Dr Greg Bahnsen - Theonomy and it's Critics: Church/State Criticisms (Part 5)

Tonight I'm turning to arguments that are brought against the theonomic thesis, specifically with respect to the obligation of the state today to the law of God and also to the arguments that center on the issue of the separation of church and state. So first of all, arguments directed against the theonomic thesis with respect to its claim that modern day states are obliged to follow the law of God. You'll recall, if you've read my book, that a good portion of the argumentation has to do with structural form of how can I put this? There's a parallel, as I see it, between what Paul says in Romans 13 and what is said in the Old Testament about Jewish magistrates and about gentile magistrates. The seven basic points that Paul makes in Romans 13 are made in the Old Testament as well. Now, Laird Harris, in his review of my book in Presbyterion, is not happy with one portion at least of the parallelism that I'm drawing between Old Testament and New Testament. I point out that where Paul uses religious titles in the New Testament, civil magistrates calling them ministers of God, likewise in the Old Testament we find religious titles being used, for instance, of Old Testament Jewish magistrates or officers in the court of the king. We find the word priest being used, that there are priests in the court of David that are not Levitical priests apparently, but they are in fact his own sons. At one point the office is designated the son of David and the other and it's called the priest. And then with respect to pagan kings in the Old Testament, we'll find certain religiously significant titles used of men like Cyrus, who was called the Lord's anointed technically in the Septuagint, the Lord's Christ, the Shepherd of God, and so forth and so on. Now, Laird Harris says that too much is made of these titles. He thinks that you cannot rest very much on it. And I suppose what I want to say to that is simply that I don't rest everything upon that. I find it interesting that there's a parallel between the Old Testament and the New Testament on seven significant points, one of which is the use of religious titles. And so even if that point were not granted, that is, even if somebody did not think those religious titles were used for political rulers in the Old and New Testament, the fact would remain that these other parallels are to be found and are significant. According to Dr. Harris, the old Testament political officers were not called priests. But what you really have in the Old Testament is the existence of priests, Levitical priests in the court of David. But as I've Already told you, I think that's highly unlikely in light of the fact that these officers are called elsewhere, the sons of David. In my book, I make a good deal of the decree of Artaxerxes that Ezra praises God for. Remember, Artaxerxes declared that the law of God was to be taught in all the region beyond the river, and that anybody who did not keep the law was to be punished according to it, even to the point of death. And Ezra praises God for putting such a thing in the heart of the king. Now, Dr. Harris says that the decree of Artaxerxes was merely a permissive decree. And if I understand the criticism, it runs something like this. Artaxerxes was not actively promoting the law of God. He was simply giving permission for it to be used in the general region where it would have been observed anyway. Well, I'm not sure that that is true, but I'm willing to grant it for the sake of argument. Because even if Artaxerxes was simply permitting the people in that area to keep the law of God, he was in that way promoting the law of God. And moreover, the law of God was being kept in all the region beyond the river, which is far more than the land of Palestine that was given to the Jews. And consequently, you have a pagan king promoting the law of God outside of Israel. And that's my only point. And that point remains, even if it's a permissive decree. According to Dr. Harris, Old Testament pagan kings and kings today, since we don't have a theocracy, ought to rule in terms of common grace and conscience. He says the law of God is not the standard for these rulers, but rather they rule by conscience and common grace. Well, one has got to press a little bit beyond that and say, well, what are the standards of common grace and conscience? What is it that God reveals in nature and in conscience? What are these standards? Do they conflict with the law of God? Do they go beyond the law of God? Are they less than the law of God? Well, from my reading of the New Testament, Paul tells us that what God shows us through natural revelation or common revelation, general revelation, and what God reveals through conscience are precisely the same standards that the Mosaic law laid down, except that they are given now in a different medium of revelation. So I could, in a formal sense agree with Dr. Harris that Pagan kings should rule by conscience and common grace. But I don't happen to think that God's common grace conflicts with his special revelation. Nor do I think that the legitimate standards of conscience are other than what the Law of Moses would say God does not have a double standard of morality. Okay. At another point in my book, I deal with an argument to the effect that we are bound to be submissive to any kind of ruler, no matter how evil he is. Because Paul said that Christians were to be submissive in Romans 13. And when he wrote, Nero was in power and Nero was a very wicked ruler, and yet Paul said to be in submission to him. Consequently, we should be in submission to any ruler, no matter what. Now, I don't think that's a good argument. I don't think that reads Paul correctly. But in terms of the historical accuracy of that, in a sense, as I say in the book, you could argue that when Paul wrote these words, it was in the earlier days of Nero's reign, when it was recognized throughout the empire that he was ruling very justly and enlightened, if you will, benevolent way early in Nero's reign. He was not the monster he turned out to be at the end. And since Paul was writing during the earlier portion of Nero's reign, if anything, what Paul is saying is be submissive to rulers when they rule in this benevolent fashion. Now, I don't happen to think that's an argument that I would want to use, but it's what called a reductio ad absurdum over against those who are saying we have to be submissive no matter ruler does, because Nero was a terrible man. Now Dr. Harris takes up that reductio ad absurdum and reads it for something other than it is. And he says, well, Nero did not rule by the perceptive will of God even in his earlier reign. Well, I never claimed that he did. My point is not that Nero was ruling by the law of God, but simply that the character of Nero's rule when Paul wrote in is not that which people make it out to be when they argue we have to submit to it, no matter what the ruler may say. Okay, let me move on to another set of criticisms. Now I'm going to be looking at some made by Louis Nielsen in his book on God's law and Christian behavior or conduct. I forget the exact title little pamphlet, which is explicitly dealing with an analysis of my text. And Nielsen at one point says that Bahnsen's argument is not clearly stated in Scripture, but is rather built on inferences. On inferences. Now, if I understand this, what he's saying is you don't have any verse of the Bible that says explicitly gentile rulers are to rule by the law of God. I think it's probably a fair response to that, to say that there are explicit statements to that effect. I mean, when the Old Testament in the Book of Proverbs says that righteousness is the foundation of the king's throne, speaking of all kings, when it says it's a sin for any nation, when it's a disgrace for any nation to sin, I think we get some rather definite statements. When David says, be wise, you kings of the earth and Judges, serve Jehovah, kiss the sun lest you perish. In the way, he's making some rather explicit statements. But now let's say that we don't actually have a sentence that is word for word, what Mr. Nielsen is looking for. And therefore we are drawing an inference, that is to say there's a step from the explicit statement of Scripture to the conclusion. And anytime there's an inferential step, then somebody has the right to question the bridge between the statement of Scripture to your conclusion. However, the fact that there may be inferential reasoning in the book can hardly be held against my book. I mean, it simply is too high a standard to say that no book on theology should do anything but republish the explicit statements of Scripture. If that's all we have to do in theology, there wouldn't be any differences in between any Christians, because every biblical Christian should say that whatever the Bible says is true. It's the problem of interpretation of what the Bible says, how you combine these things. Now then, if we're going to be. Thank you. Against inferential theology, then we have to ask ourselves, do we believe that the Chalcedonian formula of Christology is biblical instruction? Well, obviously the Chalcedonian formula cannot be found in the Bible. And yet most of us feel that it's a very important thing to maintain for orthodoxy in the church or the doctrine of the Trinity. To use a standard illustration, there's nowhere in the Bible that the word Trinity is found or anything close to the formulations of the Trinity or the statements about the Trinity and the early church councils. And yet we don't feel that the early church councils were mistaken. They were being inferential. Now, if we can infer a doctrine of the Trinity from the Bible, it seems to me a rather easy thing to infer the fact that all men are bound to the objective and universal law of God. After this point, Mr. Nielsen says not only is the theonomic thesis inferential in character, but some aspects of Scripture would undermine those inferences. Now, this is very important. Formally speaking, I would say this is the Sort of thing we want to see what is it in the Bible that would undermine the reasoning that