New Constructs' Friday Webinar: Intelligent Capital Allocation 2 June 2023

I'm gonna go ahead and get started. We'll go into our Friday webinar, Intelligent Capital Allocation. Cody's with us today, Kyle, David, myself, and these are our disclaimers and disclosures as usual. We have a great agenda created by our community out on Society. I wanted to do a few announcements before I hand it over. I have sent out a customer survey to our current members. If you have time this week or next, I would love it if you filled those in. I am avidly reading those that are coming in, and I appreciate the time that folks are taking to do that. It's incredibly helpful. The company is very excited to get that feedback. We will be doing a demo day both for future members and current members in late June. I'll be getting that date out to you as we have it firmed up. As we go through today, please don't forget to use the Q&A feature and ask us questions throughout. Please don't hold your questions. We would love to get your questions immediately and answer them while we're talking about a particular topic. Or change the topic. If you have a question about something else, we will make sure to get to it. We are considering taking either the Friday before the 4th of July or the Friday after the 4th of July off. So please let us know in the survey that goes out after this meeting has ended. There will be a question about that in the survey. So if you have a preference as to which one of those We take off. Let us know. You can get replays and slides on society. We'll be spending a lot of our time on society today. But before we do, I did want to give you the list of all of the research that came out last week. A number of great macro pieces of research came out this week as well. As well as updates to the Most Attractive and Most Dangerous Model Portfolio. And Kyle, I wanted to hand it over to you to talk a little bit more about the research.

Yeah, we've got a lot of the macro fundamental trends coming out this week. Right now, let me share, just show everyone where we can find them. The research tab of the website here, you see the S&P 500 and sectors, you know, GAAP earnings misleading, GAAP earnings free. We do put out a free version of each of these that is available right now. They're on the main page. Once we start publishing them, they might get pushed down. You could also find them in the fundamental market and sector trends category. And we'll have reports here on, again, core earnings versus GAAP, ROIC versus WACC, free cash flow yield, price to economic book value, and economic earnings. for the S&P 500. And then coming into next week, we'll start putting in the NC 2000 reports just on the NC 2000 instead of S&P 500. Fundamental Market Sector Trends is where you'll find all these members-only— get, you know, some of these have, you know, 39, 40 charts looking at all the sectors, the S&P. And then that free version gives you a sneak peek of what you could expect in the more full members-only version. I'm gonna kick it over to David for the interesting headlines.

Thanks, Kyle. Yeah, I wanted to focus on one of the macro reports that we lead with every week, and that is the GAAP earnings versus core earnings. And look, we, we think that the market is in an increasingly dangerous place. We've seen a relief rally today because the debt ceiling issue got resolved. We've also got unrealistic expectations in the market, we believe, for Fed funds rate cuts. We think that's probably a little overly optimistic. And now the fundamentals are a false tailwind, and nothing says it better than what we put into this analysis. It's macro research, which is really large fundamental trends for the S&P and the overall market. And no one else does this work. And if they do, usually it's always ex-financials. Why? Well, because the legacy databases, the legacy fundamental databases can't do apples-to-apples analysis on financials and other sectors. We can because we're looking at the economics and we're not tripped up by the accounting. The economics of all businesses are effectively measured in the same way. You have a certain amount of cash flow that a business generates relative to a certain amount of capital that's used to generate that cash flow. That's what drives everything in understanding corporate performance. And we, again, we do that better than anything anybody else. That's the whole Ernst Young paper on the numerator cash flow and the denominator is invested capital, the capital used to drive the numerator anyway. And so core earnings, which you got— you all are probably very familiar with as being proven to be a superior measure of earnings. You'll see in this chart we're seeing a decline in core earnings.

We also do have a question about preparing accounts for the downturn anticipated. So as it makes sense to get to that question.

