BBC Interview with General David H. Petraeus: Strategic Judgment in an Age of Global Volatility

Well, we heard that Donald Trump said that they are ready to help. The United States is ready to help. Let's talk to the retired US Army General David Petraeus. David, good to see you. You're the former CIA director who actually led Allied forces in Iraq during the 2007 surge, later commanding US forces in Afghanistan. When Donald Trump says that if the killing does not stop the US will get involved. This doesn't mean boots on the ground. What are the US's options?

Well, there are numerous options. You can— all the way from diplomatic and informational. Even just getting Starlink dishes in on the ground would help them communicate with each other and with the outside world. There can be economic sanctions of various types against individuals, against Iran's ability to export oil. There's humanitarian options. And then, of course, there are many military options. And I was also the former commander of U.S. Central Command, which is the greater Middle East. That would be the regional combatant command that undoubtedly has been developing the menus of options for the president and others to consider. There can certainly be strikes on the headquarters of the security force organizations that are violently putting down these protests, these demonstrations that have been killing the people. In very substantial numbers. He could go after the missile capability that they have, which of course was heavily damaged during the Israeli strikes against Iran and which concluded with a U.S. substantial bombing as well. They've been trying to reconstitute those missile arsenals. That would be useful. It could prevent some of the retaliation that might be of a concern. Again, a number of different activities that wouldn't require boots on the ground, many of which could even be done with unmanned systems, cruise missiles and the like.

Should, in your— from your experience in your capacity, should the US be getting involved?

I think the US should be getting involved in a variety of ways. I think it's a tougher call as to whether the US should use the military options that I've outlined. I also should note that the legal basis for this would be somewhat difficult to establish if there's not threats against U.S. citizens. Keep in mind that most of our operations in the Middle East have been justified by the authority to use military force in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, which allow us to go after al-Qaeda and essentially al-Qaeda affiliates and those who those who shelter them. And then there's the self-defense. That was the legal basis for the strike against Qassem Soleimani, the over-20-year head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force. In this case, I'm not sure what that objective would be. Even the humanitarian assistance that President Obama rendered, if you will, against the Islamic State, once again, that was really based on the authority to use military force, again, against Sunni extremist elements. These are Shia. Needless to say, and there is also some authority left over from the legislation on Iraq that justified that particular operation. So that would also be a concern, I would think, even though noting that President Trump controls both houses of Congress and they have certainly not been willing to challenge him on these kinds of issues.

We saw that Donald Trump feels emboldened following the seizure of Venezuela's leader, Nicolás Maduro. But we also know that Congress was split about that. Does he need to start getting Congress involved?

Well, again, I don't think Congress— even though you saw a vote that was somewhat surprising in the Senate in which enough Republicans voted with the Democrats to actually challenge the president, uh, but again, I, I don't think that that is sufficient. And he should feel a bit emboldened. That was an extraordinary operation. I don't think people realize at all how dicey that really was when you think of how many Secret Service protectors around President Maduro. There had to be reportedly over 30 Cubans alone were killed in that operation. So there had to be some very, very difficult moments in there. And of course, as we now know, the lead helicopter was hit and the pilot of the lead helicopter was hit several times in the leg. Envision the kind of Joint Special Operations Command options would be at the top of the list here. I think you're talking much more about conventional capabilities. Again, cruise missiles, perhaps stealth bombers, precision munitions and so forth. But again, to what end? Also, I guess that's the other really key question. Do we think that this would help the opposition or would it actually gel the opposition to the United States? The same reservations I'm sure that Israel has if it might be contemplating any activity at this time as well.

You talked about the reasoning and the justification behind potential US involvement. We know that back in last year, the summer of last year, June last year, the United States did strike Iranian nuclear sites. Is that a form of justification that they continue with their nuclear programs?

Well, that nuclear program, I think, has really been set back several years. It's possible, to be sure, that there could be some stored highly enriched uranium and some advanced centrifuges to enrich to the next level to weapons grade. But I think if those exist, they will be found. And I think that Israel and the United States would not hesitate to take them out. So I think that particular issue has really been resolved for quite some time. Of course, over a dozen of the most important nuclear scientists were killed, and so was the capability that people overlook, which is to take the gaseous state, which would be the highly enriched uranium if they enrich further, and turn it into a metal, which is what's required to create the essentially the core of a nuclear device that then is triggered and sets off the chain reaction. They don't have that capability. It was taken out first by the Israelis and then with the US dropping a Massive Ordnance Penetrator on top of it as well.

Now, one issue that is of interest is what happens next. Obviously, within Iran, there is no organized opposition, but we are hearing a lot about the exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of the former— of the last Shah of Iran. Is that logical? Is that something that is possible given his background?

I think it's possible, but there will be some skepticism about that, as was noted by your report right before I came on. He hasn't been in Iran since the Shah was deposed. He's really been much more in France and the United States. So whether he would resonate with the people, I think, is somewhat in question. And, you know, we're really watching, I think, for that moment where all of a sudden these security force elements, the Basij militia, who may number as much as between 1 and 2 million pipe swingers willing to shoot crowds and so forth, backed up by the Revolutionary Guards Corps elements as well. When might they lose, if you will, the courage to confront these crowds? When might they doubt what it is that they're doing? Perhaps not similar in a way that took place in Egypt, where, of course, the army drew back and refused to kill the civilians in Tahrir Square and essentially allowed Mubarak to go under the bus. But a very different situation here because the regime elements are so large. And they stand to lose so much if the overall regime goes under. And as you note, there is this— this is a leaderless demonstration, essentially. In the past, some demonstrations back, there were actual leaders. They are not in evidence in this case. This is a really popular uprising. But we should note that Karim Sadjadpour, one of the most respected Iranian experts here in the United States at the Carnegie Institute, He has described Iran as a zombie state. He said its legitimacy, its ideology, its economy, and its leader are dead or dying. What keeps it alive is lethal force. It kills to live and it lives to kill. Brutality can delay the regime's funeral, but it can't restore the pulse. The question is, is there a funeral for this regime coming, or will the regime forces in the end be able to do what they've done in all the other times like this in recent decades, and that is put this— these demonstrations down, regain control. Noting, though, that they have so mismanaged the economy. Inflation is taking off. The rial has plummeted in its value, and they really don't have much that they can actually do for the people. In a previous time, of course, they said, we'll take the religious police off the streets, we'll allow women not to wear the hijab, this kind of thing. There's not much left. In their arsenal of tools to answer the legitimate concerns of the people.

