Understanding Iran Under Attack: A Discussion with Author Vali Nasr

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Hello everyone, I'm Paul Sterbet and welcome to America and Beyond, The New Books Network. My guest today is Vali Nasr. He is the Majid Khadori Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. He's written many books, some having to do with Iran, including The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future. Also co-authored Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty, and last year, Iran's Grand Strategy: A Political History. He was born in Tehran in 1960 and then went to boarding school in England, I believe at the age of 16, and then to the United States after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. 9. Welcome to America and Beyond, Vali.

Thanks for inviting me. It's good to be with you.

And we want, of course, to draw on your knowledge and expertise, such as expressed in your book, which can help frame the current conflict which you're in. I believe it's day 11 now of this war. And why don't we start there? What, if anything, has surprised you about what you have seen so far?

I mean, the war was in many ways expected, and I think the Iranians themselves expected that the June ceasefire at the end of the 12-day war would be short-lived and that the war would resume. But what has surprised me actually is how quickly Iran adapted itself to the lessons it learned in that war and how quickly it prepared itself for the war that was coming. And in many ways, the way in which they have absorbed the hits that they have got and yet been able to surprise the United States by extending the battlefield away from where the US expected it, to energy markets, to Gulf countries, to attack US bases, in the manner that they have done has been a bit surprising. In other words, both the audacity and the preparation is what I didn't expect, that in a 6-month period they would be able to prepare this quickly.

You thought that they would be less resilient or more fragile or just slower to arrive at their decision-making?

Well, I think all of it. I think the decision-making was probably they concluded that war understanding that decapitation decapitation and trying to make the Islamic Republic dysfunctional by killing its leaders was part of the war strategy, that counting on a popular uprising was part of the war strategy, and that the US and Israel would be hitting Iran pretty hard to trying to knock it out very quickly out of the war. But so they understood that they have to build a, to reorganize themselves both at the military side and at the civilian side in a way that decapitation would not paralyze the system. So you had to do a whole reorganization of decision-making at multiple layers of the state to make that possible. Secondly, they had to rebuild their stocks of missiles and drones in order to be able to wage the kind of war that they are waging, but also prepare for electricity, food, varieties of things that ultimately would allow them to sustain themselves through a longer war. So, I mean, the goals were all there, but it seemed like that they were able to adapt very quickly in the 6 months and implement a lot of this. So when the Supreme Leader was killed, the war continued. That the US has hit them very hard, Israel has hit them very hard, but it hasn't been able to knock them out. And they are actually capable of waging the war at fronts of their choosing, which is attacking US bases, attacking energy infrastructure, threatening the closure of the Straits of Hormuz, and then also be able to sustain this at a level that would— it's beginning to deplete air defense systems. I think one lesson they learned from the 12-day war is that the question is not how much firepower Israel and the US have. They have enormous, unending firepower. But the question is how much defensive capability they have. And they realize that that's an Achilles heel. In other words, there are not as many interceptors, THAAD missiles, Patriot missiles to support a long-term campaign for either of them. And that's exactly what they're exploiting as we enter sort of this the first 10 days of the war are over and we're starting the next phase of the war, that they have been able to exploit that.

How do you think about the next phase of the war from, let's say, the perspective of the Iranian government?

So that, and this is the unknown, that maybe they will unveil more missile attacks now that the interceptors have been depleted. And that they would keep the barrage of drone attacks on the Gulf, which again, the US and the Gulf countries are now hard-pressed to defend against. So the US's only means now is to, and Israel's, is to hit Iran harder, more severe bombing, more sustained bombing, more terrifying bombing, hitting infrastructure, electricity, fuel, et cetera. But trying to basically force Iran to capitulate under their offensive pressure. But their ability to defend against what Iran is doing is not affected. And I think Iran's strategy is to raise oil prices, impact the global economy by casting a shadow on viability of not just oil and gas flow, but everything else that flows out of the Gulf and has bearing on many countries, like container traffic in and out of the Gulf matters a lot to India's economy. It matters a lot to a lot of other economies. And the US is not able to protect the Gulf, essentially. So the longer this goes on, yes, Iran gets pounded, but the US is unable to protect the global economy and inflation and gas prices at home or in Europe from the war. And that's essentially what Iran is exploiting.

