The #1 Reason Corporate Ventures Fail

Hello, um, good afternoon, good morning, depending on, um, kind of where you are. Welcome to Future Foundry Live. Um, really good to have you all here today. Um, we're going to be taking a look at, I guess, the number one reason that we see for corporate venture failure. Now, we, we, we know why regular startups fail, um, and it's usually a lack of product-market fit, or more often than not, running out of cash before finding product-market fit. So, you know, they're not finding scalable, sustainable demand for the thing that they're producing or sort of selling. And we also have to find product-market fit for corporate startups too. Um, but that's more kind of the external front in the, in the war, because far and away the leading reason for corporate venture failure that we see is internal rather than external. And it's a failure to find what we call corporate venture fit, which often becomes much sooner in the venture building process than product-market fit. So, you know, before most corporate innovation teams even have an opportunity to demonstrate product-market fit, they fail because they don't find corporate venture fit. And I think corporate startups are particularly hard because essentially you're fighting on this 2-front war, right? One with the market externally trying to find product-market fit, and one with your internal stakeholders where you're trying to find corporate venture fit. And it's the latter really that we're going to focus on today. And to help me to do that and to help me to unpack corporate venture fit as a topic, super excited to be joined by, um, Carlo from Lateral. Carlo, how are you and where do we find you in the world today?

Hello, Jacob. Um, great to be here. Um, today you'll find me based in my home office in BC. Usually I'm between here and Norway for the most part, but I'm on the East Coast today.

Amazing. Well, thanks so much for joining us. Yeah, relatively early on the East Coast. As we chat, if you want to ask any questions, go ahead, do that. You can drop them in the chat. We'll pick those up as we go. And Carlo, before we kind of get into corporate venture fit as a subject, can you tell us a little bit more about your background and experience in building and scaling new corporate ventures. What is the, what is the Karlo story to date?

Yeah, sure. So I've been on the technology track for now almost 15 years. So in healthcare education specifically. And I think one of the early new ventures we did is, was kind of In a, uh, it was a, on a smaller mid-sized company, uh, out here in DC, uh, moving completely from an on-premise solution, like creating a kind of disrupting that completely earlier on when the days of Flash was kind of dying out. And a lot of the things, the signals that we were seeing in a changing landscape between, uh, how SaaS solutions were coming to be, et cetera, and introducing that. So that was one of the beginnings and introducing and doing a change internally. was quite a full-length shift in the overall mindset and the expectations of the organization as a whole. But we were successful. Just took a longer time, as usually the expectations on timelines tend to not necessarily align. And I would say the same continues now in my current role at Laerdal Medical. You know, we're very— one of the leading companies in healthcare education on the simulation side. So we manufacture simulators both on the resuscitation and medical devices. and simulators. So if you've ever had CPR training, for the most part, you probably used one of our mannequins. And in that context as well, it's a similar challenge, much bigger organization for the most part, and how we can leverage the integrations and the ecosystem that we exist in from a data perspective as artificial intelligence and data become more valuable in that. And as well, we have a very solid, if you want, you know, hardware-based on-premise solutions and how you can elevate. So similar challenge to some extent, but very different lens and how we can innovate and bring more partners into that system and allow, you know, new ideas to flourish.

How would you define corporate venture fit, Colin? Because it's not talked about as much as, say, you know, finding problem-solution fit finding solution product fit, finding product market fit. What's your definition of corporate venture fit and why do you think it's so important to get this right?