Okay, here's the chart. It's from this report. You'll see it on the site. As Kyle mentioned, there's a free version of that. You won't see this chart in the free version. You can see here where earnings were set up for this increase by an overstated decline, also known as the kitchen sink effect. You've heard us talk about that quite a bit. But the core earnings are flat to down here. It's close, right? But this is a very clear growth number. And it is being— going to be set up to be a good amount of growth for a while. only to get back to where we were anyway if you take out the unusual losses. That's the point of doing this work. You'll see that our core earnings numbers are less volatile than GAAP earnings, so you don't have to worry about all this noise there. And here it is, above, below, above, below, just in the last couple of years. We think this is a time for people to be particularly careful. We will be publishing this week A report on the stocks you need to be most worried about in terms of overstated earnings and also an unattractive rating. Those two things combined are what you want to be careful about most. And yeah, to the question, do we need to prepare the accounts for the downturn anticipated later this year? Look, I think it's always to be preparing your accounts to be ready for and able to deal with when risk starts to matter again because it's in all of our best interests that risk matter. A world without risk means people just throw money willy-nilly after whatever and we have an enormous amount of value destruction because people spend billions of dollars on fusion energy or rocket ships to Mars or things that aren't going to create any value for society but only line the pockets of the people selling the narrative or the crazy idea. That leads to destruction for us all. When there's no risk, people don't discern. So I'm an optimist. I want to believe people are going to be discerning again, and I'm going to believe that risk is always going to matter at least a little bit and hopefully a whole lot just around the corner. Yeah, I think you're always preparing for that downturn, and if you're not, I would for sure be more focused on that today. That leads us in over to Circle. where we had an interesting question about the disconnect between the report we just were looking at, right? And what it showed about industrial sector earnings growth while we actually had an unattractive rating on the sector. And great question. They said, well, how can you say core earnings growth is great, but then have an unattractive rating on the sector? And the answer is, is— has got a few, few layers to it. But the first is that, look, every rating and every opinion on an investment is a function of 2 things: quality of earnings and valuation, right? The idea is a good company's not always a good stock. A bad company's not always a bad stock. If the stock price implies a meaningfully different future than what you believe is going to happen, that's what defines a good investment opportunity. That's why we said we were bullish on Disney with a very unattractive rating. We believe that the expectations embedded in the current valuation of Disney are still too low. So that's the first thing you got to look at, at the valuation as well as the quality of earnings. But then you want to take it to another level in terms of quality of earnings. And that is to look at, well, what's driving quality of earnings? The thing about core earnings is that's an income statement only item. The income statement, which in this analysis— this is from the key stats section of the sector ratings section of the website— and you can see NOPAT, which is really a proxy for income statement performance. NOPAT growth looks pretty good, right, in the TTM. Economic earnings, on the other hand, does not look so good. What is this? What does this really mean? Well, Well, it means that the income statement performance is strong, but the balance sheet performance is not as strong. So, and core earnings effectively are just going to capture income statement performance. That's why core earnings can look good, return on invested capital can look, you know, can be not as good, economic earnings can look bad, and if valuation is bad, That's all going to contribute to an overall rating of unattractive or very unattractive. And that's what we're seeing with the industrial sector. The sector ratings are available here. You can see the ratings tab, click on sectors. And for those of you with accounts that have that ability, you'll get to— you'll be able to look at all of our sector ratings and a lot of subsector ratings as well. And then the other thing I wanted to touch on is this Wall Street Journal article that came out recently. you know, I think a little bit after our article pointing out that GAAP earnings were overstating core earnings. And it's, it's, it's highlighting that a crowning fraud indicator signals coming economic trouble. Look, you get this indicator every single day, every minute with new constructs, and no one does it better than we do. That's what Harvard Business School and MIT Sloan prove. Uh, it's good to see when the Wall Street Journal is validating some of our work, and hopefully it's good for you to know that you're getting that diligence, the best level of that diligence in the world every day as a new constructs client. Should we get these questions before I pass to Cody? People don't want to go through 2008 again. They don't have enough time to recoup if they are 50+. Exactly. Which is why you want to be managing risk on a day-to-day basis. The problem with playing musical chairs is you don't know when the music's going to stop. And that to me is what momentum investing is about. It's musical chairs. Oh, it's going up from momentum. Nvidia, it's going up. I don't want to miss out on that. Yeah, but oftentimes these overpriced stocks tend to fall as hard as they are, as fast as they went up. You know, we saw that for sure with a lot of the zombie stocks last year. All those crazy IPOs: Sweetgreen, Carvana, Beyond Meat. They saw a little bit of a rally this year, but most of that's been squashed. Yes, and then another great quote here: Risk is at its greatest when people believe there is no risk. That's right. I would also add to that, my version of that is truth is at its most valuable when lies are at their cheapest. And that's why, you know, that's why I created New Constructs, because I wanted more people to have access to the truth about earnings and profitability. Speaking of the truth, let's talk to Cody Fincher and this cool analysis he did on Chipotle and the growth expectations baked into the stock price.

