Deals We Didn't Do; The Rise of Pref Equity and when to Run like Hell

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They're bailing out their own company, not investors. They're masquerading as really good private equity deals, and they are upside down as upside down can be, and you should run like hell.

Hello, future billionaires. Welcome back to another episode of the Invest Like a Billionaire podcast. Today's episode is going to be something a little different, and I'm very excited about it. I'm Ben Frazier, and I'm joined by Jim Maffuccio, Bob Fraser, and Ellis Hammond. This is a new segment that we're calling Deals We Didn't Do, and we're bringing on several other folks from our leadership team and our partners at Aspen Funds, where we look at hundreds of deals every quarter. And sometimes we see a deal that looks like a good deal on the surface. But as you pull back the layers of the onion, it doesn't. Or in some cases, like the one we're going to talk about today, it's so blaringly obviously bad that you need to run the other direction. And we're going to talk about some of these things that you need to look out for that are massive red flags. And if you've followed us for a length of time, you know that we really like this asset class called private credit, preferred equity. It's a great place to be because you're lowering the capital stack, you get more cash flow, you're reducing your overall risk in a deal. And there's a lot of great deals out there. But one of the things we're seeing, and this is a trend we're seeing, where sponsors are raising funds for their own deals, their own struggling distressed deals. And we're calling them bail-in funds or rescue preferred equity funds, but they're disguised as, you know, the good kind of private credit. And so, Bob, maybe talk a little bit about what you've seen just across some of these different deals.

Absolutely. I mean, the whole thing about private credit is you get equity-like returns. Yeah, with debt-like risk. And the point is, you go down the capital stack, you have all this equity behind you, right? And so it's a very, very safe deal. And you typically get income, you have control rights, you have all these different things. And so private credit, we just love it, especially in today's market, right? So today's market in real estate equity deals, they're going to struggle because of the high interest rates. So it's better to move down the capital stack, go safer because we're not going to be hitting home runs right now, right? We're going to be hitting singles and doubles, right? In the market generally. And so let's go down the capital stack and hit singles and doubles in private credit. So what happened in the great interest rate increase, a lot of these young sponsors went and bought deals and they overpaid for them like 4 cap deals, which means they're earning 4% unlevered. That's terrible. They took variable rate interest rate loans on this stuff that spiked up, just causing all their cash flows to go vastly negative. And then when cap rates rose, all these properties dropped in value 25%, 35% now, and they're underwater. Okay, so these sponsors, big sponsors, are really good at promoting. What do they do? Well, they don't want to let their deals go, and they've been bailing in money. They've been writing checks. Out of their personal accounts to cash flow these deals and to buy the rate caps down. And so, they've got this big debt out there and they're going to lose like everybody else. And so, they're doing bail-in funds and they're doing funds that look good on the outside, but that are absolutely deadly. I mean, we haven't done a full underwrite of these deals, but one we're looking at, I mean, I don't see any way this returns capital to investors. It looks to me like it is primarily about paying back the loan made by the sponsor to bail in these bad deals. They're pulling almost $5 million out of cash. Of the money going into the property to bail in the deals, they're pulling the money back out and paying themselves off. They're bailing out their own company, not investors. So anyhow, I just see it as a trend. We're seeing a number of these deals. They're masquerading as really good private equity deals, and they're as upside down as upside down can be, and you should run like hell. You've said.

Yeah. So this is again, a broader problem and I've seen it over and over and over again. And we've been talking internally about this. We're like, we need to get on the podcast and talk about this because this is really, really important for investors to understand. And so we're going to go through a case study of a deal that we just saw recently. And, you know, I went and put on my underwriter hat, you know, pulled out my old banking days and just did some back of the napkin calculations, right? Just at a high level. Where is this deal sitting and what do investors need to understand if they're investing in a fund like this? And so we're going to break all that down in a minute. And before we do that though, you know, one of the things that's challenging in these types of funds is they're not being fully transparent about where the deals are at from a valuation standpoint. And that's a really big issue because they're going and raising new capital from new investors. They're raising it as preferred equity in this instance, which is going to take priority or precedence over the common equity investors that wrote checks several years ago. Then they're promising a preferred rate of return and a targeted total return. They're showing it as, "Hey, here's how we're going to do that." But if you pull back some of the underlying assumptions that are being made to hit these numbers, it starts looking pretty absurd. So I'm going to go through some of these numbers and how it was presented, and then we'll talk about it as a group here. Yeah.

