‘We Should Be Very Worried’ About Total State Collapse in Iran

How long can Iran last against the most powerful country in the history of the world?

If the Taliban could survive 20 years of US military pressure on them, these people are determined enough to be able to survive.

Donald Trump clearly wants some kind of Venezuela situation.

It would be very politically toxic for any Iranian politician to bend the knee to him.

Do you think history, this pattern, will just repeat itself? That 10, 20 years from now, we'll be back to an even more repressive Iranian government?

By definition, it's going to be an unstable formula.

Not many people are talking about another option, which is total state collapse. How likely is that? How worried should we be about that? It seems that all across Western media, news outlets are continuing to report the same headlines about Iranians all around the world celebrating the US's assassination of the the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. And while many Iranians are indeed glad to see the end of Khamenei's often brutal reign, the country is still facing fear, uncertainty, and even grief as the US continues to kill Iranian civilians in airstrikes and send pretty mixed messages on what its plan for Iran is. There are even reports that the US could be about to arm Kurdish and other groups to fight against the Iranian regime on the ground. So is Iran heading for a civil war? Joining me now is Iranian affairs expert Ali Vaez, who is the International Crisis Group's Iran project director. Ali, thanks so much for joining me on the show. What is going on right now in terms of Donald Trump reaching out to Kurdish groups? These are the latest reports we've heard, that the Trump administration is talking to Kurdish groups in Iraq, in Iran, about possibly arming these groups to fight against the government. Is that something that surprises you? Is that what you saw coming?

It's good to be with you, Mehdi. Look, we had seen evidence of Israel and the United States already in the past few months working with some of these Kurdish groups. Most of them are in the category of separatist groups because there are also Kurdish groups that want to remain within the borders of Iran and are not seeking autonomy or independence. But there was also evidence that they were being armed, as there is evidence that Israel has sent arms to the Baluchi groups on the eastern border of Iran with Pakistan. And the concept has always been that if Iran is internally focused to try to put down these separatist groups, it doesn't have the bandwidth to be able to project power beyond its borders. There is also apparently this calculation within the Trump administration that if the Kurds rise up in an armed uprising against the regime, it will inspire other segments of the Iranian society to also come to the streets and take matters into their own hands if the repressive capacity of the regime is severely degraded.

Echo chambers are tough to recognize and even tougher to break out of. Ground News was built to fix this problem. Its unique Blindspot feature highlights stories that you might miss. Take this story about the abuse of Palestinian journalists inside of Israeli prisons. Ground News shows you that the story had virtually no coverage by right-leaning outlets, and frankly, very little coverage by any mainstream media outlet. You can also use Ground News to compare headlines and take a closer look at each article using built-in tools like bias distribution and ownership. For example, this report by Middle East Eye comes up as high factuality and left-leaning. Subscribe to Ground News at ground.news/zeteo to get 40% off the unlimited access Vantage subscription. Do you buy that analysis? Is that what will happen?

I don't buy that analysis because it will be very difficult to get to that point. Look, the Revolutionary Guards is about 200,000 strong. It has a militia, the Basij, which is about a million strong. There are also additional security forces and they're all armed. Ordinary Iranians, civilians are not armed or not organized. They don't have leaders on the ground. And remember that the massacre that the regime committed against its own people back in January was not like what was done in Syria with fighter jets and barrel bombs and chemical weapons and tanks. It was done with small arms. And in order for the United States to completely degrade that kind of repressive capacity without boots on the ground and only from the air, it would require flattening huge parts of the country, killing so many civilians that I think is likely to turn the population against the war effort. And Iranians are deeply nationalistic, so they're also extremely concerned about disintegration of the country. And as soon as they see that there are fights in Kurdistan or in Balochistan, They would be worried about where this is all headed. And even those who hated the regime and wanted military intervention by the US to get rid of their tormentors are likely to turn against the war effort.

You mentioned air attacks versus boots on the ground. You said to CNBC a few weeks ago that the US cannot change Iran's regime, quote, without any boots on the ground. Donald Trump has not ruled out that option yet. He said he would do so if necessary. How likely do you think we are to see that, or is this whole armed Kurdish groups, Balochi groups, a substitute for putting US troops on the ground?

