Agent Talk #6: Wade Foster (Zapier) - Why Zapier Sacrificed Millions to Earn Millions

Welcome to Agent Talk. He built Zapier from the middle of Missouri, not Silicon Valley, and turned that traditional startup playbook and created a billion-dollar company while barely raising venture capital. I know this sounds weird, Why did it happen? And Wade is one of my all-time favorites. He is crushing it in racquetball, in building one of the most successful remote companies on the planet. He's back in his hometown of Missouri, and we are going to talk about all sorts of things, including his latest pricing change, which has been for about a year now. And I'm still super curious as to how that went. Wade, pleasure to have you.

Yeah, thanks for having me, guys.

So, so tell us, you know, you, you were used to, um, You created this application that charged for Zap, and that was pretty amazing because you took that Zapier concept, built a new word, created a concept that people sort of like built around it, and then you created a pricing engine around it, and then you switched it out on us in the best possible way. You actually dropped pricing and people got mad, which I'd never seen before. So give us a little bit of a backstory. How's that even possible? You charge less. And people get pissed.

I don't know that people got pissed. There was a lot of really happy folks, but there definitely was some folks that— there's always grumpy folks with price changes. Like, there's no way you can avoid that, I think.

100%.

Even when you're doing stuff that is like mostly a positive.

Yeah.

Um, I think you kind of have to set the stage a little bit for, you know, how we approach these. So for those not familiar with Zapier, the product is an automation tool. There's some Zapier-specific nomenclature that's useful to know. So the way a Zap works, is it has a trigger, which is like, hey, I get a new customer on Stripe. And then there's an action, which is like, text me about it or post it in Slack. And for the longest time, the way we priced was a kind of classic subscription model where you could have, you could buy bundles of Zaps and tasks. And now what a task is, is anytime one of those actions happens, it's a task. And so, you know, there would be a starter plan where you could get you know, 20 Zaps and, you know, 1,000 tasks, or it'd be a Pro plan where you could get, you know, 50 Zaps and, you know, thousands and thousands of tasks, so on and so forth. And yeah, the business grew like quite successfully based on that. Along the way though, there was some things that we just noticed, like our customers would constantly run into friction about. Namely, you know, we sort of had these two different value metrics. You had Zaps and you had tasks. And we're metering on both. And as a result, we would constantly get these questions, which is like, well, can I get a different plan because I need more tasks, but I'm good with the number of Zaps? Or the inverse, where it's like, I need more Zaps, but I'm like good with the number of tasks. And so, you know, people have these like lopsided accounts where they'd like be high on one or low on the other. And it would just sort of feel like, you know, they'd look at how we were charging them and just feel like, man, Zapier's just getting the better deal out of this. And it didn't make them really feel good. So that was thing 1. And then thing 2 is along the way, we started allowing our highest paid customers to have this pay as you go option, where if you went over your task meter, you didn't have to upgrade to the next subscription plan. You could just start paying as you go at a slightly higher rate, which for a lot of customers, like, that was great. It was like, hey, I don't want to go to the, like, next highest subscription tier. When, you know, I only need a little bit more, like I just need a little bit more to go on. But most of our customers didn't have access to that, especially folks that were like the smallest customers. And so the smallest customers—

but wait, why, why, why is that? Why couldn't you have access to it? Like, when you were—

well, we just didn't do it that way. It was sort of like, you know, as we'd grown the company, there was this amalgamation of pricing practices that sort of started to like sink in.

And it feels like I'm a little bit like debt. It feels like a little bit like debt. Yeah.

It's totally, it's pricing debt, right? It's like you're sort of like experimenting, testing some of these things out and you sort of back yourself into a corner where you have some like really valuable bits, but they don't apply to everybody equally. And it just doesn't, you know, your customers don't really feel good about that at the end of the day.

Was it an operational debt or was it a technical debt?

More operational than anything. You know, I think you, you know, we kind of had like run a bunch of experiments around this and we sort of knew Okay, this is sort of where we're making the most money and we're generating margin off of this. So you also get this like weird, you sort of paint yourself into this weird corner where you're making money off of things that you're not actually really excited to be making money in that way. You're sort of like, like, you know, the money is obviously great. No one's going to get into business. You want to make money, but there's a way in which that, like those dollars you're earning from your customers, like invokes loyalty. And invokes love. And then there's a way in which people are sort of like, I kind of feel like I have to do this because I'm, you know, this product is so valuable in XYZ ways, which you like, that part you like, but they don't feel good about it. Right. Which for me, I looked at that and go like, we've sort of got ourselves all like twisted up here.

