Is There a Real Estate Syndication Bubble? | Top of Mind Series

Welcome back to another Invest Like a Billionaire podcast. I'm your co-host Ben Fraser, joined by fellow co-host Bob Fraser. And today we are doing another top of mind episode. We've been on a roll of these recently. Uh, we'd kind of come out and do these when there's some newsworthy things to comment on. And there's been a lot of the news recently that's, uh, interesting to discuss and wake up call for investors. Yeah, wake up call. It's been definitely a unique time in the market and, uh, You can see on the screen behind me here, I pulled up an article that we— it was just on the Wall Street Journal front page just a week or two ago. And it's called "A Housing Bust Comes for Thousands of Small-Time Investors." And we've got a lot of, you know, investors of ours and others reaching out saying, oh, is this, you know, a bigger issue? Is this what you guys are doing? And, you know, the whole concept of syndications and, you know, the article kind of talks about the story of what happened here.

Yeah. So explain what happened.

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Get started and download your free economic report today. So basically what this article is showing is, is a firm called Applesway was a syndicator, right? And so you've heard the term before. You, you know, if you invest with us, you know, what we do is syndications and basically pooling together investor capital to go purchase, in this case, multifamily apartments.

Syndicator raises money from a pool of investors investors, they go put it together and they go buy an asset like an apartment complex, an Applesway case, and then they take fees and that from, from that.

Right.

And so very common business model. Yeah.

And, and generally the idea is you go and you buy an apartment complex that's maybe mismanaged, but it's in a great area, it's got some good bones and you can, you know, do what's called a value add to it where you're improving the the area, you're improving the units and you can rent them at higher rates, kind of at the market rate and you can force appreciation. So it's a, it's a business model that's been proven for decades and decades. It's a proven way to make money if you do it right. But what happened and what's so interesting about this is we've been kind of talking about this, you know, not a lot, not a lot on the podcast, but at least internally of where we're—

We've been warning our investors for a couple years that this was happening.

Yeah. And, and basically calling it a syndication bubble, right? Because what we've seen over the past really 3 years especially is all these different syndicators, you know, put air quotes around that, syndicators are coming out of the woodwork and being kind of sold the idea that, oh, I can go and start raising money and replace my W-2 and, you know, become a real estate investor, an expert without any background or any experience. And that's kind of what this guy did.

So the genesis of that is, is these guys that created these masterminds around syndication and capital raising. So the idea is this, you hate your job, You want to stop working for your money. In fact, the quote here says, I'm sick and tired of working for my money. The guy who started Apple said, I'm sick and tired of working for my money in IT. I became a syndicator. So you go to these groups and they teach you how to raise money from investors, how to find deals and how to do deals. And but these are guys that don't have any— they don't have a financial background. They don't have a, you know, a real estate background. And what happened is they're doing deals that shouldn't have been done. So as prices were skyrocketing, you saw rents going hockey stick, right, last couple of years and prices of these properties are going hockey stick. And so the ask is going huge. Well, then these syndicators, because they're trying to get a deal, they have to get a deal done.

Yep.

They're overpaying, right? They're overpaying. And then they're adding leverage, meaning borrowing that they shouldn't be adding. They're overleveraging with really bad debt. In order to get a deal done, then to go to investors and say, got the deal, we got the deal. But it's a deal that has, should never have been done. And yeah, professionals would never have done these deals.

So let's, let's walk through a little bit of the red flags here, right? Because the concern is, one, is this all of the things I've invested, I've invested in syndications before, are all my deals like this? And two, is there an apocalypse coming to multifamily, right? These are kind of the, the initial, you know, knee-jerk concerns that investors are having when they read this. And I think it's important to kind of, you know, parse through this article because there are some really clear things that this, you know, individual did that were pretty big red flags. What are they? And so, you know, first off, the guy was an IT professional, right? So nothing against IT professionals. We love them. No way. We all, we all need IT. But that doesn't necessarily mean you are gonna be a real estate entrepreneur success story, right? And obviously you can translate a lot of skills into it. But basically this individual went and he purchased over 7,000 units, which is mostly about— what is that, $500 million, especially in these are, I think, Sunbelt markets. So $500 million in real estate. And it didn't have the timeframe he did it in, but it's over a pretty short period of time. And so 7,000 units. And so the whole point of this article is that 3,000 of those units are being foreclosed on right now. So it's, I think it's, oh, in excess of $200 million. And it's looking like it's probably gonna be a complete equity wipe for—

Well, a foreclosure is an equity wipe.

