The Self, Security and the Surveillance State #11

Welcome to The Future View. In this episode, I'm joined by Rogier Kremers, assistant professor in China Studies at Leiden University. And the co-editor of Law and the Party in China: Ideology and Organization, and by Josh Chinn of the China Bureau at The Wall Street Journal, who is also the co-author with Lisa Lin of the new book, Surveillance State: China's Quest to Launch a New Era of Social Control. In this in-depth and illuminating conversation, we start with the macro context, discussing the geopolitical, economic, and trade situation especially on technology transfer, highlighting the issues over semiconductors and China's ambition to play a bigger role in the global economy and technology. It's a seam that is richly sewn by Josh Chin in his new book, which I urge you to go out and buy, as he takes us on a journey of the mass surveillance happening at a personal and even biological level of Chinese citizens, predominantly but not exclusively. By the Uyghurs. We cover levels of security and surveillance, the systems that are employed, and that includes of course the social credit system and both the Chinese and Western understandings and perhaps misunderstandings of that, the Supreme People's Court blacklist system, the regulation of algorithms, data security laws, and the nature of authoritarianism versus personal autonomy. And why Chinese culture contains no such notion of autonomy. Rather, a belief that humans are born incomplete, with the task of the human being being one of self-cultivation and self-improvement, and society's task being to enable that. It's a slightly longer episode than usual, with an in-depth discussion with two of the very best China watchers out there. So please do enjoy The Future of Identity, Privacy, and the Surveillance State. So Roger and Josh, thank you so much for joining me here on The Future of You. Really appreciate you, you taking the time to join me.

It's a pleasure to be here.

Pleasure to be here.

I wondered if for our audience who some might have more background in China, some might might have a little knowledge of what's going on in China and might have been picking up some of the quite heavy press coverage of late around the Congress Party and President Xi's third term. I wonder if you both could just give us your opinion and context to what's happening with China and especially sort of geopolitically on the world stage. Who would like to start?

I guess I can go first on this one. I think what's happening with China right now is that it is in the midst of a really tectonic transition away from the era of reform and opening that followed the death of Mao Zedong. So for the past 30 years, into a new phase that is dominated by Xi Jinping, and then also by his ideas about governance, which are really a sort of form of tech authoritarianism, or some people would argue tech totalitarianism, that are all about maximum control for the Communist Party, with a humongous emphasis on security, both China's own national security and then domestically within China. And we're just starting to see this play out. Xi Jinping just got his— was named to a third term as the General Secretary of the Communist Party, which is breaking with sort of succession norms that have been put in place by Deng Xiaoping years ago to sort of prevent a return to kind of Mao-style one-man rule. And so we'll sort of see what he does with this new term. One of the things he did accomplish recently was he managed to pack the top leadership all with his own protégés and allies. So there's essentially no one left at the top of the Communist Party who can really challenge him or would be inclined to challenge him. So it really is— Xi Jinping describes it as a new era in China, and I think he's he's right.

To add to that, I think Josh gave a very good picture of what's happening at the elite level, but I think there is also a very big structural dimension that we need to talk about. And to a very significant degree, that has to do with China's development trajectory, where we've now had over 3 decades of meteoric growth, but that meteoric growth started from a very low starting point. In the early 1990s, Chinese GDP per capita was under $500 US. Per year. We're now at about $12,000, and that has all kinds of consequences. It means, for instance, that, uh, all of the easy ways in which you can sort of have a rapid takeoff, uh, those ways have been exhausted. And more broadly, there's a model that's being exhausted as well. China grew through at first making very low value-added stuff like toys and clothes, and it's now at the point where it's making iPhones and laptops. But the problem with that is that, uh, it limits the extent to which you can grow your economy. A second element is that many of these sources of economic takeoff are now becoming impediments. And you see this very clearly in the energy sector, where if China wants to become a leader in green tech, it's going to have to take on sooner or later the coal lobby, which is an incredibly powerful and well-connected lobby. In terms of vested interests, it's really pretty big. And so the problem that you now have is that over the last 30 years, you could say used to say we need to maximize GDP. Now the Communist Party is saying not every unit of GDP is created equal. There are forms of GDP that are better than others, um, and we need to come up with a new model that takes that into account, which in and of itself means repoliticizing economic management, um, because these trade-offs— if you, if you don't say we're going to simply maximize GDP these trade-offs can only be dealt with politically. And so when people say it's politics back in control, in a way that is because it cannot be any other way. But that also means that the Communist Party is reaching into a vocabulary or a repertoire of tactics that is very clearly very Leninist. And that is, that is what we're seeing playing out now. That obviously takes place against the background of a domestic society which is far more connected, far more, far more mobile, far more aspirational. Which also comes with headwinds, youth unemployment, population aging, and obviously an international environment that is not very welcoming anymore to China playing a bigger role in the global economy and certainly in technology.

So Roger, you've talked to me before about there being a perception, and I hope I'm characterizing this correctly, of, you know, a kind of real economy and then a financialized economy. And Xi making some kind of distinction between those. Where does technology fit into that? Is it real or is it financialized? How important is it to this sort of, this repositioning of the economy and its management?

It is very important, but not necessarily in every way. When we in the West talk about innovation, you know, very often the first thing we think about are the big tech platforms, the Amazons, the Facebooks, the Twitters, and so on and so forth. You know, and we have this idea of, individual entrepreneur-driven economic development built on data and so on and so forth. And what the Chinese government really has said over the last 2 or 3 years is that, you know, consumer internet, it's all very nice and it's great that people can order food and so on and so forth, but in the end, it's just a slightly more sophisticated way of getting people to fork out for a new t-shirt or a new, um, you know, piece of furniture or whatever. It doesn't sort of durably add quality to the economy. The same is true for fintech. And we've really seen this in the, the very strict regulations that are now put in place on the online fintech sector. China has banned cryptocurrencies, already started banning banks from transacting in cryptocurrencies in 2015. And over the last couple of years, that has evolved into a complete ban on crypto mining and transactions because it sees crypto as a source of volatility. And if there's anything that the Communist Party really doesn't like, it is volatility. It's, it's unexpected surprises. You know, that's, that's very much a negative thing. But we also see this in more traditional fintech, for instance, in Ant Financial, which is no longer just a payment system or a system to move money around. They've also diversified into lending and into wealth management, which are activities that have a direct bearing on the money supply. And which take financial operations as a means of capital accumulation, as a way of making profit in their own right. And what the Communist Party essentially has said is, you know, that only leads to volatility. Financialization, again, is not a high-quality form of GDP generation. It doesn't add anything durable to the quality of your economy. So what we want is fintech to be the handmaiden, for lack of a better word, to the real economy and not be a locus for capital accumulation in its own right. Where you see a lot of the investment going and the government attention going is hard tech. And that's everything ranging from robotics and corporate software to things like satellite monitoring systems for more effective agriculture. So it's really using the digital in, in a broad sense to empower traditional economies that mostly produce goods In some cases services, but mostly goods.

