James Holland: World War II, Hitler, Churchill, Stalin & Biggest Battles | Lex Fridman Podcast #470

And you see that manifest itself on D Day where you've got 6,939 vessels, of which there are 1,213 warships, 4,127 assault craft, 12 and a half thousand aircraft, you know, 155,000 men landed and dropped from the air in 24 hour period. It is phenomenal. It is absolutely phenomenal.

The following is a conversation with James Holland, a historian specializing in World War II who has written a lot of amazing books on the subject, especially covering the Western Front, often providing fascinating details at multiple levels of analysis, including strategic, operational, tactical, technological, and of course, the human side, the personal accounts from the war. He also co hosts a great podcast on World War II called We have Ways of Making youg Talk. This is the Lex Friedman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description or@lexfreedman.com sponsors. And now, dear friends, here's James Holland. In volume one of the war in the west, your book series On World War II, you write, The Second World War witnessed the deaths of more than 60 million people from over 60 different countries. Entire cities were laid waste, national borders were withdrawn, and many millions more people found themselves displaced over the past couple of decades. Many of those living in the Middle east or parts of Africa, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and even the United States may feel justifiably that these troubled times have already proved the most traumatic in their recent past. Yet globally, the Second World War was and remains the single biggest catastrophe of modern history. In terms of human drama, it is unrivaled. No other war has affected so many lives in such a large number of countries. So what to you makes World War II the biggest catastrophe in human drama in modern history, and maybe from a historian perspective, the most fascinating subject to study.

The thing about World War II is it really is truly global. You know, it's fought in deserts, it's fought in the Arctic, it's fought across oceans, it's fought in the air, it's in jungle, it's in the hills, it is on the beaches, it's also on the Russian steppe and it's also in Ukraine. So it's, it's that global nature of it. And I just think, you know, where there's war, there is always incredible human drama. And I think for most people, and certainly the true, in my case, you get drawn to the human drama of it. It's that thought that, you know, gosh, if I'd been 20 years old, how would I have dealt with it? You know, would I have been in the army? Would I have been in the Air Force? Would I been on a Royal Navy destroyer? Or, you know, how would I have coped with it, and how would I have dealt with that separation? I mean, I've interviewed people who were away for four years. I remember talking to a tank man from L. Liverpool in England called Sam Bradshaw. And he went away for four years, and when he came home, he'd been twice wounded. He'd been very badly wounded in North Africa, and then he was shot in the neck in Italy. Eventually got home. When he came home, his mother had turned gray. His little baby sister, who had been, you know, 13 when he left, was now a young woman. His old school had been destroyed by Luftwaffe bombs. He didn't recognize the place. And do you know what he did? He joined up again, went back out of Europe and was one of the first people in Belsen.

So, you know, what was his justification for that, for joining right back?

He just felt completely disconnected to home. He felt that the gulf of time, his experiences, had separated him from all the normalities of life. And he felt that the normalities of the life that he had known before he'd gone away to war had just been severed in a really kind of cruel way that he didn't really feel he was able to confront at that particular point. But he decided to rejoin. Couldn't go Back to the 3rd World Tank Regiment, so it went back to a different unit. Went from kind of the Italian campaign to European theater. Didn't see so much action at the end. But, you know, like a lot of British troops, if. If you were in a certain division at a certain time, you know, you ended up passing very close to Belsen and, you know, you suddenly realized, okay, this was the right thing to do. You know, we did have to get rid of Nazism. We did have to do this, because this is the consequence. It's not just the oppression. It's just not just the secret police. It's not just the expansionism of Nazism. It is also, you know, the Holocaust, which hadn't been given its name at that point. But, you know, you're witnessing this kind of untold cruelty. And I always, you know, I've always sort of. I think a lot about Sam. I mean, he's no longer with us, but he was one of the kind of first people that I interviewed. And I interviewed him at great length. And I know you like a lot. Long interview, Lex. And. And I totally, totally get that, because when you have a. When you have a long interview, you really Start getting to the nuts and bolts of it. One of the frustrations for me when I'm looking at oral histories of. Of Second World War vets is usually they're kind of, you know, they're put on YouTube or they're put on a museum website. They're 30 minutes, you know, an hour if you're lucky. And they're just scratching the surface. You never really get to know it. And you feel that they're just repeating kind of stuff they've read in books themselves after the war and stuff. And, you know, I was kind of leave feeling frustrated that I haven't had a chance to kind of grill them on the kind of stuff that I would grill them on if I was put in front of them.

So, Tank man, what was maybe the most epic, the most intense or the most interesting story that he told you?

Well, I do remember him telling me, funny enough, it's not really about the conflict. I remember him telling me about the importance of letters. And there was this. There was this guy who literally every few weeks, you know, post would arrive intermittently. There was no kind of sort of regular post. So it was supposed to be regular, but it didn't come out regularly. So you might suddenly, suddenly get a flurry of five all in one day. But he said there was this guy and in his tank, member of a different tank troop, he was a good friend of his. In the. In the same squadron. British have squadrons for their armor and which is. Americans would have a company.

I should say that in your book, one of the wonderful things you do is you use the correct term in the language for the particular army involved, whether it's the German or the British or the American.

Well, that's not to be pretentious. That's really just said it because you're dealing with so many numbers and different units, and it can go over your head and you can get sort of consumed by the detail if you're not careful. And as a reader, it can be very unsatisfying because you just can't keep pace of everything. So one of the things about writing in the vernacular German, or in the American spelling armor, rather than A.R. mauer as we Brits would spell it, is it just immediately tells the reader, okay, this is American. Okay, I've got that. Or this is German. I've got that. Or Italian or whatever it might be. But yeah, to go back to Sam. So Sam, there was this guy in his squadron and he'd get his letters from his girlfriend, his wife, and he said it was like it was like a soap opera. He said we all just waited for his letters to come in so we could find out, you know, whether his, you know, his daughter had, you know, got to school okay or something, you know, won the swimming contest or whatever it was. You know, the sort of details of this sort of day to day, kind of banal life was just absolute catnip to these guys. They absolutely loved it. And then the letter arrived, the Dear John letter saying, sorry, I found someone else and it's over. And his friend was just absolutely devastated. It was the only thing that was keeping him going. This sort of sense of this sort of continuity of home, this sort of, this, this foundation of his life back at home. And Sam said he could see he was in a really, really bad way and he thought he's gonna do something stupid. And he went up the term and he said, look, you know, I know it's bad and I know it's terrible. I know you're absolutely devastated but you've got your mates here, just don't do anything silly. Just, you know, maybe, you know, when it's all over you can patch things up or sort things out. And he said, you know, you've got to understand it from her point of view, you know, it's a long way, you haven't seen you for two years, this kind of stuff, you know, so just, just don't do anything rash. And of course the next, next engagement, two days later he was killed. And he said it was just a kind of, he could, he just knew that was going to happen. So it was a sort of self fulfilling prophecy. That's something I've never forgotten that story. And I just thought, you know, it's about human drama, you know, that, that's, that's the truth of it and how people react to this totally alien situation. You know, for the most part the Second World War is fought by ordinary everyday people doing extra ordinary things. And I think that's something that's so fascinating. I suspect I, I think I instinctively I'm quite slap dash, I think so I think I would have, I'd have bought it, literally. I don't think it would have ended well for me. I just, I'm just a bit careless. Yeah.

I think I also have an element in me where I can believe in the idea of nation and fight for a nation. Especially when the conflict is as grand.

There are things worse than death. Yes.

As, as the propaganda would explain very clearly, but also in reality.

Yes.

So a nation, you know, France, Britain was, you Know, maybe facing the prospect of being essentially enslaved. The Soviet Union was facing the prospect of being enslaved, literally. I mean, it was very, very clearly stated what they're going to do. They're going to repopulate the land with Germanic people.

So, well, they're not just going to do that. They're also going to starve lots and lots of Soviet individuals to death by the hunger plan, for example, which is planned, you know, really very casually and not by the. You know, this is not SS units or anything like this. This is the Wehrmacht. This is the economic division of the Oberkommando de Wehrmacht. The German combined General staff. General Georg Thomas comes up with, you know, and Herman Bakker, they come up with the. Who's the kind of minister for food? They come up, you know, what are we going to do? You know, we haven't got enough food, you know, largely because German farming is inefficient. And they think, well, you know, this is part of Lebensraum. We'll go in and we'll take the food. And there's been this colossal urbanization of the Soviet Union since the revolution in 1917. So they're just not going to get their food, you know, these. These people in these cities, because we're going to take it all and that's going to leave to. That's going to lead to a lot of deaths, you know, umpteen millions is the phrase that Gail Thomas used.

So let's talk about the hunger plan. How important was the hunger plan and Lebensraum to Nazi ideology and to the whole Nazi war machine essential to the whole thing?

This is all about this notion that is embedded into Hitler's mind and into the minds of the Nazi Party. Right from the word go is there is a big sort of global conspiracy, the Jewish Bolshevik plot, I mean, completely misplaced, that Jews and Bolsheviks go hand in hand and sort of somehow dovetail. They don't, obviously. And the whole ideology is to crush this. You know, part of the way that the Nazis think, the way Hitler thinks is there is a them and there's us. We are the whites. Northern European Aryans. We should be the master race. We've been threatened by a global Jewish Bolshevik plot. We've been stabbed in the back in 1918 at the end of the First World War. We need to have to overcome this is an existential battle for future survival. It's a terrible task that has befallen our generation. But we have to do this, we have to overcome this, or else we have no future. We will be crushed. It's absolutely cut and dry. And one of the things about Hitler is that he is a very kind of black and white. Them or us, either or kind of person. It's, it's always one thing or the other. It's a thousand year Reich or his Armageddon. There is no, there's no middle ground, there's no gray area. It's just one or the other. And that's how, that's his worldview. And the reason he came to the fore was because of the crystal clear clarity of his message, which is we've been stabbed in the back. There is a global plot. We have to overcome this. We are naturally the master race. We have to reassert ourselves. We have to get rid of global Jewry, we have to get rid of global Bolshevism and we have to prevail or else. But if we do prevail, what an amazing world it's going to be. So he starts with this. Every speech he does always starts the same way. Always starts from a kind of negative and always ends with an incredible positive rabble rousing crescendo of if you're in the front row, spittle, halitosis and gesticulation. I mean you've seen pictures of him. I mean, I don't know if you've ever seen pictures of. Right. You know, he's almost, he wants to grab the air and clutch it to him. You know, you can see the kind of the venom coming out of his mouth just in a single still photograph. I mean it's amazing. There's apps you can get now where you can translate his speeches and it just sounds, you know, by today's standards you would just think what a load of absolute wibble. I mean just total nonsense. But you have to kind of put yourself back in the shoes of people listening to him in 1922 or 23 or indeed 1933, and see how kind of captivating that is to a certain part of the population. So yeah, so to go back to your original point, Lebensraum is absolutely part of it. So what you do is you crush the Bolsheviks, you crush world Jewry, then you expand. You know, Britain has had this incredible empire, global empire, you know, Germany needs that too. Germany's stuck in Europe, it doesn't have access to the world's oceans. So we're not going to be a maritime empire, we're going to be a land mass empire. The whole of landmass of Europe and into Asia. That's going to be us. And we're going to take that land, we're going to take the breadbasket of Ukraine. We're going to use that for our own ends. We're going to spread our. We're going to make ourselves rich, but we're also going to spread our peoples. We're going to spread the Aryan northern master race throughout Europe and into the traditional Slavic areas. And we will prevail and come out on top. And so you have to understand that everything about Operation Barbarossa, the planned invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, is totally wrapped up in the Nazi ideology. And people, you know, I've read it, that historians sort of go, if only Hitler had realized that, you know, the Ukrainians have been quite happy to kind of fight on his side. You know, if only he'd actually brought some of these Jewish scientists and kind of into the Nazi fold, then Germany might have prevailed in World War II. And you kind of think, well, you're missing the entire point. Point that's just never going to happen. Because this is an ideological war. Yeah.

This is not a pragmatic, rational leader. No, I mean, part of his effectiveness, we should say, is probably this singular belief in this ideology. There's pros and cons for an effective military machine. Probably having that singular focus is effective.

Yes. Except that when you're making military decisions, if those decisions are always being bracketed by an ideology which is fundamentally flawed from a pragmatic point of view, as much as a kind of ethical, you know, a kind of reasonable point of view, you're kind of opening yourselves up for trouble. I mean, this is a problem he has with Barbarossa. You know, they realized very early on in 1941 when their, when they're war gaming this whole operation, that it's not going to work. And so, you know, there's very. People like General Paulus, who's on the general staff at the time, you know, he's given a kind of, you know, he's in charge of kind of war gaming this. And he goes, this isn't going to work. And Keitel, who is the chief of the okw, goes, no, no, no, no, no, no. Go back and make it work. He goes, okay. So he comes back with a plan that does work, but it's bogus. I mean, it's just. It doesn't work because they don't have enough. They don't have enough motorization. You know, they go into barbarossa With 2,000 different types of vehicle. You know, every single one of those vehicles has to have, you know, different distributor caps and different leads and plugs and all sorts of different parts. You know, there's the interoperability of the. Of the German mechanized arm is super inefficient. And so you've got huge problems because they kind of think, well, you know, we took France in 1940, and that's kind of one of the most modern countries in the world with, you know, one of the greatest armies and armed forces in the world. And we did that in six weeks. So, you know, Soviet Union, look, they struggled against Finland, for goodness sake. I mean, how hard can it be, you know? But what you're failing to understand is that attacking the Soviet Union is over a geographical landmass 10 times the size of France just on the frontage. And you haven't really got much more mechanization than you had in May 1940 when they attacked the Low Countries in France. And you've actually got less Luftwaffe aircraft to support you, and you just do not have the operational mechanics to make it work successfully. I mean, it is largely down to incompetence of the Red army and the Soviet leadership in the summer of 1941 that they get as far as they do. I mean, you know, Barbarossa should never have come close to being a victory.

Let's talk through it. So Operation Barbarossa that you're mentioning, and we'll go back.

Yes, we jumped straight into 41.

Straight into it.

I've eaten. Eaten off two years of war.

So this is June 1941, Operation Barbarossa, when Hitler invades the Soviet Union with, I think, the largest invading force in history up to that point, collectively.

Yeah.

And there's three prongs. Army Group North, Army Group Center, Army Group South. North is going to Leningrad, center is going. It's the strongest group going directly towards Moscow. And south is going and targeting Ukraine and the caucus. So can you linger on that, on the details of this plan? What was the thinking? What was the strategy? What was the tactics? What was the logistics? There's so many things to say, but one of them is to say that you often emphasize the importance of three ways to analyze military conflict of the strategic the operational and tactical. And operational is often not given enough time, attention. And it's the logistics that make the war machine really work successfully or fail.

