Lafayette U. & DeSales College (PA): Financial Health & Viability Review for Colleges & Communities

In this episode of the College Financial Health Show, hosts Gary Stocker and Dr. Matt Hendricks use their proprietary data tools (Advanced Compass, Strategic Compass, and Majors Completion App) to compare the financial health of two Pennsylvania private colleges located 20 miles apart: Lafayette College and DeSales University. The analysis covers net‑income margins, cash from operations, unrestricted net assets, revenue and expense growth, staffing and payroll ratios, and major vendor contracts (marketing, IT, insurance, landscaping, food service). Lafayette shows strong profitability, ample cash reserves, and growing unrestricted assets, while DeSales exhibits multi‑year net‑income losses, declining cash, and accelerating expense growth that outpaces revenue. Specific cost drivers at DeSales include high staffing per revenue, a growing number of >$100K salaried non‑administrators, elevated marketing spend, inflated IT and insurance costs, and expensive landscaping and food‑service contracts. The hosts discuss remedial actions—bidding out contracts, right‑sizing staff, and reconsidering in‑house services—and explore strategic options such as mergers or program consolidation, noting that Lafayette could be a potential acquirer in the region. The Majors Completion App reveals internal and external market‑share data for 64 majors, highlighting Lafayette’s stronger program performance and the opportunity for both schools to streamline offerings. The episode concludes with recommendations for each institution and a call to action for viewers to request a demo of the data tools.
Chapters
Welcome back to the College Financial Health Show with Matt Hendricks and Gary Stocker, where each and every Tuesday we look at the financial health and viability of private colleges across the country. And we have a couple colleges we're looking at today. Dr. Matt Hendricks, what do you have for us?
Yeah, we're going to do a joint presentation of two schools in Pennsylvania. They're 20 miles apart. The schools are The South, the Sales, and what was the other, Lafayette. So I'm bringing up the Advanced Compass here and I'm going to do them at the same time. So I'll, I'll pull up the Sales on the top. And by the way, remember the capability here. You can put in a bunch of different schools. Ideally, this is set up to, you know, put 10 or 15 or even more of your peer schools in here and kind of see where you land relative to the peer set. But since I just have 2 schools, one at one for each line, we'll just need to keep straight which is which. The green line is going to be Lafayette. All right, and blue is DeSales. All right, and I'm going to start with net income margin, which is where we always start. This is like the profit margin at the school. Zoom in a little bit. You can see very, very different stories for these 2 schools. Again, 20 miles apart. Lafayette doing quite well. But since COVID things have sort of gone off the rails here financially for the sales. We've got a 4% loss, 12, and 12. Those are fairly large. Again, how do I know they're large? Well, clearly they're outside of the middle 50th percentile, right? They're below the 25th percentile. So probably more better than 80 or 90% of schools are doing better than to sales on net income margin. All right. Normal net income margin. Ideal net income margin is like +1%. Normal at this moment is slightly negative, which is not good. You don't want to be normal in higher ed at the moment, right? Median. You want to do much better than the median. Um, for forever before higher ed really had, uh, all the structural problems that it's facing right now, it was always +1%. All right.
Yeah.
