Ali Vaez: Iran's Regional Policy

But there is this perception that the US's foot might still be on the ground in that part of the world, but its heart and its head is somewhere else. And in that, I think both sides see opportunities and risks.

Welcome to Babbel: Translating the Middle East, a podcast from the Middle East Program at CSIS. Here on Babbel, we take you beyond the headlines to take a closer look at what's happening in the Middle East. And why it matters. On March 10th, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced an agreement to re-establish diplomatic relations based on days of secret talks mediated by Chinese diplomats in Beijing. To break down the agreement and how it fits into Iran's foreign policy approach to the rest of the Middle East, I speak with Ali Vaez from the International Crisis Group. Then I continue the conversation with Natasha Hall and Caleb Harper talking about what this all means for US policy on Iran and in the wider Middle East. To translate some of what's happening in the Middle East, this is Babbel. Ali Vaez is the Iran Project Director and Senior Advisor to the President at the International Crisis Group, where he's worked for more than a decade. He is also an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service, and I have guest lectured in his class. Ali, welcome to Babbel.

Thank you, John. It's great to be back.

Were you surprised that China brokered a deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia in mid-March?

I was surprised, but I wasn't shocked. Of course, there were 5 rounds of negotiations prior to the announcement of this deal in Beijing. That were facilitated by the Iraqis and the Omanis. And I had a sense that the two countries' geostrategic rivalry in the region had reached a phase of diminishing returns. I think if this deal had been announced in Baghdad or Oman, it would have been much less of a shock. But if you look at the set of motivations on both sides and also on the Chinese side, I think all the stars had aligned perfectly for this deal to be finalized.

Was the fact that it was made in Beijing a reflection of Iran's China strategy? And what is Iran's China strategy?

Well, Iran pivoted to the East about two decades ago, mostly as a result of Western sanctions, which changed the balance of trade, which was primarily towards the West, towards Europe, to China. And since 2018, US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran had also realized that geostrategically it is left with very little options other than counting on China and Russia. This is not a position that I think is comfortable for Iran. It knows that China and Russia are cognizant of the fact that Iran has little alternatives to them, and therefore these countries exploit Iran, especially China, in demanding massive discounts on Iran's energy exports to the country. But again, they've been left with very little choice. And of course, in the same way that this was for Iranians a gesture towards China, it was also, I think, for the Saudis a signal to Washington that they too could potentially have alternatives if the US does not take their security concerns into account and act in a more serious and reliable way.

The argument that the Obama administration had made was that Saudi Arabia needed to do precisely this, and Saudi Arabia was resisting. Resistant to doing this under the Obama administration. Now you say that they're doing it as a way to show the United States that they have alternatives. How do you disentangle the insistence on the regional states wanting a security umbrella against Iran and feeling of necessity to engage Iran because of a sense the US isn't willing to provide that security umbrella?

I would argue that it's primarily because they had not tested the alternative in 2015 when President Obama uttered those words, and they turned into almost blasphemy in the eyes of the Saudis and the Emiratis. But they got the policy alternative that they were looking for under the Trump administration, which was to put Iran in a corner and under tremendous pressure. But it backfired against them. Iran lashed out, as you remember, in 2019, first with attacks on the port of Fujairah in the UAE, and then with a spectacular attack on Saudi Aramco facilities in September of that year, they quickly realized that they become collateral damage in this kind of confrontation between Iran and the US. And as long as US personnel and assets are not directly affected, the US will not come to their rescue. And I think this was the wake-up call that first led the Emiratis to establish channels of communication with Iran in 2019 and normalized their relations in 2022. And the Saudis, with a bit of lag, followed the same policy.

So what is the broader Iranian strategy toward the neighbors? I'm sure you, like I, have heard any number of Arab officials and experts complaining that Iran controls 4 Arab capitals. There's the whole Shia Crescent language that King Abdullah of Jordan has put forward. Does Iran genuinely seek a sort of accommodation with Arab states? Does it think that relations with Arab states will let it continue to push its advantage against the Arab states. Where does this go?

