments. He does.

Well, you know, after he holds on.

To personal individual life norms, then he wants capital punishments. And he says then by, remember, by analogy, we must hold to capital punishment. The sword of John, Romans 13. Now, how does he defend that analogy? Even that it's no.

Yes, I think he would do that. I thought it was interesting in this one quote, by the way, that Klein says, when he gets down on his intrusion, point to. It's right here.

Why does he have capital punishment at all? My students pick this up. It's by mere analogy. It's by mere analogy. He uses that word, analogy.

Yeah, and I mentioned that in my, in my appendix on Klein, too. It is then consummation justice that was intruded when death was prescribed for religious offenses in Israel. And I read that when I was at Westminster right before I gave my lectures, and I thought to myself, you know, that hadn't jumped out at me like it does now when I read it previously, it's almost leaving the door open for Klein saying on the second table of the decalogue, which he doesn't understand in the traditional way, and rightly so, but on commandments five through ten, maybe the magistrate could use the sword today. But it's the religious offenses in Israel, the first four commandments of the decalogue, that he's particularly concerned to see as an intrusion. And I had, I had never thought about it before. I'd like to see how Klein would respond to that, whether he would say, well, maybe it is an open question whether we can actually get homosexual homosexuals, but we can't execute Sabbath breakers because he does say religious offenses. Now, of course, my own view is that all offenses are religious offenses. And so. But I mean, trying to be fair to his use of the term, I.

Think that maybe he means Celtic.

Yeah. And he says, by the way, in the review of theonomy, the first four commandments of the decalogue. If theonomy requires that, then that's the horror of theonomy. And so he may draw a distinction at that point, which would be strange given the fact that Klein is the one who has argued so vehemently against dividing the decalogue into two tables in the way that we do, I.e. two sets of commandments rather than two copies of the same commandments.

I'm going to find the passage about analogy why he wants capital punishment today for murder. What I want to find is why the analogy is valid. I don't think he went to Noah Key in way the way Murray did.

Oh, okay. I don't think he did. Go ahead, Barbara. And then I think after this, we'll call it quits. You're all getting tired, I'm sure. And if you're not, I assure you I am. Barbara, go ahead. The only reason that I can imagine is the one Joe suggested that he might call those cultic crimes rather than actual civil crimes, that is crimes against the cult, against the proper worship of God. Now, I would think it arbitrary because as a matter of fact, it's protection of society that we don't have blasphemers and idolaters and Sabbath breakers. It is for our good. Just think, if a person could be a Sabbath breaker, he could oppress his slaves, couldn't he? He could make them work seven days a week. And so I don't see how you can make that a strictly cultic matter. And if idolatry in society is undermining the law order of the whole society, that is certainly as criminal as it is cultic. Sick. And so I would not be convinced by that claim. My guess is that's the only way he would be able to argue his case, though. Well, I think we'll call it a night. I'm going to go ahead and get my stuff ready, but I think we should wait and see.