Strict Productivity| w/ Rob Snyder

Well, Rob, welcome back.

We're here again.

Here, here we are, uh, and welcome back to our listener as well. Uh, Rob, what's, what's going on?

What's new? So I think last week we talked about how I was gonna go and give 3 talks at Harvard and I would have something to rage about. Yeah. So the, the thing that's on my mind— so most of my talks were about like, okay, sell then build, like, why do you do this? And there were kind of like two classes of responses to it. Class one, which I heard like pretty loudly, was like, why aren't they teaching us this? Why are we doing hundreds of discovery interviews right now? Like, what are we doing? What is going on here? And so that's like one thing I could rage about. But then I heard backchannel from some people who were there that the concept just seems too extreme. And the idea of selling before you build and like validating by sales versus by, I don't know, guessing, is like too extreme. And so I could rage in either of those directions for quite a while. So I feel like I've got motivation.

What do you, let's touch on that second one where, The first one is kind of, it's like a form of acceptance, it's like a frustration at time lost. The second one, to what do you attribute that? Like what's going on there?

Yeah, I think in most people's minds, they think, okay, the way that sales works is I'm going to be interrupting somebody, and so when I'm interrupting somebody, I need to have have all of the variables figured out and I have to have a product built and ready to go so that I don't waste their time. Which means we lead to, like, we waste probably 6 to 12 months, if not more, of our time to then show up with something that's totally irrelevant and then waste their time, right? Yeah. It is the, like, I don't know where this idea comes from. It was an idea I had in my head too. I don't know if it's something that's just like taught to us or something that we just like implicitly assume in some way, shape, or form, but it is so damaging. And so it's like, and the idea that trying to go and talk to somebody about what they are trying to accomplish and then offering them something that is not a fully built product, but some sort of combination of product and service to see if they pull or not. To act like that is extreme, that is the opposite of extreme. That is, what's extreme is doing 400 freaking interviews, getting a laundry list of random requirements that we're not sure if anything of that is real, raising money, going and building something, and then just watching your soul slowly leave your body as no one cares.

That's extreme. Yeah, well, I think some of that might actually just be an aversion to being in uncomfortable situations, 'cause selling when you're early before you have something to lean back on is, it's an uncomfortable experience. And so I feel like some of that is just an articulation of that, like, reaction away from discomfort. It's much more comfortable to build product than it is to, to try to sell product until eventually you have to sell the thing that you built without involving the customer. But I guess the good news there for founders who buy into your demand-based approach and your selling approach is that the competition doesn't want to get out there and sell as fast as you do. And so if you do it the right way, that's like an instant advantage, basically.

Yeah, yeah, it's just a great way to stop wasting your life.

Yeah, yeah, totally. Hey Rob, what kind of organizations do you talk to? Like you've mentioned, you mentioned Buffalo, uh, you know, last week, Harvard. Um, like when do you go talk? And then we'll, we'll jump into today's, uh, maybe, maybe to tease today's, uh, podcast/newsletter, we're talking about productivity, but not in the 7 hacks to get 14 hours out of your day productivity, like in a really super thoughtful way. So we'll get to that in a second. But if, yeah, who do you talk to and, you know, how might people like get you to chat with them?

Yeah, I mean, I basically talk to whoever reaches out and wants to understand this. And so I've done— this week was really interesting. I gave a talk at the i-Lab at Harvard, which is kind of like the cross-school student thing. I gave a talk for an MBA club and I gave a talk to a faculty AI accelerator. I was like, why am I here? You're the faculty, like, what am I doing here? Uh, which is kind of cool. And then I've done everything from, uh, what's been interesting is like venture firms have started reaching out to have me explain the physics of startups to them so that they can hopefully stop steering their startups straight into the icebergs. Um, and so yeah, I don't know, it's been interesting.

Who gets, who gets the most out of you out of your chats or, you know, out of your conversations?

Yeah, I'd say like the earliest stage startups hear what I say, agree with it, nod, and then go do whatever the hell they want to do until reality kind of like punches them in the face and they're like, okay, maybe I should actually consider this. The people who get the most out of it, interestingly, are people who've had some pattern exposure to this but haven't been able to articulate it. And so whether that's serial entrepreneurs, people who've been struggling and like found little like offshoots of success in places but they can't kind of like conceptualize it. Yeah. And then like investors who've seen some of their startups go straight to the moon and others that look like they were doing the same things just not work. And have lacked the language to be able to articulate. I remember one investor told me, I was like, "What does it take to get to Series A?" And he was like, "I can't explain this to you very well, but you have to show that you've figured something out." And I was like, "Okay, that's super helpful." But it turns out he was right, but it was just he didn't have the language to put that across, like in a way that my brain could interpret.