Yeah.

So if it is an, if they complete foreclosure and they don't do a deal, it is an equity wipe, which means anybody, anybody, any junior debt is gonna be completely wiped and any private equity is gonna be completely wiped and any equity is gonna be completely wiped.

—right—

in a foreclosure. So it's an apocalypse scenario where— right— everybody except the bank, the senior lien holder, loses.

So the first red flag was experience, right? When you're looking at a syndicator, a sponsor firm to invest with, you want to look at the track record. What have they done before? And, you know, this guy was a very good salesman, obviously, to raise money to go purchase half a billion dollars worth of real estate. But it was all done in a very short period of time. And then some of the things he was saying, right, he's quoting basically almost guarantees of returns and just saying the sky's the limit on how much money we're going to make. And he basically said, I don't care about the economy because I just— I make money no matter what. And yeah, just saying all these claims that are just really, to me, arrogance and exuberance, right? It's like, oh, the market's only going to go up. And then kind of the next big yellow flag— this is something we have talked a lot on the podcast about— is debt, right? And purchasing these properties with what we would argue is bad debt. Right. And you know, we'll get to this in a minute, but multifamily is an asset class. You know, it's going through a, a reset right now, a little bit of a correction cuz there was so much price appreciation over the past several years. But from a fundamental standpoint, supply and demand, right? There's still a massive demand for housing.

There's a, there's a shortage of how many units have we seen?

Estimates I've seen range, I think it's 5 to 7 million right now.

Shortage in America of housing unit shortage. And so, so you've got this, this, you know, this hockey stick price appreciation, it's like the stock market. If it suddenly just goes hockey stick, well, there's a period of time where it has to correct. But the fundamentals of the housing market are still very solid. So this is where these guys have been playing off these fundamentals and showing this housing shortage. But they're, they're doing deals that shouldn't be done. I mean, the guy growing this fast, well, he— I'll tell you how you win bids. You just become the high bidder. I can, I can become the high bidder on anything I want to. And win a lot of deals. Doesn't mean the deal should be done. And so that's, that's what he did. And then you convince these bridge debt to, to, to become lenders.

But, but back to your point about debt, right? So, so the, the debt, right? And we saw kind of in 2018 to 2019 with rates being as low as they were and bridge debt, which is basically non-bank debt, these are private equity firms that are coming in. They were, they were funding, I remember getting quotes on some of the deals we were doing, 80% leverage loan to cost on just the purchase and then 100% of the renovations, right? So on a value-add deal, that can be a pretty big deal. So you're leveraged probably 85% on your senior debt. And because of that, from a syndicator standpoint, especially an inexperienced one, that's really attractive because it means I have to raise less equity, right? And so—

And 80% on what is this on an appraisal or is this on pro forma or what is it? What is the 80%?

Usually limited to the appraised value.

Yeah. Yeah. But the appraised values went ballistic. Oh, yeah. So, so it's literally— it's, it's really approaching 100% of real value because the appraisals were kind of optimistic. Yeah, sure. And so, so here's, here's what happened. So basically it's like buying this apartment complex with debt, with no equity, where you're pretty much getting your lenders to, to put in all the money for this thing. And including all the rehab costs, which can be significant. Right. And, and you should— they—

no one should be doing deals like that. Right. And because of the low rates, obviously it's— they got really aggressive on leverage and it, it propped up a lot of these, these kind of marginal deals.

These bridge lenders, they're private lenders. They're not banks, right? Private equity companies. And they were lending at, you know, what, 3% and 4%, right? But it's variable rate.

Variable rate. They would not fix the rate.

They would not fix the rate. So, hey, as long as rates stay low, we're all great. And let's, let's just put in our, in our spreadsheets, rates stay low, you know, and, you know, abracadabra. Yeah. Unfortunately they don't. So these are, again, not professional underwriters who did this kind of thing and they're not measuring the risks. Right.