Are you seeing any cracks or fissures at all? It was suggested, at least in the Western media, when the president made this comment about seeming to apologize for some of these wider attacks in the Gulf Arab countries, that that was quickly kind of pointed in a different direction from other elements in the government, in the regime, and perhaps too much was made of this as a crack or a fissure, or does it represent something more deep in terms of the perspective that elements in the Iranian government have about how to handle these attacks?

I think it was groping for straws in the West. I mean, when it suits us, we constantly say the Iranian president is irrelevant. And when it suits us, we say, no, no, he's very relevant. I mean, he said—

Which is it?

Which is it? Exactly. So now all of a sudden, he's a big power broker that broke with the overwhelming message. I mean, he did apologize, but the rest of it, he said that if we are attacked from those territories, we will retaliate. So he didn't say that we will not at all hit this and this was a mistake. And also there was interpretation was that his comments were more directed at Azerbaijan and Turkey than they were directed at the Arab countries. And then those who corrected him at the end said also that we're not targeting the Gulf countries. The Gulf countries are collateral damage. Because they are host to bases from where the United States is attacking us. And Iran's line so far is that it has not really attacked the Gulf countries in earnest. Most of what's fallen on Dubai and Abu Dhabi have been debris from interceptors and drones and missiles that have been hit, although that's not entirely true. But no, there is no evidence of real fissures in the war because you see, during the war, the war cabinet matters. War cabinet, now obviously the Supreme, Iran has this new Supreme Leader, so he would be part of it. It's national security advisors, it's the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards who are doing the war planning. The Iranian president is important, but he's actually really running, in charge of running the Iranian civilian side of the state, which is the administrative side of the state, right? So his role is important, but I don't see this as a sign of a crack. And I think actually, let me put it this way, I don't sense in reading Iran today, listening to what they're saying, reading between the lines, reading the tea leaves, that they feel that they're under a kind of pressure that actually would make them have a massive debate. They actually feel a little confident, overconfident to my liking.

Really?

That they think that they are executing their plan very well, that they expected they would be hit, but they have put pressures on the US in ways that they didn't expect, and that actually it's President Trump that's feeling pressure. It is the veering between outlandish threats that President Trump makes and then, you know, sort of saying the war is going to be 5 days, then 5 weeks, then I'm going to destroy them versus that. They see actually that that kind of a debate is happening in Washington more than it is happening in Tehran. They may be misreading it. I'm not saying they're correct, but actually I don't see that a situation in which there's a group of military leaders and senior security officials that they're saying, we need to debate this. I mean, yesterday the president tried to calm markets by saying, we've made all our gains and the war is almost complete. And the answer that he got immediately from Iran's Speaker of the Parliament is that, no, we're not accepting a ceasefire. But that doesn't sort of suggest to you that there is a crisis of confidence in terms of that their plans have gone awry? Yes.

I mean, we've been dealing with Iran, we in the West, the United States, you know, in a kind of intense way for many, many decades. And yet, what would you say is the thing that— important thing that we understand least about Iranian society and how things actually work there?

I mean, I think we— my belief, and I've written this in my latest book, Iran's Grand Strategy, I think this idea for a very long time that this is a deranged theocracy, its decision-making somehow comes from religious ideology, is misplaced. So this is a regime that, yes, it is Islamic in its language and its sort of self-identity, but it has a national security doctrine which it's problematic at many, many levels and has cost Iran enormously. But it's based on the assumption that the United States is a vital threat to Iran. And it's based on a history reading of Iran's history that the US staged a coup in Iran after 1953, Iran was basically a colony of the United States. And it's the Islamic Revolution that has freed Iran from the clutches of American imperialism. And the job of the Islamic Republic is to protect that independence that Iran gained in 1979. Now, you know, this, we might say, is an exaggerated reading of Iran's history. And this protection of Iran from America's clutches has been enormously costly to Iran. But it's not a religious argument. It is no different in a way of Putin thinking that America has plans to disenfranchise, you know, Russia of all of its power and influence and it's encroaching on Russia's territory. Russia had to invade. So countries other than Islamic countries or Islamic revolution can have outlandish nationalist national security conceptions, which then leads them down a road. So I think the US never got this. And secondly, this administration in particular, its reading of Iran is faulty. And I think it's partly because there is no real debate is happening before policy is made. So these assumptions that the Revolutionary Guards may fracture or break away is a reading of Iran's Revolutionary Guard as if it's a Latin American military.