Yeah, was he referring there to you have to have identified demand and to be showing signs of—

You have found demand and demonstrated that you have found demand, by which it means customers are pulling a product out of your hands and your startup is kind of growing without pushing and without kind of, with some form of repeatability. But like the thing that you have figured out is something about a market that causes them to pull that product out of your hands.

Yeah. Yeah. Super interesting how even just the introduction of that language has changed the way that I, I understand sales calls and, you know, stuff like that. Just, just the introduction of vocabulary, basically. Rob, today we're talking about your blog, Strict Productivity: Making Sense of Superhuman Founders. What version of overthinking founders is this one for?

This is basically for every founder. This is not just for overthinking founders, although it's particularly designed for the kind of founder who listens to us talk, which is a certain kind. But it's also for the kind of founder, the like, just do things founder. Who doesn't think very hard and just goes out and like does things to learn. That founder— so the first overthinking founder is the one who needs to understand everything before acting, which means you tend to not act very much and tend to not take very much action. And if your mental model of how things work is wrong, you think for a long time and then take stupid actions, which is not a good combination. Then the other side of that, the kind of like just do things founder is the one who does a lot of things but struggles to kind of put together a coherent worldview of why certain things work, why others don't, and what do you do about it.

Yeah. Yeah. Well, let's jump into some of the foundational concepts that you introduce in this post. Why don't, why don't we start here, Rob, with kind of a, like a basic question, like, why does the world need another newsletter, Substack, whatever, about productivity?

Yeah, this is something that I've wrestled with, um, because I've like read as many productivity books as a human being can possibly read. And what I've found is that the best ones are like very surface level. They don't get down to the root of like like, how do things work? And if you're trying to be productive, right, like my favorite example is the book The One Thing, which asks a really good question, which is, what's the one thing you can do such that everything else becomes easier or irrelevant? Great question, amazing question. The challenge is you have to have a theory of how things work to be able to actually take action on that and know what the one thing is. And then there's more to it than that. And so, and so in all of this productivity stuff, there's, there's always some sort of like, uh, oh, here's the 7 hacks to productivity, or like, here's a useful productivity question. Oh, you need to make time for deep work. But you actually have to have a theory of how things work at the bottom to know what is going to move you forward and what isn't. And so I just never found anything that got to that ground truth level, which tells you where the leverage in the the system is, where should you actually focus? And then yes, all this other stuff can, can build on top. All the other advice can kind of like build on top of that, but we had to start from some sort of a foundational layer. And I noticed that there were a lot of founders that I was watching who are working really hard, but don't seem to be making progress. And then there are some founders that I'd watch who would just like make such fast progress. They would just nail one thing, move to the next, and it's like, their like zero to a million, zero to 5 million journeys were just like, it felt inevitable the way they were operating. And it wasn't 'cause they were working more, it was just something about the things they were doing were working and the right things.

Yeah, why don't, is there a founder that, or I don't know if you wanna name names, anybody that we can like use throughout this as like an archetype?

Yeah, there's one. I won't name him because I didn't ask, but he basically— they went $0 to $3 million ARR in like 6 months. And he reached out to work. It's actually the person— there's a couple of founders that I keep in my mind and ask like, what would this person do? What would this person do in this situation? Because just watching them operate has been awesome. So one of them reached out to me, I don't know, a year and a half ago or something like that. And He was like, hey, I'm having 5 sales calls per week— or per day, rather, not per week— and I have a pretty low close rate, and I'm not sure why. It's not working. I need to figure this out. So I was like, cool, that's normal. That's why kind of everyone reaches out to me. And the difference was that he was like, okay, cool. So what I'm going to do, I'm having 5 sales calls per day. I want to review these every 2 days with you. I want to ship a change, and I want to review that change every 2 days. I was like, sweet, I love that. And so basically within the course of 2 weeks, we were able to make the changes to the sales process that led to it going from like 10, 15% close rate up to 60% or something like that close rate. And it was very, very fast changes in a very short compressed timescale. And then it was like, cool, sales is working. It wasn't like, okay, cool, let's lean back and chill out. It was What's the next bottleneck? Okay, the next bottleneck is this. Let's move on.

