Israel and the U.S. at war with Iran: what comes next & what implications for the region and beyond?

Hello and welcome everyone to this webinar on the US-Israel and Iran war. What comes next and what implications for the region and beyond? My name is Laure Fouché. I'm the senior analyst at the FRS for The Middle East. I'm pleased to welcome 4 prominent experts today. So Abdelaziz Elrashian joining us from Riyadh is a senior nonresident fellow at the Gulf International Forum. Dani Citrinovitz from Tel Aviv is a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security and Studies at the INSS. Nate Swanson from Washington, senior fellow and director of the Iran Strategy Project at the Atlantic Council. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, he spent nearly 20 years as a career State Department official, primarily focused on Iran. And also served as director for Iran at the NSC. And last but not least, Ali Vaez from Geneva, Iran project director and senior advisor to the president at International Crisis Group. So thank you so much for the four of you to agree to share your analysis with us today. I know your time is precious, so thank you very much. Just practical information for the audience. This is a live event. We will have 1 hour of discussion. We will have to stop at 3. We will have 2 rounds of questions with the panelists, during which they will be able to respond to each other. And you can submit any question in the chat box, and I will do my best to integrate it. And hopefully, we will have a bit of time for the Q&A at the end of the session. So going back to the subject of our webinar, of course, there are many issues to address. But today I would like to focus on what may come next in light of developments on the ground after 12 days of war and the dilemmas that have emerged since then and how they may alter or confirm the actors' strategy and calculations. So the aim is really to step back and adopt a broader strategic perspective in order to assess the possible longer-term implications of this war. And in a second one of question, I would like us to take a bit of time to consider how France and Europe's reaction are perceived by the different actors and how Europeans might want or should position themselves to play a more influential and constructive role. So let's start. And if you allow me, Nate, let me start with you. Despite some operational successes, Trump is clearly facing significant challenges, significant opposition to the war within the US, including in his own camp, the impact of the fighting on the global energy market, the probable consolidation of power under Mojtaba Khamenei, and the persistent nuclear threat posed by Iran. So my question for you is, what are the options left for Trump today given these elements? And what are the strategic gains for the US so far? Do you see at this stage any credible path to end the war with an agreement that preserves the operational achievements that were made? And also on a more domestic level, could this war cost the Republicans the midterm elections? And what are the impacts, if you have a bit of time left, for the US-Israel relationship? So if you could keep your answer to around 5 minutes, that will be great. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much for having me. And that is a lot of stuff. So I will try to do as quickly as possible. Look, first, I would just say the US entered this war with this assumption of this being a low-cost affair that we would be able to get into the war and get out quickly. And this was, you know, Trump's past model of success— decisive action, decisive off-ramp. So they entered this war really strategically from the perspective they'd be able to do it again. And, you know, fundamentally, that was a huge misunderstanding of where Iran was coming from. And, you know, as you've seen in the last few weeks, you know, we kind of flailed trying to define what our objectives are. That leads us to our next problem, that I think the president is looking for an off-ramp. He does want to close this up relatively quickly, but he does not actually probably control the timing in the way that he thinks he does. I think, you know, there's some signals now that the US is looking to do this, but I think that— I mean, I'll look forward to Ali and others' comments, but I think that's a misreading of where Iran is right now. And so You know, so I see a scenario coming relatively quickly in the next week or so where he's going to be left with basically 3 options. You know, he's going to want an off-ramp to declare victory, you know, highlight the successes of the campaign, you know, killing Khamenei the father and, you know, degrading the military. But Iran might not give him that off-ramp. So he's going to be left with 3 choices and they're all kind of bad. The first is basically he's going to have to walk away. He's going to basically declare victory. But, but since Iran might not take it, that means he's going to have to actively constrain the actors in the region, which is, you know, something that really no president has ever done, basically trying to restrict Israeli freedom of movement. I mean, Trump did it a little bit after the June war, but it was long— it was short-lived. And I think Iran will probably want more than that. So I think that's his first option. His second option, which is seeming more and more possible by the day, is he doubles down. You know, we put some form of troops on the ground, either for a special operations mission or potentially for a longer term to secure objective. And, you know, and that previously would have been unthinkable a few weeks ago. That's like an anathema to everything he's campaigned on. It's an anathema to America First. But there's not a clear, easy way out. So I think this is increasingly being considered. And the third thing, which I think has the likelihood has declined over the last couple of weeks, but I think was really something I was worried about last week is that basically this gets outsourced into an ethnic conflict where, you know, the U.S. and Israel are trying to in some way stoke these armed oppositions and basically have them and have Iran focused solely internally. So the U.S. and Israel hypothetically back off, but the ongoing conflict keeps Iran busy and unable to project power. And basically, I mean, the Israelis have been pretty clear. I mean, the goal has been regime collapse. And so this is a way of doing it. So I mean, to me, that's actually the worst-case scenario in all these. And I do see some implications or some reasons to believe that Trump is backing off it. But these are all really bad choices. And I think, you know, are a reflection of miscalculation on the front end. And they're going to have a harder time getting out of this than they want. Um, look, I mean, I do think Trump at some point, and he's very good at this, will, will, uh, claim victory and say we've achieved two things that are accurate. We killed Khamenei, even though he replaced with another Khamenei, but, you know, he'll claim that was significant. And then he will also claim correctly that there's been a severe degradation of, uh, Iran's, Iran's, you know, conventional weapon campaign, specifically the threat to Israel and the MRBMs and the MRBM launchers. So, I mean, he will tout those as success. I mean, you're going to have a much harder time projecting strategic gain. In theory, this was, you know, supposed— I mean, at least for the US, for the first 12 or 24 hours, it was supposed to be a regime change war. I mean, I think we're seeing the opposite happening there. And so they quickly moved away from that. And I think there's still this maybe misplaced hope that Trump will be able to pick a supreme leader or someone to work with, a Delsi Rodriguez model, but I just don't see that happening. So I think what you're going to see, and you already see it in the DC narrative, is there's going to be this hyperfocus on the military degradation as victory. Okay. And so to your last question, I'll wrap up here is, Look, I mean, you're seeing the way this is being talked about in D.C. already is just hyperpartisan. You know, those who are supportive of the president are saying this is a major victory. Those who are not are pointing out all the flaws, the miscalculation, the impact it's having on our Gulf neighbors, you know, the impact it's having on energy prices. These are like really— the fact that the president didn't make the case or have a legal justification, these are all, you know, like really big deals. And so I think, you know, that's, that's where the debate is. I mean, I do think the president is very, very sensitive to the energy prices and also the impact it's having on our Gulf neighbors. I mean, I do think that is going to push some of his thinking, but there's no easy answers to that. So I think from my understanding, the White House is, is very eager to get out of this, but they don't know how to do it without losing face. So I'll just stop there.