Let's talk about the good stuff, right? Or why it looked good. Let's talk about why it was appealing.

Yeah. Because we do know a lot of people that are raising for these or are investing in these types of deals. And this is in, you know, a great MSA, a great growing part of the market. They're Sunbelt assets. And this particular fund was a portfolio of 5 multifamily assets in the Southwest. But if you look at the purchase date of these assets, they were in end of 2021 and beginning of 2022, which was at the peak of the market.

Yeah.

December 2021 through May of 2022 was the acquisition date of these assets.

Right.

They paid absolutely top dollar for these before interest rates had risen while they were still really low.

That sounds right. And so that's one of the first things I always look at, right? If there's a cash-in preferred equity deal, kind of a bail-in fund, I want to look at the acquisition date because that's going to be one of the quickest indicators of, oh wow, they bought this at the top of the market. But one of the interesting things about this deal is the occupancy. So you think of distressed assets, you think of old rundown properties in a bad part of town with low vacancy, bad tenants, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. The thing is, these are actually nice looking assets. They're kind of in BC areas, but they're nicer for the area. Their occupancy is actually in the low to mid 90s. So fairly high occupancy. And they're all fully renovated. So looking at this, it seems okay. It's not that distressed, right? Jim, did you want to say something here?

Yeah. You know, it's just I've been watching this kind of stuff really for 30 years, but it's like these are the kinds of things that cause some investors that don't really dig deeper to say, well, I'm done investing in apartments because, man, they just don't work out. This thing ate my lunch. And it's like, no, it's not the apartment's fault. The thesis for investing in multifamily is great. I mean, here you just said it. It's— there's hardly any vacancy. It's great occupancy. It's a good-looking project. It's financial distress. It's really the debt structuring and the financial structuring. And then there's the addiction to promoting. And when it becomes easier to promote than to just suck it up and go tell your investors, hey, you know what, we're in trouble. We need to pony up some more money and put some more on the equity side. But the easier thing to do is to go out and raise more money from the next crop of investors. So you're kind of ruining certain people to the whole alternative investment world because they get hosed on a deal like this, or other people you're turning off to apartments and it's not a problem with apartments. It's a problem with the way these deals are being structured. So it's kind of frustrating to see this happen.

You know, but before we go eviscerate this deal, Ellis, why don't you give us what's the appealing part of this deal? Why is this getting any traction at all? What is the appeal?

Well, I mean, you can't do this if you don't have a large presence online or track record over the last couple years, right? Not every group can go do this. And so I could list several that you've seen a lot at conferences, et cetera, that have a good online reputation, that have raised a lot of money. The second thing is, is it does look pretty good on paper. I mean, they're offering these funds anywhere from 7, 8% preferred return. Heck, I saw online yesterday, there is a sponsor offering a 24% all accrued preferred return for the next 2 years. And so if you're looking at that deal, and again, you don't know what a cap rate is, and let's be honest, a lot of retail investors probably don't know what a cap rate is. They probably don't know what the LTV is, and they don't know what the valuation of the current property is today at today's levels. And then what the assumption is moving forward. And so I do think when you look at it, they're paying 7% in year 1. So, okay, cool. There's cash yield right away.

So they're cash flowing, but the properties are not cash flowing.

That's right.

Properties have massive negative cash flow. They're cash flow because they're taking money they're raising from investors and you're paying yourself. We're going to take money from you, then we're going to use your money to pay you, and we're going to call that income.

Yeah. So at least the 24% group is just not like they're not making enough.

Like, we don't got no cash.

If anyone is raising money from you at 24%, that means they couldn't raise cheaper money somewhere else.

That's precisely.

So they're looking for you, the dumbest investor ever, to go give them money, right? That's why you raise at 24%.

So I think that's the big things. And I think, Ben, you know, it's helpful for you to kind of put on your banker hat today and dive into understanding, I think, what's going to be really helpful for investors today. And this is meant to be educational, not bashing someone else. Most investors don't know what assumptions they should be— like, even that question, what assumptions are you having to make in order to pay these returns? And as you're going to see today, there are massive assumptions that are being made in terms of where cap rates are today, where cap rates are tomorrow and where rent growth has to be over the next 2 to 3 years.

