Private Governance: Creating a Market in AI Regulation, with Dr. Gillian Hadfield & Andrew Freedman

Hello, and welcome back to The Cognitive Revolution. Today we're kicking off a short series on creative AI governance proposals, and I'm speaking with Dr. Gillian Hadfield, Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of AI Alignment and Governance at Johns Hopkins University, and Andrew Friedman, co-founder and chief strategy officer at Fathom, about their proposal to govern AI via private regulatory markets. AI is, to put it mildly, a hard technology for society to effectively manage. The relentless march of capabilities advances, the radical uncertainty about how powerful AI systems will get and how soon, the feverish pace of adoption, and the increasingly intense international competition combine to create huge stakes, but still very little clarity on what should be done, with legitimate worries that even the most tech-savvy policymakers could easily get things wrong. And yet, while highly prescriptive government regulation of the sort that Europe is attempting with their AI Act doesn't seem to me likely to meet the moment, the fact that xAI can credibly claim frontier capabilities even while Grok-4 continues to self-identify as Hitler suggests that a laissez-faire free-for-all won't serve us well for all that much longer either. Is there any way to create a governance regime that's agile enough to keep up with AI developments? Sophisticated enough to address the most important and extreme risks, and yet not so burdensome that I'll still be able to have my AI doctor? It's a hard problem, but Dr. Hadfield and Andrew have a very interesting proposal to harness market mechanisms and hopefully create a race to the top in AI safety standards. It's been introduced into California's legislative process as SB 813, and from what I hear, it does seem to be gaining traction in a number of red states, as well. The core idea is to separate the process of democratic deliberation about the outcomes we want and want to avoid from the detailed rulemaking process meant to get us there. In concrete terms, a government body, perhaps the California Attorney General, or perhaps a newly created AI safety board, would articulate goals like AI systems must not enable the development of bioweapons, or standards like autonomous vehicles must be safer than human drivers. And then create a competitive ecosystem of private certifiers who develop the safety standards, engage the companies to make sure they're properly implemented, and then report back to the government and public on results. Companies could then choose to work with these approved certifiers, and in exchange for meeting their standards, would receive some level of liability protection when things still end up going wrong. Which, given the unwieldiness of AI systems generally and the unsettled nature of AI liability law, is a serious incentive that would presumably convince many companies to opt in to participate in the system. As a lifelong libertarian, I really like the idea of trying to bring market dynamism to AI governance. And I appreciate that while this idea is new to the public now, Dr. Hadfield has been developing such concepts for decades, even working with Anthropic co-founder and policy lead Jack Clark on related ideas as early as 2019. Andrew, for his part, brings invaluable practical implementation experience to the table as well, having worked as Colorado's cannabis czar while the state was rolling out a new regulatory system for legal marijuana. Nevertheless, as you'll hear, I pressed them on several important concerns. How do we avoid a race to the bottom where companies simply choose the most permissive certifier? How would the liability protections interact with existing tort law, and what exactly are people giving up in terms of their ability to sue? Do we have any organizations that could step up and do a good job in the role of private regulator? And who do we really have to trust to do a good job for such a system to work, not just in the beginning, but on an ongoing basis? In the end, there's no silver bullet. Any governance system that we might design does ultimately rely on some number of people doing a good job in key roles. But I do come away from this conversation optimistic that an arrangement of this sort, if it could put the good folks at FAR AI, NEDR, or other similarly tech-savvy organizations in a position of some real authority, could deliver much more responsive regulation than the government could muster on its own, while also making sure that society is not flying entirely blind into the fast-approaching AI future. Coming up soon, we'll have another episode with Professor Gabriel Weil, who has a very different proposal to address many of the same core concerns via liability law. So please stay tuned for that, and definitely reach out to let me know which of these ideas you find most promising, Or if there are other proposals that you think would be better yet. With that, I hope you enjoy this exploration of a proposal to harness market dynamism to effectively govern AI technology with Dr. Gillian Hadfield of Johns Hopkins and Andrew Friedman of Fathom.

Dr. Gillian Hadfield, Bloomberg Distinguished Professor of AI Alignment and Governance at Johns Hopkins University, and Andrew Friedman, co-founder and chief strategy officer at Fathom. Welcome to the Cognitive Revolution.

Pleasure to be here. Thanks for having us.

I'm excited for the conversation. You guys are working on some very interesting stuff. I'm always looking out for creative solutions to the vexing problems of AI that we have in the governance space. Obviously, we're kind of still flying pretty much naked here through this rapidly cresting technology wave. And I think you guys have got a very interesting proposal. I understand that there's kind of a one-two punch maybe that we'll want to keep in mind for this conversation, one being like the general sort of set of ideas.

Yeah.

And then second, but also very important, this is being introduced now into the California state legislative process with an actual bill that will at some point either get revised or get passed or hopefully maybe even one day could come into law. Maybe for starters, tell us what you're up to. Like, give us the kind of grand landscape of this private governance notion.

Yeah, let me— I'll start with there because really so much of the heart of this idea comes from Professor Hadfield. I'll talk about how Fathom got interested in it. Fathom started just over a year ago, really on the notion that AI was going to, for better or worse, break a lot of things, governance being one of them. Obviously a lot of the way that we interact as a society, a lot of the way we interact as an economy. And then we as a society, we're going to have to figure out how to put it back together. And generally tech policy has been left to tech to figure out tech policy. And this was so much of a broader societal issue. And so how do we start not just a think tank, but an organization that could help rise the ideas up from society that are going to best fill the needs needed here and then help build them. And that's really what Fathom has based its mission around. The very first thing we ran across when we went out and did tons of polling and qualitative work, meeting with leaders across industry segments and society, was everybody thought that governance was needed here. Almost everyone agreed that the current ways of thinking about, of kind of heavy-handed up from the top down governance was probably not going to work for AI, but also simply leaving everything to society was also not— or leaving everything to the labs was also not going to solve for society. So that began a journey for us of, okay, if those aren't the solutions, where are the solutions? And it turns out that the professor has been thinking about this for a very long time and has some amazing thoughts on there. And there's some other thought leaders, Dean Ball being one of them as well, who really thought that there was a third way to start thinking about this that was not generally brought up in public. So I'll leave that there of how Fathom became interested in it and toss it over to the professor.

OK, Gillian, Gillian. Yeah, so I've been thinking for decades in my career about how well our legal and regulatory systems perform. I worked on access to justice for a long time and then started thinking about the way our legal and regulatory systems are responding to technology and global somewhere in the mid-2000s, sort of just recognizing that our, you know, the systems we developed for making law and regulation really starting in the 19th century were really no longer fit for purpose. They didn't keep up with the complexity and the speed and the multi-jurisdictional nature of the world we live in. AI just ramps that up several levels, right? So that So, we just had this real mismatch between the way we make law and regulation and the way technology is now, the speed with which it moves, the complexity with which it moves. So, I started thinking about, okay, so how do we need to adapt our approaches to building that regulatory infrastructure for a much faster-moving, complex, and now AI-based world? And that's when I started thinking about How do we get markets involved more in figuring out our regulatory problem? And as a starting point, we can talk more about this. It's really important to recognize that regulation is actually the thing we build in. It's actually not something that is sort of just dragging down markets. So sometimes I started writing about this quite some time ago as well. You know, the idea our markets are built on good legal and regulatory infrastructure: contract, property, fraud, antitrust—all that good. Stuff, frankly, that allows people to invest and participate in markets with confidence. So it was like, okay, so if we have stuff moving at the speed of very rapidly adapting markets that are producing the technology, how do we get more of that market energy and investment into solving the problem of what's the best way to build that regulatory infrastructure for technology? So that led to this concept of regulatory markets, which is the idea that we still need our governments involved in setting what is the acceptable risk level for society, making judgments about what we will and won't allow. But then the technical question of, but how do we translate that into what companies, labs, et cetera, actually need to do? Like from a technical, we need to get more market activity into into that phase. So, we can talk more in detail about how this all works, but that's really where it came from. And then Jack Clark and I wrote a paper in 2019 when I was on contract and he was a policy director at OpenAI, proposing that this was a model for AI safety. And so, we've just been building on that since then.

That's interesting. I didn't know that tidbit that it goes back to 2019 and that you were working with Jack at that time. I don't know if it was Luigi Zingales who said this, or I forget where the source of the quote was, but I always remember this quote: Markets are not free or unfree. Markets have rules, and some rules work better than others.

Perfect. I, I, it, yeah, constant refrain: no such thing as a free market. And this I've been doing my entire career. So my, my PhD is in economics. I did it jointly with a law degree, and the focus there is like, oh, there's all this institutional structure, like market— markets— economists assume that markets just— they had— they did assume markets just kind of existed. This was, you know, honestly, the afterfall of the Soviet Union and the shift from socialist economies to market-based economies. And economists just kind of said, oh, we'll just get rid of all that government control over industry and markets will flourish. And they did not, because if you didn't have good legal systems for enforcing contract rights and property rights and intellectual property rights and good regulation, markets don't thrive. So fabulous quote. It's exactly the right one. There's no such thing as a free market. There's healthy markets that are well structured with good legal underpinnings and the kind of regulation that makes everybody willing to invest. Participate, you know. Anyway, that's what leads to a vibrant market. And we kind of know this around the world because we know that the countries that struggle on the development side, they don't have good rule of law, they don't have good legal underpinnings, and nobody wants to invest there. So I think that's a really, really important observation.

