Alternative Security Architectures: Türkiye Wants to Join the Saudi-Pakistani Alliance?

Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. I'm your host, Dr. Oualaalou, excited to be with you as always. Today's topic, we will be talking about Türkiye, or Türkiye as it is pronounced, and the ability of this country to join the defense pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. You know, what are we looking at? What, what prompted even Türkiye at want to consider something like this. So this is what I'm going to be providing you in this live stream. I'll share my analysis and so forth. So, but first, let me say hi to our wonderful community. Let me get my reading glasses here quickly. Just say hi quickly to our community. Uh, Karkula, good to see you. You too, super good to— oh, that's an interesting one. Just found that Indian confidently claimed that you are funded by Pakistan. No, I'm not funded by anybody. And if it were the case, I will let the community know because transparency matters to me. So if I am ever to be funded by anybody, the community will know. So, uh, just to put that on a record. Leanne, good to see you. Hanging G, as always, and good afternoon to you, or good evening, that is. Alexis, good to see you. Liang, good to see you. Y, Y, YTT, good to see you. Say It Like It Is, good to see you. Casey Wong, Willie Homan, as always. All right, let me get it. Phil, good to see you here. Alok 1970, good to see you here. Famida, good to see you. And Khadija also. All right, let me get in into some, uh, once again, just FYI, what I'm gonna be, uh, talking about today is why Türkiye is considering joining Saudi-Pakistani alliance or defense pact, that is. It is a seismic change. So nonetheless, but it's worth— to me, that's what— when I thought about it, I said, no, the community needs to understand exactly what is going on. So I have two quick headlines for you just to put things in perspective. The first one has to do with Europe, and it's none other than Bucharest. Whoever thought? Take a look at this, uh, I'm going to share the screen with you right here. So take a listen here. All right, this is what you're looking at, is, uh, the, uh, demonstr— the protest or demonstrations. Thousands of anti-EU, uh, sort of march in Bucharest. Bucharest, the capital of Romania. As a matter of fact, this is where it's from. I spent some time in Bucharest. So, and those are opposing the sort of the anti-free speech laws that is in Europe. So very, very interesting. However, I didn't see this coming. All of a sudden it's coming out of none other than Romania. So the second one has to do with this individual here. And this one is none other than Cabello. Cabello is the Interior Minister of Venezuela. So what happened? There are now declassified, uh, uh, documents coming out revealing that secret contact between Washington and a Venezuelan minister before Maduro's arrest. And, and this was also revealed by Reuters. That revealed today, as a matter of fact this morning, that officials in the US administration, President Donald Trump's, that is, administration, were in contact with the Venezuelan interior minister, Diosdado Cabello. And this happened months, yeah, months before the US operation which led to the kidnapping and abduction of the Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. So, and by the way, these contacts are still going on. So that's why I was confident that it had to be some interior elements that facilitated the, the, the operation to abduct or kidnap Maduro. So, and this is again, when you have, like I said yesterday, uh, when you want to do regime change, you always have to have two main things. The guns, which is part of the military, and the intelligence services. So the interior minister seems to be a little bit powerful, but power in Venezuela is divided. You have— still have— they have the intelligence and you still have the military. So anyway, that's what I wanted to just share with you on this one. Let's get in back to our topic of the day. Turkey are joining, uh, wanted to join Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. And what's this all about? And by the way, make sure you stay with me till the end because I got some really a lot of pictures to gonna be sharing with you, and I'm gonna tell you some stuff about why all of a sudden the interest from part of Turkey into Pakistan. So when we think about the idea of, uh, what I wanted to do in this particular analysis, uh, so I wanted to just sort of break it down for you and, and, and even examine this emerging, uh, I will look at it as a strategic alliance. You know, some will say it's too early for that, Dr. Oualaalou. Yeah, I agree with you, but at the same time, these talks didn't happen last month. These talks have been in— these talks were conducted 10 months ago. They're still going on. And most likely, most likely, and the way I reach my conclusion is also based on some foreign intelligence agencies' assessment that most likely Turkey might end up joining them. So when you look at this, that's why I use the term strategic alliance between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, because Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, as you know, do have a mutual defense pact which signed between Riyadh and Islamabad. And this is where this advanced discussions for Turkish involvement has been going on. So in my opinion, this alliance, should it move forward, will represent a significant geopolitical alignment. And because why? When you take the three countries, they have some sort of shared security concerns. You add to that the decline in confidence in the United States' reliability. And the fourth, the third element is the regional rivalries. You look at the rivalries in the Middle East, but you look at also the rivalries vis-à-vis Pakistan when it looks in at India. And this is why some sort of, uh, what I wanted to do in this analysis is provide you this: what are the strategic drivers behind this particular alliance? Because make no mistake,— it's going to reshape the Middle East or West Asia and South Asia power dynamics moving forward. So, and, uh, a lot of people are questioning Turkey's reliability. Well, of course, for at least Saudis, Turkey's reliability as a partner, because the Saudis have the rivalry against now United Arab Emirates. Iran is always there. I'm