2025 State of SaaS: Trends and Predictions with SaaStr CEO and Founder, Jason Lemkin

Hey everybody, how you doing? I want to do something a little bit different today with the SEO-focused audience. I know if you folks know Saastr content, thank you if you do, a lot of it's very prescriptive. Basically a lot of it's like in the old days, it was like, here's what I screwed up, here's what I wish I'd done, here's what someone else did better. Even today with all the stuff we do, it's very prescriptive, but there's so much change the last 3 years that I wanted to summarize all the things I'm thinking about that have changed And not all of it I have amazing ideas what to do about it, but at least I can share things that maybe we can all get on the same page together. Maybe some of it's cathartic or some of it's— because I really think we are in a new world as managers, as leaders. I think that 2020 was nuts, right? First it seemed like the world would end for all of us, we'd all be bankrupt. That lasted about 7 weeks. And then all of a sudden the world exploded. The back half of 2020 was great. 2021 comes in and somehow we have 600 unicorns and everyone can burn $500 million a year or have huge sales teams. 2021 was great. And then at the end of 2021, all of a sudden the music stopped. And at the very end of 2021, HashiCorp went public and it was great. And then it stopped. There were no IPOs. There were no IPOs from December 2021 until Klaviyo a couple of months ago. And even Klaviyo, which is one of my favorite SaaS companies— read about it on SaaS if you haven't, it's coming up on a billion. There's nothing wrong with this company. It's still barely IPO'd at $800 million in revenue. So it was a tough time. Then 2022 was crazy, right? Because it was like a knife was falling. And everything fell off a cliff so much faster than we thought. And everyone was in a reactive mode. And then 2023 was a weird world because everyone got efficient, everyone got efficient, everyone raised prices even though they didn't often— usually didn't earn it. They jammed price increases down customers' throats. Everyone cut the burn, but maybe they didn't grow. There are a lot of companies that cut the burn and didn't grow. And we went into this preservation mode. And now we're coming into 2024 and one, we have to grow again as founders, which is tough in many cases. But I think an even bigger deal is I think our teams have not caught up. I think as humans, it's been too much whiplash. I don't think most folks have caught up. I don't think most marketers or sales folks or customer success leaders have caught up to this world. It's too much change. Each of the last 3 years has been too different. And I don't know that we're all going to make it to the next phase. So I wanted to digest it. In some ways, we may have to start over again. We may have to start over again in this new world with new energy and new perspectives. Because for some of us, we may not make it through the 4th year of radical change. It's so much. Even good change is a lot for folks to process. So I think I thought I'd dig into my learnings and hopefully some of them are helpful. The first one, it took me a little while to figure this out. What does all this efficiency mean? What does it all mean? And I realized a couple months ago, and I just wrote this up on SaaStr, that I have about 3 investments, 3 to 4 investments I made in 2013, 2014, 2015 that are now $200 million in revenue. So that's pretty good, right? From like when I started investing, I've only done like 30 investments. I started in 2013 and the first one was Pipedrive. They're not quite there but they're close. They sold for $1.5 billion, then Algolia, then TalkDesk, then Salesloft, and a few others. And I've got over 3, maybe 4, that are at $200 million in revenue. And if we looked at what they would have looked like in 2020, we would have seen all over the place, 2,000 employees, 5,000 employees, burning $10 million a month profit. Like they would have been very diverse. Turns out in 2024, that all these 3.5 companies, they're all exactly the same. They're all breakeven. And they'll have 700 employees. Break even, all of them. And they're all in the zone, they're not running out of money, they're all planning to try to go public. And so I thought about this, folks are still confused. Why can't I have 200 reps? Why can't I have 50 SDRs feeding 80 AEs, feeding 50 people on my marketing team, feeding 80 people on my CS team? It's not fair to me, I need a team. Everyone needs a team, even in 2024, so be it. But back into this number, okay? This is a way to think about efficiency in a very specific way. You've got, when you get to $200 million you can have 700 people, okay? And you can do the back of the room, that's approaching $300K per employee. If you look at the average public SaaS company, they're the most efficient they've ever been in the history of SaaS. The average public SaaS company is now above $300,000 per employee, okay? But what does that mean before you're public? 