So before we get into the details of the private governance structure and the way that's instantiated in SB 813 and possibly some variations on that. Let's take a minute and just cover what do you see as the fundamental problem with either the sort of top-down approach? And you can kind of characterise top-down as you will. I mean, there was not too long ago somebody like Sam Altman was saying maybe we need licensing for frontier models. Obviously he's backed off of that. Something like SB 1047 was sort of, in my view, fairly light touch, but still had some elements of top-down in that there were statutory thresholds, which I think the critics have been at least partially vindicated in that those thresholds do— they haven't aged super well and it hasn't been a super long time. So interested in the problems in that, but also interested in kind of the problems on the other end of like, why do we need new rules here? I mean, some might say, You know, we've got general rules for commerce. You know, is this really that different? Why, why should we think of this as being different than any other new product that somebody might bring to market that doesn't, you know, and by the way, I don't really buy that. Of course, like, I spend all my time thinking about this, but I'd like to hear your kind of dismantling of that naive notion.

So is that directed to me? From, from the point of view of thinking about regulation as a thing we're trying to accomplish for healthy societies, prosperous societies, fair societies. You know, top-down governance just becomes more and more untenable if you're setting the detailed rules. It becomes more untenable the more complex technologies are, the more quickly they develop, the more jurisdictions they're in, right? The number— because you're setting rules that you've got to follow everywhere. So, so you need I mean, so I'm an economist and I'm a big fan of markets, but not for any ideological reasons, but because they're good information processing and discovering engines, right? They're down at the ground level. They're responding to what's happening, you know, in the trenches. And you need that kind of information to sort of figure out what's the right way to regulate and the right way to regulate, right? Like to capture the benefits. of promoting innovation and, you know, getting efficient markets and so on, but at the same time establishing those ground rules that make everybody feel confident and willing to invest in and participate. So the problem with the top-down approach is governments, it's just very hard for them to have access to that one, that kind of information there. You know, we do have ways of getting that. We've developed those over about 20th century, like with chemists and people who have expertise in biology and forests and clean water and so on. But when you need to move at the speed with which the technology is advancing, it's just that you have this real mismatch. Like you need this information from, from the ground level, but then you have a process in our legislatures and courts and agencies that just operates on a different timescale. And it's just very hard to keep up. And of course, one of the things we've observed in that process over the last several decades is, you know, that process has in many ways gotten more ponderous. Like the length of our laws is a lot, you know, they're a lot longer than they used to be. Opinions out of courts are a lot longer than they used to be. It takes a lot longer to accomplish stuff and that means you don't revisit it. So it just, it's just like, there's just so much sand in the gears and we don't, we don't keep up very well. So it's, I think that's the issue with the top-down. So what you want to try and do is you want to find a way to get all that intelligence from the ground level into your regulatory system without abandoning the ultimate democratic control. Because we as a collective need to be deciding what's okay, what's not okay. Are we taking this risk with autonomous vehicles or companion AI or various algorithmic decision-making? We need to be making those decisions. But can we separate out making those risk adjustments and then the technical process? What do you need to know about how this works? Like what data you should train on, what red team tests you should do, all that kind of detail. Can we get that? So I think that's the issue with trying to do that all top-down from government.

I think the only thing I'd love to dovetail to that is my first job in emerging regulatory systems was I was cannabis czar in Colorado for the rollout of its regulatory system. And that in so many ways is a much simpler policy than AI is ever going to be. And we already thought that that touched like Every area of Colorado law at that time. And the thing, the strength of the system to which, you know, I think muddled success throughout the nation on it, but the strength of it was that whenever we set up a system that was more iterative and was able to say like, oh, here's a problem. We didn't see edibles coming up in this way. And now we can like change edible rules and get there and understand. I think the idea that at any one time we can predict where the AI system is going and create good guardrails that will make sense even 6 months later is wrong. And so the challenges are going to be huge. The opportunities are going to be huge, but our ability to predict the future will be very low. And so part of what attracts me so much to this system is it is a way to put independent subject matter experts up front and allow them to continue to make decisions over time about what good looks like. The second part I'd put in that is I do think that if industry understands what good looks like according to independent subject matter experts and understand that that is going to be in some way universally applied to them, then that's the brass ring they're going to start reaching for. I do think that when you create top-down measures, that tends to become a floor that then goes and is thrown to a compliance department. And the compliance department is, here's all the boxes we got to check in order to say we technically meet this, but we're not going to get in the way of the business unit, which is out doing its own thing. And so again, that structure is, I think, going to do more to make sure that lawyers have a job in the future of AI than it is to make sure that we're— and both Gillian and I are lawyers, so no shade thrown there— but then to ensure that what is happening is actually in the best interest of the public.

Hey, we'll continue our interview in a moment after a word from our sponsors. So let's describe the mechanism. I'll let you do it. There's kind of 3 tiers, but yeah, floor is yours. Tell us what you're doing.

Let me take a first hack at it and then have Gillian clean up everything. So the most, what I would say, full instantiation of this idea is in Senate Bill 813. But this is, I think, broadly going to be a conversation we want to have many times over many different ways. And I also think SB 813 requires quite a bit of revision. So I don't want to get too in the weeds there. But there's 2 ideas there. One is how do you set up something like a regulatory markets mechanism to be able to identify third-party auditors, private-side regulators, verifiers, certifiers who really know what good looks like, what best practices are at all times, and have the ability to prove to both companies and the government that they can actually verify claims and that companies really are meeting these best practices. They would scope where their expertise lies in some way, saying, we are maybe AI as it pertains to chatbots or automotive vehicles, and these are the sort of safety parameters we're looking at. And an AI either developer or application or a deployer would come in and say, you know, we're worried about the risk that we are going to be taking on by utilizing it the way we're utilizing it. So we want to be certified that we're meeting best practices. And they enter into a process to be certified by these third-party groups that they're meeting best practices. And if they can show that, Senate Bill 813 would say that should be proof on the back end that if something bad does happen, that you've met a standard of care, that you've met some form of duty to the public and should, should count as— liability shield is probably too strong of a word, but evidence in court that you did the best you should be doing and you're meeting that duty of care. Meanwhile, the third-party auditor certifiers, verifiers at that point, are constantly going back to, to the California government and saying, here's proof that when we certify people, they're doing better in the world. Our certified AI cars are getting in fewer crashes. Our chatbots are causing fewer issues amongst teenagers. We are beating not only maybe the status quo of how it would be without us, but we are in fact performing higher than other certifiers in this area. And therefore, there's some race to the top to be able to show we should be able to keep our ability to certify against somebody who cannot prove that they're doing as good of a job in this field.

So, Andrew's given you the kind of the version of where, you know, maybe a particular implementation of it, how it's— and I think there's, because there's a lot of questions about how do you get to this. It's a real transformation in the way we approach regulation. And when I first started working on this, as I said, before I was focusing on AI, so a book I released in 2017, was just talking about, yeah, we're going to need to change the way we approach regulation and add this kind of tool to our toolkit because most technology is moving very fast. We have very decentralized supply chains and so on. So I'm going to— I'm just going to talk about the kind of the more abstract version of this and compare it to that idea of the, you know, the top-down version. So if you think about just the sketch, of what, you know, what, you know, the caricature, the cartoon of regulation is government sets rules, companies that are regulated by government have to, you know, follow those rules, and then government monitors to see if they're in violation and, you know, fines them or takes them out of business or something like that. So it's, it's a, it gets called command and control or prescriptive regulation. And people have been working on design of regulation to be more agile and adaptive for quite some time. And one of the developers developments there has been the idea of what's called like performance-based regulation, which said, okay, so under— let's just take the example of pollution control. Like the command-and-control version of that is the government says, here's the particular scrubbers you have to install into your smokestacks, right? It's a very 1970s version of a regulatory problem, but here's the technology you have to adopt. in order to achieve what we think as the government is the, you know, acceptable level of pollution. A performance-based approach to that says, okay, government's going to say, here's the acceptable level of pollution coming out of the top of the smokestack. You, factory, figure out what's the best technology to do that. And different companies, different factories could use different technologies. People could, you know, companies could arise that would say, help to develop that technology, here's a more effective, cost-effective one. But the target, you had to be in compliance for the government, you had to reach those output goals. So the way a regulatory market structure works is, okay, let's take that idea of government setting the outcomes. Here's the acceptable level of accidents for autonomous vehicles. We want to see uplift, any uplift for, you know, capacity to develop bioweapons falls, you know, below a threshold level. It doesn't have to be a threshold that's set in numerical terms. It could be qualitative, judged by experts. Our tort standards are actually outcome-based, right? We want to see companies take reasonable precautions to prevent harm. And then you say to, instead of just saying to the regulated company, you figure it out, Right? You then say, actually, what we want is to develop a whole sector of independent firms that are engaged directly in the project of figuring out the best way to achieve those outcomes. So you have licensing that happens or oversight that happens. Governments, you know, will license what I'm going to call regulatory services providers in different contexts, in different pieces of legislation. you know, other ways of thinking about how we characterize them, but I'm just going to call them regulatory services providers. They are licensed on the basis of demonstrating that their approach, their technology, their rules achieves that outcome. And then the companies that you're trying to regulate, I call the target companies, they select a regulator from those in that market, right, from those those approved regulators. I mean, in the version that, you know, we were originally proposing, and sort of again in the theoretical framework, was, okay, that's mandated. Like, those companies have to select regulators. So in the pollution context would be, you can't come up with your own approach, but you can select a company that's been approved for this. And, and the idea then, and a key idea there, this is the market ideas, like, we actually need a vibrant market where we're getting investment, we're attracting financial capital, human capital to the project of what's the best way to achieve this outcome. You know, is it red teaming tests? Is it review of the data? Is it, you know, embedded, you know, officials observing the process, right? We actually don't know the best way to regulate to achieve our goals with respect to AI. So I think the basic structure is Government sets outcomes. You have an independent sector of companies that are specializing, and they could be nonprofit companies, by the way. It doesn't have to be for-profit. Nonprofit, profit companies that are specializing in developing the technology of achieving that goal. And then that the third component is, of course, your target companies that you're trying to regulate. And, and Andrew was sort of appealing to the fact that actually there's We're pretty familiar with lots of private actors playing a role in our very complex regulatory systems today— certifiers, auditors. I mean, lawyers play a role in that sense. They have professional obligations to keep their eye on what's happening inside the firm to make sure that it's law-abiding. And so we have accountants who are doing oversight roles like that. So, you know, part of getting to that ideal version I just described is to say, okay, how do you, how do you start to move our existing markets more in the direction of providing greater oversight and providing more of the substantive content of what is it the lab actually has to— that's what they want to know. What do we have to do to limit our liability or to be in compliance with government requirements?