Yeah, I think today, you know, I don't think any business could survive without any corporate venture inside of it as an, you know, as an engine of fielding new ideas, but not as only fielding new ideas, disrupting itself. And the reason is, as we are gonna see now, probably We're at a track of high, you know, driving efficiency much further in almost every single business, especially with AI and the technology, how fast it's been evolving. So we see this efficiency driving, like hitting us harder and harder and like how quickly things move. And as a result, I do believe, you know, we see the timeline for how long a certain business will succeed will become shorter and shorter. So a corporation which could probably rely on its business model for like 10, 15, 20, 30 years, that timeline keeps getting shorter. So for it to survive, it will require disrupting itself internally and allowing for some of these new ideas or new business models to flourish. And for me, corporate venture is really a story of disruption for the business itself and allowing for that type of paradoxical, if you want, mindset to intervene and actually allow the business to survive as a consequence. Because it, I do believe it operates against the core processes and structures and everything that we operate in, in, in, in a corporate setting. It operates sometimes at odds ends. So it's like completely different in structure, different in the measures of success, different in how we, you know, engage with it. And, and kind of balancing those paradoxes and enabling for both, I think will be quite interesting. Yeah.

Yeah. So, I mean, we talk quite a lot about product-market fit. And I guess the way that we define product-market fit, which has been popularized and has been around for years, right, is, you know, we know we found product-market fit, and this is on the external front of the war, when we found that we have, you know, high customer satisfaction and retention rates for the new venture that we're building, you know, that corporate startup probably has quite strong sort of organic growth, quite strong, um, sort of acquisition metrics. You know, there's demonstrable sort of market demand for the product or service that we're developing. And I guess the way that we sort of think about corporate venture fit is by using a slightly different criteria, right? I, I guess the questions that we'd ask here are, is this a good strategic fit? And that's probably the most critical aspect, right? Because that involves the business model of the startup that we're building with the corporate partner, the products and services that it's developing. But I think we also have to look at cultural fit. Is the corporate culture, with corporate as the lead investor, and the entrepreneurial culture of a startup, is that compatible? For some clients, we see that technological fit is particularly important, particularly when it's like a tech-driven investment. So, You know, is the startup that we're building compatible with, or can it be integrated into the corporate investor's existing stack? And is there a kind of financial fit, right? Like, do the expectations that the corporate has for the financial returns and time horizons, do they align with what's realistic for this sort of venture that we're building? Why do you think that so many corporate innovation teams focus on product-market fit and the cart goes before the horse rather than spending enough time working out corporate venture fit and whether the venture that they're building is even a good fit for the, for the company that they're, they're working in.

I, I think, you know, I think you pointed out on one aspect which I think is crucial, and in corporate venture fit, people internal people dynamics and like managing, if you want, the behaviors and the culture and the mindset and how we operate is probably comes first in the conversation. And as such, it's quite challenging. I would say always give me a technology problem, it's easy to fix. Give me a people problem, it's much more difficult for the most part. And coordinating and orchestrating against different stakeholders, not that, you know, going to the market and understanding the market, but I think those systems are usually Much more established and much easier accessible in how you demonstrate value. On the flip side, internally, it's much more difficult, right? And internally as well, the bandwidth and I'd say the responsibilities people have is different. So you want to grab their attention in a meaningful way. Tell if you want very good convincing stories, what is the value that, you know, you're betting on sometimes a value which people cannot see or materialize. for the most part. And I think that's very hard. Like you're almost giving someone a, you know, in 5, 10 years, this is going to be amazing. And I want you to kind of trust that that's the thing. It's a very hard story to sell. It's a very hard kind of change in the way you think and how you are a little bit more adaptable for that kind of mindset. And I think that's quite challenging. So that sits at the core and it's not easy to engage in those conversations and to make sure that they actually— there's a space for them to happen. Even in the beginning. So for me, it kind of revolves around the people more so, and people are not necessarily easy because we're talking about behaviors, we're talking with the changing of workflows, changing of how you think, and the mindset shifts, and those happen subtle, like they don't happen instantaneously. So managing that, I do believe, poses a challenge for the most part.

And what do you think are Like the most common sort of internal obstacles that kind of let corporate innovation teams down here. I mean, some of the things that we see quite often is that the strategic objectives for corporate venturing aren't particularly well stated. And I think that leads to innovation teams often running off in different directions, building ventures without fit. Because there's a clear lack of North Star or vision around what it is that we're trying to achieve. But what other obstacles do you see to teams being able to build out ventures that have a strong financial, technological, cultural, organizational fit?