And it was, you know, at that stage everyone thought, oh, rates are going to be low forever. There's a lot of exuberance around multifamily. Hey, everyone's going to make money. Hey, this model has been proven and, and then you— but you're in a highly leveraged deal with a variable rate loan. And then obviously we all know what has happened over the past 12 months, right, with interest rates. They've gone up the fastest on record. And so apparently it wasn't initially covered in this article, but from word on the street from other people that I know that are around this, that he did not purchase a rate cap, which basically on bridge debt, a lot of times the lenders would require you— you fix the rate. To buy like interest rate swap or a cap where you have a max amount of how far the interest rate can go. But in this case he did not. And so obviously you're gonna be already cash flow constrained on a big value add rehab. Well, the other kind of big downside with these loans and the bridge debt is they have short maturities. So they only have 3-year maturities. And so it's very difficult, especially on a really big project to complete a full business plan reversal in 3 years, or it's possible, but everything has to go right, right? And sometimes you can buy extensions, but meanwhile you have this floating rate. And so, you know, red flag number 1, no track record. Red flag number 2, getting very aggressive on the leverage. And then red flag number 3, and this is where I think everything kind of just started going downhill, was he was an individual operator. So he purchased half a billion dollars of apartments, just him as a lone dude. He had no boots on the ground. He wasn't, you know, he wasn't tied in with asset management, with property management. And the property managers let these, you know, properties just go into the toilet. And you can see some of the pictures on this article. I mean, it's just, just terrible. The tenants were in, you know, pretty bad conditions. And so, you know, he was this very exuberant, charismatic person, able to raise a lot of money and got this idea in his head and ultimately is going to be— so lots of money.

Let me just walk through the cash flow for a minute. Yeah. Okay. So you buy this $50 million apartment complex, you put in, you know, you raise equity from investors of $5 million or ish, right? And now you buy this thing. Well, and it's cash flowing supposedly, right? It's got— so you, you basically collect the rents and then you, you pay the debt at 3% and, and there's usually the debt service coverage ratio is like 1.2 or 1.25. So you're getting— you have enough money to pay the bills of the apartment complex and pay the debt and have, have a quarter amount of your debt payments kind of left over. So that's the idea. And it's all great. You have a little bit of cash trickling to the bottom line. You pay your investors, you do distributions, or you rehab the property. But what happens when that rate goes from 3% to, you know, 7 plus percent, 8%, 8%. Well, all of a sudden that debt payment goes double or triple, right? All of a sudden there's no money coming to the bottom line. In fact, you can't— there's not enough cash flow from the property to pay the debt anymore.

And that's if everything stayed the same. In fact, if you started having massive delinquency problems, the whole— the tenants started moving out.

He doesn't properly take care of these places. So tenants are leaving. And so bottom line is that's when a foreclosure happens. So again, this is just a really poorly constructed deal and right without any thought of risk mitigation.

And here's the thing too, that you're not to get too technical with on the math side of things, but when you look at cap rate, right, especially in the Sunbelt markets and the Houston, Texas markets, obviously they're going to trade at a premium to other markets because of the growth that's going on. But the lower the cap rate, right? So if you're purchasing a property at a 3 or 4% cap rate, right? And cap rate is basically price divided by annual income.

So and what that means, the cap rate is if you wrote a check cash for this apartment complex, what would be your earnings per year? Yeah. And in percentage. So I've seen cap rates in Dallas as low as 2.5%. A couple of years ago, right? 2.5%. So you write a $50 million check, you're getting a 2.5% return on that money. Yep. That's nuts. That's wrong.

It's wrong. And so let's think about this, right? So we've, we've seen— okay, but then, and then the way—

so how does that make— how they make it make sense? Well, as soon as you leverage like crazy and if you can put in 90% leverage and we saw deals, I saw a deal in Dallas, Texas, 2.5% cap rate, 80% loan, and then 10% private equity on top of that. So it's 90% leverage. Yeah. So your equity dollars, you're buying 90% leverage. Well, you put 90% leverage on a 2.5% cap yield, it actually makes great returns, but it's a bug looking for a windshield, right? I mean, this is, this is a disaster with— but they put in the projections of what it's going to be. You know? Yeah, 100%.

