Iran After Khamenei: Vali Nasr on the New Supreme Leader and Tehran's War Strategy

Hi, my name is André Gonawela. Welcome back to the Burn Bag Podcast. The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran continues to escalate, and today on Thursday, we saw a major signal from Iran's new leadership. In his first public remarks since becoming Supreme Leader on March 9th, Mojtaba Khamenei declared that the Strait of Hormuz should remain closed as a tool to pressure the United States and its allies, while warning that the US military bases across the Middle East could face further attacks. The statement comes as shipping through the strait has largely halted, oil prices are surging, and Iranian attacks on tankers and regional targets are intensifying. This is also the first clear window into how Iran's leadership may approach the conflict following the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in US-Israeli strikes late last month. With a new Supreme Leader in place and the country at war, the question now is just not, just not what Iran will do next, but how power actually functions inside the Islamic Republic and how leadership decisions are made in a moment like this. To help unpack all of this, I'm joined by Vali Nasr, a professor of Middle East Studies and International Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Professor Nasr is one of the leading scholars of Iranian politics and Shia leadership structures, the author of several books, including Iran's Grand Strategy, and previously served as a senior advisor in the State Department. He has spent decades studying Iran's political system and advising US policymakers on the region. Professor, thanks for joining me here today.

Good to be with you. Thank you.

So I want to talk a little bit first about who Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was and what his role and his worldview was. So the Ayatollah ruled Iran for more than 3 decades with his assassination marking one of the most consequential sort of flashpoints in Iran's history, at least in the last few decades. How should we understand who the Ayatollah was, what his ideology was, and how he actually wielded power?

So Ayatollah Khamenei was the second leader of the Islamic Republic, but in a way, he also was the third longest serving ruler of Iran since the mid-19th century. So his imprint is quite important. And in fact, the Islamic Republic that we see today was very much shaped by him. Of course, it came out of the Islamic Revolution. It was built on the original ideology of the revolution. But state structures, the economy, and particularly Iran's foreign policy over the past 3 decades very much show his imprint. He was a follower of the revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini, but he had very firm views of his own, which is captured in this idea of resistance. In other words, in a way, his mindset was very anti-imperialist in the manner that we understood it in the 1960s and '70s in the West and in the Third World. He was very well read in the literature of anti-imperialism. He viewed the United States as an imperialist power that wanted to deny Iran its sovereignty, that it had done so after the coup of 1953, helping the Shah to come back to power. And he believed that the Islamic Republic's job was to deny the United States that domination of Iran. And so he organized the state, the society, the economy around this battle against the United States. So his view of anti-Americanism was not just ideological because we don't like their culture or because they are un-Islamic. This was very much a political battle against the United States so that in his mind, the Islamic Republic could preserve Iran's independence. And the way he saw it, that Iran should go through whatever sacrifice is necessary, accept any degree of sanctions, confrontation with the United States in order to achieve that goal. And so what we see in Iran today, the tensions domestically, the economic ruin of the country under sanctions, as well as the way it flexes its muscle with proxies, with missiles, the war against Israel, the war with the United States, they're all outcome of the political worldview that he had.

And was that political worldview, I mean, you talked a lot about who he was as an individual, a lot about what he read, how he thought. Was he an ideological successor to his predecessor, the Ayatollah Khomeini, who came to power in 1979, or was he fundamentally different in how we thought? Like, was it sort of a clean line or was there a divergence?

No, there is a clean line. But I think Khamenei, although he adhered to the same original ideology of the revolution, he honed these geostrategic implications of that ideology much more. And he operationalized it in the Islamic Republic in his own person. So yes, he believed in the Islamic ideology. He believed in the message of Khomeini, which also was anti-American and sought to bring independence to Iran. But I think Khomeini was much more thinking about these issues in practical terms, in geopolitical practical terms, as opposed to writing extensively about these things and, you know, writing books about Islamic ideology, Islamic thinking. So he was more of a statesman than an ideologue. And if I were if we would, let's say, compare him to the Iranian Revolution, to the Russian Revolution, he was less the Lenin and more the Brezhnev or more the Stalin of Iran. So, and you could say this is also in the process of how revolutions gradually go from ideology to become crystallized in forms of state behavior. So that shift from the first generation of revolution, which was driven by ideas, to it translating into policy and state behavior happened under Khamenei.