Let me just first say that I think for Iran, this deal with Saudi Arabia was more of a tactical move than a strategic move in the sense that at this moment, Iran is primarily focused on crisis management. It's dealing with a confluence of crises at the same time. It has tensions with Azerbaijan in its north, tensions over the Iraqi Kurdistan region where Iranian dissident groups reside, concerns about Israel's growing presence around Iran. Add to that domestic unrest that Iran has been dealing with in the past almost 7 months, and of course, growing tensions over Iran's nuclear program and the deepening rift between Iran and the West over Iran's supply of weapons to Russia. That has deployed Iranian drones in its war of aggression in Ukraine. So you put all of that together, I think the Iranians wanted to at least close off one potential front, which is in the Gulf region, which is also a similar motivating factor for the Saudis and the Emiratis, that they wanted to get themselves out of the line of fire in case there is another round of confrontation between Iran and the West. But strategically, Iran is still focused on its Axis of Resistance. That basically provided with a forward defense against Israel. But that policy is primarily focused on the Levant. It's an axis that goes from Tehran to Baghdad to Damascus to Beirut. Iran really never wanted to expand that zone of influence into the Arabian Peninsula. But I would argue the war in Yemen provided Iran with an opportunity to turn the table against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which it felt were doing the same thing to Iran in the Levant by supporting non- non-state actors in Syria to curb Iran's influence there. And this is why at this stage, I think Iran had reached a point of diminishing returns because it basically has won in Syria in terms of the primary objective of preserving Syria's geostrategic orientation against Israel. And in Yemen, one of the commitments that we've heard Iran has made in this agreement with Saudi Arabia is to stop arming the Houthis. And this too, I think, was already a fait accompli because it had become much more difficult for the Iranians to do that anyways. And so this is usually when diplomatic opportunities occur in the sense that you've reached a stage that the alternative is just not very attractive.

Do you think it was part of Iran's intention to try to put a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia?

I think Iranians are realistic enough to understand that that is not possible, that at the end of the day, the Saudis might be discontent with US policy in the region, but they can't really rely on any other security guarantor. And no one would be able to dislodge US military primacy in that part of the world anytime soon. But I think there were domestic calculations for the Iranians here, for instance, that were much more important than an attempt to drive a wedge between the US and Saudi Arabia. Their alleged Saudi ties to a satellite TV network known as Iran International, which had quickly turned into Iran's version of Fox News, basically a very popular but a divisive TV network that Iranians believed it was responsible for fueling the fires of protests in the past few months. So I would say for the first time, the Saudis had an internal security card that Iran cared about. That could have been exchanged for the question of Yemen, which for the Saudis is a question of internal security, is not really a foreign policy issue. But I don't think the Iranians are under any illusions they would be able to create a serious rift between the Saudis and the Biden administration.

As Iran makes greater diplomatic ties with the Saudis and the Emiratis and the Kuwaitis, does that change the way they think the United States is going to think about Gulf security? Does it change the way the Gulf states think about the United States and Gulf security?

Look, there is a general perception of U.S. pivoting away from this region, which started under the Obama administration. In practice, we don't really see any evidence for it on the ground. In fact, the U.S. now has a higher number of troops and military assets in the region than in the beginning of the Obama administration. But there is this perception that the U.S. US's foot might still be on the ground in that part of the world, but its heart and its head is somewhere else. And in that, I think both sides see opportunities and risks. The Saudis have obviously tried to hedge their bets by maintaining ties with Russia despite US's efforts to cut them off. The Saudis have also, I think, are increasingly moving towards rapprochement with Israel, which could happen when MBS becomes king. But same for the Iranians, that they see in US disengagement from the region an opportunity for trying to deepen relations and bring down the temperature, at least in the subregion. There is another motivation here from the Iranians, which is that they have learned that economic ties with regional countries are much more immune to US pressure than is the case elsewhere. You know, if you look at Iran's trade with South Korea or Japan, They almost disappeared overnight when the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. But even the Trump administration could not manage to cut off economic ties between Iran and the UAE or between Iran and Iraq or between Iran and Turkey. And so they see in this kind of developing of relationships an opportunity for creating lifelines for the Iranian economy, which, given the deep troubles that it is in right now, It is of vital interest to them.

