Will Meta Be Forced to Spin Off Instagram and WhatsApp?

Hello and welcome back to The Deal Room. And if you are new to joining us, welcome back. I know your last episode, Stephen, was particularly well received where we rattled through a couple of big M&A deals. So yeah, it feels like I'm talking to a famous person now.

Yeah, it's absolutely crazy. Last week I was very skeptical, or maybe you were quite skeptical about whether we could make a podcast out of some pretty fundamental accounting stuff. But look, I mean, it went, it went, I don't think it quite went viral. I don't think that we're quite at that stage yet, but it racked up the likes and it racked up the listens on Spotify and on YouTube as well. So yeah, keep it coming. And I was actually, I was teaching up in Leeds over the week, during the week. I just saw we've got about 755-star reviews on our Spotify. So, you know, I know we've been going at this for a while, but that's not insignificant.

Well, look, if you're listening, get us up to that 1K mark. Let's do this. And one of the things that was really cool actually on YouTube, and I encourage this for anyone who listens to any of our shows, do ask questions and do share your opinion. Like, we're not here to say we know better or worse. We're just here to educate and uncover and explain things. So definitely feel comfortable doing that and we'll do our best to reply and help as much as we can. But In terms of this episode, there are really two main topics, and of course, talking all things M&A, one of the stories here is going to talk about some of the key principles of M&A, which is competition and antitrust. And when you say those words, there's probably no other better firm than to talk about than Meta for lots of reasons, Stephen, I know you're going to unpack. And this concept of whether or not eventually, and it has been mooted before, there'd be a spin-off. Whatsapps and the Instagrams of this world are so massive. And then the other part of the conversation, we're going to talk a little bit about a concept of restructuring in a case study with private equity and a private equity giant in KKR in exclusive talks to invest £4 billion into Thames Water. If you're a US listener, you might not have heard of them before, but they're the UK's largest water utility. Uh, and the move comes as a bid to save that water firm from collapse under nearly £20 billion of debt. So yes, you heard those numbers right. They're in talks to invest £4 billion. They're nearly £20 billion of debt that needs to be managed. So yes, restructuring is on the table as well. So why don't we kick it off? Uh, uh, I know you've got a bit of a bone to pick here with Meta, Steven.

Yeah, thanks. And I, I think we should all I have a bone to pick with Meta from a business model perspective. And I think you'll get the kind of, you'll get the gist very quickly as to what I think of Meta. And it doesn't surprise you to say that I do not invest in Meta and I don't have any of the Meta, actually I do have WhatsApp, but I don't have Instagram or Facebook. But anyway, so just to set the scene for this mega antitrust battle. Between Meta and the FTC concerning Instagram and WhatsApp. I just wanted to kind of take a step back. Meta announced its latest quarterly earnings a few days ago, last week, in fact, 16% year-on-year revenue increase, net income up 35% to $16.7 billion, and that's just in one quarter, right? So, this has got to be the most extractive, I'm using that word very particularly, the most extractive company that we've ever seen. So, you know, maybe when you think of extractive companies or extraction, you know, you might think about a mining company, right? So, mining companies, they extract rocks and stuff and precious metals out of the ground. They're basically inanimate objects that the mining companies have managed to monetize by extracting it and selling it. I would say that Meta extracts our personalities. They are extractive regarding our hopes and our fears and our frustrations and our desires, and then it monetizes them, right? That's what they do. That is the business model, extracting our attention, based on our emotions and then selling adverts and selling different people's opinions on stuff. It's so, so insidious. And it's even more insidious because remember, you know, using the kind of mining analogy, rocks don't get addicted to stuff, whereas humans do. So they've managed to make this extractive thing addictive. It's like the kind of precious metals kind of desperate to kind of be extracted because they're addicted to the process. It's a quite bonkers, quite bonkers business model. And I try to compare it to, for all those of you that have studied economics, you've got rentier capitalism, which is something that's been railed against ever since Adam Smith, which is the kind of, I don't produce anything of value, but I just sit on some land and gain, or I own some machines and I just gain money through renting out that land or those machines. I don't make stuff with my own hands. It's kind of the same here. You know, Meta, it just translates its assets, which are human attention spans, and turns it into money, not for the humans, but for them. And that money is represented by a $16.7 billion quarterly profit, net income, just in this last quarter. It's absolutely bonkers.