Gotcha. So, I mean, when we're talking about, you know, that practical political power, I mean, I think for the general public, when they think about the Supreme Leader, they often think of him as wielding near-absolute authority. But in practice, I mean, how did Khamenei govern and sort of maintain control over Iran's political system?

Well, Iran has a system based on its constitution that makes the office that Khamenei held as a Supreme Leader is an office that's not electable or accountable to the constitution. It was once somebody has been elected to that office, then there's no more elections. And he's in that position for life or for as long as he wants. And he's not accountable to the constitution. So he has, in a way, he sits above the state as a whole. And Khamenei obviously was the final arbiter of all decisions in Iran, but he delegated a lot of authority in terms of operational practice of the state to various nodes of power. So under Iranian constitution, Iran has a president who really is in charge of the administrative dimensions of power, runs the government, the ministries of health, education, foreign affairs, is in charge of governing the country. Then there are Iran's military and security forces, which report directly to the Supreme Leader, not to the president. You have a judiciary that is again independent from the presidency or the executive branch of the government and reports to the Supreme Leader. There are large numbers of institutions, foundations, that control large areas of the economy that are also outside of government control and respond to the Supreme Leader. And so Khamenei essentially set the course for the way Iran was going to behave and act, especially on foreign policy issues. And he kept the system focused on the fact that it was in this resistance against the United States. And whatever it needed to do to sustain that resistance, ideological vigilance, building missiles, supporting proxies, organizing the economy to deal with sanctions, all of these, ultimately, he gave the direction for people who were beneath him to actually implement and operationalize. And then because he was there for such a long time, there's a whole generation of leadership in Iran that is in place today, that largely came up through the system based on what he laid out should be the direction of the country. So he not only shaped the institutions, he also shaped and picked and elevated the people who were willing to subscribe to what he was laying out and were willing to implement it.

Professor, could you sort of speak to the religious ideas, the religious legitimacy that is rooted in the office of Supreme Leader? Like, how much were Khamenei's religious credentials important to maintaining authority? And where did those credentials come from? Like, what is the religious ideology around the Supreme Leader?

Well, originally, when the revolution happened, the person who led the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, was a very eminent cleric. If you were to sort of put it in Catholicism sense, you would say he was a very senior cardinal, very respected in that sense. So at that point, there were maybe 4 or 5 people, senior ayatollahs of that rank, and Khomeini was one of them. And Khomeini conceived of the, of that office as being both religiously and politically the most eminent person, kind of like Caesar and Pope at the same time. But when he died, essentially that office was no longer replicable. There was not a candidate like him because the most eminent ayatollahs of the time were not involved in politics and were not part of the Islamic Republic that he had created. They were outside. And all the clerics like Ayatollah Khamenei who succeeded him were better known for their political activity and less known for their religious scholarship or religious following. So in effect, when Khamenei became Khomeini's successor, he really was not of the same stature. He was a mid-ranking cleric. Who was better known for the years he spent in prison and political activism and revolutionary activism, but had no publications or record or following as an eminent cleric. Over time, it is the office that makes him into a senior religious cleric. And so this transition between the first leader of the revolution and the second one is that the charisma and legitimacy increasingly effectively moves from the person of the leader to the office. So even now that we see Khamenei's son has succeeded him, he also is not a senior cleric, but once he steps into that role, he will assume that. In fact, the term Supreme Leader, which is a secular term, it's not a religious term. Was adopted as a way of referring to the leader of Iran after Khomeini became leader. Under Khomeini, they referred to him as Imam Khomeini, and they referred to him as the Vali-e-Faqih, or the person who occupies the office of Vali-e-Faqih, which means that he's the most supreme religious jurist. Khomeini didn't use that. His title increasingly became a secular title, which means that he's the most eminent leader leader of the country, not the most eminent religious figure in the country. And this subtle shift suggests that over time, the Islamic Republic invested the charisma that Khomeini had envisioned for the clerical leadership in Iran in the office rather than in the person.

So I want to sort of talk about, I mean, what types of groups are powerful in Iran. Like you talked about the clerics, we also have the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the IRGC. For short. What is the balance of power between those two groups? I mean, like, and did Khamenei, did he favor one group or the other, or was he maintaining a balance between, you know, clerical authority and the military's power?