Do you read anything into the fact that a lot of these negotiations have been quite visibly handled by Ali Shamkhani, the head of the Supreme Council on National Security in Iran, rather than the Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who in many ways had articulated this idea that we're not going to worry as much on the West, we're going to focus on the neighborhood and to some extent to the East.

Well, there are multiple factors here. First, on the Saudi side, they were always interested in talking to Iranian security officials because they believe that Iran's regional policy is not run by diplomats in the Foreign Ministry, but by the Revolutionary Guards and the security apparatus. But also on the Iranian side, I think there were a few factors involved. One, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council used to play a very prominent role before the Rouhani administration.

This is when Rouhani had that job.

Rouhani had that job as national security advisor. He was the chief nuclear negotiator. He was the one who negotiated a security agreement with Saudi Arabia in 2001. And then it was only under the Rouhani administration that Foreign Minister Zarif became the face of Iran's diplomatic outreach, both to the West and also to the region. And the region, it was not successful, of course. But now it's basically a return factory settings of the Supreme National Security Council Secretary playing that prominent role. Number 2 is the fact that the current Foreign Minister, Amir-Abdollahian, is one of the most hated Iranians in the Arab world because he was Deputy Foreign Minister when the Syrian crisis started. And he was the face of Iran's strategy in Syria, which of course was deeply, deeply visceral and emotional for Arab states. It's the same kind of reaction you now see Europeans have towards Ukraine, whereas Ali Shamkhani is an Iranian Arab, speaks perfect Arabic. He received the highest medal of honor from King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. I think the only Iranian who's been honored in that way. So it's an entirely different character. And of course, as you well know, personalities and people matter in diplomacy. And so I think Ali Shamkhani was much better placed for doing this job. And in general, in the Raisi administration, you have a really weakened government. And in that, I think there was a possibility. An opportunity for Shamkhani to play a more prominent role.

Do you think over time that growing ties with the region, growing ties with Asia, eventually bring the West along, that they can work from the inside out the same way that sometimes in the Bush administration, people said the road to Jerusalem is through Baghdad? Is the way to Washington through Abu Dhabi and Riyadh?

I think if we still had the capacity for strategic thinking in the United States, that would be the right way of looking at things. But of course, in the same way that I said Iran had agreed to this deal based on tactical calculations, I think the Saudis and the Biden administration are also looking at all of this in the short term because we're only 18 months away from the next presidential elections in the United States. And that determines whether there would be a significant continuity or strategic change in how the US sees the region. I would argue, ironically, the perception of US disengagement, the perception of US unreliability, both as a diplomatic negotiating partner and as a security guarantor, has created diplomatic opportunities in the region. Also, I think it is time for us to start learning the lessons that the kind of compartmentalization that the Obama administration pursued in trying to resolve the nuclear issue as the most urgent issue, regardless of what was happening in the neighborhood, has failed. In reality, tensions in one area can easily spill over into another. And even the fact that there was a successful nuclear deal did not survive the broader context of enmity between Iran and US allies in the region. Unlike in 2015, that Iran had good relations with Europe and was on speaking terms with the United States and had really bad relations with its neighbors. And now it's the other way around. And in that, I think there is an opportunity to also look at the nuclear issue in a different way. Instead of it being a deal between Iran and the West, it could be between Iran and the region. And in this way, you would shield off this part of the world on which at least a third of seaborne energy exports at the global level depend. It would be beneficial for all sides, China, US, Europe, everyone.

So what would that look like? What would it look like in terms of the IAEA? What would it look like in terms of the UN Security Council? And what would it look like in terms of what the JCPOA didn't address, which is the ballistic missile threat, which arguably is a much larger issue for Iran's neighborhood.