I mean, Josh, your whole book, "A Surveillance State," is about the role of technology in this economy, in this society. I'm sure you have plenty to add to that.

Yeah, you know, I think one really interesting thing about what the Communist Party's been doing with the economy under Xi Jinping and this sort of move away from, or the skepticism of the consumer internet companies these, you know, big sort of e-commerce companies like, like Alibaba or Tencent that does gaming and social media, is that it's moving away from the one, uh, area of the economy that was previously genuinely innovative. Um, it was, it was the one area of the economy that was, um, also possibly not coincidentally dominated by, by private companies, and it was a real engine of growth and dynamism and inspiration, you know, for within, within China. People like Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba, were heroes to generations of, of Chinese young people. And, and Xi has really moved heavily against this, these companies. They— he canceled the IPO famously of, of Ant Financial, which is the, the fintech arm of Alibaba, which was, which was supposed to be was expected to be the largest IPO in history at the time. And, and really, you get this sense in China now when you're talking to entrepreneurs, to young sort of ambitious people that they don't know what to do. Right. They don't sort of— they're a little bit lost. The one area where there clearly is a lot of emphasis now because the Communist Party's emphasis is in hard tech, is in areas like AI, like chips. And other sort of tech that Roger mentioned. But that's a very limited area, right? And it's one that not everyone wants to go into. And it's also, China has had very limited success so far in those areas. And so it's a really interesting move on Xi Jinping's part to move to essentially shift economic resources and energy from one sector that was, by all accounts, extremely dynamic and innovative into another area where China's prospects are less certain.

It seems kind of a paradox that— and maybe I'm mischaracterizing it— that whilst that's going on in China, and there's a move in that direction, back in Europe and the West, or certainly in Europe and the UK, there's a sort of move away from industry, a deindustrialization and a refinancialization of some countries. And how is that going to work out? Are we going to have an imbalance, do you think? And sort of allied to that, which of the regions do you think is more ready and prepared and will be more successful if a proper decoupling does take place?

I think none of us is really prepared for the consequences of a true decoupling. And certainly one of the things that I haven't seen, for instance, now in relation to, for instance, the sanctions around semiconductors, you know, the semiconductor industry is perhaps the most complex economic activity in the world right now. It involves hundreds, if not thousands, of companies. It involves technology that's really pushing the limits of the laws of physics. You know, the metaphor I sometimes use is it's a finely tuned switch watch that some of these sanctions are now taking a hammer too. And that's happening in a sector that was already under pressure. You know, we all know about the chip shortage in a range of industries. And I think we're sort of still trying to figure out the fallout from that. And certainly so is the Chinese government, as well as the businesses that are, that are involved in this sector. And, you know, over the long run, that sector will probably readjust, but it's going to be hugely expensive and time-consuming. And so the question really is, there seems to be a paradigmatic shift where we move from a globally integrated digital economy that had been developing with economic efficiency as the sole organizing principle under WTO rules with not really a lot of meaningful borders impeding the flow of goods, you know, components, semi-finished products, and all the rest of it. We now seem to be moving towards a situation where we're saying economic efficiency alone isn't good enough. There are massive security concerns here as well. So we need to account for those. And automatically that means that economic efficiency is going to go down. That automatically means that prices are going to go up. And that means, you know, if we think this through, for instance, are we ready for a world in which a smartphone costs 2 or 3 times the amount of money that it does now and where it isn't sort of available on call in hundreds of shops in any city, but where it comes with a multiple-month waiting period? That being said, you know, sometimes I'd like to take the Chinese on their word. And there was a very interesting report that briefly came out a couple of months ago, done by very well-respected academics at Peking University, that was then immediately taken down from the internet. But that report very clearly signaled how, how these Chinese researchers at least see China as being far more vulnerable, uh, to the impact of decoupling than the United States.

Yeah, you know, that's a, that's a really, um, good point that Roger makes. I mean, it's, it is, uh, it is a very difficult moment for China, right? Especially with these, with these new restrictions on semiconductors. I mean, for listeners who haven't been following that closely recently, the, the Biden administration imposed, um, really, really broad set of export restrictions on any American entity So that's an individual or a company providing American technology or know-how to Chinese companies for the production of chips, of advanced chips and semiconductors. And the United States controls so much of the chip industry, especially at the high end, as Roger was mentioning, the end where we're pushing the laws of physics, the really sort of tiny chips that you need to sort of run AI applications and missiles and that sort of thing. The US completely dominates that part of the industry. And so it is effectively impossible for China to make those chips without relying to one degree or another on American technology and know-how. So depending on how strictly the US government decides to implement these restrictions, it could really just destroy the chip industry in China, or at least set it back for many, many years. And when you just think about all of the applications for chips, it really has the potential to sort of ripple out through the Chinese economy.

I mean, the States might have to go to, you know, South Korea and other Southeast Asian and South Asian countries for lots of resources and to plug some gaps in the supply chain if they can't reach out to China. And I guess vice versa, China will probably also need to use those countries for resources. And so do you foresee in this sort of bifurcation, potentially, of these two bigger regions, that there's a bit of a battle over the access and the resources in, I don't know, Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand? Is that why there is so much geopolitical attention and kind of economic interest in those areas now?

