China Outsmarts the US w/Dr. Warwick Powell | Geopolitical Trends

All right, hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Excited to be with you once again, uh, but I am even more excited because I have a, a dear friend of mine, Dr. Warik Pau, who's going to be sharing with us his insights and, and knowledge. And you guys are in for a treat. Let me bring in, uh, uh, Warik here. Hi, Warwick. Good morning, good evening, good afternoon to you, your community, for our, our viewers from around the world. As a matter of fact, they are from different parts of the world. So, well, first of all, guys, to those who do not know who Dr. Warwick Pao is, I'm going to just provide you a brief bio here, but please check him out on the full description that I, uh, disclosed in, in, in the description for the video. Uh, Dr. Warwick Pao is a senior fellow at the Tahir Institute in Beijing. He is also an adjunct professor at the Queensland University of Technology, and he is the author— and I am very familiar with the book, I'm going to share a picture with you guys for you to see— he is the author of the, um, China, uh, uh, China Trust and Digital Supply Chains. And this one was published by Routledge. Routledge is a well-reputable publisher. So we are very, very excited to have you here, Warwick, and thank you for carving out time for us. So let me start first of all with just highlighting to the community what we're going to be covering here, guys. And I have about 4 key points that I'm going to be addressing with Warwick. One of them has to do with President Xi Jinping's recent trip to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia. We also be talking about Australia's economy recession, supply chain, and BRICS. And you have a lot to, guys, uh, learn from what Warwick will have to share with us. So, well, first of all, before we delve in into all this, Warwick, I would like to have your assessment for where do you see now the global economy headed given the erratic policies eminating or coming out of Washington of late?

Look, I think the global economy is going to go through a period of, um, difficult transition. Difficult because all transitions always involve some effort, um, whenever you're changing from one set of ways of doing things to new ways. So it will involve some time and effort from parties involved, but there's no doubt that when the United States decides to change the relative pricing structure for its market, it will have some impacts across the global economy. Now, it's important to bear in mind though, David, that the US market these days represents less than 15% of global import in terms of merchandise trade, which means that it is no longer as significant as it once was. A generation or so ago, the US market represented about 30% of global imports, so it's halved in relative significance. This is important because it means that trade amongst other countries with themselves, also in particular with China, has grown much faster over the course of the last 20 to 25 years than has been the case with the United States. And as a consequence of that, it is possible for countries around the world to make adjustments to their international exposures and their trading relationships that will minimize the amount of time it will take to adjust. And because it's going to take less time than perhaps it might have in a previous generation, it will also have slightly lesser adverse impacts, certainly impacts that can be, I think, absorbed. So a combination of domestic fiscal policy together with greater coordination, both of fiscal policy but also around trade practices and trade rules and regimes, compliance, etc., etc., will enable countries, particularly countries of the Global South, to adapt and adjust to what is unfolding as the new reality.

Well, to piggyback on that last point, Warwick, Would I be fair to start to think in terms of, especially with China, in terms of its approach now to how it's handling these dealings with the US, would it be fair to say that maybe Beijing is going to turn away from globalization altogether? Or could it be the possibility of sort of pre-positioning for global, uh, Globalization 2.0 along with Global South?

Yeah, look, I've suggested in some writings that what we're witnessing is not the end of globalization, which has been a really common refrain, but what we are seeing is the end of globalization with Western colonial characteristics. For the best part of the last 80 or so years, the dynamics of global integration have largely involved economic transactions between North America, Western Europe, and Japan. They— those three sort of core pivot points have dominated the global economy. In the course of the last 20 years or so, what we've seen is a change in that structure, and that change has been occasioned by the rise of China. So China's growth as an economic, um, power in its own right to become what is in effect the largest economy in the world in purchasing power parity terms, also has, uh, involved China becoming the largest trading partner of 150 nations or thereabouts. And that has fundamentally changed the contours of global international economic system. So where we're heading, I think, is into an era of intensified globalization, but one with multipolar characteristics.

Well, for sure. I mean, just to add to this one here, Warwick, the idea of how much, for example, the free trade between ASEAN and the Chinese, so which almost what surpassed a trillion dollars to my knowledge last year, that's just, it's giving us an idea as to what lies ahead. And we're gonna get into the depth of this, but Lemme, I wanna, I wanna move to one particular aspect since you are in Brisbane in Australia, and I'm gonna play a clip for, for our audience, and I would like to have your take on it, uh, because I wanted to hear the accuracy of the statements coming from the representative of the Trump administration during this hearing. So let's take a listen here quickly, if I may.

Patriot surplus with Australia. We have a free trade agreement. Why? They are incredibly important national security partner. Why were they whacked with a tariff? Senator, despite the agreement, they ban our beef, they ban our pork, they're getting ready to impose measures on our digital companies. With your Greek letter formula, the fact that we have a trade surplus— we have a global tariff on every— we're trying to address the $1.2 trillion deficit that Biden left us with. I think that answer Sir, you're a much smarter person than that answer. The idea that we are gonna whack friend and foe alike, and particularly friends, with this level is both, I think, insulting to the Australians, undermines our national security, and frankly makes us not a good partner going forward.

Okay. That's, by the way, guys, just for you to know, that was Mark Warner. He, he is like, he's serving on the Finance Committee to my knowledge. I know him when I was in DC when he was serving as a vice chairman for the Senate Intel Committee. What do you think, uh, of the statements?

