Connections, Episode 18 — Iran: Domestic and Foreign Politics with Ali Vaez

What impact will the recent change of government in Iran have on the country and its people? Are Iran's relations with its neighbors and with the West heading towards relaxation or escalation? Welcome to Connections, the Arab Studies Institute's interview program on current events, policy questions, and new ideas. I'm Mahindra Bani, and for this episode, we're delighted to be speaking with Ali Vaez of Crisis Group. Ali Vaez is Iran Project Director and Senior Advisor to the President at Crisis Group. Previously, he was the Iran Project Director at the Federation of American Scientists. Trained as a scientist, Vaez has written and commented widely on Iranian affairs, including for most leading international print, digital, and television media. He is currently also Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. And a fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Ali Vaez, it's a real pleasure to welcome you to Connections.

Thank you very much, Mehran. It's a pleasure to be with you.

Thank you. You know, people often take a one-dimensional view of Iran when discussing its policy and politics, limiting it almost exclusively to the future of the Iran nuclear agreement. So I'd actually like to start by looking at its domestic politics, which I suspect is at least, if not significantly more important to many Iranians. And in this context, I'd like to ask you about the recent Iranian parliamentary elections, the presidential elections, a change in government. We now have a new president and a a new government in Iran. And I know I've heard you comment that this had been the least free and most restricted election in Iran since 1979, but also that it could lead to significant changes in domestic policy. So I'd be very interested to hear from you, what do you believe has been and will be the impact of these elections and the change of government on domestic policy and politics?

Sure, that's actually a very good way of starting this conversation. You know, the reality is Iranian elections, at least over the past 3 decades, were always unfree, unfair, but at least competitive. But since last year, the parliamentary election of 2020 and then the presidential election of 2021, there is a change in the government's approach towards the elections. It appears that that element of basically popular participation, which was a way of demonstrating the legitimacy of the system, is no longer a top priority for the Iranian leadership. And it all, I think, goes back to the delicate moment that Iran is in right now, where domestically everything is about succession. Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, is 82 years old, and, you know, who and what comes after him really determines the vested economic and political interests that exist in the system. And that really trumps everything else. That trumps foreign policy, that trumps nuclear policy, regional policy. That is the key question of the survival of the Islamic Republic, survival of the revolution, whose vision is going to prevail in the future. And that's why I think the system has decided that at this moment in time, it cannot really afford any kind of risk with opening up the system. And so it has decided to close it down.

And if I can interrupt, should we understand these recent elections also as an exercise in positioning for the succession, or more to prevent the space for any dissent and challenges to the existing system?

Well, I think it's the latter, but the reality is that it can be both. You know, we don't know. There is a lot of speculation that President Raisi is basically being prepared for succeeding the Supreme Leader in the same way that the Supreme Leader himself was president in the 1980s, when Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, passed away and he succeeded him as supreme leader. And, you know, in many ways, Mr. Raisi is a mini-me of Ayatollah Khomeini, even in the way he dresses himself and his attitude, his narrative. He really imitates the supreme leader, and I'm sure he has the ambition But whether the Supreme Leader and his office also want Mr. Raisi to become the successor, or is someone who's just laying the groundwork for whatever plans they have in mind for succession, is something that we really don't know at this stage.

I see. And that being said, do you expect, or have you perhaps already seen meaningful changes in domestic policy by the new Iranian government, or would you expect to see them in the months ahead?

So let me put it this way, that what we have in practice is minority rule right now in Iran. It's a very limited number of people from the inner circle who are trusted, who are now running every single institution in Iran. There is no rival faction pushing for a different vision or a different policy. This is, I would even argue, the first time in the history of Islamic Republic since 1979 that you have such a unified rule of a small group of political elite. A lot of people draw comparisons between this period right now and Ahmadinejad's presidency when the conservatives were also in control of seemingly in control of all institutions of power. But the reality is that Ahmadinejad himself, for instance, was not really appointed to any position before he became president by the Supreme Leader. He didn't owe his political success to the Supreme Leader. It was his own populist messaging and skills that brought him up as—

so he had a kind of independent power base. I think he was previously the mayor of Tehran.

