The Grammar of Crisis

Tim Stock argues that crises are shaped by competing narratives, not just material events. He proposes StoryAware Scenario Practice, which maps the language and stories that drive decisions in Iran's politics, EV rollouts, and weight-loss drugs, helping planners see which narratives their choices reinforce.
Chapters
Picture a map of the evolving Iran crisis the way it usually shows up in war rooms. You get arrows, targets, maritime lanes, maybe a cyber kill chain diagram in the corner. It looks very hard, very technical, but what's actually doing most of the work in that picture is invisible. It's the stories people are already living inside. Every drone strike, every seizure of a ship in a shared sea, every cyber probe, every proxy rocket is not just a tactical move. It's a line in a story aimed at a very particular audience. We won't be humiliated. We are the true defenders. They're losing control. We still matter. Susan Sontag had this wonderfully blunt way of putting it: Stories decide what counts as reality. They can look trivial because they're everywhere—news, movies, gossip, social media—but they quietly fix what will feel real and important. In Iran, that isn't some literary aside; it's the operating system. If I already believe my nation has been humiliated for decades, then almost any foreign move is going to show up for me as either further humiliation or a chance to claw back dignity. If I live in a story of resistance, I will read the same move very differently—as proof that struggle is working, or that betrayal is close. Inside Iran, you see these rival storylines colliding all the time. Security hardliners reach for a script of dignity and survival: the world is hostile, only strength protects us, Compromise equals collapse. Reformist technocrats, when they have room to speak, lean into a story of order and competence. We can manage risk, we can be normal, just let us stabilize things. Protest movements bring a different narrative altogether, one of justice and exhaustion with fear. For them, each crackdown, each blackout, each arrest is a chapter in a long-running book about stolen futures. And then you have diaspora networks and regional actors, each with their own versions: betrayal, abandonment, redemption, revenge. By the time anyone opens a formal analysis—slides, charts, risk matrices—a lot of the important decisions have already been made, because those stories have silently narrowed what feels possible. If you are a hardliner, and your core tale is "we will never kneel," then a de-escalation step has to fight its way through that story. It doesn't matter that the spreadsheets say it's rational; it feels like surrender. If you are a protester living a story of "no more lies," then even a genuine reform proposal might be heard as just another act in the same long play of manipulation. This is why two sides can watch the same maritime incident—say, a ship boarded in the Gulf—and treat it as conclusive proof of completely opposite things. One camp sees it as bold resistance to bullying, another as reckless proof that the regime is beyond control, another as a calculated bargaining move. Crises deepen not only because people lack information, but because each faction takes the other's actions as confirmation that its own story was right all along. You get this feedback loop where language and action reinforce a narrative architecture that no one is actually mapping on purpose. So when we talk about Iran as a crisis, we're not just talking about missiles and sanctions; we're talking about a crowded, contested story system—humiliation and pride, Resistance and betrayal, legitimacy and fraud. The task for anyone trying to think strategically isn't just to predict moves, but to understand which stories those moves are going to live inside, and how that will decide what counts as reality next. Let's stay in that Iran map for a minute, but shift tools. In most institutions, when people hear scenario, they think forecasting. A kind of polite guess about what might happen— low, medium, high conflict— plus a few indicators to watch. It can feel very neutral, very procedural. The trouble is, that version of scenario work often floats above the actual stories people are living in. It pretends you can work with raw facts without touching humiliation, resistance, legitimacy, fear. A better way to think of scenarios is as disciplined stories. They're not predictions. They're structured what-ifs that make your assumptions visible and force you to follow them all the way to the uncomfortable end. If we keep treating this proxy escalation as manageable, what happens if one unlucky strike hits a school bus? If we lean entirely on cyber pressure, what happens when a misread signal takes down a hospital system instead of a radar array? Who gets blamed? Who feels vindicated? Who changes stories? Pierre Wack, one of the early pioneers of scenario planning in the corporate world, had this great insistence that scenarios had to change how decision-makers see before events force that change. In other words, the point isn't to get the future right. It's to jolt people out of the story they're in now long enough to recognize that other futures are plausible and that their own language may be blinding them. Done well, a scenario about Iran might say, "Let's inhabit the world where a limited exchange spirals because domestic audiences on each side stop believing in the word 'deterrence.' What does it feel like to be a commander who suddenly can't use that word without being laughed at or shouted down? What choices start to close?" Or, flip it: imagine a future where protests inside Iran gain traction precisely because outside powers hold back, undermining the hardliners' story that external enemies justify permanent emergency. How does that shift internal alliances? The contrast here is with what I'd call technical scenario work, which sticks to variables and curves and shies away from narrative. It lists stakeholders but doesn't really ask what stories those stakeholders inhabit. It branches pathways