Dave Morin Fireside with Josh Elman | #ProductSF

At Product sf, Greylock's Josh Elman talks to Slovenures founder and partner Dave Morin about Dave's days at Apple and Facebook and his learnings from Building Path. Dave discusses the distinctions between building social products that involve a community and building products that do not have social components. This presentation was recorded at Product SF and an event hosted by Greylock Partners that brings together founders, PMs and product leaders to talk about the challenges of building new innovative products that change lives and create habits. For more podcasts, please visit news.greylock.com I'm.

Really looking forward to this next conversation with my friend Dave Morin because I think we'd talk about some of the other sides of that challenge. I mean, Dave in his career, he started at Apple where he was working in the college program and, and he was getting excited about this great thing to market to college students called Facebook. He joined Facebook as one of the first hundred people got to build the Facebook platform that I think was the biggest explosion of distribution on the consumer Internet and then left to found a company called Path that I still use pretty often with a very intimate, close set of friends and family. And he sold that to Dom Cacao. And when you look at the world of these massive, multi billion dollar, multi hundred million dollar networks, Path didn't ultimately end up becoming one. And I think it's just great to think about sort of what some of the learnings are from that. So, Dave, I'd love to bring you up and let's just have a fun conversation. Thanks dude. Thanks for coming.

Hey Josh, thanks for having me.

After college, you joined two of what are today the most important companies in the world. Getting to work at both Apple and Facebook. What did you actually see? What did you recognize that drew you there? Kind of so early in their histories or so early in some of the patterns that really have turned them out to be companies of today.

Interesting question. I have this vivid memory of reading this article that Steve Jobs was interviewed in probably back in the 2002, 2001, I think I was probably a senior in college and he was saying that Mac OS X was coming out and he said that the icons were so beautiful that you would want to lick them. And I had always been a Mac user my entire life. I had one when I was like 4 years old and so I was a hardcore Apple guy. But I'd taken a detour for a few years and was using Windows mostly in college. And I don't know, I was really inspired by a lot of what Steve was Talking about and some of the new products that were coming out. The ibook in particular, I thought was, you know, the imac was great and, like, the blue ones were all around, but the white ibook, the first one, and then the combination of that with Mac OS X and a lot of the feature work and the way that Mac OS X worked I just thought was better in almost every way than Windows. And so that was a big reason that attracted me. And it was prior to the ipod. I think the ipod launched, like, right around when I got there. So. And a lot of people don't remember this, but the ipod we couldn't sell. The people from Apple in the audience will remember we couldn't sell the ipod to anyone for, like, the first two years. One of the first things that I had to do when I got to Apple was we gave away ipods to every student at Duke.

Wow.

Because we couldn't get students to buy them. And so nobody remembers these things. So watch out for the Apple watch.

Are they giving away free?

Sooner or later, a lot of people forget. But the thing that made the ipod really go was the itunes music store. For the first two years, you had to rip music off of CDs and put it onto the ipod, which the friction was just way too high. That's a, I guess, story about Apple. The story about Facebook is, you know, I was like Josh said, I was working on college marketing for Apple and I learned about Facebook because I was kind of obsessed with social networks. Ironically, to Reid's conversation this morning, I used to find out about a new social network and then send it out to all the student reps. And I had 900 of them all over the country. I sent LinkedIn out and they all joined LinkedIn. And I sent Friendster out and they all joined Friendster. I think MySpace was probably already MySpace out. And then I found Facebook and sent it out. And I had a meeting later on in that day with Jennifer Bailey, who ran the online store at Apple for a long time. And I think she's now running the wallet and the Apple pay. And I was trying to prove to her that this Facebook system was really powerful. And so I sent it out to all the student reps and I said, hey, send me a friend request. And it was like two hours time in between. When I sent that email and got into the meeting, I had like 150 friend requests. And this was like a good example of just how insane the engagement was on Facebook. And so I think that from the minute I saw Facebook, the engagement was just like, so through the roof compared to most of the Internet systems that I'd ever used that it was pretty obvious early on whether it was obvious that it was going to scale bigger than that, and it certainly felt like it. So I think those were probably like two good stories. I don't know if that answers your question.

No, that does. And so you joined Facebook and you get involved in this little thing called the Facebook platform, which was like a crazy bet that Facebook at the time didn't seem like something you would build a platform around. Can you talk a little about kind of what inspired that launch of the platform and what you guys were thinking? And then I want to talk about sort of what happened sort of after the cat was out of the bag.