From an investment perspective though, as we, as a world, thinking of natural resources, sticking on the theme of mining and so on, as the world becomes further and further increasingly digitized, and although VR and augmented virtual reality seem to have that seems to have passed. It had a little bit of a bubble moment. The future probably is heading towards that more Meta, not company name, but metaverse space. Aren't they pretty well positioned though to looking at it purely from a monetary perspective for the future?

Yeah. Yeah. Leaving ethics aside, you know, Meta is, you know, it's an unbelievable business unless it gets split up, right? It's got 4 billion daily active users. Its advertising engine is insane. Its AI capability is growing. And by the way, you, you, there's a very, very strong correlation between the, the evilness of companies and how many times they get sued. And there are like 3 or 4 examples of them getting sued that are not, that isn't the purpose of this story. One of which is the 14 authors have, are suing Meta, because they basically used an illegal and non-copyrighted version of a load of books, hundreds of thousands, millions of books to train its AI models. And it's ba— you know, and Facebook's saying, you know, like AI models are for the good of the world. They've, you know, so we should be able to, by any means necessary, get access to all of these authors, quote unquote, training data. So it's unethical and it's possibly illegal, but from a business perspective, I mean, the share price is up 5% over the last few days, right? On account of bonkers, you know, barnstorming earnings. So you really have to split your head in two if it's possible to do such a thing and say, yeah, the business model is killer. You know, it's a $1.4 trillion market cap company. But it's doing it in pretty insidious ways.

I wonder if there's a degree of influence that Zuckerberg can yield over Trump. I know it's obviously a reciprocal relationship in terms of the policies the administration would set and so on. But what I mean is that what you've described in terms of what Meta owns, which is our, us and our psyche, they hold the balance of power, it almost feels like, and as a foreign nation, it needs to be a protected asset in terms of from the US perspective. So it's interesting how, yeah, it's like best frenemies, Zuckerberg and Trump.

Oh, absolutely. And if you think about the arc of the relationship between Trump and Facebook, you know, back in 2016, Trump getting into power, that was the Facebook election, right? Right. And it was the first time, and again, super, super insidious. There were Facebook, there were, there were Facebook teams outsourced, contracted out to the Trump campaign to make his Facebook campaign more effective. Right. So it really, really was Facebook that got Trump into the White House in 2016. And then obviously, you know, post-January 6th. Trump gets banned from Instagram and Facebook and there's a very, very kind of righteous tone from Zuckerberg. And then obviously when Trump gets back in, Zuckerberg does a totally spineless about-turn and goes, I'm going to donate $1 million to your inauguration campaign, and I'm actually going to fire all of our diversity, equality, and inclusivity people because Facebook's become a bit too feminine, were the words that have been touted. That he said. So it is, it's a, it's just a, you know, it's a remarkable, remarkable, amoral, possibly immoral company.

Okay. Are you feeling okay now? Can we go back to the FTC's allegations and back to the matter at hand, please, Steve?

Can I just say that this company spends $200,000 a day lobbying because it knows just how bad its products are. But anyway, okay, so let's get to the story. Sorry. Rant over, possibly. So the story that I really wanted to cover was the ongoing FTC— well, the ongoing trial where the FTC are bringing an antitrust case against Meta for monopoly power, in particular relating to their acquisition of Instagram, and to a slightly lesser extent, their acquisition of WhatsApp in 2014. And it's been super interesting as a courtroom drama goes. It's amazing just to see all of these different pieces of evidence coming out of the woodwork and lots, you know, email records from Mark Zuckerberg basically saying that they're acquiring Instagram to quote unquote neutralize competition. 2012 emails, Instagram could hurt us meaningfully, and that Instagram was pretty threatening to us. So, you know, the argument goes, and we'll get onto the kind of legal side of this and whether it's a good, whether the FTC has a good case. The argument goes from the FTC's perspective, Facebook pursued a monopolistic or an anti-competitive acquisition strategy in order to buy and then bury, or buy and then kind of integrate its biggest competitors. And it's got, depending on the way that, and this is such an important part of the case, depending on the way that you view it, Facebook now with Meta and Instagram have over 85% market share in social media. Different from entertainment content like TikTok and YouTube. So splitting it out between, you know, I want to communicate with my friends and catch up with long-lost relatives and things like that. It's got over 85% market share, which is monopolistic.