you find in the book? Because if there are things that contradict the reasoning in the book that is significant, that's something that I would want to take account of. The difficulty is that having said that, he doesn't give us any illustrations. And it always is a matter of suspicion to me when a theologian says, well, there are just some obvious things that contradict that inferential reasoning. And then he can't apparently name even one. And so, since I'm given any, all I can say is that formally I would agree that if there are biblical texts that undermine the inferences that there's something wrong with the thesis. But that's all hypothetical at this point. I don't know of any texts that undermine thesis inferences in my book. What Mr. Nielsen does supply is the following kind of claim. He says that theonomy misses the New Testament's greater emphasis on grace, life, inwardness and newness. The New Testament has a graces on grace, life and inwardness and newness than the Old. Christ urged forgiveness, rebuked the desire to to have fire come down from heaven, and specified that spiritual weapons are to be used against false religions. And the New Testament sets aside the sword for vindicating the cause of God. I don't disagree with any of that. I do wonder about this idea of greater emphasis on grace, life, inwardness and all that. Sometimes, when that's said, it almost appears that a dispensational contrast between Old and New Testaments is being worked up. But I don't want to pin that on Mr. Nielsen. It simply seems to be a direction. But for all of that, there is something of a greater emphasis upon grace. If you mean by that God has actually brought about the completion accomplishment of his redemptive promise. And indeed Christ did urge forgiveness. What I would say is that the Old Testament urged forgiveness, that Christ did rebuke the desire to have fire come down from heaven, and the Old Testament would have done likewise. The personal use of divine vengeance was never condoned in the Old Testament. And Christ did specify spiritual weapons for false religions. He did set aside the sword for vindicating the kingdom of God, for advancing it and defending it. But for all of that that you see is simply congruous with the change of the nature of Christ's kingdom from a national entity to an international body that's based upon profession of faith. Consequently, all of this discontinuity between the New and Old Testament is granted. What we do not have is any statement to the effect that the Old Testament social or penal sanctions have been changed. It may be true that we don't defend the kingdom of God by the sword, but that doesn't mean that the magistrate doesn't use the sword today. That would be a very difficult thesis to sustain in light of Romans 13 statement that all of the magistrate's duty is epitomized by what the sword. So the sword has not been set aside in the civil domain. It's simply the sword has been set aside for the defense of the kingdom of God. Now that being true, we still have to ask what are the proper uses of the sword in the civil domain. And for that we are given very little argumentation to the effect by Mr. Nielsen anyway that the standards of God in the Old Testament are different than those in the New. He does say that the book, my book, overlooks that the penal laws were given only in a national covenant with Israel. Well, I suppose that's probably a good thing to overlook if the Bible doesn't say that. I don't think the Bible says that. Let's just start at a minimal level. I think I'm almost positive, given Mr. Nielsen socio political conservatism and what little I know of his background, that he would believe that capital punishment is taught in the Noah covenant. And so he certainly doesn't want to say that the penal laws were given only in a national covenant with Israel. He may want to say that only that law is on based binding today. But I've got another argument to deal with that approach. In terms of saying the penal sanctions were given only to Israel in a national covenant. We do not have support for that. We have in fact counter evidence that God gave penal laws outside of Israel and God illustrated penal laws outside of Israel as well. Condoning the historical death of the sodomites, I think is a rather clear example. Although that's not something imposed by the civil magistrate, it certainly is historical, historical judgment. And Paul tells us that even homosexuals in the Roman Empire knew the ordinance of God, that those who commit such things are worthy of death. Okay. At another point, Mr. Nielsen argues that the penal sanctions have to be distinguished from the moral law in that the penal sanctions were the result of God's justice, but they could be suspended even though the moral law might, could not ever be suspended. And so the immutability of God does not demand an unchanged penal sanction, but the immutability of God does demand an unchanged moral law. What does it mean to say that the Moral law was not never suspended. That is to say that it always was the obligation that such and such be done. What does it mean to say that the penal sanctions were suspended? That at a certain point they weren't to be followed out? Is that to say that it was not the presumption that they should have been? What does the idea of suspension mean if it doesn't mean that they ought to have been followed? But exception. If God made an exception, you have to follow this very closely because as a matter of fact, Mr. Nielsen is supporting my thesis. If God made an exception and it was recognized as an exception, then it's the exception that proves the underlying rule. Now, if we mean that the suspension of the moral law means that we ought not to have done it, then the suspension of the penal sanctions means we ought not to have done it. But the exceptional nature of the case, the presumption, is they ought to have been done unless God said otherwise. So if God wishes to suspend the penal sanctions today, I don't have an argument with that. Obviously God says it, then we must believe it. We must do everything we can to conduct our lives in accordance with it. Where has God suspended the penal sanctions for today? Again, the only thing you get in the Old Testament are exceptions to the rule. And as such exceptions, they prove the rule. And so I don't see that this argument is of much help. If anything, it only reinforces the idea that the presumption was everybody should follow the law. Okay, Mr. Nielsen goes on to his next criticism, that there is no sufficient evidence in the New Testament that we are to strive to make government subject to Christ's kingdom on earth. That's a tricky criticism, because I'm not sure what he means by the phrase Christ's kingdom on earth. I suspect that he means the Church. And if that's true, then I agree that there is no evidence we are to try to make government subject to the Church. I believe in the separation of church and state. So he hasn't proven anything contrary to theonomy. If he means Christ's kingdom on earth in the sense that the New Testament means it, and that is the dominion of Christ. So that God's will is done, his kingdom comes, which is to say his will is done on earth, even as it's done in heaven, then we certainly do have evidence that we are to try to make government subject to Christ's dominion. The very fact we have to pray the Lord's Prayer tells you that we want God's will. We're to ask him that his will be done on earth. The very fact that Paul writes Romans 13 and puts the civil magistrate under obligation to be an avenger of God's wrath as a minister of God, the fact that the magistrate is criticized as a man of lawlessness in Revelation, he's called a beast when he wants to replace God's law with his own law is an indication that we ought to be working to bring government subject to the kingdom of Christ. After all, the accusation made against Paul in Acts 17 was precisely that he taught contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another King Jesus. To put Caesar subject to the rule of Jesus Christ was contrary to the decrees of Caesar. But it's fully in accordance with the New Testament perspective on civil rule. Okay, moving on to another line of criticism. Walter Chantry criticizes me in the Banner of Truth a couple of summers ago. At least I understand that he's criticizing me when in response to a letter I wrote to the editor, he replies that people have to understand that these things theonomists. Believe in social reconstruction among unbelievers. I get the impression he's saying that, like, isn't this amazing? Just look at this. They're actually trying to promote social reconstruction among unbelievers. He doesn't say as much that it's a criticism and he doesn't support it. But I don't see how it could function in his response other than kind of reductu ad absurdum, because their position amounts to doing this. And everybody knows we're not supposed to do that. That's obvious. But you see, it's not obvious. I've got 600 pages of text that support the idea that it's not obvious that we shouldn't be promoting social reconstruction among unbelievers. Okay, then you have in Meredith Klein, as well as in some views expressed by Iain Murray, the view that the common nation should be ruled by general revelation, common grace and conscience. We've already dealt with that criticism under Laird Harris. And then finally, it is argued by Meredith Klein, as well as old Palmer Robertson at Westminster Seminary, that the Old Testament state was an aspect of a redemptive covenantal relation to God, that the state was part and parcel of a covenantal context, a redemptive covenant that the nation had been put into with God. The inference is that anything that's part of a redemptive covenant with God, anything that is part of an overall covenant, a redemptive covenant with God, cannot be binding today, Since the state was part of an overall redemptive covenant with God in the Old Testament. It's not binding today. Now we have to ask ourselves whether we can use that reasoning. It's about the obligation we have in the New Testament as Christians to. To obey the law of God as.

