Drones in Warfare: Leadership, Innovation, and Useful Fiction: Insights from Dr. Peter W. Singer

24 Jul 2025 · 2 min

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In this excerpt, Dr. Peter W. Singer discusses the longstanding but under‑acknowledged threat posed by small combat drones. He notes that non‑state actors have been employing such drones since the mid‑2000s, citing their use in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria against U.S. forces and by ISIS. Singer critiques the U.S. military’s delayed institutional response, attributing it to a sunk‑cost bias tied to existing systems, doctrines, and procurement programs that hinder adaptation. He argues that overcoming this bias and actively learning from the experiences of other nations are essential for protecting troops and effectively integrating drones into future operations. He concludes that the current understanding of drone capabilities is only a “scraping of the surface,” implying a need for deeper strategic and technological engagement.

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hold it, drones can be a threat. We could use it more effectively. Other actors could use them more effectively. Look, this was out in the open, not just for years, but for decades. You know, the first small drone used in conflict by a non-state actor was back in the mid-2000s in the conflict in Lebanon. They were used against US forces in Iraq and Syria by ISIS. Why is it taking now the year 2025 to go, hold it, we need to better protect our units against this threat, or hold it, we ought to be equipping our units with it. So I think there is a, you know, we'll call it a sunk cost phenomenon of, well, we've put so much investment into system approach X, doctrine Y. And, you know, the danger with sunk costs is, you know, they don't deliver for you. You just keep plowing, you know, Uh, just because you've spent a lot on something doesn't mean you should spend a lot on it in the future. I think letting go of that is a big challenge for us. Um, so that combination of looking at other nations' experiences and trying to learn from them rather than, you know, losing on the battlefield ourselves, and then secondly, escaping from the sunk cost phenomena, um, I think are two crucial areas for us. The final is to understand that we're only scraping the surface of what we