How far back in retrospect can you make these claims though? Because Instagram wasn't anywhere near the platform that it has become some over a decade later. So are you saying then that like, so how far back can this, the, the FCC go and go, oh yeah, 25 years ago when this happened, we're now saying that we, you know, this is a problem. Like, how does that work?

Yeah, I, I, I don't know what the statute of limitations are for these types of, for these types of trials or these types of allegations. I think there's a, there's a difference. There's a significant difference between the timing of the infringement and the effects that it's had on the industry. So for example, you know, you wouldn't have brought an antitrust case against Facebook for acquiring Instagram in 2012 because neither of them were market dominant players in a incredibly important, globally significant market. However, the outcome of that acquisition and the subsequent WhatsApp acquisition has become potentially very anti-competitive. So you could probably go quite a long way back into the past to find the moments where these anti-competitive seeds were sown, and then you can start digging up evidence that maybe at the time didn't seem so problematic as it does with hindsight. And there's a lot of evidence that has got varying degrees of veracity or viability relating to, you know, Kevin Systrom, who is the co-founder of Instagram and had his day on the docket. He was giving his testimony a few days ago. And he was basically saying, look, you know, I left, I sold Instagram, which I'm a little bit gutted by. And then I left in 2018. Obviously, he's pretty wealthy, so we shouldn't be too sorry for him. And he left in 2018. He's basically said, you know, Zuckerberg embarked on a pretty concerted campaign to lower the growth of Instagram relative to Facebook. We would have grown a lot quickly, a lot more quickly organically. But we got sucked in by Facebook, we didn't get given access to all of the tools that Facebook platform got. And, you know, we still grew really quickly because we're a better product. And he seemed to insinuate that this was a bit of a Zuckerberg ego thing, you know, you know, I want Facebook to be more popular than Instagram. So I'm going to belittle Instagram in terms of resource availability. Which again, if you put maybe two and two together and make either four or five, depending on what side you're on, that has anti-competitive implications, let's say.

Do we have actually any idea about a spinoff? Like what sort of size? I mean, obviously it's a, I don't know, I can't even recall now. We've had such market volatility, what the valuation of Meta is, but proportionately Instagram must make up a sizable chunk. What is the value of that?

Yeah, I mean, I don't know if we've got a number on it, and I've seen everything from kind of $300 billion to $600 billion kind of mooted, but it's really interesting. So Facebook's market cap's $1.4 trillion at the moment, at the time of recording this podcast. And it's really interesting to think, and again, this is kind of M&A 101, it's really interesting to think whether the sum of Meta's parts are worth as much as the whole, right? Is it the fact that Meta, and this is the antitrust case in a nutshell, is it the fact that Meta, you know, has interwoven WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram from a, you know, advertising engine perspective and from a data harvesting perspective to such an extent that if you cast off Instagram into its own entity, then everything, all three entities would be subsequently diminished. And therefore the actual standalone value of Instagram would not be equivalent to the sum of its parts. We don't, well, I'm sure that plenty of smart people have done plenty of smart speculation, but that hasn't really, it feels like the nature of the coverage is somewhat skeptical as to whether, you know, even if there is a ruling that the acquisition of Instagram was indeed anti-competitive and has resulted in a worse consumer landscape and worse consumer experience when you're on the platforms, even if that is decided by the FTC and by the judge, um, I would say that splitting up is probably the most extreme verdict or potential outcome.

And then just generally wider then for the technology sector, thinking of, I think we discussed this previously, one of the other M&A deals in the last episode about legal precedence. So what would this signal? What would be the fallout if the FTC had managed to push something through?

