Pricing Guru Madhavan Ramanujam: How Smart Startups Design Their Products Around the Price

Most entrepreneurs, they still think of pricing as more of an art, and they kind of like just come up with a price based on a gut feel. One of the biggest goals for us was to show that there is a science and not just an art, and the science of pricing dominates the art.

That's the voice of Madhavan Ramanujam. World renowned venture capitalist Bill Gurley says it well. He is to monetization strategy what what Bob Marley is to reggae music. And his book Monetizing Innovation is the first book I recommend to all the founders I work with when it comes to pricing. This is Mike Maples Jr. Of Floodgate, and it's go time with Madhavan Ramanujam. Welcome to Starring Greatness, a podcast dedicated to ambitious founders who want to go from nothing to awesome super fast. When you're a startup founder, you have to channel your inner James Bond, your MacGyver, your Wonder Woman woman. I'm going to help you win by curating the lessons of the super performers but before they were successful.

So, without further ado, Ignition sequence start.

Let's get started. Matavan Ramanujam is a humble voice with great power. I actually found out about his book Monetizing Innovation from multiple founders I work with when I asked a simple question. What is the one book you wish I had told you about when we first started working together? This intrigued me, and when I read his book, it was completely obvious these founders are right. So what's the big deal about Monetizing innovation? Well, it turns out that you can't just create value for the rest of the world when you start something, you also have to find a way to claim value for your business if you're destined for greatness. Matavan has better ideas about how to do this than anyone I know, and I'm so excited he agreed to be a guest on the show. Let's talk to him.

Madhavan, welcome to the podcast.

Thanks, Mike, for having me on the show.

I'm a huge fan of your book. It's probably the best book on pricing I've ever read for startups. And even though it applies to more than just startups, I think it's the go to book that I point founders to. I'd love to just learn more about how you got fascinated with pricing and monetization and what was your journey on the path to writing this book Monetizing Innovation in the first place.

Thanks for those nice words, Mike. My fascination for pricing started, I guess, way back when I was at Stanford. Like most people graduating from Stanford, I was thinking of founding my own startup. We even had some ideas. I was the guy who was responsible for all these business plans. And then we ended up pitching to several VCs. And then there was this one question that one of the VCs asked me. He said, how do you know you would monetize on your idea? And I pulled up my assumptions and my spreadsheets and showed it to him. And he quickly said, you've labeled them right. Those are assumptions. How do you truly know? And that question really haunted me and it drove me. And as luck would have it, within a week of that kind of conversation, I got a call from the managing partner of Simon Kutcher and Partners, the world's largest pricing strategy consulting firm, saying that they were hiring. I decided to join Simon Kutcher 12 years ago, last nine as a partner, last five also on the board of our company. It's been probably one of the most amazing experiences of my life and the reason I wrote Monetizing Innovation, right. For many years working at Simon Kutcher Now, I witnessed how Silicon Valley was obsessed with creating amazing new innovations, but hardly, hardly paid attention as to how to monetize them successfully. We used to even get calls saying, hey, I've built a new product, we've been working on it for the last two years, and oops, we need a price. And by the way, we needed it last week. When you couple that kind of reaction with the failure rate and innovation that we see in the Valley that is so high, the classic phrase that comes to mind when you take a step back and look at it is these companies were simply throwing spaghetti up against the wall and seeing if it sticks. In other words, the fundamental issue for the high failure rate is that pricing or commercialization was an afterthought to building the product. And that's what made me write this book, Monetizing Innovation. And I wish to flip that process in its head.

Yeah, it's interesting because I remember when I first read Steve Blank's book, the Four Steps to the Epiphany, he said something similar about getting customers, right? People would. They build the product and then after they were done with the product, they would go get customers. And that was kind of the thought process. And so Steve argued that you should develop products and customers in parallel, almost more like a dance than a sequence. And your book kind of makes the same point about pricing in many ways, right? Like you can't, you can't separate the price from the product itself. If you're thinking about it, the Right way.

That's right, yep. And it can't be an afterthought.

So then. And you have an example that I've always really liked, which was the Porsche Cayenne. You probably get asked to tell this story a lot of times, but I think listeners would find it interesting.