Thank you, David. I'm going to start by presenting a post that I did in Society looking at Chipotle and a comp between Chipotle and McDonald's. And I started this looking at where they're priced right now. McDonald's is still a good bit bigger than Chipotle in terms of market value, but there's a bigger disconnect between their level of profitability in terms of NOPAT. So I went through a bit of a thought experiment and said, Chipotle's priced a certain way partially because of their level of profitability, but the big piece of that is the future growth that's expected out of Chipotle. You can present that in terms of a price-to-economic book value multiple. The economic book value is the no-growth version of the stock. Basically, if the current level of NOPAT was just a perpetuity, And then when you trade at a price-to-economic book value of greater than 1, that means that there is some expectation for future growth. Currently, Chipotle trades at a very high price-to-economic book value of 5.62. McDonald's, for comparison, trades at something closer to 2. Chipotle's talked about how they have plans to eventually get the US market up to 7,000 stores. They're a little over 3,000 right now. The market has granted them this high multiple because in theory, Chipotle could double their stores just within the US. But I did some analysis and it looks like that is already well priced into the stock. You can put together a model. I encourage you guys to jump out to the post in Society. You can put together a model where Chipotle does that, effectively doubles their profitability, But that on its own doesn't guarantee the stock price is going to move at all. All that could happen is profitability goes up, growth expectations come down, and you can stay net zero in terms of gain or loss. The market seems to think, okay, we're just granting them. They're going to get to 7,000 stores domestically. If you want to then justify thinking that the stock could still go up from there, I think what you got to do is start looking already at Chipotle's international growth plan, which is in its infancy at best. They're self-described over the past couple of years as being in the experimental phase, trying to figure out what works and what doesn't. I wanted to do another mini-analysis comparing that to McDonald's. McDonald's is a company that has a much higher market value today. I'm sure Chipotle And their investors would love to think one day they could be the size of McDonald's. McDonald's is a company that already has a really large international presence. Actually, most of McDonald's locations are international at this point, and that's where pretty much all of McDonald's growth comes from. They've actually closed more stores domestically in the last 10 years than they've opened. I went through a quick analysis of, okay, if they want to be like McDonald's, then at some point they're probably going to have to get to a level of profitability that's comparable to McDonald's today. You grant them, okay, theoretically they double their profitability by executing on their domestic store plan, then they gotta do a lot more internationally as well. I think the way that I calculated it out is they're gonna need a little over 16,000 international stores to be roughly the same level of profitability as McDonald's. The thing Chipotle has going for them is that the average Chipotle is actually more profitable than the average McDonald's. So to be the same profitability, they don't actually have to have the same amount of stores, but they have to have a lot more than they have right now. I played out a little best-case scenario of if they get to this 7,000 stores even faster than they think, and then add international locations at a rate that's the best that McDonald's has ever done, it's probably still going to take them 25 to 30 years to get to McDonald's market cap today. So it could be bigger, but do you want to wait 25 to 30 years for that growth? And I think this is a place where the reverse DCF can come in handy for sure. Because it's ambiguous to say, you know, I could theoretically invest in Chipotle today and then in 30 years they're the size of McDonald's. Is that a good trade-off? Yes, you have more money, but you also spent a pretty significant amount of time. I'm going to jump over to the reverse DCF, share this tab over here. What I did is I put in pretty ambitious growth expectations, modeling out 15% revenue growth for The full 25 years. That's roughly how my analysis starts. And then even that is much more aggressive towards the end than what I was modeling out. What you're able to see by doing that is, okay, if they're able to do that, they're able to execute on that kind of crazy growth plan for the next 25 years. What does that really mean? And that means you still got to get all the way out. Till 2061. That's their growth appreciation period in this model. And that is forecasting way more stores than what I forecasted. In this, you can see, this is nice with something that's as concrete as Chipotle, where even Chipotle tells you what they think the total addressable market is. This model has them getting to almost 80,000 stores, I believe. Which is, I think, way more than Chipotle would tell you the global market is going to support. I mean, they have said that they think they can get to 7,000 stores domestically. That's basically one store for every two McDonald's, and this would mean that they would have like double the amount of locations as McDonald's does globally, which it's just hard to believe the world can support. That many Chipotles. The reverse DCF is really cool because it allows you to take expectations and bring it back to an actionable decision today. You can see this is what they're going to have to do. They're going to have to grow that way for upwards of 30 years in order for me just to justify paying the price that it trades at today. Growth on top of that, I'm going to have to hit on some other things that I'm not even You know, forecasting at this point. That was a fun way to go through and do some Excel modeling and then get an idea in my head and then bring that all the way out to the reverse DCF where you're able to get much more computational and modeling power quickly.