He was trying to create an independent power base at some stage. You know, he came to power with a really populist narrative. Then midway, he turned around and started using ancient Persia's symbols and narratives around the greatness of, you know, Iranian monarchies of 2,500 years ago as a way of mobilizing support for himself. So he evolved or devolved, however you want to put it, over the years. But my point here is that, you know, now you have a setup that the president, the head of the judiciary, the head of the parliament, everyone in every institution is or has been an appointee of Ayatollah Khamenei in the past. And so that's why they have created a very homogenized setup. And that's for two main reasons from what I've heard from Iranian interlocutors. Number one is that the system is dealing with too many crises at the same time. Iran has had economic problems in the past. It has dealt with unrest in the past. But it is now dealing with a confluence of crises from economic to environmental to Iran's instability in Iran's near abroad, you know, from takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban to tensions now between Iran and Azerbaijan and Turkey. You know, the other side, Iraq going through elections, Iran's neighbors to the south establishing relations with Iran's arch rival in the region, Israel. And there is unrest, there are shortages of electricity, protests. And so it's a really tall order that they have to deal with. And somebody described it to me, a senior Iranian official described it to me as, You know, it's like we're driving towards a cliff and we can't afford to have the wheel and the gear in the hands of two different people who don't agree with one another. We need to have, at least at this stage, put aside even the concept of pluralism because the priority is the survival of the system. And again, I think that's even overshadowed by the bigger question of Ayatollah Khamenei's succession.

Yeah, and this is quite a different perspective than the one we often receive in the Western media, which is basically that Iran is becoming a surrogate state of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. You, if I understand you correctly, you seem to believe they have a role. They certainly have influence, but this concept that they are now in charge of the state is not really applicable.

Yeah, I don't believe Iran has become a military dictatorship. Without any doubt, the Revolutionary Guard is extremely powerful, but, you know, at the end of the day, they're subservient to the Supreme Leader. And this system, at the end of the day, is a constitutional theocracy. And, you know, the Iranian clerical establishment still holds enormous amount of power. They control religious and revolutionary foundations that are basically responsible for about a quarter of Iran's economy. And, you know, the Shia clerics in Iran understand that it took them 14 centuries to ascend to the pinnacle of power. And, you know, if they lose it to the military, it's a one-way street. And so I don't think the system is prepared to just hand power to the Revolutionary Guards. But there is also a risk that the Revolutionary Guards has become so omnipotent and powerful and present in all sectors of the country, from politics to economy, even in cultural sphere, that in the absence of someone like Ayatollah Khamenei who can rein them in, there is a possibility that they would be able to take over. So that risk exists, but I don't think the system deliberately is moving in that direction.

And that may also, the potential scenario that you just described, that may also help explain the increasingly restricted political space at this particular historical juncture. Would you agree with that?

Well, absolutely. Again, I think we are in a situation that the system just doesn't want to take any risks because, you know, Ayatollah Khamenei is someone who came to power in 1989 as an underdog. But managed to outweigh and outwit everyone in the system, people who were much smarter, much better placed than him, and has now, I would argue, more institutional power than any Iranian ruler in the past century. And, you know, and this was done through calculated steps that he has taken. So I refuse to believe that a man like that does not have a plan for his succession. And he knows that the survival of his vision, his legacy, depends on who and what comes next. And so that's why in the past few years we've seen that he intentionally has acted in ways that are, you know, not in line with his previous pattern of behavior. He really did care about participation rate, but like, you know, in the presidential election this year, a participation rate in Tehran, the capital, was below 25%. In some of the previous elections, like in the parliamentary elections in some provinces, there was really no competition. There was only one candidate for a district, for instance.

The others having been disqualified.

Exactly. And so he has put aside the semblance of pluralism because he has bigger fish to fry, basically.

Right. Well, I'd like to return to the question of succession. Later in our discussion. But at this point, I think it would be interesting, having described the domestic scene, to also look at Iran's regional role and foreign affairs. And here, I think the obvious starting point would be the JCPOA, the Iranian nuclear agreement. You have been following this very closely, and I've heard from others that you also helped think through some of the proposals in 2014, 2015 that were actually incorporated in various forms into the agreement. I should add, if I'm not mistaken, you have a background in nuclear physics as well as political analysis. And from your understanding, Where do things now stand with the JCPOA? I mean, on the one hand, as you know, the U.S. unilaterally renounced this international agreement. Then, rather than rejoining it after Biden took office, they sought to renegotiate mutual compliance because in the U.S. view, Iran, while it never withdrew from the agreement, had violated certain aspects of it. So where do things stand, and how do you view what seems to be growing pessimism in the last month or two that an agreement can in fact be reached?