Well, certainly, you know, if we talk about the battle for resources, again, we have to think about the complexity of the sector that we're dealing with. And again, this complexity is unfathomable. You cannot duplicate the chip industry. The costs to entry are so incredibly high. Just to give you an indication of the sort of the numbers that we're talking about, TSMC, the Taiwanese company that is the most advanced chip manufacturer in the world, is expecting to spend about $100 billion by itself on capital expenditure in the next couple of years. That company alone, therefore, is going to invest 3 times as much as the European Union foresees to spend in the EU equivalent of the CHIPS Act over the next near decade. These are the numbers that we're talking about. And even if China could afford recreating all of these facilities, which it can't because nobody can, Then you still have the problem that, again, you need hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of extremely highly trained engineers, experts, and specialists. You need access to extremely well-refined chemicals. Just to give a stupid example, I'm talking to you from the Netherlands, and this is obviously a big topic here because in the Netherlands there is a company called ASML. And ASML makes a machine that is indispensable in the lithography process, you know, the etching of the circuits in semiconductors. It's a monopolist. There's no other company in the world that can make those machines. But it itself has thousands and thousands of suppliers, many of whom, again, are monopolists or oligopolists in their field. They are so highly specialized to make, for instance, the optical tools that are necessary for that machine to function. There's only a very small number of companies in the world that can make that. So what you're really talking about is not just, you know, reproducing what TSMC does or what ASML does, but you really have— they sit on top of an enormous pyramid that we haven't even begun, I think, as a policy issue to fathom the complexity of. Part of that is obviously rare earths, And this is where a very interesting political question comes in. We call them rare earths, but they're not actually that rare. The problem is they are— they occur naturally in very many places of the world, but extracting them is an incredibly filthy business. And this is a sort of filthy business that for political reasons Western countries have tried to move away from because it's incredibly polluting. You know, labor conditions almost by definition are fairly unpleasant. And so we were happy for all of that stuff to happen in China. That means that China has very significant amounts of market share in these activities, in some cases near monopolies. Again, are we ready to pay the political cost to reopen these mines in our own countries or in the— or, you know, in our allies, coming with all of the social and political costs that that will entail?

You mean an end to greenwashing?

God forbid.

Exactly. Josh, I'm sure you'd like to come in on this.

Yeah. You know, it's interesting. I actually had a— I was back in the United States recently. I'm from the state of Utah, which has a famous lake called the Great Salt Lake, and which turns out contains large amounts of lithium. We're talking about lithium used for batteries. And I didn't, I didn't realize this, but I ran into a Chinese businessman when I was back there who, who was involved in trying to find ways to extract lithium from the Great Salt Lake. And what he was saying was, is that there's only one company in the world that has the technology that is capable of extracting lithium from saltwater like this in an efficient way that is actually not environmentally destructive. And that company is in China. And so he is, you know, he is desperately trying to find a way to get that company involved in pulling lithium out of the Great Salt Lake near my hometown. But, you know, I asked him about the geopolitics of it and he was— he's sort of— he'd been working on this for years and he's kind of thrown his hands hands up because he's not sure it's gonna work anymore. So I mean, I think that's just a small example of how it works, but I think, you know, I think that's gonna play out around the globe.

That's amazing. I did not know that at all. That's a revelation. So that's a really good context, I think. And we've talked a little bit about the macro. What about the micro? Let's turn to think about some of the technologies you obviously talk a lot about, both of you, in terms of governance,, but also in terms of, you know, it's just people going about their ordinary everyday business in China. What happens when we can't get any semiconductors, or the Chinese Communist Party and the industry within China can't get semiconductors, let's say, and nobody can have a smartphone to carry around and track themselves and put themselves through the surveillance system, or there's a problem with facial facial recognition, getting hold of that sort of technology. Can the surveillance industry, as it stands in China, keep up given the limitations or perhaps the challenges and obstacles that there might be in supply? Or maybe there won't be any challenges in China and all the challenges are in the States.

No, I think you are going to see some major challenges for the the surveillance industry, the entire surveillance system in China with what's, what's going on now. I don't know. I don't think that that's necessarily the US, the US's main target. I think their, their main concern seemed to be with the Chinese military. They want to deny these technologies to the military. They're worried about, about things like AI weapons and that sort of thing. But, but surveillance is a, is a, is a is another motivator for them, even if it's a secondary one. And, you know, already you're starting to see talk at some of the top AI facial recognition, computer vision startups in China about layoffs, which is, which is a really kind of shocking turn of events. I mean, these companies were for years adding people, adding staff at an amazing clip. They couldn't get enough people in to help them, you know, with scrubbing data or engineering new products. And now they are— Megvii, which is one of the top, the top facial recognition companies in China, is reportedly considering fairly significant layoffs. So I think you're going to see it's a problem. I mean, the— a lot of the companies, the tech companies in China have been stockpiling chips. They've seen, you know, they could see some of this coming, but eventually those stockpiles are are going to run out and you are going to, you know, it is going to be hard for China to replace that.

That being said, what is not happening, just to be complete, is that Chinese consumers are essentially being cut off from smartphones. So Apple will at least, you know, under the status quo, be able to continue to sell iPhones into China for the foreseeable future. And the same thing is true for Samsung and so on and so forth. Um, so this is about Chinese smartphone manufacturers that will not have access to chips above a certain performance threshold, and that threshold isn't dynamic, right? So it's never going to move. But an individual Chinese person will be able to get an iPhone or a Samsung phone or any other non-Chinese brand of smartphone. Um, it is just that Chinese companies will not be able to get access to the chips inside those phones. We're already, by the way, seeing signs of a gray market in chips developing. So it's going to be very interesting to see what all the fallout of this is going to be across the supply chain.

On the gray market topic, one really great example of this and just also the, you know, of the complexity of supply chains and the difficulty of actually denying this trade from a regulator standpoint is that, Recently, the US government banned NVIDIA, which is a, you know, Californian chipmaker. They make GPUs, graphics processing units, which were originally, you know, designed for gaming, but which turn out to be really excellent for training AI algorithms as well. The US government banned NVIDIA from selling its highest-end GPUs to China. Which Nvidia came out and said was going to cost them something on the order of $400 million per quarter in business. But if you look around and you, you just Google— well, not Google, I guess you Baidu around on, on, on Chinese e-commerce sites and, and you can find these chips for sale on, on Taobao, which is a, which is a commercial e-commerce site. So there are all sorts of ways for these technologies to get into China. And it will depend on exactly how strict the US wants to be in trying to deny it. So just to say, it is very complicated.

It is indeed. Now, Josh, in your book, Surveillance State, you take us on a little journey, particularly at the beginning, of a chap, I think his name is Tahir, where it's fascinating. I wonder if you could, without without giving too many spoilers, because obviously people want to enjoy it. I wonder if you could just take us on his journey a little bit to illustrate the kinds of surveillance through the implementation of technology in the Chinese state that he comes into contact with.