Yeah, that's absolutely, absolutely spot on. And it's interesting because the vast majority of general histories of World War II tend to focus on the strategic and the tactical. So what do I mean by that? Well, the strategic, just for those who don't know, that's your overall war aims. You know, get to Moscow, whatever it might be, conquer the world, that's your strategy. The tactical side of things is that's the coal face of war. That's the attritional bit, that's the following. His Spitfire, the tank crew, the soldier in his foxhole. It's the actual kinetic fighting bit. The operational bit is the level of war that links the strategic to the tactical. So it is absolutely factories, it's economics, it's shipping, it's supply chains, it's how you manage your war. And one of the things where I think people have been guilty in the past, historians have been guilty in the past, is by judging warfare all on the same level. But obviously, every competent nation has a different approach to war because of the nation they are, the size they are, their geographical location. So Britain, for example, is an island nation. Its priority is the Royal Navy, which is why the Royal Navy is known as the Senior service. And, you know, in 1939, it's easy to forget it now when you see how depleted Britain is today. But 1939, it has comfortably the world's largest navy, something like 194 destroyers. I think it's 15 battleships, seven aircraft carriers, and another kind of six on the way. America, it's got Pacific Ocean, it's got the Atlantic Ocean, it's got two seaboards. It has the second largest navy in the world, but a tiny army. I mean, the army of the US army in September 1939 is the 19th largest in the world, sandwiched between Portugal and Uruguay. It's just incredible. It's like 189,000 strong, which might seem reasonably large by today's standards, but is absolutely tiny by 1939 standards, you know, whereas, you know, Germany's got an army of, you know, three and a half million in 1939. So, you know, these are big, big, big differences. But, but America's coming at it from a different perspective, Britain's coming apart from a different perspective. You know, Britain's, Britain's empire is all about, you know, it's. It's a shipping, it's a. It's a. It's a seaborne empire. Whereas there's also another point which, which is having large armies. It's actually inherently impractical and inefficient because the larger army, the more people you've got to feed, the more kind of barracks you've got to have, the more space you've got to have for training. The more people you're taking out of your workforce to produce tanks and shells and all the rest of it because they're tramping around with rifles, you know, so there's an argument saying. Saying actually, it's really not. Not very good way of doing things. So, you know, very much the. The British way and, and subsequently the United States way and way of Britain's dominions and empire is to use kind of steel, not our flesh, as a principle. The idea is that you use technology, mechanization, modernity, global reach to do a lot of your hard yards. That's the sort of basic principle behind the strategic air campaign. When we talk about the strategic air campaign, we're talking about strategic air forces which are operating in isolation from other armed forces. So a tactical air force, for example, is an air force which is offering close air support for ground operations. A strategic air force has got nothing to do with ground operations. It's just operating on its own. So that's your bomber force or whatever, that's your B17s and B24s of the 8th Air Force Flying out of East England, bombing the Ruhr industrial complex of Germany or whatever it might be. So it's important to understand that when you compare, you have to have in the back of your mind that Britain compared to Germany, for example, is coming at it from a completely different perspective. And I would say one of the failures of Hitler is that he always views everybody through his own very narrow worldview, which is not particularly helpful. You know, you want to get inside the head of your enemy, and, you know, he's sort of guilty of not doing that. So when you're talking about Operation Barbarossa, to go back to your original question next, you're dealing with an operation on such a vast scale that that operational level of war is absolutely vital to its chances of success or failure. It doesn't matter how good your individual commanders are at the front, if you haven't the backup, it's not going to work. And the problem that the Germans have is, yes, they've got their kind of, you know, 3 million men on the front, and they've got their kind of, you know, 3,000 aircraft and all the rest of it. But actually what you need to do is break it down. And who is doing the hard yards of that. And way the German war machine works is that the machine bit is only the spearhead. So people always talk about the Nazi war machine. In a way, it's a kind of misnomer because you're sort of suggesting that it's highly mechanized and industrialized and all the rest of it. And nothing could be further from the truth. The spearhead is, but the rest of it is not. And this is the kind of fatal flaw of the German armed forces in the whole of World War II, really. But even in this early stage, because in Barbarossa you're talking about 17 Panzer divisions out of 100 odd that are involved in the initial attack. Well, 17. And that Panzer division is not a division full of panzers tanks. It is a combined arms motorized outfit. So Scouts on BMWs with sidecars, armored cars, infantry grenadiers, Panzer grenadiers which are infantry in half tracks and trucks. Mechanized. It is motorized artillery. It is motorized anti aircraft artillery. It is motorized anti tank artillery. And of course it is tanks as well. Well, panzers, but those are a really, really small proportion of, you know, you're talking less than 20% of your, of your attacking force are those spearhead forces. And inevitably they are going to be attrited as they go. You know, you are going to take casualties. And not only that, you're not going to just take battlefield casualties, you're also going to have mechanical casualties because of the huge spaces involved. You just simply can't function. So what you see is in the initial phases of, of Operation Barbarossa, they surge forward. Red Army's got absolutely no answers to anything. Stalin weirdly hasn't heeded all the warnings that this, this attack is brewing. And there have been plenty, incidentally at smolensk falls on the 15th of July, you know, in less than four weeks. It's just incredible. Three and a half weeks smolensk has gone. You know, they've done overwhelmed the rest of what had been Poland. They surged into what is now Belarus, taken Smilensky all. You know, this is Army Group Center, Army Group north has thrust up into the, into the Bu Baltic. It's all going swimmingly well. But then the next several months they barely go 100 miles and that's because they're running out of steam. And the 16th Panzer Division, for example, by the time it's taken Smolensk, involved in taking Smolensk on the 15th of July 1941. The following day it's got 16 tanks left, 16 out of, should have 180. So it's just being attributed. They can't sustain it. And they can't sustain it because as the Russians fall back, as the Soviet Red army falls back, they do their own scorched earth policy. They also discover that the railway line is kind of a different loading gauge. So they've got to change it so it's slightly. The Russian loading gauge is slightly wider. So every single mile, every yard, every foot, every meter that they're capturing of Russian railway has to be moved a couple of inches to the left to make it fit the German Kriegslock in the standard train of locomotive of the Reichsbahn. Just imagine what that's like. And also, Soviet trains are bigger, so they can take more water, which means the water stops in between are fewer and far between. So they have to. The Germans, when they come in their trains, their Kriegslog are smaller, so they have to be rewatered more often and recalled more often. So they have to. I mean, it's absolutely boggling just how complicated it is and how badly planned it is because they haven't reckoned on this. They're having to kind of think on their feet.

I love the logistical details of all this because, yes, that's a huge component of this, especially when you're covering that much territory. But there is a notion that if Hitler didn't stop Army Group center, it could have pushed all the way to Moscow. It was. It was only maybe 100 miles away from Moscow. Is that, Is that. Is that a possibility? Because it had so much success in the early days pushing forward. Do you think it's possible that if Hitler, as we mentioned, from a military blunder perspective, didn't make that blunder, that they could have defeated the Soviet Union right there and then?

Well, my own view is that they should never have got close. Red army has plenty of men to be able to see off anything that the Germans can do. The capture of Kyiv, for example, in September 1941 was a catastrophe for the Soviet Union and should never have happened. I mean, Zhukov is saying to Stalin, we got to pull back across the Dnieper. Stalin's going, no, you can't possibly do that. You can't abandon Kyiv. It's like third city in Soviet Union. No way. No, absolutely not. And he goes, we are just going to be overwhelmed. You know, we can't hold this. And he says, you know, either back me or far me. Back me or sack me. So Stalin sacks him. Obviously, as we know, Zhukov gets rehabilitated in pretty quick order. And Stalin does learn very quickly thereafter to learn the lessons. But the opening phase of Barbarossa has been a catastrophe. And so as a consequence of Stalin refusing to let his men retreat back across the Dnieper, which is a substantial barrier and would be very Difficult for the Germans to overwhelm. Had they not. Had they moved back in time, you know, that's another kind of 700,000 men put in the bag. I mean, that's just staggering numbers. But yeah, I mean, there's so many things wrong with the Barbarossa plan, you know, too much over. It's just such a vast area. I mean, you're talking about kind of, you know, 2, 500 miles or something, you know, of frontage. You know, maybe if you kind of put your, your, your panzer groups, which are these spearheads, and you put them all in one big thrust and just go hell for lever straight across on a kind of, you know, much more narrow front of, let's say, kind of 400 miles rather than 1200, then they might have got, you know, they might have just sort of burnt away straight through to Moscow.

They really caught the Red army unprepared.

Yep.

Is there something to be said about the, the strategic genius of that, or was it just luck?

No, I don't think so. I mean, I think what's happened is you've had the, you've had the, the Soviet purges of the, of the second half of the 1930s where they've, you know, they have executed or imprisoned 22 and a half thousand officers, of which, you know, three out of five marshals, you know, God knows how many army commanders, etc. Etc. So, so, you know, you've completely decapitated the Red army in terms of its command structure.

So before that, would it be fair to say it was one of, if not the greatest army in the world?

Well, it was a lot of experience. There's a lot of experience there.

But also technology, material.

Yeah.

The size of the army and the number of people that are mobilized.

Yeah. And they're the first people to kind of adapt, you know, create airborne troops, for example. So, yes, I think there is an argument to say that, but the decapitation is, is. Is absolutely brutal. If you've decapitated an army, you've then got to put new guys in charge. And someone who, who looks on paper like a half decent peacetime commander might not be a very good wartime commander. They're different disciplines and different skills. And what comes to. You don't know that until you're tested. It's very hard to kind of judge. And of course, you know, Stalin is existing in a sort of, you know, a vacuum of paranoia and suspicion all the time, which is unhelpful when you're trying to develop a strong armed forces. So they Go into Finland in back end of 1939 and they get there, you know, they get really badly hammered. They do take about, you know, to get the Karelia peninsula and they do take some ground but at huge cost. I mean the casualties are five times as bad as those of the Finns and it's a humiliation. So Hitler sees that and thinks, okay, they're not up to much cop. Then Hitler loses the Battle of Britain and he thinks I can't afford to fight a war on two fronts. That's one of the reasons why Germany loses The war in 1914-18 is fighting on the Eastern Front but also fighting on, you know, the Western Front at the same time. We've got to avoid that. But I've got to get rid of Britain and Britain hasn't come out of the fight. Britain is still fighting in the back end of 1940 having won the Battle of Britain. And so maybe I'll go into the Soviet Union now while the Red army is still weak. We're not 100% ready ourselves but let's hurry the whole thing forward because originally he'd been thinking of planning an operation in 1943 or 1944. So the idea is you take Poland out, you take out France and the Low Countries, you conquer most of Western Europe, you knock out Britain. So therefore you don't have to worry so much about the United States because they're over the other side of the Atlantic. That then gives and buys him the time to kind of rebuild up his strength for the all out thrust on the Soviet Union. The failure to subdue Britain in 1940 changes all those plans and makes him think, actually I'm going to go in early. And he's also been kind of, you know, he's hoisted by Z Petard because he starts to believe his own genius. You know, everyone told him that, you know, he wouldn't be able to, you know, he wouldn't be able to beat France and the Low Countries. Everyone told him that, you know, it wouldn't work out. When he went into Poland everyone was really nervous about it. You know, well go hang you, you cautious, this awful aristocratic Prussian general say you know, I'm the best at this, I've told you, I've shown you I'm the genius, I can do it. He starts to believe his own hype and of course this is a problem. You know, he's surrounded by sycophants and people who are constantly telling him that he's this incredible genius. So he starts to believe it and he thinks everything is possible. And he's very much into this idea of the will of the German people. You know, this is our destiny. And Ivor will, as I say earlier on, you know, it's the Thousand Year Reich of Armageddon. But momentum is with us and we need to strike it. And only by, by gambling, only by being bold will the Germans prevail and all this kind of nonsense. And so that's why he goes into Soviet Union in June 1941 rather than a couple of or even three years later.

Yeah, he really hated the Prussian generals, huh?

Yeah, he hated them.

Is there a case to be made that there he was indeed at times a military genius?

No, I don't think so. Because none of the plan, I mean even the plan for the invasion of France and the Low Countries isn't his. The concept is von Manstein's and the execution is Guderian's. Heinz Guderian. So heis Guderian is the kind of, he's the pioneer of the panzer force, the panzer frost. This idea of the ultra mechanized combined arms panzer arm spearhead doing this kind of lightning fast thrust. It's not Hitler's idea. He adopts it and takes it as his own because he's a fury, he can do what he likes, but it isn't his. So it's not. And up until that point, until that comes into being, till that plan is put forward to Franz Halder, who is the chief of staff of the German army at that time, Halder's just thinking, how do we get out of this mess? This is just a nightmare. Because they know that France has got a larger army, they know that France has got more tanks, they know that France has got double the number of artillery pieces, it's got parity in terms of air forces. Then you add Holland, then you add Belgium, then you add Great Britain. And that looks like a very, very tough nut to crack. I mean the reason why France is subdued in 1940 is 50% brilliance of the Germans and their operational art in that particular instance. And 50% French failure really and incompetence.

I mean there is a kind of genius to be able to see and take advantage and set up the world stage in such a way that you have the appeasement from France and Britain. Keep the United States out of it. Just set up the world stage where you could just plow through everybody with no, with very little resistance. I mean there is a kind of.

Well, yes, geopolitical genius if it works, but it doesn't, you know, that's That's a problem. I mean, you know, I mean, he goes into Poland on the assumption that Britain and France will not declare war. You know, he, he is not prepared for Britain and France declaring war on Germany.

Right.

He thinks they won't.

That's right. So miscalculation, blunder. But then France does. Right, and then that doesn't, you know, France does not successfully do anything with this incredible army that it has, it has a size.

But one of the problems that France has is that it's very, very top heavy. It's very cumbersome in the way it operates. There's no question that it's got some brilliant young commanders, but at the top, the commander's very old. Most of them are First World War veterans. Weygan, Gamelin, General Georges, these people, they're all well into their 60s. General George is the youngest army commander and he's 60. You know, it's too old to be an army commander. You need to be in your kind of late 40s, early 50s. And they're too just consumed by conservatism and the old ways. And what they assume is that any future war will be much like the First World War. It'll be attritional, long and drawn out, but static. But actually they're right on two parts of it. It is, as it turns out, it is going to be long and drawn out and attritional, but it's going to be mobile rather than static. And that's a big miscalculation.