So how similar is this to other things that exist today? I'm not aware of any like major sectors that have such a market today. I'm also not quite sure how core to the idea of the liability protection is, or if that is sort of one of many carrots or one of many deals that could be made. And then I'm thinking, like, how similar is this to, for example, things like the auto industry, where obviously there's a lot of regulation there, there's a lot of standards? Do we in fact have, even if it's not necessarily through this sort of market structure? Do we in fact have a similar deal already in place with car companies where as long as they're hitting certain standards, even if they were maybe just prescribed by an agency or whatever, that they do in fact get liability protection from that? So, yeah, several compare and contrast points.

The best I can say on it is this smells a lot like other things, but it is novel in some ways. And the novelty, I think, is important in a couple of ways, but the one I like the most to compare it to is Underwriters Lab, UL. If you pick up any consumer electric good in your house, it will have a little stamp that says UL. And that company was started during a World's Fair in, I think, late 19th century because they didn't want their entire fair to go up in flames. And so they brought in an independent subject matter expert group to be able to inspect all of these different shows that are going to happen at all these places and make sure that there wasn't a fire liability there. And that group kind of took off, right? And found their way into a number of different arenas to be able to say, like, we have a viable— we have a really valuable thing we can add to you, right? You don't have to trust every consumer product that comes your way, that there's actually— maybe you should just require those consumer products to go get this UL stamp. And About 100 years later, UL started to get written straight and codified straight into law. I do think that there is a need to make sure that public good is more directly instantiated into these private governance worlds. Meaning, like, I don't believe that if we let it go, we will find that there's just going to be enough verifiers, auditors, and ecosystem out there that all have enough of a true north pointing to what is societal good to be able to solve this problem for us. Meaning that leaving this to the private side without any sort of government accountability to solve will probably do more to create things that cover the butts of the labs and less to make sure that what's happening is actually doing the most to protect public good. So I do think that, in particular, Gillian's Race to the Top mechanism that she's putting in that really requires some amount of accountability and sets the goals of these companies really via public legislation is a vital aspect to it. I also believe we don't have 100 years to wait for these things to kind of organically grow up inside these systems and find their ways to it. This has to be— we have to take the lessons from a UL and say, how do we supercharge that? How do we make sure it's accountable? How do we make sure it doesn't get captured by industry? And how do we make sure that its true north is pointing in the right direction?

Hey, we'll continue our interview in a moment after a word from our sponsors.

Yeah, I think it's exactly right to say this is novel. So, you can't point to an existing, here's the full-on, full-scale model already implemented in this industry. This is a proposal for something we don't have yet that I think we need. It's about being innovative in our legal and regulatory technology in the way that we are innovative in the underlying technology. But there's lots and lots of things that kind of come up to the doorstep. So Anders emphasized standard, like, you know, entities that perform the function of identity. You know, we're going to create standards and requirements and very specific technical requirements. And then those are going to get played out into the market. Right? That's a market in the sense that Underwriters Laboratory and other entities, we have lots of standard-setting organizations, ISO and so on, that those are nonprofit companies that are in the business of creating standards and sometimes very, very technical standards. And then they can be, oh, they're adopted because they have, you know, they have a good impact on the market share for that company, or they get implemented and picked up by government that says, okay, if you want to be in compliance with the California regulations on building farm equipment. You know, you have to have followed the standards from this organization. One of the examples I like to give of something that gets kind of close, and it sometimes is helpful to think as a model, is actually the regulation of medical devices and quality production in medical devices, where governments have said— and it's actually a consortium of 5 countries, Canada, the US, And I think, well, I'm not going to remember the other countries, but it's a consortium of about 5 countries that have said each of the countries is going to choose their own standard for quality control in medical device production. And the US has an FDA standard. Canada uses the ISO standard, the ISO being a nonprofit standard-setting body. But then collectively, they have produced an approved list of authorized certifiers of compliance with those standards. And then they have a rule that says, well, if you've been— it's a single audit— if you've been approved by one of these approved— if you've been certified by one of these approved certifiers, then you can sell your medical devices in all of our, you know, all the countries in the consortium. So that's, you know, some example of, like I say, we've got pieces of this. I always like to emphasize too that this is Part of the development of regulation, often the history of regulation in a new area starts off in the private sector. So securities regulation, you know, starts off with, you know, private organizations, stock exchanges, right, saying, here's our rules. If you want to participate on our stock exchange, you have to engage in this kind of disclosure. That's caught, you know, the disclosure helps bring more people to the exchange. And then that gets picked up by government and it sort of develops in this, on this private basis and gets picked up and integrated into government. And today, sort of regulation of financial transactions has important roles for these private entities. For example, FINRA, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, I think it is, it is a private membership organization, but then it's overseen by the SEC. The SEC actually approves the rules that FINRA uses to oversee its members. So there's, there's lots of examples of this public-private integration in our current regulatory regime. They're much more complex than that kind of cartoon of that I was giving you earlier of like the, you know, command and control, government sets the rules and companies have to comply. It's really a very complex system and overlap. So this kind of takes it to the next level. And it says, let's really lean into that outcome-based role for government and try to get more market activity around what's the best way to achieve these regulatory objectives. I think it's also— your question, Nathan, also went to liability and carrots and so on. And so I think it's important to keep these things kind of distinct, just like what's the model, like what's the regulatory structure we want to get to, and then to think about how do you get there. So like in the original proposals about this. As I mentioned, it was like, well, let's— we just mandate it, just like we mandate compliance with securities laws or health and safety rules or automobile safety requirements. We can just mandate you must purchase the services of an approved regulator. But of course, you know, it takes some time to get there. We need to actually evolve this market. We need to build this market. We don't have Lots of players in the market. It'd be very hard to turn around tomorrow and say, you must buy the services of an approved regulator in some of these AI domains because it just— you just don't have the market there. So the vision behind something like SB 813 is to say, how can we move ourselves towards that? And so that's where you start to think, oh, well, just like there's a there's a market-based incentive to say get the UL certification mark on your product. You know, can we create an incentive that says, well, you don't have to come and participate in this structure, you don't have to purchase these services. We're going to create that market, we're going to create a mechanism for government to say these are approved providers of this service. But we're going to create an incentive for that because If you do that, you will have the capacity to demonstrate that you've met your compliance requirement. Like, if you get sued, you'll be able to say, oh, but I was following the program. I was in compliance with the requirements of this approved regulator. The government, you know, the state had said this is an approved oversight body, verification body, certifier. And so that, that could just be an argument in your tort case, or it could have a formal, formal role in your tort case. So you've actually got a legal benefit that says you're entitled now to a presumption that you were in compliance with your, your tort liability duty, because the government started off by saying, oh, we're only going to approve those entities that are actually able to demonstrate that if you did what they required, you were in compliance with your tort duty.

I, I will say, um, yeah, go ahead. SB 813 and some of these things, it's like almost like 2 complex ideas put into one that, that do have interesting ways they play off each other. Um, uh, some things I like about tort being the backdrop for why you would want to enter this is, one, it does, it does force the market to decide where the risk is, right? And some players get to come in and say, you know, let's say we're certifying for something that the leading labs are just like, that is not a thing we think we'll ever get sued on. And it's not a problem we think will ever come up. Then that part of the market holds no value, right? And so there's a little bit of where do you actually think the harm is going to come from that forces everybody to get a little real on that, right? And so instead of there being 10,000 cases and they're all kind of edge cases and it forces people to start saying like, where's the brunt of where we really need need to focus in order to work on that. So I like that part of it. The second thing that's a little bit elegant on that is tort as a backdrop has this kind of feature of being both national, even when it's not federal. So the common law just applies everywhere in the United States. And for those like kind of unfamiliar with tort law, it's part of kind of the— it was brought over from England and It was this idea that it's kind of what makes us all whole in the background of everything going on in society. And it differs from state to state, but there's just a lot of commonality across states. And so meeting your duty of care in one state can be proof that you're meeting your duty of care in another state. And so at a time where I think there's a lot of fear that proposals are going to be creating a patchwork between the states, These 2 ideas combined can— you could imagine a world where it creates national, maybe even international private-side regulators who provide a very real good across different state— across state lines. And again, even internationally, that there's a carrot there that doesn't complicate compliance. It actually starts to really centralize and focus where we should be worried and how we can meet compliance goals.