Yes.

It's an understanding of militaries around the developing world where the militaries have disdain for the constitution and disdain for civilians. This Revolutionary Guard was born of the revolution. It actually sees itself as the defender of this constitution and the defender of the Islamic Republic.

Yes.

And it readily accepts the leadership of a supreme leader.

Yeah. Didn't it actually, this is in your book I was reading, that it kind of cut its teeth and forged its identity, the IRGC, in suppressing the Kurdish rebellion, the separatist uprising in Syria?

Separatist rebellion, as well as the Iran-Iraq War. And essentially it was born of the revolution. It's much more like the Red Army in China or the Red Army in Russia. It's not like the Egyptian military. Where a military could see itself as superior and separate from the civilian administration and has zero respect for the constitution, like we see in Pakistan.

Yes.

So, so this idea that if we bomb them, the Revolutionary Guards may separate or the Revolutionary Guards may fracture is actually a complete misreading. Or this idea that President Trump had and Prime Minister Netanyahu has propagated that if we bomb Iran, that somehow we're going to see a popular uprising in the middle of the war. Yeah, it's a misreading of Iranian nationalism. Uh, yes, plenty of Iranians dislike and hate the Islamic Republic. They want it gone. Perhaps a lot of Iranians were very gleeful when Khomeini was killed, but then they're not— I mean, the idea that they would rise up to support an invader.

Yeah.

That is bombing their cities and is, you know, is threatening the disintegration of Iran as a whole, as President Trump does, that somehow they would align with the invader. Again, what was a misreading. Or that President Trump's idea that I'm going to kill the Supreme Leader because he's the stumbling block for the rest of the regime to somehow reform itself. And once I kill him, there's going to be a US America-friendly leader who's going to step forward and change the direction of Iran was hugely misplaced. And, and so it, particularly with the Trump administration, it built policy which came from top down without it being debated and without any kind of a testing of policy, which is based on fantastical assumptions about Iran.

I mean, I'm tempted to ask you why this kind of blind spot might exist in Washington. Perhaps that's a different discussion, but given the terms of this blind spot, how much do you think it relates to a failure also to understand Shia Islam and a sort of theme of martyrdom that is at the core of Shia Islam and not understanding also just what, how the role of a Supreme Leader, you know, fits overall in Iranian society.

I mean, that, that, that's, uh, have always been a persistent problem. It was a problem in 1979. It was a problem in 2003 when we went into Iraq. It was a, it's a problem now. Particularly because yes, maybe the majority of the Iranian public has become more secular and less beholden to Shia mythology. But Shiism is very, very important in its mythology to that core constituency that buttresses the Islamic Republic. As the Revolutionary Guards, its core constituency, which supposedly we were hoping we would break away or somehow distance itself from the regime. But it goes beyond that because there is also a fundamental misunderstanding of Iranian nationalism that ultimately, you know, we read too much about sort of emotions at the moment, or the administration basically read too much into a diaspora opposition on a domestic opposition that it itself helped create.

Yes.

And obviously opposition to the Islamic Republic plays one way when there is peace and the only issue becomes the abuse of power by the Islamic Republic and the public's anger at the regime. Nationalism and national sentiment plays in a very different way when you're at war and when the President of the United States is threatening the territorial integrity. Yeah.

What?

Is bombing Iranian heritage historical sites.

Yes. And I mean, just to go a little bit deeper into that, one thing that fascinates me about Iran, and I don't think again is quite realized in the States, is this sense that it's not simply like a Persian people. I mean, we have significant minorities like the Azeris, for example, in the northern part of the country. And to what degree do they, do you think, share in Iranian nationalism as a kind of multi-ethnic type phenomenon? Because again, one can read in the Western press that Iran is ready to fragment, you know, if we assist the Kurds or Azeris, but then one also can read that some of the most prominent people in the government are, for example, Azeris. So, you know, that doesn't quite fit.