but only on measurable indicators, not on shifts in meaning, and because of that, it quietly ends up justifying whatever the institution already believes. You plug in the numbers, you emerge with the same comfort story you walked in with, now laminated with pseudo-rigor. StoryAware Scenario Practice does something harder. It says out loud, "This future assumes the public will keep trusting the phrase 'surgical strike.' This one assumes proportional response will still sound legitimate after the third round of escalation." Once you phrase it like that, people can argue back. Actually, our own data on protests or on veterans or on media narratives suggests that trust is already eroding. You move from scenario as bureaucratic ritual to scenario as a kind of structured argument about which story you are betting on. In a crisis like Iran, where actions double as messages that discipline matters, the goal isn't clairvoyance. It's honesty about the stories your plans depend on and a willingness to explore futures where those stories break. Once you take stories seriously, the classic language of stakeholder maps starts to feel a bit flat. It treats people and institutions as boxes with interests—government, military, business, civil society—neatly labeled and more or less stable. But the Iran crisis doesn't actually behave like that. It behaves like a moving network of overlapping storyworlds, each with its own vocabulary for power, belonging, risk, and possibility. In what we call Story Systems work, the starting point is very simple: language is evidence. The metaphors people lean on, the phrases they repeat, the things they refuse to name—these are clues to the deeper architecture of how they think the world works. Culture mapping takes those clues and lays them out in a structured way, so you can see patterns instead of isolated quotes. Around Iran, for instance, security hardliners might cluster around words like dignity, martyrdom, encirclement, red line. That language encodes a story in which the nation is perpetually under siege, and any concession is existential. Reformist technocrats, by contrast, reach for stability, normalization, investment, rule-based. They're imagining a world where Iran can be a functional node in a global system, rather than a permanent exception. Protest movements use a different register again: justice, freedom, corruption, fearless. Their storyworld is about reclaiming everyday life from a machinery of control. Diaspora communities add layers of betrayal, memory, return, voice. External powers circulate their own script in deterrence, containment, regional order, credibility. None of these are neutral. Each is a miniature universe of who is worthy, who is dangerous, who is invisible. When you put fragments of this language into a culture map, literally on a grid, you start to see which subcultures stabilize the existing story, which keep older narratives alive, which are quietly testing new ones, and which want to break the plot altogether. You also see places where internal factions and external publics accidentally share a vocabulary or crash into each other. And this leads to a very practical shift. Instead of asking, "Who do we need to inform about our next move?" you start with, Which story are we about to strengthen or break? A ministry planning a calibrated strike doesn't just list domestic and foreign audiences. It asks: inside the hardliner story of dignity, what will this look like? Inside the protest story of justice, does this confirm that nothing ever changes or open a crack? In the diaspora story of betrayal and return, does this move deepen the sense of abandonment or suggest a possible reentry? Once that's your unit of work, your strategy changes. You stop treating communication as after-the-fact packaging. You treat it as part of the action itself, because the meaning will land before the dust settles. You design scenarios that are written into these narrative worlds from the start, instead of grafting them on at the end. And crucially, you become more alert to small shifts in language. New slogans, worn-out metaphors, suddenly awkward phrases, as early warning signs that the underlying story system is moving. In a place as tightly wound as Iran, that movement can be the difference between a contained crisis and a cascade. Let's leave the war room for a bit and walk onto an ordinary street in, say, Los Angeles or Atlanta. Parked at the curb is an electric vehicle, charging cable trailing across the pavement. On paper, this is a completely different domain from Iran. It's about mobility, infrastructure, climate policy, markets. But if you listen closely, the same story structures are at work. For some people, the EV is a symbol that the future has finally arrived. The language here is freedom, clean, quiet, instant torque, 'Never go to a gas station again.' The grid and the street are imagined as friendly, responsive, built for you. In that story, a scenario about rapid EV adoption looks like unambiguous progress: lower emissions, new jobs, smarter cities. The word 'transition' carries a positive charge—movement from old to new, from dirty to clean. But there's another story running alongside it. For a driver in a rural area, or in a city neighborhood, with few chargers and unreliable power, the EV can be a moving reminder of exclusion. Here the language shifts: range anxiety, charging deserts, stranded, not for people like us. The same physical object lives in a different narrative world, one where the grid was never designed with your life in mind, and where infrastructure investments seem to flow elsewhere again. If institutions build scenarios for EVs that only inhabit the first story, where "transition" will obviously be heard as progress, they risk failing not on the numbers, but on the language. The uptake model may be impeccable, the assumptions about charging technology may be realistic, and yet on the ground the narrative may quietly flip from a story of freedom, to a story of being stranded, stuck at a broken charger at midnight, or unable to afford home charging