Iran at a Crossroads: Will Domestic Unrest Reshape the Region?

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Ayad Al-Ghaffar. I'm the director of the Foreign Policy Program here at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. It's a pleasure to have you with us. Today, Iran is facing an unprecedented number of crises, arguably the most challenging since the inception of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Domestically, Iranians are simultaneously grappling with hyperinflation, currency collapse, water shortages, and a growing perception that the regime has prioritized its regional ambitions over their basic needs. As the country faces domestic unrest, the challenges are compounded by several regional setbacks and increasing international pressure since Israel's attack last year, as well as the US attacks on the country. The network of allies that Tehran spent years cultivating and building have been severely degraded, raising doubts about the viability and sustainability of its forward defense doctrine. Last year, it was attacked by both the US and Israel, and this conflict remains unresolved and may erupt again at any moment. So what will be the outcome of the protests and unrest domestically on the regime's calculus? And as it grapples with domestic unrest, how is the government assessing its regional posture and forward defense doctrine? How will US policy change and evolve under the current US administration? To unpack many of these questions, we've assembled for you an excellent panel today. First, we have Ali Vaez, the Iran Project Director at International Crisis Group, and we also have Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at XWP and also my colleague here at the Middle East Council as a non-resident fellow. Gentlemen, it's a real pleasure to have you. I follow your work very, very closely, especially at these critical times, so I really want us to have a good in-depth conversation now for our audience to really understand and unpack many of these issues. Ali, I just want to start with you. I want to ask you, at a basic level, how is this protest wave different than previous protest waves, and what are the demands of the protesters?

Thank you very much, Adel, for the invitation. It's great to be with you and with my dear friend Hamid on this panel. Look, these protests were different, I think, in two specific ways. Was the just degree of sheer desperation within the population that has created this sense of finality, that this current status quo is just untenable. And this is not limited to one segment of the society or one specific geographic location in Iran, as has been the case in some protests in the past. We saw, for instance, in the province of Khuzestan a few years ago, protests about water scarcity. Of course, the protests, the Women, Life, Freedom protests of 2022 was triggered by the killing of a Kurdish girl in Tehran. And we've also seen economically driven protests. But almost for an entire population, a national sense of being at a deadlock and going beyond any specific policy demand, like recounting the votes or changing a specific economic policy, to get to a point of really the majority of the population wishing to see the back of this regime, it was quite unique and extraordinary. The second way it was unique, I think, was this convergence of internal unrest. And external threats. The Islamic Republic, in its 47-year-long history, it has experienced unrest repeatedly. It has also experienced foreign threats. It has rarely experienced the convergence of the two. And I think that is one of the reasons that the regime resorted to brute force with speed and ferocity. That we had not seen in the past, and has resulted now in the highest number of fatalities, even according to the Islamic Republic's own narrative. Now, of course, the regime blames a lot of that on foreign instigation and on elements of foreign intelligence agencies. But, you know, what I have noticed over the years is that the pace of protests in Iran are becoming more frequent, and they're also becoming more violent. And again, one of the reasons that they're becoming more violent is because the population is just so fed up and frustrated that some of these acts of violence are acts of desperation, in fact. That doesn't rule out the possibility that there might be foreign hands as well. We saw how deeply penetrated Israeli intelligence has been in the Iranian system and society, given the extraordinary operations that they could mount during the 12-day war against Iran. But again, the primary failure is the failure of Islamic Republic's rulers themselves. And if foreigners have a hand in it, they're just adding fuel to fires. That have been instigated by the regime itself.

Great, thanks Ali. Hamid, maybe I'll just move to you as well and just have you commentate on the protest movement and how do you see the government responding as well?