No, you're right, it doesn't quite fit. Yes, there is separatist tendencies, but in Iran it's more complicated than in other countries. So yes, the Kurds have separatist aspirations in Iran, but the Kurds are also an Iranian people. So their relationship with Iran is different than the relationship with Turks in Turkey or Arabs in Iraq and Syria. They have grievances, and the issue of Turks having their own state across the Middle East has been very important. But in Iran, not all, and in fact perhaps the majority of the Kurds are not separatists. There is a separatist element, which is pretty serious, and it has reared its head in 1946 when Stalin tried to create a separatist Kurdish Republic in Iran. It reared its head in the 1970s. It reared its head immediately after the Iranian Revolution. And then it is there as well. I mean, there are Kurdish separatist militias that are supported by Israel and the US and are operating out of the Kurdish region of Iraq. But the Kurds are not alienated. They may be alienated from a particular government and its policies. But they're not alienated from Iranian society in the same way that they might be alienated from, uh, in the Arab world. And, uh, and then the Kurds in Iran are partly Sunni, partly Shia. Some of them also are more distant from the Islamic Republic. Some are much closer. And then same with the Azeris. Yes, the Azeris have their own identity, but it's the Azeris who actually created modern Iran. The Safavids, who basically are responsible for the shape of Iran today and for the fact that Iran is Shia, were Azeris. And for majority of Iran's history, from 1500 to today, Iran's rulers have been Azeris. Even the Supreme Leader who was killed was Azeri-speaking. He spoke Azeri very well. The Pahlavis and Khomeini, and then a small dynasty Vali Nasr, uh, in the, uh, 19th century, uh, are the only, uh, non-Azeri rulers of Iran. And Azeris are a very large population in Iran, but also they're hugely integrated into the system. So yes, there is Azeri nationalism that has become more prominent in recent years, um, but, uh, again, it's, it's not that there is a consolidated Azeri separatist opinion in Iran, that all Azeris believe in separation of Azerbaijan from Iran. And you're correct, a large number of high and low security intelligence and military officials and civilian leadership, including Iran's current president, for instance, are Azeris. So yes, Azeri and Persian identity are separate, but Azeris are by no means an oppressed, marginalized community in Iraq. And so it's not a given that separatism will play out the same way that it did in Iraq or let's say in Syria.

Yeah. Or also, I mean, another analogy is the Soviet Union and how it collapsed. And I've seen that comparison as well. You know, You had the Chechnya separatism, for example, all along the margins. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, you had a lot of pressures inside of Russia that were separatist. And so again, it seems like people sometimes import these kinds of models or analogies, which I understand. This is something that political scientists, historians often do, but how appropriate they are. What about the situation in Southern and Southeastern Iran with other groups? I mean, you know, Pakistan apparently is worried as well about some of this spilling over. How does that play out?

Iran has had a restless Baluchi population, which is Sunni by faith. They also, even though their origins are Iranian, they feel disenfranchised by Iran. And yes, if these areas become, if Iran were to implode, at the center, which is partly maybe Israel's project for Iran, to force the state to collapse, then yes, then if you have an autonomous or independent Balochistan, it will inflame Pakistan's also separatism as well. I mean, the countries around Iran, none of them is welcoming a collapse of Iran.

Right.

Because whether you're the Republic of Azerbaijan or you're Pakistan or you're Iraq or your Turkey.

Armenia.

Right. And well, at least these ones that have a sort of an ethnic identity within Iran.

Yeah.

Basically, this means trouble. It means, first of all, refugees.

Mm-hmm.

Azeri refugees in an event of a massive collapse are likely to go to Turkey or to other Republic of Azerbaijan, or the Baluchis may go into Pakistan. But also collapse of borders means a much more difficult security situation for those countries. Whether it's drugs, guns, terrorism, separatists, etc., will become a far wider regional problem.

Which one sometimes reads can maybe is a difference in objective from the point of view of, let's say, Jerusalem versus Washington. I mean, I'm not in Israel now, but From the Israeli press, one gets the idea that they wouldn't mind a somewhat anarchic situation in Iran because it's basically better than what exists now.