not denying this, but the Turkish and the Saudis are converging together against United Arab Emirates. Of course, they're gonna always keep, uh, an eye on Iran. So, and this is where you're gonna have to understand also what are the major powers' assessments on this. For example, how does Russia see it? How does China see it? How does the United States see it? So, and all this also tied to Pakistan JF-17 fighter jets because the export ambitions for Pakistan— and this is what I'm going to be addressing towards the end of this live stream because it's worth knowing exactly where to think about moving forward. So the idea of Ankara, which is the capital of Turkey, is considering joining an alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia because it has been actively considering this particular aspect, you know. And the core agreement, the core agreement is that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed that Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement, which was signed back in September 2025. So in which basically that defense pact suggests that any attack on one country is considered an attack on all. Same scenario like the Article 5 of NATO, except now for Turkey it's gonna present a dilemma. Why? Because Turkey is a NATO member, and we'll get into that as we move forward. So now, Turkey's interests— those advanced talks that Türkiye had with both Pakistan and India is most likely will lead to the latter joining the, that alliance or joining Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. So, and this was reported from different sources, at least from the one I found that from, is was from the intelligence services on overseas. So And this is where you have the Pakistani Defense Minister— oh, the— I'm sorry, the Pakistani Defense Production Minister. Those are two different things. He's confirming that the draft agreement is already available with the three— between the three countries. So it's almost a foregone conclusion. And like I said earlier, that's been in talks for 10 months. And where the importance of this? If you are watching from outside in, you're going to see the first thing that's going to come to your mind is the strategic complementary of this. Because why? Each country brings something to the table. So, so in this case, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and, and, and Turkey, they bring this thing strength to this potential alliance. Let's start with Saudi Arabia, for example. What does Saudi Arabia bring to the table? Money. Even though some will say, what, the economic power? No, there is no economic power in Saudi Arabia. It's money because of oil. That's one which will be very— like in any war, remember how major wars were won because of access to energy, how Germany destroyed its own economy because of lack of access to energy. That is what I mean. Saudi Arabia brings this to the table. Pakistan, on the other hand, has a nuclear capability, has also ballistic missiles. So, and if this is not enough, you add manpower. And Türkiye provides military experience, especially for the highly developed defense industry. For example, when you think about their Bayraktar drones, which has been very, very great demand on it from different parts of the world. So because it was developed internally. So, so, and this arrangement, in my opinion, will echo exactly Article 5 for NATO. This is where the dilemma for Türkiye is, because it is already a member of NATO. Now the question becomes, what is the motivation for this, especially on part of Türkiye? So Türkiye's interest reflects the growing concern about US reliability. Is this question has been just under Donald Trump, or it has been in the previous administrations? It depends on whom you ask. For now, we can say because of Donald Trump, this reliability question has come to the surface. So, but on the other hand, we can't focus just on this. We have to focus also on the shared concerns that Saudi Arabia and Turkey have, especially when it comes down to two countries Iran and United Arab Emirates. Despite what you hear, yes, the Saudis are in good terms with Iran, whatever, but there is always that suspicion that exists because they've always viewed Iran that way. However, like I mentioned earlier, uh, yesterday when I did the live stream for you, the idea that now Saudi Arabia is voicing its opposition to regime change in Iran, and ain't gonna happen anyway. Because now you see tanks have backed down completely and makes you just wonder what. So, so this is where Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have been converging strategically. You look at what's going on in Syria and you look at the issue of United Arab Emirates. So, and this is why after so many years of rivalry, yeah, between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, especially in Syria, Since Assad is gone, things have changed, but now they have more issues to emerge in, in Syria that they have to deal with. Suffice it to say for us is that the alliance represents a significant reshaping of the regional security landscape, particularly given the potential implications for Southeast Asia politics when it comes down to India, especially on Pakistan part. So in other words, this alliance between those three countries, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, each will benefit from different angle. So, and that's, you start to ask yourself, you know, what is, what's behind it? You know, how will this alignment sort of reshape the geopolitical landscape in the regions? Both Middle East or West Asia and Southeast Asia. So, and this to me, it will be a significant realignment. So, and it has some, it will have some sort of different layers if you are to look at that. And those different layers will be what is driving this particular desire for Türkiye to join this alliance and makes it fundamental. So, so you think about the core drivers for this particular alliance. So, and the one of the key elements, it stems from the shared security anxieties that exist among not only the two Middle Eastern countries but all three. Pakistan's tension with India, of course, Saudi Arabia rivalry with United Arab Emirates and Iran to a degree, and Turkey's conflicts with both United Arab Emirates and the Kurds. Remember, today the Joulanis of Syria just signed a decree to acknowledge the Kurds. How do you think