Yeah, probably for me, it is a little bit around You have an expectation that, you know, your core, you know, corporate venture teams don't have structure or less of a structure in how they model and how they, you know, align with the strategy, aligns with what they're measuring against. And I don't believe that's true. It's just different than the core business and how that looks like. You know, I drove a car where I, in Lebanon first time, because I grew up there. And when I came to the States, there was much more rules and et cetera. Right? And I thought driving in Lebanon was crazy. But then I went to India, Bangalore, and I saw how everyone drives. And you would look at that system and I was like, that's nuts. Like there is no way you can manage, you know, driving there. But if you look at it, there is a system. The system is though at the individual more like kind of in the negotiation on how everyone move around and like how the expectations and, you know, it still works. So sometimes innovation look like, you know, you're working crazy, that there is no system behind it and that there is no way and how you're managing the, at which point you should say no, at which point you need to, the investment needs to be, but there is, and I, it's just different than how the core business, which is already established, which already has a product in the market, which already is doing iterative kind of approach. And then I think that distinction and that difference is sometimes very hard to visualize and very hard to put a framework in place for the organization to operate in that way.

Yeah, that's interesting. And so from like a dimensions perspective then, so if we think about sort of product market fit as high retention rates, strong growth, clear sort of market demand, if those are the 3 things that have to be true in order to say we found product market fit for this venture, what are the kind of 2 or 3 things that you think would have to be true in order to demonstrate sort of corporate venture fit?

Very good question. So if we're looking at the measures of like, what, how does that, you know, how we can say it's successful or not successful, right? Key stakeholders alignment is very important. So are you given the space to operate and financially, I would say, but as well and the kind of resources that you need, that is very easy to measure. And whether it's a budget which is allocated and siloed or protected by the CEO or someone who has, you know, the umbrella. So that alignment very high top in the organization is important. But I think it's important as well to look at alignment within the product teams themselves because some of these ideas will eventually lend themselves to be funneled through those channels, right? So earlier on, as First off, do these teams, are you talking to them early? Do they actually have bandwidth to cooperate? Are they allowed to have the bandwidth? Because if everyone is putting out fires every day, that as well for me is a signal that nothing is going to flourish. There is no room for it to flourish. So it already means that the corporate corporation is not set up in a way that allows for any of those ideas to actually have a life. Even if, you know, we do the analysis, we do the market fit, we do everything. And then what? Like, right, how do you actually experiment? Can you actually put it into practice and move it forward? So for me, it's a lot around those things. And probably the third one would be, I do believe the organization needs to be designed more around integration rather than just, you know, building everything internally. So if it's very highly vertically integrated all the way, you lose a little bit of the operational mindset of like, oh, okay, I can connect to something else. And I think that connection is very important because that allows for new ideas, whether they are internal or external, frankly, to have a way to kind of connect and integrate. And that integration aspect is, I think, is very key too.

That's interesting. I mean, on, yeah, because it's almost It almost sounds like, and I guess it's just hitting me, we hear this in kind of lots of different flavors and lots of different varieties, that as corporate innovators, we spend a lot of time obsessing around the system or the process that we're going to use to, you know, identify new growth opportunities, to test and validate new ventures, and to kind of scale those. But we don't obsess to the same degree around, are we even focused in the right area, right? So when you were pointing around sort of stakeholder alignment, does everybody agree that this is where we should be looking for new, like, growth opportunities as a broad territory? Quite often, I think there's a lot of teams that don't necessarily have, like, an investment thesis. Like, you know, if you were working with a venture capital fund, you would absolutely expect them to have an investment thesis.