Thank you, thank you Adel. It's a pleasure to join you again for a discussion, especially this timely one, and also a pleasure to share the panel with Ali. So let me start where Ali just ended, the kind of convergence of the external and internal angles of pressure on the Islamic Republic, which is, as he mentioned, is kind of unprecedented, at least since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Because in the early years after the Islamic Revolution and during the war, of course, we had also some separatist movements, some rebel movements in different parts of the country. And that kind of resulted in the government feeling the need to shift some of its attention and resources to fighting domestically. But what I want to say is that I think that experience and also the accumulation, of course, of the internal and external pressure, that was the main reason that kind of compelled the Islamic Republic leaders to use such kind of extreme measures and commit this kind of mass killing of the protesters. Because one thing that I heard frequently in the period after the end of the 12-day war and up to the start of the protests in late December, from the government-affiliated experts, also between the lines, or sometimes also publicly from the Iranian officials, was that they were expecting this to happen. On one hand, they were seeing the kind of, you know, how challenging the economic situation is, especially given the hardened position of the U.S. administration under Donald Trump, which to their view had already closed the door to any fair and acceptable, or better to say, face-saving agreement on the nuclear issue and other matters. So they saw this pressure on one side, and on the other hand, they were basically seeing the war with Israel as not finished decisively with a very fragile and informal ceasefire. So there was this repeated mention to the possibility of Israel basically instigating, in their wording, an internal kind of problem or internal uprising or something so that it could build on that and sort of, you know, deal a more decisive blow. Because again, in the Islamic Republic narrative, their view was that in the June war, in the 12-day war, Israel attacked Iran hoping that the people would be encouraged to pour to the streets against the regime. But this time it would be the opposite. And they would wait. And of course, behind the scenes they would work on bringing people, convincing people to come to the streets. And then initiates an attack. So this kind of framing was already there. So I think for that reason, I think it wasn't like that the Islamic Republic was surprised and that surprise led to using excessive force and killing of thousands of people. Because they were ready and because they were afraid that if they don't, quell the protests quickly enough, the situation would be suitable for Israel and/or the United States to attack. They felt the need to use extreme force against the protesters. And by that, they would send a message to both domestic and external audience. The message to the domestic audience, of course, would be that, you know, the threshold for accepting any kind of civil activism by the regime has even lowered than before. And to the external is that if the existence of the regime is threatened, they wouldn't even shy away from mass killing of their own citizens, let alone resorting to measures like, I don't know, the things that they threatened before but they didn't do. Like, I don't know, closing the Strait of Hormuz or targeting US bases around the region, those measures, for example. So I think this kind of perception of the combination of external and internal oppression reaching a decisive point, and the fear that the internal unrest would provide the ground for an external attack, And especially things like Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to the United States end of December, and Trump's change of tone, and bringing for the first time, or better to say, mentioning for the first time the Iranian missile threats, as he framed it. So these things were kind of seen as different parts of the same puzzle that eventually led to this kind of extreme measure. And to end with this, I think that's why people like Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, for example, refer to the protest, the first day of the mass protest on January 8th, as the day 13 of the war with Israel. So to my mind, it's not just propaganda. Of course, propaganda is part of it. War framing, securitization, these are part of the plots. But beneath that, I think there's a real fear that it is part of a hybrid war and that it may get to the thresholds of existential for the Islamic Republic.

Okay, thanks, Hamid. And Ali, maybe I want to go to you now. We've covered a bit of the protests. You know, any protest movement needs to coalesce around organized opposition that advances its goals. So I wanted you maybe to perhaps reflect on the Iranian opposition, not just inside the country, but outside the country. Who's ready to lead? Who's ready to further this movement if it does move forward?