I love that you use the word love. I only heard founders use the word love to describe how you want the customers to feel about the product.

Well, yeah. And so I think it took like, we sort of went back to, to square one a little and said, hey, we know we've done a lot of price optimizations that are making us money, but we look— the way in which we're doing it does not feel good at all. And so we need to kind of just back up into first principles. We need to set aside some of these, like, tests and results and all these things we've run and just look at where there's customer friction, where there is pain point, and know that if we can go solve these things, folks are going to stick with Zapier today. And then trust that they're going to use us more and more and more over the long haul. And so it may not— these changes we're going to go make, they may not pay off on day 1, but they might pay off, you know, day 365, day 700, day, you know, 1,500, etc., etc., because they're going to willing to stick with you. And so the choices we made were the following. One, we said all plans have unlimited Zaps, so we just stopped metering on that altogether. Two, tasks became the sole meter. 3, every plan now has a pay-as-you-go element. So you can subscribe to a Pro plan and get the chunk of tasks, but if you go over, you don't have to move to Team, you don't have to move to Company, you don't have to buy the next like tranche. You can just pay as you go if you'd like. So we changed that. So that was the second big change.

And then third thing, it's like effectively unbundling.

Yeah, basically. Yeah. Uh, and so you can still buy like buckets of tasks, that come at a cheaper rate, you know, you're going to commit to us, we'll give you a little bit of a cheaper rate. But if you want to pay as you go, you can. So you get more flexibility if you're a customer, which a lot of our, especially the smaller customers, really like that flexibility. And the third thing we did is, this is another like very Zapier-specific thing. We have all these apps on our platform that are like utility apps. They're, we call them by Zapier apps. So they're things like you can filter tasks. So you can say, hey, I don't want to run this if this doesn't make— if, if, you know, the email is gmail.com, I don't want it to keep going. I only want to look at, you know, company domains or something. Or, you know, we have a formatter where it's like, if, you know, they spit this name over as a full name and the other app needs it to be first and last name, you can sort of use this formatter to manipulate the data, et cetera. So we have all these utility functions, but the way our editor functions is that those are also actions. And so those things counted as tasks as well. And they're, they're really popular. They're used a ton. And, uh, turns out they rack up a lot of tasks for a lot of customers. And we looked at that and said, gosh, these things are not where the value is. Like, these things are just like little helper utilities to kind of help you get from point A to point B at the end of the day. And so we took all those and said, okay, those things don't count as tasks anymore. So that was a, you know, a sizable portion of our task volume was coming through that. So we got rid of it. The end result is, I, I won't disclose the exact number, but like we shaved off a good chunk of like our top line revenue meaningfully with these pricing changes by just making the platform way more customer friendly. Um, and the end result is that the growth rate, the number of consumption of tasks that our customers use also meaningfully grew. People were like just much, much happier about using the platform.

Mm-hmm.

So that was kind of the, the ultimate end result. Now, like you said at the top, there were some folks who were frustrated, but I think the frustration mostly just comes from not like us not communicating like well exactly the changes. Pricing changes are always really difficult to communicate exactly, but the, but the end result is there is a lot more value delivered on the platform. And because we have been largely a profitable company, because it's largely bootstrapped, we are able to take the hit and play the long game here in a way that I think a lot of venture-backed companies just simply couldn't have done what we did.

Were you, were you, do you have a board?

We do have a board, which is Brian, Mike, and I, and Jay from Atlassian. And Jay had told this story. Oh, yeah.

Awesome.

Well, and the thing that got me over the, the fence, Jay had told me a story of Atlassian during the financial crisis of a pla— a pricing change they made there that was very customer friendly as well, that had similar revenue implications. And when he walked me through it, I was like, okay, we need to go do this. This is 100% the right call. And yeah, we, we went and made it happen.

That's amazing. How did your margins play into this decision? Like how, if you look at the inverse, not just top line, but straight up profitability, how did that change the game?

Well, you know, I think you, it matters.

Like, so walk me through, like, is this Zaps cheaper than tasks and tasks are worth charging?