Here's my question. I think you're being too nice on France here. So when Germany invaded Poland, correct me if I'm wrong, but it feels like France could have just went straight to Berlin.

Yeah, they absolutely could have.

I know you said it's very top heavy and you're saying all of these things, but they literally did basically nothing.

Yeah, they were pulling so like that.

And I think a part of that, and I think you described this well, maybe you can speak to that is the insanity that is Hitler creating this psychological, with the propaganda, creating this feeling that there's this Nazi force that's unstoppable. So France just didn't want to like step into that. Maybe they were like legitimately, I hesitate to say these words, but scared of.

War 100 they are that, you know, because France has been totally traumatized by the First World War. It's fought on their land, it's fought in their industrial heartland. You know, they lose three times the amount of people killed that, that Britain does. Britain's traumatized by it. But, but, but not to the same degree that France is front. You know, there is just no stomach to do that again. And so that makes them risk averse. And by being risk averse you're actually taking a far greater risk. That's the irony of it. And the truth is also there isn't the political will. And a successful military can only be successful if there is a political will at the top. And the problem with France in the 1930s is it's very politically divided. It's a time of multiple governments, multiple prime ministers, coalition governments, really very extreme coalition governments from the sort of drawn from the left and the right as well as the center. And you know, this is not a coalition of two parties. This is a coalition of multiple parties. No one can ever agree anything. I mean, that's the problem. It's amazing that the Maginot Line has even agreed, you know, this incredibly strong defensive position down the western side of France of border with Germany, which is kind of largely impregnable. But the problem is there's the bit that's not impregnable which is the hinge where the Maginot Line ends and it sort of basically starts turning kind of towards in a kind of north, northerly direction and the border with Belgium. And you know, what they should have done is built kind of border defenses all along the northern coast of Belgium because Belgium refused to kind of allow any allied troops into, into its territory. It was neutral and France should have said okay, fine, well then we'll defend our, you know, we're not going to come to your rescue if you get invaded. That's your, that's your work. Well that, that's, that's the payoff and consequence of that. We are going to stop parlaying that and we're not going to be drawn into the neutral territory should Germany invade from the west. But they don't do that because of the psychological damage of having fought a war in exactly that area a generation earlier. And that's the problem. So when the, you know, there is a Germany is so weakened by the invasion of Poland, there is literally nothing left. You know, the back door from into western Germany is completely open. And so they do what they call the SAR offensive. But it's not, it's a kind reconnaissance in force where they kind of go across the border, kind of pick their noses for a few days and then kind of trundle back again. And it's just, it's embarrassing. And that is what you're seeing. There is a Nation which is just not ready for this, which is scared, which is politically divided, which is then having a knock on effect on the decision making process and which is just consumed by military complacency. And that's the big problem. There is this, you know, the commanders at the very top of the French regime are complacent. They haven't bought into kind of modern ways. They haven't looked at how contemporary technology could help them. I mean, it is absurd, for example, that there isn't a single radio in the Chateau de Vincennes, which is, you know, it's the headquarters of the commander in chief of the by French armed forces, which is General Marshal Maurice Gamelin. I mean, it's just unbelievable. But that is the case and there's no getting away from that. And it is all the more ironic when you consider that France is actually the most automotive society in Europe. It's the second most automotive society in the world after the United States by some margin, it has to be said as well. It has a fantastic transportation system. Railway network is superb. There are eight people, people for every motorized vehicle in France, which is way above Germany, which is in 1939. That figure is 47, for example, it's 106 in Italy.

So France is very mechanized, like very mechanized.

So come on guys, pull your finger out, get it together. And they just don't. They're incredibly slow and cumbersome. And what they think is, when what will happen is the Germans won't think of going, you know, they won't do a pincer movement because you can't possibly take motorized forces through the Ardennes. That just is not possible. Which is the hinge area between the end of the Maginot, the northern part of the Maginot line, which runs down the western, sorry, the eastern border of France and the northern bit. And so what we'll do with that hinge around the town of Sedan, we'll move into Belgium. We'll meet the Germans before they get anywhere near France. We'll hold them. And while we're holding them, we will bring up our reserves and then we'll counter attack and crush them. That's the idea behind it. But the problem is they don't have a means of moving fast. And their communication systems are dreadful, absolutely dreadful. They're dependent on conventional telephone lines, which, you know, dive bombers and whatever are just kind of absolutely wrecking. Suddenly the streets are clogged with refugees and people can't move. So they're. Then, you know, telephone lines are down. There's no radios, so that you're then dependent on sending dispatch riders on little motorbikes, you know. General Maurice Gamelin sends out a dispatch rider at 6 o' clock in the morning. By 12 o' clock he hasn't come back. So you then send another one. Finally the answer comes back at kind of 9 o' clock at night, by which time the Germans advance another 15 miles. And the original message that you sent at 6 o' clock that morning is completely redundant and has passed its sell by date. And that's happening every step of the way. So you've got overall command headquarters, then you've got Army Group, then you've got army, then you've got Corps, then you've got Division. So the consequence of all that is that French just can't move. They're just stuck. They're rabbits in headlights. And the Germans are able to remove them, destroy them in isolation. Meanwhile, they're able to use their excellent communications to very, very good effect. And you were talking about the genius of, of war. It's not Hitler that's a genius. If anyone's a genius, it's Goebbels, the propaganda chief. And it is their ability to harness that. They are the kings of messaging. You know, they don't have, they don't have, have X, they don't have social media, but they do have new technology. And that new technology, that new approach is flooding the airwaves with their singular message, which is always the same and has been ever since the Nazis come into power. And it is using radios. And I think radios are really, really key to the whole story because there is no denser radio network anywhere in the world, including the United States and Germany in 1939. So while it's really behind the times in terms of mechanization, it is, is absolutely on top of its game in terms of comms. So 70% of households in Germany have radios by 1939, which is an unprecedented number that, that is only beaten by United States and only just. So it is, it is greater than any other other nation in Europe. And in terms of flooding the airwaves, it is the densest because even for Those who, the 30% who don't have radios, that's not a problem because we'll put them in the stairwells of apartment blocks, we'll put them in squares, we'll put them in cafes and the same stuff. The state, the, the, the Nazi state controls the radio airwaves as it does the movies, as it does newspapers. All aspects of the media are controlled by, by Goebbels, the propaganda ministry. And they are putting out the same message over and over again. It's not, it's not all Hitler's ranting. It's entertainment, light entertainment, some humorous shows. It is also Wagner, of course, and Richard Strauss. It's, it's a mixture and, but the subliminal message is the same. We're the best. We're the top dogs. Jewish Bolshevik plot is awful. That needs to be, you know, that's the existential threat to us. We have to overcome that. We're the top dogs militarily. We're the best. We should feel really good about ourselves. We're going to absolutely win and be the greatest nation in the world ever. And Hitler's a genius. And that is just repeated over and over and over and over again. And the, you know, for all the modernity of the world in which we live in today, most people believe what they're told repeatedly. Yeah, they still do. If you just repeat, repeat, repeat over and over again, people will believe it. You know, if you're a, if you're a die hard Trump supporter, you want to believe that you'll believe everything he says. If you are a die hard Bernie Sanders, man, you know, you're from the left, you'll believe everything he says because it's reinforcing what you already want to, what you already want to believe.

But the scary thing is, you know, radio is the technology of the day. The technology of the day today, which is a terrifying one for me, is I would say AI on social media. So bots, you could have basically bot farms, which I assume is used by Ukraine, by Russia, by us. I would love to read the history written about this era, about the information wars. Who has the biggest bot farms? Who has the biggest propaganda machines? And when I say bot, I mean both automated AI bots and humans operating large number of smartphones with SIM cards that are just able to boost messages enough to where they become viral. And then real humans with real opinions get excited also. It's like this vicious cycle. So if you support your nation, all you need is a little boost. And then everybody gets real excited. And then now you're chanting and now you're in this mass hysteria. And now it's the 1984 Two Minutes of Hate. And the message is clear. I mean, that's what propaganda does, is it really clarifies the mind.

That is exactly what Hitler and the Nazis and Goebbels are doing in the 1930s. Well, they're doing it in the 1920s as well, but more effectively once they come into power, of course. And Hitler is so fortunate that he comes, he takes over the chancellorship in January 1933 at a time where the economy is just starting to turn and he's able to make the most of that. And if you're Germans and you've been through hyperinflation in the early 1920s, you've been through the humiliation of Versailles Treaty, which was this terrible error in retrospect, and you've been through. Then having got through that, you've emerged into a kind of democratic Weimar Republic which is based on manufacturing. Germany's a traditional genius at engineering and manufacturing and production of high quality items. They're merging through that. Then you have the Wall street crash and the loans that are coming in from America, which is propping up the entire German economy, suddenly get cut off. And you've suddenly got the Depression again and massive unemployment. And suddenly Hitler comes in and everyone's got jobs and they're rebuilding and they're growing their military. And the message that's coming out is, we're the greatest, we're the best, we're fantastic. I was telling you earlier on about speeches starting with the dark, starting dark and ending in hope and light and the sunlit uplands. You know, that's what you're getting. You're suddenly getting this vision of hope. This is of, you know, my God, actually, this is really working, you know. Okay, so, you know, I'm not sure that I particularly buy into the kind of anti Semitic thing, but, you know, we'll sweep that under the carpet because overall, I've now got a job, I've got money, I've got my new radio, you know, and then this is a genius about the radios, for example. So they have the, they have the, the German receiver to start off with the Deutsche Fanger, and then they have the Deutsche Kleinempfanger, which is the German little receiver, little radio. These are genius. This is as outrageous as the arrival of the ipod. I mean, remember that, you know, suddenly you don't have to have a Sony Walkman anymore. You can have something really, really small and military and listen to thousands and thousands and thousands of songs all at once. What an amazing thing. And the Deutsche Kleinenfanger is 9 inches by 4 inches by 4 inches. It's made of Bakelite and everyone can have one because it's super cheap. It's just incredible. And no one else said that, because up until that point, radios, generally speaking, are aspirational. You know, they've got sort of walnut lacquer at the front. And you know, you have them if you're middle class and you show them off to your neighbors to show how kind of, you know, affluent and well to do you are, but suddenly everyone can have one. And if everyone can have one, then everyone can receive the same message. And you can, and you can also. And this is the whole point about the Hitler Youth as well. You know, the young guys, that's where they're, they're most impressionistic, they're, they're least risk averse, so they're most gung ho, they're, they're most full of excitement for the possibilities of life. And they're also, their minds are the most opened to suggestion. So you get the youth, you hang on, you get them. And so a whole generation of young men are brought up thinking about the genius of Hitler and how he's delivering us this much better nation and returning our over overhauling the humiliations of the First World War. We're overcoming the bat stab in the back that happened in 1918, et cetera, et cetera. And as a young 16, 17 year old German, you're thinking, yeah, I want a piece of that. And hey, guess what? They've got really cool uniforms and come and join the SS and get the fro line. What's not to like? You can see why it's so clever. And what's so interesting is propaganda today is still using those, those tenets that Goebbels was using back in the 1930s. And this is why I would say that history doesn't repeat itself. Of course it doesn't. It can't possibly repeat itself because we're always living in a constantly evolving time, but patterns of human behavior do. And what you always get after economic crisis is political upheaval. Always, always, always. Because some people are in a worse off position than they were financially before. They're thinking, oh well, the current system doesn't work. What's the alternative? So in the case of, of now, we in the west, first of all, we face the crisis of 2008, financial crisis of 2008. Then we've had the kind of double whammy of COVID And that has been incredibly unsettling. And so we're now in a situation of political turmoil. And whether you're pro Trump or anti Trump, what he's offering is something completely different. And he's saying the old ways don't work. I'm just going to say what I think. I'm going to come out I'm not going to bother with all the diplomacy and kind of, you know, mealy mouth words that politicians always use, you know, which, where you can't trust anyone. I'm just going to tell you as it is. And obviously people respond to that. You know, you can understand why that has a, has an appeal. And if the country already feels broken and here's someone who is going to be a disruptor and going to change the way you go about things, you can see why a reasonably large proportion of the population is going to go, I'll have a piece of that, thank you very much.

And especially when the country is in the economic crisis like Germany was. I think you've written that the Treaty of Versailles created Hitler and the Wall street crash and the Great Depression brought him to power.

Yes.

And of course, the propaganda machine that you describe is the thing that got everybody else in Germany on board.

Yeah, it's amazing how he, because he comes in with 33% of the vote. He had 37% of the vote of the vote in July 1932. So again, this is another period of, of turmoil, just like it is in France where you're having constant different kind of coalitions and, you know, different chancellors, leaders of Germany.

So it's very possible he, he, he wouldn't have come to power.

Well, he said, he said, I will only, you know, we will only take our seats if, if, if I can be Chancellor. Otherwise, forget it. I'm not coming into any coalition. So then the government falls again in January 1933. They have the election. The Nazi vote is down from where it was the previous summer. But this time they go, okay, Petler can be Chancellor, but we'll manipulate him. How wrong they were. He's manipulating everyone. And then Hindenburg, who is the president, dies the following summer and he's able to get rid of the presidency. There is no more president of Germany. There is just the Fuhrer, him. And he gets rid of. He has an AXI Enabling act, which is where all other political parties are disbanded and suddenly you've got a totalitarian state just like that.

I think there's a lesson there. There's many lessons there. But one of them is don't let an extremist into government and assume you can control them.

Yes. The arrogance of the existing politicians who just completely screwed it up.

I mean, there is a real power to an extremist. Like there's a person who sees the world in black and white, can really gain the attention and the support of the populace.

Yes.

Especially when there's a resentment about, like, Treaty of Versailles, when there's economic hardship and if there's effective modern technology that allows you to do propaganda and sell the message, there's something really compelling about the black and white message.

