This Week In College Viability (TWICV) for December 1 2025

It is the first Monday of December 2025. Hi everybody, Gary Stocker with this podcast episode of This Week in College Viability News and Commentary. And of course, it is December 1st, 2025, and this is the podcast that talks about the financial health and viability of public and private colleges with data and details and perspectives offered nowhere else. What do we have this week? Rider University president— this is in New Jersey— the Rider University president says the university will survive. Well, of course he has to say that, and that's a tough sell when I take you through the data. And then a study of 44 private colleges in the Northeast by Michael Horn and Stephen Schulman really provides more data to support my premise that I've shared many times. Many times that higher education will continue to move through its consolidation era. Many closures today, many, many, many more mergers tomorrow. And Daniel Greenstein— I believe that's right, Greenstein, my apologies— is the former chancellor, I believe, of the Pennsylvania Public Health— Public College System. And he's got an interesting perspective on how selectivity, college selectivity, percent admitted shapes financial resilience. We talk about that. And then belatedly, NBC News jumps on the college bad news bandwagon. Of course, much more. Hey, don't be selfish. Don't be selfish at all. Send this link to others. Send this link to your friends and family and neighbors and let them in on the latest in the higher education industry. And I don't have any cutbacks. I don't have any layoffs. And I don't have any closures this week because of course it was Thanksgiving week last week and nobody was interested in doing that even when they were working. So nothing this week. That's a rare week, but it makes sense with the holiday last week. Page 2. All right. New president, new president at Rider University in New Jersey. And he says the university will survive. And Ann Levin had this story on November 19th in Town Topics. In Princeton, New Jersey. And she writes that— Miss Levine writes that a quarter of its full-time faculty is being let go. I had this story a couple weeks ago. Several senior positions are being eliminated, and all employees' base pay— all employees' base pay is being reduced by 14%. But John Lojak, who took over as president of Rider University in New Jersey this past May, is confident is confident that the end for the beleaguered university in Lawrence Township, wherever that is, the end is nowhere near, John Lojak says, the president at Rider University. Let me beg to differ. This is a very challenging situation. Maybe I should go to the data. Total assets at Rider University down $34 million. 54%, more than half since 2016. The unrestricted net assets, essentially the value of the college, is down $40 million. That's down 147%. That's 3 digits. The net income— net income margin, we're going to call it profit— averaged negative 16, negative 1.6% from 2020 to 2024. The CapEx to depreciation ratio, remember, that's kind of the safety ratio, how much colleges are investing in their infrastructure for safety and for buildings and for hardware and software and that kind of stuff. And that ratio should be about 1 or above. It was below 1 in 6 of the 9 past reported years. Interestingly, that CapEx depreciation ratio was high, really high, above 2, I believe, in 2019, 2020, and 2021. I don't know if they built stuff had something break, what the case may be, I didn't look. And the enrollment is down 20% since 2016, and the net tuition revenue from students and auxiliary fees decreased 28%, almost a third. And remember, remember, one-year turnarounds do not exist. We've had folks at Albright University and Webster University, among others, say, hey, we fixed things in a year. Doesn't happen. It doesn't happen. I've heard Matt Hendricks say many times that it takes at least 4 years to recover from one bad enrollment year. At least 4 years. Ryder is down on enrollment for each of the past 6 reported years. Don't tell me he could come in since May or July— when was that when he started— in 5 or 6 months and turn things around, even if you cut back things. Those are proposed reductions. They haven't taken place yet. Not going to happen. And, and Mr. Loyak concluded— or the reporter, Ms. Levine, concludes the story with a quote from Mr. Loyak, and he says, you don't hide bad news from people. It is a tough reality to get used to. It's hard to brush off. But it would be impossible for us, Mr. Luljak says, it would be impossible for us to succeed without complete transparency. In my definition, transparency includes what I just shared with you. Transparency includes you can't turn around colleges based on budgeted numbers. It's the audited financial reports that come out a year later, sometimes 18 months later. This is a difficult situation. It's— the recovery is unlikely. And again, this is a guy, me, who looks at this data all the time. This is a market you heard me say so many times, too many colleges, and Rider is one of that number. Too many colleges, not enough students willing to pay even heavily discounted tuition to attend those colleges. Page 3, this The Financial Risk of Declining Enrollment to Midsize Colleges. And this was an analysis that Stephen Shulman and Michael Horne did with an Education Next story. I didn't see a date on that. And it was an analysis of 44 private institutions in New England that revealed troubling signs for the viability of all such schools nationwide, they say. And there's a list of the 40-some-odd colleges on the article. I'm not— I've got it in my notes. But some of those are Champlain, Emerson, Fairfield, Holy Cross, Quinnipiac, Stonehill, Middlebury, Lesley, and a couple, and many others. The list is available, and of course I'll have the show notes, in the show notes, the link to this story. And here's what they found, Michael Horn and Steven Schulman. A study over the past year of 44 private tuition-dependent New England colleges that enroll between 1,000 and 8,000 students reveals that the threat facing colleges and universities could be much more pervasive than thought. My thoughts, my words, not his. Their analysis examines cash flow— real stuff, not the heightened cash monitoring or the government's pathetically outdated composite score. It only looked at