Yeah. Which is a good demonstration of what's at stake. It's not, it's not like, how do I get a couple extra hours of work out of the day by not looking at my cell phone? It's how do I 4x my close rate on, on things like the value is immense when you look at it, not as the amount of work I can do, but the outcomes of the work that I can do are, you know, that's, at stake when you think of productivity. You alluded to this a few minutes ago. You talk about the theory under— like undergirding the— like, what is it that we're talking about? Why don't we just start there briefly? Anybody that's listened to you talk before, this will sound familiar. But what is the foundational base that we need to then layer productivity on top of? Like, what is a startup?

Yeah, yeah, so this is always like a hard thing for me to explain to people. I'm like, no, the Case Study Factory model is the important thing to understand. And everyone's like, what the hell are you talking about? And I can never find the right way into the concept. So at the, like, we have to have a theory about how startups work in order to say, okay, Given that theory, I should focus here because if I focus here, it will make all the other problems go away. Or if I, if I focus at this point, this point will make the biggest possible improvement in my business right now. When we don't have that kind of core base level concept, we just, we just do random acts of kind of like improvement that may or may not actually improve things and often break things in other places. And so the base model here is the case study factory, which if we start, right, we start with demand, right? Customers are trying to accomplish something in their lives. We offer supply that fits better than their alternatives such that they pull the product out of our hands and become satisfied retained customers. That is one demand-supply fit which creates one case study. Sounds like a case study, reads like a case study. Okay, cool. A startup, in order to grow, we can't just do that once. We have to do that a bunch of times, and we have to do that a bunch of times in a way that is not custom each time. It has to be repeatable so we can think about getting from one customer to a million customers as the art of finding and repeating a repeatable case study. One customer case study where they pull, where there's demand, where there's— where our supply fits. If we don't have one repeatable case study, it is essentially impossible to scale. Okay, in order to repeat a case study a bunch of times, we have to do things to create almost like a process for repeating the case study. This process, the set of steps in this process, can be thought of as a factory to repeat a case study. I have 3 steps in the factory. There's the pipeline step, there's the sales step, and then there's the delivery step. Each of these serves a different purpose underneath the process of repeating a case study. And, and kind of like repeating it faster and faster over time with the overall output is, okay, we're producing a ton of identical case studies with very happy customers. Last piece here is once you see this as a startup, as a case study factory, where first we have to figure out what our repeatable case study is and then we build a factory to repeat it, that base model, you can use a bunch of manufacturing knowledge from the past century and a half of manufacturing thinking to know exactly what matters when and where to focus. If you don't have that, you're just doing random acts of maybe improvement.

Yeah, yeah. Let me, let me take a shot at repeating pieces of this that I, that I, that are jumping out to me while I'm thinking about productivity specifically. And it's what you talk to about the three elements of it. I think of it as literally like there are customers that are coming into a pipeline and running through it. And you actually, the other thing that you write about is like how you can either push them, try to push them through this pipeline, or demand can like pull them. It's like almost like a suction force that they are moving through this pipeline that exists, which is your case study factory. But you talk about three steps, the pipeline, sales and delivery. We got into delivery deeply in the last one. We talk about sales a lot, pipeline, you did a pipeline mega post, like we've hit those individually. Let's apply bottleneck theory. You quote from The Goal, which one of the, you know, you're referring— Why don't you give a little bit of background on The Goal? What's it about?

Yeah, so, well, The Goal is a must-read book. It is a business fiction book, which you don't get many of those. I think it's like one of the original business fiction— I don't know for sure, but it's like 50 or 60 years old or something like that. And it's about how applying manufacturing thinking to a factory, to Boy Scouts, to your love life, it solves everything. It's just like very funny, but it's a business fable way to explain this concept of the theory of constraints, which is basically if you, if you look at a factory, and let's just take our simple factory with 3 steps. There's pipeline step, there's sales process step, there's delivery step. One of those steps is the limiter of the entire output of the system. We care about producing the highest volume of output through, through the fact we want to just produce a ton and ton and increasing volume of perfect case studies. And so in that case, if we're only having one sales conversation per week, right, pipeline is probably the system bottleneck. It doesn't really matter how much nicer we're making our delivery process with product at that point. We could make our delivery process twice as good, and it won't really matter if we're just having one sales conversation a week. In that case, pipeline is probably the bottleneck. If we focus on anything other than pipeline, getting from 1 to say 10 per week, it's not going to really make a difference in the factory output. And so the bottleneck, the idea of a bottleneck is you find the place in the manufacturing system that is the core limiter, the, the thing that is— that if you improve anything else, it does not really make an impact. The bottleneck is the thing where, uh, uh, you know, it is the entire output of the system is constrained by the output of the bottleneck step.