Sure. I think the point is best illustrated from what I call as the tale of two cars. You know, the first car in our story is from Fiat. So in 2014, they wanted to reintroduce the Dodge Dart in the market and really own the sedan market because they were missing that opportunity. There was a lot of excitement and fanfare. The innovation process was actually documented pretty well in a commercial they released. The process started with a lot of excitement. Engineers, designers, product folks obsessing over building the next awesome car. Prototype after prototype were built, destroyed, rebuilt, till the engineers thought that they had perfected the product. And when it was time to launch the car in the market, they chose a price of 15,995 and launched it in the market. This is the story of the first car. The second car in our story is the story of Porsche. Now, back in the 90s, they were driving off a financial cliff, if not at 200 miles per hour, pretty damn fast. They were known for their speed machines, but they came up with this idea to build an suv. That truly was a bold idea. And the innovation process they followed couldn't have been more drastically different than the Dodge they started by testing in the market whether there's an appetite for an SUV from Porsche before a single blueprint was actually made. To their pleasant surprise, they not only found an appetite, but also a willingness to pay for one. And what happened next was even more fascinating. Every feature that went into the car was battle tested with their customers and no amount of convincing by an engineer would do the trick. It needed to be approved in a customer test. What they were trying to do was to find if customers needed the features that they needed to build, did they value it, and more fundamentally, would they pay for these features? To give you an example, a six speed manual transmission, man, which is what Porsche was at least most famous for back then, was out of the window because customers did not need this in an suv, did not value it, and they're not willing to pay for this. Similarly, let's say a huge cup holder, which goes against the grain of most German engineers, was in because people needed it, valued it and were willing to pay for it. And on and on this went. And they designed the car around what customers need value and were willing to pay for. In short, around the price. The outcome from these two cars couldn't have been more different. The market watch actually documented Dodge Dart as the single biggest flop in 2015. And the car came out with a plethora of things that the customers, their customers were truly not looking for and definitely not willing to pay for. Porsche, on the other hand, had a dramatic success. I mean, the SUV was called Cayenne. Like you pointed out, one of the biggest successes in automotive history and accounts for almost half of Porsche's profits. So the moral of the story here is that pricing is key from the get go and needs to be brought up front in the innovation process and cannot be an afterthought.

So the other thing I really liked about the anecdote was this idea of sometimes you can define your customer base or your prospect base based on the people who are willing to pay a certain price, right? So you kind of say, okay, if we can't sell an SUV for more than say, I don't know what their cutoff was, like $75,000 or something like that, we're not going to make one. And so we're only going to make one if people pay more than that for it. And so the only people I'm interested in talking to are the people who potentially would, right? So if somebody says, well, my limit is to pay $50,000 for an SUV, part of what Porsche got right was they said, hey, that's wonderful for you, but we're not going to gather requirements from you.

That's exactly right. It's productizing to a price and not just pricing the product.

Before we jump into more examples of monetizing, well, maybe we should talk about the traps to avoid. And you've come up with a few good categories of mistakes and traps, so why don't we go through those?

In general, we see four failure patterns when it comes to monetizing innovation. The first one is what we call as a feature shock. So these are products where there is simply too much going on. The entrepreneur or the company, when they bought the product out, they just decided to actually put everything in the kitchen sink in a product and release the product. But at the end of the day, this product perhaps does not resonate with any particular person and it just feels like an excess. And the right way to do this would have been to version the products across segments. I mean, if you hear things like, for instance, let's just throw this feature in. Our customers don't know what they want. Most likely you're on to making a feature shock. And it happens even in some of the most amazing companies. Like, for instance, if you take Amazon, which is super successful, one of the most super successful companies of our times. If you look at the fire phone, you know, it came out with a plethora of features that no one was looking for, and it was just too much of an excess. And my favorite one, which I didn't like, there was four cameras that could actually track your eyeball movement so that you didn't need, you know, geeky glasses to get 3D perspective. While that might sound interesting, no one is willing to pay for it. And then if you have too many of these kind of features. The phone started with $179. In six months, it was 99 cents. And another three months, they wrote the business off.

So it's putting stuff into a product because you can.

Exactly. And not because you should.

And then I think your next trap, I think you call it minivations.