'Cause it's hard for us sometimes to internalize public. $700 to $200 million. So at $100 million AR, what does that mean you can have? $350 on average, maybe $400, maybe a little bit more if you're well funded. But we had plenty of folks with 1,000, 2,000 employees at $100 million revenue in venture capital. We had folks with hundreds and hundreds of employees at $10 million in ARR, at $15 million in ARR. And it just doesn't work, folks. It just doesn't work. So when you're planning, I found somehow this was helpful when I shared it with founders. Okay, this is your— forget about how you get there. Bootstrap, left strap, right strap, overfunded, underfunded. It all normalizes itself over time because at some point your business has to pay for itself. This is how many you can fit then. How many can you afford to get there? And we got bloated. We all got bloated. We all thought we could have so many more people than we can, but you can't change physics. This is the number you skate to. So just a thought. And 300 to 30 million AR just isn't going to work anymore. That's what we all saw in 2021. Everyone had 300, 400 employees at 30 million in revenue. And we all got used to team sizes and metrics and OTs and everything around that. Just, we will probably never see this again outside of a few outliers. In our lifetime. And that's why even great companies like Brax just announced they had to lay off 20% at $250, $300 million revenue. Why? They had to get back to normal math. It's not a bad— it's a great company, but this math has to work. So this is something that maybe for your teams and yourself you can help back into this 300,000 per person. All up and down from the bottom to the top. I interviewed over 50 VPs of sales last year, both corporeal companies and myself. 40 of them were not willing to do sales themselves anymore. For only 10 of them were willing —very— lived in Pleasanton, very highly respected, highly regarded sales professional. I asked him, I said, listen, I strongly believe that in 2024 you have to visit your customers, especially with distributed teams. The more distributed you are, the more important I think. And I said, are you willing to visit customers? He's, I am willing to visit customers, but Palo Alto and San Francisco are too far. I'm only willing to visit customers You laugh. This is someone highly respected. And what happened? How could someone highly respected say that? Burnt out after 4 years. Burnt out of quotas, down quotas. And I get that people are burnt out. I talked a couple months ago to an AE that made over $400,000 last year and just quit with no job. Burnout. Again and again I do so many of these stories. And I have empathy, but I don't have sympathy. Or maybe I have sympathy and not empathy. I'm not sure which one I have. Here's what I've decided after interviewing some 50 VP of Sales, and again everyone needs a team of 10. Every person with 1 year of experience needed a team of 10 in 2021. I don't think they're going to work. A lot of these people will work again, but it lasted too long. I think 3 years of this yo-yo up and down, dieting, binging, purging, whatever behavior a lot of folks went through, I think it's too many years for folks to go back. And I know this is hard to say. I don't think we can hire these people. 40 of those— 42 of those 50 VPs of Sales I recommended to the founders or myself to not hire them. They're not willing to sell anymore. Is sales hard? We all know sales is hard. But if after 3 years of ups and downs, you're not willing to do it, your old boss was mean to you, your quotas were too hard, it wasn't fair, you got dealt a bad hand, you weren't given enough budget, whatever, at some point it breaks people. And I think we have a lost generation of folks that are broken that all want to just be managers, all wanted to just watch dashboards. And I know it's tough, it's almost toxic to say, but I'm giving up on these people. I'm giving up on these people. And I'm giving up on CS folks that won't talk to customers anymore. I interviewed almost 40 CS people last year. The majority of them are not willing to talk to customers anymore. I got this email last week. Because SaaS for itself, we need like a head of sponsors, customer success. I got this email from this great person and she was like, "I've been following SaaS for 10 years. I know exactly what you need. Here's, you have 200 sponsors, you have this, here's what you need." I said, "Great." That's terrific. You do realize you'll actually have to meet with folks and to work. And she just responded back, that's not me, that's not me. She's like, I have a playbook and I just want to run my playbook. So I can't do one more interview like this. I can't do— I think we have a lost generation. And I don't know the answer other than what I can tell you is if we're builders here, if your folks are building companies, I think this is tough to say. I think 90% of the candidates out there, you just have to rule out because they're done. They're burnt, they're broken, they're tired. And they just won't work. Don't be suckered in by that great LinkedIn, that great experience. There's so many veterans now. We've had so many years of so many great billion-dollar era companies, so many people to hire. Don't hire the broken. You gotta get back to only hiring the pirates and the romantics, only the people that are quirky enough to want to do this crap we do. Doesn't make sense, okay? And the other thing that happened as part of this is sometime around 2020, '21, startups just became normal. They became very mainstream. And some of it's good, like Y Combinator mainstreamed Affiato for founders, but it became a very normal job, a 20 to 30 hour a week job you did from home and then you did your side hustles and you watched your YouTubes and you hit your quota and life was great. That just doesn't work. This is too hard. It's too hard to get