And how do— how should a founder identify where their where their bottleneck is. They probably know, honestly, like, if they think about it. But how, like, um, do founders come to you, uh, to talk about like finding the bottleneck, or how would you advise that they do?

Yeah, it's like just like a rough thing. Nobody asked me this, but, uh, okay.

Yeah, they, they kind of know it's like the most painful thing usually that's going on.

Yeah, well, and sometimes I actually— they don't know they should be looking at this, and so they're focusing on the wrong thing, so we have to zoom out and like One of the questions you can ask is, if I double the performance of this, what happens to the total output of the factory? Right? And so basically, if I double my pipeline, do I expect there will be double the output at the end of the factory? If I double my close rates, like, what's going to happen? Right? And so usually you will find that, um, there's like, there's like one clear area where if you make that metric change, the entire output of the system is, is like most impacted. And it's often, right, like it basically always starts on pipeline because if you're not talking to anybody, then nothing else matters. But then it very quickly becomes, okay, I'm having 5 sales calls a week and 0 are converting to actual customers. Okay, obviously we should focus on the sales process, right? And then when you focus on the sales process and say this is the bottleneck, then there's a kind of like set of questions you ask to figure out what the heck do we do about this. It could be a variety, it could be you change your targeting, it could be like a variety of different things, but it's nothing else matters until you figure out that sales bottleneck.

Yeah, yeah. And the founder that went $0 to $3 million in 6 months, who went from a 15% close rate to a a 60% close rate. They just— it sounds like intuitive that pipeline's fine. They were having 5 calls a day. Pipeline was, was obviously not the problem. They could imagine if I double or triple or quadruple eventually, um, you know, my, my close rate, like that was the constraining factor, which it's a percentage in that, in that one rather than it's like a volume, a number thing in the pipeline and then a percentage. I guess it, it kind of flips a little bit.

Yeah, yeah. And it's basically numbers on pipeline, then percentage conversion for sales and delivery usually.

Yeah, yeah.

But there's also a time component too that you could— like, you could actually get this to be quite complex, right? Where you're like, okay, it's not just about the percentage conversion, it could, could actually be about the sales cycle length, for example, or the, the timeline until the leading indicator of retention is hit. Right. And so those things and like how much effort is it for us, like those things eventually become bottlenecks.

Yeah, that's interesting. How much does the founder, him or herself, actually have to be involved in this step? I imagine. Well, let's, so we've, let's say that we've identified the bottleneck. You then write about two conflicting approaches or two, you contrast two approaches to solving it. One is direct and one is indirect. Why don't we dissect like there's, okay, so you know where the problem is. There are better and worse ways to invest your time at that point.

Yeah, what I basically found is that, and these are posts that I've written before and I'm just kind of assembling them into something that like now it's like, oh, okay, that's what these people are doing. But when I've watched these founders like figure stuff out super fast, it's because they take a very direct approach to solving whatever bottleneck that currently is. And so let's say pipeline is your bottleneck. A super simple example here is the founder whose bottleneck is pipeline. They're kind of like, there's a variety of approaches to fixing a pipeline bottleneck. One is like writing a bunch of blog posts and hoping SEO ticks up in 12 months, right? Which might work, might work super well, but you're going to be sitting on your hands for 12 months until you figure it out. Then there's the other approach of like, okay, what's the most direct approach to solve pipeline right now? Maybe it's, okay, cool, I'm going to just DM a bunch of my potential customers and get 5 of them to talk to me right now, or I'm gonna go fly to this conference, or I'm gonna go stand in this shopping mall and talk to X number of— it, you know, it's whatever it winds up being. But the founders who make the most progress are the ones who find the approach that could work, it would be weird not to work, and they attack it in goblin mode right now.