Yeah.

It's kind of this interesting story of a conversation that happened between Apple and Facebook at that moment in time. I had switched out of marketing and was working in this special projects group on product stuff. It was basically Steve and John Couch were like, the social networking thing seems like a pretty good thing. Like we should figure out how to put it into more of our products. And so I was going around to the Iphoto team and the Imovie team and the OS X team trying to convince them to do social networking stuff. And. And one of the things that I got the most obsessed with was this idea of replacing the address book with Facebook because everybody's address book is full of dead data, right? And like, how many startups, it's like, if you want to be sure your startup dies, try to go after the contacts problem. So Dustin Moskovitz, the co founder of Facebook, he wrote this API so that we could try to integrate with Mac OS X. And we kept trying to do this and we're like running around Apple trying to convince people that this was a good idea to, you know, replace the address book with Facebook. But Facebook was really small. It only had 5 million users. And people don't remember this either, but MySpace had like 100 million users at the time. And Steve was like, really annoyed at MySpace because it was messing with the itunes business. And so he couldn't convince him. It's just too small, this Facebook thing. You know, it's like not. It's not going to be a thing. So Dustin and I were having a lot of conversations that summer about this idea of what if you could put the social graph in the hands of developers and create a social operating system. So this conversation kind of happened in the summer of 06 of. Well, we could keep trying to Convince Apple to do this, or we could turn Facebook into an operating system. And so that was kind of the straw that broke the camel's back. And Dustin still gives me and Mark, give me grief to this day that, you know, I should have joined two years prior to that and joined that summer. And we got the platform project underway and we kind of had a small group of, I think it was like about six people working on it initially. Well, I guess it started with Dave Fetterman and I, and then we kind of had a six person team. And we spent the next nine months kind of figuring out, like, what is it exactly that makes Facebook Facebook. And our most important example was the Photos app. Got it. The Photos app was like the premier example of the power of the Facebook social graph. And a lot of the reasons why was very simple. You know, you could upload a photo and you could use the social graph to tag the person that was in it. And that would push that over onto their Facebook profile, which would then expose the content to their friend network, which was like a critical piece of the distribution system. And so a lot of what we spent the year trying to figure out is how do we give developers the ability to do these same kind of distribution things, right? And then creating tools to do that. And there were a bunch of privacy considerations. You know, we had to invent a new markup language, a new JavaScript language. We had to invent a new query language and database to enable people to query the graph but not violate privacy and not display who is visiting, whose profile. All these, like, interesting questions in order to give people the ability to create apps. And, you know, I think we got it done in about nine months and launched in 2007.

And who here was building Facebook apps kind of in that 2007, 2008, like Cambrian explosion.

Okay.

It's a good set of you. So you'll remember this era really well.

So, okay, so I still miss the profile back then.

Me too. The profile with all the little profile.

Widgets, you can like, really express yourself.

Really add and decorate. Back in the era of expression Expression, nobody expressed themselves.

Now we live in a uniform era.

So, okay, so cats out of the bag. You guys figure out this new language, got all the privacy stuff figured out. You got like, great distribution for everybody. And then, like, it works.

By the way, if you guys have ever met Charlie Cheever, the guy's like a mad genius Facebook platform, like, would not have happened. That's great. He's just like, he created all these languages and things. It's Unbelievable.

And so it worked. Yeah, it worked so well that I think everybody was inviting every friend to every single product and things were showing up on people's profiles and feeds were getting spammed. And all of a sudden Facebook started changing things and maybe taking some things away or curbing some things maybe. And look, I remember you kind of out there as sort of a very visible figure hosting events, talking about the Facebook platform. And I also remember you bearing a ton of the kind of anger and frustration from developers directly.

I still do. Still do. Like, I'm afraid to go on stages.

What did you learn? Like, what did you learn about how to manage a platform? What are you so proud of that went right? And what do you wish you'd done differently and learned differently after that experience?