Established in the Old Testament.

That's right. I see. Yeah. Both on a personal as well as on a social basis.

Are we expected to have any exchange here, or did you want.

No, I'm more than happy to have some exchange.

How can we social reconstruction among the unbelievers when they don't think as a Christian thinks? Is that what you deal with in your book?

Yes, that the reconstruction is precisely to get them to think as a Christian thinks. The agency by which this reconstruction becomes effective, of course, is the Great Commission discipling the nations, hoping to bring about conversion, sanctification according to the word of God in all areas of life. Life. So that a man who is a plumber who gets converted, not only has his sins forgiven, but he's now striving repentantly through the power of the spirit and sanctification to keep the law of God. And the more and more he grows by the grace of God, he's going to want to keep the law in all areas of his life. Not simply in his home life now, not just cleaning up his abusive language, for instance, but now he wants to keep the law of God when it comes to plumbing, too. He wants to follow the standards of righteousness and justice in his occupation. Well, you take that a step further. He should want to follow these standards of righteousness as he votes. He's going to want to vote for men and vote for policies which are in conformity with the standards of God's law. And so that's how we would promote social reconstruction among unbelievers. By evangelizing, edifying, and hoping to bring about a desire in them to see God's word over in all areas of their life, including the social and political areas of their life.

What is your arena? Political or church or school?

What's that?

The arena in which you hope to reach this public, I mean.

Well, we hope to reach them by every agency we possibly can. Although we do not believe in the use of coercion to reach unbelievers. And therefore the civil sword is never used as an agency of evangelism or to promote Christian faith. However, the sword of the state can still be guided by the standards of God's objective justice when it comes to interpersonal relations. And so the arena through which we would reach these people would be through our Church through our personal evangelism, through our Christian schools, through our publications, by demonstrating apologetically the value of obeying the law of God when it comes to this or that difficulty in society, trying to solve people's problems, marital counseling, I mean on and on and on through every possible way of getting the word out.

You know, the law in this land at one time was objectively, I don't know what that means, especially the. It was at one time basically found by men of God.

Right.

I mean it was initiated by men of God and therefore it was founded out of Christian doctrine. But as time has gone on and the more unbelievers have gotten into government, more of the law has been formed without Christian ethic behind it.

Yes.

In that direction seems to be the one that's going in now. More so and more so.

Yes. What we call the. I was just going to say it's what we call the process of secularization. We started with Christian foundations, they are now being replaced by humanistic foundations.

Right, exactly. So how can you get politicians to put Christian laws in it when they're trying exactly to get away from that?