Right. So look, the negotiations are currently in a state of suspended animation since 3.5 months ago. And the expectation is that the new Iranian government will eventually come to the table at some point in November and, you know, would basically try to pick up from where the previous administration, the Rouhani administration, left off.

These are the talks taking place in Vienna with all the parties to the agreement plus the Americans?

That's correct. And the talks between Iran and the U.S. are indirect through intermediaries, through other the signatories to the deal, the Europeans, the Russians, and the Chinese. But, you know, talks were at a deadlock back in June because of, I would say, mismatched expectations between the two sides. So the Iranians, you know, as a matter of principle, see themselves as the aggrieved party here. They were fulfilling their obligations under the deal, but, you know, the U.S. withdrew from the deal. Iran stayed in it even a year after Trump ended U.S. participation in the agreement in the hope that the Europeans would try to help Iran confront the economic coercion that Trump had—

The maximum pressure campaign, as it was called.

Exactly. And when that didn't work, Iran started in an incremental manner rolling back its own compliance with its nuclear obligations. But, you know, but the reality is that the U.S. administration, the Biden administration, has not treated them as the aggrieved party. It has treated them as any other adversarial country that the U.S. is negotiating with. And in addition to that, it has, you know, asked Iran to commit to a follow-on negotiation to get what the Biden administration has called a longer and stronger nuclear deal. And, you know, Biden during his presidential campaign never mentioned return to the nuclear deal, the JCPOA, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, without also simultaneously mentioning that there is a need to build a follow-on successor agreement on top of it.

Sorry, but I think during the campaign, Biden at one point even said that the U.S. expected Iran to return to full compliance first before the U.S. would rejoin the agreement. Is that right?

Well, that came after— that came during the transition and then during the first few weeks of the Biden administration. And, you know, the Iranian expectation was that, you know, given that Biden and his team are the same people in the Obama administration negotiated, supported the JCPOA, that first of all, there will be a mea culpa of taking responsibility for the fact that it was the U.S. that reneged on the agreement. And the economic damages caused by the maximum pressure strategy, the Iranians estimate that it amounts to about a trillion dollars. And, you know, they expected that at least there would be a mention of regret that this has happened, and that then the U.S. would do the same thing that it did to restore its credibility on the international scene and reversing some of Trump's policies, like returning to Paris Climate Deal or returning to World Health Organization. They expected the same thing to happen on the JCPOA. When none of that happened, and also there was posturing on the U.S. side that Iran should take the first step to come back into compliance, I think it's hardened Iran's position. Now, I would argue Iran's position by that point already was pretty tough, and they had a set of unrealistic expectations. But I would say the first few weeks of the Biden administration really made matters worse. There was no goodwill gesture, no humanitarian relief from sanctions so that Iran could purchase COVID vaccines or medical equipment. And all of that really toughened Iran's position. And so the talks from the get-go were pretty, pretty difficult. Plus the fact that because there's no direct discussion between the Iranians and the Americans, there's plenty of room for misunderstandings and miscalculations.

Just, just on this point, I think many people have questioned— I mean, it would seem to be a reasonable assumption, you know, Trump withdrew from the agreement, and the expectation would have been that Biden would simply rejoin it and then address any issues about Iranian non-compliance with any aspects of the agreement from within the agreement. But as you pointed out, that never happened. What is your understanding of why the Biden administration has refused to rejoin the agreement, especially after all the criticism that his own people made of Trump's withdrawal from it?