Part of this negative though here could be just spending down some of the massive COVID relief funds that were divvied out. See this huge plus 5% for the median, and that still hasn't really been gobbled up with these negatives back here. So it could be that still. All right. So what's the takeaway from this? It looks like Lafayette's doing fine financially, not so fine for the sales, actually. That's pretty alarming to have 3 years in a row in such sizable net income loss. We'll double-check cash, net cash from operations. That should always be positive because again, there's some expenses that are not cash, right? So really cash should be better. That cash margin should be better on average depending on the way that you do the accounting, though. Looks like the way Lafayette's doing the accounting is they're pulling out their endowment draws and they're still right at zero. That's fine. And you can see the sales has the proper account, the accounting that I prefer, which is keeping the endowment draw in. So they do a little bit better on net cash, but still negative, right? Negative net cash from operating activities is very bad. Again, assuming you're not putting in your endowment draws, which I did verify for the sales. So it means basically to cover your payroll and everything, your cash outflow, you have to either sell assets or draw down your cash reserves. And in their case, it looked like they were doing massive drawdowns on their cash. I'll just show you cash and equivalents here. Yeah. So very different. These schools are relatively similar size, right? So maybe it's not— I wonder if their endowments are quite different. But just, just for comparison here, Lafayette has $64 million in cash at the end of 2024. And the sales has $4.7 million in cash and you can see it's decreasing. And that's part of this drawdown that I'm talking about. That's not ideal, but that's a lot of cash on hand too. But relative to their revenues, yes, still very high.
Same thing.
Yeah. Okay. So some stress here, evidence of financial stress for sure on the case of the sales. Out the sales. And let's take a look at CapEx. Remember, CapEx is something that's a good indicator. Uh, usually it's a low priority thing to sort of fix a roof or a parking lot if finances are not there. But both of these schools look pretty good on CapEx, so I'm not worried about this. Again, ideally you're right at 1 or above every year. Uh, Lafayette is, of course, uh, the sales not quite at that level, but they had some big years back here, so I'm not— we've seen worse, much worse. Um, all right, let's take a look at, um, unrestricted net assets. That's kind of like the best— it's really, in my opinion, the best gauge at how big the runway is for these schools. And you can see Lafayette has almost $500 million in unrestricted net assets, and DeSales, that's also quite good, $126 million It's great. I'm not worried about either of these schools closing anytime soon, but I am worried about this trend for DeSales, right? You don't want your unrestricted net assets to be declining, especially not at this fast rate, which is again a product of their budget deficits. It looks like a normal unrestricted net asset growth. The median school is growing, right? And DeSales is not. All right. See, since 2021, they're down quite a bit. And Lafayette's up quite a bit. So this runway is still pretty big, but it's getting smaller and smaller the longer they let these deficits go. So it needs to be addressed. All right. I think that's it. So clearly Lafayette looks great financially. Sales not so great, but certainly not at any risk of closing anytime soon. But they should deal with this immediately, in my opinion. All right. So let's take a look at revenue and expenses. Starting with operating revenues. So Lafayette's revenue is 200— like, more than double what the sales is. Lafayette is— that's great— $212 million in revenue versus $81 million. $81 million in revenue. But I want to focus mostly on changes on the same scale. So Lafayette, even though their revenue is really high, it's also grown faster than to sales has— they're up 33% versus to sales normal revenue growth of 17%. It's actually quite good. It's normal. So right out of the gate, I can tell you can probably guess what's going to be the issue here, right? If your revenue growth is normal and you're running deficits, you probably have expense growth that is not normal. So that's what I'm going to switch into right now. Just remember these numbers, 33% and 17% for operating growth, revenue growth. And let's compare it to expenses. Yeah. So both of them have expenses growing at the same rate. All right. Which is fine for Lafayette, right? They're up 31%. Remember, the revenue is up 33%. So that's perfect. But it's not perfect for DeSales because remember, their revenue is up 17%, but their expenses are up 30%. So just like we suspected, they're going to have faster than normal expense growth. And far faster than normal expense growth for the subset of schools that have 17% growth, right, in that range. It's not normal to grow your expenses far faster than you see that, Matt.
We see that so often with these colleges, just an inability to manage their expenses in relationship to the revenue.
Yeah, and you can see, I mean, it's, it's fine if it happens once, one year, and then you fix it, right? That's sort of a normal thing to see, uh, but to let it go for several years is not, uh, sort indicates a breakdown in budgeting, oversight, or both. The board needs to get involved. If they don't know about this, they need to get involved. Watch the show. I'm going to give you some advice right now on how to, how they might fix this on the expense side. So I'm going to focus in on the expenses, but I will show the revenues here, net tuition revenue and enrollments for these two schools. So we have Let's look at change in net tuition revenue. Both of them doing great on revenue side. I mean, obviously Lafayette doing better. That's nearly a 75th percentile for net tuition revenue growth, up 30%, right? So like, what enrollment cliff is what they're saying, right?