Well, I mean, um, from an Australian perspective, I think, um, across the board Australia has been, um, either disappointed or angered by the tariffs that have been placed on Australian products to the United States. Firstly, because Australia actually does have an ex— it does have a trade deficit with the US. In other words, Australia buys more from the United States in dollar value terms than Australia sells to the United States. So it points to a capriciousness in the way in which these tariffs have been applied. And whether or not you have a trade surplus or a deficit with the United States, a tariff has been imposed regardless. So I think that that's the first point. But more importantly, I think, um, uh, David, is that it is showing that the United States is no longer the reliable and stable partner that Australia has seen in the United States over the course of the last 7 to 8 decades. And that has caused considerable concerns down under, where folk across the political spectrum have been shaken by recent events and had their faith in the Australia-US alliance seriously tested, and that's an understatement in regards to some people. It's also opened up a wider public debate once again about whether Australia needs to refashion its relationship both with the United States but also as a consequence with the rest of the Asia region. As it looks forward into the 21st century. In other words, the question now is whether or not Australia's future can be premised upon the way it's gone about its relationships in the past. And there are strong suggestions from, again, a broad cross-section of the political community that Australia needs to take this as an opportunity to deeply rethink its entire attitudes towards Asia and its relationship with the United States, and importantly in that process, to also think deeply about Australia's own national independence and sovereignty.

Well, that will be— I agree with you on this, except I am not seeing signs emanating from Canberra, especially when you hear, for example, what's his name, Jim Chalmers. He's the Australian Treasurer. Here's what he says, and I quote, we expect more manageable impacts on the Australian economy, but we still do expect Australian GDP to take a hit, and we expect there to be an impact on prices as well. Because there are some who saying in Australia, no, there will be no recession. The data suggests otherwise. Will I be wrong, Warwick?

Well, um, actually there's been a per capita recession now for the last 2 years in Australia, where in per capita terms the Australian GDP has not grown. Um, the only thing that has kept the GDP growing in Australia has been population growth. So, um, so in per capita terms, Australia has basically been flatlined for the last couple of years. Uh, Australia is a trading nation, which means that, uh, its external balances and the policies of its trading partners, uh, do affect its economic performance as a whole. And consequently, Australia also has a very, very strong interest in maintaining the stability of not only the global multilateral trading systems anchored by the World Trade Organization, but also a raft of bilateral and multilateral trading institutions that it is a signatory to, whether that's the free trade agreement with the United States, which the United States has capriciously thrown aside, or its multilateral trading relationships through institutions such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Now, what's interesting in all of this is that it's forcing a— well, I won't use the word realignment strongly, but it's forcing an alignment of interests, no matter what the politicians say, between countries that may otherwise view the world from quite different perspectives. So both China and Australia, for example, have their own reasons to be strong supporters of World Trade Organization and multilateral trading institutions. At the end of the day, Australia can't afford for these institutions to be undermined, and it desperately needs large trading countries such as China, which incidentally Australia's largest trading partner, to be a firm backer and the ballast of a functional global multilateral trading organization. So that's where Australia sits at the moment. Its economic structure is heavily trade-oriented, and the policies coming out of Washington at the moment are obviously having multi-layered effects on Australian livelihoods, both in the short term and potentially in the longer term.

Well, apparently— well, I mean, will that be fair? Will it be fair to say that Australia is not thinking in terms of joining the neighborhood, if I may use the term, to move economically, unlike what ASEAN are doing.

Yeah, look, Australia has had a, a long and difficult relationship, in truth, with Asia. Asia is the region in which Australia geographically is located, but it is not the region in which Australia is historically or culturally located. So for For many decades, Australia has on and off worked quite hard at engaging with Asia, and, and it has to varying degrees of success managed to achieve strong trading relationships in particular. So in the 1980s, Australia developed very strong economic relationships with Japan, and then from the 1990s onwards, its trading relationships with China in particular have burgeoned. The, the efforts by the National government to recalibrate Australia's economic relationships, at the very least, towards Southeast Asia, I would say, is well-intentioned, but it remains work in progress. Australia's engagement with ASEAN, notwithstanding the stated ambitions, remains minuscule, both in investment and trade terms, but certainly in investment terms. There are other areas in which I think there are challenges in terms of Australia's relationship with Asia. Stretching to issues such as the management of visas, the openness of Australia to international students from the region, etc. So Australia has had an ongoing effort to find its place in the region. The big question for Australia, the pivotal question, is whether going forward Australia finds its security and prosperity in Asia, or whether Australia will continue to seek its prosperity and security from Asia.

Wow, that's, that's, that's an interesting question, Warwick. So this leads me to— we pave into talking about ASEAN, especially with the recent trip of President Xi Jinping to Vietnam, of course Malaysia, and I think he ended his trip today in Cambodia. So, and I'm gonna just, uh, would like to share a clip. I do have, by the way, I know some of my viewers speak Chinese, so I'm gonna play both the clip in English and in Chinese with the translation. So let's take a listen, please. Here, let me add this one here, and I'll take your insights on it. And today, at a time when multilateralism is under tremendous strain When some nations abandon the principles of shared responsibility and others question longstanding commitments, China's global initiative offers a new lease on hope. They look outward, not inward. They speak not of rivalry, but of renewal. All right, uh, what, what do you make out of the, the measured words that Mr. Anwar Ibrahim used when referring to China's role on the global stage?

Look, I think it's a recognition that China as an emerging great power has laid out very, very clearly its own aspirations about how it believes it needs to conduct itself and also how it thinks that through its contributions to the global architecture, it can contribute something meaningful to how the, the world of international relations unfold. So China has actually launched 3 core initiatives, and that clip kind of touched on those. It talked about the, the China's global initiatives. The 3 core initiatives is the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. And those 3 documents amount to a comprehensive and an integrated statement of intent and vision for not only China's role in the world, but also how China thinks the world can unfold. This is a very interesting approach that draws deeply from China's own historical experiences, as well as its historical philosophical foundations as far as the world is concerned, and It is underpinned by the idea that the world is a world of difference, but that in this difference it is imperative that people and countries are able to find commonality, and that in fact it is through mutual understanding that difference can become the foundations of what is in effect a common purpose of humankind and its relationship to the planet. So that's the idea of being able to mobilize, um, a respect for difference to collaborate, um, with common purpose for development and for civilization so that we are able to leave a, a legacy for future generations. And, um, and the comments by Malaysia's Prime Minister, I think, speaks directly to, um, to China's, uh, very clear statements of intent in that regard.