Very good question. So look, I think one of the reasons that these protests did not succeed, at least not for now, in dislodging the Islamic Republic is precisely the fact that they remain leaderless and organizationless, in the sense that, you know, if you compare this to 1979 Revolution, it is true that Ayatollah Khomeini was leading the revolution from exile. But first of all, he was seen almost universally, even by Maoists and communists opposition of the Shah, as the right man for the moment. And they had all coalesced around him. And second, he had organizational capacity inside the country. He had a network of mosques and charitable organizations that were organizing the protests and distributing his messages throughout the country. He even had a Council of Revolution who were, a majority of them were based inside the country. Now, there is no opposition leader outside of Iran who has those kind of capabilities. Partly is because of lack of charisma or lack of leadership skills and failure to serve as a unifier. You know, again, Ayatollah Khomeini, if we compare with that as an example of successful revolutionary movement, his mantra was prior to the revolution that, you know, if you agree with me at 10%, you're an ally. The problem with the current Iranian opposition, especially the one in exile, is that if you agree with them at 90%, you're still an enemy if there's 10% disagreeing. And so, for that reason, I think no one from the outside has been able to gain sufficient legitimacy to be seen as a viable alternative. Now, for sure, the former crown prince's stock has improved. Reza Pahlavi. He has, I think, more followership inside the country, some of it as a result of a sense of nostalgia of the past when Iran was economically prosperous and socially free. But some of it is also, again, out of this sense of sheer desperation that there's no one else. The reason there's no one else is also partly the regime's fault. Because it has imprisoned everyone who could potentially serve as an alternative at home. I mean, there is a Nobel Prize laureate, Naguib Mohamadi, who is now imprisoned. There is someone like Nasrin Sotoudeh, a very prominent human rights lawyer. Mostafat Tajzadeh, not a very prominent political political activists and former officials, these are all sitting in jails in Iran. So, there is no alternative inside the country and no alternative outside of the country. And I think that is one of the reasons that you see that the regime is successful in cracking down and remaining in power, in addition to the fact that there is also no cracks at the top of the system. You don't see any defections, and the system remains at least among the political elites, you see a sense of closing the ranks, because they all understand that they're sitting in the same ship, and if it sinks, they will all sink with it.

Thanks, Ali. And Hamid, do you agree with this assessment of the Iranian opposition, and do you see them perhaps getting stronger in the coming period, or still they're being divided and conquered?

Well, I think one very special feature of this wave of protests, especially on January 8th and 9th, was of course the role of the diaspora opposition, and in this case Reza Pahlavi, in kind of calling for mobilization. For the people actually to come to the streets and basically many, many of them of course chanted his name and also there were slogans about the monarchy and things like that. But in these just past 2 weeks, I think a lot of things have happened that point to a specific direction that is more or less in line with what Ali just described. So I think the opposition, and especially Reza Pahlavi, they couldn't take the momentum in order to turn this mobilization into an effective movement that would essentially challenge the Islamic Republic. And that, of course, has to do with the lack of proper organization, and of course, also lack of proper planning. Because I can see, I mean, of course, fewer people from the Iranians inside the country due to the lack of communication tools and internet restrictions and everything. But many people from the Iranian diaspora who actually more or less, or at least tacitly, agreed to Pahlavi's call. Are now questioning the fact that, or basically criticizing the fact that he called on the people to go to the streets, but he didn't have any plan for what to do next. And if the plan was just to wait for foreign intervention or to pitch that movement to US President Donald Trump in order to convince him that foreign intervention, a military intervention is needed. That actually, I think, backfired in the sense that that's been one of the key arguments that the Islamic Republic has resorted to in order to even more forcefully crash the protest. So that's very important to have in mind. And also, many people who who basically did accept the call and went to the streets, they are not necessarily seen, they cannot necessarily be seen as supporters of the monarchy or those who want to go back to the political system before 1979. What unifies people at this moment is, of course, is their hatred of the Islamic Republic more than their affection towards this or that specific political figure. And again, People inside the country saw the momentum in order to show unity, but lack of proper organization on the side of the diaspora opposition led to what we eventually saw. This doesn't mean that we are done with the protest or that there is no potential for any organized or coordinated opposition. But it really depends on the extent to which different opposition factions, again, as Ali mentioned, they can agree on at least some fundamental, some basic principles and work with each other. We had a moment after the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in 2022 that different people gathered together at that famous Georgetown meeting, but it was very much, very short-lived. And internal disagreements led to the fragmentation. And we shouldn't also overlook the fact that the Islamic Republic itself has, over the years, and this is not a new phenomenon actually, over the decades, has been actively trying to manipulate the opposition and trying to divide and rule. So part of the narrative that is extreme in rejecting this or that person or expressing, for example, dissent towards one segment of the opposition if not instigated, if not initiated by the Islamic Republic itself, is at least promoted by that in order to face one segment of the opposition at a time, and by that, prolonging its existence in the sense that it has been so far.