Right.
That's funny. Honestly, I think actually we'll take a look. It might not have to do with the enrollment. And same for DeSales. Their 16% net tuition revenue growth is not bad. It's much better than average. Um, I would definitely like that if that were my school. Um, and the prices— the prices are very different. And this is a— this is one of the key things if you're going to survive this sort of enrollment cliff. It's all— it's all going to be about price and market share, right? And Lafayette's in a great spot here. Their students pay a ton on average, $36K versus $17K, which is actually slightly lower than what kids used to pay Actually, I just said that wrong, right? Yeah, a little bit higher, a little bit higher, a little bit higher. Yeah, but in real terms it's probably lower, but it is.
Yeah.
Um, but it's still, still not way out of the ordinary, right? That's— they're just sort of following along with the median school in the country in terms of net tuition revenue per student. Uh, look at enrollment really quick. Students. All right, so this gets all the attention, right? Both of these schools Nothing about— so we have 7% enrollment growth at Lafayette, yet their revenues are exploding, right? So it has not much to like to do with the enrollment. And really the same at the Sales, right? Their enrollment's up 10%. That's in the 75th percentile nearly relative to 2016. Although they— I will admit this.
Yeah, look at 2020.
But still, you can deal with that, right? You're up 10% on FTE enrollment since 2016, which is why your net tuition revenue is higher, right? So again, just the expenses outpace these revenue growths for DeSales. All right, let's take a look at the expense side then, because that's where I think it's going to be most of the bang for the buck for both. Well, actually not both, just for DeSales. Buffett looks fine, but we'll see them along the way. Let's take a look at staffing first. It's the biggest item. I think I have it in here under employees.
Employees. Yeah.
All right. So first I'll look at it relative to FTE. Sales has a bigger staff per FTE than does— or sorry, Lafayette is green versus the sales. It's hard to say whether it's bad or good. Obviously sales has more money.
They can afford it.
Yeah, it has more money per student. Their students are paying $36K, right? You can afford to have a lot of staff per student when that's the case versus $17K here relative to their revenues. This shows a little bit cleaner view that there could be a problem at the sales. So relative to the revenue, this is really going to impact the bottom line. How many staff do you have relative to your actual operating revenue. And you can see DeSales is near the 75th percentile on that metric.
Again, so a lower number is a better number here.
Yes, yes. So one way to think about this, well, this is number of staff per $1 million of revenue, and this is not ideal, right? DeSales, they're right in. So you can see some of the schools that close, they're in this territory where they're just, they're Staffing relative to their overall revenue is just quite a burden, right? Whereas the sales is not, right? Probably. Well, this is the number, the actual staff count. So we'll look at payroll, get a better sense of that. Looking at salaries and wages, other means just non-officer. But again, relative to revenue. Yeah, this doesn't look right. Yeah, this is where they're running deficits here, right? '23 and '24. We don't have '24— big deficits in '23 and '24. So total payroll. So this is the way to interpret this. About 4.5% of their operating revenue is going to salaries and wages for non-admin, right? So this is not including directors, faculty, staff, mostly faculty, staff. Yeah. Not your top-end staff. So that looks inflated. Whereas DeSales— or sorry, Lafayette, it's quite low still. Let's take a look at the director's compensation.
We're always entertained with this one. Yeah.