That is right. So minivations are products that are the, you know, are absolutely the right product market fit. But the company or the entrepreneur did not have the courage to charge the right price. So this is to give you a classic example. One of the semiconductor companies came up with a groundbreaking chip that was supposed to revolutionize consumer electronics. And they thought about how to come up with the pricing. There was literally no parallel in the market. I mean, they had done a previous generation at 65 cents. And they said, okay, you know what? We know about this thing called Moore's Law, and we know we have done something remarkably unique. Let's price this as 85 cents. And the worst kept secret in the room was everyone knew that they could have priced higher, but they just went for, like, 85 cents because they wanted to. You know, they were not sure this product flew off the shelves, but when they did a postmortem with their own clients, they, their consumer electronic companies were saying, hey, your product alone made us capture $50 from our customers. So 85 cents for, like, $50 of economic value generated is simply not fair. And they actually said they would have been just fine if this company had charged up to $5. So that's an example of a classic product market fit. But you just under monetize like crazy and built an innovation.

Why do you think that happens? Is it because the founder lacks confidence in their differentiation, or they feel sort of sheepish about asking for what the product's worth?

I think it's a combination of reasons. I think it starts with the founders not necessarily having the Courage, because it dampens their enthusiasm about the innovation. It's almost like the thing that kills the party. It's a buzz kill, right? And then it's also all kinds of business cases are usually done and you're trying to hit some numbers without truly understanding market willingness to pay and price elasticity. All of those business cases are useless in the sense that you're just trying to hit a number. And if you're trying to hit a number, the most intuitive thing that someone would say, let's lowball this and then see what happens. We'll beat expectations. So they start reducing the price, then what from what it should be. And they try to see that. They try to play the volume game when they should actually be playing both the pricing and the volume game. And I think the third thing is, which I would say the third reason is most entrepreneurs and founders, I mean, they still think of pricing as more of an art and they kind of like just come up with a price based on a gut feel, but I think hopefully monetizing innovation. One of the biggest goals for us was to show that there is a science and not just an art. And the science of pricing dominates the art. And, you know, as an entrepreneur or a company, you actually don't have a choice whether you'll have a pricing conversation with your customers. The only thing in your control is when you will have it, who takes the initiative and who takes the initiative. I mean, you can follow the Dodge Dot approach and have it after the fact and hope for the best, or follow the Porsche way, where you have these conversations much earlier to see if customers need and value your product and are willing to pay for it. I mean, in short, you're having this awesome sales and marketing conversation before you build a product. And if someone doesn't buy it before, chances are they're not going to bite afterwards.

It's as simple as, and particularly in the world of startups, we like to say that when you're a startup, a startup is a provocative act and the world is just doing what the world's doing. And so for you to move the needle for a potential customer, you have to do something unique that they're desperate for. And if, if you do something that, if there's something that only you can do that they're desperate for, you have to be not a very good business person to not monetize it, right? Like in theory, right? You're either, you're either really bad at pricing or you have. You. You over. Over believe in the value proposition of your product. But One of those two things is true 100%.

And I think the opposite also happens often where you should bring out a product but you don't because it goes against the grain of your company or DNA. Which actually brings me to the third monetizing innovation failure type, which is the hidden gems. These are products that a company should have launched but didn't have the courage to because it just went against their grain. I think the classic example here is like Kodak for instance. They had the IP for digital photographs back in the 70s, but they didn't bring this out because they're worried about cannibalizing their print business. And they didn't harness this hidden gem. And a hidden gem often happens when there's an inflection point like a hardware company trying to do software, software company trying to do hardware, offline companies trying to do online, online trying to do offline, etc. And if you don't look hard enough, you probably don't find the hidden gem and you don't harness it. I mean companies like for instance autotrader or cars.com it started by the Atlanta Daily or the Chicago Tribune when they actually realized that newspaper ads would be a thing of the past. And they created these two sided marketplaces and they're all now several billion dollar companies because they realize the hidden gem with the inflection point of the Internet, etc. I think. So that's again something that you want to watch out for.

So then you also talk about undead products. So what causes an undead product to happen?

Yeah, this is the fourth type and by far my favorite. We called it undead because in kind of classic science fiction movie fashion you should have never launched this product because they just come back to haunt you. And they come in.

It's the opposite of. It's the opposite of being non courageous. It's like exactly not having a healthy respect for what you're about to do to yourself.