Yeah, you know, Tahir is— so Tahir is a— his full name is Tahir Hamut. He's considered by some to be one of the greatest Uyghur living poets. And so Uyghurs are a Turkic Muslim group that come from the far northwestern region of China known as Xinjiang. And so he was a— he's a poet. He's also a filmmaker. And he, you know, is a sort of towering intellectual figure in Urumqi. And his story, one of the things his story illustrates, which I think is really fascinating, is the sort of boiling frog nature of state surveillance, in that he, you know, being a Uyghur growing up in China, he sort of— his entire life was subject to some level of scrutiny because Uyghurs for many, many years have been very resistant to Han Chinese rule. There's been a lot of conflict. And so the Communist Party has always kept a very close eye on Uyghurs, particularly influential Uyghurs like Tahir. So in Xinjiang, around the late 2016, early 2017, a new Communist Party boss arrived. And the Communist Party at this point had been prosecuting what it called a people's war on terror. The government had suffered some terrorist attacks outside of Xinjiang carried out by Uyghurs that it was quite concerned about and had really been cranking up the pressure. They sort of felt like it wasn't enough. And they wanted to really try something new. And so in late 2016, the new party boss comes in and starts implementing an incredibly intense rollout of cutting-edge surveillance technology throughout Xinjiang. You know, just installing huge banks of surveillance cameras, building what he called convenience police stations, sort throughout Uyghur neighborhoods. And, and as this was happening, Tahir sort of didn't really— he didn't really notice it at first. Right. Because he'd always sort of grown up seeing police and seeing surveillance cameras. And it was only one day in the sort of spring of 2017 when he and his wife got called into the police station that he started to realize that something new was happening. And what happened in the police station was he and his wife were called down to a basement, asked to line up with a bunch of other Uyghurs, and subjected to biometric data collection. So they've been told that they were there, they needed their fingerprints taken, which they did. But they also had their blood taken. They had their voices recorded. They were asked to read from a newspaper article while their voices were recorded. And then they had 3D models of their faces made in this really painstaking process where they had to sit in front of this camera and sort of turn their head to the left and turn it to the right and up and down and open their mouths and close them. And, you know, none of the police said anything about what this was for, uh, but, but as they were leaving the police station, it just— they were trying to make sense of it, and they sort of— it was just the sign that something, something new was happening. And then over the next few weeks, the full picture kind of came into view, uh, and they started hearing stories about other Uyghurs in other parts of town being taken away. And disappearing, being sent to schools. And then there were new rumors about a data collection platform based on sort of military technology that had been— it was developed for, for counterinsurgency operations that was being used in Xinjiang to collect data on Uyghurs, on their behaviors, on their— on who their friends were, how often they prayed, what sort of content they had on their phone.. And that data was being used to categorize Uyghurs according to the level of threat that they posed to the Communist Party rule. And people who were deemed safe were allowed to move about freely, but those who were deemed unsafe were sent off to what were effectively internment camps where they were subjected to political reeducation. And at one point, Tahir, one of his, one of his best friends, disappeared and was taken away. And he started sleeping with a pile of clothes next to his bed because he had heard about Uyghurs being taken away in the middle of the night in their underwear and locked away. And so I won't give away the entire story, but basically he did start to try to find a way to escape. He did manage to escape through some really, um, through some luck and, and some guile. But he was— he ended up being one of the last really prominent Uyghurs to, to get out of Xinjiang before the door slammed shut.

And is that story very specific to Xinjiang and, you know, the problems that we hear emanating from there, or is it the canary in a coal mine for sort of wider application across Chinese society and maybe even globally for the use of technology to surveil people at a very biological, very personal level.

Yeah, you know, actually, after I took my first trip to Xinjiang, which was at the end of 2017, when all of this was just sort of starting to come to light, I remember coming back from that trip, going back to Beijing, and I was meeting with a Chinese human rights activist for a completely different story, but I just sort of happened to mention where I'd been and described what I'd seen. And he immediately said, oh, that's what's happening in Xinjiang now is just a prelude. That's coming for the rest of China. And I remember at the time kind of being skeptical of that. I felt like the level of surveillance in Xinjiang, and it really is, I mean, it is pervasive and suffocating in a way that makes 1984 seem like a child's story, right? It's just, it's incredibly just intimidating and almost unimaginable if you haven't been there. And so I thought, ah, that's an exaggeration. That's probably not, that's really not true. But years later, beginning of 2020, I remember coming down from my apartment and this was the beginning. This was when the, what was known at the time as the novel coronavirus had just escaped from Wuhan. And I came down from my apartment into my residential compound in Beijing, and I realized that all of the exits to the compound had been blocked off except for one, so that everyone in this compound, though there are thousands of people who live there, they all have to go through this one exit. And they would get, and they would, and we were being issued passes to allow us to go out and buy groceries. Groceries and that sort of thing. And they were, you know, uh, tracking our movements. And that is exactly, uh, the method of management that, that the Chinese government was using in Uyghur compounds in, in Xinjiang a few years earlier. Uh, and then after that, uh, the government rolled out this, this Health Code system, which is a smartphone-based system that tracks the movements of essentially everyone in China. Uh, and, and tracks whether— where they've been, whether they've been in a high-risk area for COVID, whether they've been in proximity to someone who had COVID or was a close contact of someone who had COVID. And then it assigns a rating, a risk rating based on that exposure, which, you know, is again a sort of one-to-one transfer from Xinjiang, where in Xinjiang they were, they were trying to track the spreading of the spread of ideological viruses, right? But in, in the rest of China with the, with the pandemic, they were tracking an actual virus. And so they did— they didn't end up expanding systems that were used in Xinjiang or pirated Xinjiang to the entire population of China.

Now, Roger, you and I have talked about the health code before, um, we've talked about it in relation to the social credit system. So I wonder if you could expand on what Josh was saying and also Um, you know, tell listeners a little bit more about the Health Code and how the social credit system all fits into this use of technology, or maybe it doesn't.