Well, clerical authority in Iran technically is of two kinds. There is religious clerical authority, and there are eminent clerics who sit in the city of Qom, which is Iran's religious center, just like they sit in Najaf in Iraq. And they basically are training students, answering the requests and questions that the faithful have. They are functioning as eminent religious leaders. And then you have clerical authority of bureaucrats and statesmen who happen to be turbaned. Who went to seminary, but they really didn't follow religious functions and they went into government. In Iran, you have ministers of intelligence, you know, Iran's top spy chiefs in IRGC as well as in the government who have turbans on their head, who went to seminary but also did secular education. And they haven't spent a day of their career in religious activity. They haven't trained students. They're not clerics. They're essentially bureaucrats, statesmen, government functionaries. So that's one form of clerical authority. Or let's say the judges in Iran's judiciary, they're like American judges. Their job from the morning till evening is to render verdicts on anything from divorce to commercial dispute to murder. To constitutional issues, but they're not actually involved in religious activity of the kind that we associate with, with those who are sitting in Qom or Najaf. You know, they're not functioning religious leaders. IRGC was born as an institution after the revolution through Iran-Iraq War, and it is simultaneously Iran's most prominent military arm. But also is integrated into the fabric of the Islamic Republic as its main, as one of its main pillars. It has become more and more powerful the more Iran has been at war, not only live war as today with the United States, but also hide-and-seek war, shadow war, proxy war in Lebanon, in Syria, etc. So over time it has become Bigger, more powerful, controls vast areas of the economy, has a lot of same politics. But where it's different from militaries in Latin America or in Egypt or in Pakistan or in Myanmar is that the IRGC does not see itself as separate from the civilian leadership of the country. It does not see itself disdainful of the civilian constitution. To the contrary, IRGC is part of the fabric of the Islamic Republic. It's its defender and it's very close to the political establishment. When Khamenei Senior was there, I believe that he saw himself less as a cleric and more as the commander-in-chief of IRGC and Iran's military and security IRGC forces. And his son, who has now become leader, was actually, before he went to seminary and got a religious education to put a turban on his head, actually was an IRGC fighter during Iran-Iraq War. So he's a veteran of the IRGC. And for the past 2, 3 decades, while sitting at the side of his father, he has been deeply involved in management of IRGC. Of his promotions, of his policies, of his strategy. So I would say that Iran in many ways is under the thumb of IRGC, but not in the way that we think about it as an institution onto its own, which is at war or in competition with civilian authority. It is a partner in state. That's the better way of thinking about it.

So it's almost like I mean, please correct me if I'm wrong, but it's almost like the Ayatollah's personal military. Is that a way to think about it?

No, it is, it is, it is because the Ayatollah himself is also not separate from the structure there.

Okay.

It is more like the US military. In other words, you cannot think of the US military like you would think of the Pakistan military, as if the Pakistan military is sitting outside of the civilian structure. Has disdain for civilian leadership, has complete lack of respect for constitution of the country, and basically steps in anytime it wants and shunts away civilians and the constitution. So the IRGC is, you know, if you were to say, what are the pillars of authority in Iran today? You say it's the clerics, it's the civilian state, It's the IRGC. And these constitute, if you would, together they sustain a system at the top of which sits the Supreme Leader. So for the Supreme Leader, the entirety of the state essentially reports to him, and IRGC is a part of it. So yes, there may be a shift in the balance of power between the Iranian presidency and the executive branch of the government. The judiciary and IRGC, but that's all still within, underneath the rubric of the overall structure of the Islamic Republic.

Gotcha. So you mentioned the new Ayatollah Mojtaba. There are a lot of rumors obviously about the state of his health. I've seen rumors about whether he sustained severe injuries or relatively minor injuries. The statement that I believe we saw today on Thursday was a written statement. You mentioned his background in the military service, but what should we know about him beyond that? Is he also sort of a linear successor to his father? What are his sort of political alliances like? Is he sort of different religiously? I mean, he's also coming into power having lost several significant family members of his own, which, I mean, if he is conscious, would certainly shade his view for how to carry out this war. Who is he?