Yeah, it's a really good question. So the basis of this trial and the real fundamental parts of this trial, you can get all excited about the emails back and forth and the slightly kind of salacious goings-on in Facebook kind of 8, 9, 10 years ago. But the real fundamentals of this case, it basically relies on two things, right? One, is Meta a monopolist? Monopolist according to the definition of that personal social network, which excludes TikTok or YouTube. If you look at Facebook's defense, they just mentioned TikTok about 100 times, right? You know, how can we be a monopolist where there's TikTok in this world? The FTC's argument is, well, TikTok doesn't do, you know, the same level of, you know, friendship, community, uh, messages, you know, it's not a social network in the same sense. So firstly, the FTC has to prove, and their lawyers have to prove, that Meta is indeed a monopolist. We'll talk about the concept of substitutes in a second with regards to Google. And then secondly, if it is indeed a monopolist, are consumers getting a worse experience or paying more? At the end of the day, you want, you know, competitive dynamics within a market. The reason why we want that is because we want prices to be efficient for the consumer, and we want competition over the quality of product. In a monopolistic environment, you don't get either. So you've got to prove those two different things. Now, if you layer those two different things, is it a monopolist and are consumers getting a worse experience? You could probably make very, very similar arguments, certainly when it comes to Google, and certainly when it comes to Google Search. And there's significant antitrust cases and inquiries going on regarding splitting out or siphoning off Chrome as the gateway to Google's advertising and search engine. So yeah, I would say that the next in line would probably be that element of Google, maybe not the YouTube element, but certainly the search, Chrome, advertising engine trifecta, which is really capturing the market. I think it's very hard to argue that it's not a monopolist in the sense that there are very, very few viable substitutes. I don't think anyone's going to say with regards to Google search that Bing is a viable substitute just from a quality usability. Perspective.

So, so going back to what you were describing then with when Facebook originally acquired Instagram. So just thinking then about broader implications and the effect on M&A. So let's say I'm a startup, I'm thinking, right, I just want to have a really amazing product and scale my community and I want to sell it to one of these big tech firms because they seem the viable option to pay what I want. And equally, as you said, Facebook got out the Hoover, previous tactic, and just Hoover up anyone showing any sign of competition or advantageous technology or community. So yeah, what are some of these other kind of aftereffects of the outcomes of this particular situation?

Yeah, I think if you take a step back and put your put yourself in the shoes of a startup CEO or a wannabe CEO that's thinking about starting a company. I think 6, 7, 8 years ago, it was pretty well, it was a pretty well-trodden path that you would build some tech and that tech could get a groundswell of interest, you know, a little bit of product market fit, and then you would sell said tech to, you know, a Salesforce or a Facebook or whatever it might be, right? I think that there has been a shift in the way that the startup community is thinking about self-sufficiency. You know, instead of pitching to a bunch of VCs that this is an amazing thing and it will get sold to Facebook in 3 years' time, it's, all right, this is an amazing thing that we are building. The unit economics and the And the business model are good enough to stand alone. And we think that we can create a really attractive moat, business model moat around the business that we are creating. If it so happens that someone comes along and takes us out the game, then yeah, that would, we would have to consider that. It is unlikely. Well, it is almost, it is very, very unlikely that a large tech company, well, you know, Meta is going to be buying anything in the social networking space because it's already kind of done all of that. There's no more competition to sweep up. It's kind of been successful in its hoovering up. So yeah, I think there is and there will be a slightly different perspective depending on the outcome of this case and of other cases. We know that Amazon's in the news at the moment for antitrust issues. We know that Google's in the news, Microsoft's never far away. So the next kind of 18 months from a big tech perspective are going to be super interesting. And let's remember that the previous wave of breakups through massively, massive monopolists in the US, this was the kind of Standard Oil, J.D. Rockefeller era in the early part of the 20th century, from a market share perspective and from a size of company perspective, these even on today's terms were much less significant than the Meta, the Google, the Microsoft, the Amazon, the Apple of this era. So, you know, we've let the big tech companies go on continuing to acquire power and market share, and it's going to be an incredibly hard battle to bring them back in to something that resembles a slightly more normal size.

Too big to fail, Steven. The big tech ship has sailed and regulators are too slow.

But as you know, and this is really important because you were talking about the relationship between Meta and Trump and the fact that it's a nationally strategically significant company. And actually what it does is, it almost should be nationalized, right? The kind of, it shouldn't be owned by someone that can become a multi-decade billionaire off the back of it. It should be almost something like the internet that was run as a public good project. I don't mind, you know, a Facebook equivalent that connects people around the world that doesn't try to monetize and harvest your assets, right?

Well, we'll see. We'll see what Trump manages to squeeze out of the Zuck, because I'm sure he'll get a little bit, a little slice of the action for himself. But look, let's move on and let's talk about, I know you were particularly enjoying a bit of a pun. In an FT article headline, but why don't you just bring everyone up to speed about, I guess let's start from the bottom up. So the actual headline, but who KKR and who particularly Thames Water are and the significance they have in terms of the UK.