liquid assets, kind of like yours and my checking account— cash that is available and that is generated in the normal course of business, and other unrestricted investments— call that yours and my savings account for an analogy— other unrestricted investments that can fund operations. The model uses a simple formula for cash and cash equivalents on hand and annual primary net cash flow. Let's call it profit. Accountants may disagree with the terminology, but we're going to call it that. For ease in our presentation. And Mr. Horn and Mr. Schulman write, assuming business as usual and no decline in enrollment for the coming years— that's unlikely— 15, 1-5, of the 44 schools or colleges already facing, are already facing serious liquidity challenges at their current levels of enrollment. This is without any continuing decrease. These colleges will only be able to cover their typical operating expenses and other normal uses for cash for a maximum of 3 years before they go under, right? Before they must spend beyond the 5 to 7% of their unrestricted quasi-endowments. I don't know what they mean by that, I have to check, to sustain operations. And that, they note, risks undermining their long-term sustainability. And 6, they note— don't identify the 6, I could— 6 have already stepped into that dangerous territory, as those are already drawing down almost 13%, 12.7% of their endowment for operations to keep the lights on, to meet payroll, well in excess of the industry norm of roughly 4 to 5%. These 6 already double that plus. And that's essentially breaking the piggy bank, breaking that savings account just to keep the lights on. And they go on to add, college leaders would be wise to stop considering partnerships and mergers as akin to failure. They shouldn't consider mergers and partnerships failure. Instead, they write, it's critical they be realistic about whether their institution can make it on its own. And trust me, folks, in more cases than not, they cannot and will not. The data simply supports that, no matter what protestations and proclamations come from these college leaders. They say be proactive, be proactive about a merger while you still have valuable assets, and look to preserve the mission of the school 'in the context of a merger may be the best and possibly only way— possibly the only way— only way for the board to fulfill its fiduciary responsibility.' Now, I, I— that's the end of the quote, it's the end of the story. I think most colleges in financial trouble are past the stage, are past the stage where they have enough assets to bring any value at all to merger and acquisition discussions. They're going to fail. They're going to close. They're going to have reductions and layoffs and cutbacks because they have waited too long, because they considered mergers failure. And it's too late. Day late, dollar short. Now, I've only touched— this is a really good piece. This is a really good piece. Lots of stuff. And I've only touched on the highlights that I want to comment on this article. That's the benefit of doing my own podcast. And ladies and gentlemen, boys and girls, many, many, if not all of the colleges that Michael Horne and Stephen Schulman reviewed already know internally, already know they cannot reasonably expect to thrive or even survive as a standalone college. We had that with Trinity Lutheran College, Trinity Christian College a couple weeks ago. They had those discussions many months, and colleges that close, reports tell us, have known that for many, many months. And I believe that to be the case. I think we'll see that the case when other colleges continue to close. They know today they can't make it, and the challenge they face is, is, is reasonable. The challenge these colleges face in being transparent and say, hey, we're probably not going to make it is that of a self-fulfilling prophecy. If they make any public statement, unlike the spin that Ryder U tried, uh, that I shared earlier in the podcast, if they make any public statement, it cannot be one that suggests financial stress to the point of being a non-viable institution or even an at-risk institution. Such a transparent statement will almost certainly hasten their demise. So what does that mean? One of the tasks I have here, probably the main task I have here at College Viability, is to create consumer awareness about financially troubled colleges. It's not my job to say, hey, this one's not going to make it. College Viability, the College Viability apps that I have created, and I'm working on the 2026 version right now, is kind of like the Kelley Blue Book for cars. You've heard me say that before. Kelley Blue Book kicks the tires on cars. I kick the finances of colleges. And then for consumers, students, families, grandmas, grandpas, neighbors, friends, relatives, go to mycollegeviability— one long word— mycollegeviability.com. There's a link there to get your free report on colleges of your choosing on their financial health and viability. I look at the financial data of colleges almost daily. I didn't on Thanksgiving. I don't think the day after either. I do a show every Tuesday, the College Financial Health Show with Matt Hendricks and Gary Stocker. I can tell you, I can tell you, I could tell you which colleges by name which colleges by name are unlikely to survive. I won't, I won't though. Not my job. My job is to challenge colleges with data and to share data with stakeholders and consumers to help them to decide which colleges are financially strong enough to A, survive, and maybe B, more importantly for more colleges, B, provide a quality college education. And as you've heard me share before, even if a college doesn't close, you need to look at their finances. Do they have the capacity to provide the type of quality college education you want for yourself or your family member or others? And you'll find in too many cases, it's a risky proposition. Daniel Greenstein— Greenstein, I gotta reach out and find out how to pronounce that— has a story, The Price of Admission: How Selectivity, or percent admitted, Shapes Financial Resilience in Private Higher Education. This was on November 29th, so over the weekend. And across nearly 1,000 private institutions, as acceptance rates rise— percent accepted— as those rates rise Daniel Greenstein says financial resilience collapses. He notes the relationship in his study, his