Ep.38 Ali Vaez & Iran

Welcome to Bomberoom. My name is Charlie Daugherty, and I am the Executive Director of the Norwegian Peace Council. Today I spoke with Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director at the International Crisis Group and one of the world's leading experts on Iran's nuclear program. Today we discussed the history of Iran's nuclear program, where things stand right now in the ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Iran, with the hope of coming up with a new agreement, or at least a framework, by the end of 2025. We talk about the history, the current state, and the hopes for the future regarding Iranian nuclear development and the attempts to keep Iran in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Um, well, thank you so much for joining me today. Um, I have Ali Vaez from the Crisis Group, um, who I think you can safely describe as an Iranian nuclear program expert. Um, and so Ali, one thing we haven't talked very much on our podcast in our, in our community is we haven't spoke much on the Iranian nuclear program, or it's not just fair to call it the Iranian nuclear program, but I guess you could say Iran's relationship to the UN, to the United States, to Europe, and to Israel in general. We've had, we had that agreement in 2015, and then the Trump administration backed out of it during his administration. But now with the war in Gaza, and the return of Trump, and Netanyahu in Israel, it seems that Iran is back on the list of subjects that people are talking about.

Yes, absolutely. I mean, this is a function also of how grave the threat has become. You know, if you had told me, and I've been covering this now for, you know, 18 years, but if you had told me 5 years ago, 4 years ago, that Iran would be enriching uranium to 60%, and would basically be accumulating enough 60% fissile material for a single nuclear weapon every month, already having enough stockpile for 10 nuclear weapons, and the amount of time that it would take for Iran to enrich enough fissile material to weapons-grade for a single nuclear weapon would be just less than a week, and the sky has not fallen, I would not have believed it. But this is where we are. This is, you know, Iran has never been closer to the verge of nuclear weapons. And one thing that President Trump is absolutely right about is his assessment that this issue would have to come to a head soon, this year in 2025. And the reason, again, is pretty straightforward. The deal that you mentioned, the 2015 agreement, that rolled back Iran's nuclear program and subjected it to rigorous monitoring that President Trump reneged on in 2018, was endorsed by the UN Security Council in 2015, Resolution 2231. That resolution expires in October, and with it, the ability of the West to keep Iran's nuclear file in the Security Council. So the European members of the 2015 deal have threatened that in the absence of a deal that would cap, freeze, or roll back Iran's nuclear program, that they would snap back the UN sanctions. And Iran has threatened that if that happens, it will withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is what North Korea did in 2003 before it tested its first nuclear weapon. So we are now getting very close to that point that in the absence of a deal by midsummer, I would say late July, early August, the Europeans will trigger snapback and we will enter into a very serious nonproliferation crisis that could trigger an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear program that could in turn suck the United States into another conflict in the Middle East. So this is why the stakes are so high around this issue at this moment.

So what happened? How did we get here?