So can you calibrate me on what— I mean, I guess this could obviously be set at various levels, right? And I understand that there's sort of a distinction, again, between the sort of more diffuse academic layer of ideas and the specific statutory proposal that's on the table in California. How much would the public be giving up in terms of its ability to sue if SB 813 were to go into effect, maybe calibrate me on how does that compare to pharma or auto?

Yeah.

I generally have the sense that if I get into a car accident, I can't sue the carmaker, but maybe in some cases I can. I don't know exactly. There's always a carve-out on something, right? And similarly, if I have an adverse reaction to a drug, I probably can't sue the drugmaker unless maybe they sent me a tainted pill or something, right? So I don't quite understand what the limits are, even in the world that I inhabit today with products I'm very familiar with, and not sure how that translates to AI. Where, by the way, just to complicate things a little further, we've got very familiar things like an AI might drive my car, or it might make me a medical diagnosis and recommend a treatment, or it might become my romantic partner. And then I have no idea how to even think about what I would be— how does one taxonomise that? But we can maybe leave that for part 2. First question is just like, what is the trade that SB 813 is proposing? How does that compare? And, you know, do you think it is the right balance? Or how would you maybe revise it, if at all?

Yeah, great questions. First of all, not only do you not know that, but literally no one knows it. So far in the world of— we're kind of, I think we're kind of skating to where we believe the puck is going here a little bit. So far in the world of technology, it really has been fairly shielded from tort law. It comes up, but in limited situations. And I believe, and I think a lot of people would say, and I think even tech companies are starting to understand that the agentic nature of AI, AI as being more than an algorithm that's going to say, as long as you spit in this information, this is the information that comes out on the other side, but in fact being an actor in the world, world is going to bring it into a world of liability that I don't think tech has been in before. And the nearest proof we have to that is the Character AI case, which just survived a motion to dismiss, but, you know, did— is the chatbot example of being open for tort law. My guess is, and I think it's pretty reasonable to say, that the hundreds of state judges across the country are going to find various levels liability for developers, for deployers, for applications, for— and so the kind of the full stack of like people involved in AI will have to start worrying about liability in a way that they didn't. And consumers, on the other hand, will have options for suing in cases where something bad happens to them that they can say, you know, it really was, you know, all the way back at the model level. Where 813 sits currently is that this is a rebuttable presumption, to get kind of nerdy about it. So— Please. It's encouraged. This counts as evidence, but if you can come in with any sort of other evidence that they didn't meet it. So, okay, if you really want me to get nerdy, here's the nerdy part. One of the elements of tort law is always going to be, did you meet a duty of care? And there's lots of different ways of cutting up duty of care. Sometimes there's something called strict liability where nothing, you know, if it causes a harm, it's your fault versus was there negligence? Was there gross negligence? Did you clearly do something intentional? There's a lot of different theories of duty of care that come in. And then the question is, whatever you fall in, did you reach that? None of that has really played out in AI at this point. And so ours is a fairly light touch as it sits right now. It says, One of the ways you can think about it is, is, was the comp— was the— was whoever wanted to go get the certification, were they acting negligently? And our thing would say this test should stand as a good amount of proof that you were not acting negligently. If you can come in with debate, with, with proof that they were acting negligently, that, that can counteract that in trial. I would say we're very open for where this Where to move that needle based on stakeholder input. I think our initial goal is what's enough to kind of bootstrap this regulatory market system to that's going to start getting people involved and start coming to it, to the table on it. I do think tort law offers a lot of what I call potential energy, meaning there's a lot of places where harms could, you know, make people, make companies do the right thing. So far it has not come out as kinetic energy. Like, so far that all remains theoretical, 10, 15 years down the road. I do think SB 813 does a lot to kind of say, like, you should think about it now, and then you should go reach for best practices now to be there.

Let me, let me, um, sort of be the law professor here and just sort of the, the, you know, much more up in the abstract thinking about tort law, because my answer to my students when they would say, well, can you sue? I think you can always sue, especially in tort, right? You can always sue. Exactly. And that's actually a part of, you know, the, you know, the tort system as part of our common law system, the fact that it is entirely court-based, judge-based, it only evolves up out of the cases that people have brought. And there's lots of things that can happen once you get there. But you can always sue, you can always get in there and claim. I was harmed. The defendant is the one that caused my harm. And they— let's just stick with standard negligence. It was because I was harmed because they didn't take reasonable steps to prevent this harm to me. It's not that complicated. It gets much more nuanced in case law and so on. But that's also part of what people think of as like, this is the way we evolved our law, like through the 19th and 20th centuries. Right? You evolved the law because the courts were there and people could file their suits and so on. The part that you were asking about, Nathan, about the relationship with, okay, now we have some regulation, we have automobile regulation, we have pharma regulation, what's the impact on tort there? And I mean, it varies from place to place, but you don't generally get a barring of the potential to bring a potentially survive in a, you know, prevail in a tort claim. You know, if you're selling an FDA-approved drug, you can still file your claim that said, but the company did something that doesn't meet the state standard for what's required. You could definitely sue the manufacturer of the automobile, right? Even though they're in compliance with whatever requirements, regulatory requirements. What courts do in those cases, and then they take all that into account. And they say, well, you know, we think the reasonable steps to take were getting FDA approval, or the reasonable steps to take were complying with federal law. So I think all of that is still available. So there's no sense in which you're closing the door to the capacity of courts to participate in structuring this. We do have a few cases. I mean, certainly there are cases, maybe lots of them. I know of a couple where you have government that comes in and says, no, you cannot file a lawsuit here. So like, I'm pretty sure with vaccines, right, we have like, you cannot file a tort lawsuit, but we also have a compensation fund for injuries from vaccines. I did work long ago, back in the early days of thinking about how our legal system's working on the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund, which was created by Congress for those who were killed or injured in the September 11th attacks. And that came with, and you can't sue the airlines, you can't sue the Port Authority, you know, running the World Trade Center and so on. And actually the project I was working on is how do people feel about that? The fact that they couldn't have access to courts and they could only go through this compensation mechanism. But I don't think we're thinking about anything kind of like that here. It would change the way the tort case works. But it's really important to emphasize That that's because it's like two alternative ways of making sure people comply with what they're supposed to do in tort, which is take reasonable steps to prevent harming others. And it's like, okay, you could litigate that, and in lots of different courts, lots of different cases, have different ways that courts and juries end up supplying the content to that. Or you— and it happens at the end of a long process, an expensive process, and by the way, a process that does not give everybody access and doesn't work perfectly in any sense at all. Or you could try and kind of pull that back to an earlier stage and say, oh, guess what? We're going to try and establish upfront what it means to comply with that duty. And we're going to give you an oversight body, an independent approved oversight body that will come in and look. Okay. We're not going to wait for accidents to happen. We're not going to wait for people to get harmed and then long litigation to go through. We're going to move that process. deciding what did you have to do in order to do the right thing. Move that closer to, you know, when we're releasing and observing our products and not taking the tort law approach all alone of wait till something happens and then go through litigation for those who can afford to get into a litigation opera.

Can I just say one other thing that I think does get lost in this? Because I do think you end up thinking about, like, the sympathetic person that was harmed and like, well, what have you given them as a remedy? But the overall goal should be fewer people harmed. And so I would much rather a system overall that says, can you prove that you're harming fewer people? Then, then we should reward that behavior, right? If you, if you can, there should, and there should be some front end. I'd much rather there be fewer cases simply because there's fewer bad things happening. But yeah, that overall, I think, is hard to remain That should be the true north.

Yeah, for certainly some subcategories, that seems relatively clean. Like, I've seen some of these graphs put out by, like, Waymo and Swiss Re, where they're just like, here's the level of accidents and injuries with human drivers, and here it is with Waymo. And it's like, okay, let's all move to Waymo. I think that seems pretty, pretty clear. I guess I wonder how, you know, to sort of red team the bill, which has become a meme in this space.

Yeah.

How do we create a race to the top? And how do we avoid all sorts of shenanigans when it comes to— and sometimes these are just legitimately very hard questions, but what gets categorised as what? You said a second ago, nobody knows, in response to some of these fine-grained liability questions. A joke that I've recently made is, what is an AI agent? Nobody knows that either, right? So it could be anything from a workflow that exists in Zapier to something that is calling on senior citizens on the phone and explicitly instructed not to identify itself as AI, which, by the way, is something I have done on existing commercial platforms. Not actually calling seniors, but demoing that can be done on existing commercial platforms. So all of that right now is kind of getting swept up into AI agent. And I guess I wonder, with so much in flux and so little clarity on even what counts as what, and then the space sort of pre-paradigmatic on taxonomising itself, how do we create the right incentives to actually have a race to the top? And how do we avoid situations where somebody's like, well, I'm the AI agent regulator, and then they're sort of lumping a lot of things together or doing some sort of weird bundled trade that in fact, like, I mean, I guess another data point on this is I briefly was in the financial services industry in the run-up to the mortgage meltdown, and I just saw very up close and personal how the credit rating agencies had just been totally captured and were basically worthless at that point. So how do we avoid the sort of credit rating agency problem that was maybe similar in a way too, right? I mean, there were all these exotic products at the time, and now if there's one thing you can say about AI, it's like an explosion of exotic products. So what are the key points in terms of creating a race to the top dynamic that is real and durable, as opposed to, you know, getting ourselves into 2007 credit rating scenario.