Of course, you can't still resolve everything at the same time. I'm not talking about a grand bargain here. I'm talking about sort of the foundations of the kind of security engagement in the region that would eventually result in an architecture in the region that everybody feels protected by, regardless of their size and their conventional military capabilities. This would, I think, require regionalizing some of the aspects of the nuclear deal. For instance, if you put a limit on enrichment level, 5%, across the subregion between Iran and the GCC, you basically can permanently ensure that no country in that part of the world will reach the kind of capability that Iran has right now and is a major source of concern. Iranians could agree to it because they're not being singled out. This is part of a regional arrangement, and the GCC wouldn't really be giving up much because they don't have nuclear fuel cycle technology as we speak. And in return, I think the economic incentives could come from the region and not from the West, because it would give the Saudis or the Bahrainis, for instance, leverage over Iran that they currently don't have. The Saudi finance minister has already started talking about this. And Iran would also benefit again, because it no longer believes that sanctions relief from the West would ever materialize. But at the regional level, the Qataris wanted to do massive investments in Iran as part of the JCPOA revival. The Saudis now wanted to do it. The Emiratis wanted to do it. So we're in a different world. And I think smart diplomacy can use these completely different circumstances and come up with a more creative design that would basically ensure a more sustainable arrangement that addresses the nuclear issue and some regional issues. And then on top of that, you can start building additional layers. The problem with ballistic missiles is, of course, we can't expect Iran to unilaterally give up on a capability that it believes is its sole conventional, reliable conventional deterrent. Right. So what you need is some kind of a rebalancing of conventional capabilities in the region. And of course, limits on proliferation of some of these weapons to Iranian allies, at least again, shielding of the Sahab region from that kind of weapon transfers. But you've got to start somewhere. And I do believe that this kind of a nuclear versus regional trade quid pro quo is a good place to start.

And of course, Iran has been a pioneer in developing asymmetric threats, not just its nuclear capability, but with use of proxy groups and all kinds of other tools. Would you expect that if you can get an agreement on nuclear issues in the region, that it can start expanding to all of the unconventional things that ultimately are what all of Iran's neighbors worry about.

Look, I don't want to be starry-eyed here, but we have to again look at the recent history and learn from it. Why did Iran attack Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019? It wasn't because of the rivalry competition with Saudi Arabia, which has always existed, but it escalated because we got into a zero-sum game And this idea that Iran could be put in a box and under pressure from the US and contained, and the rest of the region can flourish, I think has proven to be completely wrongheaded. So that kind of policy towards Iran, basically dealing with Iran as a pariah, as a rogue state, also motivated Iran to act as one, right? But if we enter into a completely different kind of engagement, which we're in the early phases of, then I think there is less motivation for Iran to pursue that kind of policy because it will have more to lose. And this is why I think it has now agreed to slow down its support for the Houthis, of course, with realistic limitations because the Houthis are not really an Iranian proxy. So there is a ceiling on how much influence Iran has on them, but it has control over its weapons transfers. We have seen the number of cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia from Yemen dropping significantly. And so those kind of developments, I think, are possible. Now, as you've heard, China is interested in organizing an Iran-GCC summit in Beijing. I don't expect much on the substance side to come out of what China is trying to organize. It seems to be more of a publicity coup. But I think there is an opportunity to try to now build on what China has made possible and create more interdependency between Iran and the GCC. Which would then put constraints on how far Iran will go to use its asymmetric capabilities against countries in the Gulf region. Now, again, that doesn't mean Iran's policy in the rest of the region will change, especially the enmity with Israel. You see the Supreme Leader issuing thousands of pardons of protests, of people who've been arrested during the protests as an effort to bring down the temperature internally. You've seen this deal with Saudi Arabia as an attempt to bring down the temperature in the Gulf region. But this de-escalatory pattern, I think, is motivated in part by the escalatory pattern that we've seen between Iran and Israel slash the US. Israel is more and more targeting Iranian assets in Syria. Iran retaliates against, against the US, which is much more exposed in Syria. We've seen fatalities now on the US side, on the Iranian side. And so none of the dynamics that I'm describing in the Gulf is going to resolve those problems in the Levant, but it doesn't mean that progress in the Gulf is not possible because of those tensions.