Well, interestingly, we know very little about him because there are people who met him, but he held a very, very low public profile. No public speeches, no public meetings in the past 20, 30 years. He periodically may have been seen in public, but very little is known about him. It's mostly his fingerprint. That were evident, which is, you know, he was involved in the management of IRGC, ultimately sitting next to his father. You could assume that what policies that his father adopted were very close to where he is. I would say that it's not so much how close he is to his father, religiously, because I don't think Mojtaba's most important characteristic is his religious views. It's rather how close was he to his father strategically and politically. And I think in terms of what I described of Khamenei Senior's worldview towards America, this incessant resistance, I think Mojtaba is very much there. He might be even more aggressive than his father in implementing it, especially now. But it's not as if he's a person who would come in and say, I believe it's time that we made friends with the United States and change the direction of the country completely. In fact, he was chosen largely as a candidate of continuity rather than as a candidate of change. And I think had there not been war, possibly that he might not have been chosen as Supreme Leader. So it very much reflects the exigency of the moment that IRGC and other statesmen believe that they need somebody to continue the fight. Now, we don't know how injured he was. Obviously, when you look at the fact that his father, his sister, his wife, his son, his nephews, they all were killed in that attack. Unless he was in a bunker or somewhere else, it's miraculous that he survived. It is difficult to think that the Council of Experts would've chosen a leader who might imminently die or who would be dysfunctional because that actually would not serve the benefit of the country, which is to have somebody quickly step into the breach and keep things together and move Iran forward through the war and after. You know, looking at the political alliances, I mean, people who clearly he appointed and were closest to him does not give one a sense of comfort. I mean, the intelligence officials, the military officials that have been closest to him in Revolutionary Guard and its intelligence tended to have been the much more hardline uncompromising kind of people, the greater risk-takers, the ones who wanted to take the fight to the United States at a level that went beyond even what Khamenei Senior was prepared to do. And then, you know, what is the impact of the loss and what he suffered in this moment on his decision-making is not known. I mean, we can guess. That whether he comes out of this more vengeful or whether the personal loss gives him different lessons, I don't know. We will have to see what happens. But I don't think we're going to see major change in posture until the war is over. I did not expect him to come and his first statement be a deviation from what Iran is doing right now. You know, there is a war plan that his father had put in play that Mojtaba was privy to and was part of. That war plan is operating, and he didn't become Supreme Leader to stop, change, or move that in a different direction, especially because actually the war plan is working in Iran's favor. It's putting a lot of pressure economically on the US. This is exactly what they wanted to do from the get-go. So I think if this war finishes and there is an Islamic Republic afterwards to then, you know, pick up the pieces and go forward, that's I think when we will begin to see his fingerprints.

That makes sense. And I mean, you know, in the days after his father had been killed up to now, you know, we hear this statement and obviously again, questions lingering about his state of being with the injuries and so on. I'm sort of curious about your take, right? Like about like who is actually sort of driving this strategic decision-making in the country right now? Are we looking more closely at it being the IRGC or the president or some other entities, right? About who is making the decisions for how to wage the war. I had seen an interview with the foreign minister where I think the American news media had pressed the foreign minister on why are certain attacks taking place the way they are. And please correct me if I'm wrong, but he had sort of implied that the military sort given sort of generic guidelines and they're sort of carrying these attacks out on their own. So I was sort of curious, like, I mean, who is sort of driving decision-making, let's say, in the absence of clear guidance from the Ayatollah?

Well, even if Khamenei was alive, he wouldn't be making individual decisions like hit this base or hit that port in Oman. I mean, that was not even at the peacetime. He didn't govern like that. I mean, the major decisions as to whether we actually sign a nuclear deal or not, or do we talk, make peace with Saudi Arabia or not, would go to him, and ultimately he would make a decision. But even there, he had this style of creating consensus first and then putting his finger on something. So he would have debates go on in the National Security Council, back and forth, and then in the end, he would make a decision. I think the way Iran organized itself for surviving decapitation, especially after his experience in June War, was that to make continuous decision-making at the top not necessary. So there is war planning and there is broad, if you would, objectives, both on the civilian side and the military side that's decided upon, and commanders in their bunkers, et cetera, know what they need to do. So they are operationally responsible, and if they're killed, their successor would know what to do. So it is less by micromanaging that Iran has survived this war, but is rather by delegating operational authority very broadly under the, I think, the rubric of an overall war plan. So the overall war plan is to bring the Gulf economies to their knees. Now you may, then basically they know they have these drones and these set of targets and these set of missiles and mines and ships, et cetera. And they have a general plan about how they're going to deploy them. And I think the various commanders are making those decisions on an ongoing basis. And if it comes Further up for decision-making, there's a higher level in IRGC that is in, that will manage the war planning, colonel level, let's say brigadier level. And then depending on who's been eliminated, who's there. And then at the level of the country as a whole, there is a, I would say a, what I would call a deep state, which is a web of senior statesmen like Ali Larijani, Iran's National Security Advisor or the Iranian president, as well as IRGC commanders that would make those broader decisions. Let's say if it comes to the point where Iran can accept or refuse a ceasefire or can or has to accept a surrender or something major comes, I think at that level, then this sort of a much more senior layer would make the decision. And when and if Mojtaba is then at the helm, I think obviously the final decision would go to him. But Iran deliberately is following a kind of decision-making and management to nullify the effect of decapitation.