We had this one thing that happened that was that we were all kids, we were in our twenties managing this thing. I mean, I think most of us, if we're not in our 20s, you kind of learned how to communicate in your 20s so that you could get married. And I think that we didn't know how to communicate. And we weren't very transparent and it wasn't intentional. It wasn't like we intentionally were not transparent or intentionally changed the rules and wreaked a bunch of havoc. It was more that we were dealing with this inbound amount of traffic that was like extraordinary and we didn't know what to do in a lot of cases. And we were trying to make smart decisions and to help. I actually remember sitting on the stage the night before we launched Facebook platform and the biggest widget directory on the web was 5,000 widgets. It was the Igoogle directory. There was a couple others that were like homepage widget directories. And then there was the Apple ecosystem that had 250,000 developers and they had built it for 30 years. Within one year, we had half a million developers building on Facebook platform and there were apps within two days that had a million users. And so it went way faster than we expected. Right? I mean, really, truly. And I will tell you, we were literally sitting there the night of the launch being like, ah, wouldn't it be great if we had like education apps and maybe we could impact government, you know? And you know what happened within like a month, it was all games. We literally had no games developers at launch. I'm telling you, this is how unexpected the ecosystem that happened was. We were trying to do the best job that we could and make smart decisions. One of the biggest decisions that I made in the very Earliest days was we shifted the directory from being based on downloads, which the app store till this day is still based on downloads and velocity of downloads. We shifted it from that to engagement that that change fundamentally decimated half the ecosystem. And we just thought we were doing the right thing for the users, which I think that we were. We didn't really explain the decision to the community, I think with the kind of fidelity that in hindsight, I think it would have been a lot better if we would have sort of maybe hosted forums and hosted events and gotten feedback and then made that transparent to the community and then sort of taken. Taken them through the decision process rather than just like, you know, sending a shot across the bout in order to try to protect our users, but not sort of doing the conversation in kind of a way that frankly, you see this happen all the time. And the US government's like, actually really good at this. You know, they sort of have many, many, many conversations before you make a big change. Because the reality is you don't want to decimate all the small businesses in America. I found myself reading like a lot of econ books around the time, rather than technical books.

Well, really, the platform became a pretty substantial economy. Do you see anything like what's happening with Facebook, you know, happening now? Is imessage the next great platform, or is that sort of interesting distribution that, that you were able to create through Facebook sort of the last time that'll happen because everybody's so afraid of this happening again?

I think iMessage is pretty interesting. I had, like, actually last night I had. Somebody asked me this question in a very real way. There. There was a. A media company that I'm an investor in. They were talking to a big advertiser today that wanted to spend $3 million to go build apps, right? And they have a lot of content that's good for sending cards and things to each other. And I was like, you know, probably imessage is the best new platform right now. However, distribution is kind of hard, right? Like, I think if you can create a good experience that, you know, Bitmoji actually is probably the best example of something that was so good, it just spread itself, right? One of the problems though, is that a lot of people don't execute this distribution pattern, which we used on Facebook, which I always thought was the most important piece, was that you could browse around to each other's profiles and see which apps the person had installed. And then we had a very simple little add button that made it easy to just click one, click and it would install onto your profile. And that pattern is broadly missing for most of these new platforms that are going out the door. Most of these new platforms create an app store of some kind. You have to browse around it, find apps that you want to install. But it's very hard to actually go and say, what apps does Josh have on his home screen of his phone? Or what apps does Josh have installed in his imessage? So that pattern is sort of missing. So it kind of makes the social discovery other than just talking to each other in person, which actually to me is a lot of what drives app distribution today, other than Facebook news feed and ads. I think most of it's people literally pulling out their phone and being like, dude, what do you have on your phone? Right. And being able to make that an asynchronous thing, I think was a critical component to Facebook platform success.

That's interesting. I'd never thought about it that way. So skipping ahead, you go through this whole experience of Facebook, what a roller coaster. And it's clearly, we launched Connect, we got it out to the rest of the web. So it wasn't just people building into Facebook. That's going really well. You're still at the company, you're working on all these kind of new things, and yet you decide you're going to leave your role at Facebook and go start a company. How can you leave, you know, such a good rocket ship? What was your kind of moment and catalyst that said you had to go found a company?