Can I take the credit rating point? Okay, because we— because Jack and I actually discussed the credit rating agencies in the 2019 paper, because it's, it's everybody's always going to be like that. Really important points about the credit rate. So credit rating agencies, their market demand was created by government because government said, you know, you have to go to these— you have to be rated by these credit rating agencies in order to be able to issue bonds and so on. But at the same time, government immunized the credit rating agencies from any liability for the ratings that they gave. So there was zero government oversight of the credit rating agencies from the point of view of how well they were doing their— they were doing their job. And that's the— that's just completely different from saying this regulatory markets approach, which says, no, what we're trying to do is move the role of government to being, okay, we're going to have oversight over these regulatory services providers, the ones who are figuring out what's the best method for making sure we don't get uplift in bioweapons, or we have, you know, safe AI companions, right? Like, you absolutely need a government— there's a government role there, and it's government oversight. We're shifting the role of government from the detailed oversight, which is almost impossible for them to do, of what the labs are doing, to the oversight of what these private, these regulatory services providers are doing. So the race to the top could be coming from something like, let's suppose the standard that government says, and then it's peering in and it's It's regularly looking and it's saying, look, we're going to yank your license, we're going to yank your approval if you don't meet this standard. So you could imagine a standard that was, you need, you know, state-of-the-art protection against providing the capacity to build bioweapons to people without, you know, anything more than maybe high school chemistry. So now you have these competitive companies that are in this business who have an— they have an interest now, right? They have a market interest in communicating to the government, oh, look at what we've figured out. Here's how we can reduce that risk and here's how we can demonstrate that to you. By the way, our competitors over here in the regulatory services market, they're trying to pull the wool over your eyes. That this is all we can do, or, you know, we've done a good job or whatever, because, you know, Company A has an interest in increasing its market share and demonstrating it can do better. So I think there's a race to the top there. And then there's— so that can actually move our standard. And then there's a race to the top of saying, okay, what's the most effective way? What's the cost-effective way? Right? I mean, part of what we're facing with where our AI governance is right now is we've defaulted to a lot of process-based regulation. You know, check this box, put this oversight process in place where we didn't actually test whether or not that works. Like, do we know that it works to have these logs and have these officials in place and so on? And so again, the race to the top is get government oversight. that says, here's what we want, and companies that are competing to achieve that standard. So I think it's really important to recognize the difference with the credit rating agencies as you're pointing out, a really key example of what we've seen, that we saw as a big failure of this private role. But it was, it actually wasn't this model 'cause it did not have oversight of those entities. I'm sure there's some regulation of credit rating agencies. So I don't want anybody following up to say, oh, here's all the laws I have to follow. But they definitely were immunized from liability for their ratings.

A couple of other things that I think are just important as guardrails for these private-side regulators. One is, I do think that the government has to be super involved in the finances of them, right? There's 2 things. One is make sure that they aren't seeded, funded by the labs themselves, that there's some independence There. And then 2, that they can actually afford to deny certification and continue existing, right? I do think that that's some stress testing that would fall on government in order to make sure that this is right, right? If you are like, hey, here's some great processes. By the way, if we don't certify 4 out of 5 labs, we can't continue to exist. And so we're going to figure out how to certify 4 out of 5 labs, then this is trouble, right? And that's So I think that's a deep analysis that actually has to happen from government. The second part is I do think government does have to get real about what outcomes it's expecting. And as you mentioned, Nathan, like part of that is in some places that's easy, in some places that's hard, right? In some places you can say, well, we have a very clear human analog to what's going on right now. And so if you can't prove that you're safer than humans, in this way or safer than the average human, then that's bad, right? But some places it's going to be completely new stuff, like just new harms, new ways of thinking about harms, places where we don't have incident reporting systems or places where the first incident is so bad as to kind of be so catastrophic that who cares that you followed some rules on the way there, that outcome was just totally unacceptable. Absolutely not acceptable on any level. I do think that there is some crawl, walk, run parts of this model. One of the reasons I like it being so voluntary at the beginning is the government sets outcomes in certain places and the companies get to decide if they think that that amount of liability protection or housekeeping seal of approval or whatever it is, is worthwhile to go get for right now, and the conversation makes sense at the beginning. There's going to be some places it's really going to have to work out over time. Are there outcomes that the government can set for us where this makes sense to bring in, uh, this private regulatory model, or does there have to be a different solution, right? Is that, is that issue kind of so, um, uh, major and in such a different place that actually the regulatory markets don't solve for this problem, and it needs to be put into a different category.

Yeah, I can definitely see some biorisk things in particular being sort of just sort of beyond the scope of what any sort of liability framework— I think we heard, I recently was on another episode saying, like, hard to go to the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Whether or not it ultimately came from there is another question that I'm not taking a position on. But with 10 million plus dead globally, it's hard to go there and sue them for damages. Right. It seems to be sort of a— I mean, you may have a different point of view on that, but to me, that does seem like a sort of order of magnitude different thing. That's just like, as the externalities become so big, you may just need a totally different regime.

I honestly think that is one of the amendments that we would love to see in something Yeah. Like SBA 813, which is like, there's a harm that's so big that it shouldn't fall within this, right? And that's, I think, part of like, what is the exact right landscape of how we start this program up or this way of regulating up where it doesn't have to accomplish everything, but it's accomplishing some very real things at the beginning. And we can grow it and mature it into a way to accomplish a large portion of things. But certainly there's always going to be the sorts of edge cases, especially when it's attached to really large harms that have to be handled otherwise.

Yeah, I think it's really important to emphasize that it's just, it's one tool in the toolbox. I think it's something really important that we're missing in the toolbox and that we will need and we will need, you know, more in some areas than others. But it is not like, it's not like it displaces all the other complex ways in which we achieve, you know, safe, fair, stable market societies and so on. So, we already have a very complex— we just don't see it— a very complex set of systems that interleave and overlap and tort law and standard settings and corporate— and, you know, corporations have their own incentives to create safety. We just— lots of— There's the press, there's oversight, There's just tons and tons of stuff. There's international. So it's going to be a part of that complex system. And then I think the other point we maybe haven't emphasized enough, but it's been there in part of your questions, Nathan, is what you had asked earlier. I'm not sure we answered what's different about AI. Like, why isn't it just like any other product? We regulate cars, we regulate drugs. It's another product. Well, AI is not a thing, right? It's not a product. It's a general-purpose technology that I think is going to transform the way we do just about everything. So it's going to end up impacting and requiring regulation on a ton of dimensions. We have a very complex regulatory landscape. And it's like you mentioned, education, health, justice, logistics, city management. bioweapons, AI companions. I mean, it's just the press. It's just going to be in everything. And so, we're going to have different regulatory goals and different regulatory methods in all those places. So, we don't want to think, oh, we've regulated AI, right? It's like, can we build a vibrant, robust, agile mechanism that helps us identify where to regulate, how to regulate, This was a point that I think Andrew was going to earlier. Another way in which this building this kind of an ecosystem can help to surface where are the problems, where is the need to regulate, where is there demand for regulation. This could be from like enterprise purchasers that say, "I can't, I can't integrate that chatbot into my customer service because I don't know if it's going to make stuff up." So, you know, they say, and that could cause me harm because it could cause harm because I'm giving advice to my customers, or it's going to cause me harm because they're going to think I'm selling something I'm not selling. So, you know, I can imagine that enterprise starts to come in and say, here's the kind of protection that we need in order to drive adoption. I think this is going to be a critical part of, you know, we talk about risks and harm, but we also want to be talking about like, why are we building this in the first place? First place? Well, hopefully the reason we're building it is because it can make everybody better off. So we need to be figuring out how can we, how can we respond to the ways in which the market can tell us, here's the concern people have. Parents have this concern about their kids in school using AI. Or, I mean, as the tort system has surfaced, they have obvious concerns. I mean, quite very sad concerns about the ways AI companions are impacting their children. And so, that's a bottom-up kind of process. Like, we want a way for the market to be able to respond to what the market can tell us about what concerns people have, what problems people found, what stumbles we've identified. That's why the top-down approaches in regulation are so complicated because I mean, that's what markets do for you. They sniff it out at the ground level and tell you, here's where an opportunity is. Here's where harm is. Here's where risk is. Here's where there's a demand for something different than what we've got right now. And I think that includes, again, in this very general purpose, there's just simply no way to sit in a boardroom and get out the whiteboard and say, okay, here, let's, here's the list of risks we need to worry about from AI. And here's the rules we could put in place. I just think that's a fallacy of of lawmaking and regulation.

I want to push a little bit more on this race to the top versus race to the bottom. And then I've got a few kind of objections or red teaming from other perspectives besides my own that I want to throw at you as well and get your reaction to. It seems like on the race to the top question, I mean, I think that you make a great point about the demand from enterprise. Enterprise in general, rightfully wants to use this technology, but also wants to cover their butts. And that seems like a force for good. That also seems like it is going to be more like those folks are going to be more oriented toward kind of known unknowns than unknown unknowns, I think. So putting my sort of AI safety x-risk hat on for a second, And focusing on the frontier developers with the ones that are pushing things forward as fast as possible and really getting into uncharted territory. I wouldn't say that it's— I don't think it's a fair description to say that they all are trying to do the least they can. I think, on the contrary, we're relatively fortunate compared to counterfactuals I can easily imagine in terms of the people who are running these frontier developers and how Responsibly, I think, again, relative to alternatives, I can easily imagine how responsibly they're acting. But nevertheless, if I'm just like realpolitik or my cynic follow the incentives sort of analysis would be like, the frontier developers are going to want to do the least that they can. So if they have a menu of options in front of them, they're going to choose the most permissive, least costly one. I'm not entirely sure if money is supposed to be flowing from the labs to the regulators, the MROs in SB 813 parlance, or if the money is kind of coming from some other place. But if there's any correlation between who gets picked and they pick you and that's how you get paid, then there's sort of this incentive to try to be the one that gets picked, which that all seems like a sort of race to the bottom type dynamic. And then It seems like, at least again, in the 813 scenario, we're really relying on the Attorney General to be doing a great job. They're the ones that have to approve these organisations in the first place. They're the ones that have to keep a close eye on them. If they take their eye off the ball, everything can kind of race to the bottom, probably pretty quickly. And we have sort of a challenge there. Obviously, we've seen recently in our country how one administration to another can bring about dramatically different attitudes and personnel and decision-making. Right. So from one California AG to the next, I could imagine going from a great scenario where you've got the crack team that's doing exactly what you'd want them to do, to somebody that's just focused on other things, or even more problematically prone to being lobbied by companies. There's a whole political economy of how people are kind of channeling messages and what— I mean, whatever. I don't need to tell you about the complications of the political economy of this. But is it right to say that in the SB 13 world, we're really putting a lot of trust into The AG?