It is, because it's simple. And what Hitler does throughout the 1920s is he sticks to this. There is actually, when he comes out of prison. So there's the bit hall putsch in November 1923, he. He gets charged with treason, which he has been, because he's attempting a coup, and he gets sentenced to five years, which is pretty lenient for what he's done. And he then gets let out after nine months. The Nazi Party is banned at that point, but then comes back into being. And the year that follows, there is then a substantial debate about where the party should go go. And there are actually a large number of people who think that actually they should be looking at how the Soviets are doing things and taking some of the things that they consider to be positive out of the communist state and applying those to the Nazis. And Hitler goes, no, no, no, no, no, no. We've just got to stick to this kind of Jewish Bolshevik thing. This is how we're going to do it. This is. We're going to do it. Goebbels, for example, who is. He's very open. He's very, very. Joseph Goebbels is. He's a not very successful journalist, but he does have a PhD in German literature. He's very disaffected because he was born with tallipes, which is, you know, more commonly known as a club foot. He's disabled, he can't fight in the First World War. He's very frustrated by that. He's in a deep despair about the state of Germany in the first part of the early 1920s. He's looking for a. A political messiah, quasi religious messiah, thinks it's Hitler. Then discovers that Hitler's not open to any ideas at all about any deviation, but then sees the light. Hitler recognizes that this guy is someone that he wants on his side, and so then goes to him, makes a real special effort. Come on, come to dinner. I think you're great. You know, all this kind of stuff wins it about over. And Goebbels has this complete vault, fast discards his earlier kind of, yeah, you know, Hitler's right, I was wrong. Hitler is the kind of messiah figure that I want to follow. I want to follow the hero leader. And they come on board and they absolutely work out. Hitler completely wins out of all dissenters within the. What had been the German Workers Party. Drop comes. The German National Socialist Party becomes the Nazis. He comes out, emerges as the absolute, undisputed Fuhrer of that leader of that. That party. And what he says goes, and everyone toes him behind it. And part of the genius of that, you know, Hitler does have some genius. I just don't think it's military, but he does have some genius. And no question about it is this simplicity of message, what he's doing. It's that kind of us and them thing that we were talking about earlier on. It's the kind of either or. It's kind of. It's my way or the highway. It's kind of this is the only way. This is how we get to the sunlit uplands. This is how we create this amazing master race of this unification of German peoples which dominates the world, which is the preeminent power in the world for the next thousand years. Or it's decay and despair and being crushed by our enemies. And our enemies are the Jews and the Bolsheviks, the Communists. And what he taps into as well is Front Gemeinschaft and Volksgemeinschaft. And these are. There's no direct English translation of Walsgemeinschaft or indeed Franz Gemeinschaft. But in its most basic form, it's community. It's people community or front veterans community. So the Front Gemeinschaft is. We are the guys. We're bonded because we were in the trenches. You know, we were in the First World War. We were the people who bravely stuck it out, saw our friends being slaughtered and blown to pieces. We did our duty as proud Germans, but we were let down by the elites and we were let down by the. By this Jewish Bolshevik plot. You know, we were stabbed in the back. The myth of the stab of stabbing in the back is very, very strong. So we're bound, we're bonded by our experience of the First World War and the fact that we did what we should and what we could and we would. We didn't fail in what we were doing. We were failed by our leaders and by the elites. So that's Frontgemeinschaft. Volksgemeinschaft is this sense of national unity. It's a cultural ethnic bonding of people who speak German who have a similar outlook on life. And again, that just reinforces the us.

And them, good and evil.

It reinforces the black and white worldview. And then you add that to this very simple message which Hitler is repeating over and over again. Communists are a big threat. Jews are A big threat. They're the enemy. You have to have an opposition in the them and us kind of process. And that's what he's doing. And people just buy into it. They go, yeah, we're together, we're Germans, we're a brotherhood. We've got our Volksgemeinschaft. And so he cleverly ties into that and taps into that. But they're an irrelevance by the late 1920s, by 1928, he's not gonna get a deal for Mein Kampf Part 2. He's impoverished. The party's impoverished. Numbers are down. They're kind of at best, and irrelevant.

We should say he wrote Mein Kampf at this time when he was in prison.

Well, he writes most of Mein Kampf in prison, in Landsberg prison. And then he writes the rest of. In what becomes known as the Kampfuzel, which is this little wooden hut in the Obersalzberg. And you can still see the remnants of that. And unfortunately there's still little candles there and stuff in the woods by neo Nazis and what have you. But that's where he wrote the rest of it. I mean, it was Jean Jacques Rousseau who says, man has his greatest thoughts when surrounded by nature. That was something that kind of Hitler took very much to heart. There was a mentor of his called Dietrich Ecker. Dietrich Eckart introduced him to the Obersalzberg and the beauty of the southwest southeast Bavarian Alps around Burkisgarden. And that was his favorite place on the planet. And that's where he eventually bought the Berghof with the royalties, it has to be said, from Mein Kampf, which went from being almost pulped, suddenly being a runaway bestseller, unfortunately.

Can you actually comment on that? It's a shitty manifesto as far as manifest manifestos goes. I think there's a lot of values to understand from a first person perspective. The words of a dictator, of a person like Hitler. But it just feels like that's just such a shitty.

Yeah, I mean, you know, it's banned in a number of countries. You don't need to, because no one's going to read it because it's unreadable. I mean, it's very untidy, it's very incoherent. It's got no. There's no narrative arc, to use the kind of writer's phrase. I mean, it's just. But it does give you a very clear. The overall impression you get at the end of it is the kind of Communists and the Jews are to blame for everything.

Yeah, but there's also the component of predicting basically World War II there. So it's not just the debate.

He's hungry for war. He thinks that this is the natural state, that we have to have this terrible conflict. And once the conflict's over, Germany will emerge victorious and then there will be the Thousand Year Reich. I mean, I'm finding myself in talking to you, I keep saying this kind of, you know, it's Armageddon, all the Thousand year. Right. It's because it comes up, it's unavoidable because that's how he's speaking the whole time. It's just the same message over and over and over and over again.

It's a pretty unique way of speaking, sort of allowing violence as a tool in this picture, that there's a hierarchy, that there's a superior race and inferior races and it's okay to destroy the inferior ones. Yeah, usually politicians don't speak that way. They just say, well, here's good and evil. We're the good guys. And yeah, maybe we'll destroy the evil a little bit. No, here is like, there's a complete certainty about a very large number of people. The Slavic people, they just need to be removed.

Well, they need to be made an irrelevance. You know, we have to take it. We have to take it. And if that kills millions of them, fine, then they can sort of squish their way over to Siberia. It doesn't matter whether or Kamchatka, whatever, where they go.

We just need to populate this land that belongs to the German people because they're the superior people.

There's no question that he glorifies violence and war. He's absolutely chomping at the bit. And in a way, I think he's a bit disappointed that in the 1930s, the conquests that he does undertake are also peaceful. March 1948 just goes straight into Austria. There's the Angelus. Not a shot is fired. 1946 goes into Rhineland, reconquers that, retakes that over that from the occupying Allies. Not a shot is fired. You know, he takes the sedation land. Not a shot. Barely a shot is fired, and then goes into, into the rest of Czechoslovaka in March 1930, 39, and again, barely a shot is fired. And, you know, it's a bit disappointing. You know, he wants to be, wants to, wants to be tested. He wants to kind of have the, have the, the wartime triumph. You can see him being frustrated about this in, in the munich crisis in 1938. He wants a Fight. He's absolutely spoiling for it. He's desperate to go in. He's all ready and gung ho. He's built his Luftwaffe, he's he, his, his Panzers. Now he's got his, his, his massive armed forces. You know, he wants to test them. He wants to, wants to get this show on the road and prove it. You know, he is a, he's an arch gambler.

Hitler, you make it seem so clear. But all the while to the rest of the world, to Chamberlain, to France, to Britain, to the rest of the world, he's saying he doesn't want that. He's making agreements. Everything you just mentioned, you just went through it so quickly. But those are agreements that were made that he's not going to do that. And he does it over and over. He violates the Treaty of Versailles, he violates every single treaty, but he still is doing the meeting. So maybe can you go through it the lead up to the war, 1939, September 1st. What are the different agreements? What is the signaling he's doing? What is he doing secretly in terms of building up the military force?

Yes. So he, you know, part of the Treaty of Versailles, you're not, you know, you're allowed a very, very limited armed forces. There's restrictions on naval expansion, there's restrictions on the size of the army, there's restrictions on the weapons you, you can use. There are, you're not allowed an air force B starts doing this all clandestinely. There are people in Kroppers got, for example, which is in the Ruhr, a sort of big armaments manufacturer. They are producing tanks elsewhere and parts elsewhere in say the Netherlands for example, and then shipping them back into Germany. They're doing Panzer training exercises actually in the Soviet Union at this time. There's all sorts of things going on. The Luftwaffe is being announced to the world in 1935, but it's obviously been in the process of developing long before that. The Messerschmitt 109 single engine fighter plane, for example, is created in 1934. So they're doing all these things against it. And the truth is he's just constantly pushing, what can I get away with here? And of course Britain, France, the rest of the world, rest of the Allies, they're all reeling from the Wall street crash and the Depression as well. Well, so have they got the stomach for this? Not really. And perhaps actually on reflection, the terms of Versailles treat are a bit harsh anyway, so maybe we don't need to worry about it. There's just no Political will. There's no political will to kind of fight against what Germany's doing. Then he gets away of it. So he suddenly starts realizing that actually he can push this quite a long way because no one's going to stand up to him, which is why he makes a decision in 1936 to go back into the. You know, into the Rhineland, which has been occupied by French Allied troops. At that point, he just walks in, just goes, do your worst. And no one's going to do anything because there isn't the stomach to do anything.

That was a big step in 1936, remilitarizing the Rhineland. I mean, that's a huge, huge step of like, oh, I don't have to follow anybody's rules, and they're going to do nothing.

And he's looking at his military and. And he's also looking at response. So one of the things they do is they, you know, it's really very clever. So they get over the head of the army, of the Air army de La. Which is the French Air Force, and they invite him over. And they. Erhard Milk, who is the second command of the Luftwaffe, invites him over. So come and see what we're. What we're up to. You know, we want to be. You're our European neighbors. We're all friends together, this kind of stuff. Come see what we've got. And he takes him to this airfield. There's a row of Meterschmidt 109s all lined up like sort of 50th of them. And the head of the army of the Air sort of looks at him and goes, cr. That's impressive. And Milk goes, well, let me go and take you to another airfield. And they go off the sort of the back route out of the airfield and a long, secure route in the Mercedes. Meanwhile, all the Messerschmitts take off from that airfield, going to land at the next airfield. Here's another. And they're all the same aircraft. And the commander in chief of the army of the Air goes back to France and goes, we're never going to be able to eat Germany. So you were alluding to this earlier on. You know, how much is this sort of this Justice Hutz part of this ability to kind of portray the mechanized Moloch? Yeah, it absolutely cows the enemy. So they're increasing the effectiveness of their armed forces purely by propaganda and by mind games and by talking the talk. And, you know, you look at. We might all think these military parades that the Nazis have look rather silly by today's. Standards. But you look what that looks like. If you're the rest of the world, you're in Britain and you're still reading from the Depression and you see the triumph of the will. You see some of that footage and you see these automatons in their steel helmets and you see the swastikas and you see hundreds of thousands of people all lined up and Zeke Isling and all the rest of it. You're going to think again before you go into war with people like that.

It's also hard to put yourself in the, in the mind of those leaders now, now that we have nuclear weapons. So nuclear weapons have created this kind of cloak of a kind of safety from mutually assured destruction that you think surely you will not do a million or 2 million soldier army invading another land just full on gigantic like hot war. But at that time that's a real possibility. You remember World War I, you remember all of that. So you know, okay, there's a mad guy with a mustache, he's making statements that this land belongs to Germany anyway because it's mostly German populated. So. And like you said, Treaty of Versailles wasn't really fair and you can start justifying all kinds of things.

And maybe they got a point about the dancing corridor. You know, they are mainly Germans, German speaking people there. And you know, it's disconnected from East Prussia, which is this thing. You know, I can, I, I sort of get it. You know, maybe they've got a point, you know, and is Poland really a kind of thriving democracy anyway? Not really. By 1930, late 1930s, it's not, it's to all intents and purposes a dictatorship in Poland at that time. I mean it, it's not right that you just go and take someone else's country. Of course you, you can't do that. But, but you can see why, why in Germany people are thinking they've got a point. You can also see why in France and Britain they're thinking, well, do we really care about the Poles? I mean, is it worth going to war over? But there's kind of bigger things at play by this point. That's the point.

Yeah. But before we get to Poland, there is this meeting. September 1938. So Chamberlain made three trips to meet with Hitler.

Yeah.

Which culminated in the Munich conference.

Yeah. On the 30th of September. Yeah.

War was Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini and Doladier, Prime Minister of France. They met to discuss the century Czechoslovakia without any of the government officials of Czechoslovakia participating. And Hitler promised to make no more territorial conquest In Chamberlain believe him.

He chose to believe him, I think, is the thing, is the point. So it's very interesting. So Chamberlain gets a very bad press. Oh, well, no, I'm not. No, it's not really. Oh, I just think there's too much retrospective view on this. And that's fine because the whole point of history is you can look back and you can judge decisions that were made at a certain point point through the prism of what subsequently happened, which of course the people that are making the decisions at the time can't because they're in that particular moment. So I don't think Chamberlain did trust Hitler, but he wanted to give him the benefit of the doubt. Britain was not obliged to Czechoslovakia at all. France was. France had signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1924, but Britain had not. So there was no obligation at all for Britain to do this. The only reason why Britain would go to war over Czechoslovakia is because of threat of narcissism and what the ramifications of not going to war with him. But the problem is is that Chamberlain is interesting because in 1935 he was. He was chance of his checker. And when they started to sort of think, okay, we really do need to rearm, he was very much in favor of. Of substantially expanding and rehabilitating the navy, so updating existing battleships and so on, and also developing the air force. There's not really much argument for having a large army because if you have a large army, you've got to maintain it. Britain is a small place. Where do you put them? You've also got to transport them. That's complicated. You've got to train them, you've got to put them barracks, you've got to feed them all this kind of stuff. There's a kind of sort of impracticality about having a large army. Whereas navies are great because you can keep them at sea and they can be on the water. Air force is slightly different. Air power is viewed in very much the same way that naval power is viewed that this is. We're an island nation. We have a global, global assets and air power gives us the flexibility that an army doesn't. So he is all for backing the expansion of the. Of the army, of the air force and the Navy in 1930. Then he subsequently becomes prime minister and sticks for his guns on that. It is he that enables the air force and the air ministry to develop the first fully coordinated air defense system anywhere in the world. There is not an air defense system in Poland, nor Norway, nor Denmark. Nor the Netherlands, nor Belgium, nor France. There is in Britain, Britain is the only one, and frankly, it pays off big time in the summer of 1940. So you have to give him credit for that. Britain, interestingly, is also the world's leading armaments exporter in the 1930s, which is amazing, really, when you think everyone complains about the fact that we weren't rearming enough. Actually, we were. When we had all the infrastructure there and we were expanding that infrastructure dramatically. I say we. I'm only saying that because I'm British. So they were doing that. But in 1938, Britain wasn't ready for war. Now, you can argue that Germany wasn't ready for war either, but Chamberlain was prime minister in a democracy, a parliamentary democracy, when 92% of the population were against going to war in 1938. There is not a single democratic leader in the world that would go against the wishes of 92% of the population. Now, you could say, well, he should have just argued it better and presented his case better and all the rest of it. But at that point there was no legal obligation to go to the defense of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was another of these new nations that have been created out of 1919 in the Versailles Treaty, who was to say, we in Britain are able to judge the rights and wrongs of that. How fantastic it would be to go to war with a nation a long way away for people whom we know very little, et cetera, et cetera. I'm paraphrasing his quote, but I'm not saying it was the right decision. I'm just saying I can see why in September 1938, he is prepared to give him the chance. Now, I do think he was a bit nice nave. And what he also does is really interesting thing. He goes over to Hitler's flat, completely ambushes him, goes to his flat on the afternoon of the 30th of September and says to Hitler, look, I've drawn up this agreement here, and this is to continue the naval agreement that we've already made. And by signing this, you are saying that Germany and Britain should never go to war with one another. It goes, yeah, whatever, you know, signs it, yeah. Chamberlain comes back, lands at hand and waves his. Waves his little piece of paper, you know, piece in our time and all the rest of it, which obviously comes back to bite him in a very big way. But it's interesting that when Hitler then subsequently goes and moves in, you know, France and Britain decide in rather the same way that there's been discussion about deciding that large Portions of Ukraine should just be handed over to Russia without consulting Ukraine a few weeks ago. It is incredible. I think that France and Britain and Italy with Germany are deciding that, yes, it's fine for Germany to go in and take the Sudetenland without really consulting the Czechs. Sort of similar kind of scenario really, and it's equally wrong. But when Germany does then go and take over the whole of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, that's the bottom line. That's the point where Chamberlain goes, okay, I've given him the benefit of the doubt. No more benefits of the doubt. That's it. That is, he's crossed the line. And so you reinforce your agreement with Poland. You do a formal agreement, you go, okay, we will uphold your sovereignty. If you are invaded, we will go to war with you. That is a ratcheting up of diplomacy and politics in a very, very big way. And that decision to make a treaty with the Poles is not heeded by Hitler, but it's heeded by literally every one of his commanders. And it's also heeded by Goering, who is his number two and who is obviously the commander in chief of the, of the Luftwaffe and is president of Prussia and you know, and all the rest of it. And you know, is the second most senior Nazi. And you know, he's going, this is a catastrophe. This is the last thing we want to be doing, is going to war against Britain and indeed France.