Yeah, we've always had relatively like healthy margins. And so we didn't look at this from like a really margin-specific way. Like, we definitely did all that modeling, and so we, we sort of knew what, like, okay, here's like a line of no returns that we can't go beyond. But a lot of the changes we were getting at were the type of changes where you're not exactly sure how they're going to play out. Like, we figured we would get more usage out the other side, and we'd monetize that usage less, but you don't exactly know until you do it. And so there's a little bit of a leap of faith that you have to go into here. And so You know, there was a lot of back and forth with me and our CFO, just like looking at this stuff, saying like, okay, you know, where is our tolerance line? Where is our fault line? And, you know, it's probably, for those of you who have been in these discussions, it's probably like a little bit of a classic give and go here where like I'm pushing like way more customer-friendly things and he's sort of like toeing the line and us knowing like, okay, we're both playing the roles we need to play here. And then there was a spot where like we both sort of were like, Okay, we can live with that. Let's, let's just lock arms and go make it happen.

I've heard you tell this story before. When you were just starting, you kind of just set the price arbitrarily. You just said, okay, it'll be $100 just because the customer asked. And I'm reminded of more recently when, uh, Sam Altman decided to do the same for ChatGPT Pro, $200 a month. So what do you think that kind of tells us about all these pricing strategies and pricing consultancies who sell like really expensive packages to, to try and figure out pricing. Like there's that approach, there's this approach. Like how, how do you think about that?

So I think there's two, two learnings I have. One is I think when you're building a product that is somewhat novel, pricing really is challenging and there's a certain amount of YOLO to it where you're just like, okay, I've, I've looked at like any product out there that sort of kind of is comparable to what I'm doing, but at the end of the day, like, there's not a direct one-to-one. You're also looking at the customers you think you're selling to and you're trying to understand, well, what other software do they buy and how much do they pay for it? And like, what roughly is the value I'm delivering for them and how does it compare to other things they get? And then you're just trying to pick a zip code that you're like, I think this is gonna be good. So yeah, I think I look at what OpenAI does, and candidly, a lot of these AI companies are in this moment where there's a little bit of like, you know, that, that finger in the wind, like, I think this is where I should go. Let's give it a, let's give it a, let's give it a shot and see what happens. And I think that's important for sort of novel folks. Then on the flip side, when you have the pricing consultancy, so we've worked with some of these folks, I think the big value you get from them is they work with a lot of the top companies and they work with a lot of, sort of forward-thinking companies as it comes to pricing. And what I've learned is they, they have a ton of insight on how customers buy these products. And so they know what the, like, where the wind is blowing. And in some ways, I think they actually can dictate the market's, like, willingness to, like, buy in certain ways because they move so many of their clients at once to certain types of billing infrastructure and certain ways of working. And so they start to see, like, Oh, this worked well for this customer. So then enough people start to do it and the customer base in certain industries, in certain places gets conditioned to buying that way. And so I think in a lot of ways these big consultancies like pull, kind of tug the market along to like new types of pricing models. And so it's useful to like, at least once you get to a certain size, it's useful to at least be friends with them because they just have so much knowledge from working with a lot of these folks. Now, whether it's worth the price or not, I mean, that's hard to say. Uh, you know, I think you get a lot of knowledge and insight just by being close to these folks. And so it's probably worth it at least once or twice to do a project with them because you do learn a lot and you make friends with them for sure.

What, what, what is equivalent to Zapier right now? What's Zapier right now? What's, what's out there?

Well, I mean, there's, there are some like direct competitors that we have, you know, both sort of like downmarket and upmarket that do a lot of like counter-positioning against us. You know, we've got one that like looks at our pricing and finds every single way to like make us look worse on it. They're really effective at it. You know, same thing upmarket. We've got folks that counter-position there. And yeah, I think that's the— that's like a challenging plight when you're sort of first to market and have set the standard and are like really good at it is eventually you are going to have formidable competitors that come along and they're gonna wanna like counterposition against you. And one of those dimensions that they have is price. And so they can go find all the levers where maybe your price isn't quite optimal, or maybe you haven't done a good job of communicating something and they can just press on it. And whether it's true or not, it's true in the market's eyes. And so that like pressure point is, I mean, it's a really like important part of capitalism. I think it like just forces like competition and it forces all of us to be on the top of our game.

But when you change your price, you went to a completely different scheme. Like, it wasn't just like a little bit here and a little bit there. You kind of said, I'm gonna stop charging for this, I'm gonna start charging for this other thing. Your competitors were not charging in that particular way, right? The competitors were charging in like the closest thing that looks to you. So when you did that, what was your competitive reaction to it?