Well, it's a long story, but basically we got here primarily because Iran, in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, when Saddam Hussein had invaded Iran and was using chemical weapons against civilians, and was also developing nuclear weapons, decided to revive its nuclear program that it had suspended after the 1979 revolution, but this time with the aim of developing nuclear weapons. And that effort continued until 2003, when Saddam Hussein was toppled after the US invaded Iraq. And it was exposed that Iran had a pretty elaborate nuclear program. But instead of coming clean, the Iranians decided to deny that the program ever had a weaponization dimension and portrayed it as a purely civilian program. And from that point on, something that was supposed to be a pillar of Iran's national security strategy turned into a symbol of its confrontation with the West over its desire for sovereignty and independence. And, you know, and in the past 22 years, there's been on and off diplomatic efforts to try to resolve this issue. There have been unrealistic maximalist demands on all sides. It all, all the stars aligned at a particular moment in the second term of the Obama administration, when first, in a secret channel, the US recognized Iran's right to having access to nuclear fuel cycle. And then Iran and the US took an initial framework agreement to the other parties who were involved in the negotiations, all members of the Security Council plus Germany, the so-called P5+1. And that turned into an interim agreement in November 2013 that basically suspended some aspects of Iran's nuclear program in return for partial sanctions relief and put additional time on the clock to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement. It took another year and a half to negotiate the so-called Joint Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action, JCPOA, which was finalized in July of 2015. And it really shrunk-wrapped Iran's nuclear program and subjected it to the most rigorous monitoring ever implemented anywhere in the world. But it also became a highly polarizing issue in Washington, especially because of Israel's opposition to it. And as a result, when President Trump was elected a few months later, he started undermining the agreement, and in 2018, he withdrew from it. The Iranians stayed in the deal for another year until 2019 in the hope that the Europeans would be able to keep the deal and the economic benefits that it had promised to Iran alive. It didn't work. European companies were much more afraid of U.S. sanctions than their own governments. And so Iran started also to abandon its commitments under the deal and gradually escalated its nuclear program. Then the Biden administration came in in 2021 on the promise of reviving the agreement. These were people who were involved in negotiating the agreement in the Obama administration, so there was a lot of hope that they would be able to do it. But I think they, at least in 2021, wasted some time, postured in a way that basically hardened the Iranian position. And then the Iranians elected a much more hardline president in late 2021. And that also further complicated the negotiations. And then the final nail in the coffin of the JCPOA was Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, which basically broke down the P5+1. And since then, Iran and the US have been in this cycle of sanctions against centrifuges. Iran has installed more and more capacity and ratcheted up its nuclear activities more and more, and the US has continued to add on to sanctions. And finally, we now have the Trump administration back in power. At this time trying to negotiate a deal with Iran. But at this moment, it appears pretty conflicting in terms of U.S. negotiating strategy and what is it that they actually want. Is it the so-called Libya model of completely dismantling Iran's nuclear program or some version of the 2015 deal in which Iran would restrict its nuclear program and subject it to very intrusive monitoring. We will see. But, but, but this is kind of a long 22 years of history summarized for you in 5 minutes.

Yeah. No, that was, that was very comprehensive. And, and you today, you are, you are working on this topic, correct?

Yes, absolutely.

And what are you working with now?

How? So our work has traditionally been to try to talk to all sides in any conflict and get a sense exactly of how they see the issues, what are the hopes and fears in the negotiations, and to try to offer solutions to bridge the divides between the parties. So this is what we're still trying to do. We played a critical role in the JCPOA negotiations and the JCPOA revival negotiations. And these efforts continue to this day. And it's not, by the way, just focused on the parties who are at the table. As you know, the Europeans, for instance, are now not at the table, but doesn't mean that we're not engaging them because they're stakeholders. The Persian Gulf countries are in contrast to when the JCPOA was negotiated in 2015, were very much opposed to it, are now very much on board with a diplomatic settlement to the nuclear standoff with Iran. And therefore, you hear more and more ideas of a consortium for nuclear fuel cycle technologies in the Gulf region. And so we engage with all of these parties and try to brainstorm and come up with innovative solutions.

Yeah, that's interesting. I guess I didn't give a good introduction to the Crisis Group itself, but the Crisis Group is— could you talk a little more about the Crisis Group? Of course.

Crisis Group is actually celebrating its 30th year this year.

Congratulations.