The Munich Conference is a pretty interesting moment, I would say, in all of human history because it got the leaders of these bigger than life nations and the most dramatic brewing conflict in human history. Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini, Dadier. It's interesting when these bigger than life leaders are in a room together, is there something that you know about their interactions?

Yeah, I think one of the things that's interesting is that Hitler's got home advice advantage because it's on his turf. And you know, to start off with the first meeting is at the Berghof, his beloved place in the Obersalzberg overlooking Berkersgarden in the Alps. So he's pretty confident because this is my manner, this is my turf. You know, I'm not going to be bossed around by these guys. But Chamberlain, for example, is going there thinking, I've been around the blocks, no one can teach me anything. I've been a politician for ages. You know, I'm not going to be kind of count out by this, this sort of, you know, Austrian upstart. So they're both coming at it with a kind of sort of slight kind of superiority, kind of complex. Interestingly, when you get to the actual meetings at the Bernabeu in Munich a couple of weeks later, Chamberlain is cheered by the crowds when his car comes in, when he goes to his hotel, when he's moving from his hotel to the Bernabeu, there are cars cheering him, waving Union Jacks, all this kind of, of stuff. Hitler does not like that at all. Not at all. Puts him on the back foot. And that's because the German people don't want war in the same way that the British people don't want war, nor do the German people. The difference is that Hitler is a dictator and an autocrat and has the devotion of the people. So he can do what he wants in a way that Chamberlain can't. Chamberlain's hands are tied because he is an elected prime minister, an elected leader, political leader, and he's not head of state. So there is no question that it is Hitler and Chamberlain that are the top dogs in this particular discussion. You know, Daladier takes a backseat. Even Mussolini, although he's there, he doesn't want war either. You know, he wants to be left alone to do his own thing without anyone getting in the way. But he doesn't want, he doesn't want to sort of, it's not in his interest to have a European war, so he's trying to avoid it. So it is really, really, you see that the kind of alpha males in the room are Chamberlain and Hitler. And it's really interesting because Hitler's got this sort of slightly garrulous voice and very kind of pale blue eyes and such distinct features, quite a long nose. And he always says this is why he has mustaches, to kind of disguise the big nose. As I was saying to you earlier on, before we started recording, he does have a sense of humor. It's not, maybe not one that you and I would kind of tap into, but, but he does have one. Whereas Chamberlain is just sort of, you know, he sounds like a sort of, you know, bit like an old man. You know, he's sort of silver haired and he looks like you're sort of archetypal kind of British gentleman who's rolled up umbrella and his, you know, in his homburg hat and all the rest of it. So they're both sort of caricatures in a funny sort of way. And yet the consequence of these discussions, you know, these, these great events happening, you know, you are, you're absolutely going to, going either which way. The Munich crisis comes out, you're taking A step closer to war. It's just whether the war is going to happen kind of next week or whether it's going to happen a year hence. But the Munich crisis obviously doesn't stem the inevitability of war at all. It just heightens it.

Do you think there are words that Chamberlain should have said, could have said, that put more pressure on Hitler, intimidate Hitler more?

Yeah, it's a really tricky one. It's such a difficult one because you're always looking at it through. You know, the enemy has a vote and you don't know what that vote is going to be and you don't know what it's going to look like. There's no question that Europe, the rest of Europe is, is, is cowed by the kind of impression of military might that the Germans have put out. They, they certainly fear they are stronger than they actually are. And then on the other hand, they're also going, yeah, but, you know, Germany doesn't have natural resources, doesn't have access to the world's oceans. You know, it's kind of, you know, it shouldn't be able to win a war. And so they're kind of contradicting themselves at the same time, you know, so one minute they're sort of going, oh, God, you don't want to take on all those Nazis and all those swastikas and those automaton stormtroopers. But on the other hand, they're then saying, but actually Germany doesn't have much in its kind of, you know, in its basket. You know, it's got actually quite a lot of weaknesses and we should be able to kind of prevail, blah, blah, blah. Well, just impose an economic blockade and then it'll be stuffed. And Britain is not ready to fight a war in, in 1948. But nor is Hitler, you know, nor is Germany. So, you know, one is sort of striking out the other. But it's very easy to say that in hindsight, but at the time, you know, with people kind of digging trenches in Hyde park in the central London and baroons going up over London and, you know, children being evacuated from the cities and 92% of the population not wanting to go to war, you can see why he takes a course. He does, does. I suppose that's, that's what I'm saying. I'm not saying it's necessarily the right decision, but I, I, I think it's an understandable decision.

But what about even just on the human level, if I go into a room with a British Gentleman versus going to a room with Trump. It feels like it's so much easier to read and manipulate the British gentleman because Trump is like Trump like characters. It seems like Hitler is similar, Churchill is similar. It's like this guy can do anything. There something terrifying about the unpredictability. Yeah, it feels like there's something very predictable about Chamberlain.

Yes, I think that's true. But also, one has to take a step back and think about what Britain represents. So therefore, what Chamberlain represents. In 1938, Britain has the largest empire the world has ever known. In 1938, you shouldn't forget that, you know, part of the world is pink, as the saying goes. You know, and that saying comes from the kind of atlas of the World where all British territories are kind of colored pink. And on top of that, it has lots of extra imperial territories as well. So, you know, if you look at, there's this incredible map of global shipping in 1937, and there's these little ant lines of ships going out, and one of the strongest ant lines is going down to Argentina and South America from Britain, so down past West Africa and down the southern Atlantic, and there it is. And that's because Britain owns most of Argentina. It owns. Owns huge, great farming estates and ranches. It owns the railway system. It owns many of the port facilities. So you don't even need an empire. You just need the. You know, you need the facilities that overseas trade and possessions can give you. And Britain not only has the largest navy, it also has the largest Merchant Navy, has 33% of the world's merchant shipping, and access to a further 50%, you know, Greek, Norwegian, and Canadian shipping that it can access. So if you've got access to more than in excess of 80% of the world shipping, that puts you in an incredibly strong position. And actually, all sorts of other things have been going on. While they might not have been creating a huge army or producing enough Spitfires that they might want to. Up until this point, what they have also been doing is stockpiling bauxite and copper and tungsten and huge reserves. And because Britain has this huge global reach and because it has its empire and its extra imperial assets, assets, it can strike bargains that no one else can strike. So it can go into various countries around the world and can go, okay, I want you to guarantee me for the next five years, every bit of your rubber supply, I will pay over the asking price to secure that. And it's doing that in the 1930s. So when war comes, it's got everything it possibly needs now, you always need more because it's suddenly turning into a kind of proper, global, long drawn out war. But, but that is a huge advantage. So it is with that mindset that Chamberlain is going into those talks and thinking, okay, well, I'm not going to get a war over the Czechoslovakian, who cares about them? But I am going to show Hitler that I mean business. Hitler's going, who's this stuffy guy with his white hair, I don't give a toss about him. And he's coming at it from a completely different perspective. And I think one of the things that's so interesting from a dramatic point of view and from a historian's point of view or even a novelist's point of view in context, the case of Robert Harris writing his book about these negotiations, which I don't know if you've read it, but it's really, it's terrifically good, is the fact you've got two men, two alpha males who are going to those negotiations from totally different perspectives and vantage points. And I think it's very easy for people today to forget how elevated Britain was in the late 1930s. The gold standard was tied to the pound, not the dollar. And so, so Britain was the number one nation in the world at that time, and it just was. And it's so diminished by comparison today that it's hard to imagine it. And I think one of the interesting things about the historiography, about the narrative of how we tell World War II is that so much of it has been dictated by the shift in power that took place subsequent to 1945 and when people were starting to write these sort of major narratives in the 1970s and 80s and into the 1990s is through a prism of a very, very different world. And so one of the reasons why you have this narrative that Britain was a bit rubbish and hanging on the shirt tails of the Americans and all the blood was spilt in Eastern Front and Germany had the best army in the world and was only defeated because Hitler was mad and blah, blah, blah, that kind of traditional natural narrative, that narrative emerges through the prism of what was going on in the 1970s and what was going on in the 1980s and the changing world, rather than looking at it through the prism of the late 1930s or early 1940s, still there.

Is this moment of decision. When do you think, what lesson do you take from that? When is the right time for appeasement, to negotiate, for diplomacy? And when is the right time for, for military strength, offensive Attacking for military conflict. Where's that line? Where's that?

Well, I kind of think it probably was when it was, I mean, Poland. Yeah. Honestly, I'm not sure it would have been the right decision to go to war in 1950, 38. I just, I, I think it would. I, I'm, I can't predict because you can't second guess how things are going to play out because you just don't know. But, but I, I, I'm not sure that Chamberlain made the wrong decision. I'm not saying he made the right decision. I'm just like, I'm not, I'm being a bit wishy washy about this.

You could have threatened it more. Imagine Churchill in those same meetings.

Yeah, but, but Churchill also appeases. I mean, he appeases Stalin all the time. I mean, you know, so the idea that Churchill's this big strong man and never appeases and you know, he's gung ho for war, Churchill's out of the government at that time. He recognizes you can't trust Hitler. He recognizes that Nazism is bad. But he, because he's out of the government, he doesn't have a window on exactly where Britain is at that particular time in a way that Chamberlain does, you know. So I suppose what I'm saying is Chamberlain is better placed to make those decisions than Churchill is. Which again doesn't mean that Chamberlain is right and Churchill is wrong. It's just that's a massive punt to go to war in 1938 when you still don't have, you know, you've got a handful of Spitfires, you've got a handful of Hurricanes, you haven't got enough. You know, your air defense system isn't properly sorted at this point. Your navy is strong, long. But what's that going to look like? I mean, if you do go to war, there's not going to be armies sweeping into Germany. It's just, it's going to be accelerated industrialization for a year. So even if you go to War in 1938 over Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia will not be saved. France and Britain will not be going invading Germany. That is absolutely not going to, to happen. So sort of what's the point? I mean, you know, if you're not going to do that, why didn't you accelerate your rearmament thereafter? Get your ducks in a row and then you can consider it. I mean, after all, you know, even in September 1939, they don't really do anything. I mean, we talked about the kind of the SAR offensive which isn't really an offensive at all. It's firing a one round of machine gun and scuttling back again. But I mean they don't even do that then. They're still buying time in 1939. And you know, Britain is only just about ready to take on the onslaught of the Luftwaffe in summer of 1940.

Well, nobody's ready for war.

No. And you always want more than you've got at any time, even when you're winning.

But like really not ready. Even like, like you mentioned with Barbarossa, Nazi Germany is really not ready.

Not ready.

Nobody's really. Except France. I swear, France have radios, fine. But come on, come on. When Nazi Germany invades Poland, I mean, yeah, it's terrible.

It's terrible because I also do think that had France gone in, in some force with some British troops as well, had they gone in, what would have happened is that would have, that easily could have brought down Hitler because most of his commanders are, his senior commanders are just thinking what the hell is going on? This is a catastrophe. I mean to a man, I mean even Goering is thinking this is a terrible idea. They are absolutely not convinced. And when Hitler does his big talk to, he asks all his senior commanders to come to the Berghoff to brief them about the invasion of Poland. It's just after the ribbon molotov Pact of 22 August. He calls them all to Berghoff and says, come in mufti, come in civilian suits. They all turn up and he gives them this kind of huge great speech and says this is the moment, this is the time, this is what we're going to do. And they're all going what? You're kidding me. What? We're going to Poland on the 26th of August. That's the plan. Two days time. Where's the plan? The whole point is that they're emerging and growing militarily. But they were supposed to have all these exercises where they, you know, coordinating ground forces, the, you know, the panzer spearhead with operations in the air with the Luftwaffe, none of that happens. So Poland becomes the proving ground and actually they discover that there's lots of things that don't work and lots of things that are wrong. But, but, but you know, it, it's flying in the face of all convention, military convention, that, that they, you know, he does this without any kind of warning and even by the 1st of September where there's been this kind of sort of five day delay at those last minute negotiations, the last minute negotiations are thrust upon Hitler by people like Goering and by Mussolini and the Italians going, oh my God, don't do this, don't do this. There's got to be a solution. Hitler's absolutely jumping at the bit.

Well, in that case, from a dark militaristic perspective of his bet paid off.