Yeah. I think not only right, I think probably has to be changed a little bit to put more of a commission structure of who— like some expertise into the government to be able to say, have you rightly scoped your outcomes? Do you actually have the ability to track the outcomes that we say are important and what on an ongoing basis? I don't think it's right until essentially there's a little bit of fear of God moment. for the people who would be, who would be these private side regulators that like it can really disappear very quickly, right? Your ability to, to be a certifier of in this nature, if you have, you know, if there is a complaint out there that says that, you know, you definitely bent your rules for in order to make sure something went through, that that can be fully investigated and that there's the money and resources to fully investigate. I will say in a in an ideal world, this gets passed in a couple of states or a couple of different governments, and there's multiple people who are looking after and giving the seal of approval. And that if one drops off, that that's a signal for, you know, if, if the, you know, if a different— if State Z is like, hey, this— something doesn't feel right in this, and so we are— we're withdrawing from, uh, our, you know, the, the licensing of this private regulator. And then that should kick off a whole bunch of other people starting to go in there. And if it becomes an international group, that there's countries that are actually also watching over and diving into this business. What I like about it is it's this layer of, this is what the government should be doing, is looking into these private side regulators and really up into their business. Are they qualitatively and quantitatively showing that they're making a good difference in the world? And if they aren't, there should be enough competition that we are able to withdraw from one person, from one group, and give power to another group. And we should be held accountable as lawmakers. You know, there's some point where there's like turtles all the way down. Um, that does— there's a moment where it stops, where, you know, you're trying to create the best scenario for government to hold these groups accountable. And if the government is simply not interested in holding those groups accountable, people, redundancies aside, there's a problem there. I will point out that exists with every regulatory structure. There's just a moment. I think what this does is really brings it out in the open and allows the public to see, okay, you guys have allowed these people to be certifiers for years. When they put out their numbers about how they create a better world, it is laughable. Meanwhile, look at this certifier that's doing this other thing. And actually creating a better world. So there's at least some way of maintaining that race to the top that doesn't include public accountability. My last and final point is like, I do come from a world where I see all ceilings become floors, where, you know, the best intended government regulation just becomes yet one more way of checking the box and sticking away from stuff. I don't know another structure that is more set up to do the opposite, to actually create a qualitative race to the top, uh, and continue to iterate that system as technology grows.

So I think there's, there's the reality of how do you get to this model, right? The ideal that, that sort of I was describing, Jack and I were describing back in 2019 and been talking about since. So there's the sausage making of, well, you know, you've got to do it this way, that way, in this legislature, this process. Here's what we think is achievable today, and so on. But on this point about the race to the bottom, this system is only as good as the capacity for your government to have oversight of these private actors, whichever they are, whatever category we're putting them in— regulatory services, providers, independent verification organizations. That government regulation has to have teeth in it, just like our existing regulation is only as good as our capacity for our government, the IRS or the FDA or the Securities Exchange Commission to, to actually create good rules and enforce them. So I always like to think of this as the proposal here, sort of in the grander scheme of things, is to shift government effort and expertise into the task of overseeing these private regulatory bodies. And so, so I think of that as a pretty muscular thing. And, and the model is only as good as your capacity to do that. That's your backstop against a race to the bottom. That's your backstop against, oh, come on over here. Like, you're not going to have to do very much to comply with my system. And so absolutely, like, the key design feature is how do you address that. Now, of course, regulatory capture and so on is a problem throughout our regulatory system. I mean, the whole term is based on the idea of corporations capturing, capturing government. So we always need to be comparing this proposal and what we think we could achieve if we put the resources into it and got the design, right, you know, relative to what we can achieve in the absence. And, you know, what's being proposed here are real methods of getting that kind of appropriate and effective government oversight. Um, and, and I think just going back to the conversation about, you know, the various domains here, right, like the expertise you'll need in government to oversee The domain of autonomous vehicles will be different than the expertise to oversee the domain of companion AI, to oversee bioweapons risk, financial stability risk, right? That's the complex regulatory regime we're in. And we're just trying to change the role of government in that. But I don't think anybody should think this is a one and done. We just gonna, you know, did you fill out the right form? Have you shown us something that looks plausible? And then we'll leave you to it. No, this is a way of actually getting us away from the world we are currently in, in AI governance, which is we have defaulted to corporate oversight. In fact, self-governance kind of throughout the— like saying, oh, we have no idea what you're— so we're just— the labs will tell us what red teaming tests to do and we'll have limited visibility into that. Or we're going to kick it over to industry standard-setting bodies, which are corporate-funded and lots of participants from there. That we really— government has basically been defaulting on, I think, its central role in saying, hey, this is what we want from these domains. And a reason for that is because it's technically so challenging. So this is a proposal that's trying to deal with the technical challenge without giving up on, in fact, making more muscular the democratic role for governments. Governments should be telling us, here's how much risk we're willing to take. And we're not, we're not there right now. So, you know, at the end of the day, the race to the bottom protection is you actually have government regulating. It's just regulating in a different way than it is supposed to, you know, conventionally does. And which it's actually not able to effectively do right now. So, that was like, did you say, Nathan, we're kind of naked on this? I think that's right. I think that's right.

Or another way to put it, and he wasn't talking about this at the time, but friend of the show and research partner of Fathom, Dean Ball, once simply put it to me, republics require virtue. And I think that is a it's a good reminder that you can always kind of poke a hole and say, well, what if somebody— what if the person in that seat is bad and who's going to monitor the monitors and whatever? But at some point, this is an institution that is going to be populated by people, at least until there's maybe some AIs taking over key roles.

Regulated AIs taking over.

Future speculation. That's right. But yeah, somebody's got to actually be trying to do a good job at some point in any given system, or it's going to go to hell. So there's kind of no way around that.

I think— but so, uh, republics require virtue, okay? They also require visibility. And I think this is one of the things that we are in a serious, uh, state with, which is, you know, I think this is pretty much first time in history we've seen such a massively consequential technology with a general-purpose capacity built entirely really almost entirely inside private technology companies, which have this ring around them, a legally created fictional ring around them that says anything that happens inside stays inside and it doesn't get out unless they choose to let it out or government comes in and says, you got to let us look. And, and right now, I think governments are just, you know, in an impossible position to be able to effectively regulate because they do not have visibility. So, another feature of this is starting to say, okay, we need to get increased visibility into what's happening. So again, like, who's our partner in that? An independent sector of entities that are in the weeds, right? We already have some of these companies and nonprofits starting to emerge providing red teaming services or, you know, checking on, you know, developing technology to check robustness of systems or hallucinations in systems. We really want to lean into those startups, those that sector say let's let's make this a powerful sector. Let's create increased market demand for that. Let's attract investment into this, and then that's the partner for government that gives increased visibility for government into what the heck is going on because right now governments are just you know at kind of. at the mercy of what, what have the labs chosen to share with us. And, you know, I'm not beating up on the labs. Like, okay, if you're going to structure them as corporations and that's the protections we give corporations and that's, that's the way they're going to behave. I'm an economist. They're going to engage in profit-maximizing behavior. That's what gets us this technology in the first place. But it's, it runs headlong into what we need for regulations. So, you know, virtue and— And visibility.

So that seems like another, like a different law though, right? Like the, because we couldn't expect people to be, well, maybe we could try to incentivise them to, but if we really want visibility, we might just have to mandate it. Do you have thoughts on like how visibility should be mandated? There's a connection there to like whistleblower protections as well. And I was also going to ask about the mechanism of how you think money should flow in this system. So I'm rapid-firing questions at you.

But yeah, let me, let me do this. And then, Andrew, I know you got something to say. So come to you. So, so, so first of all, and again, Jack and I talked about this in this 2019 paper, I think because what you, you— so if you have a private entity that you've contracted with to provide regulatory services, like to give you that, that oversight. So first of all, yes, dollars are in my sort of vision of this, dollars are moving. There's— because you need to get dollars into the business. I mean, I've just been chatting with some of the nonprofits that are engaged in, say, doing red teaming under contract for the labs. And, you know, surprise, surprise, they're just finding they, you know, they need more resources. It's a bigger job than, you know, a few very, very virtuous people can do. You need to get dollars into that. So that's— that is part of the flow. And attracting investment of this is like, for me, is like one of the number one reasons to do it. And then there's the fact that I actually think you will be able to get much more fine-grained information transfer between 2 private entities under contract Because we see companies engaging in, you know, they go into joint ventures and collaborations and they share, you know, within ranges of detailed private info because they have confidence that their confidentiality and IP protections and so on will keep that information private and they're not sharing it with the government. So I think you will see more visibility going into a private regulator than into the public regulator. But then the public regulator has complete— can sort of set whatever standards it wants for its oversight of those private regulatory agencies and say, okay, you need to show us your stuff. You've got to show us the results of what you've been learning. And they may not— the government may not end up getting into the weeds on, you know, what's actually— all of the information out of the labs. But I think you start structuring those information So I think there are ways to improve the visibility, and you increase the visibility because you again you've harnessed that incentive of this independent sector to say here's what I need to know, and if you want to be certified by me, you're going to have to share that information. Here's what I need to know in order to be able to fulfill my duty to the government to say I can demonstrate that my approach, my technology achieves your government. a goal, that target for regulation.