So it's actually flipped here. Like, so interesting stories emerging at DeSales. Like, they've got payroll costs appear to be high, but it's mostly non-admin. right? Whereas we've seen it reversed at a lot of schools. Yeah. So this is one of the interesting things about looking at data. You can find weird patterns. And if I remember right, there's another pattern here with number of employees over 100K. Yeah, look at this. So what's sort of emerging here, so what this says on its face is that they have a lot of staff at DeSales. For their revenue, a lot of staff making over $100,000. And it's increased a lot dramatically since 2020, which is odd, right? That's not normal. All right. Don't tell me this has to do with inflation or anything like that. It doesn't. So this is very odd. They need to look at— okay, again, the payroll number is high overall. It's not the directors. So it's like your maybe mid-level management or faculty that make over $100K that seems to have grown quite a bit and maybe causing stress in the budget. Look really closely at those folks. If you do a strategic compass engagement, we can find these folks relatively easily at, by occupation level and then do a deeper dive and find, you know, find by occupation level and department. Exactly where these folks are and what might be causing problems on the payroll side.
Yeah, I was showing the Strategic Compass to a CFO last night and he was stunned at the data that came out of that in terms of employees.
Yeah, I know people ask me all the time, where does this data come from? Where do you get this? So yeah, people just don't seem to know that this capability is out there. We'll keep it secret, right?
That's right. Don't tell anybody.
No, yeah, it's very powerful. Okay, so staffing is clearly an issue at DeSales. They need to look at, particularly these folks over $100K, not considered directors. All right, let's look at contractors. That tends to be another pain point. Both of them look fine, a bit high at DeSales, but that looks okay to me as far as number of contractors and Yeah, I think I'll whip into then some of the big items here like advertising. Okay, here's another one that needs to be looked at immediately.
Interesting.
So DeSales is paying a lot for marketing. Look at Lafayette, like virtually nothing out of their budget is going to advertising and the opposite at DeSales. Okay.
Lafayette is a real— I'm guessing Lafayette's a really selective college. I bet that shows up in the admissions.
Yeah, they probably— yeah, like they might have a much stronger brand. I mean, it seems like if the students are paying double to go there, triple, um, and they don't need to be convinced to go there. Yeah, it doesn't mean that the sales needs to be doing this, right? And they have some natural experiments here. Look at 2019, look at this drop here and then this rise here. It didn't matter. This freshman class has changed at all here. So you've got lots of natural movement here. Double-check these. It could be that this advertising is not working at all, in which case they can probably cut it back down to normal. And that's $2 million. All right. So that would close their— that would close their net cash deficit. Right. So that's one thing. IT spends Looks like there may have also been an issue with IT at DeSales that they recently corrected. Yeah, almost corrected. This is again really, really high IT spend. But I did that they dropped the contractor that was in IT. So that's probably what happened here. They probably still have some excessive IT spend that they need to get off their books.
Are you going to show us that in the vendor table?
Yeah, I will. Okay, DeSales looks fine on insurance. But if I were at Lafayette, I would look at the insurance policies. This is not, not normal. It used to be normal. Now they're not. There could be $1 million or so there. Let me see this. They're spending $3 million on insurance. They used to spend $1.3. So it's like it's doubled. It's doubled in just a few years. That's not normal. I would double-check this. Oh, and that brings me back to another issue of health insurance. Benefits potentially, or not just health insurance but just employee benefits. Uh, actually, this is just health insurance. Yeah, okay, so one of the problems with the payroll at the sales appears to be the benefits package. This could be health insurance. Again, one thing I like to dig into when I'm working with clients, figure out what, what's causing this, but this is a really high benefit spend, and I think In this case, I have to double-check this. This might not include the employee retirement contribution. This is like health, dental, vision, life, that kind of stuff. And this is really high. All right. So look at that.
Okay.
IT insurance.
Okay.