Okay. Thank you so much, Nate, for this. Let me turn to you, Dani. How does Israel currently assess the conduct and outcomes of this war compared with what it had anticipated? And is there any unexpected dilemma emerging? And to build on what Nate just said, If the US stops its offensive tomorrow and claims victory, what Israel will do, given that the regime managed for now to maintain its cohesion and it's clearly still in place. So how can it impact the future of the relationship between Israel and Iran? And finally, in your view, what Israel has gained so far on the strategic level, not on the tactical military level, but really on the strategic level. And how this can reshape eventually the region in Israel's favor, as most of the leadership in Israel is claiming?

Well, again, a lot of questions. I'll try to be very precise for the next 5 minutes, more or less. And again, thank you for inviting me and for being inside esteemed colleagues that I follow their work. And I think they have an amazing ability to analyze the situation as we are going through the attrition war stage, probably more or less. So I'll say that for Israel, this war was something like, I'll try to find the exact word, it was a dream come true for Netanyahu. Netanyahu, ever since he entered the Israeli politics, he was dreaming for the fact that he will convince the US president to attack Iran. And not attacking like the midnight hammer, but actually significant attack in Iran to change this regime. And I think that for him, it can, whatever will happen in the end of the war, he will say we won for two main reasons. One, we won because we degraded Iran's capabilities. Of course, there is a question of the buildup, and we'll speak about that. But, and the second thing that I, Netanyahu, brought President Trump to strike in Iran. And this is something that will play definitely that we are getting closer and closer to the election time in Israel. For Israel's perspective, if the war will end tomorrow and if the war will end when Trump says it ends, because theoretically we can continue, practically we need the US help defensively, offensively. So I think that until Trump will say stop, we'll continue. I think Israel is sprinting in marathon, meaning that we are trying to do the utmost to degrade Iranian capabilities as much as we can. And the main goal of Israel is not a regime change in Iran. Yes, we're hoping that we're part of returning back and we'll have diplomatic relations with Tehran. But we all know that the chances of that are slim to none. And Israel has no ability to create this reality happening. So we are aiming to degrade Iran capabilities as much as we can and actually not toppling this regime in a way or even toppling, but just making sure that this regime won't pull the threat of state of Israel. So regardless if it's going to be chaos, civil war, whatever, for us, everything is better than the current regime. This is why I think that what Israel is trying to do is to try to degrade its capabilities until Trump will say no. You know, the main problem that we have is the fact that we initiated this war after an 8-month a year ago, we had another war with Iran, 12-day war that we said, Netanyahu said, problem has solved. I saved Israel from two existential threats, the nuclear and the missiles, just to 8 months later to discover that there are problems because those two essential threats actually reemerge again because the regime didn't change strategy. It was obvious from the get-go for everyone, maybe except Netanyahu. Now, the problem is that Netanyahu has a good thing and bad thing in that regard. So the good thing for him is the fact that there is no opposition in Israel right now for this war politically, meaning that everybody's supporting the war. And even we have opposition leaders that are offering to hit Iran even harder in the energy sector or whatever. This is one element. And the second, from the population, there is no one that actually, you know, we are— it's not that we can do something, but I can sense in the last 48 hours that more and more discontent coming from the fact that there are questions about what we'll achieve now that we didn't achieve 8 months ago. And on top of that, we are paying the same price. We have to remember that we are paying a price in Israel as well. People are not working. People are not working. Kids are not going to school. And the problem is in that regard is that there is a price to pay, let alone talking about the people that actually were killed in the Iranian attacks. So I think that if I try to wrap about, about everything, when the war will end, Netanyahu will say we won. Goes without saying, it doesn't matter what will happen. The problem is that, and this is something that is really amazing me every time and again and again, there is a stark difference between the operational superiority that we have over Iran. We know where everyone they are and where we can hit them, whatever, and to the strategic understanding of Iran. Meaning, I don't know that even Netanyahu thinks that people go to the streets while there is war. This is one aspect. And second, that the regime, this regime able to be changed by strikes from the air. Now, Israel is probably moving to the second phase. We have hearing drones coming back and forth over Tehran and Basij or whatever. But the thing is, and that's towards the end, that those operational achievements are not accumulating strategic gain, meaning of changing this regime, of toppling this regime. And the problem that Israel will have, and this is the two major problems that we have to remember for Israel. One, bipartisanship in the US. We have major problems, like Nate said, because people really think that Israel pushed US into the war. Now, I don't think Israel pushed Israel. I think pushed Trump. I think that Israel was, Netanyahu was highly involved in trying to assess, to tell President Trump that this is the time to do that. And Netanyahu did the utmost to make sure that the situation would be such that people go to— that the war would be initiated. But I don't think it would push to the war. But people in Washington really think that this is the major problem that we have. This is one element. And the second, this is going to— I'm going to end, is the problem that we know that Moushtaba is more to the extreme than his father. And I don't think he will forego missiles. I think he will think about the nuclear strategy of his father. No Fatwa now. So I think we can find ourselves in a situation where the US won't back us because I don't think that we have, you know, we have midterm. I don't think we'll see another Lincoln and Ford in the area. So we have maybe more towards the future, more problematic situation regarding Iran. But this time it will be really only on Israel to take that into account and to do that. While we have to remember, this is my last sentence, that we are coping for the first time maybe with a regional war. We have Hezbollah acting dramatically against Israel. We have the Shia militia that might attack us. We have the Houthis in Yemen. So on top of that, even if we close the war with Iran, and we all know that it's not guaranteed, then we still have a mountain to climb. Everything happening is Lebanon. So the bottom line of that is Israel initiated war, but I don't think we really thought through what can really happen by initiating this war. Yes, we kill Khamenei, but at the end of the day, I'm not sure that strategic reality of Israel after this war will be better than strategic reality before this war. Thank you.