Goblin mode and weird not to work in one sentence. That is like my number one moment on this podcast so far. I feel like I'm frequently just like the anti-hero for all of what you have ever written, Rob. I'm like, yeah, like my instinct is definitely to take the indirect route and I can point 5 probably just off the top of my head and can testify to how painful it is.

I write this as a critique of myself, right? Like, this is ultimately a self-critique that a lot of other people find useful, happen to find useful.

Yeah. And hopefully it can, it can help people shortcut the immense amounts of pain and frustration that come from taking the very long route to doing it. Rob, are there tangible examples of people that took the A-direct route that stood out to you?

Yeah, so classic example, Founder 2 weeks ago had a, they're NYC, they had a deal that was like a $100,000, $150,000 deal and it was like on the line and it's gonna, you know, like a very big important deal and the they're battling against an entrenched incumbent that is well known, da da da da da, and she has a champion in the company who's like the COO or something like that, who's like, yeah, I'm trying to push for you, and like gets the message that, yeah, I'm leaning towards choosing you, and I think we can get this done, right? And so when she gets that, she doesn't just like sit back and like say, cool, great, looks like we're set. She says, cool, I'm in San Francisco, you're in Orlando, I'll be there tomorrow morning and we will get this hammered out. And it's like, just, that is the, right? What's the, customer is on the fence, really important potential customer, early customer is on the fence. What do you do in that situation? Do you go the, it could work approach by saying, great, 'Cool, love that. Thank you. I'm here if you have any questions.' Or do you do the thing that would be weird not to work, which is show up in their office with a contract ready to sign tomorrow, right? Weird not to work plus goblin mode put together. And it's like, cool, just do that, get that done, get them onboarded, and then move to the next thing.

Yeah, it feels like a similar one for, um, if the bottleneck is customer success or onboarding, it's fly there, sit there with them, figure it out. What about pipeline? Um, like, what's the, what's the most direct path to pipeline?

Yeah, so I think like, like outbound in general is the most direct path to pipeline early on.

Yeah, it's like, it's like, don't— not SEO. It's like message people, watch rates, like, uh, adjust quickly.

It's like, okay, if you spend 2 hours today, yeah, just messaging people who could be potential customers. Can you not get 2 calls today out of that? It's like, yes, of course you can. Yeah, then there's like another layer of Goblin Mode of like, okay, if all of your potential customers are going to be at a conference next week, hmm, you need to be there. It would be, it would be right. There's one version of it where it's like, oh well, I don't know You know, maybe, maybe we kind of like, I don't know, talk to the conference organizers and learn more about it. And then maybe next year we'll go and da da da da. No, be there.

Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So we've, we've talked about the direct approach for pipeline sales and delivery. Let's, let's take it back to strict, the concept of strict productivity, which you talk about by contrasting being productive and being performative, or productive actions and performative actions. Am I remembering that? Something along that way. Can you help us? Let's start with productive and performative. Like, explain what are they and what's the difference between the two?

Yeah. Okay, cool. So, zooming out, now we know what founders who make a ridiculous amount of progress do, or at least we have a way to understand what they are doing and how they're approaching it and how they just kind of run a compression algorithm on progress for their company. Yeah. Okay. And like, we understand it from the base level of how things work.

Okay.

Given that, now I get to rant against my least common denominatorification of the world, which is most startup advice that's kind of like, cool, if you do a couple of discovery interviews, you're gonna, you know, like, you're gonna be successful. And it's like, no, you're not. So, so what I'm encouraging here is going to sound very extreme, and it is very extreme, but it's extreme not for the sake of being extreme. It's this extreme for the sake of saying the bar is here and you should try to meet the bar, right? Like, you should, you should aspire to meet the bar and not set the bar low. Okay, preface aside, my argument is that there is strict productivity, which is work that is centered on whatever your bottleneck is, approached in a way that is weird not to work, executed in goblin mode. That is strict productivity. Anything other than that is performative work, which is everything from going to a pitch competition to LARPing about writing social media— like, to just everything from pure LARPing to, you know, work that is focused on the bottleneck but isn't actually weird not to work or isn't done in Goblin mode. I'm arguing that there is strict— a very strict definition of productivity that is very tight. Must be bottleneck-focused, weird not to work, and goblin mode. Everything else we should consider as performative work.

What— why do founders do performative work?