research. The relationship is not linear between percent admitted, acceptance, and financial challenges. It is exponential. And he's got a chart in his story, and again, that link will be in the show notes. Modest sizes, modest differences in selectivity between institutions that admit 25% versus 50% correspond really to differences in liquidity, operating margin, and overall financial risk. But beyond roughly 50%, beyond roughly 50% acceptance— I'm going to call that desperation rates— the decline becomes a free fall. The decline in liquidity, operating margin, overall financial risk becomes a free fall. By the time acceptance rates exceeds 75%. Daniel Greenstein notes that nearly 9 out of 10 institutions are rated as high or critical risk. Selectivity, he notes, is not just a prestige metric. Many colleges continue to think that it is, and it is for a very small number. It is a proxy, he notes, for pricing power and brand elasticity— is the word he uses— but flexibility. Financial flexibility. It is the capacity to command tuition revenue without destroying demand, also known as raising tuition without losing enrollment. His categorizations are acceptance rates below 25%, the institution, the college, sets the price and the market follows. Between 25% and 50%, 50% admission rates, price and demand are mostly in equilibrium. And beyond 50%, the market sets the price. That's why we see so many tuition discounts, and institutions lose control of their margin. His closing reflections: in the end, the relationship between selectivity and financial health is less about prestige than it is about flexibility— my word, not his— that is, the ability to adjust what you're doing without breaking. Elite colleges have room to flex. Open admissions or high admission rate colleges do not. The middle, Daniel Greenstein says, increasingly is where the danger lies. Institutions with too much cost, too many expenses to shrink, too little market to grow. Across hundreds of cases, he concludes, the data tell a consistent story. The less selective an institution becomes, the more the market, not management, read that right, or university, the more the market, not management, dictates its fate. Now I've talked about heartbeat admissions policies before. Have heartbeat, we'll admit. And this is yet another indication of colleges putting admissions and enrollment ahead of what is best for the student. And don't tell me this is about access. High acceptance rates, 50% plus, 80% plus, high acceptance rates are about a college's financial survival on the fringes of financial collapse. This is about colleges ignoring sub-50% and lower 4-year graduation rates. This is about colleges putting their financial survival, their financial survival on the backs of students who are neither academically nor financially capable of a college education today. This is not, this is not about the millions of students who will select a college, attend, grow intellectually and socially and academically graduate in 4 years, and there are millions. Page 4, we welcome NBC News to— we welcome NBC News to recognizing that higher education is an industry in trouble. And then this is from, uh, excuse me, Ben Kamasar on November 28th, NBC News. He writes that just 33% agree a 4-year college degree is worth the cost because people have a better chance to get a good job and earn more money over their lifetime. Here are the numbers. In June 2013, 53%, a little over half, of students thought that college was worth the cost. In October 2025, 2 months ago, 33%, down 20 points in 12 years from 53% who thought college was worth the cost to 33%. Doesn't matter why, Doesn't matter what the source of information is. This is the data. Do with it much what you want. And on the other end, 40% in June of 2013, 40% thought college was not worth the cost. 12 years later, in October 2025, 63% not worth the cost. You don't need me behind this— in front of, excuse me, in front of this microphone to say higher education is in trouble. That data itself proves the point. And they have an anecdotal observation. Jacob Kennedy, a 28-year-old server and bartender in Detroit, believes education is good, but he notes if people can't use those degrees because of the debt they're carrying, it undercuts the value. Well put, Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy, who has a 2-year degree Says he's— the number of people who he's met working in the service industry who have a 4-year degree and then within the year of graduating immediately quit their, in quotes, grown-up jobs to go back to the jobs they had. The cost, he notes, the cost of higher education overwhelms the value. You go to school with all that student debt, the jobs you get out of college don't pay that debt. So you have to go find something else that can pay that debt. And I know it's an anecdotal story, but it's representative. It's representative of that marginal college student who enrolls, but for whatever reason, for whatever reason, is unable to complete that college education. And this can only happen so many times This can only happen so many times before the market reality sets in that college is problematic for many. NBC News, welcome to the party. Thanks for joining us. And the wrap is this: there will be many colleges to thrive and survive in the coming years. They are needed and they have the financial resources needed. There will be millions of college students successfully complete their college degree in 4 years. But there are many colleges, too many colleges that do not have and cannot generate the needed financial resources to survive, let alone thrive. It is an economic reality. Too many colleges, not enough students. There will be millions of college students who will not or cannot complete their college education in 4, 6, or even 8 years. There are basically two different higher education worlds: one with the financial resources to thrive and survive, and one where neither is a likely— neither is a likely scenario, despite profound proclamations from their leaders. There's one more month in 2025. I'll be back next Monday on December 8th, I guess that will be, with another episode of This Week in College Viability. As always, so grateful for those that take time to download the podcast and listen to it, and I encourage you to share it with others. For College Viability, I'm Gary Stocker. I'll be back next week.