Exactly. And they come in two varieties. They are an answer to a question that no one cares about or they are the wrong answer to the right question. Either way, you shouldn't have productized this because they come back to haunt you and in fact happens at again some of the most successful companies. Like if you take for instance Google Glass, probably dead on arrival. I mean only the paparazzi used it for like few weeks and it was done. The better thing to have done there was if they truly followed the principles of monetizing innovation, they would have found that the market opportunity is in B2B and not B2C. And productize this for like a B2B operations. Like for instance, if I'm a B doctor or if I'm a repair technician, the ability to actually have my hands available is fundamental and there's a willingness to pay. So I mean, productizing to B2B and then bringing to B2C might have been the right strategy. I mean, we hear now that Google is embarking on the Google Glass B2B strategy. So I think that is absolutely right. But for the B2C segment, it was the wrong answer to the right question and no one cared about it.

Are there other examples that are kind of famous in your analysis of this?

Yeah, I mean, the other one that comes to mind, recent one, is Juicero. Right?

Okay.

The $400 machine that probably reproduces the same test as like squeezing the fruit with your own hands. That's obviously an undead because there's a lot of bells and whistles. But at the end of the day, it's the wrong answer to the right question. Perhaps that was one and even segue. For instance, in the not so much in the recent past. Again, wrong answer to the right question because at 5,000 bucks or 10,000 when they were released, no one really wanted it, they didn't need it, they were not willing to pay for it, and only used in tourist malls and by probably cops nowadays after 10 years, I think they met their first year forecast.

I'm getting depressed by all these examples of people doing it wrong. Let's go back to people who did it right. Or let's talk about what founders can do, should do. Earlier you'd said that pricing needs to be intrinsic to the product from the get go. So how do you recommend founders engage customers early to find their willingness to pay?

So the idea is to achieve not just a product market fit, but what I call a product market pricing fit. For instance, if someone comes and asks me right now, I mean, do you like the headset that you're using? I would say, yeah, I like it. But if they ask me, do you like it for $400, the whole conversation is different. Right. So if I didn't put pricing as part of my product market test, I'm often hearing just what I want to hear. So the crux is to achieve a product market pricing fit and ensure that you have an idea that is commercializable when you're building it. So you're no longer hoping to monetize, but you truly know you will. So then you can dedicate all your resources to building an awesome product. Because you know there's a product market pricing fit. Test with customers to see whether they will need the innovation that you're building, do they value it? And then just ask them the question, will you pay for it? And if someone says no, ask them the most important question, which is why often you start hearing so much information that is useful to redesign your products in such a way that they will actually pay and you will maximize your success. Now put a price on your product in your product market test and see if people would purchase the product. Keep doubling that price till you reach a point where they start reacting violently. You know that you reach some kind of psychological threshold, right? Another way to test this is anchor people on a relative way. Like for instance, you know what this means is if you go and ask someone, how much should I charge for this? You will get nonsense back because people can't come up with these kind of answers. And frankly, you're passing on what you should do to your customers. Another really simple question to ask, but it has a ton of value is to what I call ask the acceptable expensive or prohibitively expensive questions. You know, have the sales and marketing conversation, put the product in front of your customers, pitch it, and then ask them, what do you think is an acceptable price for this idea or product? Of course, everyone wants to low ball. They love negotiating with themselves. They're going to give you an answer, Clock this answer, then ask them, what do you think is an expensive price? They'll give you an answer, clock it, and then ask them, what do you think is a prohibitively expensive price? Clock that one. And from our experience across, having done more than 25,000 projects in this space, what we really see is acceptable price tends to be the price that they not only love your product, but they also love your price. Expensive tends to be the price that is more value priced, as in that is the right price aligned with the value that you actually deliver. They won't hate you, they won't love you, but they will pay you for it. Prohibitively expensive tends to be the price that they will laugh you out of the room. I mean, even some simple kind of questions such as this would start giving you a range. And if people don't even give you an answer, then ask them why wouldn't they pay for it? And it's better to find out seven months before you release your product than seven months after.

Now the other point I love is how you charge is just as important as what you charge, maybe even more so. What's up with that?