Okay, here's a series of questions that I've either gathered or kind of had posed to me by others. I just had Matt Perault, who's the head of AI policy at a16z, on. He is very focused, and a16z is very focused on advocating for little tech and just trying to make sure that there's like a place for startups. His concern about SB 813 in particular, and I think probably would abstract to the sort of more general concept, is what if the rules become so onerous that only the big tech companies can do them? Then the big tech companies get the benefits and the startups can't get into that beneficial regime, and then it becomes very hard for them to compete or raise capital because they're on this disadvantaged legal basis as compared to the big tech incumbents. One answer might be, if that's the way it plays out, might be, so be it, or that's a cost worth paying. But I don't know if you want to bite that bullet or if you think there's a way to kind of best of both worlds.

No, I definitely don't want to bite that bullet. Honestly, I don't know of a structure that can more scale to provide solutions that are different for little tech than our available for the frontier labs, meaning like you could well envision and maybe like some guiding language within an 813 would be helpful here that there is a specialty lane for models or applications or deployers that are smaller scale and pose a less immediate risk in these ways and that ways have a much lower burden of what it shows to meet best practices in the environment that they're in. And therefore, you know, should still— they can still go get whatever seal of approval the system ends up creating out and being watched after, but that it is of a level that makes sense for them, either because they're selling to enterprise or because they do believe that they introduce some risk into the environment that they need to look after. But that Instead of it being, say, like a SOC 2, where it's the same for everyone across and everyone has to— that there suddenly is some way of actually creating gradation and saying, this is actually what the best practices should look like for a 10-developer group who is looking for a limited application that goes out this way. It's just so much different than, you know, you're going to be in 10,000 vehicles tomorrow, and we need to make sure that you know how to obey traffic signs or stop before a little girl drops the ball in the street. And the problem with, say, like a top-down is there's no way to account for that, right? You can try to write it into legislation and try to bifurcate it today. That's going to make— however you've done it, whether it's by flops or whatever, it's not going to make any sense tomorrow. Whereas groups that are specifically looking to meet this moment where it's at can really change and And be really flexible to that moment. And then I would also argue, you know, for the little tech world, they are in an also impossible position because with a no-regulation world, because the only people who can prove that they're going to be safe for a fintech to be able to come in are going to be the big guys right now, right? They're the only ones that can go and do the amount of independent certification and work and longstanding work. A little guy, deciding that they have a way to forever change the banking industry at this moment has no way of proving to the banking industry that his stuff should be trusted. And so I would argue that there's a way of creating this that actually is of massive value to little tech. And then I'd also argue that the flip side is the other alternatives are not going to be able to become as bespoke towards the needs of little tech as a solution like this Yeah.

So I think this is actually at the very heart of what for me has been sort of driving my thinking about how do we get more markets into solving our regulatory problems for decades, frankly, because markets have the capacity to, yeah, to be differentiated. We've got, you know, you got cars for your middle-class working class. You've got fancy cars for your execs. You get differentiation in markets. And so, I think that's a key feature of saying, oh, let's try and unleash some market effort here. And if you have venture money that says, hey, we really want to build the little tech world, let's put money into building the right kind of— funding the right kind of regulatory infrastructure that serves that need. That's, that's a regulatory puzzle, right? How do we do that well? How do we do that efficiently? So I think that's, that's a key reason for trying to recruit more markets, regulated, overseen markets, right? So don't, don't lose sight of the fact that we're not just abandoning it to the private sector where it's only with that muscular government oversight. But I think the other thing is like, when I started thinking about this set of ideas, I was fundamentally driven by by the fact that our legal systems, our regulatory systems have become far too expensive, far too slow and onerous. And that, you know, that we've leaned into a set of techniques for regulation that on the one hand are very expensive to comply with. Lots and lots of process-based stuff, front-end process-based. With very little demonstration that those process-based protections actually achieve what you're looking for. So in some ways, the very problem you're trying to solve is that we've built an incredibly expensive regulatory regime that absolutely only our biggest companies can really afford to, to comply with. That is a massive drag on the startup sector innovation. And that's a key reason that we need to be adapting and innovating in our regulatory methods. So if you think about the General Data Protection Regulation, for example, GDPR in the EU, right? Lots of process, this definition, that definition. Have you got the you know? Have you got these logs, etc.? And in fact, there's pressure right now in the EU to say, "Oh, how can we modify this because it is too much of a drag?" on the innovative startup sector. So, so I actually think it's precisely a mechanism like this that's— that the goal of it is to say, how do we build more efficient, more effective regulatory regimes and move away from kind of the top-down thing that frankly lawyers in a room are going to create or, you know, I beat up a lot on lawyers in my book, or at least the way in which our profession has kind of failed to rise to the need of societies for greater innovation in what we produce. We do not need more words on paper. We need more smart approaches for regulation. How are we going to get there? That's what we're trying to do. That's the path we're trying to set us off on. There'll be a lot of hiccups and bumps and wrong turns and dead ends. But I think it's absolutely— we need to be making this shift. And we need to have been making it 10 years ago. And the only thing that's happening is AI is ramping up faster and faster. And we are still, like, you know, got our shoelaces tied on the starting line. We are not getting there. And we need to get there.

I do love the fact that this proposal creates an opportunity for people to come up with new ideas and enter into the ecosystem on an ongoing basis. And also just the fact that, like, I know this maybe still needs to get a little bit worked out in SB 813 and in general, but there seems to be sort of an implicit, if not like sunset clause, which is something I always advocate for in law and never seems to happen. There's at least a sort of ongoing subject to renegotiation or reevaluation of a lot of things. in this proposal. And I think that is really great too, because it at least gives it a decent chance to age well, which is my constant joke about AI content. AI content does not age well. AI regulatory proposals generally do not age well. But this sort of metastructure that allows for sort of new entrants and ongoing revision seems like it has a better chance of aging well than just about anything else I've Heard. 2 more different angles of red teaming the proposal. One, maybe the most different or the most almost opposite direction, although you may see it a bit differently, is from another law professor, Gabe Weil, who has, as I'm sure you're aware, been advocating for the idea of sort of an expanded notion of liability. I haven't studied his stuff in depth, yet. I'm going to do an episode with him before too long as well. But the general sketch of it is there are some potential harms, problems, catastrophic, existential in some cases they may be, that are so bad that we need a way to deal with them before they happen. And so his proposal is basically to expand liability to encompass near misses. So if you were acting negligently and nothing really bad happened, but it came close or could have or whatever, then you could still be sued and liable for harm, even though maybe you got lucky. Mindfully being mindful that I haven't probably described his position quite right because I haven't done the full study yet. Any reactions? That seems like we probably can't do both of those, right? These are pretty two different directions at a minimum.

It seems. Am I going? I'm going. Okay. So again, go back to the idea that our regulatory regime's ecosystem is a whole bunch of different threads and liability, which, by which usually when people use the term liability, they're thinking about litigation-based, court-based regulation. Which is is always it's after the fact. It's a big process. It's I mean it's got lots of virtues because it can be like that bottom-up reactive. So that's a good thing about having a you know a strong litigation regime. I'm not anti litigation or anti courts as you know tools in our toolbox for getting people and companies to do the things we want them to do the right thing. The you know so one approach would be yeah so you could say well. We don't want to wait for catastrophic harms to happen. We should cover near misses. And maybe that's a fine amendment to make into tort law. And I'm not enough of a tort scholar to even know, like, what's our existing doctrines on how close do you have to be to cause— like, can you just create a risk or do you have to actually get the harm? So I don't want to go into the details on that. But the fact of the matter is that these are the tiniest types of domains. where we actually don't generally leave it to litigation. Like, we don't say, well, we're going to rely on the tort system to handle the risk of nuclear facilities blowing up or, you know, creating fallout for communities. We actually don't rely— like, think about pharma, right? We started early with pharma. We have an FDA that says you cannot put a drug on the market unless you've demonstrated safety and efficacy. And gone through a fairly lengthy approval process with our regulatory, that you still have a backup liability. You can you can still sue for harms caused by drugs on the market that have been FDA approved, but we haven't put the whole thing out there. I certainly think if we're thinking in the domain of catastrophic risk, but by which actually I think we want to include lots of things like collapsing our markets and bung bunging up our you know our financial. trading systems or, you know, just there's a lot of economic stability risks that I think we don't pay enough attention to as potentially catastrophic. But I don't think I would be focused, you know, heavily on, you know, well, let's just deal with this by making, you know, tweaks to the, to the tort law regime. Maybe we make those as well. But, you know, first line of defense for me would be, no, I think I want some oversight on whether or not there's bioweapons risk or You know, these trading agents could collapse or, you know, could cause kind of the equivalent of massive bank runs or just crashes of the stock market. I mean, those are very costly things. And I don't think we just want to handle all of that through backend litigation.