Look, there is no historic precedence for changing regimes through just the sole use of air power. In Iraq and Afghanistan, of course, the US had to put boots on the ground. Even in the case of Afghanistan, there were Afghan boots on the ground as well, but nevertheless, the US had to deploy its own forces. In the case of Libya, there were indigenous boots on the ground. So a regime as entrenched as the Iranian regime will be very difficult to dislodge without having some sort of ground presence. Now, it is possible— I don't rule out this possibility— that the US would do limited special force interventions in specific areas. For instance, one, one can foresee the possibility that on the southern shore that where Iran basically is now blocking the traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, that the US forces would, would go down, would take out some of the military installations there, maybe silos of drones and short-range missiles in order to reassure the international maritime traffic that they can get through the strait without any threats. Or I don't rule out the possibility that at some point maybe the US would try to secure an area around where they believe the stockpile of highly enriched uranium that is unaccounted for is in order to take that out of the country. So those kind of operations I can imagine. I can also imagine a scenario in which the US would send some special forces to get embedded with the Kurdish troops and try to gain territory so that they can challenge the central government by controlling bits and pieces of territory. This is what happened in Iraq after the first Gulf War or in Syria after 2011. But to have a real land invasion, it would require 500 to 1 million American troops. That is just not on the cards.

So you mentioned Iraq and Syria. There's a lot of talk in Western media here in Washington, DC about what comes next, you know, Is it another supreme leader who's handpicked by Trump? Is it a deal with the Revolutionary Guards? Is it complete regime change and the return to power of the Shah's son? Not many people are talking about another option, which seems increasingly likely listening to you talking about Kurdish separatist groups and Balochis and armed groups on the street, which is total state collapse. That Iran goes the way of Iraq post-2003. Goes the way of Syria post-2011, that there is some form of civil war, that it does become a failed state, that people are just killing each other for the indefinite future. How likely is that? How worried should we be about that?

We should be very worried about it. Iran has the same ethnic and sectarian fault lines that have led other countries in the region into civil strife, like Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, the list goes on. And the Islamic Republic mistreated Iranian minorities more than any other segments of the society. So there's more anger and pent-up frustration within those communities than at any other segment of the Iranian society. And plus, as I said, some of these minorities are armed. Now, imagine what happens if Iran descends into a scenario like this. Turkey has just been able to put down its long-term problem with the PKK, its own Kurdish separatist groups. There are elements of PKK within this coalition of Kurdish groups that are now picking up arms against the Iranian regime. So Turkey will be very concerned and might be dragged into this. Pakistan is also extremely concerned about these Balochi militias. So you might have the same ingredients we've seen in other cases, that these civil strife often quickly turn into proxy wars as well, bringing in regional powers with different agendas.

Libya being the classic example of that.

Exactly. And then there is another scenario, and this all depends on when and where this war ends and who is still standing with it when it ends. But because the most powerful force within Iran after the Supreme Leader has, has been the Revolutionary Guards. But the Revolutionary Guards ranks have also been thinning with all the assassinations of the Revolutionary Guards leadership. It is quite possible that if there is a power vacuum at the top, it might be filled with a strongman emerging from the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards. But there is also the possibility that you would end up with a Sudan scenario or a Libya scenario in which you have two rival generals from the Revolutionary Guards who can't establish full control and the country gets divided along those lines. All of those ingredients are there. And my view is that this is Israel's ultimate objective, even though the United States might not necessarily share it.

Yeah, I sympathize with that view as well, that this is what Israel wants, a region full of internally divided countries while they do what they want. The Trump administration has taken a lot of criticism for its mixed messaging. Trump initially did call for regime change, He assassinated Khamenei on day one. He told Iranians to take back their country. Then he said, I'm happy to talk to them. Then he said he won't talk to them. You said on CNN recently, Iran's political system is not a one-man show, obviously referring to the Supreme Leader who was killed. What do you mean by that? And what is the Iranian political system then, if it's not one that's built around the Supreme Leader?