Ali Vaez, thank you very much for joining us on Babbel.

An absolute pleasure.

Next, Jon, Natasha, and I continue the conversation about what this all means for US policy in the region. Jon and Natasha, thank you for joining me for another Table Talk.

Thank you, Caleb.

Thanks for having us, Caleb.

One of the things that Ali Vaez pointed out that I found really interesting, Jon, is that the United States is thinking a bit tactically about this agreement right now because in 18 months there's going to be an election that could shift how Washington is thinking about this bigger picture approach to Iran. If we think about what Ali Vaez was talking about with the wider agreement between Iran and the GCC, how do you think a Democratic administration would approach that versus a Republican administration?

I think a Democratic administration would probably accept it, not especially warmly, but it would accept it. In many ways, this is a manifestation of what the Obama administration had wanted in the Gulf, which is the Gulf reaches something of its own equilibrium. There's still a US security umbrella, But there's a certain degree of accommodation. There's a certain degree to which Gulf states try not to antagonize Iran and count on the United States always being there. And Iran tries not to antagonize the Gulf states. I think the difference comes if you have a Republican administration that decides it's going to do some version of maximum pressure. It's going to force the Iranians to comply. It's going to force the Iranians to accommodate, for example, Israeli security concerns. And for Gulf Arab states who have their own strategy toward Iran, they could find themselves on the wrong side of the administration instead of on the right side.

I would totally agree with John here. I think it seems to me that Republicans have always had a more absolutist view on Iran regardless of current dynamics, whereas Democrats have tended to be conciliatory, and that's kind of been the case for, I would say, 20 years. I mean, even when Iran seemed more conciliatory after 9/11, George W. Bush made that infamous remark just a few months later, lumping Iran in with the Axis of Evil. And even just last year, I think it was like 49 senators, Republican senators, told the Biden administration that they weren't interested in a deal or revival of the JCPOA, that was even weaker than its predecessor. For the Israel component, I think that's at least part of Netanyahu's calculus where he started obviously sort of siding with Republican administrations. And it's not necessarily because I think both parties are still sort of strongly pro-Israel, but their stance on Iran is quite different. So I would say for closer relations between the GCC and Iran, but I agree with John that I think Democrats would actually to a certain degree welcome this because it's part of their plan to be less hegemonic, as Vaez was saying, and more of kind of an offshore balancer. How they feel about China being that offshore balancer more consistently, I think, is another thing. But I do think that the deal shows to a certain degree this new geopolitical dynamic and almost the growing influence of China and Russia, and this notion that you don't have to pick sides. You can be friends with with enemies, and it's not just okay, but it's beneficial, and you can play them off of each other. And I think that's how Saudi Arabia played this.

And it's interesting from an Israeli perspective, as the Gulf states look on the one hand to keep a relationship with Israel and supplement it with a relationship with Iran, certainly in a warm relationship with Iran. But from the Israeli perspective, that's not what the Abraham Accords were supposed to be about. The Abraham Accords were supposed to put Iran into a box. And instead, you see that same playing both sides. To some degree, you have the playing both sides on the Israeli side between the United States and Russia, because Israel has very complicated relationships with Russia. The country that's not very good at playing both sides is the United States. We're the ones who say you have to color inside the lines, pick a side. What we're seeing is the diplomacy of our friends, is all about striking the right balance between adversaries.

So as we think about this agreement and countries in the region trying to strike their own balance, what do you think this agreement, or even a larger agreement between Iran and its Arab neighbors, could do in the region to kind of de-escalate tensions? And on the flip side of that, what do you think it couldn't do?