Can you tell us a little bit more about two of those individuals you mentioned, the president of Iran right now, and then of course Ali Larijani, who we've been hearing more about, at least the general public has been hearing a little bit more about him in the recent days.

So Iran's president was elected, he was just a few years ago, he was a more moderate reformist member of the parliament before that. But ultimately his mandate is management of the day-to-day affairs of the country, provision of water, food, running the different ministries, governorships in Iran. Foreign policy and warmaking are not in his hands, particularly because he, under the constitution, he does not oversee the security forces. So IRGC and the military don't report to the president. They report to the Supreme Leader. And in the absence of the Supreme Leader, there was a committee of three that was put in place to basically fulfill the functions of the Supreme Leader. And in that committee, the president also served. But effectively, he's not part of the war planning and war decision-making. The office of the Security Council in Iran, you know, Iran's national security adviser, Ali Larijani, is more important for two reasons. One is that Larijani personally is a much more experienced statesman than the president. He was speaker of the parliament. He himself was National Security Advisor. He's been on the scene for a very long time. He has much more powerful networks of influence and contacts in the system than the president. And secondly, his office, Office of the National Security Advisor, ultimately deals with national security, which means that it's the web through which the different branches of Iranian state coordinate around security issues. Now, after Khamenei was killed, Larijani became obviously much more prominent in terms of managing the Iranian state until it basically settled on a new national security, on a new Supreme Leader. Mojtaba in time may decide a different, may resolve on a different national security advisor. But the Iranian president, the Larijani, as well as a few other civilian leaders, the Chief of the Judiciary and the Speaker of the Parliament, are right now the most important civilian leaders in this configuration.

So while we've been talking quite a bit about Mojtaba and when he will lay his fingerprints on all of this and so on, I mean, he's also target number one, at least I believe individuals within the Israeli government and security establishment have said they want to get him. I mean, if something were to happen to him, I mean, who are some of the other individuals who could realistically emerge as Supreme Leader?

Well, every time there'd be a new vote. But from what I've heard, that this time the Council of Experts already probably has resolved on more than one candidate. So if Mojtaba was killed, I think they could go to a next candidate, although that's not a given they would go to him depends on where Iran is at that point in time. But I think the entire Iranian system right now is built on preparedness for elimination. So every civilian leader, every military leader has been told to appoint up to 4 people below them. And when they are killed, the next person also will still have to appoint one other person, which goes below that. And so this is a way in which they've created resilience. Presidency. So I think the idea was to elect Mojtaba as the Supreme Leader now. But if it comes to a situation where he's eliminated, I think they would go to appoint a next person.

That makes sense. And I mean, there's another individual I wanna ask you about actually, because I mean, his name has been sort of vocalized in some of these protests and of course within some of the Western circles, Erezeh Pahlavi. I mean, how do you think he is perceived within Iran, within the Iranian population? I mean, obviously, I mean, there are a lot of questions around like regime change. I mean, President Trump has, you know, put those questions forward. Whether or not it's actually likely is another question. But I mean, people have been looking at him as sort of like this individual in the opposition. What's the general consensus?