And you know, a lot of these deals, it's, you're highly leveraged. You can make the numbers say what you want to say. Right. But what, what I kind of equate them to is you're, you're paying for the future value of an asset. Right. Now and taking all the risk to get to that. Right. When you're buying it at a 2.5 cap, you're basically, you're paying so much for the current income. You're basically buying your future price, but you're paying all of it now. You're taking all the risk. So, Again, not to say all multifamily is bad and all, you know, these value-add strategies are bad, but when you have a poorly constructed deal with a bad capital stack, you buy it for an insane price and obviously you have some, something, one of the dominoes tips, which in this case was interest rates and it just cascaded into the whole set of other problems. It's a big deal. So, Obviously want to come on here and just, just share some of the concerns, right? Yeah. Well, I think it's the big question, right, that we're getting from investors is, is this, is this the first one to pop? And this is, you know, all coming down.

Multifamily is going to explode. Right, right.

And so that's why we said we want to thread the needle of, you know, what, what's, what's important to understand from the fundamentals and what was just a bad deal. And I think, again, there's a lot of red flags here. But as we stated earlier, multifamily as an asset class still has a lot of tailwinds behind it. Right? Right. And from our standpoint as investors and opportunistic investors that are looking at the macroeconomic picture of where the best opportunities are going to be, we still like multifamily. We want to keep investing there, but we're going to— we're investing differently than we were a couple of years ago because the strategies are changing. So we're shifting with the tides. But multifamily, you know, it's still a big shortage. There's still a big need for housing.

Huge need for housing.

And, and right now we're actually seeing new construction starts plummeting, uh, for obvious reasons of it's getting more expensive to, to build and some of the exuberance has, has left the market. So a couple years from now we're gonna be in actually a worse position, uh, than we are right now.

So playing the long game here, here's our forecast at Aspen. Yeah. So playing the long game, apartments are apartments. There's not enough. There's not enough single-family homes either. So it's both multifamily and single are just a record. There's a lot of building that needs to happen. There's still a shortage in America of housing units. So long game, it's going up. Long game part 2 is you're going to see inflation continue. And this is part of my, you know, our economic thesis is you're going to see higher inflation, not, not sky-high inflation, but we will see higher than 2% for an extended period of time. Well, that is going to raise rents. So this stuff, long game, apartments are going to be super good. Short game, I do think it's going to get a little ugly. Yep. And, and so to me, this is a great opportunity, right? For those of us that haven't, haven't, you know, been walking the knife's edge for the last 3 years in our deals, we're going to do just fine. And, and in fact, I think there's going to be a lot of opportunity. In fact, we're seeing some opportunities right now being presented to us that are extremely lucrative for investors. Right.

And I think the key here, right, is to play the long game. You have to have good debt in place. And that's what we've been saying from the get-go. And we've actually never done a deal with bridge debt. We've only ever done 5-year fixed rate term with traditional— traditional lenders, which is banks where we're actually signing on the loans. Right. And that's the big deal with these, these bridge debt guys. They didn't require recourse. So they would actually— they didn't actually require the general partners to sign and guarantee the loan personally.

So literally, if we lose a deal, the bank's coming after us to collect, you know, personally. So we signed that paper, you know.

Right. And so let's get into real quick. It's kind of the last thing here because again— but let's do—

before we do that. So just the short term. I mean, so one of the, one of the stats that, that we saw recently was from Fitch. And these are— this is a ratings agency that rates commercial mortgage-backed securities. Okay. They're well-known ratings agency like S&P or Moody's. And they rate them and they were looking at the 2023, this year maturities, right? What's coming? And, and they said of the, of the loans that are maturing this year, 23% of them will not qualify for refinance due to loan-to-value, the too high of— the loan is too big and the value doesn't support it or debt service coverage ratio means there's not enough cash flow to pay the new rates. 23%, right? Almost a quarter. So they're going to literally blow up. And now their, their view was that the servicers were going to do something to help these guys and not just, not just take the property. So I think that's a little optimistic, but it just gives you a picture of the scale. I saw, I saw another, another statistic from some of the tracks. I can't remember the name of the firm. Yeah. And they're saying over 5 years we're seeing about, about just shy of $1 trillion worth of worth of financing that's going to hit maturity. So we do think there's going to be some price softness in multifamily. For, from our point of view, that is an incredible buying opportunity. When you see the long game going up. Yeah. And you see the short game going down, that's called a buy signal.

It's called dislocation. Price dislocation. So it's really, really a great opportunity.

And we're, we're looking at distressed deals right now that we could, we could jump into and and really make a killing on.