So summarize the good side: a well-known sponsor, a well-known market, Sunbelt market, that's a popular market, you know, stabilized property with the redos are done, 93% occupancy, and you're getting a cash flow investment with a good pref return. Okay. Yeah, it's a good start, right? So let's go into this. As we pointed out, well, one, yeah, they overpaid for these assets too. Yeah, there's cash flow, but you're paying yourself.

The project isn't cash flowing. The structure of the deal is cash flowing.

That's right.

Until it isn't.

Yeah.

Which, by the way, these are all the things that we promote in our private credit fund, which is just like— the reason it's attractive is the same reason private credit is attractive for us: immediate cash flow, preferred position in the capital stack, low execution risk. Like, it's all the things we would say, but there's some nuance to it. And so I think, to answer your question, Bob, that's why.

Yeah, love it.

So Ben, go through some of the deal points about this deal.

Yeah, I want to make a really clear point up front. All of these were things that I had to go figure out myself. These were not outlined in the presentation. And I think that's the real big issue is it's not fully transparent, right? And so it's not fully clear where you sit. So if I'm putting on my banker hat, I'm thinking about a few things as a preferred equity investor. One, where am I at in the capital stack? I'm lower. Yes, I have preference over common equity. But what's the actual value of the combined properties right now? So when I put that money in today, you know, how much margin do I have? Two, how is my cash flow going to be paid? Because I'm getting current cash flow. And that is a very attractive part of why people are like this, right? I'm getting cash flow day one. So I want to look at where's that coming from. And then the third thing is, I want to look at how do I get taken out? How do I get paid off in a couple years? So let's say this is 3 years. So I want to look at the assumptions that are going to be required to take me out and get my capital back and all my return. So let's break this down one by one. The first one is, where do I stand today valuation-wise? And this was not clear. And there's probably a reason they're not putting this front and center. Because what I had to do is I looked at their 3-year sales price. The plan is to sell these in 3 years. I looked at the sales price and I reverse calculated their implied cap rate. Because they had the NOI for year 3, they had the expected sales price. So I just calculated what is the implied cap rate that they're selling at in year 3, and that number was 4.4% cap rate, right? Which is already a very aggressive assumption.

And just for clarity, how did you do that?

So I went to year 3 and they had the expected sales price. They had the NOI in year 3.

So you divide your NOI by your sales price, 4.4%.

4.4%.

Which is their expected price they're going to get is a 4.4% yield on cash.

Yeah, that's year 3. We'll get to that in a minute. So now I use that 4.4% on what's the current NOI, right? Because that was year 3. Now let's look at current NOI.

So you credited them 4.4% today on existing value as well?

Hey, we're being generous. We're being generous in this example.

Okay, I'm just saying that is very generous. I'm just curious because that actually would mean whatever you value this probably even higher than what it is today.

And that's a great point, which we'll get to in a minute. Today, At the valuation of 4.4% at current NOI, net operating income, all common equity is completely wiped out. And 35% of the new preferred equity day one is underwater, is likely underwater.

Just because you're lower in the capital stack, the property is still lower than all of it.

Exactly.

You know, everybody's underwater. It's like, yeah, you're lower in the capital stack from the idiots who invested in, you know, in '21 and '22. You're putting money in. It's like, you know, you're buying a house at $600,000. It's worth $400,000 and you're the investor that's going to help buy that.

So that right there should be full stop. Okay, what's going on? Right. They are underwater in their properties. They might have done a capital call. Who knows if they have to their current equity investors. The current equity has decided not to fund a capital call to do what it needs to take to get this to the next 3 years. So now they're going out to new equity. but that new equity, preferred equity, is likely already partially underwater day one. So this is very, very, very serious implications, right? And not something very uncommon that we see. So let's go to cash flow. So we already talked about this one, and this is what I get— I had to go back and calculate. So they're saying you're going to get cash flow monthly at a 7% return year one. Well, as an investor, I want to know, how is that being paid? Is the property cash flowing? And right now, based on their current debt service and the current NOI, which are in this deck, but though they did not calculate the debt service coverage for you, you had to do it yourself. It was below 1.0. So if your NOI is less than the debt service requirement payment, you have no free cash flow. That means there's no excess cash flow. And so that 7% is coming from—

1.0 means the property will pay the debt service.

Yes.