Uh, thank you. It was born, uh, out of the, uh, conflict, uh, in, uh, in, in Bosnia, um, which was, uh, you know, a predictable conflict, um, but, um, no one really did anything about it until it resulted in, uh, a tragedy of, of, of a massacre. Um, so the concept of Crisis Group is that, uh, just like in, uh, health sciences, prevention is always better than cure. There are lots of organizations who deal with the consequences of conflict, whether it's refugees or health issues or humanitarian aid or food and things like that. We believe that it's much better and less costly to try to prevent conflicts from happening, but this requires that you have your ear on the ground you really see the dark clouds gathering and you also come up with solutions to prevent the emergence of violence and conflict. And the only way to do it is to talk to everyone and to be very perceptive and also to be able to do very high-level advocacy. And this is not just, by the way, related to the most visible conflicts in the world. Obviously, we cover Ukraine and Gaza and, you know, Iran nuclear talks and all the key issues. But there are also conflicts that are not in the headlines in Africa or parts of Asia that we cover very closely. And it's a unique organization because it's in a way a news organization, a think tank, research institution, and a lobby group wrapped into one. Because we do very rigorous, serious research, but this is not just for academic purposes. It's also, it's a policy organization, and we don't produce policy recommendations just to check a box. We actually want to see them translate into policy changes and behavior changes at the level of decision makers. And so, you know, we do very high-level advocacy by engaging with these policymakers to make sure that our advice is heeded.

Okay. And you've been involved in this topic for a long time. And were you with the crisis group back in 2015 as well?

I was, yes. I've, I've, I started going to these negotiations since 2012. So I believe the first round that I went to was in Almaty, Kazakhstan in early 2013. And, you know, I've, I then ended up going to 22 rounds around the world that finally led to the JCPOA. And again, I've been going to other negotiations, JCPOA revival, and now the Trump negotiations as well.

So now that— I mean, you followed these, I guess you could call it the modern era of these talks since their inception, really. And how does it feel now? How do you feel having followed it for so long and then it being where it is today?

Look, so part of it is déjà vu in the sense that it's the same issues and there is a circular nature in how they're addressed. You know, like when I hear arguments in Washington that, you know, it requires the only good deal with Iran is a deal in which it would have zero enrichment. It reminds me of the Bush era, you know, and zero enrichment in a way is the father of Iran's nuclear program, because in 2003, in negotiations with France, UK, and Germany, Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment for 2 years in return for economic incentives that were never delivered. And the US insisted at the time, John Bolton was at the State Department, and insisted that the only acceptable formula is what Libya did in 2003, which was to completely dismantle its nuclear program. The difference between Iran and Libya is that although they both started their nuclear programs by importing material and equipment on the black market, Iran actually had indigenous knowledge and expertise. Its nuclear program started in 1957 by the United States, and there is a body of expertise and knowledge that has been institutionalized basically in Iran. So it's not— it has deep roots. It's not like Libya that it was entirely imported. And therefore could be exported. But Bolton's insistence on zero enrichment resulted in failure of those negotiations. Iran went from having around 20 centrifuges at the time to 20,000 centrifuges in 2015 when there was another opportunity for a deal. And people were still insisting on zero enrichment, but President Obama stood his ground and finalized the agreement.

Enrichment.

And then when President Trump withdrew from the deal, Secretary of State Pompeo at the time also wanted zero enrichment, and Bolton, who was at that time National Security Advisor, also advocated for zero enrichment. But then zero enrichment resulted in the growth of Iran's nuclear program to a point that I explained to you today, which is basically Iran is a virtual nuclear weapons state. So every time insistence on zero enrichment has put us in a situation that we had let go of good enough for the ideal. But from a nonproliferation perspective, you don't need zero enrichment to ensure civilian nuclear program. You need very rigorous monitoring in order to make sure of that. So, you know, part of it for me is just so familiar, but it's also frustrating that we go in circles and people who don't necessarily have institutional memory or knowledge of the history of all of this, uh, get back to adopting positions that are just not workable. And this is, you know, if you're pragmatic enough about it, is not a difficult thing to resolve. And there is already plenty of material out there in terms of ideas. As soon as we get beyond maximalism, there are plenty of technical ideas that are completely workable, uh, in, in resolving these issues. Now, the question of sanctions relief is so much more difficult, to be honest with you. But that's usually an afterthought for people rather than the first thing they think about when they talk about nuclear negotiations.

Can you go a little deeper into that?