No, absolutely. I mean, not only they don't mind, I think that's what they want. And you read a lot of commentary in Israeli press, at least the English versions that I read, that actually Iran should be divided. Ultimately be far less of a headache for Israel, whether it's democratic, pro-Western, or Islamic, anti-Western, if it wasn't this big behemoth. And also that Israel's experience is that Syria was far more of a threat to Israel when it was unified under the Assads than when it was in civil war. And so it's not like when Syria was in mayhem, It threatened Israel. And Iran being in mayhem will not be a threat to Israel. And it's also not on Israel's borders. Right. So it's a problem for Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, the Gulf countries, and Pakistan or Turkmenistan. But it will not be a problem for Israel. And so I think there is a difference in objective where President Trump is looking for a good Iranian leader à la Venezuela, à la Syria. That would basically be America-friendly and take over and bring stability, or the Gulf countries want stability in Iran. I don't think Israel's actual war objective is to have regime change. I think its objective is more regime collapse than regime change. So I think Israel's goal is to knock Iran out as a factor in the Middle East for a generation.

Which is also why we keep reading that, you know, that the new Supreme Leader, the son, has a target on his back. What salient facts in terms of what is known about the new Supreme Leader register with you?

Well, I mean, we know very little about him because he's always been in the shadows. He's never given public speeches until his father's death, and even we have yet to hear from him. He hasn't got writings. He's very rarely seen in public. So Iranians have had visits with him, but he's maintained a very, very quiet, in-the-shadows presence. We know certain things about his background, like before he went to seminary, he actually was a soldier in the Iran-Iraq War as a member of a Revolutionary Guard battalion. So he's a veteran of the Revolutionary Guards. He has maintained close relationships with people who he fought with during Iran-Iraq War. Some of these people became generals in the Revolutionary Guard. Some, like him, went to seminary and then became statesmen. That he has been very involved in shaping the Revolutionary Guard since 2009, particularly Revolutionary Guard intelligence, which after the Green Movement became a much, much bigger factor. In Iran's politics, that he has a— his— that the Revolutionary Guard, particularly younger generation, have good relations with him and identify with him, that also he oversaw a lot of statecraft as his father's right-hand person for over a 30-year period. So he's not just somebody like when the senior Assad died, his son was an ophthalmologist.

Yeah.

When Mrs. Gandhi died in India, his son was an Air India pilot.

Yeah, no, no, he's right. He's integrated into the system.

He had a period of educating and settling in, and they had to grow into the job. Mostaba is probably among all the candidates that the Council of Experts was considering, maybe with the exception of former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who was in the mix, is the candidate which was ready to step into the job they want. Right?

But is there a contradiction in the sense that the Islamic Revolution in '79 was partly about not having this hereditary kind of transfer of power? How do they sort of rationalize that?

Well, not only that, but actually apparently his father was opposed or was of two minds about this. And there is rumor that he wrote a letter to the Council of Experts asking asking him not to appoint specifically. But I think this is a decision that is made during war when the country's whole existence is under threat. So I think he was chosen not because he lobbied very well or the way in which primogeniture works. I think the assumption was that the guards thought that he, that's the leader they want. That's the leader they need. And I think the system as a whole decided that this is, given where Iran is, he's the most effective leader. Yes, of course he has his father's name and particularly the way Khamenei was killed.

Yeah.

I mean, quote unquote martyred and had an enormous amount of resonance in Iran because he was not killed in a bunker.

Yeah.

Escaping Israelis. He knew the attack may come.

Yeah.

Somehow he decided to come out of hiding that he had been for the 6 months before.

Yeah.

To his office. So in Iran, it was interpreted that he died with his head high.

Yeah.

And, and, and then, you know, Mostafa's own story that his son, his wife, his sister, his father, his mother were all killed. Yeah.

How did that happen? I can't understand. Were they all in the same spot?

They were all in that compound. And, you know, the Israelis hit 30 bombs at that compound.

But how did the son not die? I mean, it seems amazing.

He might have not been there. Or he might have been in a bunker, or, I mean, there are rumors about whether he was injured or not.

Yeah.

You don't know, but—

Have we actually seen any evidence that he's, you know, okay? No, no, no.

I don't know intelligence, what Israelis or the CIA may know, but nothing public, nothing in Iran. There are rumors that he might have been injured, and that's why he's not been publicly unveiled. Yeah, but the reality of it is that that story itself is so compelling for Iranians.