Well, most recently, we don't, We don't know because it's very difficult to know what is the political situation inside Iran. But the reality is that inside Iran, there is no alternative to the Islamic Republic. There is no political organization, political party, political movement that could lead any kind of political dissent and political anger, of which there is plenty in Iran. I mean, maybe it won't manifest itself in wartime, but it could manifest itself in peacetime. But it doesn't exist on the ground. The exile forces, like the one you mentioned, ultimately have not shown a pathway to how they would assume authority and power in Iran. Popularity by itself, first of all, it could fluctuate. I do believe that, you know, there is now much more division in Iran in terms of what has happened and what are the consequences, etc., than than we saw, for instance, before the war when there was massive protests in Iran. And it's true that most Iranians want something completely different. They want something other than the Islamic Republic. But there has to be a very credible path to power. I mean, ultimately Israel and the United States is showing at least some of the exile political organizations the path to power, which is we're going to destroy the Islamic Republic by air war. And then the people of Iran can take over. But this is still missing a link here. Now, under what political movement, through what process are they going to take over? I mean, mob rule is not the same thing as regime change. That actually is a recipe for collapse, if you were to say. And so, I mean, the regime changes that we have seen in recent years in Iraq or in Afghanistan, or even in Iran itself in 1941, when the monarch then was removed from his throne, have always been when the foreign troops arrived in the capital city with tanks, and then they could dictate regime change. President Trump does not seem to be amenable to that. I mean, in Venezuela, he shied away from regime change. And settled on regime transition. He seems to be saying the same thing about Iran. I want somebody from inside, somebody who knows the system. So, you know, that complicates the entry point for, for exile forces, forces outside Iran. If the United States is not going to have troops on the ground in Tehran to, to force regime change and install them in power, or that there is not a political organization that actually can facilitate regime change. You know, it remains to be seen how the exile forces actually in a concrete way can actually assume power and create a whole new state if and when the Islamic Republic were to collapse.

So, I mean, as you're also watching this war go on, as we're seeing so many of these strikes being exchanged and so on, I mean, and this may be a dumb question, but does the current Iranian government truly believe that this is existential for the Islamic regime, especially based on whether or not President Trump would actually have the appetite to put boots on the ground, for example? And do you believe that we're going to see a wider escalation of the war should things maintain, go on as we are seeing right now? Because as you said earlier, right, like the strategy is to impose costs on a lot of the Gulf economies and the Gulf countries and so on. But I'd love for your thoughts on that.

No, definitely. I think it's an existential moment for the Islamic Republic, but the people in the Islamic Republic do not distinguish between regime and country. They don't see it that way. In other words, for them, it's an existential moment for the country as well, because if Israel is determined to destroy Iran's infrastructure, bring down the state, the state is a little bit different from the government that is managing it. Or when President Trump talks about arming separatist forces to break away from Iran or says in an interview that maybe at the end of the war, Iran's border will change, then that's not just existential threat to the regime, it's existential threat to the country. And so that's very much pervasive there. At least there are Iranians maybe that believe that the regime could fall and something better could come out of the war. Definitely Iranians who are opposed to the Islamic Republic hope that now that the country is paying this cost, that at the end of it, it will not be an existential threat to the country, but existential threat to the regime. But I think in the eyes of Revolutionary Guards, in the eyes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic, this is a fight to the finish, not only to save them, but also to save the country. Because as I said, it is embedded in the thinking of the Islamic Republic that it has been there in order to protect Iran from American imperialism. So in the mind of Khamenei, in the mind of IRGC, in the mind of the people who run Iran, if the Islamic Republic were to fall, Iran would not become independent in their eyes. Iran will become a colony of the United States. That's the way they see it. So for them, yes, it is an existential fight because of this worldview.

So, Professor, my last question, you know, as we're looking ahead over the next few weeks, I mean, what signals should we be watching within Iran's political system that would actually tell us about, you know, the regime's stability and so on?

Well, I mean, first of all, we haven't seen any kind of a popular uprising so far. So that's something we have to watch for, particularly as Israel seeks to degrade the police security suppression capabilities of the state. We will see that. Secondly, you know, whether or not the pace of the bombing actually passes a tipping point with the Islamic Republic, you know, as it loses its ability to fight back or it begins to lose its coherence and that you begin to see loss of control in parts of the country, loss of control in decision. So those are things to watch out for. Watch for. The other side of it, whether we see gradually the pressure that Iran is putting on oil market, oil prices, the Gulf economies begin to also have an impact on US's will and willingness to continue the fight. So this war is not about who's stronger, because off the bat we could say, The United States and Israel are obviously far stronger in sheer firepower and technological capability and ability to inflict pain on any adversary, Iran included. It is rather a test of stamina. In other words, who can withstand pain? What are the relative thresholds and who is going to basically first blink, if you would? In those terms. And so that is something to also watch for.

Professor Nasser, thank you so much for joining me here today. I really appreciate your time, especially in this very pivotal moment for the region, for Iran. You are one of the top experts. I really appreciate your knowledge.

Thank you very much for having me. It was great to have this conversation with you.

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