Well, given the, uh, the economic agreements that China signed with Malaysia and Vietnam, I think one of them was like 45 agreements with Vietnam and about 30 memorandum of understanding with Malaysia. I haven't read yet about Cambodia yet, I'm, I'm going to do some reading about it tomorrow. But to me, it gives me an idea as to where things are headed. At the same time, for us here in the US, which a lot of people have no idea, uh, that, uh, I just read stats recently suggest that about 275,000 jobs were cut, uh, which surpasses, by the way, 2001 and 2008 recessions that we experienced here because of Mr. Trump's tariff. China is approaching this differently. And, uh, the, the, the data, for example— and I'll share a slide here, uh, between China and Vietnam and U.S. trade— we can see this over the last, uh, 8 years or so, how it was increasing between Vietnam and China, not the U.S. So we see where the trend is headed.

Yeah, David, I think that there's an interesting contrast point too that's worth raising for you and your community, and that is, um, contrast China's role in the Asian— is in the Asian regional economy with the approach that the United States is currently taking in relation to the North American economy. So in North America, we've obviously seen some, uh, very aggressive moves by Washington in relation to Canada and Mexico, and both of those countries are now subject to a range of tariffs, and with the aim of obviously stymieing the ability of those countries to export goods into North America. Contrast that with China. Now, of course, China is the largest economy in the Asian region and consequently also is, and because it's one of the biggest industrial powers in the world, is also going to be by dint of that a significant exporter into the region as well. But as you can see from that data, China is increasingly opening up its market to products from other countries, in this case Vietnam, and it will continue to do so. The other thing that China is doing is that it's encouraging its firms to invest in the countries of the region to enable more value-add to be done. So a lot of those numbers that we see in Vietnam, not all of it, and certainly I wouldn't understate the results of Vietnam's own initiatives in this regard, but China and Chinese enterprises have played a significant role in the development of Vietnam's own industrialization. And ditto, you'll find the same kind of commitments throughout Indochina and then into the Malaysian archipelago. The other thing to mind here is that these three countries that President Xi Jinping just visited have some very— has a very important common feature, and that is that they are all being connected to a broader Eurasian economy through the expansion of road and rail networks in particular, and to a lesser extent maritime infrastructure too. And if you followed the rail line projects, you'll find that Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam are all part of a series of important rail initiatives that will enable the people and goods of these countries to travel within the region, but also to travel into the Chinese market by rail, and ultimately to, to find its way into Europe as well. So we are potentially, over the course of the next 15 to 20 years, going to see a situation where Singapore is connected via continental rail to Saint Petersburg via Sichuan.

Wow.

Well, that will be very, very shocking to the Americans, given how the policy that we are, uh, I mean, I mean, to me, I'm not surprised, uh, Warick, given, uh, uh, there is a, there is a Chinese, an ancient Chinese proverb that says, work in silence and let your success make the noise. And, and, and I can apply this to the setting that's going on right now into how China is approaching this erratic behavior by the Americans regarding the trade and tariffs and so forth, while they are moving forward. I just read again yesterday that now Beijing gave the orders to its companies not to import or purchase anything pertaining to Boeing and Airbus as far as parts, which means China is going to now move its own, uh, uh, air industry forward, and Asian countries would purchase from Chinese instead of Boeing or Airbus.

Yeah, look, and I think that that's a sign of two things. One is an increasing sensitivity to the potential risks of capricious American policy intervening, like the US has done it in the area of semiconductors. So, uh, China is now moving to mitigate those risks of future supply. The other issue, of course, is that Boeing has, over the course of the last 6 or 7 years, unfortunately been a company that has been mired in a range of safety controversies and problems. And, and that really raises red flags in terms of, um, of, of its attractiveness as equipment supplying partner. And, um, and until— and look, in some sense, Boeing is a— is the embodiment of the transition of the American economy at large from being an industrial economy in the '50s and '60s into a financialized economy. And Boeing as a company has become a heavily financialized company with far less emphasis on its historic engineering safety prowess these days. So I think that that's what the Boeing story in a sense tells us.

Yeah, very, very interesting. Uh, uh, to those who just joined me here, uh, we are having a conversation with Dr. Warwick Powell, uh, regarding a host of issues pertaining to the economic, uh, developments going on around the world. So, uh, this leads me, uh, to talk about, uh, something that you pointed to Uh, Warick, that literally media is not covering it as far as the supply chain, given how the United States with these tariffs. Now, I don't know if anybody who's advising Donald Trump explained to him in basic language that when it comes down to supply chain, ain't gonna happen in a year or two. It takes a long time to build that foundation. So what can we expect moving forward? When it comes down to this.