Yeah, absolutely. So yeah, this is our second story and I got myself riled up with Meta, so let's see if I can tone it down a bit. I don't know if I will because this is quite a, contentious issue as well. So the headline that I want to discuss today is, came out of the FT, as you said, last week, Barbarians at the Sluice Gate: KKR and its Acquisition of Thames Water. Now, the reason why I thought this was quite funny was because there was that classic, everyone that is interested in private equity should read Barbarians at the Gates, which was the story of KKR's hostile leveraged acquisition of consumer and cigarette company RJR Nabisco back in the '80s. The greed was good back then. So it's always been tainted as the kind of sharpest end of investing and the sharpest end of capitalism. So when you hear KKR, the kind of arch leveraged buyout merchants, pretty sharp elbowed, thinking about and then getting exclusivity over the acquisition of a utility and not only, no, not just any utility, a water utility that serves 16 million customers in the UK. You start thinking, all right, you know, your head starts to scratch and you think, all right, KKR, what is effectively the business model of KKR from a buyout perspective? And from a restructuring and infrastructure perspective, well, the business model is help turn the company around, which is exactly what Thames Water needs. But then, you know, make sure that this organization is run as efficiently and as kind of cost-consciously as possible. Again, we might say that that's a good thing, but remember the UK has one of the oldest sewage and water networks in the entire world. And it's a, there's a lot of capital expenditure that needs to go in for future generations. Now, even though this is going more into KKR's infrastructure area of the business, their infrastructure division, as opposed to their buyout division, thinking generationally about multi-decade improvements to the way that water is recycled, captured, recycled, and reused is not really central to a kind of KKR playbook. So the fact that, as I said, the news article that was announced last week, Thames Water has granted KKR, I think, a 12-week exclusivity period to try and make a deal happen. This is raising, I would say, some relatively significant alarm bells.

Can you just let me know then, what's the difference? You've described there what the process is that someone like KKR would do. What would the process look like at the other alternative for this company, i.e., potential nationalization?

Yeah. I mean, yeah, let's step back because Thames Water are running out of options, right? I've put a couple of screenshots from their annual report on my notes just because they really It really stood out to me. So if you've ever read an annual report or if you've ever been on an investor relations site, they try to do their best. They try to put their best foot forward about the statistics and the metrics that they want investors or people visiting that page to get quite excited about. So on the front page of the investor relations website, Thames Water's website, They have underlying revenue of £1.3 billion, underlying EBITDA of £715 million, which is quite nice. CapEx of over £1 billion a year. Okay. They're reinvesting in, into the network and into the system. Gearing 84.2%. Now gearing is the relationship between debt and equity in terms of your capital structure, how you fund and finance the business. I.e., the gearing ratio. 84% of all of the capital that's going into this business is debt. Gearing ratio above 50% is pretty disastrous. Gearing ratio of above 80% spells, you know, terminal, terminal failure for a business. And just to go into a little bit more detail, Thames Water paid £700 million in interest payments last year. On £520 million of operating profit. It was about to go bankrupt on the 24th of March, a couple of months ago, because it had a bond maturity, £224 million out of its $20 billion of debt that it has got on its balance sheet. It was actually thrown a lifeline where existing creditors agreed to provide £3 billion, of kind of emergency financing at 10% interest rate, by the way, you know, so not cheap. If they hadn't done that, if they hadn't have provided this £3 billion lifeline back in February, this is before the KKR talks, they hadn't done that, then this company would go into receivership and would be owned because it's a strategically important company. It would've been renationalized. So the alternatives to KKR stepping in, and who's to say whether the alternative is better than the KKR offer, but the alternative is, yeah, this gets put under public ownership, the debt gets restructured, the business gets recapitalized, and then it gets probably floated again over, you know, over the course of a few years, a little bit like what happened for those of you that can remember a little bit like what happened with RBS, right? Strategically significant national business that needed to be owned by the government during the financial crisis. Eventually had to get, yeah, had to get owned by the government and then sold off in bits and bobs over the next few years so that the government doesn't end up with RBS on its balance sheet.

So thinking about from the government's position then, would it be right in that the government could do without A, the headache, and B, the impacts on budgets and so forth? So they'd prefer to work in a situation with the private sector to come up with a solution.