Well, in a way it does and it doesn't. Uh, they are separate systems, but we tend to sort of conflate them. Uh, the social credit system essentially is an amplification device that gets put on top of traditional forms of law and regulation, uh, which is essentially a means of essentially better enforcing the law. China had, had huge problems. It doesn't have huge problems in writing laws, but it has huge problems in getting people to follow them. Um, and that leads to things like distrust in the marketplace, which, uh, Beijing sees very much as an impediment, uh, to continued growth. Um, so the whole idea of the social credit system is to be able, one, to add on extra punishments to people who break the law particularly badly, um, and then you end up in a blacklist. And the best known blacklist system is the Supreme People's Court blacklist system that you end up on when you have been convicted of something and you haven't met the terms of that conviction. You haven't paid your fine or you haven't paid back your debt, uh, that sort of thing. And then indeed there are extra sanctions that follow. But what we think is that it's sort of this you know, the word Orwellian is used all the time, that it's this sort of massive machine that is constantly sucking up information about every single Chinese individual and then rolling out with a sort of dynamically updated quantified score that then decides everything that they can do. And that is phenomenally overblown. You know, there isn't a system in the world that can do that, and certainly there isn't a system in China that can do that. But it is that sort of that fantasy that we have. I do think sometimes we like to sort of overreact to what China is doing and make it into a bit more of a boogeyman than it actually is. But indeed, with the health code thing, the notion was you have a traffic light system and, you know, we use technologies including things like geo-tracking to identify whether you can go into public spaces. That's the green light. The yellow light is you should probably get tested or go into short-term quarantine. And the red light is you should go into into long-term quarantine. And what we are increasingly seeing is that these systems are then being used, for instance, to deal with protests. For instance, to forestall protests, you can essentially switch people's health code systems to red, and there are reports that this has happened. The problem obviously being, and this, when we think about technology, it's very easy to come up with the most dystopian case, but we forget that, you know, if you want a system that works to prevent the spread, the spread of, you know, an actual virus, if you're going to use it for different purposes, its utility in preventing that spread of that virus is going to decrease. And the same thing is true for the social credit system, where if you come up with a single metric to qualify or to quantify an individual's behavior, that metric is actually not going to tell you very much about that person. And so the moment that you add on functionality to any system, its original functions start degrading. Now, the interesting thing, and you asked the question, and it's a question that I get a lot, is, you know, to what extent is this going to spread globally? And this is where I do feel obliged to remind our listeners that other governments and other countries have agencies too, right? And we do see there is, there is such a thing as technology creep, where, you know, when a technological function is available and there is a political crisis or a political moment where that is demanded, you know, then that's an opportune moment for states to expand those capabilities. Just look at what the Patriot Act was able to do to American civil liberties in the wake of 9/11. But all of this is to say that Unlike the novel coronavirus, the spread of technologically empowered forms of surveillance is a political choice and it's a corporate choice. And, you know, if we are unhappy with the potential of that choice, then, you know, we have ways of political agency to stop that. But it is, again, sort of, it fits into this notion of China as a boogeyman that is sort of going to roll out over the world. No. And as these chip sanctions also underline, other governments have agency too.

It's interesting, that point about perceptions, I think, because I mean, even when I've been at conferences or events or in discussions and debates, you know, especially about the social credit system, because I think you, Roger, were the first person to explain to me just how it was born out of an administrative system, actually, like a legal system, if anything. But when I've debated and discussed it in groups of people here in the UK, for example, you know, somebody, a Chinese person has got up and made the point that we seem to have a very groupthink, one-dimensional view of the technology and how it's utilized in society. And I remember one girl in particular speaking up and saying, you know, as a woman, she feels much safer walking around certain districts in China because of the surveillance technology and the CCTV, et cetera, than she does, for example, in London. I mean, London's got a lot of CCTV, so I'm not sure what that's about. But I think the point she was making and that I'm trying to make is that Obviously there are completely different perceptions and completely different narratives, and part of it depends on sort of, you know, the culture and the cultural narratives. I don't know if you want to speak to that, Josh, or Roger, because I know you do pick up on that in the book, in Surveillance State, a little bit as well. And you do talk about the US, you also talk about places like Uganda, and it's a good reminder from Roger that obviously it's not that China is It shouldn't be that China is the bogeyman because every state or many states have this ability to implement it in several different ways.

Yeah. I mean, if you want to get sort of really grand about it, I mean, in some ways surveillance is indivisible from states, from government period, right? I mean, every government and state has to collect a certain amount of information on its population. Otherwise it can't do things like levy taxes taxes or draft people for the military and that sort of thing, right? So, you know, governments have been doing this for an extremely long time, centuries. And in the sort of modern era, of course, with the Patriot Act, the US actually sort of gave birth to the entire digital surveillance industry globally. So China's certainly not unique. But, you know, this question of kind of attitudes towards surveillance or towards privacy and culture is a really interesting one. I mean, I think undeniably, if you look around the globe, different countries deal with these issues in different ways. You know, Europe obviously is one of the strictest places for the regulation of data and of digital technologies anywhere. The US is a bit schizophrenic. China is evolving. You know, one really interesting factoid that I came across in writing the book was that the word for privacy in Mandarin did not appear in the official Chinese dictionary until 1998, right? So it is, yeah, yeah. I mean, it probably existed in conversation the way language works, but it wasn't sort of officially acknowledged by, by the government until 1998. And so the conversation about privacy in China is young, but there is a conversation. And what I think is interesting in China is there are certainly people who you will run across who feel like China is a more collectivist society. It's not, you know, the people in China don't care as much about individual rights or individual identity. And they're much more focused on the sort of common good. And that, that may or may not be true. I think what is really interesting in, in China is that as privacy consciousness has grown, mostly in bigger, wealthier cities, the, the government has been really savvy in the way it approaches that. Rather than censor that, that conversation, which it could try to do, as it does with a lot of other conversations, it actually embraced it. And I think it's reflective of a sort of understanding within the Communist Party of the malleability of privacy as a concept. Right. And if you ask someone to define what privacy is, it's almost impossible to do in one or two lines. Right. You can take an entire book and sort of not be able to fully capture it. Right. Because it's one of these— as important as it is, it's a really inchoate sort of concept. And I think, you know, the Chinese government intuited that. And what they've done is whenever there are privacy controversies, as there are, they direct them at companies. Right. And so, so China now has, you know, it's a sort of regular pattern where some sort of privacy scandal will emerge. One instance I remember, the CEO of Baidu, of China's Google, said at a tech conference once that, oh, China is a great great place to run a tech company because Chinese people don't care about privacy and you can just take their data. And as soon as that comment went out, it blew up and he had to apologize. And it partly blew up because the People's Daily and China Central Television helped it blow up. So the government's really— it's sort of taken privacy and redefined it as a concept that applies to companies but not the government. And so they actually, you know, Speaking of writing good laws, as Roger mentioned earlier, China actually has one of the world's strictest personal information protection regimes, legal regimes anywhere. It's modeled on GDPR to a certain degree in Europe. And, and if taken at face value, it's quite, it's quite restrictive. In practice, though, it has a lot of loopholes for for in particular national security, which in China is a huge, broad concept that can apply to everything from an actual terrorist to someone who told an off-color joke about Xi Jinping on the internet.

Is this the cyber sovereignty approach, Roger?