You think? You know, I think there are two reasons for this. Number one is the fact that the Iranian Supreme Leader had already, by the time that Biden came to office, determined a set of demands or red lines that signaled to the U.S. that a unilateral U.S. return to the agreement is not going to work because it might fall short of Iran's expectations. For instance, For instance, the Supreme Leader had said in a vague manner that Iran expects all sanctions to be lifted. I mean, just for listeners, maybe they don't know the details, but what the JCPOA did was basically to suspend sanctions. It didn't permanently lift them. And so, and to do it in a verifiable manner, which, you know, Iran's nuclear commitments could be verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog. So there is a neutral, you know, referee here. But in the case of sanctions relief, it wasn't clear what the Iranians actually meant by verification. So there were questions of whether U.S. unilateral action would actually work. That's one element. The second element is that I think the president, President Biden, when he came to office and saw the intelligence in terms of Iran's activities in Iraq against U.S. presence, Iran's support for the Houthis in Yemen, you know, the tit-for-tat that happened between Iran and Israel in the maritime realm. All of that signaled that Iran is extremely aggressive, and it was perceived, I think, that unilateral U.S. action would be misinterpreted by the Iranians as a sign of weakness and might actually backfire. So it's a combination of those two factors, but also initially in the first few weeks of the Biden administration, there was a debate about the policy and there was consultation with allies, and that also slowed down the process and again led to Iran hardening its own stance.

And if we look at the current situation, some people have suggested that given— and here I'd like to refer to your background also as a scientist— that some people have suggested, given Iran's activities in the nuclear realm since 2019 and the additional knowledge and expertise that it has gained, that at this point, Iranian compliance with the 2015 agreement may not even be worth it to the Americans, while at the same time, the Iranians had such a bitter experience with the Trump administration effectively making the Europeans accomplices to the maximum pressure that the Iranians may not be all that interested either. But at the same time, they say there's a big difference between 2021 and 2011, which is that currently a full agreement or armed conflict are not the only options, that there could also be various informal understandings or limited agreements. How do you see these issues?

So look, I don't think either side has made the strategic decision that the nuclear deal is no longer serving their interests. I think there are tactical differences in terms of how to return to mutual compliance with with the JCPOA. But both sides still see it in their interest. And at the end of the day, the alternatives to it are really not that much more attractive for either side either. I mean, take into account, for instance, that if the JCPOA completely collapses, and, you know, I say it as a possibility, because we might not have a moment of collapse, it might be a process. But if the JCPOA collapses, it basically means that Iran's nuclear program will continue to grow. It's now 1 month away from the point of breakout, which is, you know, an artificial concept, but basically is the amount of time that it takes to accumulate enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon. That doesn't mean you have the weapon, but it means you have the material for a weapon, and then you have to fashion it into a weapon.

And so it becomes only a question of time. Taking a decision rather than acquiring scientific expertise.

That's correct, yes. But, and the JCPOA extended that timeline to 12 months. And now, as a result of the Trump administration withdrawal, which led to Iranian violations of the deal, breakout time is at 1 month. Now imagine if this process, if the deal collapses, or that we get into a protracted stalemate in the negotiations, which means that Iran's nuclear program will continue to grow, in a few months Iran's breakout time will be near zero. And that would for sure, you know, raise alarm bells. And there is a possibility of an Israeli or U.S., or actually both, taking military action against Iran's nuclear facilities. Even if that doesn't happen, you know, the JCPOA will become completely irrelevant because Iran would make the kind of advancements in terms of research and development the kind of knowledge that they will learn that you can't bomb out of their head or wipe out of the head of their scientists, that it would require a different deal. So the JCPOA nonproliferation value will be completely lost. On the Iranian side, it also means that Iran would have to continue to live under sanctions. Now, the new government in Iran, the Raisi administration's view is that they can survive without sanctions relief. The reality is, you know, after the U.S. has basically thrown the entire kitchen sink at them, everything that could be sanctioned has already been sanctioned, but they're still standing. And they believe that, you know, they might not be able to thrive, but they can survive. And the reality is that they have a much bigger space to ratchet up the nuclear program, ratchet down the inspections, and also escalate in the region, especially against U.S. presence in Iraq and Syria, then the U.S. can match their leverage. Because again, the U.S. is almost maxed out. And so that creates in the minds of the new Iranian administration this perception that time is on their side, And so that's, I think, the main reason that they have not returned to the negotiating table, but also that there is a real— I don't think it's just a rhetorical issue. There is real skepticism on the Iranian side that the U.S. can deliver on sanctions relief, you know, because they've gone through this experience before. In 2016, sanctions relief really fell short of their expectations. Other than oil and gas. You know, their economy, their banking sector never went back to normal. Trade was never normalized. And, you know, they fear that Democrats might lose control over Congress in 2022 and might even lose the White House in 2024. And so, and there are some in Iran who believe this kind of uncertainty that is created as a result of the sanctions switch being on and off every 2 years or every 4 years is more detrimental to the Iranian economy than the predictability that they need to basically count on their own resources and become self-sufficient. And so the combination of all of that, I think, has resulted in a very tough Iranian approach towards the negotiations, which has created a lot of pessimism about the possibility of a breakthrough.

