Identity-Based-Organizations IBO web
The paper develops a formal economic model that treats personal and social identity as culturally transmitted club goods produced within organizations. Individuals belong to one of two communities (mainstream or alternative) and may join one of two identity‑based organizations that set a strictness level – the minimum participation required. Participation incurs a quadratic cost and determines the probability of acquiring the organization’s identity, which in turn affects both personal identity (through role‑model transmission) and social identity (through external inference). The model derives a unique subgame‑perfect equilibrium: mainstream‑type individuals remain unaffiliated, the mainstream organization attracts no members, and the alternative organization attracts a subset of alternative‑type agents whose participation exactly equals the announced strictness. The equilibrium strictness lies between half and the full tension parameter τ (the extra payoff alternative types obtain from the alternative identity). Higher tension raises both strictness and total participation, linking doctrinal extremity to organizational demands. The analysis connects to the economics of religion, cultural transmission, and collective action, explaining why oppositional identities and strict religious groups are more effective at mobilizing members and achieving collective goals. The paper includes formal proofs, comparative statics, and a discussion of implications for religious doctrine, free‑rider problems, and social movements.
Topics
Identity as a Club Good: Conceptual Integration of Personal and Social Identity
Introduces the central idea that identity formation functions like a rival club good, produced by voluntary participation within organizations and transmitted culturally.