Yeah, I mean, so far it seems like this agreement is fairly limited and more of a signaling exercise, which I think is substantial in and of itself. But I mean, this is one of the most hardline Iranian regimes we've seen in a while, as Ali Vaez was saying. And we have a very aggressive crown prince in Saudi Arabia, although I think he's learning. But there is a reason not to exaggerate what this will accomplish at this point. That said, I think both countries have kind of a reason to de-escalate. Iran is facing a lot of domestic unrest, and Saudi Arabia does have stronger ties with China now, and it's facing a US that is much more disengaged. Or at least appears to be more disengaged. And so I think both sides would like to bring tensions down on fronts where it's possible. And in that regard, I think everyone has eyes on Yemen. Iran agreed to halt shipments of arms to the Houthis, but many analysts, including Vaez, have noted that Iran may have actually upped the shipments in advance of the agreement. And so the U.S. started intercepting more. So this looks like perhaps more of a concession than it actually is. But in any case, I think without, even without tangible Iranian support, it's still unclear what the strategy for Yemen is. So I'm still a little bit nervous about where this goes from here.

You know, Ali, in another interview, quoted Peter Salisbury, the former analyst for the International Crisis Group, who said that the Iranians may have a foot on the accelerator, but they can't steer the car. So assuming that the Iranians can control the Houthis, I think the Iranians can influence the Houthis. I don't think they can bring an end to this war. And the more the Houthis think the Saudis want an agreement, the more the Houthis have an instinct, if we can hold on for 6 more months, we'll get a lot more for the next 50 years, creating a huge incentive for them to hold off. I think the way I think of the Saudi-Iranian agreement, it's a little bit like when you take kids to the bowling alley and you can put up the bumpers. You can keep the ball from going in the gutter. Maybe you can keep things from quickly spiraling out of control. Maybe the Saudis have taken themselves off the top of the target list, but they're not bowling strikes. They're not doing well together. There are so many issues where Iran and Saudi Arabia are at loggerheads that maybe you're putting some boundaries on the disagreements, but you're not really creating much agreement. And as I say, it may be that the most important thing is to take Saudi from the top of the potential Iranian target list if things go bad and put it somewhere in the middle of the deck.

So you just said that Iran doesn't really have that much leverage over the Houthis in Yemen, but if we look at a conflict in the region, in the Levant, in Syria, where the Iranians seem to have more leverage, what do you think this agreement or a wider deal between Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbors could mean for a place like Syria?

Yeah, I mean, Caleb, I wish I was more optimistic about that. And I would actually broaden this to Iraq and Lebanon as well. I think Iran is quite proud of how deeply entrenched it's become in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. I don't think it's going to give that up anytime soon. And this isn't something that any of the GCC states could accomplish with all their wealth. I'd argue it's not something the US could accomplish. With its superpower status. And if anything, Iranian influence has increased. But I think we're entering a period, and this goes back, I think, to the Yemen conversation, where it's not just Iran attempting to gain power in these fragile and conflict-affected countries. There's also the Gulf, there's Turkey. And so I wish I was a bit more optimistic than say that that means greater peace and prosperity for the people in these countries. But I actually don't think it bodes well for Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon, at least for now, because what it seems to be doing is further entrenching these authoritarian and corrupt politicians. And that's why I suspect there's a conflict. It might actually happen between the GCC states and Iran and one of these states, and perhaps not directly between kind of like a Cold War, but within the region. I think it's quite interesting actually, because we're seeing these tiers of nonalignment. Where the middle powers like Gulf states are playing the US, China, and Russia off of each other. And then you have these sort of poor countries, these tinpot dictatorships like Assad, that are playing Gulf states and Iran off of each other and really using all of their agency to stay in power.