Look, the Supreme Leader had the final say on all matters of state, but the Islamic Republic was built to absorb shocks and survive them by creating all sorts of power centers with overlapping authorities. For instance, in the opening act of this war, the US managed to take out former national security adviser and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Ali Shamkhani, who was the head of a council called the National Defense Council. But that council is almost a carbon copy of the Supreme National Security Council, which has survived and it's, it's Secretary Ali Larijani is now almost running the country. You know, you've now had 5 days after Khamenei has been killed and the country remains functional and it's punching back and there's no cracks at the top. These are all indicative of the fact that this was not a pyramid sitting on its head, but it is a system with multiple power centers. Precisely designed for decentralized authority at the time of crisis. The Iranians also learned a lot of lessons from US invasion of Iraq, how they need to give more authority to different provinces in order to fight back in terms of command and control. And all of that is already in action. So this is why, even in the absence of a supreme leader, The system has been able to retain a degree of cohesiveness in order not just to keep control internally, but also to punch back against much more superior military powers like Israel and the United States.

Just on the Supreme Leader issue, though, the Iranians are trying to replace Khamenei. They're being attacked as they do so. Who are they going to pick? Are they going to go for someone more moderate? Are they going to go for someone more hardline? There's talk of them picking Khamenei's son, Mojtaba Khomeini, I believe his name is. Where do you think this debate's going to go?

So look, I'm doubtful that they would actually choose someone in the middle of the conflict because by doing so, they would be painting a target on that person's back.

Yes.

But once the dust settles, they can then make a selection depending on, again, how much of the structure has survived. But Mohammad Khamenei, son of the former leader, I think is a double-edged sword because by selecting him, the system has become full circle into a dynastic one. Yes, it toppled the monarchy and now it has become one itself. And that would alienate even its, its 5 to 10% of core constituents who still believe in this regime. And second, Mashaba is a very unpopular figure in Iran among huge segments of the Iranian society, just as his father was toward the end, towards the end of his reign. So that's not going to necessarily help the regime. But on the other side of the coin, this is a man who's been operating from the shadows in his father's office and is very familiar with how the machinery works. And is very close to the Revolutionary Guards. So there might be a view that with him they can have continuity amid all of this crisis and would be able to, you know, there's no learning on the job, basically, can hit the ground running. But, but that doesn't necessarily mean that he would be the choice. It is quite possible that these are all also messaging by rival groups or by his allies to try to elevate his position. As they make a decision. But again, I don't think that decision will be imminent.

Well, the Israelis have said they'll kill anyone who is Iran's leader, regardless who that person is. I think the foreign minister said that just this week. Let me ask you this. Donald Trump clearly wants some kind of Venezuela situation where he kind of decapitates the regime, gets a quick win, gets a government that he can control and get, you know, resources from. If he were to strike that kind of deal, in Iran, who would he strike it with? Is it with President Pesechian, who we haven't heard much from recently, the more moderate president? Is it with the IRGC, with the military top brass? Who would he be doing a deal with in this opaque system?

So power is not in the hands of the council, three-member council, who has assumed the responsibilities of the office of the Supreme Leader on an interim basis. That is comprised of President Pesechian, the head of the judiciary and a member of the Guardian Council. Power is really in the hands of two individuals, National Security Adviser Ali Larijani and former speaker and current Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf. Both of these men are former commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, and both of them are pretty experienced in statecraft. If they survive, those would be the possible Delcy Rodriguez of Iran. However, having said that, they will not go as far as, as she did. Because remember that in the case of Venezuela, the negotiated transition happened before the military action. The Iranians now, number one, don't trust Trump because he got out of a deal with them and then bombed them twice in the middle of negotiations. So no Iranian politician would basically put their eggs in the basket of President Trump. Second, He is the person who killed Soleimani in 2020, killed Khamenei this year. And it would be very politically toxic for any Iranian politician to bend the knee to him. So you can see the possibility of defining some sort of a modus vivendi, but not going as far as subjugating the country to President Trump, especially if the system survives this war.

Yeah, if it survives the war is a big question. I've got to ask a question about some historical stuff here. So the last time the US attempted regime change in Iran was 1953, when it pulled off a regime change against Mohammad Mosaddegh, who was the democratically elected prime minister. That paved the way for the Shah returning to power. And then just a decade and a half later, in 1979, The Shah's brutal rule paved the way for the Islamic Revolution, for Khomeini, for the, quote, wicked radical dictatorship that Trump claims to be fighting today. If there is a successful regime change by the Americans and the Israelis this time around in 2026, do you think history, this pattern will just repeat itself, that 10, 20 years from now we'll be back to an even more repressive Iranian government?