Yes.

thesis that dictates the types of companies they're going to invest in, but more importantly, the kinds of companies they're not going to invest in. And so, yeah, I think the stakeholder alignment and building that around some sort of corporate innovation or investment thesis, that could be kind of one way of kind of solving for that challenge. I think that's something that's overlooked quite a lot. And then, yeah, on your other point, we, I think, spend a lot of time thinking about how to find and test new ventures. But there is a bit of a valley of death, right? Like, once we've validated a new venture, where in our experience most new corporate ventures go to die is kind of past product-market fit.

Yeah.

And then getting it into the hands of the sales force, the product teams, the customers, you know, beyond MVP and into kind of V1. And I wonder if, Collin, you'd agree that that's an area that people don't, well, corporate innovation teams specifically, don't spend enough time thinking about, is what happens when we're successful? And I wonder if that's because so much of what we do is unsuccessful, right? Do you kind of go along with that? Worth it?

Yeah, I, I do believe the success though should be measured across the full chain. Like, are you able to integrate it and push it forward as well? Not necessarily where you kind of end at the product market fit or the MVP. So I think you push the success a little bit further down and say, okay, is it, is this moving? When you have an idea which seems there is a value for, like, is this going to move down the line? And then going to be part of the organization or that's not? And even if that's not, what is the other avenue for it? Like, right? Are we spinning off? Are we doing it like, right? There is other, you know, paths, but you need to have the positioning. You need to have the landscape ready for actually all of these avenues because I look at it from an outcome perspective. So what's the outcome? What eventually are we looking at from an outcome and what that outcome looks like, right? So does that outcome look like that this is something incorporated with these teams because it's aligned around their vision? Is the outcome this is you know, a completely new venture which we're going to spin off? Is this, you know, something which we probably will acquire because we see value and we see some— like, how— what is the outcome that will yield and how we are going to capture what we just, you know, found to be extremely valuable or as a new business that we can approach, right? And once we look at it from an outcome perspective, it becomes much easier to visualize if this is being successful or not. And of course, because at the end of the day, the business usually ties its success I mean, some, you know, with 3 bottom lines, but for the most part, revenue to some extent. And is it going all the way on achieving that? And the problem is the timeline for these is usually longer than we expect. It's not necessarily contained within a certain period and scope. So it's harder to measure immediately and see those things.

Yeah, that's really interesting. What I'm thinking about, because I'm fascinated by this point, You know, it's impossible to have corporate venture fit if the people who need to invest in, sell, build that product or service ultimately aren't on board. And I think one of the paradoxes that a lot of innovation teams face is that it's difficult to have conversations with internal investors, with product teams, with sales teams, before you've developed a new venture, because there are so many hypothetical assumptions and unknowns that there's not a huge amount of value in that conversation. And latterly, once it's been developed in an MVP form and we found product-market fit, then it tends to suffer from a not invented here syndrome where—

Right.

People who need to invest in it, the people that need to sell it, the people who need to build it, Um, tend to be pretty resistant to it. I don't know if you have an answer to that paradox, but how can corporate innovators align the stakeholders that they'll need eventually, like earlier, earlier on?

So I, I believe there's a step before that. And so in that, in that mode of operation, we're saying we're giving, but I think there needs to be a listening before. And then there is needs to building those relationships on listening and staying, you know, close to the operation as much as possible way before. So in that sense, I would say corporate innovator is not necessarily just, you know, in their own bubble doing their thing, they're interacting beforehand and listening and staying close. And in that listening kind of exercise, they probably are not giving so much like they don't have because they don't know, like there's a lot of assumptions they're playing with so many, but they are listening and staying close. And they're building those relationships way before they actually You know, get to a point where you're trying to integrate or you're trying to move the needle forward. So it kind of happens before when you even have nothing for the most part, or you don't have something to show for. But that does not mean there is no value in like understanding where they are, understanding the challenges they are facing. Not too much because sometimes you get stuck into that and then you are very biased to the problems they are solving, but still staying close to a certain extent, at least a percentage of the time. I think it's very surprising for anyone that to show on their doorstep and say, oh, voilà, like, you know, like, good, like, you know, this is something and you've never heard about it before. You haven't met, you know, you haven't engaged before meaningfully in a way. And then I think everyone would reject that. We have a built-in defensive mechanism where like, oh, something new and like whatever I'm, you know, but it doesn't have to be new. If the idea has been even teased out or the conversation is happening much, much before, then I think the acceptance or It becomes much easier. That conversation, that kind of becomes, it's not going to disappear, but it just becomes a little bit easier.