Yeah, it seems like a reenactment of the mythology that we've been talking about.

Exactly. So that reenactment essentially, I mean, all of these goes into the decision. These 60 people who are sitting there, 80 people, sorry, who are making this decision.

The Assembly of Experts.

Skirts would have made a different decision if Iran was in peacetime.

So they really make, yeah. Do they really make the decision? I mean, I think, you know, they make the decision. They're not, they, they have the full legitimacy and authority.

No, no, they have the, they make the decision by constitution. They make the decision. I'm sure they're lobbied just like, uh, you know, a Congress or any parliament may be lobbied at a time of a big decision. Uh, they conferred among themselves. But the issue is the context in which this decision is made is always extremely important. In other words, if this decision was made in peacetime, they would have made maybe a different decision. But this decision was made in a time of war when, as I said, the whole existence of the country was at risk. And the president already said that he wants to choose the leader of Iran He wants to bring about regime change. He wants to pull down the Islamic Republic. He wants to arm the Kurds to invade Iran.

Right. The U.S. president. Yeah.

So, so I, I think they chose the leader that they thought that it would be most effective at this point. And if they heard from the Revolutionary Guards, probably they said, this is the war that we have to fight. These are the realities of it. This is, this is the person that we need.

Are they, but they're popularly elected, right? The members of this assembly.

They are elected at a, not very frequently, but they're elected. And, you know, obviously who can stand to be elected, they all have to be clerics, is vetted by the same Guardian Council that vets all other candidates. So yes, of course, this is, there are very few reformists or liberal-minded clergy on the Council of Experts. But I'm not sure that under the circumstances that Iran is there, that anybody would have said that we need a, let's say, a liberal, you know, supreme leader who, you know, wouldn't understand the guards, the guards wouldn't understand him, may send the wrong signal to the United States, is not capable of managing the system immediately. You know, it's like the selection of the Pope.

I was thinking about that, the College of Cardinals.

Well, obviously the College of the Cardinals and the Guardian Council, but you know, your College of Cardinals could become more conservative over time if you have a conservative Pope that keeps appointing conservative Cardinals.

Right.

In the end, we're in the room, they think about what is most important for survival and the future of the Church. And if there is a particular crisis, like the scandals that the church faced over, you know, the sex scandals.

Yes, the Catholic Church.

Obviously the decision would be very different than if those issues were not on the table. And so—

Sure, they could, they consider the circumstances of the moment and yeah, act, So ironically, I think President Trump actually helped get Mojtaba elected. Yeah.

I mean, you know, I think the irony, and maybe the Israelis didn't care or they knew better, but really President Trump's assumptions about Iran, they're just really misplaced. That I killed Khamenei and somehow a far more moderate leader would come was just completely back.

And if they, and if they managed to kill this guy, maybe, you know, then the news—

No, I don't think it would be different because I think the message the Iranians want to send them is that you're not getting your way with this war.

Yeah.

Right? I think it's a message of defiance is that they don't want to signal to Washington that your assumptions about the war were correct or that waging war with Iran will actually get you to the results that you want. Assume that if they did that, there would be no end to American aggression towards Iran.

Is there any way that we can really assess what the public opinion is at this point in Iran? And particularly, you know, in the West, we read a great deal about this, you know, the attack on the school, the girls' elementary school in southern Iran, which all evidence points to a US, you know, Tomahawk missile fired from a from a naval vessel, which Iran does not possess, as far as I know, any Tomahawk missile, despite what the US president said. And we also have these photographs of this toxic black rain pouring on Tehran from fuel depots hit by Israel. So are those, one would think those would be kind of public opinion moving events.

Yeah, they are. And also, so is also the damage done to cherished historical sites in Isfahan, in Karshan, in Tehran. And also the president's threat that he wants to disintegrate Iran, change its borders. Now, you know, Iranians are not sort of, you know, unidimensional people. So before the war started, in January, we saw massive protests against the Islamic Republic, which were bloodily suppressed.

Yes.