Well, in the first place, we've got to work and pray to God for the conversion of our politicians. We need to be putting pressure on our politicians. You see, even the most humanistic politician is wanting to be re elected or to be originally elected. And if nothing else, if everybody who claims claimed to be born again in the state of Ohio wrote to their senators and said if you support abortion, you have lost my vote, you can be very sure that whatever their own personal standards are, they care more about being reelected than they care about giving freedom for abortion. That's one bad thing about humanism. It doesn't give you any moral fiber, it doesn't give you anything to stand up for for the sake of the principle itself. The thing that's most important to a politician who's a humanist is his own skin. And consequently the Christian has as much right as anybody to appeal to him at that base level and say, hey, if you want to be reelected, you better understand that we're not going to elect anybody who believes in abortion. So I mean that at the most minimal level is something you can do. Moreover, you can pray for his conversion, you can try to seek his conversion, you can send him literature to show him the advantages of following the law of God. And then we can try to eliminate elect Christian politicians. We can try to educate our populace. A good number of people involved in anti abortion around the country find there's a Great deal of value simply in letting people know what's going on, telling them what abortion is, what the word of God says. Not everybody's going to buy that, not everybody's going to submit, but a large number of people are going to. If we were just educating the public, we would be getting a lot better results in our political arena. So you're right, we're in a secularistic age and the tendency is towards humanism. But we are to be the salt of the earth and the light of the world. We must preserve this earth from decaying any more than it would. And we've got to try to scatter the darkness by the light that reflects through us from our Master, Jesus Christ. What I'm saying I don't think is radically different than what anybody else would say in terms of our general outlook on how Christians try to change people's minds or try to influence their society. What I am saying that is distinctive, at least if I listen to my critics, is that the standards by which we would have the state rule are more strictly in accordance with the law of God than many people would like to see happen. There are some people, some of my critics have said that they would rather see more general approach, approach, say, like general revelation or common grace or conscience. But I have difficulty with that, as I've said already, because I don't see those standards are different than what we find in the Bible. They're just a different medium of revelation. So anyway, the way we bring society into conformity is simply the Great Commission and all the implications of the Great Commission. But what we bring society in conformity to is all that Jesus commanded. He said, go and disciple the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe whatsoever I've commanded you. And in a sense, theonomy is an attempt to explicate what it means to teach whatever Jesus has commanded the nations to do. Let me come back to this criticism now that if the Old Testament was. Every aspect of Old Testament life was in redemptive covenantal relation with God. And therefore we can't ask the state to keep the law today, because the state today is not redemptive, historical, sorry, redemptive, covenantal relationship with God. I'm asking what would happen if we applied this line of reasoning across the board? That is, what if we were not being inconsistent or using special pleading, but consistently use that line of reasoning? Well, the following reductio ad absurdum might be suggested. The laws for marriage in the Old Testament were part and parcel of Old Testament life for people who were in redemptive covenantal relationship with God. Since today society at large is not in covenantal redemptive relationship with God necessarily, the laws for marriage in the Old Testament should, should not apply to our society. So that if we believe in monogamy or if we believe that divorce is to be granted only on matters of fornication, we believe that bestiality is wrong. If we believe in marital faithfulness, we are really applying a redemptive covenantal standard to a society that is not in redemptive covenantal relationship with God. Now I can conceive of some of my critics saying, well, I guess that's right. I guess if we're going to be consistent, then we mustn't make unbelievers live according to Christian marital standards. I mean, I can think of that. But I really don't believe anybody in this day and age is ready to go so far. And therefore we can see that this principle, this argumentative principle is invalid. Let me turn to another focus of criticism with respect to the thesis that the law of God is to be kept in the state today. And that has to do with matters of church state separation. Palmer Robertson points out in some tapes on my book that the thesis of an identical relationship between church and state in the Old Testament. I don't want to. There's two kinds of relations being discussed here. There's a relationship between Old and state and the New Testament. There's a relationship between. There's a relationship between church and state in the Old Testament, relationship between church and state in the New Testament. Now, that relationship, okay, we're relating the relationships now, is said to be identical in theonomy, according to Palmer Robertson. And he says the statement of an identical relation between the relations is indispensable. Well, as a matter of fact, I do not believe that the relationship between church and state in the Old Testament is identical with the relationship today. I believe it's far more common and in parallel than people tend to see in our day. But I don't believe it's identical. I do believe there have been changes. I believe there's a change of focus or emphasis, that there are subtle alterations. And I certainly do not believe that's indispensable. You see, I would argue that even if church and state were identical in the Old Testament, that there was no separation at all. That necessarily today we still have to have standards for our civil government. Where are we going to find standards for civil rule if we don't turn to the Old Testament. And consequently, in our day and age, church and state were the same. In our day and age, they are different. But the state still has to be righteous today, still has to be just. Now, I don't happen to think that they were identical in the Old Testament, but I'm just saying this to show you how fallacious it is to think that the idea of identical relationship between New and Old Testament is indispensable to my book. I could say that they are radically different and still sustain the overall thesis of my book. It's pointed out by some critics that a rigid distinction was in historical context, not made by those who were living in the theocratic situation in the Old Testament, that they did not draw a rigid distinction between, say, the cult and the state. Well, I don't know what psychologically went through the minds of people in the Old Testament. Perhaps they didn't catch on, and perhaps they didn't recognize what they should have been able to recognize. But whether they did or not, the Bible teaches it. As a matter of fact, I'm sure that they did recognize the difference between cult and state. I know that Uzziah understood very clearly the difference when he attempted as a king to enter into the temple. And God said, this is not the place for the king, it's the place for the priest, and was struck with leprosy. Okay. A more serious criticism, a rather clever one, is that in the Old Testament, citizenship required circumcision. In the Old Testament, citizenship required circumcision, and therefore there was no difference between the conditions of membership in the church and the conditions of membership in the estate. To be part of the church in the Old Testament, you had to be circumcised. But of course, to be circumcised made you a citizen as well. Well, that looks like a promising line of criticism until one stops to think about the accuracy of it. Is it true that circumcision was required for citizenship? Well, that all depends on what you mean by citizenship. We must be very careful not to be reasoning in a circle here in begging the question. If somebody says, I will not honor any concept of citizenship short of circumcision being required, then of course he's made his point. But now, whether that concept of citizenship is the one that we use today in our argumentation is another question. And as a matter of fact, it's not the one we use today. By citizenship today, we mean somebody who in a certain territory is under the rules and regulations of that territory and is and is privileged to have the protections of the magistrate, that whatever protections are offered by the state are his, and whatever duties are laid down by the state are his as well. Now, if that is what we take as the concept of citizenship, which is the common notion, you just look in Webster's or what have you. As a matter of fact, in the Old Testament, there were people who were citizens in Israel who were not circumcised. And I'm thinking here of the resident strangers in the land, that translation is a little misleading because we tend to think of them as strangers. They must have been back and forth, you know, in and out of the land. But they weren't. They were residents. They were the ger of the land. Now, the ger who were Gentiles coming into the land, if you'll read the law of God, they are obliged to keep every bit of the law of God short of two things. They were not to be certain, they were not circumcised unless they became believers, and they did not partake of the Lord's Supper, which is to say the Passover meal. On the other hand, the only privilege they did not have is that they were not released from slavery after seven years or in the seventh year. Okay? And as I see that as a law typifying the redemptive work of Christ, that's very appropriate. Those who are not circumcised, those who are not members of the covenant, those who do not take the redemptive meal, do not enjoy the blessings of redemption. In the seventh year, in the eschatological year, it's all well and good, but nevertheless, not being circumcised, they still had to keep the laws of the state, and they had all the protections of the state. In our day and age. I'd say that's pretty parallel to a person having to keep the law of God in his social relations, having the protection of God's law and his social conduct, but he's not a member of the church until he is baptized and he takes the Lord's Supper. And so, as it turns out, when you look at the historical facts of the Old Testament, this line of criticism turns out to support theonomy because it's pointing out that we have a very parallel situation in this day and age. The only thing the uncircumcised didn't have in the Old Testament was the Passover meal and manumission in the seventh year. It is also argued by some critics, for instance, those who wrote up the presbytery report in Evangel Presbytery in Alabama that in the Old Testament, the state punished false prophecy which was a religious or church, which is a religious or church matter today. Well, that begs the question, is that a religious matter for the church today? Should the state not punish false prophecy today? Those who come proclaiming to be spokesman for God, when in fact they aren't spokesman for God, their prophecies don't come true, and their prophecies do not conform to previous revelation given by God. Well, if our state is founded on Christian principles, which is to say founded on the objective law of God, and the law of God says we should punish false prophecy, it would certainly seem to be prima facie the case that the state should punish false prophecy today as it should punish blasphemy and subversion to idolatry. Now, those are not popular theses to maintain, and I'm even uncomfortable with them because of my secular upbringing, my humanistic heart. I know very well that that's a difficult thing, an awkward thing to maintain, but as a matter of theological consistency, I don't see how we can get around it. To claim that the state punished what the Church should be punishing today is in fact, fact to beg the question, nobody doubts the Church can punish false prophecy. But then again, one has to ask, is it punishment to be put out of the Church when in fact you're not in conformity with the Church itself? That's not punishment. How can we punish Mormons today? Dr. Robertson suggests we can put them out of our fellowship. Anybody see any Mormons in our fellowship to begin with? I mean, even if you considered excommunication a punishment, there aren't any Mormons in the Christian Church to excommunicate. So I just don't see that there's any punishment for false prophecy in our day and age. If you take that line, whether the state should punish it or not should be a matter of whether the New Testament alters the Old Testament standard. And I have yet to see evidence that it does. Okay. It is argued by others, for instance, Iain Murray, Meredith Klein, that the restoration of the Mosaic Judicial Law today would be contrary to the Church's mission. It is argued that if the Church today were to observe, if the State today were to observe the law of God, that the Church's mission would be violated, because the Church's mission, of course, is to seek the conversion of souls. But if we believe in the execution of those who are subverting to idolatry false prophets and blasphemers, then we can't really be Interested in the conversion of their souls. Well, do we believe we should execute murderers today? Most all my conservative critics would say yes. Does that then mean we're not interested in the conversion of their souls? No, because even if they're on death row, we still would hope to see them converted before they die. Granted, if they die, we don't have any further opportunity to evangelize. But that's not within our province to worry about. God says the secret things belong unto him, but those things revealed belong to our children for all generations. It's the revealed, prescriptive law of God that is our concern to follow. We don't worry about the secret will of God as to who will or will not die and whether they'll be converted in such a period of time or before a certain deadline or not. So if it's true in general that evangelism is not contrary to keeping the law of God or capital punishment, then we have to ask whether it's contrary to capital punishment for these crimes in general. It would seem not. However, Dr. Klein says it would. Because it would seem that we're putting people to death for the very reason that the church is evangelizing. That is, the church evangelizes because people are unbelievers, but the state's putting them to death because they are unbelievers. That's a very subtle form of criticism. I can understand how people who don't think clearly might be sucked in by it. As a matter of fact, it is wrong to say that the state in the Old Testament punished people for being unbelievers. It never punished anybody for failing to have faith. It never punished anybody for failing to profess faith in Yahweh. It punished people for subverting the society to following other gods. That's not. That certainly is a result of unbelief, but murder is a result of unbelief, too. The fact that you execute murderers is not to say you execute them precisely for their unbelief. You execute them for their social misdemeanor. Now, if subversion to idolatry is a social misdeed, and I hope you can all see that it certainly would be, then punishing it is not to say we're punishing for the sake of unbelief. And so Dr. Klein is just wrong. I think the Old Testament never punished a person for heresy or for unbelief. It punished a person for subverting to idolatry. 13 does not deal with heresy, much less with unbelief, much less with heresy. Or unbelief in missionary situations. It deals with a land where the established and recognized social standard is the law of God. And if our state, by God's grace, ever should recognize the law of God as its standard, then those who come along teaching other gods and idolatry false prophecy are subverting our society. And we're not saying that people who are teaching Mormon doctrine or evangelizing as Jehovah's Witnesses today should be executed. What we're saying is that in a day and age where the law of God is honored by the vast majority of the society and laws are erected to that effect, that then and there those who subvert to idolatry should be executed, not those who believe in idolatry, not those who practice it in their heart of hearts, but only those who try to get our society to go along with it. So it's not contrary to the Church's mission, although it may be that the New Testament tells us not to follow those laws. But that's where the argument has to be waged whether the New Testament changes the standard, not whether the New Testament, by teaching evangelism, says we can't keep certain of God's laws. See, the presumption here is that in the Old Testament, where those laws obviously were to be kept, evangelism was not God's will. But now stop and think about it. Did God not want children of believers evangelized in the Old Testament were they not to bring up their children, Duke. Or we follow BAAL or somebody like that, or something like that, But the heretics would not. That's right. Okay, I'll give you an illustration of this in a society. Now, my exegesis may be wrong. My application may be wrong. My book does not get into this. But on the principles of the book, it does seem to me, in accordance with the facts as I know them, that a Mormon in a society where the law of God is being kept and recognized, and it's already been voted in by the culture, that in such a society a Mormon who propagates his views would be an idolater because he teaches poor polytheism, but a Jehovah's Witness would not, although he is an Arian when it comes to Christology, and that's heresy, and therefore we should not honor Jehovah's Witness doctrine in our churches. The state does not look into questions of heresy or Christology, but simply whether people are following false gods. An Old Testament Jew or an Orthodox Jew would not be an idolater in the eyes of the Civil magistrate. But a Mormon of course would because they do not believe, you know, in Jehovah they are polytheistic. And of course a Buddhist and a Moslem and all the rest would be in like categories. Does that trouble you? If it is, I'd like you to ask further. Hadn't thought about it before.