It's still unclear. No, I mean, I think that I'd always wanted to build my own company. You know, I think I'm probably pretty stereotypical and that I moved here, was enchanted by entrepreneurship, met Reid. I had had this long conversation going with my friend Sean Fanning, who is the co founder of Napster. And we were talking about starting a company together. And one of the things that we kept talking about around that period of time was that though these networks such as Facebook, such as MySpace, such as Twitter, were amazing in the early days, when they're really nascent and brand new, they feel really high fidelity. You know, there was always these stories on Facebook that like you could put keg stand photos on Facebook in the early days, but you can't anymore because like your mom and your professor are on it. So you kind of have to change your behavior. Right. And that that early days were always awesome. The story of Twitter was like, oh my God. Like Twitter in the early days is like watching Silicon Valley's brain firing you know, and then as time went on, like, the conversation changed. It didn't get worse, it just changed. Right. And so we kept talking about that and that maybe there's a network to be made that tries to maintain some of that quality over time. And so this notion of could you limit the number of connections that people have to maintain intimacy and to maintain quality, was like this thing we kept talking about a lot. And the other thing we kept talking about a lot, which I actually still think is a problem, was this notion that though there's all these networks that exist, a lot of the social graphs in the networks are very rigid. You know, you kind of get stuck into this one version of the graph, and it's very hard to, like, break out of it and get different views. You hear a lot of people talking about this right now because they want to, like, borrow their Republican friend's Facebook login so they can see a different version of the feed. You know, they're very rigid. And so creating new networks, new topologies, was something we were talking a lot about. So this one in particular, especially since Facebook was getting bigger, we kind of got excited enough that I felt, you know, now's the time, I would say. The only other thing is that I kind of felt like once platform and connect were done, this notion of replacing the address book, you know, we had finally done the deal with Steve to, like, put Facebook into the os, which still to this day, you can go, and, you know, it's in your settings, right. In the iPhone. So we kind of. I felt like the job was done.

Got it. Well, and so the path, I think, was so much in the right place at the right time. Like, you know, in 2010, the idea of a mobile network where we'd actually share our most intimate things and take a lot more photos, you know, it turns out to have been really, really timely. And there's a couple companies that got, you know, really big through that. You grew a lot.

Don't remind me.

No, no, no, you grew a lot.

You.

You raised a lot of money. Like, what did you learn along the way? What. What didn't quite deliver on some of. Some of that promise that got you to go? Found a company.

It was funny listening to Reid this morning. I'm like, ah, I'm in the social debt phase. Yeah. You know, Reid actually called me the day path was over and told me that story, which was, you know, really cool. What did I learn? Like, holistically? Yeah.

Like, what. What do you. What do you look back and go, if. If Only I'd done this, like, at one point, Path was growing a lot. You'd figured out some growth hacks. Like, there must have been some things that you're like, you know, what if we had stuck to our guns or if we had figured out this one.

Hook, we ended up with a bunch of growth and stuff. Southeast Asia and I had played enough risk against Mark Zuckerberg while I worked at Facebook to know that I needed at least one country. And I made this in risk.

You always got to win Australia.

Mark attacks every country at once all the time. So we made this decision. We saw a growth curve that looked right, which when you're doing these social systems, it's always important when you see that, take advantage of it. And we made a decision because we thought, okay, Southeast Asia, 250 million people, same size as the United States, fastest growing mobile market in the world. More mobile phones happening there than anywhere else. Clearly, it's like, next after the Brick, right? So after Brazil, Russia, India, China, Indonesia, maybe Mexico, maybe Turkey, maybe Nigeria, these are like, probably the countries, but Indonesia is like the largest. And so we were like, okay, if we can seal up Indonesia, then maybe we'll be in position to leverage that into adjacent markets, which was, as, you know, something we did a lot of at Facebook. We would see massive growth in Turkey or Italy, and then we'd go adjacent. And so I was like, all right, I'm going to do this. And we did it. Path to this day is still, I think, the number one social network in the top two classes of Indonesia. So all the people that have the resources to use it and potentially be monetized, I think it was. The reason I sort of dwell on this is that I think that it was the wrong decision strategically, because ultimately those users ended up weighing down the system and weighing down our resources. And we burned a lot of capital trying to build out that portion of the network. And we were too early. I think that, like, probably if it was at scale next year, we would have been in a position to monetize. But when we got to our series, I guess it was series D. And I was out there, you know, going to Jakarta and Singapore, and I'm like, in bars in Jakarta, being like, how did this small town guy from Montana end up in Jakarta? We just couldn't find the capital that we needed to continue to scale the company. And the reason why is we couldn't monetize. We were too early. We were at scale, but we were too early. You know, Indonesia's average income per Capita for like the bottom three classes is like less than a dollar in, you know, so it's really, really hard to monetize there. That became a pretty hard lesson. So I could tell a bunch of other like minor lessons, but that one was like a pretty big strategic thing where I kind of now tell people like, you should be really like if you're doing anything in social, like lock it down to the United States and like figure out your distribution before you try to go other places. Because you can end up with a bunch of users that are not paying rent in your building that are kind of holding things down while you're trying to figure out how the heck you're going to monetize elsewhere. So I think that was like a pretty hard lesson.