Below that means it will not.

Yes.

And just to make sure I heard you right, Ben, that's using the 4.4% cap rate, even the current NOI.

Yeah.

So we're not even getting into valuation right now. Now it's just cash flow. So where's the cash coming from?

Okay. Wow.

And are you talking— is that year 3 cash flow or is that current cash flow?

Current cash flow. So by year 3, they're hopeful that they will be able to pay the current preferred return out of cash flow. But again, this is not coming from operating cash flow from the property. And so what they are doing— Jimmy made a great point earlier. This is cash flow from financial engineering, not cash flow from good fundamentals of the property. And that's a big issue because if— to me, what that does is create a massive ticking time bomb, right? Because they're paying current cash flow, which is now draining reserves of the property, and the property is not cash flowing. So at some point, if the property doesn't hit that inflection point to where it goes above a 1.0 debt service coverage, and it can support the preferred return, all of a sudden, you're back to where you were originally. You can't pay the current cash flow and you're back to no reserves again.

So can I ask you a question that just kind of sticks out to me then?

How—

like, so they're at 93, 94% occupancy, right? Clearly the properties don't cash flow today. What can they do at 93% occupied to even grow revenue enough to get out of this deal later?

That's the great point.

Hope and pray.

Well, so here's the big assumption. So that's the third point here is what is it going to take for this property to achieve what they're hoping for in year 3, right? And this is— I did all this in 10 minutes looking at their deck. I didn't get the underwriting model. I didn't go into their PPM. This is all simple math that you guys can do when you're looking at these decks. So all I did was look at what's the year 3 gross potential rent, GPR, the big top line number in multifamily or any commercial real estate. And then I just did the growth rate from year 3's number to what today's is. And that's basically how much can they grow their revenue? How much can they grow the rents in 3 years? What are they projecting?

Yeah.

The assumption in that growth rate was a 33% rent growth rate.

33% annual rent growth?

Not annual, in 3 years.

Okay, gotcha.

So basically 11% per year rent growth.

And we know the Sunbelt markets are at zero rent growth basically right now.

Exactly. And the data in the deck showed the projections from some big brokerages of what projected rent growth was going to be in the area. This is in the deck. Guess what the rent growth number for the market is over those 3 years? About 3 to 3.5% per year. So a total of about 10%.

So they tripled the broker's estimate of projected rent growth.

Yes.

And again, well, how are they going to get that rent growth, right? Are they going to improve these properties, do big value-add? What? Nothing. They got— they're not doing anything.

Hope and pray.

No. And, and that's the point. In some cases, if you're doing a value-add, you can beat the organic market rent growth because you can get higher rent premiums on nicer units. That's the big point here, right, that people are missing is all the renovations have been done. And if you look at what's the capital going to be used for, which we're getting to next, it is not for improvements to the properties to command higher rent premiums. So that's A huge assumption, 33% rent growth in 3 years to grow out of it. So then you look at the year 3, they have their expected sales price, they have their implied cap rate of 4.4%. What does that mean? Well, you think it'd be a home run, everybody wins. Well, in that case, they hit all those assumptions. Yes, the preferred equity does get paid off and gets the return, but the common equity still does not get their full capital return. They're still slightly underwater, even with those very aggressive growth assumptions. Right? And so they put this pro forma in this deck. Again, we're not trying to be slanderous, but a lot of times when sponsors get into challenges, they're kind of trying to solve for a certain number sometimes, right? And that you got to be wary of that because in this case it feels like they're trying to solve for what's that ultimate valuation that gets everyone paid off and what are the assumptions that it takes to get to that? I have a really hard time believing any of those assumptions are—

You reverse engineer what assumptions gets everybody paid and everybody happy. Then you massage the spreadsheet until that's what you get.

Yet.

And it's a common problem with some sponsors, you know. Yeah, you're trying to solve for a problem.

So Ellis, you had a great question a minute ago about cap rate. You said, well, could they even get a 4.4% cap rate? So what do you think on that, Ellis?

Well, I mean, I personally own a lot of multifamily assets, and the difficult thing that we have seen in really good markets like Dallas, for example, is that the price of new build construct, like stuff that has just been built, is now very close to a Class B asset in terms of price per unit, right? Meaning like if you can, you know, sell your Class B unit, for example, in Dallas, $185 a door, you might be able to get brand new stuff for $200, $210, right?