Turkey is gonna be looking at that? And if you add another element to all this is the strain of the NATO relations, especially when it comes down to Turkey. So, but, but if we put all this aside, we're gonna be looking at a much deeper strategic shift that is existing. Because when you look at those 3 countries, you know, they do deal with the United States on a regular basis, right? Especially when it comes down to security partners. Because now what you have, not just those countries, but others as well. US security partners are looking to develop now independent collective defense capabilities. We heard how many times Europe has been talking about that, right? But that's Europe for you. They just talk, you know. Watch what a man does versus what he says, like what the former emperor of the Roman Empire, Marcus Aurelius, said once. So And this, when you look at this particular aspect, is that the reduction of the reliance on American security guarantees. Look what happened to Qatar when it was attacked by Israel. What did the US do? Nada, nothing. So, and in the case of Türkiye, makes it very, very delicate. Even though Türkiye particularly views the pact as a way to strengthen its security in this growing tensions and questions, uh, over how it can rely on the United States. But at the same time, Türkiye has also commitment towards NATO. I mean, I don't foresee Türkiye withdrawing from NATO. Do you? And what do you think? This question for you: should Türkiye withdraw from NATO altogether. And the other thing has to do with the regional alignments, and that is very crucial because what makes this timing particularly very notable is the warming relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia after years of rivalry, after years of tensions. So than this rival for, for what is for the Sunni Muslim leadership, you know, because that relation, that tensions was marked by mistrust, you know. But now it's water over the bridge. Ties have improved between Ankara and Riyadh, and the two countries have expanded economic and security cooperation. And remember, Turkey, Turkey gets some financial aid from, from Saudis. So because now both of them, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have shared concerns and common enemy, which, which one is that? United Arab Emirates. This is where, uh, the concern is. Yet both of them do support the Sunni-led government in Syria, but there are some reservations here and there. Then we move into the geopolitical reshaping because you cannot ignore the impact, how it's going to shape the geopolitical landscape moving forward if formalized. That is the key word. If formalized, there's 3 countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Interests are increasingly aligned in Southeast Asia, okay, the Middle East, and even in Africa, because the impacts of this will be substantial. Some of you might say, how, how come Africa? Because you need to understand the role of Turkey, Türkiye, in Africa, especially in Sudan. You know, you also have to understand the role of Saudi Arabia in Africa. Especially in support for the Sudan, Sudan, and, and, uh, and, uh, even within Somalia aspects. Because why? Because United Arab Emirates is funding some movements in those parts of, of, uh, uh, of the, uh, in those parts of the world. Sudan, uh, Yemen, of course, and Somalia. And this is where you think about it. From an analytical perspective, while it is meaningful defense cooperation, assuming it moves forward, you know, it is still, at least for me I see it, it is still unlikely to evolve into a full institutionalized collective security system because that requires a lot. So I'm not saying it might never happen, Because if it does, that's going to pave the way for much bigger setting because we could be talking about a Muslim NATO here. If only Muslims can get together, I mean, just think about it, the resources the Muslim world have, oil, money, manpower, and yet they are divided. But again, that's the— so this is where I see The challenge for Türkiye will be its NATO obligations because its NATO obligations constrained it from going too far. That is what I'm saying. Will Ankara reach a point where it says to NATO, I no longer want to be a member, withdraw all? I used to have a— it's not I used to, I still have a friend of mine. It's just I haven't talked to him for a while. He used to be the commander, the commanding officer of the Incirlik base. And if you know, in Sirlik base and what's in it, you got the idea. So, but I don't see Turkey doing this at this point. So most realistically, what is more realistically is that the most plausible outcome, in my opinion, it will be regarding these three countries, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, it will be some sort of an enhanced defense industrial collaboration. It will be also the armed development. Remember, now a lot of countries are demanding the fighter jets from Pakistan, wants to buy it from Pakistan. So, and of course, the joint military exercises between those three will shape, uh, uh, uh, this aspects of this alliance, and that will move it into a strategic sort of positioning, because in geopolitics you always have to think strategically. So, because here is the thing, the way you have to think about why Turkey also could consider this, there is one specific element most media do not even address this, and this has to do with Israel. How so, you may ask? It's because Israel has simultaneously deepened its military cooperation with two main countries. Who are they? Greece and Cyprus. And if you know the history of those two countries vis-à-vis Turkey, Türkiye, then you put the two and two together and figure, now I see it. So, because this will create a counterbalance dynamics, in my opinion. So, because there is always that assumption, which even— that's why I said 10 months ago, it was that assumption that the Saudis might end up joining the Abraham Accord and establish diplomatic relations with Israel, like United Arab Emirates did. But the Saudis were— they were, they were, they, they were convinced and reached the conclusion that it will not make strategic sense for them to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. And here we are. This is why Türkiye is looking at it from this perspective, because if Israel can push Greece and Cyprus, that's gonna complicate the framing