A bit. A bit. I'm going to slightly sort of building on Josh's exposition. And for those listeners that you have suffering from severe insomnia, I actually wrote a 15,000-word paper on this, which I'm happy to put in the show notes. The interesting thing is there is a Chinese legal concept for privacy and it's part of civil law and it refers to, you know, it has this sort of tinge of information about you that might embarrass you or that might be in some way morally connected. So, you know, indecent pictures of yourself, which are not illegal to take, But, you know, you're not supposed to spread them. And that is part of the civil law. So that is where Chinese individuals can sue other Chinese individuals, for instance, for having leaked or disseminated their nudie pics or pictures from the inside of their house without their consent. You know, it's got a lot to do with shame or shamefulness, embarrassment, that sort of thing. The Personal Information Protection Law actually doesn't even contain the word privacy because that is seen as, you know, if privacy is just a very narrow thing, if you compare it with the European Union, privacy is a fundamental right. It is a right that I as a European citizen enjoy vis-à-vis other individuals, vis-à-vis companies, but also vis-à-vis the state. As Josh said, you know, the US is a little bit higgledy-piggledy on all of this. So the EU is like the very interesting contrast. Now, Whether or not the Chinese people care about privacy, you know, that's a very long culturalist argument. I approach it more from the sort of the political structural side, which is that the very notion of a fundamental right does not meaningfully exist within the Chinese legal political order and hasn't existed there for the last 2,000-3,000 years at the very least. And so what you're dealing with when you look at personal information protection in China is the prevention of outright abuses, you know, illegal data trading, fraud, and so on and so forth. Increasingly, we see also the regulation of corporate business models, the use of data, for instance, for algorithmic content recommendation. And indeed, fairly wide exceptions for national security, essentially, you know, allowing state security bodies, the Ministry of Public Security, and so on and so forth, to do their job as they're supposed to while at the same time limiting the ability of, because this used to happen a lot and maybe it still does, of sort of mid-tier employees in the Chinese equivalent of the Department of Motor Vehicles to use their access to information about how people drive their cars to essentially sell that information to insurance companies because, you know, hey, these people aren't necessarily paid very well. And a bit of moonlighting is lucrative. And so in that sense, you see that there's a sort of nearly micromanage-er-al approach of trying to identify the different ways and the different purposes for which data, personal information, can be collected and processed and sort of micromanaging exactly what happens there rather than starting from, as we do in Europe, a fundamental proposition that privacy is a fundamental right and that the GDPR is primarily there to put meat on the skeleton of that fundamental right, to give guidelines about exactly what that means in the day-to-day business of companies, of governments, and so on and so forth. So privacy really isn't the word that you want to be looking for, but it is the notion that Chinese people, in my view, quite understandably, do not want to be bombarded with spam. When you deal with China, you know, if you are a 60-year-old in China today, that means that you were born right after one of the biggest famines in global history. You lived through a very long period where China was one of the poorest countries in the world, and suddenly these people are, you know, dealing with smartphones. You know, the learning curve there is incredibly steep, and I'm sure that we all have stories about our own grandparents trying to navigate the digital world. You know, in China, that challenge just goes up by multiple orders of magnitude simply because of, you know, that enormous income deficit, that wealth deficit that China had to deal with. And so it isn't so much privacy in our political sense of the word that the Chinese people care about, or that we see these discussions being had about, as it is, or certainly as the government sort of molds those debates into being. You know, protests over, on the one hand, outright abuses, but on the other hand also increasingly corporate business models.

And what about the notion of autonomy? Does that exist? If so, does it exist in the same way as it might be understood in the West? Lots of the conversations I have about technology and how it might be altering or influencing our notions or our concept of the self end up as conversations about privacy. But it's not really privacy most of the time I'm trying to interrogate, it's normally autonomy. But it kind of gets bundled up with the idea of user-centric, which is both about autonomy and privacy. So is there a notion of autonomy?

Well, I'm afraid I'm going to have to get even more into the weeds of sort of political philosophy. But there's a really good book out there by a British author called Tom Holland— not Spider-Man, the other one. It's called Dominion, and essentially it talks about how the mental world in which we live is deeply Christian.

And it is.

And in very many ways, our concepts about humanity, human life, values, our ideas about the good are deeply, deeply Christian. You know, as a certain American document has it, we are all endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights. And what we've done with secularization is we've stripped out God and Jesus, but essentially we've kept the intellectual framework. And so the idea of autonomy comes from the notion that We, in the Christian tradition, are all created in the image of God, and we therefore carry within us a spark of the divine. And therefore, because we are all divine creatures, that's where— that's really the roots of liberalism as a political theory. Individual human beings should be able to pursue life as they see fit with as little encumbrance as possible, um, because we are all divine, right? Um, and the whole notion of autonomy then gets into, you know, this notion of living your best life, as the kids would call it today, or being true to yourself. But it, it, it comes down to this notion that within you there is a core of authenticity. There is a real you that can be sullied by authoritarian political systems or other undue influences, and your task as, as a human being, or our task in our political systems, is to liberalize as much as possible, to set individuals free as much as possible. Throughout Chinese political history, that notion has never been there. Um, rather, the notion was that we are not born with a spark of the divine, but we are born as incomplete human beings. We cannot We cannot talk. We cannot take care of ourselves. We cannot take responsibility. And so the task of a human being is to self-cultivate, and the task of society is to socialize. And so that notion of autonomy as a fundamental part of the way that you see human, human life is not really there pretty much throughout Chinese imperial history, where it's much more this notion where You have to be socialized into your role, and it is your job to carry out that role. Combined with that is a very strong tradition in which, again, you know, going back way back when, in Europe and then, you know, the Europe-based world, we had a very strict— we had a very clear separation between moral authority and worldly authority, where in Chinese imperial history, that authority was fused. The emperor was always both pope and king. And you still see that today in the moral aspirations that the Chinese Communist Party leadership very clearly broadcasts, where what they're not just trying to do is regulate a world in which human beings are then autonomous to pursue the good life, but they actually are trying to, as Xi Jinping's speech to writers says, to engineer human minds, to improve the quality of the human being on the basis of a preexisting set of moral precepts. And so what, you know, it's really, I feel like I have to dig into the depths of political theory here because we really can't begin to understand sometimes how different Chinese political tradition is from ours if we don't go really into the foundations on which it's built. It's pretty much a sort of, Windows versus Mac sort of incompatibility.