A quiet Mormon, proud lady.

Oh yeah, That's right. It's the Mormon teachers who try to subvert the society that would be subject to discipline in the eyes of the state. And the reason for that is that once you subvert following of this particular God, then you don't have any particular moral standard, do you? What do we have today in our secular society? Different strokes for different folks. And if you get enough people that like strokes this way, then they're a majority and that's it. But that isn't a moral standard. And so anybody who teaches contrary to the God of the Old Testament is teaching contrary to the idea of his objective and universal moral standard, which is to say is teaching contrary to the law of the state, which is to say they are revolutionary. Most people don't see it that way because we have such a secular outlook on religion and subversion and so forth. But in the Old Testament it was clearly understood that if you subvert following Jehovah, you're really saying you don't have to follow the state because this state is enforcing the law of Jehovah. And I find it very interesting that people who cannot be suspected in the slightest of having preconceived theonomic sympathies, these, when they come to their commentaries in Deuteronomy 13, say that you take the new international commentary on the Old Testament, the Nicot. Okay, and there you have Craggy's commentary on Deuteronomy. You turn to Deuteronomy 13 and his subheading tells you what the state does with urban revolutionaries. I mean, I couldn't be more delighted to find, because I'm sure nobody suspects him of being theonomic. I don't believe he is. And if he is, he certainly hasn't come that way through any contact with the Calvinists that I associate with. I don't think he is in the first place, but there he sees quite clearly in the Old Testament that was punishing the subversion of the society revolution because it was saying if you don't have to follow God, you don't have to follow God's law, which is that you don't have to follow the law of the state. So anyway, we should Punish urban revolutionaries today, even if they are Mormon teachers, because they're really teaching people they don't have to honor the law of God. And the law of God is the standard of our society or ought to be the standard of our society. All of this is very much paper, theoretical doctrine right now. Because until we fulfill the Great Commission and get enough people converted, edified and working out the implications in their life that they want laws against subversion to idolatry, and then there's no application in society for that law as yet. It requires the people to first say, yes, we will follow this law before it becomes a matter of concern to us. Okay, it is. It has been argued by some critics as well that the Old Testament theocracy was against the New Testament concept of freedom of religion. And therefore there's a difference between Old and New Testament. Well, perhaps there is. If the New Testament teaches something that alters the idea of freedom of religion, then what I say as a theonomist is we must honor what it says. There's nothing in theonomy that says there can be no changes. What theonomy says any changes have to be exegetically founded. We just can't come with some kind of preconceived category scheme and then just say about any Old Testament law. Well, it happens to fall into my category scheme of abrogated laws. If the New Testament teaches that that law is abrogated or altered in its application, that's fine. But now, does the New Testament teach a different view of freedom of religion? I can't see that it does. In the Old Testament theology, there was freedom of religion. There wasn't freedom to propagate idolatry, but there still was freedom of religion. People didn't have to be believers in order to be members of the state or to be protected by the state. And they don't have to be believers today even to rule in the state. You don't have to be a believer, but to rule. You should rule according to the objective standard of God's law. Another criticism. In the Old Testament, priests were judges in the law courts, and therefore there was no separation of church and state. Well, even if it were true that priests were judges in the law courts, it wouldn't prove that there was no separation of church and state. It would simply prove that the separation of church and state didn't apply to that point. There certainly would still be a difference between the king's palace and in the temple, between the treasury of the temple, the priest and the treasury of the king taxes. There would still be a difference between the officers of the two. There'd still be difference between the laws that govern the two, the functions of the two and all the rest. But now, as a matter of fact, I happen to think that priests were in the law courts of the Old Testament for the sake of interpreting God's law for the magistrate, not for the sake of becoming the magistrate themselves. And consequently, I don't see that the separation of church and state was really all that much violated even there. Okay. Laird Harris says the Old Testament theocracy was a church state because the priests and kings worked together on the basis of God's word. Well, my answer to that is, if that's what he means by the phrase church state, then that's fine with me. I want a church state today where the priests and the kings are working together on the basis of God's word. I mean, the use of this abusive language is not an argument. It's simply to categorize one's view in an honorific way. I don't happen to think that's what a church state is, though. I think a church state is where, as a matter of fact, the members of one or the members of the other, they're co extensive. And there is no difference in the agency or the aims of the two. But there was a difference between the agencies and the aims and of the clientele of the church and state in the Old Testament. And consequently, I think there's a difference today as well. So it's simply a matter of whether you want to call that a church state when priests and kings work together on the basis of God's word.

Well, a lot of times in the church state, you might have had both agencies in existence, but either the church or the state used the authority of both and made the other one powerless. Like all during the Middle Ages in Europe, there was elected rulers and so on, but they were powerless unless they sent money to the church.

If the pope commanded a civil ruler to do something, at least in the days of the pope's strength, there were other days as well. There was ups and downs in the Middle Ages on that question. But if a pope commanded a civil ruler to do something, he's under obligation to do it, then I call that a church state. But the Old Testament wasn't that way. If the priest went to the king and said, you've got to do this, the king would still have to do what, according to Deuteronomy, he was supposed to look at the law of God and not depart from the left hand to the right. And if the priest told him to do what the law of God said, then that's not a church state. The priests are just reminding the king of his obligation. In the first place, if he told him to do other than the law of God, then he had to obey God rather than men, even religious men. And so there was no church state in the Old Testament, Although I agree with you, there have in history been church states, but we're not promoting a.