Yeah. Yeah. Interesting. And I wonder if there's an opportunity for, you know, corporate venture teams, corporate innovation teams, when they're at the, you know, like earliest stages of these programs where they're trying to uncover customer problems, like who, who better to work alongside to understand those problems than product teams and sales teams, right? And maybe that's a natural inflection point for them. And what other obstacles, Kali, do you tend to see that prevents corporate ventures from achieving this fit with corporate strategy?

I mean, if I'm going to wear the other hat from the product side, usually the scope and the effort that it requires requires is usually like not always articulated properly and investigated as such, right? So there is a, you know, a gap between the understanding of what that looks like and how much it will take to achieve it. And I think that's, I find that very challenging as well because, you know, you need to have some of that already prepared in your thinking process and not coming and saying, oh, okay, you know, this is it. expectation of this is like a 1-month project while it's actually like a 3-year kind of initiative, like, right? Getting that adjusted and calibrated. And I think those early conversations with product and staying close to them and the technology people as well will give you that understanding of, you know, is this feasible? What's the feasibility? How, what, what does that look like, right? From a timeline perspective. And those automatically makes the conversation easier because that's what, you know, a product leader is trying to prioritize and like make sure that they have the timeline to deliver everything they have. scope, if you come in with something which is like 3 years and then you're like, oh, okay, this is nothing, but they don't have bandwidth for 3 years or like, right? You have to calibrate it along those conversations. And I see that's a big challenge because that disconnect allows it to be, oh, okay, this is like imagination. Like that's not tied to reality because it's losing the practicality of understanding what it requires and how possibly to chunk it in a scope manner that it actually becomes more feasible. And again, I think it's an exercise which can happen with collaboration. need to be sitting with one team or the other. But I do believe that's a challenge too, because I think that automatically puts like, this is unrealistic or it's too unrealistic. It should be a little bit unrealistic because it's relatively new, but when it's to an extreme, like, you know, expectation of this is, oh, let's, you know, we'll do it in 6 months versus this is possible in like 3, 4 years. I think that's quite a big gap to bridge.

Yeah, we see internal Product roadmaps is a big, big reason for like a new venture, a new product, a new service. And like, especially for those that are close to the core, it also becomes incredibly difficult to outsource. And when you outsource, it becomes incredibly difficult to remain lean in the way that we probably should do, right? When we're building and shipping kind of new products, that feasibility gap is— Interesting, and not something that I've thought of. I guess when we think of that sort of trinity of desirability, do people want it? Feasibility, can we build it? Viable, is it going to generate a return? I think the other kind of thing that I would add is less so in desirability, because we know what we mean when we say desirability. Does it solve a real problem in a better or more efficient way? But I do think that there are early-stage viability questions that teams can be asking. One of the big errors that I see teams making are that they're working on ventures and playing in markets that are simply not interesting enough to the core business. And so understanding, well, when we say, is this viable?

Mm-hmm.

What do we mean by viable is really important, right? Do we mean viable $10 million revenues? Do we mean viable $100 million revenues, billion revenues? And I think there's probably some work to do for a lot of innovation teams to understand, not desirability, but what do we mean by feasibility? Is this about capabilities? assets, technologies that we already own, building on top of them. And from a viability perspective, you know, is this a $1, $10, $100 million, or, or a billion-dollar market, right? Yeah. Having those scales might be, might be important for, for a lot of teams.