Most of this— let's see, fees for services. Yeah, they look good. There are some issues, though, with some of these contracts. And I will show you the sales. I'll show you both of them. Oh, I forgot to mention one. Notice one of the contracts that we usually see here is missing. So DeSales— well, I'll just say what we can see right now, but it's also interesting what we can't see. So we have a landscaping contract that appears high, quite high for their revenue and high for the size. That needs to be looked at. It's $1 million for landscaping and That's not even janitorial included. Yeah. So both of these combined are probably very high for sort of maintenance, general maintenance contracts. Again, I'm just kind of guessing, but the cost of being wrong is very, very low. Just go out and get some bids, right?
Yeah. Right. Right.
Nothing. Go get some bids. You might be pleasantly surprised to find that you'll get a bid far less than $1 million to do landscaping. And same with janitorial, less than $800K. Or even change it up, right? Say, hey, what can we do with the current vendor to bring this down a couple hundred K? We mow every other week rather than every week, stuff like that, right? You have a budget deficit, so let's think about it in that context.
Yeah.
All right. So here's the advertising, right? $1.7 million for this advertising. Is this working or is it not? Again, get more bids, talk to other vendors. This is a very competitive space. Don't get complacent here. And it looks like this is their first year with MediaWorks. Yeah, look at this very closely. That does not look right, but I could be wrong. Again, the cost of being wrong is very low here. Just go get some other estimates, talk to more vendors, see what they can offer, or think about not doing it at all, right? What would be— you can tease that out of the data, right? When you reduce the spend, what what's likely to happen. All right, one of the things that's not showing up here is very important. They don't have a food service vendor, right? There's no way their food service vendor with 3,000 students is going to be under $800K. So they probably have no food service vendor, which means in-house food service. That's another important question. Almost all schools now are outsourcing food service. The reason for that probably is that it's cheaper and more efficient and better than doing it in-house. So double-check that, compare the cost of— so you're looking at, um, $1,500-$1,600 per student generally for food service. Compare that to what your current food service cost is if it's in-house.
Would that show up in the Strategic Compass for the sales?
Yeah, I have the exact projection based on their peers, what their food service contract would look like. And yeah, it's really, again, another easy thing to do. Go check, get some bids, compare that to what the current cost is for food service, which I can't see, but the CFO certainly can. What's it costing to do all this stuff in-house? And they can take that off the CFO's plate. You can probably eliminate a lot of sort of admin jobs, service jobs. Those get outsourced to the vendor. I know it's controversial, but it does tend to save schools a bunch of money and potentially also at the same time improve the food service on campus.
You can, you can envision a scenario there where some folks have been full-time employees in food service for decades and would be culturally challenging and maybe even politically challenging to change that.
Yes, yes. But again, that's why the strategic compass is so, so important, and I urge my clients to to show it to their staff, show it to their faculty, right? It's much easier to go up to your staff and say, hey, we got a— this deficit, you can see the deficit right here. This is how much we spend on food service. This is what all of our peers are spending. I mean, makes sense for us to do this, right? I'm sorry that you don't like it, but, um, it's my job to make sure the school is running as efficiently as possible. And our mission is not necessarily to provide the best dining services, but to provide the best education we possibly can, which, you know, you can go on and on. But, you know, this is the kind of thing you got to make difficult decisions. And this is honestly why I think a lot of schools struggle. They just don't want to approach these difficult decisions and make them. Just have to. Okay, bon appétit. This is so Lafayette's food service contract looks high.
All right.
So And no shock, Bon Appetit is one of the most expensive food service vendors. So you kind of got the other extreme here. If a school's struggling financially, I wouldn't recommend that they bring this one in. But yeah, Bon Appetit is, is going to be high-end food and it's going to be expensive. Look at what they spend, $4,500 per student on dining. That's a lot.
Out of $37,000 or something for tuition.
It has an almost $13 million contract. So if they want to save money, again, they can do it here, get other bids, go with some of the other vendors. But don't look at this if you're in sales saying, hey, you don't have to go with this vendor. There's other vendors. And again, you're looking for about like $1,500, $1,600 per student, not $4,500. So there's a wide range here in what you get. All right, I'll leave it at that, Gary, and pass it back to you.
