Jason M. Lemkin explains why Zoom never built a second product despite its massive success. The company captured video conferencing but missed opportunities to expand into adjacent markets, a mistake founders should avoid by planning for growth beyond their core product early.
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When I think about Zoom, I can't think of, like, a better technical founder running a leader than Zoom. I can't figure out someone I respect more on every level, as a human, as an engineer, as a leader than Eric. Why in four years? There's a mean question, and I don't deserve to even ask it, because he's talking about why didn't. Why didn't they capture more TAM? Why didn't they find a way to add 4 billion of note takers when there's a trillion note takers? Why didn't they? And I don't know the answer. It's not because you're not one of the smartest people in the industry thinking about this for a decade, but there was no great second act yet. There's no great second act. And I do. Going back to here, I worry. I worry. And this is why I tell founders to take their exits and then say no, because go bigger, but. But by default, take it.
So many things in that to unpack. I mean, one is the multiproduct thing. I think one of the big takeaways we've had is the need to be thinking about that second product much earlier than you would have thought. You don't want to wait till you hit. What's the tam. What was the word? Expression, Jason? I loved.
Was good. But I'm forgetting, what did we call it? Was it Tam Trap? The TAM Trap.
Tam. Tam Trap, Yeah. No, actually hit the TAM Trap. I mean, we were thinking. Actually we were comparing two of our portfolio companies. It's Nvidia to name them, but we would say one of them has compounded really well because it's continually added a new product that for the first year or two, is a couple of million dollars, but layered it in and now many million. So I think watching that TAM Trap is key.