That's amazing. I think that's a fantastic explanation because I see it show up in the education system, I think, in China, where there's this belief in self-improvement and one can really, really improve through hard work versus in the West where it's, well, you're either a creative genius, you've either got it or you haven't. And it's kind of like, why bother to self-improve? One can't improve on something that one has innately. Or doesn't have innately. And so I can see exactly how it sort of reflects or echoes in lots of different areas. But I think that's a brilliant explanation. It helps our understanding about the very notion of autonomy and what I mean when I kind of put that to you. Josh, I'm sure you've got lots to add to that.

On the ground in China, what I think is really interesting about what Rujia said is it is true the Communist Party has always had this notion of cultivating better human beings at its heart, and it's always had a sort of moral as well as political authority. But for a long time, it sort of deemphasized the moral side of its authority because it was prioritizing economic growth. And so for, I think, probably for at least 25 years, including a lot of the time that I was there when I was younger, the Communist Party, you know, it paid lip service to proper behavior, right? It railed against spiritual pollution from the West. And it sort of gestured at that, at its sort of moral aims for the Chinese people, but it didn't really put a lot of effort into it as much, right? There was this, you know, you hear a lot of people talk about the the sort of social contract that existed for many years in China. And social contract might not be exactly the best way to put it since people have to— for a contract to be actually legitimate, you have to enter into it voluntarily. But there was a sort of tacit agreement between the Communist Party and Chinese people for many years, which is that the Communist Party will deliver historic rapid economic growth and increased quality of life and Chinese people, and will sort of leave Chinese people to live their lives as long as they don't challenge the Communist Party politically. And what's happened with Xi Jinping, in particular in the last 5 or 6 years, has been a reversal of that. The Communist Party has reinserted itself into the lives of individual Chinese people, in a way that we just haven't seen in many, many years. And it now has technology that allows it to do that much more efficiently. You know, in the past, it would sort of rely on kind of armies of underemployed grannies to sort of go around neighborhoods and keep an eye on people and harangue them if they were behaving badly. But now it has facial recognition cameras, right? It has the ability to suck in data from your smartphone and could really involve itself in individual choices in a granular level that it's never been able to do before. And I think so you now have this, you're going to start to see this sort of Mac and Windows contrast really start to come to the fore in some interesting ways. I think.

There is another element of this, uh, which John has sort of hinted at, but I think deserves unpacking at greater length, and that is sort of that self-spiraling nature of what then technology does. And, um, there's a really good book just out by my friend Mara Dykstra at Harvard University Press. It's called Uncertainty in the Empire of Routine, and this is about the 17th century Qing state, which has established itself and it's actually fairly competent. And so it starts asking local officials for more and more information. And lo and behold, what that information reveals is actually that there are all of these abuses and cases of corruption. And then the central government sort of starts issuing all kinds of orders, including orders for more information. And lo and behold, you know, that, The more information reaches the center, the more information there is about all of these abuses which were going on anyway, but they simply weren't visible, which then leads to a sense of malaise, a sense of declinism, and it ends up being a political crisis, right? It's the sort of the self-defeating impact of when a government is successful at surveilling essentially, at seeing more of the society, the polity that it controls. And I'm wondering to what extent there's something similar going on here where, with the proliferation of social media— and Josh, you were there when that all happened in the early 2010s, you know, people started having smartphones and suddenly there was this wave of scandals and very often moral scandals that emerged on social media because of images that had been captured in very many cases with smartphones as well. In some cases that was about official corruption, but in some cases it was also, you know, one of the most tragic cases one of the cases was a toddler that was run over by a truck and then the truck ran away without doing anything. And that really leads to a sort of moral crisis. And then you get sort of call and response where, you know, there is this sort of whole thing of, "Oh my God, look at the horrible society that we are." That is picked up by propaganda authorities as, you know, a way of, putting themselves more in the spotlight, but then you have to do moral education, right? So, so it start— so there is a sort of mutually reinforcing effect of the expansion of technology, greater visibility of society, moral crisis, and then that vast expansion of a system that tries to really, um, eliminate or prevent that sort of immorality. But that will obviously then lead to the enormous in-depth levels of surveillance that Josh and his co-author have so competently described in their book.

So as we wrap up then, I wonder if the final question is— how can I put this? I was talking to Hans-Georg Müller, who'd written the book You and Your Profile, and one of his theories is that it's the end of authenticity and that in a in this new era we have entered the age of profilicity, where obviously we are profiled unendingly, relentlessly, one might say, through technology, not just on social media, but all kinds of technology that both of you work with and will talk about a lot. And that actually it's sort of reminiscent of sincerity culture and the idea of playing roles in society. And perhaps we might think of it in the is code shifting. But I thought it was, it's an incredibly interesting theory and it made me wonder whether or not we do end up in a bifurcated world to go back to the geopolitical context, but there is some decoupling, you know, and we've covered it a little bit, whose population, East or West, is kind of better equipped for being a flourishing being, or having a population of flourishing human beings in the face of this kind of technology, given that, you know, it might be the end of authenticity and perhaps the beginning of profilicity?

Well, if I can be a little bit controversial, I think this is actually a sort of, we need to be in the middle sort of thing. What I think that in the West, you know, in the 2000s, 2010s, we had this sort of techno-optimist narrative where digital technology was an unquestioned good thing and everything that technology touched would turn into gold and it would bring democracy to the darkest parts of the world and it would create all of these new and beautiful forms of doing businesses and it would connect all of us and, you know, we end up where we end up where in the United Kingdom Meta has been found in a coroner's report to have contributed to the suicide of a 14-year-old 'Go.' Right? This is now part of a legal record. I'm not quite sure if that's the reputation you want to have. China never had this illusion of techno-optimism. It always was quite optimistic about what technology could do, but at the same time, sort of quite vigilant in the sense of these things can come with harms. And partially, that is obviously informed by the fact that This is an authoritarian state in which, you know, the notion that individuals should live their lives as they see fit isn't a fundamental assumption. But I do think that there also was a fairly healthy lack of naïveté about the intentions of what are, in the end, you know, profit-pursuing businesses. And so, for instance, One of the things that the Chinese government has done is very strictly limiting the amount of online gaming hours that under-18s can play. And obviously we would see that as very paternalistic within our legal system, but whenever I talk to people individually about that, particularly if they're parents of teenage kids, they think it's the best idea ever. Or more broadly, And I'm not saying that I have the answer here, but we have a phenomenal problem with online anonymity, right? If we talk about authenticity, we very often don't know whether or not the person posting, for instance, politically salient information on Facebook or Twitter is actually a real person. In China, in the same way that we all need a unique identifier, a unique encoded identifier on the back of our cars, which we call a license plate, to be able to enable the police, for instance, to connect the car to the person owning it or driving it. For instance, when they run through a red traffic light. The Chinese government has said you simply cannot have an online account-based service provided to you if the service provider doesn't know who they are providing it to. So it's sort of like a know-your-customer rule And I'm thinking there is actually some sense to that. And we're now at the point where we go, oh, we cannot do that because the Chinese government is doing it. You know, isn't that the way— there is— you could take this too far that, you know, you could— that would be like saying we're not going to have traffic lights in our town because there are traffic lights in Beijing and China is an authoritarian dictatorship that tries to tell drivers when to stop and when to go. So, obviously, but my point is we can have a very long discussion about what we think about the way that the Chinese government has responded to those questions. I certainly have my own thoughts on that. But the fact that they asked the questions led them to being far less naive about what the deatification of society would entail. Which means that in very many cases also when you look at it from the international perspective, they're first movers. What we haven't talked about is the Data Security Law, which is a law that intends to protect not individuals against harms to themselves, but national security, the public interest, the collective good, however you want to call it, from harms arising from any kind of data. Now, this is a question that governments around the world are dealing with., and China is the first mover. And maybe it will be an example of how not to do things, but an example it will be.