Thank you so much, Dani. It's a really important point you raise. Ali, let me turn to you. Tehran has put in place a kind of survival strategy that seems to be functional for now. And if we hear Nate and Dani, it's kind of confirmed, or at least in terms of internal cohesion. But could you go back to this and tell us what are the limits and the strength of this strategy in the short, but as well in the long term. Why is there a drop of missile attacks from Iran? Why the Houthis are not joining the fight? And is the regime so resilient that it appears? And same question, if the war ends tomorrow and Trump declares victory, what Tehran will do? And To go back on what Nate said as well, do you see on your side at this stage any credible path to end the war with a long-term agreement, or are we condemned to see at best a shaky and unstable non-written ceasefire?

Thank you very much, Laure, for organizing this. And it's great to be on this panel with colleagues I highly respect, and I'm especially happy to see Aziz and Dani are in the region safe and Look, the Iranian strategy was, I think, from the beginning, a three-part strategy. First, ensure survival. Second, keep enough retaliatory capacity to be able to stay in the fight. And then third was to prolong the conflict and stretch it in time and space so that you can end it on your terms. And so far, the evidence suggests that they have been able to be pretty successful in implementing that. Now, I'll say a few words that there are potentially limits to it, but there is continuity of governance. There is still the regime even in provinces. There's still provision of services. There are no serious shortages. And of course, the new Supreme Leader was selected relatively quickly, signaling more continuity and defiance than anything else. So on that front, the regime seems pretty intact, despite the fact that it has lost some very senior leaders. In terms of retaliatory capacity, I agree with Nate 100%. It has been diminished. There's no doubt about it. But what we don't know is whether the Iranians were pacing themselves in a way that they would deplete interceptor capacity in the Gulf and in Israel, and then eventually towards the end, as we saw in the 12-day war, would be able to do more with less. That possibility, at this stage, simply there is a lot of misinformation and hype on both sides to be able to say one way or another whether the US has been able to successfully take out all the launchers on the Iranian side or whether the Iranians still have the capacity to fire towards the end of this conflict. Stretching it in time and in geography, of course, has damaged Iran's relations with most of its neighbors. Some of this, I think, could be long-lasting. Some of the neighbors were actively trying to prevent this conflict from happening, like Saudi Arabia, like Qatar, like Oman. And although one understands, because of the asymmetry in power, what Iran is trying to do here, which is to take the global economy hostage as a means of putting pressure on Trump. But there are obviously long-term implications for this strategy. Now, the part that I think is problematic is the following. Of course, Trump can do what he did in the 12-day war, which is to declare victory. And as Nate said, there is a narrative of victory already. I can see how he could frame it and take a step back. If Iran at that point says, no, we're not done, and continues striking, then first of all, it might end up in a more direct conflict with Israel. It might end up, if it continues, and if by that point has lost the capacity to fire medium-range missiles in an effective way, its only option really is to continue attacking its Gulf neighbors, which really would be very hard to justify. You can put pressure on the Gulf. If, as the Iranians say, the bases, American bases are used as launching pads towards them. But if the US is out of the war and you're fighting Israel, then it really doesn't make that much sense to continue going after the Gulf states. Yes, putting pressure on the Gulf, on the Strait of Hormuz does work. But at certain points, the markets will start adjusting unless you also go after production. And again, production in the Gulf states would be a major escalation, could push the Gulf states to move from defensive to offensive. So, there are all sorts of problems with that strategy as well. And finally, what is it that the Iranians are trying to achieve in terms of a ceasefire? The problem with last year's ceasefire was that it was not written.