And, and I think it begs the question, right, is, well, how do I distinguish between a good deal that's just, you know, run out a little bit, little bit of capital, my operator's doing a capital call, right? Versus a sinking ship like one of these deals that, you know, one more point before you get to there.

What is this 2008? Is this 2008 all over again, right? Where we saw a dramatic, I mean, we really saw the, you know, the whole economic system of the United States and the world starting to spiral down. Okay, let me say unequivocally, this is not 2008, right? Okay. 2008 was a— what started as a— as a— it was a, a, a debt crisis in, you know, it was a, you know, what you call it, a subprime crisis, right? It was lending that should not have been made. And it was a very large scale and it became a banking crisis, and that's the reason it became systemic, was not real estate values but banks. Okay. But when— and banks were going under in droves, if you remember. Yeah. Okay. We are— this is not— doesn't have— there's no way this is going to become a banking crisis. Okay. It's not happening. And we're seeing where the— where the world had been overbuilt in terms of housing units in 2008. We're seeing the opposite now. So fundamentally, it's different. And two, it's not a banking crisis. So we are not gonna see the same kind of systemic meltdown that we saw in 2008.

And I think to your earlier point, inflation is going to cover over a lot of sins. Oh yeah. Right. So if a lot of these deals can hold on, just get through, just, just get through the next couple years, turbulence, make a lot of money from the— you're gonna be okay. So that's why I think, again, debt is so, so key here. And I think why we're still bullish on multifamily and, you know, some of these opportunities. Yeah. So, okay, now to your point, So I think to— because I've had this question a lot from investors and other, you know, capital raisers that are in deals that are having capital calls and they're asking— What's a capital call? Yeah. So basically an operator, if they have run out of funding to either complete their business plan or to finish renovations or, you know, maybe the vacancy is higher than they expected at that point in time, they need more capital to get through. Right. And so a lot of times they'll first go to the equity investors. Well, first probably go to the bank and say, hey, can we get a little bit more to complete the plan? Right now, banks are tightening. They don't want to lend any more money out to deals. So the next, the next place that these operators are going is to the equity investors. Right.

So you've put more money— so you've already invested in this deal, put in more capital to rescue the deal. It's a troubled deal, but put in more capital in order to save your existing capital. Really?

Exactly. And you know, the, the initial kind of thought is, well, I don't want to put good money after bad, right? If this is a bad deal, I don't want to put more money in there and potentially lose more than I already was going to lose. And so I think it's important to distinguish, you know, is this a deal that can be rescued with another capital injection or is this a sinking ship?

So you're a banker, how do you do that?

Well, I will say it, it is complicated, right? But some, some of the things to, to look for is, really understand what went wrong, right? Based on the initial projections, initial underwriting, where did it get off? Right. Because you didn't plan on running out of money. So what was that? And was it something that was out of control of the operator? And was it something that, one, makes sense and two, is fixable? Right. So a lot of cases, especially during COVID we saw a massive run-up in prices on construction materials. There's a massive labor shortage. So renovation and construction costs skyrocketed for a period of about 12 to 18 months. Right. That was— that's out of the control of the operator. But then, you know, was it— was it something that, you know, they just mismanaged? Was it a property management problem? Did the property manager not do good tenant screening where they just put in anybody that could fog a mirror into the units and, you know, just collect your rent? But now delinquencies are back up. So what you want to be able to see and understand is what went wrong. Is it fixable? And then two, where are they at right now in the business plan? So are they able to achieve the rents that they thought they were going to hit beforehand, or are they achieving higher rents? Right. And, you know, where are they? How much capital do they need? What's the runway that they, that they have to make it? Because I will say, if a deal is fundamentally in a good position, but they just need, you know, say, X percent of capital to finish the plan and get it back to where it needs to be, it might make sense to pull a bit more money in there than to take a big loss, right, on whatever you've invested if the business plan is sound. And so it can be a little bit scary, right? And understandably so. But really diving into and asking all the hard questions, right? And asking an operator who's going to be very face up with what's going on is really important.

You give 3 points, I'll give a 4th. And that is, you know, so let's say they do a capital call for $2 million. But they don't bring in the full $2 million, you're not— you haven't saved anything, right? So, so they do a capital call, they need $2 million, they do a capital call for $3 million, but only $500,000 of people agree to it. Well, you've just put in your money. And so you really have to know that they can get the money in that they need to. Otherwise you're just writing— you are writing good money after bad. But, you know, and I think the number one reason to not do a deal is if it is an operator failure. Yes.