This is one of the most important lessons in monetizing innovation. As in, because when you think about pricing, most people gravitate towards a dollar figure that's just a price point. I mean, when we think about price, we think about it as a measure. As in like when liter is a measure of volume, price is a measure of value. And when you think about it this way, price is a proxy for whether customers like your product, how badly do they, I mean, how much they like it and how much are they willing to pay for it. And hence, things like your pricing model become way more important than the price level that you actually choose for your products. Right? And focusing on this, as in how you charge is way more important than how much. For instance, take an example from an industry of tires. You know, like if you take tires, it's, it's a notorious industry for being price sensitive. I mean, you might have gone and walked into, you know, tire shops, at least back in the days. You see all these tires, they all kind of look similar, but they're priced very differently. And you don't know why you're paying what you're paying. So it's a very price sensitive market. And Michelin, they came up with a super innovative tire which was supposed to last 20% longer. And this was tires that they had made for truckers to like take goods from point A to point B. If they had just, you know, kept this tire, which was supposed to last for 20% longer, and asked for a 20% price premium, there is no chance they would have gotten it. What they actually did was they changed the way they charged for the tires. And this was a big innovation in the industry. Rather than charging on a per tire basis, what they said is we will charge based on a per kilometer or per mile basis. What happened was fantastic. I mean, the tires actually lasted for 20% more, so they recouped that. But the truckers love this kind of monetization model because it is aligned with the value that Michelin was bringing to the table. Now they could also like write in their invoices to their end customers that I've made,700 miles as a trip and here's a tire cost and actually even ended up passing it to customers in majority of situations. They just loved it. It was a phenomenal success. And if you don't think about how to charge, you might be severely limiting yourself in terms of your true monetizing opportunity.

The other component of what you're saying that really resonates with me is that a lot of Times people have low prices that are complicated and they're not successful and then in the same market would have adopted a product with a much higher price. That's simple. And so like I find that a lot of times customers gravitate to reasonable sounding models even if they're expensive.

That's correct.

Whereas they shy away from complicated sounding models because they figure that you're pulling a fast one on them somehow. Right. They're just like, it's just too, just too hard for me to get my head around this. It just doesn't, it just doesn't, you know, I'm not, I'm just not feeling it.

Right, Exactly. We actually, for our clients, we do a lot of break even tests with their customers to understand the best pricing model. Right. For instance, if I say I'm going to charge you 3% for every hundred dollars or I'm going to charge you $3 for every hundred dollars or I'm going to charge you one and a half in fixed and then 1.5%, which one would you choose? Or would you be indifferent? I mean, if you assume the economic human being that is probably the underpinning of most of what we learn in school, people would say I'm indifferent because all of the answers are the same. But I have yet to find an example where that is the outcome majority of the time. All of the times people would have a dominant model that they actually think is fair. Like, I mean a $3 probably sounds a bit more fair, for instance, for someone. And identifying this, you can start truly identifying these kind of pricing models that align with the value that you bring. So don't rush to things like, okay, I'm going to do a subscription for seed, for instance, because that feels comfortable, or that's what everyone else is doing. Understanding how to charge is fundamental and then how much? One simple test that we do, I mean, ask your customers to articulate your own pricing strategy back to you and if they can do it properly, they've truly gotten it. If they can't and they're struggling, then you actually know that you're creating all this complexity. To your point, it has to be simple, no brainer, give one back to them and then focus on how to monetize in a customer lifetime value perspective.

Now the other dimension of this I'm curious about, and I might be putting you on the spot here a little bit, Madhavan, is it's a little bit of a Clay Christensen angle. So I used to believe that if we were selling to a customer, you did not want to have a pricing model that was similar to the incumbent solution. And the reason for that is that now the incumbent has ways to co opt you. And not only that, the customer's unlikely to believe that they should pay you as much per seat as the incumbent per seat. And so now your price is capped as a function of the price the incumbent charges. So if you're, let's say that you're selling into an ERP environment, SAP is incumbent. You don't want to sell by the seat. You want to sell by the transaction or buy anything but the seat. Right. And one of the ways that I found having this willingness to pay discussion is to say, hey, look, in order for this relationship to work, I need to be able to make X dollars per transaction and not Y dollars per seat. Is there a world where that could happen? Or am I just. Did I just have my happy ears on? Am I in a state of denial? Right. But now you kind of enlist the customer in helping you come up with a reason for him to say, that's justified.

Yep, absolutely.

And now SAP can't come back at you and co opt you by just lowering the price or by just saying, oh yeah, we're gonna have that product on our roadmap, we'll just give it to you. You know, now all of a sudden you're going to market with an orthogonal strategy that's much more disorienting to the incumbents.