And is your current expectation, assessment, that the resumption of talks will or will not lead to diplomatic success?

Look, I think there is a narrow path forward, but it requires both sides to demonstrate flexibility. If they go back to the table and pick up from where they left off with the same demands or even new or bolder red lines, the outcome is not going to be that different. It really requires both of them to understand that status quo ante is not entirely restorable. But, you know, if Iran gets 70% of sanctions relief that it wishes for, it's better than zero. And if the U.S. gets 70% of nonproliferation value of the JCPOA, it's better than zero. If they go in with that mentality, I think there is a path forward. But again, you know, there is a lot of bad blood here. There's a lot of mistrust. And so it's going to be an extremely difficult negotiation. And at the end of the day, you know, if they restore the JCPOA, then I think it's in their mutual interest to negotiate a successor agreement because both sides were unsatisfied with the original agreement. The Iranians were unhappy with sanctions relief. They require sanctions relief that goes beyond what the JCPOA offered. And the U.S. was unsatisfied with some of the nuclear restrictions. And then eventually, you know, once you get a successor agreement, it would also hopefully be more sustainable, which is another major shortcoming of the JCPOA if we look at the record of the past 4 years.

So you were saying earlier that Iran, from its own perspective, has escalatory dominance, if I can use that term, over the United States. And I also recall an interview I did with you a year or two ago in which you ascribed some of the difficulties in the current relationship between Iran and the United States and others as the problem of the JCPOA coming before any agreement on a regional security architecture. So turning now to the region, despite these points that you've been making, Iran appears to have actually chosen a somewhat different path in terms of its participation in the Baghdad Dialogue hosted by the Iraqi government, in which it is meeting with the Saudis, the Emiratis, others in the region. And there's even talk of a renewal of Saudi-Iranian diplomatic and consular relations. Should we see these discussions as serious? Or are they kind of window dressing, or is there a real interdependence between what's happening in the region and what's happening internationally?

That's a very interesting question. Look, let me just make a distinction between two processes that have happened in Baghdad. One is the Iran-Saudi dialogue, four rounds of which have happened with Iraqi facilitation. And the Baghdad process, which is a broader process of most of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran, but it also goes as far as Egypt and France and some other participants. And there have been two meetings so far, one in Baghdad, one, a follow-up meeting in New York, and the third round will be in Amman soon. I'm not as optimistic about the latter as I am about the former in the sense that a broader group, I I think brings a lot of complexities to the table. If we're focused on the Gulf per se, or let's put it this way, 6+2, which are the 6 GCC countries plus Iran and Iraq, I think you have a better chance of success than if you bring in other countries that brings other, you know, the difficulties and complexities, including Iraq's close neighbor friends? Yes, absolutely. So there are too many cooks in this kitchen, I think, and there are too many, you know, ambitions and agendas. So I'm not— although I find it quite promising that leaders in the region are now willing to actually be under the safe roof and talk to one another, that in and of itself I think is an important development. But I'm a bit skeptical about the Baghdad process. But where I see potential is on Iran's relations with its GCC neighbors. And here is where the situation is completely different than 2015 when the JCPOA was finalized. Because at the time, you know, the Saudis, Emiratis, the Bahrainis, you know, they were reluctantly willing to support the JCPOA, but they actually were pretty afraid that the JCPOA would unshackle Iran and would result in Iran basically having a freer hand in pursuing its agenda of trying, in their view, to dominate the region. And this time it would be with the U.S.'s green light. So when they saw an opportunity in Trump to once again put Iran back in a box, they completely changed sides and supported the maximum pressure policy. And the difference we have now with 2015 is that they maybe believed that the alternative would work better. Maybe pressure would work better than diplomacy. Maybe Iran back in a box would be better. Now, as a result of maximum pressure, they know that there is a cost associated with that policy and they are the ones who will be paying that cost.