But it seems to me that the real question is, what are these countries looking for? I mean, Iran is influential because what it's trying to gain influence in is not to build an intricate system that's dynamic, that's resilient. They're not trying to build something exquisite. They're trying to have influence. I think the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Qataris to some degree are looking to have influence as well. And that's something you can gain through lots of tools. And it seems to me that they will reach some sort of equilibrium. How much the equilibrium will differ from where it is now, I don't know. But it does seem to me that they're not trying to build a utopian society. They're trying to advance their interests broadly in the region. Part of that is about fundamental stability, and part of it is just about politicians you can access.

So thinking about that idea of influence or leverage in the region, I've also found it striking when Vaz said that there's a perception that the United States might have its foot in the region but its head and its heart are elsewhere. If we think about what Vaz was talking about with a wider deal between Iran and the GCC, if the region is able to come to this dialogue on their own, how does that affect US power and US influence in the Middle East?

It seems to me that that's precisely the kind of influence the US wants to have. It wants to be a guarantor. It wants to be there to create broad frameworks. It doesn't want to do all the handyman work. It doesn't want to do everything that needs to be done. From a US perspective, there's a view the US has been much too militarily engaged, doing too much, having too large a permanent presence, and the ability to surge, the ability to cooperate, maintaining close ties to more capable governments in the region, I think, is the US model of how this all works and the US sense of how the US can help underwrite this, but not do it all. The Chinese don't want to take on that role. There are ways this could go in useful directions. There are also ways that this could start fraying very quickly, and that could create the sense of, well, we need the United States. The United States just isn't there anymore.

Yeah. I mean, we've talked about the US becoming an offshore balancer. So I think that the US is signaling that it wants to decrease its role in the Middle East, which I think some would argue that translates to diminished power and influence in the region in spite of the considerable assets, military and foreign aid, still in the region. And I think that they think that if they signal this, that countries would be forced to make agreements and sort things out for themselves. And I think that's essentially what the Abraham Accords and this Iran-Saudi detente look like. So I think to a certain degree, I agree with what Jon said, especially for Democratic administrations, that this is essentially what they want over the long term. But I think that the question is, and I think that we need to ask ourselves this a lot more, is what could go wrong after the US has voluntarily diminished its role in the region? I mean, we saw congressional members get very angry when MBS refused to increase oil production. But what else could happen? There needs to be, I think, a larger conversation because I think that there's this sense that the US is shifting to East Asia, hell or high water. And if something flares up in the Middle East, then the US will deal with it then. And I'm completely oversimplifying because there's certainly still high-level visits and engagement in the region. But for those out there that are not in DC, the feeling in DC is definitely that the Middle East is, is old news. Without sort of a strategic vision for what that looks like, I think that could be pretty dangerous.

Just to pull back, I mean, it was, it was the Trump administration that didn't respond militarily when Iran attacked Abqaiq and Khurais and the two Aramco facilities in September 2019. And it was a Republican administration that worked to broker the Abraham Accords, not a withdrawal of the United States from the region, but a diplomatic insertion of the United States into the region. So I think a lot of this is complicated. A lot of it, as Natasha suggests, involves strategic questions. But there also is a question, it seems to me, of how do regional states look at the United States as a partner or as sometimes seems an employee? As a service provider, but not really a partner. And I think there's also a sense of resentment that the United States tells you what to do but doesn't partner with you. When I talk to folks in the US military, they all talk about the intimacy of our relationships as if nothing at all has changed whatsoever. And a lot has changed. And to me, one of the great challenges over the next 5 years is how we square the military relationships with right-sizing the diplomatic piece, the economic piece of our statecraft, as Middle Eastern states figure out what does the US relationship mean to them and what do they mean to the United States. I think we have a lot of work to do on that. And to me, it seems like a lot of people are talking past each other still. And we have to start talking to each other.

John and Natasha, thank you for joining me. As usual, we've covered a lot of ground, but you've left us with a lot to still think about.

Thank you for joining me.

Thanks, Caleb.

Thanks for listening to Babbel. If you enjoyed this episode, please subscribe to the podcast on iTunes or Spotify or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can find more analysis on this topic linked in the show notes. Notes on the CSIS website, and you can find us on Twitter @CSISMideast.