I think that's super cool, Cody. Great example. I love the concrete, the number of stores. And I want to make one other point in that. Yeah, McDonald's has a lower return on invested capital per store, but you know, you could almost say Chipotle is boutique-ish compared to the scale that McDonald's has. And for the level of scale that we see in McDonald's, they've got a pretty impressive return on invested capital.

Absolutely. And I think Chipotle saying that their high end of stores, they recently raised that from 6,000 to 7,000. Even they're acknowledging the US market's not going to support as many Chipotles as it does McDonald's. They know that they are, like you said, boutique in that way, at least to some extent. Chipotle is going to give you the most aggressive version of that. That's the company's projection.

That's right. This is one of the things I love about the reverse DCF, and I get this all the time with institutional investors, and we'll probably have these kinds of conversations more often in this setting too, especially around turnarounds. When we say a stock is looking very dangerous, it looks bad. Well, have you considered the fact that this business is about to be turned around? Okay, well, let's test that. Let's test that theory, and I'll go into the DCF, and I'll say, all right, turnaround. What's your best case scenario for how this business turns around? What do you think? Five, ten, twenty percent revenue growth. Well, I think it'd probably get back to you know high single digits. Okay, well, let's just put in ten. All right, and what's what's the best case margin here? He goes, well, blah blah blah this this or that, and we put that in there. And it still looks really expensive, right? It still takes like 100 years. And I'm like, hey, the turnaround is priced in, my friend, right? You got to understand what's already baked in. And Chipotle's stock price implies they're going to have more stores than even the company expects. And the companies tend to be pretty optimistic about what they're going to do. We've seen some very optimistic CEOs out there. Cody, I got a question here. Did you factor in food inflation for McDonald's and Chipotle? Each uses different items.

No, I didn't. I indirectly factored that in. I think that the food inflation and the fact that I understand there's some efficiency of Chipotle because they have not a smaller menu per se, but a smaller amount of inputs that go into their menu overall, and that gives them some efficiency there. And I think that's priced into the fact that they're already more profitable on a per-store basis. They're already making those higher margins than McDonald's is making.

I think McDonald's might be a little bit better off to deal with inflation because the scale of the operation, economies of scale and buying, buying scale, all that. A couple other quick questions. Thoughts on AI and UiPath? We've gone through the Industrial Revolution and now are living through the technology AI revolution. You know, we actually considered this as a headline for today. AI is the new meme stocks. You know, I've seen this movie so many times where whether it's the tech bubble or, or whether it's mortgage-backed securities or it's social media stocks or it's electric vehicles, whenever there's a new invention or a new technology, people think that the, the creator of that technology, the first few companies are gonna just have the lion's share of the profits and value from that. And anyone who's ever thought much about competition, I think would have— would struggle with that and challenge that because it goes back to that investment opportunity schedule, one of my favorite charts ever. If you have a really profitable business, you've got really high margins, great returns on invested capital, that will invite competition. And the competition just has to say, oh, I'm going to do what this company does that does 100% ROIC. I'm going to do what they do, but I'm going to do it for a 95% ROIC because guess what? 95 is still really good. I'm still making a lot of money and I can take share from these guys. And then the next company says, you know what, I'll do it for 90. And the next company says, you know, I'll do it for 80. The next company says 60, 50, until it goes to the cost of capital. Because the world is competitive. No one's going to sit around and say, oh, look at that business. They're making a lot of money. That's great.

Cheer them on.

I don't need any of that. They're going to come after you. They're going to copy you. They're going to figure out a way to compete with that. That's what a competitive world is about. The idea that Nvidia or a lot of these AI companies are going to take over the world and always dominate is unrealistic. Same reason why we've been predicting for 5 or 10 years— I don't know how long it's been now, Kyle— that Tesla was going to lose market share, that they weren't going to be the only EV maker forever, that there would be other firms in there. It's just the nature of the world. It's the law of competition. So yeah, I'm not too interested about AI at this point. We think there's plenty priced into Nvidia. And if you don't know what I'm talking about, go to the society, And see the reverse DCF case study we did on Nvidia. Expectations are— forget about price for perfection, price for fantasy.

We got a lot of questions popping in right now. This is great.

Do you want to take that, Cody? The Dunkin' Donuts and Starbucks one?