Thanks, Hany. Before I move on to the next segment and discuss the regional context, I know both of you have family in Iran, and there's an internet blackout. So how are people bypassing this internet blackout? How can you check on your families and loved ones? Ali?

Well, it's actually very difficult to do so. At least for the first 8 days since shutdown of the internet, it was almost impossible to get any news. I didn't have any news of my family. But as of about a few days ago, landlines function, but they can only call you. You can't call them. And so I've had at least one call from my family letting me know that they're doing okay. And here's to hoping that internet blackouts would be lifted in the next few days and communication will be re-established.

Hamid, do you have the same situation as well?

Yeah, of course, it's the same for all Iranians living abroad. And I think it was yesterday or the day before that Deputy President, one of Raisi's deputies actually, said that internet is going to be reconnected by the end of the week, but then it was rejected by some other figures. So it's very controversial. And in the meantime, there are rumors that the Iranian government may be actually establishing this kind of national intranet somehow. Because over the past few days, we saw a few strange things. For example, people getting connected shortly and then getting disconnected again from the international internet. And then, kind of incremental opening of some specific platforms like, first, there were access to some of the internal websites were re-established. And then the latest one, for example, yesterday was that they said now access to this Chinese AI chatbot Deepseek is now re-established. So it really has raised concern over some sort of Chinese model being implemented of this different layers of multi-layered somehow internet connection and certain people having access to international internet freely and others, you know, without it. So it's still very much ambiguous, I think.

Thanks, Hamid. And as Iran, of course, grapples with— the government grapples with all this domestic unrest, this will, of course, have an impact on Iran's regional posture. So I just wanted to maybe expand the conversation and move on and build on it, Ali. And just ask you, how do you see Tehran assessing its regional posture and its forward defense doctrine? You know, many of its allies, Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, and others in the region have been severely degraded, and this forward defense doctrine has been critical for Iran over the past decade. So how do you think the government is looking at its position regionally?

Well, although this is really Hamid's area of expertise, so I'll be brief. But basically, you know, right after the 12-day war, there was a debate in Tehran about pros and cons of continuity when it gets to Iran's policy of forward defense, which is based on having these partners and proxies away from Iran's borders that were supposed to deter an attack on Iranian soil. In fact, since Israel adopted its own octopus doctrine in 2021, of deciding that it is going to adopt a forward defense policy of its own, of going after Iran directly rather than trying to fight the arms of the octopus to go after the octopus head in Tehran, I think this, the dynamics had shifted against Iran. And of course, after October 7th, with Israel having much higher appetite for risk and acting in a much bolder way, I think that game was almost lost for the Iranians. Of course, we saw gradual degradation of these groups and eventually direct confrontations between Iran and Israel, twice in 2024, and of course the 12-day war in 2025. So then the question was, you know, is it in Iran's interest to continue doubling down on the same approach that hasn't worked, or it has to do it better? And my sense is that those who were saying that this doesn't work didn't have a strategic alternative available, right? It's not like you can give up on Hezbollah and instead have Su-35 fighter jets from Russia. The Russians have not provided that kind of technology to the Iranians. And therefore, it appeared to me that Iran had, was at least tilting in the direction of trying to rearm these groups and try to do it more effectively in the way that it was done in the 1980s or in the 1990s. These groups were nimble, small organizations focused entirely on resistance and on fighting Israel rather than on governance or on projecting power beyond their own borders. So it did appear that the regime was moving in that direction. Now, I think what is important to realize is that this is a regime that is in a death spiral. You know, it is basically fighting for its survival. And that's why I do believe that whatever strategic assets it has, whether it's its missile program or whatever remains of the Axis of Resistance, it is going to hang on to them, and it is going to even activate they've done, if it ends up in another round of military confrontation with Israel and the United States, because again, it is cornered, it is, it faces an existential angst, and it sees no other option available to it.