Fine.

If it's written, does that actually put it in stone that the US and Israel will not strike again in 6 months or in 3 months? Obviously, if the Islamic Republic survives, it is going to, you know, all the underlying problems that have given rise to this conflict are still going to be there. The stockpile of uranium is still there. If they touch it, if Mojtaba decides to get rid of his father's fatwa, that in and of itself could become a casus belli. The missiles, yes, maybe the US has blocked some of the silos' entrances, But the stockpiles are still there, so they would start to reopen them. They would try to recreate launchers. Again, that will be cause for war. If they continue to rearm their allies in the region, tensions will continue. Without getting sanctions relief, they can't continue to— they can't address the underlying causes of discontent within the Iranian society, which means that there will will be more upheavals, and they only have repression as the answer to those domestic problems. So all the underlying elements are still going to be there, and we're basically just buying time until the next conflict. So how do you get Israel and the US to not do this again? The Iranian answer, I think, is as Danny was saying, that the Israeli strategy was not very well thought through. I think the Iranian answer is quite similar. That it is, you know, that by creating this financial pain on the global economy, no one would decide to do this again in 6 months or in 8 months. Whereas I do believe that Israel would, you know, in a year with a weaker Iran, would very well start another war. And this time, again, with the arguments that Iran is, you know, each time it's sort of like a salami approach. Each time we get them closer and closer to the final collapse, and next year they will be even closer to collapse, and he would go in and the US would have to follow. So I'm not even sure if the Iranian strategy here is valid. I'm happy to talk about potential off-ramps, maybe in the next round.

Thank you very much, Ali. Aziz, let me turn to you. So can you please tell us what is the debate today in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia regarding that war and the strategic dilemma that it raises? At what point the Gulf would have no option actually then to go to the offensive? And will that be a kosher decision between the GCC states? And maybe in the longer term, what is your assessment on the impact of the war in the future of the relationship with Iran? But as well with the, with the US and maybe to focus more specifically on Saudi Arabia. Will this war push Riyadh to rethink entirely its regional strategy? And actually, what could be the alternative of the strategy Riyadh had until now? Thank you.