Yeah, it does take a long time to put supply chains together and to optimize, and, uh, but it doesn't take necessarily that long to pull them apart. So the— and, and to really build new things. Now, the biggest challenge in supply chains, uh, from North America's point of view will be its ability to develop its own productive capacity. So supply chain ultimately is a series of enterprises connected to each other that enable the production of goods and the transformation of goods ultimately to a point where they're distributed for other, for buyers, whether they're enterprises or for household consumers. Now, that process cutting across borders typically involves the distribution of value, right? So when somebody pays a price for a product, one end of a supply chain, money that's embodied in that product and that transaction ultimately is spread or divvied up across everybody in that supply chain, where ultimately some of it finds its way to the original producer and the raw material suppliers that supply the raw materials. On many supply chains, what you'll find is that particularly the global ones connected to to major industrial powers like China is that about 50% or thereabouts of total value is in what we would call the retail margin or the retail gross margin. That's the bit that the retail end of the system retains, not as profit, but as part of its operating balance sheet, right? So part of that obviously is retained as profit in the end, but that retail end to pay for bricks and mortar, to pay for staff, to pay for advertising, and those sorts of activities that go towards retail distribution consume about half of the total value in a supply chain. And the raw, raw producer of the original product makes a claim on between 8-12% or thereabouts of the price. So if something costs $100 to buy, um, about half of that is actually costs incurred downstream after the goods have arrived, and about 10% of that, $10 to $12 or so, is actually what the factory earns gross. And the factory probably makes about 5 to 8% profit margin. So the factory is making, um, you know, somewhere in the region of, um, 80 cents profit out of a product that sells for $100. Now, once you look at that as a system there's a few issues that emerge as a result of these tariffs. One is obviously that the additional cost has to be carried somewhere. So the big question is, is where does it get carried? The data shows that the first period after tariffs have been introduced, most of the additional costs get absorbed by the importer. So there's an important company that sucks it up basically and doesn't pass it on down the stream. And they do that because they're trying to hold on to market share, they're not wanting to disrupt their downstream customers, and they're hoping to see things through, perhaps expecting that the tariff policies will change in the not-too-distant future and they've just had to suck it up a little bit. But as the tariff regimes sustain over a longer period of time, the importer is no longer able to absorb the additional tariffs. It impacts their cash flow as well as their profit margins, and ultimately they have to begin to pass those costs on down the stream. And eventually you start to see the retail price paid by ordinary consumers increase in line with tariffs. The other thing that can happen in this environment is that prices go up regardless, because retailers and sellers exploit the opportunity of the confusion created by these new tariff regimes to increase prices anyway, um, citing the fact that tariffs have gone up and they're actually increasing their own profit margins and exploiting downstream consumers. So all of these dynamics, um, uh, catalyzed when tariffs are imposed. The next thing that that starts to do is that it builds pressure on brands. So when you have brands, well-known brands, that ultimately produce in a place like China and then sell their goods to a wholesaler who then sells it to a retailer and then finally reaches the household consumer, those brands are now needing to look at their own cost structures and whether or not they are able to sustain a model where, in effect, they're having to— they're being disadvantaged by the tariff at the customs gate. Now, one of the things that I think is likely to happen as a result of the tariffs is what we call supply chain disintermediation. And that is that product owners, brand owners, will be looking at ways of making a greater claim on that final supply chain value. So that $100 that is charged at the, at the last mile. And how do they, and how do they do that? Well, one of the ways that they do that is by disintermediation, which is in effect getting rid of the retail function. So we will start to see a growth in, um, direct-to-brand. So brands will sell directly to customers, and e-commerce of course makes that possible. But brands need to be careful too, and we're starting to see over the course of the last few days how OEM manufacturers— so these are manufacturers who essentially manufacture under contract to major brand names— are now telling the world that in fact all of these brands that people have been paying top dollar for actually come from factories where the cost is 1/10 of what the final price is. And what that will potentially do is create an environment where buyers will look to bypass not only retailers, but bypass brands themselves and buy directly from the manufacturer. And we will see a reconfiguration of supply chains whereby we now will begin to see a growth in either wholesale to the public or direct-to-factory business models emerge. Now that's going to have a very significant impact in terms of the, for instance, the American economy. You've got to remember that the manufacturer is still manufacturing. At the end of the day, whoever is making the stuff is still going to make the stuff. Where the savings are going to come in this supply chain network is going to be in the retail function, and some 16 million Americans work in retail. Amazon's Amazon is staring down the barrel of potentially losing a third of its revenues if China-made products are no longer sold through its platform. Now we're talking about $200 billion a year of revenues that is potentially at risk. And of course, the major brands who have historically benefited from what I call brand rents, you know, premium prices paid for brands, will also have their brand value severely impaired as consumers bypass name brands knowing that in fact they're buying products that are identical to branded products but without the brand label on them. These are big changes that have been unleashed as unintended consequences of these tariffs. So the tariffs not only will fail to rejuvenate manufacturing in the United States, they will also severely damage existing brands, many of which are publicly listed with shareholders whose shareholder values will be affected, and also affect retailers and all of those people who work in the retail sector.

Yeah, wow, very, very, very insightful work. Thank you for explaining and breaking it down. It's because I have not, I have not come across articles here in the US at least that addresses this particular topic. Of course, because what Mr. Trump's saying, oh, they're gonna pay the, the, the, uh, the sort of the tariffs is not going to impact us, it's going to impact them, which is not true. So I'm, I'm, I'm very grateful to you for explaining this. I had a chance, however, to read an academic journal, and, uh, it wasn't an article specific. Actually, I'm gonna put the link for you guys in the, uh, chat box should you decide to read it later on, and I'm gonna have, uh, uh, Warwick take on certain aspects of it. Uh, what they said basically is that the, uh, China— they didn't say the US, it was China— and the future of the global supply chain. So, and what this article basically talk about is that the idea that they review China roles in four major sectors. One is apparel, consumer electronics, PV, and auto, auto industry, that is. So, but here is the interesting aspect that I found which tied to our conversation here, Warwick, is that diversification has concentrated in only few countries. And guess which one comes on the top? Is Vietnam topping the list of all sectors in this study that was conducted regarding the supply chain. What they're saying, and, and this is what I'd like to have your take, Warwick, if they are wrong about this or they're correct. What they're saying basically is that the concentration has been positive in the short run, but it's not in a long run, because Vietnam has sort of offered manufacturer, Chinese and non-Chinese, which is sort of a way of saying it's only going to benefit whoever is going to be investing inside China. Is that true?