Hamid, maybe you want to expand on that as well, and I also want you perhaps, if you're able to connect it to the nuclear question. And the nuclear calculus of the regime as well in terms of potential deterrence.

Sure. Nuclear is of course Ali's jurisdiction, so I will speak a little bit on the regional and then set the scene maybe. So just one clarification I think is very essential to make before speaking of the current state and future of Iran's forward defense. I mean, forward defense is usually interpreted as the same policy of supporting non-state actors in the region or Iran's support for the Axis of Resistance. In fact, this policy of non-state partnerships and cultivating proxies is one pillar of the forward defense and not the whole of it. Forward defense, in essence, and in the Islamic Republic's strategic thinking, has been about extending the geography of the battlefield as far from Iran's own territory as possible. So in that sense, whatever asset that could help Iran do that is part of this equation. So it started, of course, already during the war, as Iran's relationship with different non-state actors, especially the Iraqi militias, as they were used against the regime of Saddam during the 8 years of war. But then it also started to include, like, modern technologies, like missiles, especially missiles and drones. And more recently, there were also some attempts at expanding the naval element of Iran's forward defense in the sense that, especially After the initial setbacks of the post-October 7th developments for Iran, they started investing even more on the maritime arena as a compensation for what they had lost on the land. So this, the combination of these, and then if you look at how, at least for some time, they could successfully connect these elements with each other. Like missiles being transferred to the proxies and partners from Hezbollah, especially Hezbollah, and then the Houthis, to those actors like the Houthis helping Iran claiming even a broader area of maritime dominance, you know, by aligning with Iran, which already controls the Strait of Hormuz. With, you know, the Houthis' control over, effective control over Bab al-Mandab, and so on and so forth. So what I want to say is that one of the reasons that, as Ali mentioned, there has been more or less, I mean, what we have seen has been doing more of the same by the Iranian regime has been that one element was weakened, but actually some other elements, especially the missiles, proved to be rather more effective than they had anticipated. You know, because if you look at the 12-day war and what eventually led to the halt of the hostilities and that fragile ceasefire was the Iranian missiles reaching Israel and causing damage, or at least this is how it is interpreted on the Iranian side. So what has happened is that the elements of deterrence by denial, which was kind of a task that those non-state actors, especially Hezbollah, were doing by increasing the cost of any invasion against Iran for Israel. That element has weakened. But Iran's reliance on the other elements of forward defense, which is deterrence by punishment through the missiles, has rather increased. So this distinction is important apart from and alongside what Ali said about the lack of other alternatives. So this is first thing. And second, again, of course, after the 12-day war, there was a heated debate of the actual use or actual benefits of working with non-state actors for Iran, especially in light of the changing relationship with the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, especially Qatar and Iran, those actors being against military intervention in Iran. So why would you resort to this, kind of stick to this non-state policy that would irritate those actors? But eventually, another agreement prevailed which argued that, I mean, until this policy was working, until we were in control of Syria. As long as we were in control of Syria, as long as Hezbollah was there, no war happened. The war happened after we lost this territory. So the policy was correct. It was working, you know, until we couldn't hold. So the prescription of the second group is to actually double down and try to revive that network. That's why we saw reports of Iran sending even more arms to not more, I mean finding new ways to send arms or to reestablish arms transfer ways to Hezbollah and also to work with Iraqi militias. But then I agree that, you know, the policy shifted towards working more with smaller groups with less visibility, especially because, you know, in countries like Iraq, those bigger groups like what we are seeing right now, for example, with Asad al-Assad, in Iraq. They have become politicized, and this politicization has made them more cautious. So Iran is working with a smaller group, trying to revive that network in a different sense, like it was in the past. And the reliance on the Houthis has also increased. So what we have seen essentially has been kind of reconfiguration, not abandoning of the same policy. So yeah, I would leave the nuclear question to Ali.