Well, except that it ended in ruins in May 1945 with total collapse of Germany. So you could say the worst decision he ever made was going into Poland in September 1939. You look at it. But I mean, yes, it's successful in that Poland's overrun in 18 days.

There's so many counterfactuals here.

But I mean, if you would say to Hitler on the 30th of April, as he's sort of taking out the pistol from his holster on his sofa in the Fuhrerbunk and going, so Adolf 1st of September 1939, still backing yourself on that one. I mean, he might have a different view.

The guy's insane and full of blunder. So he probably would have said, yeah, do it all over again.

Yeah, I'm sure he would have done as well.

Conquest Poland was not a mistake. Soviet Union was not a mistake. It's just some of the other people.

I was let down by, by people not being strong enough.

Yeah, the Prussian generals are all.

Yeah, yeah, of course, that's exactly what. It wasn't my fault.

He might have quietly done some different decisions about Barbarossa. Maybe the timing would be different, maybe.

That all out central for us rather than kind of splitting into three. Yeah, yeah.

But he was very sure. It seems like, maybe you can correct me, that Britain and France would still carry on with appeasement even after he invaded Poland.

Absolutely. He was completely convinced by it. There was clearly a kind of sort of 10 to 15% level of doubt, but what the heck, I'm going to do it anyway. He was just, he ratcheted himself up into such a laver of, of kind of. This is the moment I have to do it now. This is fate. I'm 50 and, and you know, I could be taken out by an assassin's bullet. I've got this important life work that I've got to do. We've got to get on with it now. There could be no more delay. This is my mission, you know, this is our mission of the German people. And I've. The German people have got the will and the spirit to be able to pull it off. Or I was wrong and therefore we don't deserve to be a thousand year. Right. We don't deserve to be the master race, black or white, us or them, either or. That's same all the time.

So can you tell the story of the molotov Ribbentrope Pact, 1939? So they make an agreement, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union. And that leads us, just like you mentioned, in a matter of days.

Days.

How compact everything is. It's just really, really fascinating.

It's a beautiful summer in Europe, summer of 1939. It's one of these glorious summers that sort of never rains. It's just sunshine, sunny day after sunny day. It's like that sort of Golden Summer of 1914 as well, where sky always seems to be blue, fluffy white clouds. Everyone's sort of. But this sort of. The storm clouds of war, to use that cliche, are kind of brewing. The Russians have reached out to Britain and France and said, come on over, let's negotiate, let's see what we can do. And there is just no stomach for that at all. I mean, if ever there is, I think, a mistake, Britain and France should have been a bit more into real politics and than they were. It's such an opportunity to ensure that, to snooker the Third Reich. And they don't take it because in many ways they see the westward spread of communism in exactly the same way that the Nazis see the threat of the westward spread of communism as something that's every bit as repellent as Nazism. And they don't want to be getting into bed with these guys, of course. Course they kind of have to kind of change tack on that one in summer of 1941. Very quick order. And that's the whole point about Churchill appeasing Stalin. I mean, it's all very well, people saying, well, Churchill wouldn't have appeased Hitler in the 1930s, but he does appease. He appeases all the time. And they missed that opportunity. And the French and British delegation is third tier commanders, generals going over. It's, it's a, it's a, you know, it's a shit show. I mean, it, you know, excuse my French, but I mean, it's just, it's, it's, it's a nonsense that they're not ready for it, they're not prepared. The British guy, Admiral Drax, doesn't have any authority. The whole thing's a complete joke. It's, it's never going to get anywhere.

You tell the story of this quite beautifully actually. Again, it's such a human story. I mean the, it seems like the Stalin and so, so it, they've already.

Made up their mind But I don't think they have. I think what they.

Wait, wait, wait. I mean, you described quite well that they value in person meeting.

Yes.

So, like, Chamberlain should have just gone to Moscow.

Yeah. Get on a plane.

Like it. It's such a. Maybe it's a simplistic notion, but that could have changed the trajectory of human history right there.

I really think it could have done. I think that was. I think that's. I think that's much more grievous mistake than Munich.

Why are leaders so hesitant to meet? I'm told now by a bunch of diplomats that. No, no, no, no. There's a process. You know, first you have to have these diplomats meet and they have to draft a bunch of stuff. And I sometimes have the simplistic notion, like, why not? Why not meet? Why not meet? Like, I think there is a human element. There's. There, of course. Especially when there's this force that is Hitler.

Well, yes. And because we humans, we like to interact, and you like to see people in three dimensions. And I'm sure it's why you always, quite rightly, insist on doing your podcast face to face, because you want to get the cut of someone's jib and you want to be able to see them, and you want to see the intonation and the expression and the whites of their eyes and all that kind of stuff. And that just doesn't make a difference, of course, because, you know, we're fundamentally animals and we kind of. We. We want to be sizing people up, and it's much easier to do that when you're a few feet away from each other than it is on a video screen or through the prism of someone else. Yeah.

But there's also just. You see the. The humanity in. In others. It's so much easier. You see this social media, media. It's so much easier to talk about others when you're not with them.

Yes.

And like, military conflict is the extreme version of that.

Yeah.

You can construct these narratives that they're not human, that they're evil, that they're. You can construct communist ideology. All these. You can project onto them the worst possible version of what? Of a human. But. But when you meet them, you're like.

Oh, they are just a person.

They're just a person.

Well, it's the world's great tragedy that it's only a few people that want to go to war, and the vast majority want to live happily, contented lives getting on with their neighbors. I mean, it has been ever thus. It's just it is those few that kind of ruin it for everybody else. But anyway, to go back to Leningrad back in August 1939, they go half cock. They're disrespectful to the Soviet Union. As a result of that, it gets nowhere. Had they been able to put on a really, really firm offer there and then to the Soviet Union, Soviet Union would have probably come in. I mean, the big thing is that the Soviet Union said, this is a big stumbling block. The Soviet Union said, yeah, but we want to be able to march through Poland if we get threatened by Germany. Both the British and the French just smell a massive rat there. They're basically saying, saying, you know, if they agree to that, what they're, what they fear is that Soviet Union will just march into Poland and go, yeah, but you said we could and take it, which they unquestionably would have done, but it would have stopped the world war, probably.

They're willing to appease Hitler. They're not willing to appease Stalin in that situation.

Well, they're not willing to appease anybody by that stage. That's the point.

Well, they appeased Hitler because there's a.

Now there's a bottom line, you know, we're. Which is, which is Poland, you know, so it's changed. That's why. Right. But anyway, the bottom line is they don't, you know, there is a, there is a, A reluctance on the part of French and the British to negotiate with the Soviet Union because they're Communists. Don't like them, don't trust them, worry about what they're going to do with Poland and they're going to be, you know, jumping out of the fire into the kind of water and it doesn't come off. And as a consequence of that, Soviet Union Union continue to pursue more, hardly, you know, more, more vociferously the opportunities that the, that the Germans are offering, which is the split of Poland, because Soviet Union wants that part of Poland back in its own sphere of influence and it doesn't want to go to war just yet.

And the agreement that they won't attack each other, essentially.

Yeah.

Do you think Stalin actually believed that?

No, he believed it in the same way that Hitler believed it, that it was a cynical kind of convenient bit of real politic for now. I mean, I think Soviet Union was as determined to get rid of the Nazis as the Nazis were determined to get rid of the Soviet Union. I think whoever fired first was not decided at that point, but I do think that from the moment that Hitler takes power in 1933. A conflict between Soviet Union and Nazi Germany is inevitable.

Yeah. So either direction, you think it's inevitable? Yeah, I think. I think there's. Yeah, there's a huge amount of evidence for that. Stalin probably wanted it, what, like in 42, 43? Yeah, something like that.

Yeah. And, you know, they're doing exercises and stuff and building out. He's not ready yet because he knows he's done the purges and he's got to get his. His army. You know, he's got to get his armed forces back into shape and all the rest of it. But, you know, so they have this incredibly cynical agreement. But at that point, you know, Hitler's hands are. Are untied. He no longer has to worry about the threat from the Soviet Union. He's got Carte planche to go into Poland, and he doesn't believe that France and Britain are going to go to war over Poland. He's wrong about that, obviously. But France and Britain, despite going to war with them, still do nothing. So he's got a way of it.

Who was Churchill and how did Churchill come to power at this moment?

Well, Churchill is this absolutely towering figure in British politics who's been first a minister in the naughties of the 20th century and the first years of the 20th century. First of the Liberals, then were the Conservatives. He's a former Chancellor of the Exchequer. He's a towering figure, but he's been in the wilderness because he's out of favor with the Stanley Baldwin government. He's out of favor with Chamberlain, but he is this towering figure and he has been very outspoken Balkan as a backbencher, which basically means, you know, you're not a minister, you're not in the Cabinet, you're just an ordinary member of Parliament, but obviously you're an ordinary member of Parliament, but you're also an ordinary member of Parliament who has had ministries of state and who is his towering figure. So he's listened to in a way that other backbenchers aren't. And he has been saying, you know, we need to stand up to the dictators, we need to do this, we need to rearm more heavily and blah, blah, blah. So when war is declared, he's brought back into the aboriginal royalty in charge of the navy, which is Britain's senior service, and suddenly he's there. And what happens is Britain doesn't really do anything. It's very difficult working with France because France is so politically fractured that they can't make any decisions when you can't make any decisions. You are just impotent. And so Churchill first mentions going into Norway, mining the lead. So the idea is that you're making life very difficult for the Germans to get iron ore out of Sweden. Their main source of iron ore is up in the northern part of Sweden in Arctic Circle. It then goes on a railway through northern tip of Norway and then gets shipped down the west coast of Norway into Germany, into the Baltic. So Churchill suggests in September 1939, why don't we mine the leads? Which are. The leads are these passageways out of the fjords in the north into the North Sea. Why don't we mine those and stop the Germans from. From taking this? Everyone goes, well, yeah, that's quite a good idea. But they can't decide. And French are nervous that if they do that, the Germans retaliate and bomb France and all this kind of stuff. So no decision is made until kind of April 1940. They go up to start mining the Leeds on exactly the same day that the Germans invade Denmark and Norway. And so they're caught off guards. And at that moment, really, it's seen as a failure of Chamberlain's government. And there is a kind of a mounting realization that no matter how good he was or competent he was as a peacetime prime minister, he's not a wartime prime minister. You know, he's not served in the armed forces himself, doesn't really understand it. It needs a different set of hands. And his government falls on 9 May. It becomes inevitable that he's going to have to resign. And the obvious person to take his place is Lord Halifax, who is in the House of Lords. But you can still be a prime minister. And he is without question the most respected politician in the country. He's former Viceroy of India. He's seen as an incredibly safe pair of hands, man of resolute, sound judgment, et cetera, et cetera. But he doesn't want to take it. He feels physically ill at the prospect, doesn't want this responsibility. He's also not really a military man. He's got a slightly sort of withered hand which has prevented him from doing military service. And he just blanches at this moment. And that really leaves only one other figure that could possibly take on this position, and that's just Churchill. So when Chamberlain resigns on 9 May, and Halifax says, it's not for me, the only person who's going to slip into that position is Churchill. And he becomes Prime Minister and he accepts it gladly. He feels like it is his mission in life. This is his moment. Cometh the hour, cometh the man. But he comes with a huge amount of baggage. I mean, he's known as a man who drinks too much, whose judgment hasn't always been great. He was Chancellor during the time of the General Strike, 1926. You know, he backed Edward VII over the monarchy crisis when the King wanted to marry Wallis Simpson, the divorcee, Catholic divorcee, et cetera, et cetera. So, you know, his judgment has been brought into question. You know, he is the man who was. He came up with the idea of the Gallipoli campaign, which was, you know, an ignominious failure, blah, blah, blah. So there are issues over him. You know, he is seen as a hothead and a man who doesn't have the kind of sound judgment of Halifax. So the jury is very much out. And I think, again, it's one of those things where you have to put yourself in. You have to look at this through the prism of what people were thinking in May 1940. Yes, he was considered a tyranny politician, but he is seen also as a loose cannon and by no means the right person in this hour of darkness. And it is coincidental that 10 May 1940, when he takes over as Prime Minister, he becomes Prime Minister Minister, not through an election, but by default, of a new Nationalist government. So no longer a Conservative government, but a nationalist cross party coalition government for the duration of the war, which includes members of the Liberal Party and also the Labour Party, as well as Conservatives, that it is by no means certain that he's going to be able to deliver the goods. And it is also coincidentally, the same day that the Germans launched Case Yellow, Operation Yellow, the invasion of the Low Countries in France. So these are tumultuous events, to put it mildly. And it is also the case that only a couple of weeks before, Paul Reynaud has taken over as Prime Minister of yet another coalition government in France from Daladier. So. So political turmoil is very much the watchword at this time for the Western democracies. Just at the moment that the Germans are making their kind of hammer strike into the west, this might be a.

Good moment to bring up this idea that has been circulating recently, brought up by Daryl Cooper, who hyperbolically stated that Churchill was the chief villain of the Second World War. War. To give a good faith interpretation of that, I believe he meant that Churchill forced Hitler to escalate the expansion of Nazi Germany beyond Poland into a global war. So Churchill is the one that turned this narrow war, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, into a global One, is that accurate?

No, I don't think it is. I mean, not least because the decisions over Poland were made by Chamberlain's government, not when Churchill was out of government. Churchill wasn't even involved in that decision making process at the time. No, I don't think so. I mean, again, I go back to kind of Britain's position in the world in 1939. If you say we are going to defend the sovereignty of Poland and then you don't, that looks really bad. Globally, Britain's prestige would plummet, would lead to all sorts of problems. You are saying that you are giving carte blanche to dictators to just run amok and take whatever territory they want, are risking a future upheaval of the global order away from democracies into the hands of dictators. In the west, people believe in democracy and believe in the advancement and freedoms of people. This is to echo the words of Roosevelt in August 1941. They're responding to a world free of want and fear. Now obviously there's still some issues with the form that democracy takes in the 1930s. It's not democratic for everyone. Try saying that if you're in Nigeria or India or whatever, or if you're in the black southern states of the United States. But the aspirations are there. And I think that's an important distinction. And I think by saying that Churchill is the chief warmonger of the Second World War, I think is ludicrous. It's the same thing about the bombing. The detractors of strategic air campaign always go, yeah, but Germans had the Holocaust. But weren't the Allies just as bad, just killing all those civilians? It's like, no, because the moment Hitler stopped the war, the bombing would stop. The moment the war stopped in Hitler's favor, the killing would continue and be accelerated.