Yeah, that's a, that's a, uh, a really good point about China being a first mover. The other way that they are a, a first mover that is really fascinating is in, is in their attempts to regulate algorithms. Um, they've now, the, the, the Cyberspace Administration of China, uh, uh, passed a rule, uh, basically demanding that any essentially any internet company, any company that uses algorithms, hand over those algorithms to regulators to be examined. And this is a really fascinating effort, right? Because clearly China is— there are a lot of governments around the world that are very, very worried, and legitimately so, about the influence of algorithmic systems on everything from politics to education. And but none of them have gone up, gotten to the point of actually trying to directly regulate them. And there are, there are real questions about whether China can actually do it. I mean, you know, the thing about algorithmic systems, what makes them so frightening is that even their own creators don't know exactly how they work. Right. They're black boxes ultimately. And so there's— I think there are real questions about whether a bunch of bureaucrats can do an even better job than engineers in trying to figure figure out how these things work and control them. But China is, it is out front. It is blazing new trails in sort of confronting technology and trying to harness it for state power.

If I might add to that, in Europe, we're also moving in the direction of algorithmic governance. That's part of the digital markets and services package that is now working its way through the Brussels sausage-making machine. But you say something very interesting there because at least in Europe and certainly in China, in the US not quite yet, we've sort of broken through this narrative that you can't regulate the digital realm and you shouldn't regulate the digital realm. You know, there's a process going on that I call the great normalization where as big tech, it has lost in very many ways its shine, its glamour. We are increasingly dealing with them as if they're normal companies. So Uber, for instance, because Uber happens to be a tech firm, it's been sort of getting out of treating its de facto employees as not employees, and that is all changing now. What we see with algorithms is we have actually many regulatory techniques to deal with harm, and because of the fact that we had sort of put Big Tech in this special box where they were immune from the normal laws of gravity of state functioning. We simply haven't applied them. But there are big questions here. I mean, we don't even begin to fathom how big the challenge we may be facing is. For instance, take TikTok. The worst-case scenario is if Beijing actually has something to say about TikTok. TikTok is essentially a million monkeys with a million typewriters, right? Every imaginable form of content can be generated on TikTok. So what if Beijing goes to the ByteDance HQ and says, in this country, we want you to influence the algorithm in such a way that you prioritize content that is closer in line with what we want in this election or what we want in this very important policy debate. It would be completely invisible. It would not require any content generation on the Chinese government side, right? It's not wolf warrior diplomacy. It's simply tweaking the buttons a little bit. You're not in any way dealing with anyone's freedom of speech. But you are drastically altering the availability of media content. And we have no way of identifying this, let alone dealing with this. Now, if I make a foodstuff, I don't have to put the actual recipe on the packaging, but I do have to put in the ingredients. And, you know, these are questions, you know, I agree with Josh that it's incredibly complicated for bureaucrats to evaluate algorithms, but to at least sort of know what goes into them is a first step. And that is what China is doing, but it's also what Europe is doing. And it's an area where I see discussions starting with the US, but I see also a very significant degree of reticence of actually going there.

Well, I know I have to draw us to a close. I could talk to you, Tu, for absolutely ages. I feel like it's just the tip of the iceberg, but we've had quite an in-depth lesson. It's been, well, an education. Can't thank you enough for spending so much time with me here today. I wonder, given that there is so much more we could explore, for people who do want to, Where else should they go to find out a bit more of your work or any other recommendations? I mean, both of you have got kind of book recommendations there. I'm sure people want to know other references and recommendations. Where should they go to find out more?

Well, I'll jump up and say on Roger's behalf that you should go to DigiChina because it is an amazing— it's an amazing resource that I use all of the time to try to figure out what's going on in China in tech and regulation and staying on top of it. So I heartily recommend that. I also, of course, I would encourage people to visit the website of the Wall Street Journal, which I do think these days does genuinely have the best and most comprehensive coverage of China, at least in English. And those are, yeah, those are mine.

Well, and obviously Josh has got a new book out, which is very much worth your time. Certainly in my case, I'm writing a book, but we all know what it means when an academic says that, you know, trying to finish it. But more broadly, I think both Josh and myself have Twitter accounts where we try and share an update as much as we can about this area, which is in continuous flux. This is part of the problem with writing the book. It's sort of like trying to shoot a particularly hyperactive Duracell bunny for your dinner and you just wanted to sit still for a moment. But, no, our Twitter accounts are very good. But more broadly, what we see is that there are so many good sources. There is the China Project, which used to be SupChina, which does a lot of very good thing about tech. There is the Wire China, which publishes regularly about it. And it just sort of blossoms out from there.

That's brilliant. Thank you, gentlemen. That was so enjoyable. You know, it was not nearly as dystopian as I thought it was going to be. Thank you so much, both of you.

Thank you.

Pleasure was all mine.

Thank you for listening to The Future Review. Future of You podcast hosted by me, Tracey Follows. Do like and subscribe wherever you listen to podcasts to make sure you don't miss a single episode. And if you know someone you think will enjoy this episode, please do share it with them. Also visit thefutureofyou.co.uk for more on the future of identity in a digital world and visit futuremade.consulting for the future of everything else. The Future of You podcast is edited by Big Tent Media and produced by Emily Crosby Media.