Dunkin' Donuts and Starbucks, which one is more profitable per store? Starbucks has many more stores. Yeah, I think it's a great question. We could Look into that, maybe give you an answer on a future post on Society. I think sometimes when you start breaking these things down into profitability and profitability per store and how many stores somebody has and how many they could theoretically open, what jumps out to me is that sometimes we're giving some of these companies a higher multiple because they have the coolness factor or hype factor or unrealistic expectations for future growth. I'd argue that Chipotle is a great business, but it probably doesn't deserve a PEBV multiple of more than double what McDonald's is getting right now. And that's what the analysis pointed out to me. But I think looking at Dunkin' and Starbucks next to each other could be really cool as well.

And we can get a pretty good proxy for that, Cody, I think, if we just look at At the return on invested capital of the companies, right? Dunkin', I guess, isn't traded anymore, not since 2020, but they had a return on invested capital back then of 11. This is an interesting feature that we don't get to talk about much, and that is that we cover companies that go inactive as well. So you can look at models, you can do analysis on companies that aren't around anymore, but might still be relevant. And Starbucks, As a return on invested capital, 17%. So 11% versus 17%. I would tell you Starbucks has been a remarkably high-profit business for a while. I would imagine that Starbucks profit per store is way higher than Dunkin'. We can place a wager on that if you want now, Cody, and then come back next week and tell people what the results were.

That could be interesting. The other thing that I was going to point out, because I think we are getting some questions about AI and technological advancements and how that could impact some of these numbers, I think that's also something we're able to put into our reverse DCFs. We always have that NOPBT margin there, so you can bake that in. And if you want to say, hey, you know, maybe Chipotles are getting a 15% margin right now, If they're able to remove some portion of their staff by automating the process, maybe they get to 20% or 25%, and that will have a huge impact on what you should be willing to pay for Chipotle. I don't know that it's going to be enough to make it a good buy today. Yeah, but you can absolutely test those assumptions.

That's the beauty of it all. That's one of the things I love too, like in meetings with institutional investors and they say, oh, you say the stock's expensive, but are you pricing in the fact that they're going to have this amazing thing happen?

I'm like, Well, sure.

How do you want to do that? How much of an impact is that going to have on return on capital? Well, I don't know. I haven't thought about that. Well, give me your best case scenario. Put it in and see what happens. And you have an answer. And this is all really about having, I think, constructive narrative versus Disneyland narrative or fantasy narrative, right? People love to talk about narrative and use that as a way to pump up stocks or pump down stocks. Why just base your investment decisions on plain old narrative when you can look at real numbers? We had a question about Domino's as well and running a, running a reverse DCF on that. We can maybe do that sometime this week as well. But I think maybe we want to move on to some other stuff on the agenda. Cody, you want to hit, talk about Coke?

I'd love to. We got a really good question about Coke, specifically not KO, the, the entire company, but the, the bottling company associated with Coke. A good question about, you know, we have a very attractive rating on this stock, and Jim Fain here asked the question, you know, it's very attractive, but where's the price appreciation going to come from? Talking about there's You know, the bottling business maybe isn't that sexy. You don't think of a huge boom coming to that specific area. And we got some great answers here by people in the community and a couple of our analysts as well. And I think one thing that was interesting, and I'm going to jump over to the model now to demonstrate this, is that Coke has really You know, they've been on a run here in the past couple years, and, you know, it's hard to maybe pinpoint why if you're just thinking about the company conceptually. But one thing that we can demonstrate is that one of the best indicators of what a stock price is going to do is their return on invested capital. This is really interesting to me here that you can see over the time of their run— I'm sorry, I've got to Cat trying to get out of my room here. Excuse me one second. So Coke, over the time of this run, has bumped up their returns on capital from something that was probably trending below their cost of capital back here in 2017 through 2019. And then they've really made progress since then. And to me, it looks like the market is just rewarding this progress, like they're finding a way to be a more profitable company just internally. It doesn't always have to be driven by some industry trend. Sometimes it could just be a company cleaning up their own act. And I think sometimes you see these things as companies are maybe prepping for a downturn in some sense, whether it's a recession or inflation, something that they're worried could negatively impact their business. Oftentimes companies will use that as an opportunity to clean up their operations a little bit if they've Got some excesses going. They trimmed that stuff back, and that could be what's happening here with Coke. They could have just made a better effort to allocate capital in a better way, maybe not spend as much. We had somebody point out that their SG&A as a percent of revenue has been coming down. It's a really interesting conversation. There's obviously the big question of, you know, if Coke's up 50% over the last 2 years, can it go up another 50%? I don't have the answer to that one, obviously, but I think it's an interesting case study to dive into.