And here you're referring, for example, to the 2019 attack on the Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia.

Absolutely. And attacks on, for instance, the port of Fujairah in the UAE, which created an interesting model that I think now Saudis are interested in. I would call it the Emirati model, which is after that attack, which I believe was in May of 2019, The UAE sent a delegation to Iran headed by security establishment and had dialogue with their Iranian counterparts. There was a few rounds of discussions about maritime security. The Emiratis actually opened up a few financial channels to the Iranians, you know, despite unhappiness in the Trump administration. But that resulted in de-escalation between Iran and the UAE. And, you know, the Emiratis basically through that engagement got themselves out of the line of fire. I think the Saudis came to the same conclusion a bit later, but also this perception that the U.S. is not a reliable security guarantor for the Gulf countries has further helped with these countries basically opening up more channels of communication with Iran. But having said that, I think there's also a limit to how far these processes can go if Iran is de-escalating with its neighbors in the Gulf when it's simultaneously escalating with the West over its nuclear program. I think in that scenario, all you get is the UAE model. A certain degree of de-escalation, which could potentially shield the Gulf off of another round of mutual escalation between Iran and the U.S. But if the JCPOA is restored, then I think you have a much better basis to combine the effort of diffusing the nuclear crisis with efforts of actually dialogue in the region. That could go hand in hand in addressing some of the other concerns about Iran's policy in the region, be it its support for proxies or proliferation of technologies like ballistic missiles or drones to non-state actors in the region.

And we've also heard that Israel is apparently quite disappointed with this Baghdad dialogue because it had been hoping to use its newly formed, normalized relations with some of the GCC states as an alternative point of pressure on Iran at a time when the U.S. is indirectly re-engaging with it. And, you know, we've seen a continuation of Israeli sabotage and assassination attacks on Iran. Where do you see that relationship heading, given the regional and international environment we've been discussing?

So that relationship is a real point of concern because, you know, on the Iranian side, you have a real desire within the establishment to restore deterrence with Israel. Israel has conducted a number of operations, covert operations on Iranian soil, which has been extremely humiliating to the Iranians, you know, from assassination of Iran's top nuclear scientist last November, Fakhrizadeh, to sabotage of Iran's nuclear facilities in Natanz and elsewhere, and some of the critical infrastructure in the country. To cyber attacks, to attacks on Iranian tankers throughout the world, by the way, is not just limited to the Gulf. It goes as far as the Mediterranean or the Red Sea. And Iranian retaliation of that, you know, to Israeli attacks on Iranian military presence in Syria, which has gone mostly unanswered by the Iranians. There is, you know, there was this demand to restore deterrence with Israel during the Rouhani administration, but I think there was a debate within Iran's national security apparatus, and Rouhani really did not want to provide any kind of ammunition for Israel to use against Iran to derail nuclear diplomacy, or at the time of the Trump administration, to actually provide some sort of a casus belli that the U.S. would actually use to attack Iran. But now, with this homogenized leadership in Iran, I think the Iranians believe that they have to take, you know, the kind of action on Israeli soil that would restore deterrence. And that's a major concern because it can obviously spiral out of control. But I don't believe that Israel can actually do much to derail the kind of regional diplomacy that we were talking about in the Gulf, because that's a decision that I think, you know, the Gulf leaders have come to, and they know that Israel will not come to their defense. If the U.S. was unwilling to come to their defense, Israel will not. They live right next door to Iran. and, and they need to figure out a way of managing their own differences with Iran. I think that decision has already been made, but, you know, all that doesn't take away from the fact that more and more Gulf countries have relations with Israel as well, and that provides them with options for hedging their bets, right?