Thank you, Laura. And it's really good to join everyone here who I have a lot of respect for. So I really appreciate you all. And thank you, Laura, for for gathering us. I would have to say this is very interesting that some of the debates, some of the questions that I think we had was really at the very beginning was, okay, well, when will we be from defensive posture to transition from this defensive posture to offensive posture? And I think it is worth noting there was, in my opinion, I think it was very clear that there was this information campaign, or people will even say disinformation campaign, of trying to get Saudi Arabia in particular and others to really assert it and be and say, join the fight now, join the war now and be an active member in this. And even some discussions and statements were saying, actually, they're already part of that. The attack and the offensive measures. So clearly there is, you know, there was that pressure politically or diplomatically. But there was also the fact that, okay, to what extent can we be defensive? And I think one of the luxuries that we have right now is really choosing from what's a horrendous option to a less horrendous option. Or a bad option to a less bad option. And I think this is really why we have lobbied hard not to be part of this campaign. You know, we knew that this was really, you know, this will open up a Pandora's box of chaos. And I think, you know, Danny and others were saying about this that there's not going to be any real clear— and this is something I could see from the discussion earlier— there is no clear outcome except for uncertainty, which is something that we find very very allergic to for our projects and for our security. So we're really in this pickle. But what I am seeing though, is that there seems to be more tendency towards restraint. It seems to be that they're championing this fact of restraint, and they have insisted time and again, especially I think around the first week of the war that, you know, only the strong are restraintful. You know, only the strong that are the ones that are really not going to be part of other people's wars or get dragged into this war. So right now they seem to be very championing this approach for a few reasons. Firstly, I think the anti-air defence performance by the Gulf states I think it gives them, in my opinion, a bit of confidence that they could try to withstand this. And they know very well that I think this is also a cost game in the long run. To what extent can we deplete it? You know, we see now the Saudis spoke with Zelensky a few days ago. So clearly they're already diversifying, I think, this procurement. And clearly they're trying to get this kind of boost their anti-air defense capabilities. Secondly, I think they just know that Donald Trump may stop tomorrow. You know, he may stop and declare war, and then all of a sudden we're in this, in something that we never wanted to be in. So in my opinion, there were these two things that I was looking at. It was the duration of the war, and I think the intensity of the strikes on the Saudi facilities and other places. So I think those are the two things that we're keeping on, and it seems to be, it's a bit managed, although it's escalating a little bit, but it's managed. And you can see also from the UN Security Council. So yesterday that, so clearly diplomacy is the way forward, but is it enough? Is it enough to be deterring? And clearly this is not. And I think this is where it leads to the second point. In my opinion, which is about the impact. And then do remind me about the attack and will it be unilateral or not. But this speaks to the impact, I think. When it comes to the Saudi-Iran and the GCC-Iran relations, we've entered into a post-rapprochement era, period. I mean, we're now, I think there is just so much frustration and so much anger at the fact that there was so much investment in the diplomacy, in trying to create a rapprochement, trying to make sure that Iran does not see us as a threat, and therefore, you know, for this response to happen. And this is why I think they are upset. Really at Netanyahu, but also upset at Donald Trump as well. And now they can't say that. But this is the response. I think this is why, and I think in my opinion, we also don't know what comes next. You know, one of the reasons why we actually wanted there to be a nuclear deal also is to elevate that rapprochement process from just kicking the can down the road or keeping the problems at bay to really elevating this, making sure Iran could be part of this regional project and incentivize them to kind of, you know, be better neighbors or better, more integrated kind of region for security, security through prosperity, I would say. And so this is now upended. The other point about the US, and maybe people will not will be surprised. A lot of people have been surprised with what I say. I think this war, and I wonder if Nate or everybody really agrees, but I think this war illustrated that the United States is still the main non-regional actor in the region. It's still the main impactful player in the region. And as a result, you know, even this discussion of multipolarization, hedging, China, Russia, it's still the United States that really makes the biggest impact. And as a result, I think while, I might as well try to pop this balloon, while I don't see there's going to be any Saudi-Israeli normalization because of this, irrespective of what our good friend Lindsey Graham is saying in Washington, D.C. and other places, you know, or others, or Netanyahu even. But, you know, I don't see this. I do see more of a partnership with the United States. I think they will intensify their diplomacy in the United States there to be a bit more proactive and to be a bit more, I think, influential in not making such decisions happen again and to not be boxed into this decision. Because the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was a very meticulous process. It was a very meticulous process, and they knew it was a meticulous process. And I think it had succeeded when it came to the 12-day war between Iran and Israel. But when it came now to the United States, this is when we see the limitation of this rapprochement, that structurally this relationship, it just seems to be It's still flawed. So I think here there's going to be that. I also think that diplomacy with the United States is going to be also about geared towards procurement also, because I don't think there's any really guarantees. I think there's going to be a partnership in congruence with trying to diversify relations with everywhere, military kind of diversification. So I think also the aspect of deterrence via Alliances hasn't worked, maybe they will start looking at deterrence via capabilities more. And this is where I unfortunately see where the region is going to be headed. I think the entire GCC are not going to, you know, they're going to really try to boost their capabilities a bit more now. And just the last point I will say regarding a unilateral agreement, a unilateral discussion, I'm sorry, a unilateral offensive act. Will they act accordingly or not? They will have to act accordingly. They will, because the reason being is that they know that they are on other, you know, if Saudi Arabia, for example, retaliates, Iran, and Ali can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think right now Iran does not really discern between any kind of Gulf states. I think they just see the entire Gulf as one monolithic entity. So there is a likelihood that they just will strike somewhere else that's nearby, not necessarily from where any of these strikes kind of came from, if there was an offensive measure. So we've seen this, that Saudi Arabia, you know, I think had the least, it and Oman. Dubai, notwithstanding the amount of money that was, you know, Iranian money in Dubai, is getting attacked. Qatar, the mediator, that invested so much, it's getting attacked even more, Bahrain. So I think what they don't want to do is to take a unilateral measure while someone else gets to be targeted for it. So, you know, while, for example, Saudi Arabia is very frustrated at being on the front line of other people's wars, the other GCC states also don't want to be on the front line between a Saudi and Iran confrontation as well. So I think this is where, those are my two cents.

Thank you so much, Aziz. It was really, really important. Nate, maybe let me come back to you. I mean, you and Dani have clearly said how much the strategic gains are limited, how much the challenges at the end of the day are still there. And it seems hearing you that Basically, we're in a situation in which we will have another round of conflict in 6 months or a year. And so I wanted to ask you how much and how this war might impact in the longer term the US strategy regarding on how to deal with Iran and the region in the future. If we hear what Aziz just said, if you have any suggestion for an off-ramp and And to introduce a bit the Europeans in all of discussion, how the Europeans and Paris can help on this to define an exit strategy that could be sustainable?