Not a lot of difference between that. So what you're implying is that capital would rather have a newer asset, so they're willing to pay a little bit more.

100%. Why would you go buy a Class B, you know?

So that just pushes the market price of the Class B down.

Yeah. And so at a 4.4% cap rate on a 70s vintage deal. I know you're not getting that today in any market in the country. Now it is one of the hottest markets in the country. So not to say things can't go there, but I think the big thing here, and you guys have talked about this, like the looming amount of debt coming due, what's going to trigger it? I think what's going to trigger it is liquidity. And I think this group is starting to see that, like they're running out of money and they got to create some creative ways to go get more money. and they can probably do it, but there's going to be a lot of groups who can't. And so that's going to open up a lot of supply in the market. And so we'll see.

Yeah, so I mean, from my perspective, I think 4.4 is very aggressive because what the next buyer is assuming is that the market growth is going to be so strong and so compelling that I'm willing to accept negative leverage on a stabilized asset that I'm going to grow out of it organically and get in positive leverage territories. What negative leverage means is that your cap rate, your unlevered yield on cost, your unlevered cap rate, right, 4.4%. I'm going to be borrowing money from the bank at a higher rate than that. It's called negative leverage.

When your debt costs you more than the property earns on a percentage basis.

Exactly. And in some cases, certain buyers will do that, but only the cases where the ultimate stabilized yield grows so much that it gets you into a better position. Because right now agency rates are around, say, 5.25% to 5.5% as we sit today. So that means their overall yield would have to grow by 100 basis points just to get to break even on a leverage standpoint. So I just have a really hard time seeing that. Now, there is going to be a massive premium for a high-growth market. That's clear. So I don't think it's going to be as high as, say, 6%, but I think you're probably in the low to mid-fives, very, very likely. Right now. And if that's the case, then all these numbers that we're talking about don't make any sense. So let's just review real quick. So if you use their very aggressive assumption of 4.4%, all common equity is underwater and preferred equity is partially underwater. The cash flow that they're going to be paying the preferred equity is coming out of other capital being raised, not from the property itself. The assumptions that they're using to get out of this in 3 years is 33% rent growth, on an already stabilized asset with a cap rate that is really yesterday's cap rate is the way I view that, right? If all those things happen, then the common equity only loses a little bit. If all those things happen, it's not even a single, right? It's, you just struck out and it wasn't too bad of a strikeout. Here's the other big thing. The last thing I always look at is sources and uses. So in every case in a deck, there will be a section on the sources and uses of capital. So the sources is, where is the capital coming from? And the uses is, what will it be spent on? And this is very, very clear. They actually break this out in the deck. But if you look at it, about 40% of the capital they're raising— so they're raising about, I think, $13 million in this fund— about $5 million or $4.8 million of that capital is going to pay back loans from the GP. Ooh.

From the sponsor.

From the sponsor. So Bobby made this point earlier. You look again, what's the capital being used for? By and large, the largest part of the capital use is to pay back member loans from the sponsor. That's another massive red flag. Now, there can be reasons why that could make sense, but in a case like this where the asset is already pretty distressed, right, is on the bubble, that's a pretty big deal.

Yeah, what tells me is the sponsor probably has been writing checks to deal with negative cash flow. They've been putting cash into the deal. Well, good on them, right? Now they're hoping to pull out all that cash back out. And so they're, you know, I'm sure it's been tough, right? It's like all the partners writing checks instead of getting checks written to them, right? That's not the place any sponsor wants to be in. So they're getting all paid off, which answers the question, why are you really doing this deal? I mean, any decent underwriter worth his salt would immediately say this ain't going to happen. So the reason to do this is to pay yourself.

Let me ask a question on this one, Ben. If you were to look at what today, in today's market, if these properties had to sell in a reasonable exposure, fair market value, what are they worth? And how does that compare to the current debt that's against the property? Is this property upside down just on the basis of the senior debt? So, I mean, that alone to me, unless you're doing a development project or a heavy value add, it's like Why would I put money towards gambling on a future based on really a hope and a prayer, not even doing anything physical to the property to improve it when I can go out and buy a property that doesn't need some work? It just— I don't even get it.

Oh, I would say, and this is the issue with raising retail money and having retail sponsors, to lose investor retail money when you have big exposure online, like maybe a group like this does, to lose 4 or 5 assets is going to be very detrimental to their reputation.