of this anti-Israel person. It's very, very important dynamics to understand. So the emergence of these new blocs reflects also the deliberate strategic responses to what's going on right now in the Middle East, for example. This flare-up regarding the Iran-Israeli-US war. You know, you look at, for example, even you go back a few years, the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan. You look at the defeat of India by Pakistan, you know, and you look at now the Indian Army sort of establishing military presence in the Himalayan on the border with China. All this puts in perspective why this dynamics reflects the response to this sort of regional flares up. But at the same time, the key over all this, it has to do with lack of reliability of the United States. In other words, they cannot, the allies or whatever, whomever, will not trust the United States. But the trust of the US is only one element of this because we are forced to ask the same question about Türkiye. Can Türkiye be trusted? And a lot of people are not too confident about that. And again, we're not judging here, we're just providing the facts. So, because this question, in my opinion, sits at the heart of this geopolitical debate regarding this alliance. Since, you know why? Because when you study, uh, international relations, you will realize that trust in international relations depends heavily on the context and the perspective. That's why I always say, you always heard me say, hear me saying this, in geopol— in international relations, context matters. That was why I always referring to this, you know, because when you look at this, you have to look at it from, for example, NATO and Western perspective, and Türkiye has had and continue to have a complicated track record. So it has been— by the way, what year did Türkiye became a NATO member? Doesn't everybody know? Can you type it in the chat box if you happen to know? What year did Türkiye became, uh, a NATO member, if you happen to know? Oh, oh, Karakolaki got it! 1952, that is correct. In 1952. So, and it was a strategic anchor for decades because of geographical locations. So, but it's also Turkey didn't care what NATO wants or thinks. They act sometimes independently in ways that concerns Western allies. Give you a quick example. Turkey maintained its military ties with Russia. Despite NATO sanctions. And as a matter of fact, Turkey went ahead, as you know, I'm sure you do know, went ahead and purchased the, uh, the, the Russian S-400 missile systems. Back then we sanctioned Turkey, and you know how we sanctioned them? Sanctioned them is by blocking their fire pilots from coming to the US to train on an F-35 program. And Turkey said, we don't care, we're moving forward. Why not? Why not? Why not? Uh, we're gonna move forward with purchase of the S-400. Why? Because the, uh, the Russian S-400 systems are very advanced. They can lock in radar quickly for, for American fighter jets. So, and this was also despite U.S. objections. So the same thing you can say about Turkey also vis-à-vis Syria, for example. Turkey has taken independent stance vis-à-vis Syria. And not only that, other regional issues as well. So, and this gives you an idea about how Turkey, like, like every other country, well, prioritizes its own strategic interests over alliance solidarity and so forth. And you know, that's what I'm saying. We have to look at it pragmatically. So, so, but at the same time, Türkiye has been, Türkiye has been very vital still to NATO Eastern flank. If you take Türkiye out, NATO is already, it's nothing left anyway. But we're talking about now the Ukraine front. So, and this is why Türkiye maintained its relations with Russia despite what NATO was saying. And from the regional aspects, Türkiye's sort of reliability depends on whether the partner's interests align with its own. This is where Türkiye has seen this alliance with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is because the interests align with Turkey, with Turkey as well. So when you think about it, reconciliation with Saudi Arabia after years of rivalry, what does it show? It shows that Turkey can shift its positions when strategic logic dictates, unlike every other country will do so. So with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the shared concern regarding United Arab Emirates, regarding Israel, and regarding India, and that in itself created a genuine common ground. Little long that the Saudis have been funding the nuclear program for Pakistan. It's not a secret. So of course, like I said earlier, Turkey is going to be faced with those constraints of its NATO commitment. If it can overcome that, then the alliance with the Saudis and the Pakistanis would be much easier. So, but at this age, I just want to bring this up regarding the trust issue, you know, because this trust issue is not just limited to Turkey. No, look, my own country, Because you have to think in, in geopolitics, you can't be thinking in those terms. In geopolitics, you have to look at it and approach it from the fact that most states act as rational actors pursuing their own strategic interests. And the real question always becomes is whether those interests remain aligned or not. I mean, you look at the Europeans as an example. They wanted to align their, their, their, their strategies with the Americans, but look where they end up. And that in itself tells you they don't have a strategic independence for them to say to the Americans, no, we're not gonna do it. The same issue that countries in Asia doing, like South Korea, Japan, Philippines, and Australia. They doing the same mistake. They been doing the same mistake. So, and this is why when you think about in this case, most of the cases pertain to the US lack of reliability. In other words, you can depend on the Americans, American government, that is, because the key issue for this, you have to think about other elements. For example, Iran's regional role in the area. So, and this is where you have those countries, the 3, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, sort of create the genuine conversions regarding this alliance. Has nothing to do directly with Iran. No, no, no, no, no. It just, you look at the big picture. The one thing you need to always remember is that this kind of alignment could shift if circumstances change. Think about the Chabahar