Yeah, so I mean, as you see, I've actually written a full authored book about it because I think the United States is very good at designing sanctions, is not as good at enforcing sanctions and it's terribly bad at lifting sanctions. And, you know, the reality is that sanctions are only as effective as the prospect of relieving them in response to policy changes. If you cannot remove sanctions, then you're basically neutralizing or proving that, you know, a very powerful tool that you have is not a diplomatic tool, is a one-way ratchet basically that you cannot lift under any circumstances. You see this problem now in the case of Syria, for instance, as even with regime change, the US has only been able to offer temporary suspension, which is not good enough if you want economic certainty and long-term planning, especially required for investment. But this is, for the Iranians, they've had direct experience in 2016 when sanctions were lifted after Iran complied with its obligations under the JCPOA. So Iran went first, it did all of the commitments, and then after it was verified by the IAEA, then it was supposed to get sanctions relief. But sanctions relief fell really way short of Iranian expectations, primarily because the US sanctions are so— it's like a spider web. It's so intricately woven that it's very difficult to untie. And they also create a chilling effect that doesn't dissipate quickly. So there are lots of challenges for sanctions relief, and there is, unlike the nuclear commitments on the Iranian side, which could be verified by a technical neutral UN institution like the IAEA, there is no institutional body that would monitor effectiveness of sanctions relief. And then there's the problem of sustainability of sanctions relief as well. President Trump basically proved that sanctions relief could be as good as the lifespan of the administration that has signed on to that agreement. And in the United States, there is no legal mechanism that would set an international commitment by any administration into stone. Even if you get a treaty which requires two-thirds votes plus one in the Senate, 67 votes, which is very difficult to get in a very polarized environment. But even treaties are very difficult to get into, very easy to get out of. The president can still leave them with a stroke of a pen, as President Trump has done repeatedly from Paris Climate Deal to INF Treaty and a lot of other commitments. So this is why I think overall sanctions relief is a major issue. And one of the reasons that the nuclear talks with Iran are going to be complicated and are unlikely to result in a quick deal in the way that President Trump once. There's a lot of deep-rooted mistrust, lots of technical, very complex issues, and very limited time, as I said, because of the prospect of snapback, which could happen in the next 2 months. So the most realistic option here is for the parties to maybe negotiate a framework agreement of a set of political principles that would basically set the four corners of the potential agreement without necessarily getting into too many details. But then using the framework agreement to go to the Security Council, get an extension of Resolution 2231 by 6 or 12 months so that they have more time and space to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement.

So that's quite interesting then, because if I understand what you're suggesting is that the sanctions are a powerful tool, but it's also created— it might have had some sort of stick effect, but at the same time has created an incredibly messy situation where they in themselves become an issue in negotiations almost next to the nuclear negotiations.

Absolutely right. You know, the sanctions are supposed to be a scalpel, not a chainsaw, you know, but unfortunately, the way that they're designed, you know, they have very lofty, ambitious requirements for their lifting, which could only be done by Congress. The president can only suspend them, but cannot lift them permanently. And because, especially in the case of Iran, of the multi-layered nature of sanctions, you know, the same institution in Iran could be designated for different reasons. Like the Central Bank of Iran is designated for non-proliferation pretext because of its role in Iran's nuclear program and its ballistic missiles. It is also designated for support of terrorism because Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism in the United States. And also, you know, there are institutions that are affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards that advances Iran's regional policy. And then you have human rights-related designations. And so, you know, and that creates a situation in which you might lift or suspend sanctions in one area, but unless you have a comprehensive sort of a grand bargain agreement that addresses everything at the same time, then you're leaving a lot of other sanctions in place which create too many red tapes for the private sector to navigate. And they conclude often that the risk of doing business with Iran outweighs the potential benefits. And then the Iranians don't get the satisfaction that they're seeking from sanctions relief. And they put that as evidence of West not having good intentions towards them and trying to get them to make concessions without necessarily reciprocating in kind. And other countries with whom the US has differences, especially over non-proliferation issues, look at this experience, right? So if you're talking about North Korea, you know, North Korea looks at this experience that Iran reached an agreement with the world powers, complied with it, as affirmed and confirmed 15 times by the International Atomic Energy Agency in that period. And yet, not only it didn't get the economic benefits, the US withdrew and, you know, subjected Iran to even more sanctions and the case in the past. You know, the JCPOA lifted 750 designations on Iran. Currently, I think there are about 2,500 designations in Iran. So, I mean, that shows you that unfortunately a tool that was supposed to be used to facilitate diplomacy unfortunately has become one of the reasons that diplomacy is just so difficult.