Well, I think it's important to understand, uh, these economic systems as systems of flow, right? So when we think about supply chains, you've got these different parts of a process that are connected to each other, both in physical terms where physical things are moved through transport logistics, but also in financial terms where, um, the income of one business becomes its expenditure, which becomes the income of the next business, which then becomes expenditure, and it spreads its way through what people often call the multiplier effect. So the evolution of economic structures, particularly as we're witnessing in Southeast Asia through the mobility of Chinese capital, is going to see an ongoing process of change whereby activities that once were dominant in China will increasingly be relocated elsewhere. And there's a couple of parts to that, and if I remember, I'll come back to that. The other thing is that China will also develop its own value adding. So there's a great set of studies undertaken by a team at Harvard on economic complexity, and there's an Atlas of Economic Complexity which your community could easily search on a search engine. And it shows over time the evolution of national economies by a whole complex series of indices that go to this question of complexity. And the reason why I talk about complexity is the idea that the more complex processes are, the greater the value adding, and therefore the greater the skills and the higher the productivity and the greater the material income of the countries involved. So the ability of country to evolve and become more complex is actually an important indicator of their successful economic and social development. And part of what drives that is the mobility of capital, provided that that mobility creates fixed capital investment—factories, plants, equipment. And those sorts of things, as well as cultivates an ecosystem around those facilities that involves a workforce with the kinds of capabilities and skills and knowledges that can actually contribute meaningfully to the work of those machines. And, and that's what we're starting to see. So not only is Vietnam benefiting from this, but Malaysia, Indonesia, and other parts of the world where high-end Chinese manufacturing capabilities in areas such as EVs, drone manufacturing, drone assembly, um, uh, PVs, uh, are starting to be established. And with that comes skills upgrade. So, uh, populations in these parts of the world are having their skills progressively enhanced as well. And provided that those skills can be retained and those knowledges retained locally, they become foundational to the ability to these places to continue moving up the value ladder. The other thing that's happening, David, is that the regional supply chain actually tightening up. So proximity to core centres of intellectual property and design excellence and technical capability is actually quite important now because shorter supply chains is mitigating risks associated with time and distance, and it's also reducing costs. So that's the other thing. Now, going back to that point, and I think I've remembered it, in terms of the sort of the old story or caricature of high labor, low labor cost activities in China progressively moving to other parts of the world, There is, of course, still quite a bit of labor-intensive activity taking place in China, um, and continues to export and also supply to the domestic market. But a lot of that is actually legacy, uh, work of, um, the first generation of multinationals that went into China and invested in firms that exploited low labor costs. And those multinational corporations have reached a conclusion that, that they can just leave that investment relatively stable, maintained, and milk them as cash cows going forward. And that's largely what they've done. So increasingly, over the course of the last 7 to 8 years, the contribution of foreign-owned enterprises to China's manufactured exports has remained pretty much stable, very flat. But China's export growth has driven almost entirely by the development of Chinese privately owned enterprises. So there has been a very important qualitative change since roughly 2015, when Chinese-owned private enterprises overtook foreign-invested enterprises as the largest contributor to Chinese manufactured exports. So these are the dynamics that are going on. So we've always got to think about the circumstances as part of an ongoing process of dynamic change and understand what change involves and think about change through time and space.

So one key point you mentioned, Warwick, about since 2015, is that means that China have been working on this for the last decade?

More. So, um, China's had 3 main phases since 2020 of its export development. And the first phase was roughly, say, 2000 through to 2005, 2006, where state-owned enterprises together with foreign-owned enterprises, um, tracked quite closely together as the first generation of Chinese export capability. And then progressively from about 2005 onwards, we saw foreign-owned enterprises grow their share of Chinese exports all the way through to around 2015. But by 2010 or thereabouts, we saw the emergence of a cohort of Chinese privately owned enterprises begin to emerge, and they continue growing. And eventually, over the course of about 5 years, caught up with the foreign-owned enterprises— excuse me— um, as a, as a, in terms of the output for exports. So, um, so that's what happened. Now, state-owned enterprises remain relatively flat. State-owned enterprises barely changed. I'm just getting over flu, so Excuse me and forgive me. I just hope the community can forgive me. Um, so, so basically the growth of private enterprises took place from about 2010 onwards and overtook, overtook foreign enterprises in 2015.

So, so it's a, it's a strategy. I mean, this is where the difference between us and the Chinese Chinese thinks long term, which part of their history we think— well, yeah, we think about the next quarter.

Well, a great example of that is actually EVs, right? Yeah. So the early generation of Chinese enterprises that moved into the private motor vehicle, passenger motor vehicle sector, yeah, um, never really made it big in the export space, right? They struggled to compete with established Chinese, American, and European brands. And, um, and even domestically, uh, they— Chinese, uh, PMV manufacturers were relatively, um, small relative to the importance of the, of the, the foreign ones. But in 2010 or thereabouts, a national commitment was made to develop electric or new energy vehicles. And, um, and at the time, a lot of resource was committed to R&D, um, in battery technologies, beginning the early phases of new energy vehicle research and development. And, um, and some commentators, uh, in, in the early 2010s actually highlighted this commitment by China's governments and private enterprises to developing this sector as an example of wasted investment. So China's early commitments and investments in new energy vehicle infrastructure and R&D was lambasted as total waste, as a waste. Now these same commentators come 2022 have been moaning about the fact that Chinese new energy vehicle exports are dominating the world, right? So this is a great example, uh, the, the, the public sector in China together with the private sector made long-term commitments around certain technologies and certain product categories that they understood required massive commitments, massive commitments of R&D in hard sciences, you know, the material sciences, um, and the chemical science of chemical engineering for batteries, all the way through to mastering automation and building out the technical infrastructure that would enable automation to drive productivity growth in manufacturing., and that meant developing 5G technologies, ensuring that 5G mobile communication networks were robust so that machines could receive large volumes of data quickly to do the things that they were meant to do in an automated, humanless way. So these ecosystem approaches really mark out the difference in mindset and attitude towards the development of an economy.