Yeah. I hate to beat up a straw man because I don't know enough. One of the things I will say is like, also be careful of the downside of that stuff, which How much is that just going to mean that near misses are not reported out, right? How much of that is just going to mean that, you know, you have to create your corporation now in such a way that, like, nobody knows the full picture other than, you know, a few trusted people and everybody's in their own little silo? You know, I imagine a lot of tech organizations are already kind of, you know, it takes one—

Trending that direction.

Yeah, it is. This is really Can push towards much more siloing. And, you know, if we didn't know, then there's nothing you can sue us on because we didn't know that there was a near miss there, right? And you're asking people to not go, you know, do the red teams and go do the hard work because the more they know, the more they're, you know, potentially liable on the back end. So there's some downside that I do want to be— now, maybe that's thought about in this proposal, so I don't want to— But I'd also argue, you know, I really do hope we end up seeing things that allow people to be proactive in this space and get rewarded for being proactive and not just like after the world's burned, there's a way to go and sue for it. Right. And so I hope that that is, you know, brought into that strategy as well.

Yeah. Well, stay tuned everybody for another episode where we'll get the full story on that and I can be properly Educated. And it does even strike me just in listening to your responses there, though, that I was maybe too quick to just see liability protection and liability expansion and see those as incompatible, because plausibly you could expand, but then you could also afford some protection for compliance. And it doesn't necessarily, in the end, seem like those are so diametrically opposed. Okay, a third one. is, and this one is maybe closest to your own impulses, why not require insurance and kind of put everything on the dollar scale? Insurance companies are quite— they're presumably the best organisations we have for kind of calibrating to risk. That would also bring a sort of pricing mechanism to the risk that I don't see quite— maybe you'd see a way that it emerges from the sort of structure that we've been describing, but it's not. I mean, with insurance, it's quite clear how the pricing mechanism works. So, yeah, instead of this whole thing, why not just say everybody's got to have insurance? If you don't have insurance, you can't drive.

So I think I won't speak for Gillian here, but I will say for me, I've been most bothered in my like nerdy capacity by how we've kind of waved a magic wand with insurance and said that it can solve problems without like diving into what it is that insurance does in order to solve those problems. And so for the insurance market to help be a rational market here that does actually properly price risk and then properly charge against that risk, that includes it being able to properly know what risks exist and how to best mitigate risk. And that doesn't exist absent valid third-party certifiers going in and doing that work and racing towards it. And so I would actually say like the scaffolding, we, it's easy enough to say like insurance knows how to price risk. I would argue they probably don't here, right? Like that they, not even that they probably don't, they absolutely do not know how to price risk here. And so you could require them to come into the market and they're like, great, we're going to— everything has to be self-insured. And it's, you know, an astronomical amount. And we don't really know, we don't, we're not any better than anybody else right now at coming in and doing that, that there has to be some scaffolding of information, of knowledge base of what does actually decrease risk in the system. And how do we actually know risk that comes from a valid source in order for there to be a rational insurance market?

I think people would just argue, though— oh, sorry.

Oh, sorry. Let me just, let me just add on that. So, you know, yeah, so emphasize insurance, you need to price risk. So you need lots of structure that is determining risk. And, you know, when insurance companies are insuring against liability risk for automobile accidents or construction worksite accidents, or let's go back to pharma, right? You know, they're doing that against a backdrop of a ton of structure that defines the risk. Like, we've got lots of history of automobile litigation and liability. We have tons of codes that govern how you run a construction site. We've got all this regulation around drugs. So insurance has got a lot of structure to price on the basis of, and we don't have that right now. I think there's this idea that insurance companies, because they do risk, will come in and say, oh, and they will magically solve the problem of where is the risk and what should have been done. But notice that we've just kind of reinvented the wheel. problem, which is what do the companies need to do? We don't know what that is right now. And I do not think insurance companies are going to become our AI regulators. I mean, that also would, again, we would not have any oversight of that, right? That would be insurance companies saying, how much risk are we going to allow for bio-risk or whatever? They have to build on something. My institute at that I ran at the University of Toronto up until last year, just released a report. We had lots of discussion about insurance. Insurance is a nice complement to building a regulatory market and building regulatory technologies. It's actually another one of the carrots that you can use for, hey, if you implement this regulatory method, then you can get insurance. But it's got to be that kind of partnership. And that's the kind of products that we're starting to see emerge. So, Armilla and Lloyd's. Armilla is a company that creates this regulatory technology. It's been one of my go-to examples of a startup in this domain. And through a partnership, they said, oh, if you use our approaches, we now have an arrangement through Lloyd's of London, I think, or other insurers as well. You can get insurance. Right. But the insurance companies aren't going to become our AI regulators, and it wouldn't be appropriate for them to be that. So I think just a basic, just mandate insurance and it'll all work its way out, I think just is not a realistic view of the way insurance markets work, regulation works, or democracy works.

The democracy point, I think, is strong. I think that at the end there, though, you were sort of getting to what I think the advocates for the insurance idea would say, which is like, first of all, just this market is going to be massive. So this isn't like a niche corner of the insurance market that insurers would say, forget it, it's not worth our time to figure that out. It seems like if you're an insurance company and there's AI happening and it's touching everything and the risk is massive, you would presumably want to play.

But the risk of what? The risk of what? Right? Like, what do you insure against? You insure against liability risk, which means you think that courts are going to be able to impose requirements and standards, or you risk, you know, your risk of compliance, regulatory compliance risk, but then that requires government to have regulatory structure. So we can have bad things happening, but that doesn't mean risk for the companies unless they have liability attached to that, or whether tort liability or, or regulatory compliance liability. So, it's not a massive market unless there are requirements that they're going to be held to either through the courts or through government.

I think the notion is mostly liability risk and also that it would be a lot of these same organizations that the insurance companies would turn to, to try to help them get a handle on it. So, it would be, you know, who— and I guess I'm interested to know, for the future of Fathom, does Fathom sort of envision itself being one of these private regulator entities? What other organisations are you looking at in the world today and saying, like, these guys seem like they could step up into this role? And then in the insurance context, it would be like those same candidates would maybe be the ones the insurance companies would go to and say, hey, we'll pay you to help us figure this out, and we might insist on companies going through your audit process or whatever if they want to buy the insurance. I think the hope is actually to end up in a pretty similar spot where experts are defining standards and also kind of conducting audits, but it's less concentrated through one AG or one commission and more concentrated in this sort of global insurance market, which In theory, at least, has like, you know, a lot of skin in the game.

I would love to answer the Fathom question first. And so Fathom is interested in showing proofs of concept here. Like, we think this is enough of a novel idea that— and the way in which the marketplace starts will be an important market for success. And so we would love to see some proof of concepts out, and then help those that are very interested in doing this work be very successful at doing that work. We remain a nonprofit. Any interest we have is nonprofit-related and philanthropically funded. And there's no endgame here for there being an equity play or any of that. But I do think it is one of those things that if we don't show what good looks like, people are just going to constantly be like, I don't have time to listen to a 2-hour podcast right now on this. And so—

I don't know who has time to listen to us, honestly.

It's crazy. I listen to But yeah, but we do need to start showing. Also, like, it's complicated and we do want to work out the kinks by having real-world examples on it. So I think in the near future, you'll see us trying to show what proofs of concept we're looking, working with partners who are actually the technical people in here, right? And so I don't know if I have permission to share the technical people that we are giving grants to, to see them work this work, but I think in the near future, future, that it'll be clear that we think there's some great technical minds working on this right now, that we're giving small grants to, to try to see them do this work well. I will just again, come like, the insurance is making a bet in this world at the end of the day. And if they're making a bet based on no different risks, then they, you could easily imagine a world where they go, okay, well, that's such a big catastrophic risk that if it happens, there's no one to sue on the back end. And so we'll insure against that risk, because like the chances that we have to actually be there at the end of the day to pay it out are actually very low. Society will have fallen apart. For example, there just is not— I don't think there's a magic to the governance of how insurance works, that they're going to be able to bring in the best third-party validators of risk and have them do the best work, right? Like, their focus is going to be on, okay, what's the greatest tangible next risk that's coming up that could actually— that we could actually be on the hook for here? And if— and to the extent they can't do it, and they're taking a guess, they're taking the same guess as everybody else is taking here. And so, I get it. Like, it feels like a thing that once you start mandating it, the scaffolding will fall in place. But I actually think thinking through how is that scaffolding actually governed so that we are actually creating the best third-party certifiers is the most important question. And making sure that those people are actually accountable to society rather than to any perverse economic motive on the back end.

Do you want to offer any closing thoughts?

So we need to get moving. We need to get innovative. We want as many people in the conversation and poking at the model and coming up with new ideas. I mean, that's a, again, reason you like markets is because you need lots of different minds, lots of different perspectives, lots of different knowledge. You need that conversation happening and you need this, but we need to get going. And I think we just, we can't really stand back and say, well, let's design this perfect structure. It's like we need the MVP of new approaches on regulation and let's get started. And I think SB 813, you know, whatever form it ends up in, and it will continue to evolve because of course it's like, oh, here, let's throw this out here. What? Oh, wait a second. We need to change this. We need to fix that. The key thing is we need to get down this pathway. And And so I think that's the key message I would go away from. You know, markets can help us in addressing this. They need to be overseen by governments. Governments should be deciding what's acceptable risk, and we need to get going.

Perfect. Dr. Gillian Hatfield and Andrew Friedman, thank you both for being part of The Cognitive Revolution.

It was such a pleasure. Thank you for having us.

That was terrific. Thanks.

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