people to buy another product. No one on planet Earth needs another SaaS product. They don't. Every company out there, all of the Fortune 500 and the Global 2000, they seem to work just fine with whatever CRM or marketing automation or ABM or whatever tool, they work just fine. They don't need any change. Like the bar is really high to get someone to change and there's reasons and it's supposed to be that hard. It's not supposed to just be a job. It's not supposed, it's definitely not supposed to be a job you're tired of doing and don't want to do anymore. So I don't know whether I have empathy or sympathy or not empathy. I got some of it, I do feel. Don't hire these people. Don't hire none of them. It's a lost generation and it's tough. And I have friends that are lost generation. It's tough. A related point that I think we're all going to struggle with who are scaling is that sales comp's confusing today. Sales comp's confusing. You can look at Eileen Lee's latest data. I think she said 60% of the unicorns will fail. Okay. And even the ones that are going to survive, half of them, their burn rate, they can never burn any more money. They can never raise any more money. Right. So everyone's gotten more efficient, but they're not gone. But they're not gone. OpenAI can pay anything they want. OpenAI for engineers does tender offers every year where you make millions of dollars a year for working at OpenAI. OpenAI is doing now a tender offer at $100 billion. So you can make $10 million a year and you got to be great to work at OpenAI, don't get me wrong. But you can make $10 million a year as one of the best engineers just through tender offers without going IPO. I don't know exactly how they pay their sales team, but I think they can pay well. Okay, I think they can pay well. And for every Exocorn or Strugglecorn or whatever, there's one that can pay those outlier rates. And it's going to continue to warp how we think about sales comp and sales compensation. And it's going to continue to just ripple through the industry. There is a sales leader that I've known for years that I used to work with, but he's never been a VP sales. Never been a VP sales. This is his shot. He got his shot. And he went to interview with a startup that last year went 2 to 10 in one year. Okay, pretty good. Pretty good in general. Extra good, good last year, right? This company is basically bootstrapped, but it is generating cash, right? So he went in and he said, I want an $800K OT plus I want a stretch bonus plus I want to hire at least 5 people at a $400K OT to compete. Now maybe he'll get it. Now if you think about it, that company went from 2 to 10 and can go from 10 to 40. Maybe he'll get it at this bootstrap. Maybe he'll get that, maybe he'll probably fail, but maybe he'll get his $800K OT, it's really $450K. 400, he'll get his 5 wraps outside because he wants the best. Everyone in 2021 paid high. You had to pay high end of market. Not only did you have to pay high end of market for sales talent, but you had to decide today because that SDR had 11 other offers. And I know there was no time for reference checks. I know they failed the interview, but John's got 11 offers. We got to hire the SDR today. And so everyone got hired without reference checks or without anything. And we laugh, but there's going to be glimmers of that with the outliers. And the unicorns, many of the unicorns may be dead, but cloud spend, we may, we'll hit this on the other side, cloud spend according to Gartner, cloud software will be $1 trillion next year. It'll be a record, growing double digits. So there's going to be big winners. There's not going to be even a hint of the number of winners we thought we had 20 years ago. And they will continue to distort a lot of our metrics. They will get marketing budgets that make no sense for your companies. They will get sales teams and sizes that will distort it. And so what will happen is you're going to talk to your teams and you're going to say, guys, we got to be lean, we got to stay lean. Okay, we're going to— we have— one's got to close, bring in 5 times what they take home, and our marketing budget is going to be really lean and everything's got to be lean. But someone's going to have a friend in OpenAI or whatever AI startup that just got a $20 million marketing budget. Okay. And they're going to spend like drunken soldiers and they're going to hire 50 marketers on their team and they're going to get Audience Plus and they're going to do everything and it's all going to be great. And those are going to be great in many cases. Unlike 2021, those are going to— those are truly great companies. Because there's a trillion dollars spent, but they're going to warp everyone's way of thinking. And I think before 2020, it was already happening in 2018, 2019, but we're all on the same journey. Okay, most of us were on the same journey and then it went crazy. And now we're going to live in this bifurcated world where there's going to be whispers of folks working at Decacorns and Decacorns, there'll be more Snowflakes, there'll be more APIs, and it's going to put a lot of pressure on the rest of us because people don't want to go back. They don't want to go back to when they have to work hard in the hard days. That's related to the PowerPoint. I don't have the answer, but it's going to confuse folks. Folks are going to They're going to ask for crazy numbers, they're going to ask for crazy things. And I don't know, it