Oh, it's tough. And look, and you still were able to have the company live on and the product live on. So that's still a great outcome in the end. So look, you were right in the early days about Apple's resurgence. Facebook, social, mobile. Now you're, you know, thinking about what's next. You're investing as part of Slow Ventures in a whole bunch of companies, including probably quite a few out here. You know, what has you excited today as both an investor and an area that you're interested in learning about and figuring out what's next?

Well, going through the path experience is pretty hard in a lot of ways. You know, it wasn't a business success. You know, I think it was an artistic success perhaps. I'm happy that it still lives on. You know, it's never fun to say goodbye to your team. You know, afterwards I did a lot of soul searching. You know, Slow Ventures has been a really wonderful thing. I've been doing that basically since the same year that it started path. So around 2009, you know, we're really happy with that. We're managing a lot more capital now. We have some cool stuff coming down the pipe there that we think is going to be helpful for entrepreneurs in particular. One component of Slow is we're about to launch what we're going to call Slow Studio, which is going to be more of a, you know, expa style incubator where we're going to go end to end. We did two of them last year where we're really hands on in helping people get their businesses off the ground. So we want to maintain our entrepreneurial capabilities even though we're building a venture firm. And one of the projects that I'm really focused on is called Sunrise, which is working to try to find A cure for depression. I found that that was something that I'm extremely passionate about. My dad struggled with depression his entire life. And I decided that it was an injustice that I wanted to try to write. And so one of the things that I've been doing since, since Path was over, has gone really deep down the rabbit hole of learning genomics, really understanding a lot of these new genomics technologies, such as crispr, understanding what's possible. And it's actually brought me to a point now where I'm very optimistic that we're going to see some of the cures for the most aggressive diseases in our lifetime. I think the reason why is just like when we showed up in Silicon Valley in 2002, and the Internet was this fantastic new tool, and there were some really early examples of great communities, whether it was IRC or forums. And you could see it starting to play out that this was going to be a transformational thing for social change and how humans communicate. And I'm sure that's what it was like in 1978 when Gates and Jobs and thousand other people that we aren't hearing about because they failed, were working on the personal computer and the microchip. I really think that where we are in biotech, I've been Calling It Bio 2.0, is a really profound and important moment. I do think it's early. It's probably 78. And we can sit here and be like, you know, one day I'm going to wake up in the morning and my smart toilet is going to gather all my data and my Apple Watch version 20 is going to be like, in my bloodstream. And there's going to be a 3D printer on my counter in my bathroom that prints out the exact chemical combination that I need for my body. I think we can talk about that. But it's probably still 30 years out, and there's going to be 10,000 companies between now and then. And so one of the things I'm really focused on is how do we take the hardest diseases that are not getting resources in the Valley? And in the context of bigger things that have bigger brands, such as cancer, and how do we fight for resources for other diseases that haven't been paid attention to? And I chose depression because I have personal experience with it. But the numbers also say that it's one in four women. One in six men kills a million people a year by 2030, it'll be the largest burden on global human health. It's growing faster than anything else in the world. And I think Part of that's the Internet, part of it's the war on drugs, part of it's many other things. But I think that with some of these new tools, technology is defined literally as tool. Some of these new genomics tools, I think, are going to give us the ability to cure disease in a way that I think is going to happen really rapidly in a Moore's Law kind of way. So I'm pretty excited to live at that intersection of technology and biology.

That's really cool and inspiring. Do any folks have questions that they want to ask? Dave? We have a couple minutes for it. If not, I have more, but I just want to make sure if anybody has one. So, look, one of the ones that I've been that you and I talk about all the time is kind of the spirit of social design and kind of how different it is when you design products where you have your friends there and you're living with your friends in a social experience. You always talked about photo tagging was, like, transformative, even though the other photo products were much bigger and more important at the time. Events, you know, the, you know, Evite things were out there. But once you brought your friends into events and discovered events, it completely transformed events and it became the biggest event site. Like, what are some of those core tenants that, like, you know, you think are getting used right today, or even the ones that kind of need to come back to. You talked about the profile system earlier.