Well, that's becoming very, very clear. I mean, those who criticized, for example, the, uh, the, uh, development of the Chinese EV, and I remember when I was in China, I saw, I was like very, very impressed with that. The argument here in the US is that what the Chinese were subsidizing their auto industry too much. I was like, hold on a second. Hold on a second, wasn't Tesla selling about 5 million vehicles in China? And now when China is selling about 11.1 million vehicles as of 2024, we're all crying foul.

So we kind of didn't like the fact, uh, that the Chinese have improved on this domain because of what you, uh, Warwick, as far as R&D, research technology, and so Well, let's not forget that after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, that the major automotive firms in Detroit were the beneficiary of about $800 million worth of bailouts, from memory, by the federal government of the United States. So, um, and in fact, they had a chance, they had a chance at that point in time to themselves become leaders in this arena and dabbled in exploratory research and development in EVs, but ultimately chose to remain committed to their internal combustion engine roots. For some, you know, in some respects you can understand why you do that if that is your traditional strong suit. But the idea that the American automotive sector has never been the beneficiary of a public support is very misleading. Of course, Tesla has been the beneficiary of a significant amount of public, general public support, and there's a large part of the American technology scene, which is the pinnacle in many ways of the contemporary American economy, you know, high-tech American big tech, that would not exist today had it not been for 70 to 80 years of consistent public support for American technology through contracts with the Defense Department, the Pentagon, and direct contracts through research and development funding for organizations such as RAND, as well as funding into universities. The Silicon Valley as it is today would not exist without tremendous public commitment from the American federal government. So the idea that somehow America represents the heroic achievements of private risk-taking capital, whereas China is this, is this sort of bastion of, of public sector subsidies, is a grossly misleading analogy and really doesn't appreciate what actually contributed to making America great in the first place.

Well, that's why I was— when I read that particular study, I kind of disagreed with their assertions regarding how now the US administration is going to be putting pressure on countries where they have like accepted the supply chain establishment of new manufacturers and so forth. That includes electronics and so on. Well, to me it was like, why? Why? If those countries wanted to sort of forge bilateral trade with the Chinese and open their markets to that. I'm sure China will do the same for them. That means that's going to leave the US out of the game. And I think this is where the problem that Washington does not want to accept. It does not want to accept the reality that, especially like what, uh, when I listen to President Xi Jinping's speech, he used very interesting— he used the term family. Asian family. That's, to me, was a well-measured word. That's how they view Asia, as a family. So they want to move together. And this leads me to ask you, Warwick, uh, about the geopolitical realignment regarding this outcome. What, what, what can we expect now moving forward?