They're done. Their goose is cooked. Yeah, yeah.

But don't these retail investors see this package?

The hope would be that they're not sophisticated enough to run a couple ratios that Ben just ran.

Well, this is another issue that, to me, I mean, too many people don't look at this, and that is some of the relational risk. You know, this thing could end up being a lawsuit by these common equity investors if they were to look at this package and say, wait a second, you're raising money from another group of investors to not pay us partially off, but to pay you off for money you loaned to the deal. And legal risk is another big deal when we look at deals. Like, there's always a story, like, why is this raise happening? Really? I mean, really, why is it happening?

Yeah, I think Ellis made another great point on the why is they're continuing to make acquisitions as we speak, right?

So if they go and lose money, they get a couple deals wiped, their capital raising days are over.

"So hey, we know this is not going to be a great win, potentially a complete loss for investors, but we're okay kicking that can down the road for 3 years because if we can go acquire more for the next 3 years, we actually can make something good of it for us." Right? That's a little bit of a negative view, but that feels like what it is a little bit. And I think going back to the original point of what's attractive about this, you know, the highlight in the deck, the GPs and sponsors are putting in $1 million into this $13 million fund.

Co-investment. Now that— and that's, you know, you and I just wrote a book, Ben, and co-investment is one of the best ways to evaluate your deals, right? How much is the sponsor putting in? And so they're putting in a million bucks, you know, good on them.

But the problem is on a net basis, they're actually taking out $3.8 million, right?

So, so it's a way to look like you're co-investing when you're not co-investing. I would say net co-investment is what matters, you know.

100%.

And then the other thing is then they have an acquisition fee. So in order to bail themselves out, you're going to pay them an acquisition fee of 3%.

They clearly list that in the deck. So bold on them to charge money on bail-in capital at 3%, which is not cheap.

So there's two dynamics here with all the tools online and everything. We've gotten really good at teaching people how to go buy apartment buildings, and we've gotten really good at teaching people how to go raise money. And that's what we're looking at. I mean, so everybody and his brother has bought apartment buildings, and everybody and his brother is going out and raising money. And there's a lot of really good guys. We work with a bunch of them that are out, you know, raising money and, you know, fund to funds. But when it gets too easy to go raise money or go promote, the bottom line, the fundamentals fall apart and the deal itself can't stand up to any kind of headwinds. And so there's a lot of headwinds right now, especially in the multifamily world, right?

Yeah. At the end of the day, you know, I summarize this as the problem is they bought at the peak of the market. They paid too much and you can't fix that, right? It's not something that you can scrub hard enough that the stain goes out. So that's why what you buy something for is so important in real estate.

And, you know, Ben, before we sign off, let's make the point here. So we've got, we've got private credit funds and there's good private credit. There's lots of funds besides ours that are great, right? So go through the list of here's the things where this deal does not check the boxes where a good proper fund would check these boxes.

Yeah, one is the capital stack intact, meaning with our last dollar in and current valuation, are we at usually below 80%, sometimes 75% on our last dollar in? And that's on today's valuation on a reasonable cap rate, right? The other is, how are they going to pay us? What's the cash flow being derived from? So we really like to see strong cash flow, or a very, very quick, clear path to get to that with reasonable assumptions. And then the last is, conservative business plan, right? We don't want to go and take these wild swings and we're gonna go grow rents by 33% organically when the market's projected to only grow by 10%. Right? We want to see something that's a proven business plan or proven value-add. Because even in those, like, even those scenarios, not everything's gonna work out, but we have a lot of margin to protect ourselves in those cases. If you're going to deal like this, where you have no margin starting out, and you have very aggressive assumptions, you're already playing behind the 8-ball significantly.

And then yeah, look at net co-invest and look at uses of capital and make sure it's going to places you want to invest in.

Yeah. All right. Well, thanks for coming on, guys. This is really fun to do the Deals We Didn't Do segment. We have a lot more of these planned. And listeners, we appreciate your feedback. And if you guys have other ideas or things you're seeing or want us to evaluate on this segment, the Deals We Didn't Do, we're happy to do that. Hope you enjoyed as well. If you are enjoying it, please share with a friend, leave a review. It really helps us get this podcast in front of more people. Thanks so much.