So the thing you mentioned initially is the idealist perspective of, well, Britain can't allow sort of this warmonger to break all these pacts and be under democratic, you know, murder a large number of people and do conquest of territory. Okay, that's idealistic. But if we look at the realist perspective, perspective, what decisions would minimize the amount of suffering on the continent in the next 50 years? So one of the arguments that he's making, I happen to disagree with it, to put it mildly, is that Churchill increased the amount of suffering. So Churchill's presence and decisions. So we're not talking about idealistic perspectives perspective, we talk about realists like the reality of the war of Stalin, of Hitler, of Churchill, of France and fdr. Did Churchill drag Hitler into a world war. Did he force Hitler to invade Soviet Union? Did he force Hitler to then invade. Attack Britain?

Well, no, because. Because Hitler was always going to invade the Soviet Union if. Unless. Unless the Soviet Union invaded Germany first. So that was always going to happen. No one asked Hitler to invade the Low Countries and Norway and Denmark and attack Britain. He does that of course, because he's not given a free hand in Poland. But there's no question that Hitler would have also wanted to subdue France or certainly turn France from a democracy into a totalitarian state as well. I'm absolutely certain about that.

So I think there's pretty definitive evidence. I mean it's obvious from everything he said, from everything he's written, from everything everywhere that he was going to invade the Soviet Union no matter what. And France most likely. Yes.

Also he would have done a deal with Britain. Britain could have coexisted.

So actually there is a possible reality, I don't know, maybe you can correct me on this, where Hitler basically takes all of Europe except Britain.

Yes. But then he would have got so strong that he would have then turned on Britain as well. Because he would. The fear is that if you let him do this and then he gets greedy. He wants the next one, then he wants the next one, then he wants the next one and then he wants to take over the whole world. That is the fear of the British, that is the fear of the Americans, that's the fear of President Roosevelt who's got a very. We haven't even touched on this yet. But he has a very difficult case on his hands because he's come into power also in January 1933 as President of the United States on an isolationist ticket with a retrenching, with a kind of sort of step away from the European old order, it's time for the Europeans start on their own. It all sounds very familiar right now. And suddenly he's got to do this gargantuan political vault fast and prepare the nation for war. Because he also fears, like Churchill fears, like Chamberlain feared as well, that Hitler's designs are not purely on Eastern Europe and the Lebens are on there, but would get evidence bigger and I don't doubt that they're right. I think if he'd prevailed in the Soviet Union he'd always wanted more because his whole concept is the master race. Yeah.

I think it should be said if we measure human suffering, if there was not Britain on the other side, if it was not a two front war, that the chances of Hitler Succeeding in the Soviet Union is much higher, or at least a more prolonged war. And there would be more dead, more enslaved and more tortured and all of this.

Yes, and ditto. If the Allies hadn't got involved against Imperial Japan, it would have been catastrophic. I mean, 20 to 30 million Chinese dead anyway, with American and British intervention. What's it going to be in China without that? And elsewhere? Because the reason why Japan invades French Indochina now Vietnam and Hong Kong and Malaya and Singapore and so on, and Burma is because it's not winning in China and it needs more resources because it's resource poor and America has cut off the tap. So it's going into these countries to get what it needs, its rubber and oil and natural resources and oils, precious oils and all the rest of it. And if it had been unchecked, it would have done so, and then it would have absolutely built up its strength and overrun the whole of China with even more deaths. So, you know, I think there is. I think that one of the interesting things about the Second World War is lots of wars, and why people get involved in them are extremely questionable. But I think there is a moral crusade, aid to the Allies and what they're doing that I think is entirely justified. What I think is interesting also is that as the war progresses, if the Allies are supposed to be on the force of the good, how come they're doing so much bad? And at what point is doing bad stopping you from doing good? And at what point are you doing good, but also doing bad at the same time? Such as destruction of cities, destruction of monasteries on outcrops in southern Italy, destruction of killing of lots of civilians, et cetera, et cetera. These are difficult questions to answer sometimes. They're also incredibly interesting. And I think that moral component starts to blur a little bit by kind of middle of the war, by 1943, it's kind of easy to have a fairly cut and dry war in North Africa and the deserts of North Africa, where the only people getting in the way are a few sort of Bedouin drivers or something. But once you start getting into Europe or getting into the kind of the meat of highly populated countries in the Far east, for example, that's a different kind of fish because the scale of destruction is absolutely immense. But it is also the job of political leaders to look after and defend their own peoples first and foremost. And so what you're doing is you're trying to protect your own sovereignty, your own own people, before you're protecting other people. And so that's what leads to, you know, the whole way in which the Allies are, the Western Allies are protracting war is to try and minimize the number of deaths of their own young men as much as they possibly can, whilst at the same time winning the war. And that means bringing lots of destruction to your enemies, but also trying to minimize it. And the way you bring lots of destruction by, to your enemies is by using immense firepower and this concept of steel, not our flesh, which I mentioned earlier on, and technology, so that you don't have to bring to bear too many of your young men's lives and you don't have a repeat of the slaughter of the First World War. So, you know, it is really interesting that in our mind's eye, when we're thinking of, you know, the Western Allies in the Second World War, probably the first thing that comes into mind is Americans jumping out of landing craft on Omaha beach on D Day, for example. Those are infantrymen, they're the front line, they are the coal face of. They're the first people going into the fire of the enemy. And we tend to think about guys in tanks, infantrymen with their Garand rifles or machine guns or whatever. That's what springs to mind. Yet actually, they're a comparatively small proportion of the army. So no more than 14 to 15% of any army allied army is infantry. 45% are service corps, service troops driving trucks and cooks and bottle washers and people lugging great big boxes of stuff. And that's because by that stage, the Allies have worked out the way of war, which is to use what I call big war, this concept of a very long tail. Logistics, the operational art, making sure that people have the absolute best you possibly can, Great medical care, huge advances in first aid and medical care of troops, getting them back onto the battlefield. And you are using firepower and technology and mechanization to do a lot of your hardship yards. So, you know, that's the principle behind strategic bombing. You know, if you can, if you go over and bomb and you can destroy infrastructure and civilians and households, that makes it much harder for Krupp to make those Panther tanks and Tiger tanks or whatever it might be and guns. And, you know, you're disrupting the transportation system in Germany, you know, you're making life difficult for them to do what they need to do, then that means it's going to be easier for those 15, 14, 15% of infantrymen who've got to jump out of landing craft to do their job. And you're trying to keep that to a Minimum. And you'd have to say, broadly speaking, that's a very sensible policy that makes an awful lot of sense. Consequence of that is a huge amount of destruction. And maybe that's what Daryl Cooper's driving at. But no one asked Hitler to invade Poland. I mean, that is the bottom line. No one asked Germany to go to war. No one asked Hitler to come up with these ludicrous ideas. Theology.

Yeah, there's complex ethical discussions here about.

Just like as you describe, which are fascinating.

Which are fascinating. And war is hell. And there's many ways in which it is hell. Just for a little bit to steel man, what Daryl is, where he might be coming from is since World War II, to the simplistic veneration of Churchill. Sort of saying Churchill good, Hitler bad, has been used as a template to project under other conflicts to justify military intervention. And so his general, his and other people, like libertarians, for example, resistance to the. That overly simplistic veneration of somebody like Churchill has to do with the fact that that seems to be by neocons and warmongers in the military industrial complex in the United States and elsewhere. Using Hitler way too much, using Churchill way too much to justify invading everywhere and anywhere.

Well, I do agree with that. I think oversimplification of anything is a mistake. Take life is nuanced. The past is nuanced. It's okay to be proud about certain things, and it's okay to be disgusted by other things. That's absolutely fine. We have a complicated relationship with our past. It doesn't need to be black and white. And life is not a straight line. And of course, the Allies make plenty of mistakes in World War II. Overall, I think they made the right calls. And I think one of the things that's really interesting is I think that the Allies, for the most part, use their resources much more judiciously and sensibly than the Axis powers do. And, you know, good, because that means they prevail. I think, you know, there are so many lessons from World War II that could have been brought into the last history of the last 30 years which weren't, you know, such as, you know, if you decapitate an incredibly strong leader, you get a power vacuum. And if you don't have a solution for that power vacuum, lots of bad elements are going to sweep into that in very quick order, which, of course is exactly what happens in Iraq. So, you know, Donald Ronstone going, we don't do reconstruction. Well, you freaking well should do. You know, if you're going to take on this particular challenge, you've got to see it through. That's simply not good enough. It's not good enough to go into Afghanistan and go, okay, we're going to change things around. It's going to be great. All the women are going to have education. They won't have to wear, kind of won't have to cover up their bodies anymore. Anything goes. We love liberalism. It's great. Let's make Kabul into a thriving city once more and then suddenly bug out. Because what's going to happen? You're going to undo it, everything. And I remember being in. This is a bit of a segue, Lex, but I remember being in northern Helmand province back in. When was it? January 2008. And British troops had just taken over an absolute dump of a town called Musakala. And I remember talking to this Afghan guy, he just had all his willow trees chopped down to make room for a helipad that the allies wanted, which said, you know, put their kind of surround, you know, those cages with kind of rubble in the protective wall. Is it called Hescombe, I think it was called. Anyway, I said to him, what do. What do you think about the British being there? And he just went. Shrugged at me, lifted up his hands and said, well, you know, if they stay, great, but they won't. And. And he said, you know, if they stay, then brilliant. But he said, I tell you what he said, Taliban went great. They weren't fantastic. He said, but I could leave my purse on a wall and no one would touch it. I could leave it on a wall for a week. No one would. Would touch it. Said, will they bring that kind of order? Will we have peace here? They've just chopped down my willow trees. Thanks a lot. And you're seeing a total lack of understanding of the culture, the ethnic differences. You're trying to impose a kind of Western centric view onto something which is just some. Onto a nation which isn't ready for that now. There are ways in which it looked like Afghanistan was starting to kind of emerge and there was a path. And then just at the critical moment, the west moves out with catastrophic consequences. What you have to say, though, is that in the west, post 1945, the rehabilitation of Italy, of Japan, of Western Germany was really good. You know, the consequence of. Of all that destruction, all that turmoil, was thriving, high producing democracies which burst forth into the kind of second half of the 20th century and into the 21st century in pretty good order. So the lessons of the previous generation for the first World war had been learned. Even though the scale of destruction, the displacement of people is unprecedented.

In 1940, 45, in 1939, what was the state of the militaries? What were the most powerful militaries on the world stage at that time?

Well, in terms of naval power, it's Britain, as we've already discussed, and the United States. France has a pretty large navy. Japan has a pretty large navy. Italy has a pretty large navy. But Italy's navy is by far and away its most modern aspect of its three services, air, land and sea. But it doesn't have any aircraft carriers and doesn't have any radar. So they've got modern battleships and battle cruisers, but without key modern bits of technology.

So Italy is really not ready for war.

Oh, it's so not. It's so not. It's just, again, both Hitler and Mussolini, they lack geopolitical understanding. That's because they're so kind of focused on their narrow worldview and they view everything through that prism, but they can't see that big a of bigger picture.

And we should say that Mussolini, maybe you can correct me, but I don't think at any point he wants war.

He doesn't want a war. What he does want is he wants his own new kind of Roman Empire, which extends over the Mediterranean, certainly the eastern part of the half of the Mediterranean, North Africa all the way down to kind of East Africa controlling the Suez Canal. That's what he wants.

And I think he made clear that he was. I mean, there's always this little brother jealous of Hitler kind of situation, because he wanted absolute power the way Hitler.

Did, but doesn't have it.

Doesn't have it.

Yeah, there's a monarchy often forgotten. It's amazing.

So there's always this limit. And Hitler, quite brilliantly, once he gets some power, he takes it all complete.

He completely emasculates Mussolini. And he likes him, though it's really weird. Even when Mussolini is about to fall, in July 1943, he has a meeting at Feltre, just literally a few days before Mussolini tumbles. And he does that because he likes Mussolini. He likes him as a man and thinks he's been his friend. And he respects him to a certain extent, even though he definitely views himself as top dog. Hitler does. That is, um. So it's kind of curious because I don't think Hitler particularly likes anyone really. But. But, but he does seem to like Mussolini. But anyway, the problem with Mussolini is Mussolini's Italy is. Is very impoverished from the First World War, you know, and that of course, leads to the rise of fascism and the overflow of parliamentary democracy and, and why Mussolini takes place in the first place. You know, again, it's that kind of. There's been this terrible disruption, there's been financial crisis, crisis that leads to kind of people looking at an alternative, you know, what's the alternative? Well, Mussolini is going, you know, we can be proud Italians again. Lots of chest thumping, you know, wearing great uniforms, all the rest of it. And people kind of think, well, you know, I have a piece of that. It kind of works. And, you know, preferably the trains work on time under him and, and so on and so forth, but he just gets ahead of himself, you know, and actually the writings on the war in 1935 when he goes into Abyssinia and, and, you know, against sort of what effectively are kind of by first World European standards, privative tribesmen in Abyssinia. They have quite a tough fight there. They do prevail, but it's not a complete walkover. And they get a bit of a bloody nose at times and they shouldn't have done. And they're just not ready. They don't have the industry. They're tied up into the Mediterranean. They don't have access to the world's oceans. They do have some merchant shipping, but not a huge amount. You know, they just don't have what is required. They don't. They're dependent on Britain for coal. Britain is the leading coal exporter in the world in the 1930s. So Britain's approach to fascist Spain and approach to fascist Italy has been very much sort of stick and carrot. It's like, you know, we'll let you do what you do as long as you kind of stay in your box and, you know, we'll continue to provide you with supplies and coal and whatever is you need as long as you don't kind of go too far. And so that's why Mussolini is very anxious in 1938 and again in 1939 to kind of be the power broker and kind of not let Germany go to war. But Germany's just, you know, they signed the Axis Pact of Steel in May 1939, where they've become formal allies. This is Hitler and Mussolini, Italy in Germany. But it's always a very, very unequal partnership right from the word go. And one of the reasons Mussolini signs it is because he fears that Germany has designs on Italy. It's not because he thinks, oh, these guys are great, you know, they're our natural bedfellows. It's so that he can It's a mutually convenient pact whereby Germany gets on with whatever it wants to do up in Northern Europe and Eastern Europe. Italy is given a free hand to do whatever it wants to do. They'll just kind of watch each other's backs. They have balloons, borders, you know, Austria and, and Italy border one another and they'll just do their own thing and they'll kind of help each other out with supplies and stuff, but, but basically they won't, they'll, they'll be their own. It's a kind of marriage of convenience. You know, they're never expecting to be fighting alongside each other on the battlefield. Not really. There is a kind of obligation to do so, but, but it's, it's an obligation with no expectation of ever actually happening. And so from Ms. Mussolini's point of view, the pact of steel is kind of, you know, it's just sailing your flag to one particular mast and kind of trying to cover your back. And so long as he places cards right, you know, he can still get his coal supplies from Britain, he doesn't have to worry about that. You know, the pact still doesn't make any difference to that. The problem for him is that in June 1940, he thinks that France is about to be defeated and that Britain will surely follow. And so he thinks, ah, I've got some rich pickings, I can take Malta, I can take British possessions, I can rotate overrun Egypt and now is my time. But I also need to kind of join the fight before France is completely out of the fight. Otherwise it looks like I'm a Johnny come lately and I won't get those spoils because the Germans will go, yeah, you can't have all this stuff. You've turned up too late. You need to be in the fight. So he does it what he thinks is the perfect timing and it turns out to be a catastrophic timing because of course, Britain doesn't exit the fight. Britain is still there. And by February 1941, a very, very tiny British army in Egypt has overrun two entire Italian armies and taken 133 prisoners in North Africa.