Great. Ali has written extensively on the nuclear question, of course. And perhaps you can expand, Ali, a bit on the calculus of the regime. You know, they're looking at deterrence, the nuclear question. Of course, Iran was attacked last year, and President Trump has claimed to have obliterated the nuclear program. There are conflicting reports. In that regard. But how do you see what's happening in the region changing the calculus of the government in terms of its nuclear, potential nuclear deterrence?

Right. So you could see some strategic logic along the lines that Hamid was describing, that, you know, the Axis of Resistance prevented an attack on Iran's nuclear program through deterrence by denial, and Iran's missile program also provided a shield for the program to gradually get closer and closer to the stage of hyper-latency, so that if Iran would decide to cross the threshold and develop nuclear weapons, it would be able to do so. But at a certain point, I think that logic was lost, especially as one of these shields, the regional shield, became weaker and weaker. And also, it became clear during the two confrontations between Iran and Israel in 2024 that even denial, deterrence by punishment, is not really going to deter Israel from going after Iran's nuclear program. And the third layer of failure on top of this was that Iran also didn't use use the leverage that it had through its nuclear development to try to get sanctions relief or some sort of a deal with the Trump administration. It insisted on rigid, almost ideological red lines, which resulted in President Trump thinking that there is no possibility of a deal with Iran and greenlighting Israeli military strikes against Iran. Well, the program now— lies in ruin for the most part. Having said this, there is still a pathway to nuclear weapons available to Iran. You know, there are a few things you need for nuclear weaponization. One is you need expertise. Expertise is still there. Israel has killed some top Iranian nuclear scientists, but there are dozens and dozens more who are still in the country. Iranian scientific community has deep benches, and so by killing just a dozen scientists, you would not be able to eliminate the know-how. Second, you need equipment, and equipment is also still there. The IAEA knows that Iran has hundreds of advanced centrifuges that have been stockpiled in areas that were not attacked by Israel and the United States. Third, you need the fissile material, and Iran has almost half a ton of 60% enriched uranium. And I just explained for your lay audience that when you enrich uranium to 60%, you've done 99% of the work that you need to get to weapons grade. And, you know, if you'd asked me prior to the 12-day war how long it would take for Iran to enrich enough uranium for a single nuclear weapon, I would say 6 days. And if you had asked me how long— 6 days. And if you would ask me how long it would take for Iran to fashion that into a Hiroshima-type rudimentary nuclear device, I would say 6 months. And you know what that timeline is today, Adel? It's exactly the same. It would still take the same amount of time for Iran to move in that direction. Now add to that, of course, the increased motivation, especially among some elements of the security establishment, thinking that again, they're surrounded by enemies at home and abroad, and their existence and the existence of the country might be at stake. Add to that also at a popular level, the sense of insecurity, right, because the Islamic Republic in its social contract with the society, didn't really offer economic prosperity, didn't offer peace, didn't offer social freedom. It was offering security. That in a region bogged down by turmoil, this is one island of stability. Well, not anymore. And so even that element is gone. And that has also a psychological impact among the population. And there are more and more people who are thinking that, you know, we've paid the economic price for it through years of sanctions and isolation. We've been attacked militarily by the US and Israel. Why not just do it? Why not take the last step and develop nuclear weapons? So there is heightened intention, even if it's reduced capabilities. And then there is also, in the context of internal unrest and the possibility of another U.S. military intervention, the risk of what happens to this stockpile if there is internal chaos. You know, this stockpile is enough for dozens of dirty bombs. If it's lost in the fog of some sort of civil strife in Iran, it will be a major international security breach and disaster for the world. And so this is why we should be careful what we're wishing for. And at the end of the day, I think the nuclear issue remains as much of a problem as it was in the past, even though the president of the United States would say otherwise.

Thanks, Ali. Hamid, I want to ask you, moving away now from the terms, to Iran's friends, small group of friends, you would argue. You wrote a paper last year on Iran, the Iran-Russia agreement for the Middle East Council here. And of course, Iran has an agreement, a comprehensive strategic partnership with China. Is there a sense of disappointment in official circles? That Iran's allies, quote-unquote allies and friends, such as Russia and China, have not really stepped in, in many shape or form, to help out?