Interesting. So we had the, you mentioned at the start, Matt, that these two colleges are 20 miles apart.
Yep.
And clearly one is doing quite well, Lafayette, and one is doing less well. We're in an era where mergers are going to become increasingly important. Do you see that as a potential here?
Yeah. Yeah, I think so. Especially in this Pennsylvania area where there's a lot of schools, they're also facing demographic challenges. This whole area is like a hotbed for a lot of the schools we've covered is right around in this region.
Yeah.
And yeah, the story, obviously you've got some doing well, some not so well, some with long runways, others with no runway at all. I mean, we looked at Albright, has negative unrestricted net assets, right? They're right in this region as well. I think they're probably another 50 miles away or so from this. Yeah, if I were working at Lafayette, I'd be looking at gobbling some of these up, to be honest, if that was part of what the board wanted to do.
Yeah. And I still believe economics will drive that at some point. Of course, it's just tough to tell the timeframe on that. The 2025 College Viability App, just a couple of fields, man, a couple of reports I want to show. Four-year graduation rate is where we're going to start. And again, we see two colleges doing pretty gosh darn well. Lafayette doing very, very well, 85%, over 80%, well over 80% over the last 8 years. DeSales, not as good, but as you know, Matt, 50% is the threshold and they're well above that. So to their credit, to their credit, they're doing a fine job graduating students. But like we see too many times, colleges graduating students, Matt, still have significant financial challenges, and that's what's disturbing. I can understand that for colleges that can't graduate anybody, but for colleges doing a decent if not exceptional job of graduating students, it's kind of sad to see them with challenging financials as well. I want to take a look then at the unfunded institutional grants, and of course you and I know that as most merit aid, most scholarships, and in both cases Both these colleges, you can see that from 2016 to 2023, they've invested quite a bit in discounts. And over the last 8 years, the sales is over $17 million. Tough to say they could afford that. Lafayette is over $20 million over 8 years. It's easier to say that's doable for them. But again, that intense pressure mat that we see on tuition prices is present both at strong, financially strong colleges like Lafayette and less so for colleges like DeSales University. That's that at some point, you know, Lafayette's not an issue. They're going to be fine for forever. College like DeSales, there's the one that needs to manage that. And remember the tuition differences? DeSales was what, Matt, $17,000 give or take per student?
Something like that, $17,000 versus $37,000.
And Lafayette was $37,000, yet they're still giving away a lot of that. It's not money, they're giving away discounts, giving away discounts to their students. And I would take a look at And this is, this is what's reflected in your data, and this kind of confirms what Matt shared with you a few minutes ago. Both colleges have been able to grow enrollment. Now, Matt, we've done over 130 colleges over the last year or so, and a small percentage, maybe 30%, show positive tuition growth. Most colleges, that difference column on the far right-hand side would be a negative number. So again, financially doing okay on the tuition fees. As we saw with DeSales, they have significant— and Matt identified those significant, significant expense issues, expense management issues, and they've been there for a long time. So if you're from DeSales University and you're watching this and, and you want some guidance, reach out to me. I'll have my contact information in the show notes, and we'll set up a private demo, not just of the Advanced Compass that Matt showed you earlier But the Strategic Compass that we have both referenced a couple of times, it's a tool that a college like DeSales University could make great value in. Now, we just talked mergers a moment ago. If you're at Lafayette College and you're pondering growing your business by acquiring or merging with other colleges, both the Advanced Compass and the Strategic Compass are tools you can use to identify potentially strong or more importantly, potentially weak colleges with which to approach. So again, reach out. I'll have my contact information in the show notes. And then finally, Matt, we'll close each show with the Majors Completion App. And this is, to the best of our knowledge, Dr. Hendricks, is a unique tool out there, and it lets colleges compare both the internal and external market share for the programs they offer. Now we have 64 majors. Not every major God created is on here. And we have internal market share for Lafayette College And you can see they have some strong programs, right? And none