port in Iran that is in conjunction, uh, joint ventures between India and Iran. What did India do? We drew and let Iran be holding the end of the stick. That's why you can't trust a country like India. So, and I'm not saying that is the same case with this, it's just you have to always consider the alignment can always shift if circumstances change. So because what if the US recommits to the region once again? So what if the internal dynamics of Turkey shifts to some unpredictable directions? What if, even though I'm, I'm— some will say it's impossible— what if the monarchy is toppled in Saudi Arabia? What if the Pakistani government collapses and you have to have someone else? Because remember, when Imran Khan was in power, you know, he wants to do exactly what's good for Pakistan. We didn't let him. Remember when he— when the US approached him about establishing a drone base on Pakistani soil, and Imran Khan said, I'm sorry, I don't want that. Because he knows what will— what that will create. What did we end up doing? Why do you think he's in jail for? Unjustly, in my opinion, because I read up about his case. It's not right what the government in Pakistan— and shame on Pakistani government. I do know the ISI has something to do with it. You know, I worked in Washington, we used to deal with the ISI, so That's not right. So now he's sitting in prison. That, that's not right and just. So anyway, suffice it to say, the practical approach when you look at the alliance— excuse me— that is emerging is that the idea of, like what Reagan used to say, trust but verify. That is one of the key aspects we need to consider into all this. And that is very, very crucial given, you know, this particular alliance, especially the push by the Saudis. If this has to do with tensions with United Arab Emirates, it's a logical argument, and I'm not going to rule it out. Let me play this clip and I'll get back to that. Liking this video so far? Don't just be a watcher. Go ahead and hit the like, share, and subscribe button, and don't forget to tap the bell so you will not miss any of my videos or live streams. This way you will be supporting a channel that stands for the truth and objective reporting. The choice is yours. Thanks for your support. So when you think about the— this particular aspect, Saudi and United Arab Emirates, uh, uh, tensions is directly relevant to understanding why Saudi Arabia is building this Turkey-Pakistan alliance. It is more complex, I'm not denying that, but at the same time, at least you are starting to see some sort of the first steps towards something like this. Because as you know, and I'm not going to detail this because I did a video on this, to those who have missed, uh, the video where I talked about Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, just go back. I did it last week, so you can go back and check it out. So Saudis and United Arab Emirates sort of clashed militarily now in Yemen, which happened in December when the Saudis bombed Al Mukalla base— Al Mukalla port, I'm sorry. So And also they clashed in January 2026, the beginning of the year. And this is why the Saudis sort of backed the government forces to defeat United Arab Emirates-backed separatist groups, so known as the Southern Transitional Council, the STC. All this because what the Saudis wants to do is to build some sort of a political coalition to preserve the established state borders. What happens is that Turkey happens to share— Türkiye happens to share this vision with the Saudis. And this is where you see the connections of this Türkiye-Pakistan-Saudi alliance, because here where it matters. So if this coalition, in my opinion, goes against which most likely will be also against United Arab Emirates, crystallizes, meaning if it establishes, so that will be an unprecedented geopolitical shift in my opinion in Middle Eastern power dynamics. That's going to have to push Washington into the drawing board, that's going to push China and Russia into the drawing board to reconsider. And this is why Saudis appear to be actively building a counterweight to United Arab Emirates by bringing in Turkey and Pakistan together. MBS is working to strengthen his hand against United Arab Emirates assertiveness. That is what his aim is at. It's a geopolitical move because he wants to undermine Mohammed bin Zayed sort of nefarious activities in Sudan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and you name it. That is the overall objective. So, and this is again, are we looking— and this leads me to ask the main question here, and the main question is, are we looking at the first steps of a Muslim-NATO alliance? It's worth asking. So, because it is— I'm framing it this way, I'm framing it this way just to highlight to you the complexity of such initiative or such undertaking. It's because it suggests something very either limited, okay, or conditional, or even both limited and conditional. At least for now, we don't know how things will evolve. What if Indonesia joins? What if Malaysia joins? What if, what if, what if, what if? So, you know, so And I'm just giving it this, this connotations. I know some will say there is no way, and I see your point because several key points will prevent this from being this transformative. In other words, this transform into this alliance. So, and there are about 3 or 4 points. First one, when you think about it, so Even proponents acknowledge that this kind of arrangement is unlikely to evolve, and I tend to agree with them. Unlikely to involve in or to evolve into a full institutionalized collective security system comparable to NATO, because the most realistic outcome, my, my opinion, will be enhanced just in joint ventures regarding the defense industrial collaboration. That's the only way I see it. Yeah, you will see sometimes, from time to time, joint military exercises. That's about it. So second one, it will be that the members have fundamentally different strategic positions. One of the fundamental aspects in geopolitics, if you are advising a president or whomever You're gonna have to provide this picture. This is why I don't know who's advising Donald Trump. They don't seem to provide him the full picture. So, and specifically in this case, because Turkey, as I mentioned earlier, is already a member of NATO and is constrained by creating an alternative security architecture, because