may take another year and a half or 2 years to normalize because there's still going to be folks that get to play by different rules, right? There's still going to be folks that get to play by different rules. Okay, point 4, and this one may be slightly triggering, but I thought, I think the generalist is dying in SaaS. The generalist is dying. And I don't have— this is one I'm watching in process, but I see 2 things happening. First of all, whether we like it or not, everyone's trying to use AI for support. Right? Whether this is really the greatest idea to have a hallucinating bot answering my questions. We know this is a bad idea. Okay, we know this is a terrible idea. But, and this is the triggering part, generally in my experience, the quality of support and customer success has plummeted in SaaS. Okay, I just had a discussion with Nick Metta, you can watch, we did it. But he didn't totally challenge me. I wrote a SaaS proposed, just these horrible experiences I personally had in CS the last year. Just folks not showing up to meetings when there's bad news. One product where we were spending $299 a month sent us a bill for $50,000 for 4 years prepaid without talking to us and saying they would shut our service off that day from the CS team. Okay, so many terrible experiences. I'd rather have a bot than that. Okay, but we're all going to try. In fact, everyone is trying. The real number everyone's trying to get to in the industry, and you can see it on things like the homepage of Intercom, is folks are trying to automate at least half of customer interactions. That's the goal across. If you talk to folks that are in support forward or post-sales, that's everyone's metric. We want to automate half of us. And I don't know if it's good or bad, but after OpenAI, the genie ain't going back in the bottle. We're going to have to live with this. So that's happening. And related to that, so support's going to go, and customer success. So it's one, if you read the earlier SaaS for Content, early on I was the biggest champion of CS in the world. Now I'm worried. Now that CS became part of sales, CS became weaponized. CS became weaponized. CS's goal was to get blood out of the base last year. And it destroyed the relationship. And as part of that, I just don't think that there's any great generalist role. There's no great role for, hey, I'm a generalist. I'm going to go into CS or support and just make customers happy. I'm worried this is gone. I'm worried the era of this generalist making customers happy is behind us. So this is something I don't know whether this exists. And the generalist in sales may be fading behind us too. Just a couple of the points I wanted to make. It feels like a downturn to me. Who does it feel like we're in a downturn right now? Anybody? Turns out we're not. We are, but it's a localized downturn. So I put up just two things. These are the top performers in public SaaS and cloud stocks last year. I borrowed this from, from, from Jem and Ball. Palantir up 174%. IBM this week announced, I think, their best quarter. IBM. They're doing their best quarter of the year. Okay. SAP, yeah, they're doing some layoffs, but they're really a reorg. SAP crushed their last quarter too. Okay. Samsara, okay, that's newer. But look at this list. We have so many stocks up 100%, including HubSpot, which is in sales and marketing. But then if you look at the right is Shopify and this is Shopify's GMV growth. And you can see they had the COVID boost, the Zoom-like COVID boost, and then they had a rough time. Shout out to Jason M. Lemkin. But now it's back, and that's why Klaviyo that IPO'd last year and others that are in this draft, if you talk to folks that are in B2B to e-commerce, the good ones had a great second half of last year. Great second half of last year. So it's not, my point is that it doesn't exist, it's not evenly distributed. Budgets are up, but they've gone in weird ways, and this is just something to reckon with. I never, in the old days, in the old days people would talk about What's the expression? Vitamins and painkillers. Painkillers. I didn't believe it. I didn't believe vitamins. When I started as a SaaS CEO 2 generations ago, when I started with Box and Bill and all of these companies, anyone that hit $10 million crushed it. Okay, every single one of those companies, the Boxes and the Bills and the Yammers and the others, they all kept going. They all kept going. And you could say, hey, Yammer was only— Slack. Slack's not a— it's just a snack. It's not a— what is it? Painkiller versus vitamin? I get confused which one's the good one. Vitamin's the bad one? You don't need— you can live without Slack. You can live without— they all became in huge. I believe that anyone that got to $10 million ARR with high NRR and happy customers grew forever. And I think there's many examples of that. But I was also wrong. Like a lot of great apps, the Gongs, SalesOps, Outreaches, they should be growing 100% this year I think. ZoomInfo, ZoomInfo went from 59% growth last year to 9% in one year. That's, to me that's wrong. It's not supposed to work that way. Okay? You can see some ups and downs, but I didn't believe it. But the real money is in downturn. It's not that it's there, it's just not evenly distributed. I'm hopeful hopeful that it all normalizes by next year, but realize it's a weird world where we're not, people haven't been hit, haven't been hit equally. They really haven't. Shopify is at $9 billion