are particularly dominant. Economics, interestingly— maybe Dr. Hendricks, you could go and teach economics at Lafayette someday. Um, strong— one of the stronger ones I've seen, unlike DeSales, which has none. But again, like we see everywhere, Matt, I can't think of exceptions to this. There are some majors, even at a financially healthy college, academically strong college like Lafayette, they have to be asking themselves a question: why are they in the geological and earth sciences business? Why are they in the chemistry business? I understand each of those has prerequisites for other majors, those kind of things, but there are 28 majors between the two colleges and they're 20 miles apart. The opportunity for consolidation exists, and we can do the same thing for DeSales. Interestingly, Matt, they offer a lot more courses, a lot more majors than the more financially successful Lafayette College, and We talked in the last couple weeks that Indiana and now Texas have thresholds for majors per student, for majors per— for majors graduating. And it's 15 over 3 years in Indiana, and it's 25 over 5 years in Texas. So now we have a number. So we can look at 15 and look at the number of majors that DeSales offers below that 15 number. Really, Homeland Security all the way up, those are majors— if they were a public college in Indiana, they'd be asking that to close those. They would be commanded to close those. So that's the internal market share. When we look at external market share, what I have here— and Matt, you and I talked about this before we started the show today— one major, that major psychology in Pennsylvania. Dr. Hendricks, there are 95— count them, don't count them, take too long— 95 colleges that offer psychology. And look at the external market share. This is the external market share. Let me zoom in on that a little bit. 95. And, and there are a few that do well, but look at the highest one. Penn State is at 12% of the market, Temple at 10% of the market, and West Chester University at 7% of the market. The rest are all bit players. But interestingly, I think all— almost every one of those players, not all of them, have double-digit psychology majors. You know, it's, it's And I'm going to make the argument, Matt, that there are more psychology majors offered in Pennsylvania than there are pizza joints. And maybe, you know, maybe there's some opportunity to think about these colleges consolidating those majors and engaging in some kind of revenue sharing to enhance both their expense component and their net revenue component from those majors as well. So Matt, as we always wrap up the show, And for those watching for the first time, you'll hear it for the first time. For those who've been with us quite a while, it's the comparisons, Matt, that matter. And Matt, you referenced this a couple times during the early part of the show. Don't rely on your own internal data. Matt, you've shared before, a 2% increase from year to year looking at your own data can be good or it can be awful. You don't know that unless you compare yourself to others. And so, Matt, I'll let you wrap up before I close off the show. What kind of comments do you have for both Lafayette and DeSales?
Well, I just hope, I hope they saw, if they watch the show, they see like we do every client I've ever worked with that finds something surprising in the data that they're like, wow, I didn't know that. Or wow, I hadn't even thought about, you know, looking at food service or, you know, those are the kinds of things that are massive, right? Something, some breakthrough like that, just understanding, oh, the staffing distribution might look odd, right? And we can dig far, far deeper into that with the strategic compass. But yeah, even for schools that are doing well, like Lafayette, you know, did they know there's— their food service contract is insanely expensive, right? Like, I don't know, that's pretty strong language, but I've seen worse. But, you know, do they know that they have neighbors around them that are struggling, that they might benefit mutually with that new merger candidate potentially. But, you know, there's a lot of schools around Lafayette that would probably like a lifeline from them. And that's one of the things I've been doing with the clients lately too, is finding other targets to sort of approach and say, hey, like, you know, we can probably both benefit from a merger, that kind of thing. So yeah, a lot of opportunities to learn from this data.
Well, again, fascinating show today because it showed two colleges really not extremes, but two colleges going in different directions, one doing well, Lafayette, Well, the other one less so. So again, thanks for making time to watch the show. For Dr. Matt Hendricks, I'm Gary Stocker. We look forward to doing another show next week, and we'll look at two more colleges then. We'll talk soon.
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