Well, according to reports, particularly Scott Bessant is laying out a, uh, a strategy that seeks to use tariffs as a wedge to force countries to disassociate themselves from China. Now, there's a couple of pieces to this that I think are worth at least paying some attention to. The first one is the claim that there's 70 countries that, that somehow have reached out to kiss the ass of the, of the president. Now, I haven't seen a list of these 70 countries, and I certainly haven't seen 70 different countries make any announcements at this point in time, and I haven't seen any public effort to ask the administration who these supposed 70 countries are. So I think that there's a question mark straight away as to firstly how many countries we're really talking about. The second thing that I think is important to understand is that Um, however many countries there are, and I have no doubt some countries have of course reached out, and we know that, you know, they've made it public that they've reached out to initiate discussions, and that some of them actually are relatively small. So in a scheme of the American economy, in the scheme of global economy, and certainly in the scheme of the American trade deficit, they are actually very, very small players. So that's the first point to remember, is that, um, I think that there are some question marks about how many countries we're talking about at this point in time. But I think the, the broader point is that, um, the United States is seeking to prosecute what is in effect the geopolitical contest as a way of dealing with a bubbling grievance about its loss of status, and it is in some respects grieving the, the displacement of the United States as being top dog and is doing whatever it can to stymie the prospects of others from replacing it. Now, I think that that's an unfortunate perspective to take because I don't think that there is any other single country that is in a position to somehow become the new United States. And the principal reason for that is that the United States remains a big country. So there is no single actor that will, you know, replace one global hegemon, the United States, and, you know, with some new hegemonic system. It's actually not possible. That's what multipolarity is actually doing to the world. So I think geopolitically, whilst the United States is seeking to cling on to an historic primacy, is fighting a losing battle and is dispensing with a huge amount of national resource and effort in pursuit of something that it can't achieve. It's also an unfortunate objective because it's an, it's an objective that seems somewhat detached from the everyday concerns of the majority of Americans. When I look at the evidence of the American political economy and how it's delivering for Americans today, it seems obvious to me that a growing proportion, and dare I say even a majority of Americans, have not experienced any real improvements in living standards for quite a number of decades. We know that there are a growing incidence of private household indebtedness that will, that will compel households for multiple generations to live in indebted poverty. We have evidence that American life expectancy is lower today than it was even 10 years ago. There is obviously a, a growing opioid problem and homelessness problem. Some 12.5-13% of American households experience food insecurity. Education levels have been declining for decades, where literacy and numeracy standards are lower today than they were a couple of generations ago. None of that points to healthy body politic. And an obsession about America's global status, in a sense, deflects from the root cause of these domestic challenges and problems, which ultimately go to the extent to which the American Dream has become dissociated from the reality of the American Nightmare. And, and until the United States is in a position to focus on its domestic situation, then the problems that it faces will persist. So a geopolitical obsession with status is undermining America's ability to focus on the things that I think really do matter, and they're the things that go to the material and non-material quality of life and living standards for people in North America. Now what that also means, David, is that whilst America is ignoring the plight of Americans And let's face it, the only people being ripped off by, uh, you know, being ripped off in America are the working families of America being ripped off by the elite and the oligarchy and the kleptocracy in Washington. Um, the, the, the, the effort of the United States, which is a great country, it's a big country, um, is being committed to undermining the prospects of others in the world to improve their own livelihoods. Now that seems like a lose-lose, um, unless of course you're part of the inner cabal where you might benefit from trading the swings with a little bit of insider knowledge, perhaps knowing that a presidential pardon is always guaranteed. But everywhere else in the world that is working hard to advance their own societies and advance their own economies, are constantly having to deal with what is in effect a significant, not insurmountable, nuisance that, that is what American public policy has become. So that's partly the sort of macro geopolitics. In a regional level, you mentioned Asia, and Asia is quite critical because Asia is the center of this next generation of economic dynamism in the world. It's not the only one, but it's an important one. And it's part of a broader consolidation and revitalization of Eurasian economic entity. And I don't mean that in a Mackinder sense, but I mean that in, in a much older sense, which is the sense of the Old Silk Road, and how the worlds of Southeast Asia are connected to the worlds of Western Europe, and the Middle East through both terrestrial trade and maritime trade. And as that consolidates, that's also starting to manifest itself in geopolitical institutional terms. So what's happening in Southeast Asia in terms of its trade and investment consolidation and the tightening of supply chains in and around China is that there will be, I think, a parallel development of ASEAN centrality as a basis of a regional security architecture that will emphasize issues of indivisible security, uh, together with the drawing on the principle of the Bandung Non-Aligned Movement Conference, um, and reflecting also the principles of indivisible security that were articulated in 1975 in Helsinki. So what we'll have is actually, um, over the next 10, 15, 20 years, I think, a progressive alignment of economic institutions, um, such as RCEP and BRICS. And I'll touch on this in a moment, I guess. Um, and, um, and the, and the, let's call it the, the security architecture. So things like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, um, will play a role in not only its current footprint, which is predominantly the main continent of Eurasia, but ultimately also stretching into Western Europe and reaching into the Malaysian archipelago. And ultimately, I think, bringing into its sphere of concerns the security interests and alignments of Indonesia, which is really as far south as you'll go from a Southeast Asian point of view. Before we hit Papua New Guinea and Australia. So they're the dynamics that I think are, are interesting and important for us, particularly in, in, uh, in my part of the world, in, in the Asia Pacific, to be paying attention to.

Yeah, we'll, uh, we'll be addressing BRICS shortly here, but, uh, we are almost at the top of the hour, but, uh, I still have two more 2 key aspects that I would like to have your insights, Warrick. And by the way, guys, uh, to those— there's somebody put a comment here, uh, let me share it here, show it right here. You put, Warrick is the man. He is indeed, because this is the type of individuals that I bring into this channel here, not because we want to just spend time just chatting, because I want you guys to learn something. I am learning from this. So Warwick is not your average Joe, somebody who knows what he's talking about. So, and this is the importance of listening to different perspectives. So there are so many talk on YouTube and so forth, but pay attention to what you are listening to and hearing. So, and make your own decisions. Uh, Warwick, I want to get to one particular point before I move into BRICS briefly here. What about investors? If you are hypothetically you are an investor, what would you be thinking in terms of how to move forward with investment opportunities given where we're seeing the ship is sailing towards? It's not sailing towards America because a lot of people are concerned about investing in America now.

Look, I think from an investment perspective and how global capital is trying to think through the current period of turmoil is that they are obviously looking for stability, and they're also looking to how they can consolidate their— firstly, their existing exposures. So where companies have made commitments over, say, the last 10 years to develop fixed capital in different markets, and I mean by that, of course, infrastructure and and factories and equipment, as well as committing training workforces. Their first interest is to make sure that those investments are able to function properly and to deliver returns. What that means really is that they're not going to pack them up and move them. They're going to consolidate. And we're starting to see some qualitative evidence already. Of international investors across China and other parts of the world being quite clear that in fact the last thing they're going to be doing is uprooting and moving existing facilities in this period of instability. They're going to be, you know, buckling down and battening down the hatches to make sure that what they have invested in actually performs and does well. That's the first thing. The second thing is that I think for a little while, uh, those in charge of either managing portfolios or in charge of deploying corporate capital will be, um, taking a little bit of a step back and recalibrating the way that they understand global risk. So the US market, particularly US financial securities and financial instruments, was always seen as these the zero-risk benchmark. And so if there was any doubts about doing anything in the short term, you would park your money capital in the instruments of American fictitious capital—stocks, bonds, etc.—relatively liquid and, and in fact, as you know, you think of safe houses. That clearly is changing too. And it's changing because the political institutions that underpinned stability in these areas has essentially had the rug pulled out from under them. In terms of financial instruments, particularly the US dollar, we've seen over the course of the last 10 years, and a little bit more in fact now, that what was once a stable, safe, predictable, um, medium of payment, unit of account, has been increasingly weaponized. And as that medium of payment, means of payment, and, um, a unit of account has been weaponized, there are doubts about how good it is going forward. So we have seen, of course, over the last 20 years, a gradual reduction in the proportion of US dollars being held by central banks as part of their reserves, from the 70% of them, uh, to now 58% or thereabouts, and dropping. We've also seen, I think, some concerns emerge in relation to the market for US Treasuries. And this past 2 weeks, I guess, illustrates something that we probably haven't seen for quite some time, and that is that as global institutional investors, including American investors, moved out of the US dollar, normally what that would mean is that they'd move into bonds. They move out of the stock market and move into bonds. So these things don't tend to go together. You know, they're counter-correlated. What we've seen in the past few weeks is that they've all gone together. So that's telling us that managers of money capital are exiting out of the markets of US dollars, US Treasuries, as well as the American stock market., and they're finding a need to, to, to park their money capital elsewhere or to exchange that money capital denominated in US dollars for something else. And unsurprisingly, we've seen a number of precious metals, um, and other commodities, um, uh, experience a, a significant boost in interest. So I think, uh, at a broad level, the commitments of global money capital is taking a step back and having second thoughts now about the assumption that the US market is the risk-free benchmark. At the moment, I think it's, well, certainly viewed as the risk-free benchmark, which means that should this persist, and global capital begins to institutionalize a new calculus of risk distribution, we will, I think, start to see a dilution of global capital commitments into US dollar-denominated markets.