Church church state where there was only one agency.

No, I think there. No, there has to be two agencies.

Oh, okay. Well, I didn't understand you then. I thought there would only be, like the king and he was also the.

No, no. I believe there has to be religious leaders as well as civil leaders. And that while they ought to interact, while they ought to try to work together and cooperate, that one cannot dominate over the other. I don't believe in papalism and I don't believe in erastinism. I don't believe the state dominates the church or the church dominates the state. They are both separate institutions, but both having their separate obligations to obey God. God has ordained. That's right. Separate functions. God's ordained ministers in the state and he's ordained ministers in the church. And I think the ministers ought to cooperate, But I don't believe the ministers can dictate to each other. Right.

Like the government of the United States. You have the judiciary, they have their function.

Right.

Lawmakers and their function that they should check each other.

That's right. That's right. Another criticism made is that in the state in the Old Testament, the state was an agent of evangelism. But I admit in my book, the state ought not to be an agent of evangelism today. That's a tricky criticism because it rests upon, as Dr. Robertson says later in his tape, a very broad view of evangelism. Well, again, it's one of these things where I'll use your vocabulary. I'm not going to get into a verbal dispute with anybody. If you want evangelism to be broadly defined to mean anything having to do with the kingdom of God, that's fine. Then the state should be an agent of evangelism today. But when I claimed in my book it ought not to be an agent of evangelism, I was using it in a more common and narrow sense that the state ought not to promote Christian faith and profession of faith and make it a requirement. And so again, that's simply a verbal dispute. Okay, I'll give you just one more set of criticisms. And then we'll stop for the evening. Dr. Fowler, a new Testament instructor at Reform Seminary in Jackson, Mississippi, argues against my views of church and state by pointing out that in Exodus 19 the nation of Israel was called holy and priest. It was a nation of priests, and therefore there was a difference between the Old Testament and the New Testament. I agree there's a difference. The kingdom of God was identified with an earthly political unit in the Old Testament. It's not identified with an earthly political unit today. And having said that, the very discontinuity that Dr. Fowler is trying to guard is in fact guarded. But that doesn't again point to any difference of moral standard for church or state in Old or New Testament. Doctor Fowler points out that the Hebrew words that are used for church in the Old Testament, kahal and other such words, the Hebrew words for church in the Old Testament applied to the broader society as well. Well, as I see it, that's an interesting point of Hebrew lexicography, but it doesn't have anything to do with a moral argument. I mean, it may well be that the same word in Hebrew could be used for two, but that doesn't prove that the two were co extensive. It simply meant that the connotation of the word assembly could be civil assembly or religious assembly. That's fine, although I'm not sure that I agree with him that the Hebrew word for kahal does apply to society qua society. But I haven't done enough study to dispute it. I'm simply saying I think there is reason to question and look into that. Dr. Fowler says there's a difference between the Old Testament theology theocracy in our New Testament social situation. Because in the Old Testament there was a direct theocracy. Meaning by that God spoke directly to the state by special revelation. Well, I agreed that he spoke directly to the state by special revelation. He doesn't do that today. But I don't think that the moral obligation of Old Testament rulers to the law of God ever depended upon God currently speaking through special revelation. I hope you see the difference there. God from time to time would send prophets to rebuke the kings, like Nathan was sent to David. Fine, but you see, David was under obligation to obey the law of God, whether God sent him special revelation or not. Today, God doesn't send special revelation, doesn't send inspired prophets. That's true. But whether the kings are under obligation to the law of God, it's a totally other question. The obligation to God's law never rested upon the speaking of a current prophet. If it did. I mean, you can almost see the reductio ad absurdum we can develop. Here's the king at a certain point, who has a murderer brought before him or a judge. And the judge now is going to read out the death sentence against the murderer. But he can't do it because no prophet has entered the court to give special revelation. Does anybody seriously think that nobody could pass judgment in a civil court in Israel unless a prophet came in and did it by special revelation? Well, if they don't believe that, and nobody can credibly hold to such a view, then the idea that there is no special revelation today doesn't affect in any way whether the judges should be ruling by the law of God in our land. Doctor Fowler makes an interesting remark. He had an early version of his criticism of my book that I responded to and distributed a limited distribution. And then he revised his criticism. And then I find in his second criticism, his second attempt to criticize my book, that he is using a form of criticism that I was using against him where I pointed out that distinction does not prove separation. He talked about there being a distinction between penal. As I recall, I'm not sure if this was the exact one, but it was something like this, the distinction between penal sanctions and the moral law. And I said, the fact that there's a distinction doesn't prove that there's a moral separation, that you treat them differently. Well, he comes back now and he uses my phraseology against me when he says that Bonson only proves there's a distinction between cult and state in the Old Testament. He doesn't prove that there's a separation. I don't mean this to be disrespectful, but I'm a bit amused by that because I don't prove there's a distinction. I prove there's a separation. Because, you see, there is just in the most obvious and gross physical sense a difference between the body of the king and the body of the priest. That's not distinction, that's separation. There is a gross physical distinction. By gross, by the way, I mean palpable and obvious. I don't mean somehow, you know, really grosses me out, to use the colloquial. Okay, There is. There's a very obvious distinction between the treasury of the priest and the. In the taxes, the coffers of the king. There's a difference between the temple and the palace of the king. So I'm not proving a distinction. I'm proving separation of church and state in the Old Testament or cult and state. Okay, and the final criticism will. Well, maybe two quick ones we'll end with. Dr. Fowler says old Testament Israel as the people of God, has now become the New Testament church. And therefore the laws applying to Old Testament Israel apply only to the new New Testament church. But of course, that argument is dealt with in theonomy, and no argument is given contrary to it. And so my point still holds. And that's basically that Old Testament Israel as the kingdom of God does certainly become the New Testament church. But outside of Old Testament Israel, kings were supposed to rule by the law of God anyway. It had nothing to do with them being what would eventually become the church or the kingdom in that sense, sense, and consequently the transformation of Old Testament Israel to the New Israel of God. The church doesn't affect the moral obligations of the civil magistrate. And then finally, Fowler says, given Dr. Bronson's approach to the separation of cult and state in the Old Testament, how is it that Paul could apply judicial laws of the Old Testament to the church? And, and he's thinking here of where Paul says, in the church, in the context of the church, you are not to muzzle the ox who is treading out the grain. There you have an Old Testament judicial law being applied not to the state today, but being applied to the church. Paul obviously didn't recognize the separation of church and state. Well, this is an embarrassing argument because you see, it's Dr. Fowler who thinks that it works this way. No separation in the Old Testament, clear separation in the New. But he's arguing Paul doesn't recognize that separation. But you see Paul's in the New Testament, and therefore he's arguing that there's no separation of church and state in the New Testament. Sometimes people get carried away with their antagonism to points of view and fail to see that their manner of argumentation is not consistent with what they have said previously. Moreover, the reason Paul applies the judicial law of the Old Testament to the church is because the judicial law of the Old Testament wasn't exclusively a state matter. When Paul said, you don't muzzle the ox as he treads out his grain, he simply was not. When Paul says in the Old Testament judicial law taught that, it was teaching that wherever the relationship of worker to employer is found, the employer must supply the needs of the worker. He must be able to gain a livelihood from the work he is doing, just as the ox should be able to support himself, should sustain himself on the grain that he's treading out. Consequently, since there is a relationship between the pastor and the people employing him. That truth, that social truth applying to any economic relation applies to economic relations in the church in the state. You see, Paul is not taking a state law of the Old Testament and applying it to the church in the New. He's taking a general law of the Old Testament, applying to any economic relation and applying it to the economic relations of the church. And so I think this is a very ill conc conceived line of criticism. It's not reflecting fully on the implications of what's being said. Well, as I've said, these are not intended to be formal lectures or anything grand of that sort. But I have gone through my notes on the criticisms that have been made of my book as to the obligation of the current day state to the law of God and to the idea of separation of church and state. In two weeks, Lord willing, if I'm back with you, will study finally the penal sanctions of the Old Testament, whether they're binding today and how criticism has been made of that thesis in my book as well. Anybody want to ask any questions before we close tonight?