in revenue, people are cashing their stock options and times are good, okay? It's not evenly distributed. This is the related point I just made, I put this up on Saastr. I like the Gartner data not because it's perfect, they do change their mind every quarter or two, but at least they're talking to hundreds of CIOs and buyers every quarter, that's pretty valuable. And they did lower their expectations for 2024 a little bit in the one that came out just a couple of weeks ago. But still, take a pause and look at it. Overall software spend last year, $913 billion. Overall software spend for this year, one crossing a trillion, $1.02 trillion, 12% growth. Is a lot of that going to security? Yes. Is a lot going to AI? Some. Is a lot going to overall cloud infrastructure? Yes. Is a lot going to the price increases that Salesforce and HubSpot, everyone gave us, yes, that might be absorbing most of it. Price increases, which we can chat about, but spend is going up. And if I had to give a tough piece of advice to folks in 2024, it's this, is especially to founders, be honest if you fell out of product market fit. Be honest if you fell out of product market fit. Because what happened in 2023, especially if you're a venture-backed, everyone got a pass in 2023 for venture-backed because you just didn't burn any cash. There was so much stress in the venture ecosystem that if you just burned the money last year, you were a good venture-backed startup. People literally, in many cases, did not care what your growth was last year as long as you weren't a red light company. So because of that, a lot of founders got mixed messages. They got mixed messages of all the managers being profitable. Being profitable without growing doesn't make your equity worth anything. We know this, right? It's tough. So Be honest, spend is growing. There are thousands and thousands of SaaS vendors, they can't all succeed. Be honest, did your product grow enough the last 3 years? Be honest, did you get more competitive or less competitive? Importantly, if you're in a competitive space, be honest. Find out how fast your competitors grew last year. Did you grow faster than them or not? If you had a tough year and you grew 30% last year, but your number one competitor was flat, that's a win. If you grew 30% last year but your competitor grew 60%, you're losing market share. That's because you fell out of product-market fit. And I know it's tough and a lot of founders are going to quit this year. A lot of founders are going to quit this year, not because they're out of money, but because they fell out of product-market fit, right? I had a company that I invested in, $8 million in the bank, a couple million in revenue, almost no burn. They're selling their company for pennies on the dollar. They're selling their company. Why would you sell a company with $8 million in the bank, no burn, and millions in revenue? Well, they didn't really innovate the last 3 years, and they fell out of product-market fit, and they don't have the energy to start again. They just are tired. They've been going for years, and they don't want to build another product. They just don't want to do it. Not that impressed with them. But this challenge for you guys is don't let it be you. This is hard. Like, even in the good times, you have— you fall out— you're constantly slowly falling out of product-market fit. Market, even in good times. And you have to rebuild yourself every 5 years in good times. For those folks that have been doing it for a while, if you look back at where your product was 5 years ago or 10 years ago, it wasn't— it couldn't compete today. It could not be— I have this fun question. I don't do that many podcast interviews, but I interview CEOs and I ask them, was the version of your company 5 years ago competitive today? Not really. It's too good today. Too many folks didn't innovate the last 2 and a half years. Too many folks didn't innovate at all last year because I can't innovate. I had to lay off 20% of my engineers. It's not my fault my CTO quit. It's not my fault. It's not my fault. Cry me a river. Okay. And so as founders, we have to be honest. Did you fall out of product market fit? But the one positive thing I can tell you, I can— I have worked with many of the best founders who found their way back to product market fit. The key is it really only works if you have at least a group of happy customers. If you have some happy customers that will continue to buy from you, like it's not too late. Like for public companies, Fastly is an interesting example. I wrote them up. Fastly is growing like 15% at, I don't know, $300 million revenue. And their NRR is 15%. So how many new customers do you think they added last year? Zero. Fastly added zero at a couple hundred million revenue. But they still grew 15% because their NRR is 15%. Now I'm sure it's not that fun to work at Fastly today, but they got a shot here. They have a next generation CDN. They're pushing lots of assets all across the internet. They've got hundreds of millions of revenue to work with. It's up to them whether Fastly wants to step it up and get back to growth or not. Many of you are like a smaller version of that. I know it's tough medicine and maybe it's not what you want to hear, but be honest. No one's going to be honest with you about whether you fell out of product-market fit. And it's almost a conversation that if you're too honest with your team, they'll freak out. It's too