that's what it will mean. That's what I'm saying. Will Ankara reach the point where it says to NATO, I don't want to be member anymore. I don't see Turkey doing that at this point. So, and when you think about it from this aspect, you put Turkey aside, but when you look at Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, they operate in completely different regions with different threat environments. So there is no— that's why I don't see— there is no overarching institutional framework that's going to bind all of them like the idea of Article 5. And even for this Article 5, think about what Donald Trump just said about Greenland. You know, let's hypothetically, hypothetically go forward with the idea of deploying military or whatever. I mean, isn't Denmark has the right to defend in itself against a foreign invasion or whatever? And if Denmark, a NATO member, you know, if it does that, will the rest of NATO come to its support as obligated by Article 5? And this is again, to those who are advising Mr. Trump, are not providing the big picture. And it goes beyond just Article 5. The third element, which is crucial in my opinion, it has to do with Saudi Arabia is building political coalition to preserve certain boundaries in the region, Middle East or West Asia, that is the fear of the Saudis, especially in northern Yemen, because if the southern Yemen takes over that's going to change the dynamics in southern part of Saudi Arabia especially. I know it's not a Shia-Sunni thing, that is not what I'm referring to here. I know some people misunderstood. I read the comment last time. No, no, no, has nothing to do with that, but it has to do with how the majority Shia in southern part of Saudi Arabia are not, are not enjoying the fruit of the the wealth of the oil and so forth like others in the north. So I'm not framing this from a religious perspective. No, I'm not. So, and this is why we are now at the early stages. I mean, I might even go as far as using the term strategic pluralism, especially when it comes down to the Muslim world. But do you see the Muslim world coming together? No, if they would have come together, they would have come together when Gaza was attacked, you know. No, don't, don't ever count on that, because even some Muslim country hypocrisy is the norm. They'll tell you one thing and do the reverse behind the scenes, like every other— we humans are anyway. So, and this is why US security partners in the regions are hedging their bets right now. They don't know where things are headed. So, and that is where you see this push towards the developments of independent collective defense capabilities. Europe has been talking about it forever, whether they will do it or not. I just read this morning the statement by the Chancellor of Germany, Merz, just another bonehead anyway, that, well, we need to sort of establish our own defenses away from the United States. Come on, man, how long you've been saying this? You and France and whomever else. So, and if you want to do this, why don't you start first of all with asking the American troops to leave the German territories? You know, you know, the present, we have over almost 35,000 troops in Germany. So where is your sovereignty here? And this is what I'm saying, it's very significant when we think about all this and how, uh, it's going to move forward. And that leads me to the question of how do major powers will see this development? How will they assess this development? Russia, China, US, you know, because the major powers view this particular very differently, and their assessments reveal competing interests, believe it or not. So to Russia, for example, that will be a strategic opportunity because Russia will push for this anti-Western coalition. Well, of course I can see why, because we never hold our end of the bargain when we said to the Russians during the Soviet Union at the time when it was falling in, in 1991, that we will not expand eastward. We gave our word, but we didn't hold our end to the bargain. So I can see why the Russians will do that, because that will compensate for its rupture with the West. And that in itself will help the Russians indirectly by sort of minimizing the sanctions. And that's— to Russia will be thinking in these terms. So for, and for, for China, it's another different game altogether. Different game altogether. Because the agreements, in my opinion, should this happen, in my opinion, it will sort of boost China's power. It will work in the favor of China. And why is this? It's because long-standing relationship of the Chinese with the Pakistanis. As a matter of fact, the Saudis now are buying the hardware, military hardware from Pakistan that is made by China. And I'll get into that in a second here. So then you think about the massive infrastructure that's going on, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. So, so China is Pakistan's largest trading partner, so $25 billion annually. Which counts for about 81% of Pakistan's arms imports. Then you bring the Saudi Arabia— notably, that you bring the Saudi Arabia and Pakistan together. This is now where they are talking as we speak. They are talking about converting $2 billion in Saudi loans that Saudi gave to the Pakistanis. They want to convert that into buying— guess what— JF-17 warplanes. Let me share a picture with you here. Oh, where is it? Uh, right there. That is what the Saudis wants to buy from the Pakistanis. Just to convert the $2 billion, which will buy them a lot, by the way, because I'm going to get into the cost of those planes. So, which by the way, those planes, the JF-17s, is joint ventures between Pakistan and China. So this deepens the Chinese industrial and strategic ties throughout the region. I'm not denying that, I am certain of this. Beijing will view this with some sort of skepticism, but also a healthy dose of complexity. So because the alliance, should it move forward, will reintroduce, or introduce rather, new variables into this greater power competition. And that in itself is gonna sort of offer an alternative to regional order as we know it. And that regional order that neither the US-led system nor the China-Russia axis fully controls. You have to think about it, which could also mean that China will lose some influence. But China is not worrying much about that. Where it's going to be is going to be