So, um, finally, Ali, I'd like to return to the question of, um, of succession. And of course, you described Iran as a constitutional theocracy, and it has a fairly complex institutional system. You know, you have an elected parliament and president, but supreme decision-making authority is not in the hands of either. If I'm not mistaken, if we go back to the late 1980s, Rafsanjani was a designated successor until— I can't recall if it was Ayatollah Khomeini who subsequently anointed Khamenei or whether he ascended after Khomeini's death. But looking at the situation now, do you expect the succession unfold in a manner that is decided by the current Supreme Leader? Or once he has departed from the scene, will other centers of power be able to reach a decision and appoint new leaders that are perhaps at variance with with the wishes of the current leadership?

So look, we only have one data set to look at in terms of precedence of succession in Iran, and that's 1989. And, you know, if we had this discussion 6 months before Ayatollah Khomeini passed away, there was a designated successor in the form of Ayatollah Montazeri, who was one of the founders of the revolution. And we knew that, you know, the Assembly of Experts, which is this institution which is in charge charge of selecting the Supreme Leader would have to elect a successor who has to be an ayatollah. 6 months later, Khamenei, who at the time was not even an ayatollah and was not even a designated successor, became Supreme Leader through the kind of machinations that actually Rafsanjani brought to the fore. And he was, you know, he was known as the Ayatollah Machiavelli in Iran in many ways. It's very savvy political operator. And that eventually, you know, came at his own detriment because eventually Khamenei became so powerful that he completely even sidelined Rafsanjani. But just to say that, you know, we can't look just at the tea leaves and try to read them and predict what's going to come next because Iran is not really amenable to those kind of projections. But, but, um, there are a few things that I think are clear, um, and, uh, and that's the fact that, you know, the, the difference between, uh, right now or whenever Ayatollah Khamenei passes— and by the way, let me add this, that, uh, you know, his— he's 82 now, uh, his father lived— some have lived longer, yeah, his father lived to be 104, uh, so he has good genes. And, you know, who knows, maybe we'll have this discussion, uh, you know, 10 years from now, or maybe, you know, things would change in a week, who knows. But the reality is, you know, in 1989, Khomeini's inner circle was really small. It was his son. He was a traditional Shia ayatollah, so his son was his office. Like, you know, today if you go to Sistani's office, you know, it's his son who's running it. And Khamenei, who was at the time president, and Rafsanjani, who was at the time the head of the parliament. That was his inner circle. Ayatollah Khamenei has an office that is projected to be 5,000 strong. 5,000 people work there, and we really— it's an institution, is a black box. We don't have a full understanding of the power dynamics within his office, and I think the succession will come out of that black box, which, by the way, includes his son, who's a very powerful One of his sons was a very powerful actor in his office, and I think the office has an interest in preserving its own power because in the brutal, cruel politics of Iran, they have seen what happens to the families of former, you know, officials, supreme leader, former presidents, and it's not a happy story. And so I think—

Am I correct that Montazeri was placed under house arrest?

That is correct. Montazeri was placed under house arrest Rafsanjani's children were imprisoned. You know, Khomeini's grandson— Khomeini's son was allegedly eliminated, killed by Khamenei and Rafsanjani. Khomeini's grandson has tried to enter politics in different ways. He's never been allowed to. He wanted to run for president this year. The Supreme Leader told him not to. He wanted to run even for the Assembly of Experts, and they didn't allow him to. To, to become a candidate. And so they've been completely sidelined from politics, and I don't think that's what the current office wants to happen. And so they have an interest in trying to bring to power somebody who does not have a base of his own and therefore will have to be reliant on the current office in order to govern. And in some ways, Raisi fits that profile. But if it— if the succession happens in the next few months, or maybe, you know, in the next year, but if it happens at the end of his presidency, he is going to more likely have a better command of, you know, Iranian politics and, and also build relations with the military, or even create a base of his own. So that's why I said I'm not 100% certain that Raisi is the designated successor at this stage. But I'm sure the office has a plan. It's just that we don't know what that is.

Right. And we'll have to see if that plan is indeed executed according to plan, which is always the other challenge. But on that note, Ali Vaez, I like to really thank you for sharing your expertise and insights about Iran, its domestic politics, and its regional and international affairs with us on Connections. Thank you very much.

An absolute pleasure. Thanks for having me.

Thank you.