Exactly. I mean, you wish that everyone would do that. Disrupting a existing space doesn't mean charging lower, but even charging differently, as in the pricing model. And I think that's an important lesson. I do agree with everything you said. I mean, for instance, the classic example is Netflix having a totally different model than Blockbuster back in the day. Right. I mean, and the whole comparison is different. And it's you, you make it harder to compare because you, you try to make a model that actually intuitively makes sense to people rather than trying to follow existing patterns and charge lower. Because you're just probably not bringing as much value to the table as someone else. Right. So I think in those situations, the how you charge becomes even more important. So I definitely agree with your point of view.

Now, you've, you've also talked about segmenting by willingness to pay. How do you think about that? And how do you segment by willingness to pay without just being all over the place and having too many products and losing focus?

I think, first of all, I hope that people would segment because more often than not, I hear I'm building a One size fits all. Typically what I tell them is you're building a one size fits none. As in, we have not found a single market where the needs and preferences are homogeneous. I mean, your customers are heterogeneous whether you like it or not. And building products for those heterogeneous customers is the key. I mean, even take a simple example, like the water we drink in a fountain, it's free, in a bottle, it's $2. You put gas in it, it's $2.50. Now throw it in a mini bar, it's $5, it's the same damn water. The crux of segmentation is that you need to build products, two segments. If you're building a product and then try to position two different segments, you've kind of already lost the battle. So you need to productize towards segments. And even if you're a startup which does not have resources to, let's say, focus on building many versions, do this exercise, find out whether customers need your product, do they value it, are they willing to pay for it? Identify clusters and segments of customers based on this information and then decide which one you want to prioritize and build the right product for the right segment and then bring the versions out rather than throwing everything in the kitchen sink. Assuming that you will build your product for your average customer, but in reality such an average customer does not exist. Right. So that's, that's the key. It's doing segmentation based on needs, value and willingness to pay. I mean, in Silicon Valley at least, I mean, segmentation is a known topic. I mean, when we go and ask people, you know, do you have a segmentation strategy? Many people might say it, but the point is they do segmentation based on things like demographics and Personas and get it horribly wrong.

They look at it like it's a classification scheme. Right. What they don't realize is that it should guide all your go to market strategy.

Exactly. And my favorite example is if you think of a person who's 69, incredibly wealthy, married, lives in the United Kingdom in a castle and has two children, you perhaps thought about Prince Charles, but that also fits Ozzy Osbourne. And I would bet that their needs are very different, they value things differently and are willing to pay for those things differently. You would hope, you would hope if you just segment based on demographics, you're just going to get it wrong.

Are there any other resources about pricing out there monetization that you think are really good that people should know about?

Yeah, I think I can probably point to like three resources. The first one is there are firms like First Round or Open View who have put out a lot of good articles on pricing. I mean, Kyle Poyar, for instance, from Open View has written some really good articles on pricing, especially for startups and SaaS companies. So I think that's a great resource. The second one I would probably say is there's a. Believe it or not, there's an organization called the Professional Pricing Society, and it's actually.

Sounds like a zany group.

Yeah, Exactly. I mean, 10 years ago, no one had pricing as part of their job titles, but you see hundreds and thousands of people nowadays. I mean, as in, it's becoming more of known that pricing is a science, not just an art. So I think they have some really good resources that you can tap into courses that you can take, et cetera. And I think the third one that I would say is another book that we wrote at Simon Kutcher. It is actually written by Mr. Simon of Simon Kutcher. It's called the Confessions of the Pricing Man. So he's a founder of our company, started this 34 years ago. I find that fascinating and I cannot say that's the better book out of monetizing innovation and confession.

So you gotta put one in for the boss.

Yeah, something like that. So.

So, you know, somewhere out there there's a founder with very grand ambitions and at the very early stages of their journey, they've got all the degrees of freedom in front of them. Although lots of clouds ahead too, in this environment. What are some other things that we haven't covered so far in our discussion that you think are super important for them to know?

I think the four words that I have in mind for entrepreneurs who are starting out and who have big dreams, the four words to remember is price before product. Period.

I like that. Well, thanks, Madhavana. It was a pleasure talking to you. I think people are going to really like this.

Absolutely. Thanks, Mike, and enjoyed being on your show.

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