And I can imagine it also has a domestic political factor that increases a sort of interest in maintaining the program or the nuclear program.

Yes, absolutely. And on all sides, in the sense that there is, you know, in the U.S. and in Israel, always this view that we are one set of sanctions away from economic collapse in Iran. If you give sanctions a little bit more time and maybe, you know, close this loophole or that loophole, the Iranian regime will collapse and the whole problem will be solved because, you know, once you get regime change, by definition, you will get behavior change. Even though, as I mentioned to you, you know, the Shah's regime had the same exact issues over the nuclear fuel cycle with with the US as this current regime does. And then in Iran, there is vested economic interest because, you know, the institutions that are affiliated with the state, especially the Revolutionary Guards, you know, they control the smuggling networks, they control the black market, the unofficial ports. And you know, they make— they're getting enriched from circumventing sanctions. And so they have very little interest in changing the status quo, even though the country as a whole is suffering. You know, Iran's GDP has basically been, you know, pretty flat in the past 15 years. So there's been a high degree of stagflation, so stagnation and inflation. Which has really pushed about a third of Iranian society under the poverty line. This is one of the potentially richest countries in the world. You know, they are currently— the regime is struggling to keep the lights on. There are frequent blackouts in Iran. And yet, you know, the worst elements in the regime, the Revolutionary Guards, are benefiting and being enriched by sanctions. Again, not a unique phenomenon Iran. You know, you compare Saddam's regime in 2003 to Saddam's regime in 1991, you know, he was strong enough that it took a foreign invasion to get rid of him. And yet the fabric of the Iraqi society was completely torn apart as a result of years of sanctions. So we're in a very similar situation in Iran. But with the difference that there is still, you know, the Supreme Leader sits on top of this complex system, and his main objective is to preserve the system. And so if he sees an opportunity for a degree of economic reprieve that could benefit the system as a whole, even at the expense of some elements within the system, he would keep them at bay and he would allow that deal to move forward. The main issue here is for him to be able to save face, and a deal like zero enrichment is not going to meet that criteria for him.

No, that makes sense. So how would you solve this?