the US position. Concerned but not constrained, give or take. We will go wherever the wind blowing. So this is where the picture gets very complicated, in my opinion, politically speaking or geopolitically speaking. So the agreement will face and also might force the United States to reassess its alliances, particularly with Türkiye, because it's a NATO member. That's why I'm saying if Türkiye wants to have clean slate, first withdraw from NATO because NATO is irrelevant anyway. What does NATO do to you anyway? What will it do for you anyway? Withdraw from NATO. Now you have a clean slate to start with, then decide how you proceed. But this will not be limited to Türkiye only. That reassessment will also apply to Pakistan. Because if this new alliance or bloc or whatever you want to call it sort of adopts some sort of a position that is contrary to Washington's interest, especially on two issues or two countries, China and Iran, because those, this alliance, those three countries, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, will be friend to all the, the other two, will be friend with China, will be friend with Iran. And the US is no friend of neither. So, and this is why In my opinion, the Saudis want this bad because they are sending a message, a signal to both Washington and Tel Aviv about diversifying its security alliances. After they saw what happened in Qatar and after they saw what United Arab Emirates did with the support of Tel Aviv behind closed doors to pressure Washington, to allow it to move weapons and so forth. And that is why Washington will be facing some sort of a difficult task, in my opinion, of maintaining those relations with the regional power or countries, that is Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and even India for that matter. And that will be viewed, in my opinion, with with an element of suspicion moving forward. That is how I see it. Then you enter into the picture of all this. The alliance will face some other unexpected element. And you know what that element— you remember yesterday I shared with you in the community picture of Bibi Netanyahu and Modi, and I say caption this. That was for a reason why I did this. I don't do random, by the way, just FYI. Because you have to think in terms of India and Israel, the counterbalance players. Because on the periphery, India faces three front threats. So what are the three? Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China. This is just in a setting of a scenario. So, so if Turkey-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia alliance materializes, it could seriously challenge and even, even, you know, I won't use the term, I won't go as far as threatening India because why would you threaten India for? They have enough mess domestically to deal with. You know, look at just the way how things are. The, the corruption, the corrupted institutions, the, the environments, you know, that's another topic for another day. That's why I don't see the threat. They will threaten for what? But where you have to think about is the role of Israel, because Israel will maintain the balanced relations with Russia and China, and at the same time while Israel doing this, they are also deepening their relations with India. And that in itself creating a counterweight. But we all know India will be used no matter what, because that's how it is perceived around the world, especially from major players. When they think about India or look at India, they look at it in terms of how can we use it? And once you use it, you get rid of it. That's the only way Israel is doing this. So the bottom line for these aspects here is that the major powers see this as a unified Muslim NATO per se. So they see it like some sort of with concern, but also there is a healthy dose of the signs of the multipolarity or a multipolar world. So Russia sees it as an opportunity to splinter Western cohesion. China sees this— sees it as a strategic advantage through Pakistan. And the US sees it as a sort of uncomfortable reminder that its traditional partners are looking elsewhere. So, and India, well, India will end up holding the end of the stake, the stick as it is now anyway. So, and this in itself, this, this, this setting, so that will create that competing blocks. And it's exactly what I said to you last time, the new multipolar order will be managed by blocks. Yes, one's economics and the other one military. I'm also getting closer to the end here, but I told you I will share with you my, uh, my ideas about the JF-17 fighter jets, which you need to understand really where this is and why it's important. So I'm not getting into the technical specs of all this, whatever. No, that's not what I'm getting at. What I want to highlight to you is why the JF-17 is actually central to understanding this alliance, should it emerge. So because it could work practically. So, so here is what you need to know. The JF-17, this is, as I said, is a coordinated venture between Pakistan and China. So, and this is fascinating because it reveals both Pakistan's ambitions and of course the constraints on making an alliance work practically, because Pakistan will also have to think in terms of its own strategic investment. So what is JF-17? It is, uh, uh, the— it's the full name of it is JF-17 Thunder fighter jet. It is a lightweight, all-weather, multi-role aircraft that is jointly manufactured by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. And that it belongs to the 4.5 generation category. It's not a 5th generation, but at least above 4, because most of the— what India has, for example, is just 4th generation, which is obsolete by now. So the same tier as Sweden Gripen, France Rafale, and the Eurofighter Typhoon, which by the way I'm going to share each one with you. Let me see, first I mentioned the Sweden, uh, uh, Sweden, what's the name of it, uh, uh, Gripen. Here it is, this is the Swedish, okay. This is the Rafale. France. And this is the European typhoon right here. So even, by the way, FYI, Nigeria went ahead and purchased the Pakistani JF-17. Nigeria. Why am I saying this? I know it's off the— why am I saying this? Why do you think Donald Trump wants also to attack Nigeria? Do you think it has to do with Christians? Heck no. Because if he would have done this, why doesn't he do it for Christians in India? No, it has to do with why the