And still that wound is open. Many Iranians suffered, they lost loved ones, many were injured, maimed in the attacks. And there's still a great deal of anger towards the Islamic Republic. And there's a great deal of desire for a completely different kind of Iran. But that is now subsumed with a much greater sort of the urgency of the moment, which is a question of are you for the regime or against the regime has been subsumed by are you for the war or against the war? It's been subsumed by also the question of do you want to protect Iran's existence? Isn't that the most important thing right now? Not protecting the regime, but protecting Iran.

Yeah.

And so what you're seeing, and it's very evident in daily, nightly protests that the Iranians make in the streets against the war, anti-war protests, in the large throng of Iranians that showed up yesterday to celebrate the selection of a new Supreme Leader, or the very large anti-war protests that are happening in Iran. And so yes, the public opinion towards the Islamic Republic as to whether this is the desired, you know, government for Iran hasn't changed, I think. I think the majority of Iranians don't like, don't want the oppression, isolation, etc. But where things have changed is that the public opinion, this is now mixed with public opinion against the war and against those who are threatening to disintegrate the country. Right. I mean, Iranians are very sensitive to the fact that Israel and the United States are targeting the country's infrastructure.

Yes.

Hospitals, schools, oil depots, electrical grid. I mean, that—

Desalinization.

Yeah, exactly. So I don't think the Islamic Republic, while the war is going on, is actually under any kind of a threat domestically. And the assumption that somehow very quickly after killing Khamenei, there would be a public uprising in Iran.

Well, let's suppose that President Trump, as some might suspect, just decides to declare victory and stop, and also somehow convinces Israelis to do the same. So then we have this kind of after the war, Iranian society, do you think at that point perhaps a different landscape of public opinion might emerge?

Well, I think at that point, I mean, first of all, he has to persuade the Iranians to stop. It's not off course. No, no, actually, because they said this very explicitly.

Yeah.

That, you know, you can stop, but we won't stop.

No, no, but let's suppose that they did.

Right. So it depends on how the war stops and also what happens after the war. Yeah. You know, what happens as a consequence of ceasefire negotiations, whether the president will have to agree to lift sanctions on Iran, would have to, you know, give something to Iran. But at any rate, I don't think the Islamic Republic is politically in the clear. I think it will, once there is peace in Iran, I think politics will return. The political question of, you know, legitimacy of the government, social freedoms, economic freedoms, you know, what sort of government Iran should have, all of these will come back to the fore.

Yeah.

But I think we will see those, down the road after we have peace.

Yeah. So we just wonder, what has this war accomplished? What question has it answered? What problem has it solved?

Well, exactly. I mean, that I think is a very good question, that the president started a war without actually doing real due diligence on policy. He never explained what was the urgency in February 2026 to start a major war. And, and at the end of the day, you know, he will have to, I think, negotiate a ceasefire and a next step with the Islamic Republic, not with something else. Yeah. And even if he manages to topple the Islamic Republic, yeah, it opens a whole other Pandora's box because there is no sort of a successor to it. And then whatever comes out of a collapse of the Islamic Republic, whether it's chaos in Iran or whatever comes out of it, civil war, it ultimately will still be America's problem and it will not raise the risk to global energy resources afterwards.

Yeah, and this could all end up being on the doorstep of the next American president anyway, whatever the situation is.

Right, exactly.

So how many different American presidents have we had, you know, they've been grappling with this?

It's just, you know, uh, we also had other American presidents that came close to contemplating war with Iran and then backed off because they actually went through a process of looking at, at all the consequences, scenarios, all the things that can go wrong. And whereas this president just issued the order to go to war. Without actually going through that process. And so, as a result, he's encountering surprises because I don't think there was serious thinking about the different outcomes that might be out there before starting the war.

Right. Well, of course, there's also this line that he was sold a bill of goods by the Prime Minister of Israel.

Well, that again goes to the same point because the president is sold the bill of goods, but then the policy process doesn't happen.

Yeah.

He basically says, okay, I agree, let's go to war without actually having the national security process look at all the potential outcomes.

Right. Yeah. So it's just that vacuum. Well, I think on that note, we should end. I mean, again, it's day 11 of the war and clearly, you know, we don't know exactly where it's headed, but I think we've at least tried to take a good snapshot of where things are, and I very much appreciate your insights into all of that. So this is Paul Starobin. Thank you for the America and Beyond of the New Books Network. Thank you, Vali.

Thank you. It was good talking to you.

Good talking.