Some of them had to go update their landing page, like their pricing pages to change some stuff. Uh, so there was a little bit of that. Yeah, I, I think that's sort of like the most that we've seen sort of from a competitive reaction is like, you know, everybody goes and updates their battle, their battle sheets. Just sort of like, how do I, how do I keep counter positioning against this stuff?

But what we, were you different enough from them to ask this question?

I don't know. I don't know. I think it's a really, I think it's a really unique time right now where it's, it's not just the direct competitors, it's the whole market has, um, a whole bunch of like interesting ways that like there's just new products, new pricing models, new, et cetera. And so, you know, I think it's tough to get like really clear market signal on some of these things when everything is moving so fast, mostly alluding to like what's happening in AI right now.

So let's talk about AI. So like how, how are you seeing pricing in AI evolve? Specifically not for the consumption side, which is kind of easy because you can, there's like only 3 players.

Well, I think you have, yeah, I think you have sort of two places that we're paying attention to on pricing. So one, you have the big frontier models and what's happening there. And you sort of have the open and closed source battle that's, that's getting, being duked out there. Largely, you know, this is a big, like, you know, this is like a king's market. You know, you have, you need billions of dollars to sort of compete to go to town. I think all that money pouring in is driving down prices by and large for everybody. So we're getting the application layer, consumers are getting access to you know, really affordable intelligence based on what the market probably could naturally support without all that funding. And I think you're also seeing the dynamics of like open source and closed source competing as well too. So you have something like Llama, Deepseek, et cetera, again, in a market that's driving those prices even further down. And then you have this consistent, like, one-upsmanship where you have the, like, new frontier model that is priced at a premium, and then all the subsequent models get cheaper and cheaper sort of over time. So you have like really cheap and fast intelligence and then you have like more expensive, like really smart, but maybe slower intelligence. So that's kind of what you have on the model side. Then on the application side, which is where Zapier plays, most people in AI are playing, I think you see a lot more diversity of approaches here. Um, yeah, I think you've got, you know, your sort of like classic cost plus where people are saying like, well, this is how much I pay OpenAI, or this is how much I pay Anthropic or whatever, and like, I'm gonna just try and charge some amount of utility on top of that. I think you've got, you know, folks that are really trying to figure out some sort of like value-based pricing. Oftentimes they're benchmarking this to labor where it's like, ah, you know, you're gonna have this many people trying to do this job, but now with like AI and automation, you can have that be a fraction of it. And so maybe it's 10% or 20% of what your labor costs. And so that's how you get your, you see a lot of that happening more on with products that have more of a consultant bent, like a sort of like services and software bent. I think that happens a lot more. And so those are probably like the two like predominant like motions that we're seeing. But I don't know of anyone that looks at the— I haven't talked to anyone sort of in AI with their pricing model that's like, you know, in love with sort of what they've built yet. I think there's a lot that we're all still learning to figure out how to—

so when you talk to these people, what would they wish they had? Like if, you know, they're charging X and they're trying to move to anything or they just try it, they're just confused and don't know what to do?

Well, I think the, I mean, what they really want, I think, is some space to breathe and develop the market. And, you know, there's just so many competitors, so many tools, so many options that you're not exactly sure, like, what is the customer's, like, competitive set that they're sort of like, what's the evaluation set? Who am I actually competing with? What are the alternatives? What are the options? And so it really is keeping everybody on their toes in terms of how they go to market with you know, price at the end of the day.

That's interesting. So as you evolve your company and you see other— the evolution of AI, what prevents coming with a natural framework for things to be tied to each other just by speaking to a phone or speaking to a computer and giving the command to like, make these 3 applications work together, go figure it out?

Prompt your way to connectivity.

Exactly.

We're getting closer and closer to that, I think. It's still a little bit a ways. I think God, the models just keep getting better and better. But there's a lot of like cruft sort of involved with that, where if you sort of like need a one-off thing, you can do it. But if you sort of need to like maintain integrations, you have to like do polling, you have to do authentication, you have to do retries. If you have to build a whole set of like infrastructure in and around that, that part's really hard. The sort of like, hey, write me a one script to import this to that and sort of be done with it. That's getting We're nearly there for that. But like the long-lived stuff, that's where it gets like harder and harder to, to build something in this way. And so I do think like a lot of organizations still are gonna be wanting to work with, you know, more like industrial software vendor for that. But I do think we're seeing a, a massive emergence of this sort of like one-off personalized software that like, it's like, okay, I'll just go, you know, the kind of stuff where you're like, In the past, maybe you would go look on your iPhone to like try and download an app to do an XYZ thing. Now you can probably build that just as fast as you can find it, and it might be better, honestly. That long tail of software is really exploding.