All right, folks, is there anything else on society that you guys wanted to make sure that we touched on this week?

There are a couple things we had on our list I wanted to touch on real fast, and that is some really cool work we did on banks. In particular, Italo and our publishing team did some additional analysis on the rate of deposits, insured versus uninsured deposits, and what that's looking like for Zions and some other regional banks. Some really cool work here in terms of cost of funding and what's happening with those businesses and, and why we think there's potentially some great opportunity in, in that space. We think the— there's some babies being thrown out with the bathwater for sure. in the financial space. And there are a couple really other interesting posts that we haven't touched on yet that I wanted to take just a second on before we jump out. We're almost done. And, and that is, I think this was a great one by Mark on the charts he likes to share. This is some interesting technical analysis. So, you know, we're not all just about fundamentals here. You can talk about technicals too. And there's some good stuff there. And then we had another interesting post asking about the funds we cover. We cover all ETFs and mutual funds for which we cover the stocks in those portfolios. What that means is that all the stocks we cover give us the ability to cover the funds that hold those stocks. As long as we have something like 3 quarters of the capital in the fund, we can— we cover the stocks that make up 3/4 of the capital, then we can say we have an opinion on the holdings in that fund. That's, that's how we cover stocks. Question on banks: will the FDIC raise the dollars covered in banks? I don't know if the FDIC is necessarily going to raise it much more than it already has. I think it will raise the fees it charges banks to make sure that they are paying into the FDIC enough. I think what may happen is that you're going to see a lot of these banks when their capital ratios get too low, they're going to be forced to sell stock and debt to, to cover that. So it's going to, it's going to ultimately affect the shareholders and not necessarily affect the individuals who put the deposits in. It should be the shareholders. Badly, badly run business, the owners should be the ones that pay the most. I do think there was a great comment that went into the chat as opposed to the Q&A. from Howard. And, and I think it's a great point about McDonald's. McDonald's does an awesome job of, of adapting to regional tastes. You, you see a completely different menu in South Texas for McDonald's than you do in New York City. And, and Howard points out, have you ever been in a kosher McDonald's in Israel? No Big Macs to be found there. It's a lot of great learning on that. I think their ability to customize like that is pretty impressive. I wanted to bring that out. Thanks for that comment, Howard. That's, that's a cool one. That's for sure a good point. All right, Kyle, sorry to interrupt.

Nope, all good. And I can add similar in South America. I've been to McDonald's in Brazil and it's a totally different menu catered to, you know, the local cuisine, the tastes and wants of that area as well.

What's one of the different things you'll see in the South American McDonald's menu?

Interestingly, they put It's almost like a nacho cheese over the burger instead of a slice of cheese. And so it's just a little bit different of a cheese experience. And then, yeah, just, you know, local candy goes in the ice cream and different stuff like that. But it's, you know, it's very regional and they can fit it to demands of the area.

That's awesome.

On the quick stock picks here, Just had 2 to share this week. Some big movers. First one being Tilray. We actually mentioned it and started moving last Friday, but over the past 5 days, it's down 29% while the S&P's up 1%. It's a danger zone stock. So obviously that's good movement for danger zone stocks. It's actually down 93% since our original report, which is around the time of the IPO. It's been a massive Underperforming stock or outperforming short if you went that way. One good one to avoid or have been short. It's one of the ones that also is on our zombie stock list. That's definitely the risk of going to zero. And we see that moving closer and closer over the past, you know, just 5 days here. And then the year to date, you know, 38% down. And then on the flip side, you look at Intel up 10% over the past 5 days. The S&P's up 1%, 16% year to date versus the S&P up 11%. So seeing some good performance out of Intel after some underperformance from this name. It's good to see boost in Intel shares after a couple years of not as good performance there. This being a long idea, you know, plays into some of the chip hype, I'm sure. But, you know, long-term profitable business, the one that we featured as a long idea. Just wanted to point those 2 out this week as the big movers over the past week and year to date as well.

Intel's a perfect example of great risk reward outperforming in a challenging market or in a, you know, whenever good news happens for that sector, it's going to do even better, right? 10% versus 1% for the S&P. its, its sort of overlooked value. With that, if we don't have any more questions, I think we can call it a wrap.