Yeah, thanks. And look, those are really interesting comments by everyone. I guess I would just make two comments. I mean, the first is I don't think we should assume this isn't having an impact on the president. You know, he entered this conflict with the idea that we could do this cost-free. We're experiencing costs for the first time. So while there might— I think Ali's analysis and Danny's analysis is right, that there'll be a desire for future rounds between Iran and Israel potentially. I'm not certain that's where the president will be. His whole, like, reason for doing all of these actions was because he can do them with no consequences. And that is just now punctured. So I wouldn't rule out I wouldn't assume there'll necessarily be a round 3 and 4 for the US. I mean, Danny's points and all these points are good, or I mean, they're right. But I do think the US is going to, and Trump specifically, will rethink how to approach this. Okay. But whenever this is over, whether the US is, you know, goes for round 3 or round 4 or not, I mean, we're going to have to pick up the pieces on everything. We're going to have to pick up the pieces on US Iran relationships, US-Gulf relationships, US-Israel, and at the same time, everyone else is going to have to do the same things. And I think there is a— I still think there is a strong bipartisan perspective within the US to actually do— and we've been saying this for like 4 administrations— to actually focus more on Asia and then also on the Western Hemisphere. So I don't think there is that many people in the Republican or Democratic Party that want a carrier strike group positioned in the Middle East indefinitely. So at some point there will be a push to move out. And when that happens, you have to do it with strong partners. So there has to be a much better relationship with the Gulf, much stronger, much deeper than we have now. And there has, in my view, there has to be a European role in this. So I see Europe and France and E-3 in particular playing key roles both to Iran. I know Iran's been punishing the E-3, but like, time to move past that, I think, at this point. And I think there's really a lot of work to be done on the Europe-GCC relationship as well. I think this is kind of where part of the future is. Yes, I mean, the U.S. might— will be involved and will want to be involved. But I think we're going to want to do it and we should want to do this as more of a collective action moving forward, because The alternative is something that I think ultimately most people in both parties don't want, which is indefinite US position, you know, like kind of, you know, basically in containment indefinitely. We don't want to have the post-Iraq War where we just have, you know, a massive troop presence all around the region that Bush won the Iraq War. So, I mean, I think we want to avoid that. And that's continue what I've heard from US officials. So this has to be more of a joint effort. And I think there is actually bipartisan support on that. The problem is getting there, right? We got to get out of this mess and there's no clear way to get out of this mess. So I'm hoping Danny or Ali or Aziz will tell us how to get out of this mess. And then this is where we work on the partnerships long term. So I'll stop there.

Thank you so much, Nate. Danny, would you like to react to what Nate just said and even previously?

Yeah, we have, of course, me and Ali, we prepared an answer. No, it's, you know, the problem is that Henry or no, nobody really think through this war in terms operationally speaking. Yes, you know, CENTCOM and IDF, they have an amazing cooperation. So from the get-go, it was obvious, you know, that this war machine can really can make damage to the Iranians. Go without saying, this cooperation is amazing, you know, in so many ways. Just look at it, you know, it's like two armies working together. But the thing is that nobody really thought through about the off-ramps, everything related to the exit strategy. It's obvious that we are in the mix of an attrition war that we don't know how to get out of. Now, for Israel, as I mentioned, it's all about Trump. But I don't think, you know, even if I think for the US Army and for the administration, everything is about Trump. They're still waiting to hear what he has in mind. So he can wake up tomorrow and decide that the war is over. But as Ali said, I don't think that the Iranians will buy it. It's not that the Iranians want to have an endless war. But I think that they want, like, not like 8 months ago, they want to make sure that somebody will attack them in the future. So that is a problem. So it's not that we don't have any off-ramps or, or it's very hard to think of, but the two sides actually want, still want to achieve different realities, let alone speaking about, you know, nobody's talking about returning back to negotiation on, on the nuclear. There is a slightly, no, small, small problem about 440 kilos for 60% that are in, in Isfahan. And it's very, you know, war that started to prevent Iran from reaching a nuclear weapon. Actually, if that will be there, and while much about probably think about, you know, we think about the nuclear strategy, then how you can justify war like that when you first and foremost, you cannot, even if you attack Natanz 10 times more and Fordow 10 times more and Picax Mountain, whatever, then if you have these capabilities, then That's a major problem that you have to tackle. And I don't think that operationally maybe you can do that, but you have to conquer more or less the nuclear facility in Isfahan in order to take it out with cranes or whatever. So I think that it's a major problem. Then again, it all comes back to the Bibi calling Netanyahu, Trump saying, we know where Khamenei is going to be on Saturday. Let's kill him. And Trump say, let's go. And then picking Epic Fury. And there we are. So I think that this is a major problem and they are really thinking hard and clear how this war will end. It's very hard to actually to speculate. And I think that also in Israel, I don't think that someone really thought that through in that regard. Second thing we have to remember and have to relate also to what Aziz said. In Israel, you know, Bibi's notion is that like he tried in the past, that the third circle surrounding Israel will actually will defeat the second circle, meaning that We can use this war to show to our Gulf friend that we are strong and we are fighting against the big evil, meaning Iran. And then that's, we can push the not so important Palestinian issue aside again and to continue having some sort of normalization. And of course, while they're needing us, understand the threat coming from Iran and whatever. But I think that what Aziz said and others, it's important because at the end of the day, I don't think it will happen. It's not going to happen because, you know, I'm not an analyst and I don't have some sort of clever words to say about MBS, not because I don't want to, I'm not any Saudi expert, but my sense is that someone that wants to lead the Sunni world will not say, okay, Israel attacked Iran, we'll have normalization with it. I think that he's still waiting for tangible things on the Palestinian issue that I don't think this government in Israel will be able to give him anything in that regard. Definitely that we're doing the opposite in the West Bank. So I think that we still have this problem. Netanyahu can sell to the Israeli public that notion, and maybe people will agree, or maybe, but I think that like the 12-Day War, I think we'll have a mountain to climb because again, again, we're turning back to the same problems that we think in Israel that kinetics will solve all of Israeli problems. You know, look what happened in Lebanon. It's very interesting. It's not related to Iran, but I think it's actually highlighting the situation. In Lebanon, when Hezbollah attacked, we said Hezbollah fell to our strategic trap and now we can start the war against them. But now I think that maybe we fell to the strategic trap of Hezbollah, knowing that we cannot dismantle this organization kinetically. I hope so, but I don't think it's possible. So what are we going to do there? We have so many problems. So I think that this, in a way, the fact that we have this air superiority over Iran and attacking, but still the regime is not collapsing, is highlighting the fact that there are limitations to use kinetics. And we have to think about diplomacy, not only kinetics. Now, in terms of Iran, it's a red line for Israel. Goes without saying, no negotiation or whatever. But I think that when the war will end, we'll do our assessment. We have many, many problems that actually driven from this war. We talked about the issue with the US. Many people, even senators in the US, saying it was an Israeli war. Second, we have a problem, everything related to Mujtaba'a and the fact that he will change. I think, or we think of changing the strategy. Again, we don't know. We have to be very careful. We just had his new, his first speech, but it looks like the anti-Syria control behind it. So I don't think we'll see good things about it. And I said everything related to the changes within Iran, I think that actually we, this war actually harmed the ability to create a natural change in Iran itself. You have a very old supreme leader, you have people that actually willing to go to the streets, and I think this regime had no future. But now it still has a lot of problems, but I think that maybe the rally around the flag in terms of its own support, this is something where maybe will buy him lifetime that we didn't expect to happen. So just to continue, wanted to close everything. I think that still, because this war wasn't thought through, I think that we have so many problems thinking about the exit strategy. I think that we climbed a very high ladder and it's been very hard to get out of it while explaining that the regime is still there. Yes, Israelis, we're trying to say, oh yeah, the regime, we can say it will be toppled next month. But I think it's wishful thinking, more or less. I hope that I'm mistaken and they're right, but we'll see. And by the bottom lines of everything, the things that this war will not fix, our problems that we have with our Gulf countries, I think by the opposite, because Israel pushed them towards what they don't want to be in. Yes, we can help everyone, but at the end of the day, that's a problem. And the second thing, the US for me is crucial in terms of the bipartisan support. And we have many problems over there. We are relying on President Trump. At the end of the day, he will be— someone will replace him and then we'll have a problem there. So that's— I'll stop here.