But even the hardening stuff, even the CRUD stuff, how many iterations until you get there? Like, you know, we were just playing with v0 and Cursor and Replit and what else were we playing with?

A Lovable and Bolt.new.

Yeah, Bolt.new, exactly.

And I mean, frankly, we have built so much with, you know, 2 people frankly coding, maybe 2 and a half. And it's getting better. Like it's some of the stuff you need to rewrite it just a little bit, but it works. And it comes out fully with like test cases and, you know, all the things that you need to go through to validate it. So where does that end? And like, how does, how do you navigate this new world to position Cypress?

Like, uh, well, I definitely think there's a, there's like a Darwinian moment that like all software I think is going through right now. Um, you know, it's, it's like when you can build— I saw something was going viral this morning where someone had built like a DocuSign clone in like, you know, an hour or something like that. Now, obviously, like, that is probably going to have some implication on DocuSign as a company. You know, I think like the calls of like DocuSign's demise or any SaaS, like we're just using DocuSign as an example here, are like pretty exaggerated because I think the value in a company like DocuSign is it's not just in the, the, the MVP e-signature software. It's in all the like business logic and workflows that have been embedded inside of an organization. It's in all the sales and marketing to evangelize for the space. It's in all the services that sort of come along with that. It's the brand, it's the market dominance, et cetera. That part is really hard to replicate. And the reliability, the consistency, the security, the data management, all of that stuff is incredibly valuable. And so while I do think there will be a slice of the market that does, you know, okay, I write my own e-signature software and I'll maintain it and do all the stuff that sort of has to happen with it. Like, I do think that will exist, but I don't know that most businesses are going to want to wake up in the morning and be like, let's write e-signature, like, let's, let's write every single internal tool that we could possibly do.

No, but I don't think that's the question. The question is whether there is a 10-person DocuSign company out there that can sell same product at a marginal fraction of the price.

And there, well, there is, there, there already are 10-person DocuSign companies out there that exist, but why are they not as big as DocuSign? Why are we talking about DocuSign right now? And it's because of the brand and the marketing and all that sort of stuff. And so I think the question is, could there be a 10-person DocuSign company that actually could pierce through and have the like market pull that competes with DocuSign's like sales and marketing engine? If you go look at their you know, how much they spend on sales and marketing. Like, it's insane. It's a, it's an enormous dollar amount. Like, that 10-person company has got to be incredibly, like, generating huge amount of money.

It's true, but it pales. That, that cost, you know, it's nothing compared to the headcount cost. So if you were to start your own company today, what would it look like? Like zero, and you start today. What, what, what change? How many people are in it?

Well, I mean, I think we're still starting with the 3 founders and we're going from there, you know?

That's right. That's right. Put the bad signal out, everybody comes back.

You know, I, we were always like, in some ways I think we kind of had like this mindset early on. You know, it was just 3 people for a full year. At the end of the second year, we were at 6 or 7. We had this like, don't hire till it hurts mentality. We built the company on one round of funding and done. Um, you know, nowadays that has a name, it's called seedstrapping, which that didn't, that term didn't even like exist, you know, a decade ago.

Do you invent that term?

I don't, I didn't invent it. I just heard people talking about it, like over in the last, last year or so. It's like, people are like, you were one of the first seed strappers. And I was like, what's seed strapping? So I do think we did a lot of the things right, but I do still think on the margins we probably would hire slower. I think there's probably just a lot of places where we wouldn't have had to hire as quickly. Yeah, I still think you're gonna need some amount of people to keep scaling, these organizations just because the complexity just grows and grows and grows. And like your mental ability to sort of like facilitate all that has to be delegated somewhere. Maybe you can delegate that to an agent, but some of it is, you know, sometimes you're going to be dealing to a human to be like, hey, figure out all the agents to go do this stuff. But I do think companies will probably be smaller, or at least certain teams will be much smaller on the margins.

Interesting. I mean, you served a broad swath of startups out there. What is the change that you're seeing? In your own customer base?