I mean, absolutely. I mean, to your point here specifically, I do believe, um, requires like a very low Honesty, frankly. And I do believe that's very hard. I think innovation lives in denial for the most part on both fronts of the camps. I think there is too much denial on both. And I think that type of denial does not help anyone. Like there needs to be like really brute force honesty, which is quite vulnerable for both ends and like of this conversation or those entities. One, and like, is this a big enough space that it's worth our attention? Like, right? And again, because feasibility ties to that, if it's like a $3 billion opportunity, like, okay, then we can talk. Yeah, then we talk about something else. If it's like a whatever, $20 million, then as well, that's a different— like, if all of these are kind of tightly, but sometimes it's very easy to slip into our own like kind of child, kind of, this is our own child that we've been growing and then we can stop asking those tough questions. And I think that's detrimental to the process on either end, whether, you know, corporate innovation teams or the product teams themselves, is that brutal honesty. And like, yeah, is it something we should be building? Is it something we know that— is this— there is value in actually incorporating this or actually taking it further or no? And saying no, I think is very hard. I think it really is hard to actually sometimes kill these ideas early, but it requires brutal honesty and a certain level of vulnerability from all, you know, everyone involved. I think in VCs and all of these conversations are quite harsh, like, right? And not necessarily because they're trying to, you know, be offensive or attacking, but you have to look at it, you know, as in what is rather than what is the story you want to tell behind it. And I think that's very challenging.

That's interesting. Yeah. And like the interconnectedness and interdependency, desirability, feasibility, viability is a great point, right? Because yeah, you know, as you stated, if it's worth $3 billion, like, we'll get it on the roadmap, right?

Like, yeah, I mean, then it's a completely different conversation, right? The prioritization and how you see it changes as well. Uh, and again, the value does not necessarily need to be just, you know, from a market size. It could be from an impact size. This could be from a sustainability side. Like, there is different verticals than that opportunity, but those need to be clear and articulated. And as well relative to the existing, like, right? How big, how big is it? Like, right? And as well, how long does it take? Because it might be an initiative the organization is not capable of taking on, like, right? There is a certain bandwidth and capacity constraint a lot of the times, which are tightly correlated to, like, the investments, tightly correlated to everything. So those need to be as well scrutinized, I would say, in some places to actually the conversation so it's meaningful and it's effective.

I wonder if there's an opportunity for like a bit of a corporate venture fit scorecard. I mean, we use a scorecard at 3 different stage gates at FutureFoundries. We have a problem solution fit scorecard. Does the problem really exist? Do people think this is the best or more efficient solution? We have a solution product fit scorecard. Like, can we build it? Like, is the market size? Um, big enough. And we have a product-market fit scorecard as well. And I wonder whether, like, corporate venture fit is something that runs through, like, each of those ultimately, because we're big fans of killing ideas, right? Like, we, we think that that's how the great ideas emerge. And if we can add another filter, that means that, you know, ventures don't get to the end of that process without being really closely aligned with organizational strategy, goals, capabilities, objectives, then great. So, yeah, maybe that's an approach that teams could take as well and help to get, like, an objective view from the rest of the business around whether it's doable and whether it's interesting, regardless of the vertical.

Yeah, absolutely. I think if you look at it, you have to take a step back on the wider scene that you're trying to incorporate this in at the end of the day. And, like, have measures around that? Does the ecosystem you're operating in support you? And in this case, it's, you know, your organization. Is the organization capable of taking on these type of initiatives? Or, and what is the appetite of that? What does that look like from both an investment point, capacity point, feasibility, even culture and the way you think? I do believe sometimes there is some areas you cannot touch, like, because they are so deep and how you've built them and et cetera, probably it's going to be very hard to actually change them or introduce something that disrupts them. And I do feel that's sometimes missed. There is areas I would say in an organization or specific domain expertise or stuff that are so deep that if you are presenting a disruptive idea that comes in, if you want to attack them, I would use that. It's going to like, you know, everyone is going to show their teeth. Like you're going to like have You know, everyone like kind of showing you their gnarly like teeth, like, you know, back off anyway. And I think that's interesting too, is where are the areas where you see there is room for growth and where is there not? And where is the, you know, and those areas which are probably don't touch zones might need some maturity to become like areas you can actually engage with. And that's, you can work against that. So it's interesting to look at those things too.