Well, this is why this entire approach is so short-sighted, because we should have learned the lesson that there is a direct line between the 1979 revolution and the 1953 coup. The fact that it appeared that the Shah's legitimacy relied on US intervention in Iran's internal affairs completely undermined his rule and eventually resulted in his toppling in the revolution. So if we do this again, put in place a government that would be seen as a puppet of the United States, by definition, it's going to be an unstable formula that is also going to end in grief in a similar way because the Iranians are first very nationalistic and second, historically have been against being subjugated to outside powers. It is important to understand that Iran, as a relatively weak developing country in the 18th and 19th century, was one of the only countries that was not colonized by the West. And there is, and that should already tell you a lot about the mindset and the culture, regardless of, you know, whether they like the current regime or they don't.

What about the Shah's son, the crown prince here in the US? I know it's hard to say and no one knows for sure, but what kind of support does he actually have inside of Iran on the ground? There's been a lot of reporting that the diaspora is very loud in his support, There's been reporting in the Western media that some of his support is artificial, it's kind of bots. How much support does he actually have inside of Iran were he to return on an American tank?

Well, the simple answer is that we don't know because there are no reliable surveys inside the country. One thing that seems clear is that his popularity has increased, partly as a result of the fact that the Islamic Republic has put every other alternative in prison. And so there is, there is no one else standing, partly as a result of sheer desperation within the population who are really looking for a redeemer, whoever he is, but also as a result of a lot of investment to boost his image, as you said, given his relations with Israel and so on. But I think these are two main obstacles to him being able to fulfill his dream of returning to Iran. Number one is that he doesn't have any ground game. In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini was also leading the revolution from exile, but there was a network of mosques and charitable organizations who were doing the legwork of the revolution on the ground. Yes, there is no such organization currently in Iran facilitating the crown prince's return. Second problem is that Unlike Ayatollah Khomeini, who again, in the run-up to the revolution, his motto was whoever agrees with us at 10% is an ally. The approach that the current crown prince has is that if you agree with them at 90%, you're with the other side because there are 10% of difference. And as he's surrounded by people who have ended up dividing the opposition more than uniting it. And that, I think, is a real obstacle to him being able to play the unifier, leader of transition.

One last question related to Iran's history. A lot of people are asking, how long can Iran endure this bombardment by the United States and Israel, which is only increasing by the day? There's talk from the Israelis of using the Dahiya Doctrine, which they used to flatten Beirut, applying that to Iran. We've already had over 1,000 civilians killed at the time of our conversation. How long can Iran last against the most powerful country in the history of the world? I know that historically speaking, as you mentioned, 18th, 19th centuries withstood Western colonization. In the 1980s, withstood a Western-backed Saddam Hussein invasion of Iran. For 8 years, the Iranians did not back down. They lost, I think, a million people in that war. They were subjected to chemical weapons. In the end, Khomeini reluctantly did do a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. How long can they last this time round, do you think?

Look, this is a game of endurance and the outcome will be determined by a simple math, which is who is going to run out of missile launchers or interceptors first. If the US has been very effective in trying to degrade Iran's retaliatory capacity, whether that's in the form of missiles fired towards Israel or shorter-range rockets and missiles and drones fired towards the Gulf states, then this would be a defeat for Iran and the US would be able to wrap, wrap up this war in a matter of days or weeks. However, if it's the other way around and US and its allies start running out of interceptors, And this is already the case in the Gulf states. And this is why Iran has focused its war effort primarily on targeting the Gulf countries, because they're very short on ammunition. If that happens, then I think it's likely that President Trump would blink first, because if this escalates further, we've already seen the impact on global energy prices. But this is only with the disruption of exports of energy out of the region. Is not with any kind of disruption of production. If infrastructure is hit in these countries, then the markets would absolutely panic and we would be in a different situation. If there is a high-casualty event and more American fatalities, the political costs for President Trump would change. So there are all sorts of calculations. But the Iranian view is if the Houthis could survive US assaults and a coalition led by Saudi Arabia for several years, if the Taliban could survive 20 years of US military pressure on them, these group— these people are determined enough to be able to survive.

Ali Vaez from the International Crisis Group. We'll have to leave it there. Thank you for your time and your analysis.

Great pleasure. Thanks for having me.

Did you like this video? Don't forget to subscribe to this YouTube channel and turn on notifications for exclusive content. And to support our independent, unfiltered journalism, head over to zeteo.com. Your support matters.