I have a number of brief ones. I believe I'd like to follow Palmer's line of reasoning for a moment. One of the big points he's been making in those tapes which I myself have studied, is Old Testament. You have covenantal law in a covenantal nation that argues for discontinuity because obviously we don't have covenantal law in America. We are not a covenantal nation. Now, is he saying that if America should, by the grace of God, become a covenantal nation, that we could then implement the law of Moses?

I think he would probably add, to be fair to Palmer, that would not be right for our state ever to become a covenantal state.

And what would that line of thinking be?

Well, that for the state to presume to be in covenantal relationship with God, it would have to presume to become the people of God. And that is exclusively. That title or status is exclusively reserved for the church today.

So you would have two peoples of God in a sense, if you did that, because the church is already the people of God.

Suppose he would argue that way. Now I would argue that in the Old Testament, the civil magistrate, even outside of a covenantal relationship with God, was to keep the law of God. Moses said, this is your wisdom and this is your justice or righteousness in the sight of the nations round about you. The non covenantal nations were to keep the law of God too. And so keeping the law had nothing to do exclusively with being in redemptive Covenant with God. Moreover, remember my reductio ad absurdum. If everything that is part and parcel of a covenantal redemptive relationship with God cannot hold, except for people who are in covenantal redemption relation with God, then that is to say unbelievers can commit bestiality and adultery and all the rest, because those laws apply only to those who are redeemed.

At that point you'd have to be Marsonist. You'd have to say the Old Testament has ceased totally, that Marxism.

You could be driven to that conclusion. I mean, I want to make it very clear. Dr. Robertson is much better than his argument. His own position is very close to mine in practical outworking. But theoretically you could driving that way. Okay.

Another thing that came to mind is you make a distinction between swearing in the modern sense of taking the names Lord in vain, cursing, as we say, and blasphemy.

Right.

The kind of thing you hear on the assembly line all day long is what I would consider cursing. Apparently you don't feel that is biblical blasphemy and culpable with death.

No, it's not.

Exit biblically. Give a little defense, if you can, between the difference between swearing, taking God's name in vain and blasphemy.

Well, the very concept of blasphemy is that of reprobating the name of God and not all swearing, even using the Lord's name in vain is an effort to deprecate his character.

Explain that to me.

Well, if somebody says. If somebody says God damn, that is simply taking the Lord's name vainly for a purpose that is not given in the Bible. But to say that God be damned would be blasphemy. To say God damn this, even though it's not your right to take God's name upon your lips in that way is certainly sinful. But to say that God's name be damned is to blaspheme him, is to reprobate him. And consequently, there's clearly a difference between lifting up God's name, taking his name in vain, and then, if you will, mounting an attack upon the name of God.

I can follow the logic of that. Can you? Off the cup. I know you're not prepared for this, but then you have to think of a biblical example that would make that distinction.

Well, what would count as evidence for the distinction besides what the words mean? Oh, good.

I can't tell you exactly where it is.

That's all right.

You might recognize it.

What's that?

You can take the name Jesus said that there. Or who Said it, you'll take the name of Jesus Christ in vain and it shall be forgiven him. But he that blasphemes the Holy Ghost will not be forgiven him.

Because the.

Holy Ghost is here to glorify Christ. Am I right or wrong? He's here to help us to glorify the name of Christ. If we reject Christ that grieves the Holy Spirit.

The distinction I'm drawing is certainly illustrated in that it's not in a civil context, but that's certainly all right. Jesus says, you take my name in vain, in essence, but don't you blaspheme in the name of the Holy Spirit. It's one thing to attack the name of the Holy Spirit. It's another thing to use Jesus name in vain.

I've never heard anybody curse the Holy Spirit or do anything like that.

Yeah, well, there's a whole question also of what exactly that that is and how one goes about it.

Bruce, how do you see the separation of church and state as related to the current issue for us here in Ohio, namely education itself? Would you like to comment on that?

Sure. In fact, this last week, as I was teaching this Christianity and Politics course as a colloquial colloquium at the seminary in the evening, we got into the question of what are the legitimate functions of the state. We're talking about how as Christians, we can guard against the state moving toward a totalitarian type of rule. And the only way, as I see it, that you can prevent that sort of thing is by having a regulative principle for state rule. There are limits as to what the state can and cannot do. And I think God has to give in his word the prerogative to a state to use its coercive powers, the sword, to do such and such. And I don't see that in the Bible that education is ever put within the domain of the state to coercively use the sword to draw tax money for supportive education and coercively using the sword to enforce attendance in there. Consequently, I wouldn't say that so much a separation of church and state as a separation of family and state that the state is trying to do the work of the family. Now, I believe families can get together and there can be church run schools. I'm not arguing against that. But nevertheless, the children's education is within the sovereignty or province of the parents and not within the province of the state in any sense. And consequently I would distinguish church and family even as I distinguish church and state. I believe in Ohio we ought to, as Elsewhere in the country. I think we ought to take a very definite and vocal stand in favor of the government getting out of the realm of dictating to Christian schools or private schools. And in fact, if we could, it's not in our own generation going to be seen, I'm afraid, unless financial problems bring it about. But I think we should also take a stand that all education should be funded privately and not by the state.

Do you believe that a university also should be basically a parent?

Yeah, well. Or I think it probably at that stage parents are fine, but a university ought to be funded through the tuition that is charged and all that. I don't believe a university ought to receive state aid. This is not the state's place. Because you notice that when you do this. If I went down to the university. Well, the University of Southern California is a private institution. But if I went to UCLA and wanted to teach philosophy as a Christian, now I grant you that as a Christian I could apply and perhaps get a job. I mean, if they had an opening and they liked me and all that. But it'd be very clear that I could not explicitly teach Christian theology as the foundation of my philosophical outlook. I'd have to approach it very gingerly, mention it only in passing if I was a Christian and all that. Whereas a person who is a Marxist may enter at UCLA and explicitly teach Marxism, have their epistemology taught as Marxist epistemology as well as philosophy of history, and nobody says boo. That's just wrong. The state's money is being used to propagate one point of view and to screen out another. It oughtn't to be that way. I think people who are Marxists ought to be able to pay for their institution institutions. People who are Christians pay for theirs. If a Christian wants to go to a Marxist institution for some reason to learn what they say or vice versa, that's their business. But I don't believe the state should be in the business of picking and choosing and coercively taxing the people of California to support Marxist education. So I just don't believe in state control of education in any way at all. Unless, of course, by that we mean the state can keep people from subverting the laws of the land. And I do believe the state can do that. But that's not controlling education. That's simply putting a curb up against criminal activity in the classroom. Go ahead.

What, in your judgment was the purpose or wisdom or reason of God for not having David executed for the two capital crimes he committed? I've often Wondered about this. If it is God's will for a criminal such as an adulterer or a murderer to be executed, even a believer to be such. And he had Nathan go into David. He had a golden opportunity there to announce his execution. How do you think about that?