because you rent, or waiting in line while someone else's car hogs the only fast charger for miles. In Story Systems terms, EVs are contested symbols. They sit at the intersection of subcultures, early adopters and car enthusiasts, climate activists, grid operators, low-income commuters, rideshare drivers, suburban homeowners, apartment dwellers. Each uses different language to talk about the same technology. A scenario that just says "consumer acceptance increases with incentives" is flattening all of those story worlds into a single, polite curve. A more honest EV scenario might explicitly test the moment when language starts to turn, When does "range anxiety" stop being a quirky early-adopter phrase and become a shared grievance? When do charging deserts enter mainstream talk as an injustice, not a nuisance? At what point does the phrase "transportation freedom" ring hollow for communities that keep getting left out of the map? If you treat those shifts in language as strategic alarms, you make different choices. You might design rollouts that prioritize the very neighborhoods most at risk of telling the stranded story. You might build public charging not just where demand is highest today, but where it will signal inclusion tomorrow. And you'd write scenarios that ask very directly: if we push this transition without addressing the story of exclusion, what happens when that story becomes dominant? What protests, what regulations, What backlash? Again, the point isn't that EVs are like missiles. It's that whether you're dealing with war or with wiring, the futures that stick are the ones whose stories people are willing to live inside. Scenario practice that ignores that is really just wishful thinking with better formatting. Now, one more shift in domain, from streets to bodies. GLP-1 drugs, used for diabetes and increasingly for weight loss, sit at the crossing point of 3 very different stories. You can almost hear them arguing with each other in the background of every headline. First, there's the medical story: risk reduction, clinical outcomes, managing chronic disease. The language here is A1C, comorbidities, evidence-based, guidelines. In that world, GLP-1s are tools to reduce suffering and prevent complications. Scenarios built from this story focus on health system capacity, long-term cost savings, access, side effects. Second, there's the market story: category growth, new segments, revenue, competition. The words are: blockbuster, uptake curve, pipeline, market share. Here, GLP-1s are a booming business opportunity, reshaping food, fitness, insurance. Scenario work in this register tends to revolve around pricing, supply constraints, new entrants. And then there's a third story that's more moral and cultural: whose bodies are acceptable, whose neighborhoods are worth changing, whose habits are fair game for judgment. The language starts as health, willpower, discipline, but it can drift quietly into talk of good bodies and bad bodies deserving and undeserving places. It shows up in jokes, in stigma, in unspoken assumptions about who should simply fix themselves with a drug instead of expecting better food environments or safer streets. If institutions build scenarios around GLP-1s that only engage with the first two stories, medicine and markets, they may miss the moment when the moral story hardens. You begin with what sounds like a neutral conversation about risk factors. Over time, that language can tilt into a worldview where we no longer feel obligated to change the conditions that make some neighborhoods sicker—food deserts, stress, pollution. Instead, those places become problems to be medicated, The phrase public health quietly becomes a story about individual bodies conforming to a norm, rather than about reshaping environments. In a Story Systems frame, that drift in language is a strategic alarm. When you start hearing more talk of acceptable bodies or of non-compliant communities that refuse help, you're not just dealing with bedside manner. You're watching a future lock-in where certain bodies and places are written out of the story of health altogether, or included only on punitive terms. Accountable scenario practice would force us to name that, explicitly. A health planner might sketch one future where GLP-1 deployment goes hand in hand with investments in food systems, housing, and urban design, where the story of health is still about shared environments and collective responsibility, And another where GLP-1s let wealthier groups opt out of structural change, leaving poorer neighborhoods to bear the same burdens under a thicker layer of stigma. Just as with Iran or EVs, the value here isn't in guessing which pathway will win; it's in surfacing the stories we're preparing to live into. Are we about to strengthen a narrative in which health means "fix your body to match the norm"? Or one where health means, we remake our systems so more kinds of lives can flourish? Across all these domains—Iran's contested security landscape, the uneven rollout of electric vehicles, the quiet revolution around GLP-1s—the pattern is the same. Crises and transitions don't unfold in a neutral space. They happen inside live story systems. Carried in language, amplified by subcultures, and stabilized by institutions that often don't realize which narratives they're reinforcing. The civic promise of scenario practice, at its best, is not that it will get the future "right." It's that it can make our dependence on stories visible in time for us to argue about them. To say, "This plan only works if people keep believing in deterrence," or transition, or health in a particular way. Is that a bet we're willing to make? If not, what other stories could we choose to nurture instead? If we can get into the habit of asking those questions, not just in moments of acute crisis, but in everyday strategic planning, we stand a better chance of building futures that people can actually inhabit. Rather than ones that look good only on the slide deck. And that, I think, is work we'll be coming back to again and again.