much. Like, you can tell your team, you can be like somewhere between 80 and 90% transparent with your team, and you've got to share the bad news, but not all of it. But the really bad news, like, only your co-founders can really take the really bad news. So you can't walk into a meeting and put your bang your head and say, look guys, we fell out of product market fit, it's hopeless. Some companies that can work, don't get me wrong, but I think outside of like TV, it doesn't really work. I think people today just, especially after the last 3 years, they just quit. Maybe 5 years ago, that would be a rallying cry, but today they'd be like, I'm just going to go be a consultant and sell courses and be a fractional CMO, I'm out of here. That's not as good a model as it was 12 months ago. So you've got, maybe this isn't the way to put it, so as founders you have to be honest, did we fall out of product market fit? Can we kick ourselves in the ass in January and get back into product-market fit? Be honest about it. It's important as we come out of the past that folks got last year. One thing that— the thing that I've talked about this a bit, like the thing— I like to be positive on SaaS, but I'll tell you the thing that is weighing on me just a little bit. I'm both optimistic and pessimistic that we're in year 3 of this multiple downturn and folks are talking about how it's like the old days, right? We got back to where it was in 2017, 2022. It's actually worse. It's actually worse because companies are better than ever. There's more companies that are billionaire out there. People are buying more software than ever, but the multiples are stuck around 6x. It's pretty bad. Actually, it's 2015, 2014 bad, depending on how you slice the data. The optimistic side of me says, listen, this is a buying opportunity. In fact, I put quite a bit of money for the first time ever in public stocks because I believe it. I believe they are undervalued by 20 to 30%. I don't see any reason why multiples should be lower than pre-COVID. It doesn't make sense to me. Okay. Companies are better. In some cases, growth is lower, but not always. And it's epic. But it is year 3 of the multiple downturn. At some point we want to be optimistic, but we have to be realistic, right? So we may be— I hope we're not stuck in a 6x world. I hope we're back to 8x and 10x for good ones. But I am getting a smidge worried that we haven't seen this rebound. And we all thought we were ZIRP experts and interest rate experts. But interest rates are coming down and companies are efficient and just about every public company is super efficient. But multiples have not really fully reflated. There's outliers. So it's just something I'm thinking about. Whenever we get back together, I want to talk about how multiples rebounded, but I thought it would already happen. I'm just a smidge worried about it. This one is from— I think it's from Bench Sites, right? Is David here? Okay, so this is a great chart. Dave's a little more dour on this than I am. And I'm going to run out of time, but I do think this summarizes something that founders need to be aware of. We've gotten more efficient all across the board by spending less. Every single public company is radically more efficient than 18 months ago. They all were unprofitable and now they're profitable, just cash flow positive or positive operating margins. But we didn't get better at sales and marketing. We just leaned on our base. We just relied more on price increases and NRR and existing. We actually have gotten worse at sales and marketing. And there's a lot of stuff that's counterintuitive here. And yes, as big companies, we max out accounts. We run— at some point there's no customers left in our segments. So sales and marketing costs should go up. But if you look at David's data, it's gotten worse, not better. As we cut marketing expenses, as we got leaner, as we got fitter, as we got profitable, intuitively you would think our sales and marketing costs must have gone down, right? It must. But no, it's gone up. It's gone up. We just rely— we just grew more slowly, relied on our base. So this is the challenge for 2024. I'm more positive than David, but I'd rather put together the data. We've got to figure out how to get back to growth and spend more and be more efficient at the same time. We hid in cuts last year. To be trite, cutting doesn't produce growth, right? That's what happened. And so we've got to be honest about it and know this is hard because public companies got worse at this last year. Public companies got worse at sales and marketing efficiency. So you have an even harder challenge. You have to do better than Snowflake, Twilio, GitLab. This is hard, but I know it's a job we all all signed up for. And maybe I'll hit it and I'll let Jaco go up. The last challenge was don't be an NRR zombie. If I had to tie this off, and I try to be positive at SaaS-ter, but I've got a post coming out. Too many folks are going to come out of last year being NRR zombies. They're going to hide in their NRR. They're going to hide in 100% NRR and not grow. Whatever happened in 2023, we had to do it to be alive. Did we have to raise our price of 20% without improving our product? Yes. Did we rip off customers that we shouldn't have? Yes. Put it behind you. You get one mulligan every 5 to 8 years in the SaaS. But don't be an NRR zombie. Don't rely on it. It's time to get back to growth, and it's supposed to be hard. Thanks, everybody.