Governments restrict uranium and centrifuges to prevent nuclear weapons. The speaker argues AI needs the same early control: monitor and archive every prompt, token, and chain-of-thought globally. Output safeguards come too late.
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You can't cut off every threat at the output level. You know, the way we police uranium, we cut it off at the uranium, plutonium, and centrifuge level, and that's where we measure the world. But it's, you know, once somebody has fissionable material, it's impossible to stop them from making a bomb because the remainder of the process, the thing that implodes it and the container, you can't ever police at that level. The equivalent in AI is at the prompt and the token level, it has to be monitored. That's the only future I can see that'll actually work. So we need a global agreement to monitor all prompts, and then you just have to decide what regulatory authority is allowed to see what prompts. Hard to do on your MacBook though, right? I mean, you have to find a way. And, you know, talking to Apple about installing it would be trivially easy, but, but there's no other way, only because Alex is right. New physics, new science is going to be created at an insane rate. So even if you manage to put virus detectors on every laptop in the world through some magical process, some other threat will be discovered every single month forever. Hereafter. You can't contain them all with, with afterthoughts. You have to look at what the AI is doing at the activation and prompt and chain of thought level and then monitor it all. It's so cheap to archive it all. Then we can debate which, which country gets to see it or which department and which gets to see what. You can debate that for the next 50 years, but at least you've got it.