Totally. Totally. This would cost the taxpayer billions of dollars, billions of pounds. Because the operating losses are significant. You know, there would be a lot of restructuring. They're already paying, they're already paying about £200 million as part of this restructuring. So this is getting the kind of the consultants in, getting the restructuring experts in, fundraisers. It's a £15 million a month restructuring bill. So, you know, you don't want that going on the taxpayer's dime. So if we can find a private solution to this, that protects most importantly the environment and the consumer, then that's definitely the best outcome. But it's the environment and the consumer that we need to worry about.

So how much leverage then do you think KKR has in this 12, 10-day exclusivity period when the government's probably quite heavily involved?

Yeah, I think this will go through. So KKR's come in as a bit of a quote unquote white knight. To take this company out of receivership and take this company out of public hands. And they have good relationships with the company's creditors. At the end of the day, this is a business that is not yet owned by, but will be owned by its creditors, the people that have lent it money because they're the ones that will take ownership of the company as and when it goes bankrupt. The equity holders will be totally wiped out. And KKR has been speaking and has negotiated with these senior bondholders and these senior lenders to say, look, you guys might have to take a 25% write-down on the debt that you have issued, or the bonds that you have, or the money that you have lent to Thames Water. So if I'm an investor, So let's say I'm Aberdeen and I've invested and I've lent a billion dollars, a billion pounds to Thames Water. I probably am only going to see 75p in that pound, but there may well be the offer of equity stake in the recapitalized structure. So Aberdeen might have to take the haircut on the debt, but they might get a little slice of the new equity in this new recapitalized structure. And what There was one quite good article just to get a little bit technical. It's basically saying as this company gets restructured, so this is where the debt gets retired, the equity gets retired, new debt gets issued, new equity gets issued under the kind of watchful eye and agreement of the creditors. They were saying that the article was saying that there is now going to be potentially a Chinese menu of new equity and debt options. Now this sounds a little bit silly, but if you think about the way the complexity of a capital structure, all the way from, all right, I'm going to lend you the most vanilla bank senior secured debt, all the way down to pure equity, unpreferred equity. You've got all of these different tranches that have different risk-return profiles, and this is what KKR is trying to gin up. It's trying to create a a takeout menu full of different options for the existing creditors to convert their outstanding debt, which the interest rates are too high, it's too cumbersome on the business, and put it into a structure. Because by the way, the company's still, you know, it's a utilities company that generates profit. You know, it's not, apart from the fact it's got £20 billion of debt, it shouldn't be at death's door. So if you can make a plan or a structure with your creditors that actually could work, this business could survive and could actually end up chucking out a decent amount of profit and being a real win for KKR.

And yeah, just to conclude then, because like you said, chucking out a real profit, which ultimately is why they're in this game. So rightly or wrongly, when I think of private equity, I tend to think of probably not in this situation where it's almost like a distressed situation. They come in and turn around. I tend to think more like an acquisition or a buy and build, and then they exit after 3 to 5 years. What's the categorization of the PE time horizon and of what sector would that sit?

Yeah, so this is going in KKR. You're absolutely right to mention it. This is going in KKR's infrastructure division, which is an $86 billion assets under management division. Again, just for context, KKR's total AUM is about $600 billion. This infrastructure division, the returns profile for investors that are investing in these infrastructure funds is different. It's lower and the hold period is longer, but these returns are much, much more consistent. So if you think about your typical infrastructure asset, you know, maybe it's a wind farm, maybe it's some other form of utility. One thing that is great about these assets is the predictable nature especially if you're hedging, especially if you're locking in prices into the future, the predictable nature of the cash flow of the business. So if I'm investing in KKR's infrastructure fund, I'm expecting the types of assets that are going to be pretty stable, pretty, not necessarily boring, 10 to 15% is quite nice, but not the kind of, you know, the 5x returns, the kind of big buyout stories, the big turnaround plays, et cetera. So I think what KKR's doing is it probably needs, you know, this year to put Thames Water back together again. And then it starts to look like just a kind of utilities-like play where you're like, this company, remember these utilities are monopolies. They have to be monopolies. It's not like I can turn on one of my taps and get Thames Water and turn on another and get Trent Water. So it becomes a really attractive asset if it's run properly. And that's, that's gonna be the kind of make or break for this story.

All right. Well, look, we will wrap it up there. So hopefully you enjoyed that conversation. Remember to like and share the show if you did and have a good week, Steven, everyone listening.

Yeah. Thanks, Ant.