You definitely see a lot less technical companies going a lot further. It is not uncommon to see, you know, 10, 20-person teams getting to millions, low tens of millions in revenue, maybe, maybe not quite that big, but like pretty, pretty sizable. And you go look at their engineering teams, and it's not like they have crazy impressive engineering teams. They have these like low-code, no-code stacks, and they're like semi-technical folks. And the magic is kind of that they've, they've sort of jammed domain expertise where it's like, oh, I know healthcare really well, or I know this industry really well. And they paired that with like a hacker who's like, you know, not the world's greatest engineer, but good enough. And that business can go pretty far before they have to sort of bring in, you know, quote unquote, professional engineering. And so that is all over the place these days. And that, that I think is really exciting that you can see entrepreneurship open up more towards these domain experts. And I think you start to see a different type of company being built where you're seeing stuff in like all sorts of niche esoteric industries, building tools for themselves that are like a lot better than what sort of like the classic off-the-shelf stuff would look like.

That's amazing. How do you see that impacting where you live right now? I mean, you're in Missouri and I think that's a—

well, I mean, I, yeah, there's a lot of expertise not in coding there.

Maybe there is.

Yeah. I, I think it's, tell me more. I mean, for me, like we, I, we started the company here in Central Missouri. I was out in the Bay Area for 10 years, moved back for family. Yeah. And I think that the exciting thing is that the democratized access to these tools. And so you can find folks in Central Missouri or wherever that is able to now go build stuff. They don't need as much access to capital. They don't need as much access to, you know, an elite type of talent. And it just opens up the door for really smart people to go build stuff, to be entrepreneurs, to be software entrepreneurs that in the past, it was just harder. Like, it just, like, there was just more things that had to like stack in your favor to be able to pull this stuff off. And now, you know, with a little bit of money, but mostly just know-how and determination, you can just get a lot farther.

Are you jealous of these new types of companies? Because so you built, you built a company, right, uh, 2011, 2012. Everything was so different back then. You're looking at these new entrepreneurs, are you jealous of, of what they have?

Well, I mean, I would have loved for this stuff to exist in the way that it did when, when we started, of course. Like, how could you not? But, you know, maybe there's sort of like some Zen mentality here where I'm, I'm also just like really happy with what we've achieved and where we've gotten. I, I'm still paranoid every day that like, you know, we, we're not gonna be the best to serve customers, et cetera, all that sort of stuff. So yeah, I don't know, it's like a weird mix of like, yeah, gratitude and like, yeah, these, these young kids got it so good these days. Like, you know, element.

What do they know about building a company?

My day, you know, we had to walk up hills both ways, that kind of stuff.

That's amazing. So is there a version of Zapier that is just, you know, GPT-like interface where you just describe what you want to happen and the whole thing gets set up for you.

I mean, we're pretty close to that today. Yeah. Like if you log in today, you can just say, hey, like build me a Zap that does XYZ or build me a system that does ABC. Like the activation rates for folks who do that are like on par with people who are sometimes trying to build from scratch. So like, I don't think we're that far away from that experience being really, really good. Uh, it's already good enough. I think it can get a lot better. Which, that sort of feels like everything in AI right now, where it's like you go play with this stuff and you're like, hey, you, it's not, you don't have to look that hard to see the promise. Um, and you're like, wow, this is pretty good, but it's still not great. But imagine what happens when the next model drops, the next like capabilities uncovered. It's like, it just feels like every, I mean, shoot, it feels like every day now there's sort of like something new that's like pushing the envelope, improving the capabilities, et cetera. It's a fun time.

So what, what, what creates the moat then against your competition that has access to the same tools?

I think most moats are pretty fragile. When you're sort of having a Darwinian moment. And so, you know, there are things that I think I'm glad we have that I'm like, hey, this is great. This is— it's good that we have this stuff. It's hard to bank on that. And so I think at the end of the day, it's how much do you obsess about your customers and how much— how quickly do you work to serve them? And you better hope you're near the darn top of the list on that dimension.

That's right. That's right. You just have to run faster and be more agile than the next guy.

Yeah. Which is great for customers, great for consumers.

That's right. That's right. They win at the end. Wade, it's been an incredible pleasure to, to have you over. Every time I talk to you, I learn. So thank you so much for sharing. As usual, it's, it's been a pleasure in the conversation.

Thanks, guys. This is a blast.