One of my favorite axioms is that social context is king. We used to study a lot of, like, basic Sociology 101 stuff at Facebook. And one of the most important theories was a lot of it's related to identity theory. And MIT Media Lab actually has a lot of studies around this. I can send people papers if they're interested. But one of the most important ones is this notion of modeling, which is, you know, when you see somebody else do something or if you go into a room where you've never been before, the human brain kind of is optimized for modeling the. You start modeling your behavior after what you see other people doing. And so a lot of what I think drives these newsfeed experiences and a lot of these experiences which are social and is this notion of modeling. You come in here, into this room. This is how people do things here. You come here to Instagram and people are filtering their photos. And so you start filtering your photos and to the extent you can. Reid was kind of saying this earlier. It's not just the nuts and bolts of the code and the design it's like, what is the conversation that's happening inside the system is as important to the product as is the kind of the structural stuff. And the structural stuff should sort of lead to a kind of behavior which you want other people to model, and it should be transparent. Right. Like, I see this mistake made a lot where people will, like, design an experience, and then they don't expose the behavior to the users that they want them to be doing. And so I think that's one of them that's pretty good. Another one that we use a lot was called signal Theory. Signal theory is, like, something that I think is, like, critical to understanding these types of systems. And Facebook profile, and particularly what we did with platform in the early days was, like, very centered on this. And there's three different types of signals. The first one's called a handicap signal, which basically means you're willing to handicap yourself somehow in order to signal. The best example of this is bottle service at nightclubs, basically giving people the ability to spend some of their resources in order to send a signal of some kind, which is harder to do than just being able to say, like, hey, you know, I've got resources, right? You see this play out in all kinds of product categories. The fact that cars have three series, five series, seven series, there's no change in the utility, usually, other than, like, maybe a bigger engine between the 3 Series and the 7 Series. What the real change is is the ability to signal how many resources you have. And so you can play this out across all different kinds of categories. And it's a very baseline human behavior. We spent a lot of time thinking about that on Facebook. So there's different signals on Facebook that are harder to make, right? So, like, you can't say that you're married to someone unless they confirm it. You can't tag someone unless they confirm it. There's things you can say like, I'm interested in skiing, right? And you can kind of take that at face value. Or I could post photos of myself skills, and then that confirms that I am actually making a signal that's authentic. And so we spent a lot of time thinking about those kinds of things. And I see signal theory play out a lot across a lot of these systems or get missed, you know, where you kind of either enable people not to do it accidentally, or you can, like, enhance it a lot. And there's systems like Nextdoor systems, like Angellist, Pinterest, like a lot of these things, you see this playing out in a way that's pretty dramatic. The Only other thing I would say is making a commitment to the kind of community that you want to have I think is fundamentally critical, too, and choosing values, which, you know, you see this playing out pretty well on Facebook, right? Like, you see this sort of war going on right now where you have Facebook that made a decision to have, like, values around civility, and, you know, they pay the price sometimes where they're like, you know what? You can't post this kind of thing on Facebook. And people are like, there's conversations about freedom of speech and whatnot. And then you go over to Twitter and you see a huge amount of hate. And, like, I don't know if there's a platform that I've experienced more hate on, maybe secret other than Twitter. They say that they police the hate, but the hate doesn't go away. Whereas Facebook has really maintained a really sort of strong hand in that. And so I perceive, as a user, not just a product guy, that the Facebook conversation is more civil. And my other favorite example is Reddit that kind of has gone back and forth, right? There was, like, periods of time where Reddit kind of lost its values and then came back or whatever. And now it kind of seems like it's in, like, a really good place. Like, I really enjoy all the conversations on Reddit. And so. And this goes back to the platform conversation, where it's just like having a transparent conversation with your community about the values and about what you're trying to do. We spent a lot of time on this at Path too, where, you know, we changed the friend limits. We did a lot of things because we were just trying to make the system and the community conversation more healthy. And I think that, like, taking an active role in that is, like, something that is easy to not do but has a lot of value if you do it.

Awesome. Well, thank you so much for getting up here and telling your story. And, you know, if you're around a little bit after, people can come and grab you for questions, too.

Cool. Thanks, Steve. This is awesome.