David, we're getting, we're getting notifications that the US military has struck, targeted ISIS throughout Syria. This is just developing, but just in terms of, and we know that of course the US special envoy to Syria has said that America is ready to mediate between Syria and Kurdish forces as well. I just wonder in terms of the direction for the United States. Donald Trump was always talking— was, was campaigning on a rather more isolationist program, talking about America first. And yet we have seen an extraordinary amount of US foreign engagement. Is that the direction of travel for the United States?

Well, it certainly appears to be. In fact, there have been a number of analyses just over the past week that have observed what you just did, that Despite some of the platforms of the party during his quest to be elected, that indeed the US is more active around the world than it has been for a number of years. It is flexing its military muscles. It's demonstrating really the extraordinary capability that we have in certain categories, such as what we saw in Venezuela, unequaled by any other country. I don't think any other country could have pulled off that particular operation. As successfully as our forces did. So you're seeing again this in the Middle East, even in, in Europe with respect to Russia. There were some concessions and support by the US for the efforts, the initiatives of the Coalition of the Willing. So, no, I think you see the United States leading in a variety of different situations around the world and doing so with military force, noting that of course the strikes in Syria may well have been the additional retaliation against the Islamic State for the losses that we took there in previous weeks.

And just in terms of then Greenland, which is something that Donald Trump has been speaking about an awful lot, with regards to the, the method in which potentially he is talking about taking over Greenland. What's your assessment of that? Because he's been incredibly— the talk of using potential force. But there is an argument that this could all be done very diplomatically. Is he getting his messaging right?

Well, I think you actually have to read his own book, The Art of the Deal. Listen to what he has said publicly. He talks about, in a sense, flexing one's muscles before you sit down at the table. He's even said that you should punch the other guy in the nose. Before you sit down at a table and negotiate. And I'd like to think that this is actually a negotiating tactic. We do have increasing strategic interests in Greenland. It is becoming ever more geostrategically important as the glaciers there melt and expose more and more strategic and rare earth minerals. And then also as the Arctic ice cap is receding as well, which will allow over time maritime traffic over essentially right over the top of the world. So we have a base there. We've long had that. We have an agreement that dates back to 1951 that is really quite open-ended. I think that we can get whatever it is that we want in Greenland if we sit down and negotiate. I think everyone in Congress— this is an issue on which there has been pushback because of the damage that certain of the options would do to NATO. So again, I'd like to think that this is a negotiating tactic that's used by someone who has actually talked about using all of the tools that you have to intimidate the other guys before you even sit down at the table.

Is NATO over? We know, of course, that Denmark— by no means.

Not at all.

Why not?

No. I think NATO has more reason to exist now than at any time in recent decades. I should note, I was a 1-star, 3-star, 4-star had NATO hats in those jobs, always had US hats as well. I'm a huge believer in NATO. And I think, frankly, that the combination of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump from different angles has really prompted NATO— it's been a catalyst for the NATO countries, particularly those in Europe, to truly take on much more themselves, to pledge to increase defense spending not just from 2% of GDP but to 3.5%. And of course, that's a win for President President Trump. I watched as his predecessors in these various NATO positions that I held, I watched them all try to get the Europeans to spend more. Obviously, he had a big assist from Vladimir Putin and what he's doing in Ukraine. But I think there's also a very, very clear recognition by all NATO members, including those in North America, that Russia has to be stopped in Ukraine. And I think there's actually an opportunity to do that. Russia is in a much more fragile state economically, I think, than people it runs out of the national welfare funds that it's been diverting to keep its military-industrial complex going. There could be much more pressure on them. Senator Lindsey Graham has said the White House has greenlit the sanctions package in Congress, which would be very substantial and very much complement the 19th round of sanctions by the EU. And look, the EU just recently approved $105 billion equivalent support for Ukraine, which is going to not just solve their fiscal and economic problems, but enable Ukraine to double the production of drones. So I think there's actually an opportunity here right now that, that we should really be seeking to capitalize on.

And yet, after the coalition of the willing meeting in Paris with the US envoy Steve Whitkopf, with Jared Kushner afterwards, Volodymyr Zelensky said that he still didn't have any concrete guarantees, security guarantees. That Ukraine insists on?

I actually thought that the guarantees that have been put out there— and again, there's not sufficient detail just yet, but they're much more along the lines of what I thought would be real guarantees. I'm a little bit tepid about what a presence force or some force on their soil would do unless they're in the front lines. But if you have ironclad guarantees that if Russia resumes offensive activity. This assumes, of course, a cessation of hostilities. But if Russia breaks that cessation of hostilities, that automatically European countries will take the following actions. And apparently the US is part of this. That actually does, I think, get attention. And it's not just supporting Ukraine, it's also punishing Russia and those who buy its oil and gas and provide the components to keep its military industrial complex going.

General David Petraeus, thank you very much for your time. Really appreciate it.