Thanks a lot, Dani. Ali, you nicely offered some off-ramp suggestions. So can we hear about this? And as well, if you could answer to Aziz regarding Tehran and Gulf of Averset future relationship, how Tehran intends to fix its relationship with the Gulf Arab state in the future? And is there any division among the system about it? We saw the declaration of position. I mean, can you say a few words about that? And please, could you keep in mind as well on what could be your recommendations, because we have only 10 minutes left, toward the Europeans and especially toward Paris?

Sure.

Thank you.

So I don't pretend to have a silver bullet solution here, but I'll I'll just share some ideas, which is obviously the most immediate thing that we would need at a certain point is a ceasefire agreement. And I would not rely on the very unrealistic, ambitious ideas that the Iranians are putting on the table in terms of getting reparations from the US or getting the US military out of the region or any kind of mea culpa even from the US and Israel. And the other way around, whatever the US and Israel would want to put on that piece of paper, I don't think it's going to be workable. So, you know, as I have to say, Laura, as reprehensible as the position of a lot of European leaders have been, with the exception of Spain, Switzerland, and Norway, not understanding that the way that their stance on this, on this particular question, which is a violation of UN Charter, some of the bedrock of international norms that they refer to when they need it in the case of Greenland or in the case of Ukraine, would have long-term implications and would actually turn them into just irrelevant strategic bystanders. If we put that aside and still give the Europeans, you know, with all the disappointments, another chance to do the right thing, the right thing to do now is to start drafting a balanced ceasefire resolution that would actually put things on a better trajectory. So that's step number one. And it cannot be in the favor of US and Israel. It cannot be one-sided. It has to be fair. And I think they should start doing the legwork now. That's step number one. Step number two, after we get to a ceasefire, I think, you know, we were very close to a regional security dialogue starting in parallel to the Oman-mediated nuclear talks between Iran and the Trump administration. Unfortunately, because of Israel's pressure and convincing Trump to jump into this conflict, we never got a chance. But that would have been a real game changer for the region. I hope we can rescue that, because the alternative is what Nate said, that a wounded, angry, more radicalized Iran would be, you know, similar to where Saddam ended after the first Gulf War. And that only, again, kicked the can down the road and ended in another disaster that everybody in the region and beyond paid for. So if, you know, it's understandable that at this moment everybody's angry, everybody thinks that diplomacy is over, we can't do this anymore. But I do believe that we have to try to go back and figure out a way in which all parties in the Gulf and beyond, maybe even with the involvement of countries like Turkey and Pakistan and Egypt, and try to figure out a formula in which they all believe that their legitimate security concerns are taken into account. And then in parallel to this, of course, you need some sort of a diplomatic solution to resolve the nuclear issue and other concerns. But I have a hard time imagining that that would be possible without also some sort of a political dimension to it. And as hard as that might be seen at this moment, you know, I would urge everyone to think about it, you know, because the Iranians, if they think that emerging out of this, all of a sudden Russia and China would do what they have been reluctant to do for them so far, which is to rescue them out of their misery, I don't think that's likely to happen. A regime that was not able to address the country's basic needs in terms of even electricity provision or water problems, is now going to face even bigger problems dealing with those things, and will be by definition unstable. So, if the Iranian regime is willing to undergo political changes, if it is to organize elections that are no longer monitored by the Guardian Council, are internationally monitored instead. I think this would then provide an easier opportunity for the West to do what it is now doing in Syria, which is to help economically reconstruction and reintegration of Iran. Now, a lot of this, I know, sounds starry-eyed, unrealistic, but honestly, when you think about all the alternatives, I think they are way worse, way more dangerous for the region and beyond, and way more unstable. It is quite possible that at a certain point, again, as I said, President Trump would pull the plug on this and we will end with a ceasefire that ends this battle. It will not end this war. We will be back at it again. And every time we go through this, putting the pieces back together in a constructive way becomes just so much more difficult. Look at every red line that has been crossed at every point of tension and escalation. And this is going to get worse and worse and worse. So that's why I'm saying, as unrealistic as some of my ideas might sound at this point, the alternatives are even more unpalatable.