So look, I think there is, if you look at the debate around this in Washington, because President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, any deal that draws on the same core bargain, which was nuclear restrictions and transparency measures in return for sanctions relief, is portrayed as JCPOA 2.0 in order to basically discourage President Trump from moving in that direction. The reality is that President Trump never questioned the core bargain of the JCPOA. He questioned elements of the deal, not its core. So, for instance, he questioned the fact that restrictions would have sunsets, that they would expire after a period of time. He questioned that inspections were not intrusive enough, that they couldn't go anywhere anytime. He criticized the fact that the US was providing sanctions relief for European and Asian firms to be able to do business with Iran, but it didn't really include any economic benefits for US companies. So I can see a scenario in which you get a version of the previous agreement with Iran without it really being a JCPOA, being fundamentally different than the JCPOA. Because it might not have sunsets. You know, the idea that the US is now reportedly pursuing of creating a consortium between Iran and the Gulf countries for uranium enrichment is very different than the JCPOA. So I don't think we will get another JCPOA, but some of the elements of the previous agreement could be in the new one. And I don't see an issue with that. But, you know, key is the fact that you look at 22 years of history of nuclear diplomacy with Iran here, and everything has been tried, right? Israel has sabotaged Iran's nuclear facilities, assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists. You know, the credible military threats of taking out Iran's nuclear facilities has been there on and off for many years. Sanctions have been tried. Diplomacy has been tried. The only thing that basically rolled back Iran's nuclear program was a win-win diplomatic solution. So that, I think, the evidence is very clear. This is no longer theoretical or a hypothetical issue. We know we've tried everything, and we know what works and what doesn't. Now, I think if the Trump administration can get over this question of zero enrichment and JCPOA 2.0 and realize that in fact maximalism is John Bolton 3.0, you know, if they get to that point, then as I said, there are all sorts of solutions. And I do believe that, you know, in a way, and despite all the sort of unique features of the Trump administration, Their approach, you know, if you boil it down to its essentials, it is a traditional approach. When Bill Burns and Jake Sullivan, working for Hillary Clinton at the time, went to Muscat for secret negotiations with the Iranians in 2012, 2013, they produced a, you know, one-two-page simple framework agreement. Which was then taken to the P5+1, turned into an interim agreement, and then that turned into a comprehensive agreement. I do think that that is still the only available option here because there is no way that the parties would be able to overcome all of the differences that we talked about in the course of the next 4 to 6 weeks to avoid snapback. So they need some kind of a framework deal in order to buy more time, push back snapback, buy more time, and then negotiate a much more comprehensive agreement. And I do believe that there is, you know, a good basis for a deal which would be highly beneficial. I mean, a consortium is really win-win-win. Instead of the US negotiating a separate agreement with Saudi Arabia, which now wants to have access to nuclear fuel cycle, which could then affect the UAE, which already has the so-called Gold Standard 123 Agreement with the United States in which it can get access to cutting-edge nuclear technology if it gives up a nuclear fuel cycle. But the UAE had this provision that if another country in the region gets a better deal, they can renegotiate their 123 Agreement. And the US still has to negotiate and resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. So instead of negotiating with all these countries separately to come up with imperfect solutions in all of these cases, you can put all of them in the same basket. And what I like about this kind of a regional nuclear solution is that you can get things that you couldn't get in negotiating just with Iran. For instance, one of the reasons that the Iranians never agreed to permanent restrictions is that in the NPT, you have two categories of states, nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons States, and they all have rights and obligations. Iran didn't want to be a category of its own, that it would be a non-nuclear weapons state but accepting restrictions that would be permanent or transparency measures that no other country has accepted. Now, if you apply those restrictions at the regional level, sub-regional level, I mean the Gulf region, because if you go to the Middle East, given Israel's nuclear status it becomes very complicated very quickly. If you apply those issues to sub-regional, then those restrictions could be permanent and you're not singling out anyone. It could be a first step towards a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Gulf region. And this kind of cooperation, I think, is useful eventually for a new security architecture in the region as well. Let's remember that the European Union at its seeds started from cooperation over coal. And so, you know, given the desire for nuclear technology in that part of the world, I think this is a good approach. And then Iranians have now reached a stage that they also realize that the US needs to have skin in the game for the sustainability of an agreement, meaning that the US should have an economic interest in Iran. And if that happens, and if there is possibility of offering primary sanctions relief as well to Iran, not just secondary sanctions, but also elements of US's own embargo against Iran, then this could be the beginning of a potentially transformative relationship between Iran and the United States, which would again benefit everyone in the region who are seeking peace and stability.

You sound optimistic.

Look, I wouldn't put— I'm a very cynical person by nature. I like to say I'm a short-term pessimist, long-term optimist. But I do, at this moment, given that in any negotiation, the most important element is political will, and President Trump really wants a deal and Iran really needs a deal. So there is political will on both sides, and the alternative to a negotiated solution is not attractive at all for either side. I do believe that the odds of reaching some sort of an agreement, again, it could be very broad, just political principles, are better than 60%. Now, there is still a 40% chance that this might not work and we would get into an escalatory cycle, but, uh, we'll have to wait and see.

Well, Ali Vaez, thank you so much for joining me today. I really appreciate it.

An absolute pleasure. Thank you for having me, and good luck with your work. Thank you.