Nigerians went ahead and purchased the Pakistani fighter jets. So, so, and one of the things that I read, at least about the JF-17, is the— it is a combat-proven value. So this is where the, the interest is so dramatic about purchasing this, especially its performance against India, because it was Pakistan that downed 3 types of aircraft: the Rafale, the MiG-29, and the Su-27, which is the Su-27 and all the old generations. So, and this is why in 2019, the JF-17 should shut down to Indian fighter jets in actual combat, 2019. So, so, and that is when JF-17 made its first successful dogfight engagement with another aircraft. And of course, if you go to January 2025, Pakistan used the JF-17 in Operation Markbar, uh, Sarmashar. Against, against Iran. Remember that? And successfully attacked the terrorist infrastructure with significant damage. And that is where Pakistan is leveraging this combat-proven record to market the JF-17 as an affordable option for countries with limited defense budget. Because here is what you need to understand also: the export of this particular fighter jet is momentum relevant to the alliance, the, the, the Pakistan, Saudi, Turkey. So because this directly connects Saudi Arabia deal, so Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are now, as I mentioned earlier, negotiating the $2 billion loan. That's why they want to convert it to buy in JF-17 warplane. So Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan, okay, they just signed $1.6 billion agreement, uh, for Block 3 aircraft in 2023, and this was followed by a broader package in June for 40 jets valued at roughly $4.6 billion. Even though I have suspicion here about Azerbaijani buying this, because I will not rule out the option that they will buy, of course, but they will share this with Israel to have the technology. Yes, Israel has superior stuff. No, no, it's not about that. It's you have to understand how you could undermine a fighter jet performance. But just me thinking of the— outside the box, knowing how Azerbaijan is linked with the intelligence services in Israel. Now, there are those that saying there is a critical problem with this plane. So, because the problem with this is that Pakistan may lack the capacity to deliver this aircraft at a pace suggested by its claimed contracts. Why is this? Because Pakistan will have to depend on China for avionics, electronic warfare system, and of course the weapons. Or it's gonna— might have to depend on Russia for engines. So, and this— or in addition to this, you know the economic conditions in Pakistan. Pakistan also could faces logistical and production constraint. That's why it's very careful as to how far it's going to go, uh, with this particular— but we go with the hypothesis that if Pakistan were to export, because there is now a conversation with Libya, Libya want to purchase about 16 JF-17 at a 2.0, between 2 to 4 $1 billion. And that's in addition to the potential deal with Saudi Arabia for between 20 and 40 jets, 17, JF-17. So this is where you have to see where this is headed vis-à-vis that alliance. And of course, the key other aspect has to do with the cost. The cost is important to understand, and I'm going to share something with you here. When you look at the Rafale, the French, how much does it cost? It costs $90 million. That's how much it costs. When you look at the Swedish Gripen, how much it cost? $100 billion— $100 million. I'm sorry, not a billion, million dollars. $100 $1 million. Okay, when you look at the European Typhoon, uh, right here, $117 million. When you look at the Chinese Chengdu J-10 fighter jets, this is the Chinese, uh, uh, J-10, uh, Chengdu J-10 fighter jet. How much does it cost? $50 million. So, and basically it doubles the price of the Pakistani, uh, uh, JF-17. So you can see why the cost is very, very important. So the success of the JF-17 is not limited to only its military dimensions. No, no, because it's going to contribute now to Pakistan's own international standing, especially after defeating Indians. That's why India couldn't, couldn't push back, couldn't fight anymore after they saw, uh, 7, I think 7 of their fighter jets, the Rafale, MiG-29, and, and, and Su-27. The old versions. This stood no chance against both the, the, uh, JF-17 and the Chinese missiles that the Pakistani used. And that's what I'm saying, it's not limited— this particular success of this, is of this plane, is not limited to its, to the military dimension, because it's going to contribute to Pakistan's international standing and providing it vital financial return. Why is this important for Pakistan? Because it comes at a time when Islamabad is looking for realistic alternative to reduce its dependence on external support, especially the IMF and so forth. So in this regard, the, the defense minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, when he said, and I'm paraphrasing here because I remember what he said, he's saying that we are increasingly wanted to have the demand for this particular plane because we don't want to be dependent on the IMF. And that is again where you see the relevance of this particular alliance should it move forward. And I can't tell definitely for now that it will, but I'm gonna keep my eyes open on, on this one moving forward. Hope you all enjoyed this analysis here. Uh, we'll be working for the next topic for you, and guess which one is that? Take a look. Yeah, $1 trillion. So basically, Canada gives the middle finger to the Americans. So, and we created that, so rightly so. Anyway, I hope you enjoyed this. Let me see, uh, let me go back here. Uh, just wanted to let you know, should you want to support the channel, there is a link for it. I would greatly, greatly appreciate it. You all know the type of analysis you are receiving here, uh, and I would greatly appreciate your support for the channel. To those who know that I already launched my funding campaign for my upcoming Asia trip. If you want to support the upcoming trip for Asia, here is the link. You can buy me tea over there. I'm gonna put the link in the chat box for you should you decide to do that. And many thanks in advance for that one. So, so, all right, I wish you guys a good, good weekend. Enjoy a relaxing weekend. Chill out, do nothing, and I look forward to seeing you next week. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, bye-bye.