I don't believe that could have called for David's execution. Nathan was not a witness to the crime. True. Nathan knew. He knew supernaturally and we know God knew. God could tell us. But in the civil court, it takes two witnesses.

So in your judgment, the reason that didn't go down was there were not sufficient witnesses of David and Bathsheba.

I believe that there was not due process possible in that case.

Due process was not possible because of the number of witnesses.

Yeah, because there were no witnesses to the crime. Or they're not sufficient witnesses. And even if there were sufficient witnesses, if God did not see to the execution of David, I don't know what his motivation would be. But I'm not in a position to question God. I don't understand why God wanted Abraham to take his son and sacrifice him. Contrary to Abraham, knowing the human sacrifice was wrong. But if God says it, then we do it.

But you will not allow it as an exception to your female principle, will you?

Sure I will. Sure. If Carter gets caught in adultery and should be executed and God reveals from heaven that he ought not to be, then I'd say we'd better obey God, even if we don't know why he made the exception.

I should not abuse exception. You will not allow it to refute your theonomic.

Nobody who knows anything about informal logic should allow it to. Because that would be what's called hasty generalization. Taking an exception and. And making it a general principle. You never can prove a general principle from what is in fact an exception.

Okay, if I raise the example of Cain, is that any different why God prolonged the life of Cain?

No. It's been suggested that the only person who could have executed Cain would have been a member of his family. And since God withholds the sword from the family, that that is why. That's what Rushduni says. That is initially plausible. I have some problems with it. I mean, if one of the sons of Noah had been engaged in murder, we know that murderers to be executed, then it also would have been a member of his immediate family. But I think what we have to say in the most obvious way is that God spared the life of Cain for the sake of the propagation of the human race. Okay.

Did David personally murder somebody?

No. David set him up to be murdered.

He didn't actually commit a murder.

He was a conspirator.

That's right. However, in terms of the law of God, anybody who plots and successfully achieves the death of somebody would have been guilty as well.

I see, I see.

But as I see it, the. Even in the case of Uriah's death, there would have been, at best, one witness. You know, David called his chief captain and. Who was his chief captain? Uriah Joab. And told Joab to. Well, I mean, we all know that whoever's on the front line is going to have a far greater, you know, opportunity to be killed than those who are back. And David said, I want Uriah out there as the. I want him sent out. And Joab followed the instructions of David and Uriah died. Undoubtedly, that was a murderous intent and probably could have been proven if there had been sufficient witnesses. But as I see it, there was no due process in the case of David available. And although I believe in the law of God, I believe in all the law of God. So if you bring an adulterous woman to me and she doesn't have any accusations, I don't believe she should be executed. I believe the accusers should be able to cast the first stone because they're free of offense in that matter.

Can I take time for one more?

Sure.

When I was in Philadelphia, a person asked me a question about your book. He said, Dr. Vonson sees Romans 13, which speaks about the magistrate as the minister of God, not descriptively, but prescriptively. Which is to say he is a minister of God, not just merely descriptively and always so, but that he should be a minister of God. God prescribes it that he act like a minister of God. And here is this. Is your prescriptive stance on Romans 13 specifically absolutely necessary for your theonomy thesis?

No.

Could you take a descriptive view of Romans 13 and still have theonomy intact? Sure you could. Would you reflect on that?

Sure. Because the fact that he's called the minister of God descriptively, that is to say, no matter whether he's a Hitler, a Mussolini, IDI Amin or what have you, would nevertheless. Well, it would not change the fact that Paul goes on to say that he is ordained, ordained of God to be a terror to evildoers, that it is his job to be an avenger of wrath. And Paul has already said at the end of chapter 12, not yourselves, Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord. How does God show his vengeance through the avenger of wrath? Okay, so he would still be under obligation to avenge God's wrath against evildoers. Even if Paul was saying that every single man who rules in the state as a minister of God. But now the descriptive view, while I think it is absolutely impossible to sustain exegetically and logically is consistent with the theonomic thesis. But I would like to say about the descriptive view that Paul also speaks of people in the church that are ministers of God, that are in fact not ministers of God. They have the title, but they're not pursuing to function. They are hawkers of the word of God, he says. And I think there are people in the state who have the title minister of God, but they aren't performing the function. And it's the function that theonomy is dealing with, not with the title. Now, if somebody wants to say anybody deserves the title who has power and therefore might makes right, I mean, that's rather horrendous in light of biblical teaching. But if he wants to say that's what Paul is really saying, that even an idiominus is in fact a minister of God, then I say, okay, let him say that. But he's still got to perform the function of a minister of God. I don't believe that all people who have the title minister of God in fact minister for God. Anybody who holds the descriptive view of the state minister of God, should be driven logically to hold a descriptive view in the church of the ministers of God. But as a matter of fact, most of my opponents who like the descriptive approach to Romans 13 would number themselves among the most critical of liberal ministers in the church. I should say, what sauce for the goose. The minister in the state is sauce for the gander. The minister in the church.

I would just like to suggest, if it's not too late, that you make this distinction in your answer to the enemy's question, critics in your current book that you're writing.

That's a good observation. Thank you.

Because I'm getting the impression from not just one person asked me that you cannot be open to descriptivism on Romans 13. And I sense that that was wrong, that you could be descriptivist if your exegesis allowed you. I think that point is really a good point to be made.

I will make that, I would hope. Nobody's open to descriptivism whether they're theonomic or not. That's just poor biblical interpretation. But whether they are or not, the fact is they can go on to be theonomist one way or another. They can if they wish to be. Yeah, Ross, we find that when we.

Have a society under conditions of revolution, meaning they're changing their grassroots understanding of morality, right and wrong, where do we get our definitions for morality and that sort of thing? We've seen examples in history of that being bloody and non bloody. For instance, in the United States we went from that process of secularization which we mentioned earlier, that was a non bloody revolution. But as a matter of fact, we have gone from the explicit law of God to a form of humanism. And some of before we were saying that the use of a sword to restore that biblical basis is not granted in Scripture. However, once a society achieves that.

Standard.

Of morality, then the civil magistrate has the obligation to maintain that standard.

That's right. Okay.

But on the other hand, we see an example in the Acts account where the same thing holds true.

In.

Acts 5 or something might have been 17, where they came into conflict with the Caesar, the civil magistrates and the people were saying they're teaching decrees contrary to Caesar. In other words, they're revolutionary. They're saying that there's another basis. Therefore they're calling on the civil magistrate to execute civil punishment, capital punishment, what have you. And so, you know, when everyone says, well, that would be terrible for a Christian magistrate to do something like that. But as a matter of fact, that is what is common to all cultures try to preserve themselves. That can be done in either of two ways.

It's not a question of whether the coercive power of the state will be used to preserve its moral standards or not. It's a question of which moral standards will it preserve.

And the other thing, as a matter of fact, the civil magistrate does not even have it within his power solely to keep a nation within the law of God. As we see the United States. If the populace wanes conversion, evangelism wanes. If the teaching of the law of God goes down the tubes, the country will, you know, and then the stamps of the magistrate will change and then his hands are tied.

That's why Mr. Rush Dooney says very properly that regeneration is the only way that a moral revolution will come in this country. Not by the sword. The sword only guards the common morality of the state. And if a common moral morality is not there, because regeneration is not there, the sword can't produce it and the sword can't preserve it. Well, I think I've kept you long enough. Thank you for your patience.