So you mentioned in the sea, who were the dominant armies, who would. Who was dominant in the air?

Well, in the air it has to be the Luftwaffe and it is also the Imperial Japanese, both in the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Imperial Japanese army. They both have air forces. And one of the reasons that is because the quality of the pilots in Japan is extremely high because it's so difficult to get to get to the top position. You know, you are going to Your frontline squadrons with at least 500 hours in your logbook. To put that in some perspective, you know, a British RAF or Luftwaffe pilot would be joining their frontline squadrons with 150 to 170 hours in the logbook. So it is that these guys are disciplined to within an inch of their lives. They are, you know, there are academic tests as well as physical endurance tests. You know, they are the elite of the. The elite and they are extremely good. The problem they have is that there is a good number of them, but there's not that many. The Luftwaffe is the largest air force in the world in 1939, but it is already at a parity in aircraft production with Britain. And the French have a kind of similar sized army, but they're very, very badly organized. So they're organized into different regions and one region is not really talking to another. And one of the problems that when case yell the invasion of German invasion of the west starts. France's army of the air is spread throughout France and has its own little area. So you have one bunch of, you know, fighters and bombers in that block in, you know, in the Marseille area, you have another block in kind of, you know, on the Brittany coast and you have another block in around Sudan and you have another. That. So, so consequently they're never being. They're never able to kind of bring their full strength to bear. So it's. Although, although they've both got about three and a half thousand aircraft on board paper and about two and a half thousand that are fit to fly on any one given day. The Luftwaffe, because they're the aggressor, can choose how they mass their aircraft and where they attack and at when. So in other words, you can send. Luftwaffe can send over overwhelming amounts of bombers and fighter planes and pulverize a French airfield and catch them napping because the French don't have a defence system, they can't see whether they're coming. So their only hope is to kind of take off and just hope they stooge around the sky and hope they bump into some loose Luftwaffe. And of course that's inherently inefficient. And they get all, you know, they get destroyed, they get destroyed in penny packets rather than en masse. Difference with the RAF is the RAF is not done on an air force basis where you have. Each air corps or air fleet has a handful of bombers, a handful of fighters, a handful of reconnaissance planes. They have different commands. So they have bomber command, fighter command, command, training command, coastal command, and they all have very Specific roles. So they're structured in a completely different way and the other. And that's because they're an island nation and because they see their role militarily in a different way. And because the rearming that Britain has done in the 1930s is all about defense. It is not about aggression at this point, not about taking it to the enemy. It is showing your tough, but also, first and foremost, getting your ducks in a row and making sure that you don't get defeated. So this is the principle behind the first. World's first fully coordinated air defense system, which is the radar chain, it is the observer core, it is control rooms. It is interesting technology, such as identification, friend or foe, iff, which is where you have a little pulse, which. So you have these control rooms, and you have a map table, and you have a tote board in front of you where you can see what squadrons are airborne, what state of readiness they're at, you know whether they're engaging the enemy. Little lights come on and show you. You can see weather maps. You can see. See the cloud ceiling. You see all that a glance, then you're on a dais, and then down in front of you is a massive great map of southern England. You've got croupiers sort of moving plots. So you can, through a combination of radar, which picks up a kind of a rough idea of what's coming towards you, combined with the observer corps, you have overlapping observer core stations all over Britain, covering every single inch of airspace over British, and looking up into the air and seeing how many aircraft there are and at what height they are. And you have little thing called a pantograph, which is a piece of equipment which helps you judge altitude. You then ring through that. That all comes into the control room along with the information from the radar stations, which is going into a single filter room at Fighter Command headquarters, which is then being pushed straight back out to the sector station. So this information is being updated all the time. So you have a plot, and it looks like it might be, you know, enemy bombers, 30 plus, for example, that's constantly being adapted. So as more information comes in, you will change that. And then you can see that actually it's only 20 aircraft or 22 aircraft or whatever. So you're updating that and that a little figure is put on the. On your little plot and moved across. And so you can see. And then because you can identify your own aircraft, you can then see where they are moving. And you're also on. The guys in the air are on the Radio to ground controllers who are in these control rooms and they're saying, okay, well if you proceed at, you know, angels 18, 18,000ft, you know, on a vector of, you know, 150 degrees, you should be seeing your enemy bombing formation any moment now. And what that means is that you're not on the ground when the enemy are coming towards you with their bombers to hit you your airfield, which means you're in the air. So that all they're doing is hitting a grass airfield which you've already got bulldozers and diggers and graders and lots of scalpings and earth ready to fill in the potholes. And it means you're good to go. And it means as a consequence of all that, when the Germans do launch their all out assault on Adler Tag Eagle Day on 13 August 1940, the British are ready. They can see them coming, they know what to expect and they can anticipate. And it means that they're not being caught with their trousers down on the ground. And as a consequence of that, of the 138 airfields there are in RAF airfields there are in Britain, only one of them is knocked out for more than 48 hours in the entire summer of 1940. And that's Manston on the tip of the Kent coast, which is abandoned for the duration.

So these are the two biggest air forces.

So those are the two biggest air forces.

Luftwaffe we should say. German. I mean they're like the, the, the legendary, the terrifying air force.

They are maybe, maybe they're slightly believing their own hype. There's no question about it.

Well, the rest of the world is also right.

They've just had it too easy. So they don't have, they don't have ground controllers, they don't have an air defense system in, in, in Germany. Because why would you need an air defense system? We're going to be the aggressor. You know, there's no scenario where we'll have to defend the airspace of the Third Reich because, because we're on the offensive. So they just haven't prepared it.

So there's that clash, the Battle of Britain, the clash of air forces. What explains the success of Britain in defending?

Well, it's, I mean, you know, and everyone always says, you know, the few were the last, you know, the last line of defense against the Nazi hordes and all this kind of stuff and it's just, it's all rubbish. They're the first line of defense. Second line of defense is the Royal Navy, which is the world's largest. And there is absolutely no chance on earth that a German invasion force made up of Rhine river barges, one out of every three is motorized and the other two aren't is ever going to get successfully across the English Channel. And even if they did, they would be repulsed. I mean it's just no chance. And it is often forgotten that while the Luftwaffe is coming over and bombing Britain every single day, so is the RAF going over and bombing Germany. And one of the problems that the Germans have is, is that these bombers need fighter protection. Fighter planes are there to protect the bombers and they don't have much fuel. And the Metersmith 109E the Mel as the model is of 1940 is the mainstay of the German fighter force in the summer of 1940. And they don't have much fuel. So they need to conserve their fuel, which means they need to be as close to Britain as they possibly can. Which is why the majority of them are all in airfields which are hastily created in July 1940 following the port of France in the Pas de Calais, which is the closest point. That's where the Channel is its narrowest and all the rest of it and also in the northern Normandy. And that's where they're flying from. But what that means is that even if you're completely rubbish at bombing, which the British are in 1940, they haven't developed those navigational aids that create untold accuracy by the end of the war. 1940, they don't have that luxury. It's a target rich environment. I mean you can barely miss if you go over to the isle of, you know, over to the Pas de Calais. I mean it's literally, it's just like one huge great kind of hub of fighter airfields. And consequently that means that every single German squadron, which only is 12 airplanes strong on establishment and very often even fewer than that, always has to leave two airplanes behind to defend their own airfield. And it's really interesting when you look at kind of prisoner war statements from Luftwaffe Crown crew that have been downed. They're all bugged in a holding place called Trent Park. You can see the transcripts of these conversations. They're all going about how annoying it was that the RAF were over every night and they can't sleep. And you know, when they. If only they just shut up and leave them alone and not bomb them. You know, this is just part of the narrative of the Battle of Britain that's completely left out. It's always the stocky, you know, the plucky few against the kind of the, you know, the Nazi hordes and all the rest of it. And it's just, it's a complete misnomer. And by that time aircraft production in Britain is massively outpacing the Germans. And the best ratio that the Germans achieve in 1940 is July 1940, when the British produced 490 new Hurricanes and Spitfire single engine fighters. And the Germans only produce 240 single engine fighters. That's the best ratio and of course that is the British out producing the Germans two to one. And what that means is by the end of October 1940, when the battle of Britain is sort of officially designated as being over, the single engine fighter for the Luftwaffe is less than 200 from 750 or whatever it was in beginning of 20July, whereas the British Fighter Force had been 650 or whatever at the beginning of July, is now well over 750.

And Britain is out producing.

Yeah, to a massive degree. And that continues. And you know, that is a ratio that just increases as the war progresses. I mean, Britain produces 132 and a half thousand aircraft in the Second World War, America produces 315,000.

So why is there this legend of the Luftwaffe?

Well, because it's the spearhead of the blitzkrieg.

So it has to do with the.

Blitzkrieg, it's ought to do with the blitzkrieg. The Luftwaffe becomes the kind of the bogeyman of the Third Reich. You know, they're blamed for everything, but that's because they're completely abused. They're the only part of the Third Reich's armed services, the only part of the Vermack, the Vermac being the navy, the army and the air force. And that is in constant use the whole time, or constant abuse, I should say. In Britain and America, they rotate their pilots really, really carefully. By the time that, you know, you've got the 8th Fighter Command, for example, part of the mighty 8th, the 8th Air Force operating in Britain, by the end of 1943, you would have, in a squadron that would have 60, you would never have more than 6016 airborne from a squadron at any one time. You would have 40 to 45 pilots to service 16 in the air and similar number of aircraft, which means you're not overusing these guys. And what would happen is by that stage of the war, by 1943, you know, your young fighter pilot coming to a Thunderbolt squadron or a Mustang squadron, for example, at the end of 1943, beginning of 1944, he'd have 350 hours of consecutive flying. And because you can train in America, in Florida or California or Tex, Texas or wherever you've got you, you can process many, many more people because the training is much more intense, because you've got clear skies. So you're not, it's not a question of, oh, we'd like to take you out, out Fritz this morning, but you know, it's a bit cloudy and oh, the RAF are over or you know, gay air force is over so we can't fly today. So in Germany, pilot training is constant. Aircrew training is constantly being interrupted by the war, by shortage of fuel, by inclement weather, et cetera, et cetera. In America you have none of those problems. And Britain, because of his global reach, also has training bases in what was Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe and South Africa, in Canada as well. And so you're able to process these guys much better. You're able to give them more training so that when they come, they're absolutely the finished article as pilots. What they're not the finished article as is say a bomber pilot or as a fighter pilot, but that's okay because you join your squadron of 40 other guys for 60 airborne and the old hands kind of take you up a few times. So you arrive at, I don't know, let's say some airfield in, in Suffolk in East Anglia in England and you know, you'll have 10 days to two weeks acclimatizing, getting used to it. The, oh, you know, the old hands will put you through your paces, give you some trips, tips you can pick their brains during, kind of while you're having some chow and listening on some briefings. Then the first mission you do will be a milk run over to France where the Dane is kind of pretty minimal, you know, and you can build up your experience so that by the time you're actually sent over on a mission to Berlin or Bremen or, you know, the R or whatever, you're absolutely the business. So qualitatively and quantitatively, you are just vastly superior to anything the Luftwaffe has got. The Luftwaffe by that stage. In contrast, 1940, new pilots coming to frontline squadrons with 150, 170 hours on their, in their log books, less than 100, 190, 92 hours, something like that, it's not enough. And they're just being flung straight into battle and they're getting absolutely slaughtered. And they're also, because their machines are quite complicated. There's no two seaters really, so no two seater trainers. So the first time you're flying in Your Focke Wulf 190 or your Messerschmitt 109. It's this horrendous leap of faith for which you as a young, bright Luftwaffe fighter pilot know that you're not ready for, for this. And it can bite you. And something like a Messerschmitt 109 has a very high wing loading, so it's very maneuverable in the air. But it's got these tiny wings, it's got this incredible torque, this dame Le Benz DB605 engine with its huge amount of torque and it just wants to flip you over. So if you're not used to it, and it's got a narrow undercarriage as well, if you're not used to it, you could just crash. So in the first couple of months of 1944, they lose the something like 2,400 aircraft in the air and pilots and about 3,400 are accidents.

So it has to do with training really. Yeah, not training enough.

It's training and resources and supply. And the Second World War, more than any other conflict, is a war of numbers. There are differences. The decisions that generals can make, there are moments where particular brilliance and bravery can seize the day, take the bridge, you know, hold the enemy at bay or whatever. But ultimately, you know, you're talking about differences which might make a month's difference, six months difference, maybe even several years difference. But ultimately there's a certain point in the Second World War where the outcome is absolutely inevitable because the guys that lose can't compete with the numbers that the guys are, are going to win it.

So in that sense you could think of World War II as a battle of factories.

Yes.

What does it take to win in the battle of factories in out manufacturing military equipment against the Allies?

It's efficiency really. So I was kind of, you know, I was thinking, let's take the example of the Sherman tank, for example, the mainstay of the Western Allied forces and a fair number of them sent to the Soviet Union as well.

For, for that matter, I think you've said it doesn't get the respect it deserves, maybe doesn't get the respect it deserves.

So the Sherman tank, the 75 millimeter main battle gun, it's a sort of medium velocity fire, a shell around kind of 2,000ft per second, compared to the notorious infamous German 88 millimeter, which can fire at kind of third fast again like 3,000ft per second. But on paper, a Tiger tank coming around the, the corner and a Sherman tank coming around the corner, it should be no match at all. Tiger tank is 58 tons. Looks scary, is scary. It's got a massive gun, got really thick armor. Sherman tank doesn't have as thick armor. It doesn't have a gun that's as. As big it should. It should be an absolute walkover. And yet, at about 5.30pm on Monday 26 June 1944, a Sherman tank came around the corner of a road called A Rue Monsieur, a little village called Fontenaila Pesnel in Normandy, came face to face with.