Yeah.

Yeah.

That's really interesting. And kind of goes back to that point of a thesis, right? Like it's just, it's as important for us to stay where we're not going to play, as it is important to state where we are going to play. Not just in terms of markets, but what we're going to touch, how close it's going to be to the core technology teams, et cetera, et cetera. That's a great point. I think one of the other challenges that we see for corporate innovation teams is that venture building inside a corporate takes a long time, right? We can argue about the reasons why that is, although I don't think we would. I think we'd violently agree as to why that might be. But one of the challenges that we see is over that period of time, let's say it takes, for example, sort of, I don't know, 10 months to go from opportunity identification through to getting to a venture with clear sort of product-market fit. It feels to me as though most corporates are in a perpetual state of restructure, reorganization, restrategizing. And I do have a huge amount of sympathy for corporate innovation teams who are working in those environments where the strategy pivots are happening up to every— well, it feels constant, right? But maybe kind of every 6 months. It must be hard to like, I don't know if you've come across this, but hard to build and manage and maintain a portfolio of ventures when, you know, what was interesting 10 months ago is No longer relevant.

Yeah.

Do you have an answer?

I have an answer.

I don't know how you solve that either, right? It's tough, right?

I mean, in constant change, like, how do you operate, right? Um, and in a very dynamic environment, especially every change requires time to settle in and like becomes actually effective before it, you know, you can work against it. So I do believe it's like really, so again, there is a timing for everything and what are you doing in that timeline changes based on the organization and where it's at. So if there is changes, which means, you know, changes in the strategy possibly or changes in what is important or not, probably the work is not necessarily just identifying an alignment, might be something else. Like looking at it from a different lens, where you can kind of elevate a little bit and abstract out those changes that you can, you know, you can work probably on communication channels, or you can work out on setting up easier ways or work with areas which are not changing, you know, upstream sometimes is less changing than downstream, like, right? So work on those rather than, you know, working on the areas which have like active changes which have not settled in, because I think there is a high potential of burnout in those cases for the most part. And I think that's very not great for everyone involved because it's usually not intentional. But when you have your expectations mismatched multiple times, you end up in a burnout situation. And I think that's very challenging. And seeing that wheel and like being, you know, just spinning with it over and over, I don't think it's a good position to be in. So it's really a little bit of reevaluating where the attention needs to be. And what does that look like? And a lot of the times, it could be a good time that, you know, set up channels or build up relationships, which will actually make you accelerate when those things become a little bit more stable. So I don't think there's a perfect answer. But at least that's how I see it at this point.

No, I think that's really interesting. I think the big thing that I've taken from this conversation is that finding corporate venture fit is kind of, yeah, part about alignment on objectives and scorecards and objectivity, um, but it is an equal part about the relationships that you build as a corporate innovator with the influencers and stakeholders that you, that you work with. So thanks so much, Carlos, for bringing your perspective to, to this conversation. I really, really enjoyed it. And, um, yeah, I hope you have a fantastic rest of your, rest of your week.

Thank you, Jacob. Likewise, have a great one.

Um, back in July, we'll share the recording from today with you, but back in July, we're looking at AI-powered venture building. It'll be before the holidays and before, um, kind of Europe turns on their out of office. Um, so we hope to See you then. But yeah, in the meantime, I hope everybody has a fabulous rest of the week and look forward to seeing you next time. Thanks, everyone.