Thanks a lot, Ali. Aziz, I don't know, maybe you would like to reply or to react to what has been said so far. But I have a question as well for you, because at this point it seems that the Gulf Arab states basically don't trust any of the parties to this war. And I was wondering, what about Europe? Can Europe be a reasonable, reliable partner to the Gulf Arab states? Or, and even if it's not considered as an influential player, Paris is has been looking for some years now to strengthen its partnership with Saudi Arabia, but it's kind of struggling to move from being a useful partner to a strategic one. So I was wondering if there's now a space for more strategic cooperation, including on the diplomatic side, not only on the military side.

Yep.

Thank you very much. So I think firstly, before I talk about the Saudi and GCC European relationship. I do want to say just a few words on the GCC, Gulf. Okay.

Yep.

High five to you. Or is that a— just—

sorry, there's 5 minutes left before the end of the—

So I thought you were excited saying high five, but no, I'm just kidding. But this is what I would say when it comes to— I do believe we're in a post-rapprochement era between the Gulf states and Iran. It's going to take a lot of time for them to overcome this. I think they do feel very devastated, but this is one thing. I don't see diplomatic relations between the Gulf states and Iran cutting. I think they believe that this relationship diplomatically, this channel is very important. And we've seen it even during this war, you know, that the channels were open, that they were communicating. So I don't see this cutting of relations. So that's going to be there. Okay. Now, when it comes to the Saudi or GCC, Europe, EU or France angle, in my opinion, I think it will have to play a role for a few reasons. Firstly, I think there is a precedent for working together. And we could see this, for example, in the Saudi-French-led two-state solution question on Palestine. Okay, yes, they work together. Okay, there is still no de-occupation of Palestine. There is a recognition of the state. But in my opinion, I think this shows that there is room for cooperation. But there is one thing that has to be really worked on. Which is the expectations. I think the management of the expectations is really, really something that has to be very defined, very much taken into account and very defined. And also, why do I see there is going to be room for expansion of this is because I think now, and this is a sentiment here in the GCC, that of course this was unsustainable. These multi-different tracks between, I think, the United States and Iran, Iran and the European countries, and then kind of Iran and the Gulf states, you know, they were different. They need to be now all in one. I think the GCC states now realize that they all want to be part of this big project. They want to be on the table, not just facilitating the discussion, but they want to be there illustrating what their interests are, what their grievances will be. But also, I sense, and they may not say this now, but it also has to make sense for Iran. They're very, very open-minded. You know, I won't say open-minded. They understand that there has to be significant changes and Iran has to get something out of this. Not necessarily proof of concept, because this is, you know, that you could take the international economy hostage and then you could get what you want and then negotiate. But no, to really address these core issues. So here, this is where I think diplomacy has to be. And this is where I see that the cooperation is. We're going to see kind of a bigger circle and more actors going to be there. And I think this is where, you know, this is where we see the cooperation. It just needs to be two things. I think what Ali said was ceasefire. I think this needs to happen. By the way, regarding the ceasefire, Anwar Gergash, the advisor to the president, MBZ, said, you know, stop spreading rumors. We're on the cusp of a important junction in trying to de-escalate tensions. It's very interesting because I think maybe it's a response to some of the other kind of statements that was trying to really get the UAE in trouble. You know, there was an Israeli, some guy called Segal, and he said something like, well, the, you know, the people that the UAE attacked, they attacked an oil facility. So I think there is intention, desire to really work together more. I'll leave it at that.

Thank you so much. I'm sorry, we— I think Ali and Danny really had to leave at 3. So thank you so much for the four of you. I think it was extremely interesting and really precious to have your expertise and to have this exchange among us. So thank you to the audience as well. I'm sorry we didn't manage to go through all the questions, but there is already a lot of material to think through. So thanks a lot and take care to all of you. Bye-bye.

Thank you so much for doing this.

Bye. Thank you.

Bye-bye.

Bye-bye.