So you can— you could create this as a spectrum of, of, of work that is, you know, maybe on one end— I, I'd actually started it this way, and I thought about it, and I was like, no, that's, that's Nonsense. Where on one end there's purely productive, 100% productive, and on one end there's 0% productive, 100% performative, and like most of us are somewhere in the middle there. But that gives you an out. It gives you an out by saying, "Well, you know, maybe I'll set the bar here and you can't be at 100% all the time. That'd be ridiculous. Well, like, lower the bar for myself." And so that's kind of what's on my mind is if I define productivity on a spectrum, then I'm always productive and I lower the bar for myself. Whereas if I set the bar here and say, if I'm not hitting this, then I am not productive and what am I doing? This is the bar. Then I actually have a tough conversation with myself. And say, okay, do I want to succeed or not? If I do, then I need to be doing this. Everything else is just playing pretend.

Yeah, and tying back to your operating philosophy, um, you know, approach to this, like, what do I think is true about the world? And, um, in this case, like, the thing that is true about the world is that you have to attack the bottleneck and you have to do it in a direct way in order to make the fastest progress possible. What would— let's, um, maybe for the, for the listening founder that wants to diagnose if where they are on that spectrum, or if they are at the, at the right end, if it's an on-off switch, what, what do you say to them? Like, what, what should they be doing right now?

Look at your calendar last— for the last week. And like, it will tell you very quickly if you have been in goblin mode or not, if you have been focused on the actual bottleneck or not. And I'm not saying you have to do it 100% of the time. You still have to send investor updates, which are never your bottleneck, but they're something you just have to do. But like, every day, some part of it should be spent productively, I think we can say. And so If every day you should be spending some time productively, and we have a very strict definition of productivity, have you done it?

What do those, um, the archetypal founders who are always in goblin mode, always focused on the bottleneck, always doing the most direct thing, is that just, do they just intuit that? Or is that, is it a conscious thing that they're, that they're looking at? Like what, What makes that founder special?

I don't know. I think there's a, um, I, I do think there is like this typical, I don't think they have the typical mindset, which is the typical mindset of people like you, me, and whoever listens to this is like, okay, I have been successful my entire life up until now. I have done all the work it's taken to be successful up until now. Whatever I do will wind up successful if I work hard enough at it, if I da da da da da da, if I am a good person, if I am da da, like all of these things, right? And this isn't something that we say explicitly, but it's this, I would say, this kind of like creeping entitlement almost that is that is kind of in the amygdala maybe. And so these founders that I've kind of like modeled this post off of just don't have that. They are basically like, if I don't do this, if I am not strictly productive in my words, but if I don't figure out this sales process, we're dead. And then it's, if I don't figure it out tomorrow, we're dead. "Right, and, and, but I have the capacity to figure it out if I go all in on it. And it doesn't matter if I'm comfortable or not, if, because if I'm right, like, some amount of discomfort right now is way better than death in a week." Right? They kind of like, it seems like they are shortening the timescale there and just, again, I'm trying to kind of like psychoanalyze them. But they just seem to have this sense where the thing that matters most is figuring it out. And that's the like highest order thing for them.

Yeah. Yeah. I love that as a, as a model. And I totally 100% guilty of the, there's a, it's almost like there's a sense of inevitability that I find comfortable on. Um, like, yeah, like, okay. I've figured everything else out in the past well enough. Eventually, be patient and it'll happen. And which is, I think I need a swift kick in the butt every once in a while.

Well, I think this is like, I have our mutual mentor Mike has told me I need to write another book based on the Divine Lover stuff. And my sense is that this is Something in this category is the next book. I've already started, I've already started. It's super annoying to have to do this again, but, but I think there is the, like, root of why startups are so hard is way more a cultural psychological thing. Uh, once you understand the physics of startups, demand, supply, that kind of stuff, um, and like kind of like the just the physics of business, it is way more a cultural psychological thing that's standing in our way and is causing a lot of like, yeah, it's just causing like a huge amount of malaise and wasted potential energy out there. So, ugh, don't want to do it.

Well, great. Rob, anything else we want to add before we wrap today?

Buckle up for next week's post.

The ultimate tease into it. Any— is there a one-sentence thing to add on to that?

Sales pathologies of nice people.

Oh, all right, here we go. All right, and with that, we'll catch everybody next week. See y'all later.