Give an example of the Salt Lake deal that they, you know, mismanaged the budget, came back, did a capital call, and you did not participate. Yeah. Because you felt it was misrepresentation. Yeah.

This is a very large deal and this is not an Aspen deal. Let me, let me say this. So just my own personal capital that I put in into a deal, it was a big development deal in Salt Lake City and it was a doing a big hotel development and it was a really good deal. And I believe the— they got a $50 million GMAX bid, construction bid.

Well, it wasn't GMAX.

It wasn't GMAX. Sorry. When they went back to go and to actually, you know, sign and write the checks, they raised the money successfully. Well, it wasn't $50 million.

It was $80 million to do the construction, to do the construction.

And I'm going, How do you miss that? I mean, yeah, we did have, but where's the GMAX contract? They didn't have a GMAX contract in. And you assume that there's basic things like this. And their first lender dropped out and they, their, their bridge lender came in and said, well, we'll pick up the deal at a much higher interest rate. It was like double the interest rate. They didn't even disclose this and the whole thing. So, so these guys were clearly incompetent.

Well, so they wrote you a letter and said, hey, you know, this is what I thought was so, so ironic. So, Well, our construction costs almost doubled. Our first position lender, our first, our bank freaked out and dropped out. So now our second position lender is taking first position and interest, interest costs are way higher than they originally planned. But hey, you know what? We actually discovered that we were really conservative on our rent projections. Our projections. So our new—

we're gonna make a lot more money than we thought. Yeah.

So our, our new investor returns are actually higher than we originally thought. How does that work?

That's called spreadsheet magic. Spreadsheet magic. You know, and so I didn't, I didn't participate in that, in that deal, you know, so I still think I'm gonna actually make money on that deal, believe it or not. Yeah. So they, they raised, they raised the money and off, off to the races they go, you know, so.

Right. But again, you know, hopefully some, some helpful thoughts here. We wanted to kind of come on here and just talk about what, what we're seeing and what investors' questions are being asked to us and, Hopefully this was helpful for you to understand just some of the basics and looking for red flags, right? And doing the right due diligence and asking, you know, a lot of times individuals and investors, I think, make it a lot more complicated than it needs to be. Just ask the basic questions, ask the really simple questions. And if, if it doesn't add up, yeah, you know, dig deeper. And if it continues not to add up, pass.

Yeah. And I've, I've been saying for almost 2 years now, look at the debt. Yeah, that's the main thing you want to look at. Back before interest rates blew up, I said you've got to look at the debt. You've got to look at the debt, understand how deep is the debt, right? Here's the value of the property and here's the value of the debt. That's if you're at 80%, it's too much. If you're at 70%, it's probably too much. Right. And it's got to be lower than that because then if property prices drop 30% and it's at 70, you're still probably okay. And look at the rates, look at the rates and look at private equity. So look at the entire capital stack. That's the most important thing. Right. So, you know, in our, in our view, one of the things we do with every deal that we look at is we look at a— we have a— always have a plan B for every asset we buy. So we do— hey, we have a 3-year development plan or a 5-year value-add plan, which means we're going to do our thing in 3 or 5 years, we're going to exit. But what if that doesn't work? If there's a hiccup, I want to make sure that in every one of our deals we can, we can pull the ripcord on a deal and go long term. Knowing that inflation will save our bacon, right? Even if, even if the deal goes— but we're not going to lose the deal short term. And if we hold it for 10 years, yeah, well, our investors would be disappointed because they went— we went longer. But in a 10-year period, we're going to make more money. Okay. The idea is that, that we'll let time— we'll let inflation bail us out and return a really nice deal to investors, even if it's a little bit late. So every deal we do has a plan B. You know, that's one of the advantages of of having, you know, gone through multiple economic cycles that, you know, that a few of us have done. You know, we understand that, hey, the music stops sometimes, right? And everybody's happy when the music's playing. But, you know, when the music stops, you better have a place to sit down.

You hope you have a chair. Yeah, I hope you have a chair. Awesome. Well, thanks so much for listening. I hope you got some value out of today's and be sure to tune in next time. And if you're enjoying the podcast, we always appreciate you to rate and review so we can share this with more people. Thanks so much.