I think it's very much mixed. I mean, the feeling and the view among the Iranian political elites regarding Russia and China I mean, we have this old division of, I mean, like in many other, on many other issues, also on the question of Russia, China, and look to this, we had this division between the so-called reformist moderate camp on the one hand and the conservative hardline camp on the other. The former camp calling for a more balanced foreign policy and questioning reliance on Russia and China, and the latter basically advocating for closer cooperation. But the 12-day war and the aftermath, I think, shifted this landscape in different ways. On one hand, of course, it added more kind of— it gave more reason to the critics of these relationships, especially Russia, in, I mean, as it has been depicted as the primary security partner. And especially because, to the view of many, and of course there's, you know, elements of truth to that, it was because of Russia that, at least it was one of the main reasons that the nuclear agreement was not revived under Trump, because Iran started providing Russia with drones which were used in the war in Ukraine and so on and so forth. So the fact that during the 12-day war Russia's S-300 air defense system, for example, didn't work, the fact that, for example, Russia had refused to provide Iran with Su-35 fighter jets and that was kind of one of the reasons that tilted the balance significantly toward Israel. So as I said, these gave more reasons to the critics. But on the other hand, the whole war situation and its aftermath, and especially in September, the triggering of the snapback mechanisms of the UN sanctions and the return of the sanctions, it somehow convinced the current political elite decision makers in the Islamic Republic that there's actually no alternative. And what they tried to do actually was to try to, I would say, appease even more toward the Russians and the Chinese to get their support, at least politically and diplomatically, at the international forums, especially the UN Security Council. And to some extent, it works. Like, we saw how the representatives of Russia and China objected the return of the sanctions. And then it was reflected also in formal documents presented by both countries to the United Nations and the Security Council that they do not recognize the return of the sanctions. And it was essential. It's been essential, of course, in the sense of, for example, not allowing consensus at the UN that result in some sort of UN-mandated military action against Iran or something like that. But I think it stops at that, at least for the moment, because one thing, especially thinking of China, for example, one thing that China requires for a longer-term relationship, and this is of course something that you know much better other than me, having worked on China and broadly speaking Asia-Middle East relations. So one thing that China wants is stability and predictability, and this kind of recurring waves of external confrontation and internal unrest, you know, it means that none of these two factors actually exist. What China has done is to work as a a lifeline for the Islamic Republic by continuing to buy Iranian oil. But that is also, I mean, that purchase, it also has a significant discount. So it's a win-win situation, of course, for China as well. And also for Russia. Russia has historically tried to leverage Iran's case as a bargaining chip in its relations with the West overall. The situation in the relationship between Russia and Europe has reached a point of no return, of course, one can argue. But that has added to the problems when it comes to Iran, because we can see Russia actively trying to, I wouldn't say not allow, but at least to prevent as much as it can any meaningful rapprochement between Iran and Europe. And in the meantime, trying to act as a mediator, or leverage in a different way, its relationship with Iran to mediate between Iran and Trump, and also now between Iran and Israel. So, politically, it's been somehow useful for the Islamic Republic leaders, but nothing concrete, nothing tangible has come out of this. And I think This is something that Iranian leaders also know and understand, but because of the lack of other alternatives, it has remained as it is.

Thanks, Hamid. We are almost out of time. I have one final question to both of you. If we are to use a crystal ball and look at the future, you know, Ali said the word death spiral. Very strongly worded. Will the regime survive the current crisis and adapt, or do you see some major changes coming to the Islamic Republic? Hamid, you go first, and then I'll end with Ali.

I think change is inevitable, and I really doubt that, you know, in whatever circumstances, the Islamic Republic in the sense that we have known since 1979 would continue to exist. Transformation has already happened from a kind of regime, from political system based on two main pillars: one security and the other one ideological, manifested in the clerics. It has tilted more and more towards security states and the military states. I've written about this. I don't want to use the word like a kind of IRGC rule or IRGC coup or something, but the military security establishment overall has further established its position. The fact that especially after the death of President Raisi in 2024, there's no viable alternative with the requirements that would make at least make the next Supreme Leader acceptable to the support base of the Islamic Republic itself. I think we are eventually, especially after the death or removal of Khamenei, whatever means it happens, we are no longer going to see the Islamic Republic in the sense that we know. Whether it's going to result in I mean, whether it's going to give more impetus to the people to come to the streets and initiate some sort of regime change, or whether it's going to result in something like a Soviet-style scenario of regime transformation, but the security establishment reemerging in a different form. That's an open question, but I think change is inevitable, as I said.

Change is inevitable. Ali, the final word is yours.

Well, Adil, you know, as we discussed, the axis of resistance has failed. The economy of resistance in Iran has faltered. The only kind of resistance that still stands is resistance to change. But as Hamid said, that change is inevitable and it is coming. A lot of people, when I was at the Doha Forum just a few weeks ago were telling me people were coming from Iran, that there is this sense of the country being at a deadlock, even among the political elite. But nobody had any solutions. Everybody was basically waiting for Ayatollah Khamenei to die for that change to come. Now I think given the situation that the regime is in, which, you You know, it has managed to suppress this round of protests, but because it is not able to address any of the underlying causes, any of the grievances of the population, it is just inevitable that there will be another round and another round. And now with US military forces being deployed to the region, the risk of another round of conflict would also be very high, even in the course of 2026. So this is not a stable status quo and it's just not tenable. Now, you might very much end up in a deterioration that will be protracted, similar to what happened to the Assad regime between 2011 and 2024. So I'm not predicting that the system would hit rock bottom tomorrow. But it is now, as I said, in a spiral. And from this point on, it can only go down if it refuses to change. But there is also the option of top-down change, right? Deciding what the Egyptian system did did in 2011 of sacrificing Mubarak in order to try to preserve some elements of power, or what the Venezuelan regime has done to throw Maduro under the bus in order to preserve the rest of the system. So that kind of change, given the fact that the Supreme Leader is also 87, cannot be ruled out, although I agree with Hamid that one has to Remember that the IRGC is not a monolith. It is fragmented. And that is why the Supreme Leader has remained above the fray and is still the most powerful man in Iran despite all of his failures. But again, that is one possibility of transformation in which you see the security establishment try to take over. There is also the possibility of regime implosion or collapse, but I don't think it can happen as a result of bottom-up pressure. It can only happen as a result of foreign intervention. Now, the United States does not seem to have the appetite for that kind of sustained air power, use of air power to really dismantle the state in Iran. But if we end up in a situation, and I think this is one of the reasons that the countries in the region lobbied hard against the U.S. taking military action at this moment is that even small kinetic operations in support of the protesters or next round of protests in Iran could result in the Iranian regime lashing out. A regime that feels cornered obviously can act in a much more reckless way than in normal circumstances. And so in that scenario you might end up in a much more massive and devastating war in which the regime might crack and collapse. And in that scenario, you might end up with a civil strife situation. That also cannot be ruled out. Iran has the same fault lines that resulted in civil war in Syria, in Yemen, in Libya, in Lebanon, and so on. So, those risks are there. What I think is unfortunate is that almost no one either within the opposition, Iranian opposition abroad, or in the West is thinking about how to try to engineer some soft landing for a country of 90 million. You know, because if Iran becomes yet another failed state in that region, the disastrous implications would be very hard to handle for the region and beyond. I talked about some of the security concerns, but also, you know, we're talking about waves of refugees and radicalization and instability that could spill over borders. And it is essential to try to figure out some kind of negotiated transition to a more pluralistic system.

I hope so as well, Ali, for the sake of our region. Our thoughts and prayers are definitely with the Iranian people as they go through this difficult time. I would like to thank you both for a very, very rich discussion and conversation. Thank you for your expertise and input, and we hope to be speaking soon and following up on the issue. I'd like to thank our audience as well. All the best and see you soon. Thank you.

Thank you.