Wow. Yeah, that's— I want to say it's a somber outcome, but it's a reality because it's a reflection of what what's coming forward. I just thought about this aspect of, uh, from an investor perspective, what they would be thinking.

So let's talk about— yeah, go ahead, David. Um, you know, from an investor perspective, as you can tell, I'll paint the big picture, but, um, yeah, you know, obviously, you know, different people will have their own, um, uh, sort of risk appetites, of course. Um, and, and I think the message at the moment out of all of this is that what we once took as being solid and irrefutable is now melting into air, and it is imperative that people pay more attention to these issues. You know, I think, I think you've said on many occasions that you might not be interested in geopolitics, but geopolitics is interested in you, and there is no truer a statement than that today.

Indeed, indeed. I want to address the last thing before I let you go, Warwick, and we thank you once again, great, on behalf of the entire community. I say thank you for really carving out time for us here. So I want to talk about BRICS, the role of BRICS moving forward, because I still have certain doubts personally The way I look at it, and please correct me if I'm wrong, Warwick, I'm looking at two now. I'm looking at ASEAN and I'm looking at BRICS. Both of them have elements of some weak links. In ASEAN, I can point out to Philippines. In BRICS, I can point out to India. However, I'm leaning more towards ASEAN being the only neutral group that's going to move forward in the right direction. Versus BRICS. Will I be wrong in this assessment?

Um, I'm not sure that it's either or, but, um, obviously because, because they're made up of, um, individual sovereign nations, um, they will have their own, um, uh, perspectives and dynamics about what they bring to the table and what membership of these networks entails. Now, ASEAN as you know, has been in existence now for many decades, and many outside of the region tend to underappreciate the role that it's played in holding what is actually a very diverse region together. The region comprises many relatively small countries. Obviously, big ones like Indonesia with 300-odd million people are, you know, major players, but generally speaking, we're talking about relatively small places. Vietnam's 90-odd million, but underdeveloped. So historically, limited economic clout and limited geopolitical leverage. So ASEAN has played an important role in ensuring that over the course of the last 40-odd years, the region has, generally speaking, been able to avoid major conflicts, certainly major conflicts that have been endogenously created. Now, there have been significant conflicts obviously in the region, and I'm thinking particularly Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, but interestingly, all of them have involved the United States as a protagonist. And then of course, when we move to North Asia, we've got the Korean War, which again involved the United States as a as a co-belligerent. But ASEAN itself has played an important role in holding together a diverse region and identifying areas of commonality. It's done so in a relatively low-key way, akin to your remarks of Chinese approach, which is to, you know, to do rather than to talk. ASEAN has also done the same. ASEAN is not really a marketing-driven organization, but it's a dialogue-driven organization. So over the course of the decades, it has played an important role in stabilizing the region and creating over time important alliance that in one way appear to be quite light and potentially as a result of that quite fragile because these aren't formalized alliances. But nonetheless, seem to be way stronger than they first appear. You mentioned the Philippines, and I think the Philippines itself, of course, has an interesting history of its own which is clouding or affecting the way in which it is relating to the region at large, and of course the United States. I know that you've had many discussions on your program before with, um, Anna Alindogui, who is a a Filipino scholar and someone who's got her finger on the pulse a lot more about what's going on in the Philippines than I certainly do. So I think ASEAN will continue to play an important role. The reason why I say that ASEAN and BRICS aren't mutually exclusive is because we also have members of ASEAN joining BRICS, and they don't see that as being a contradiction. Indonesia is now a full member of BRICS. And importantly, Indonesia is also the largest economy in the ASEAN network, certainly in population size as well. So what Indonesia does, does play a significant role in terms of soft power influence across Southeast Asia. Vietnam is also a partner member of BRICS, as is Thailand. And what that tells us is that these countries are looking for ways of diversifying their economic and institutional relationships as part of their own strategies to protect themselves from capricious interventions by large hegemon in particular, but also to create diversified opportunities. And that's what I think BRICS and ASEAN combined brings to the table. BRICS itself, um, is going to play, I think, important role going forward, uh, because it's reached a level of critical mass of economic heft, industrially, particularly with China as an anchor, and natural resources-wise and energy-wise through its African memberships, Middle Eastern memberships, and Russian memberships to, to, to contribute quite significantly to key global markets. So we're talking about energy and grains, rare earths and manufactured goods. Now, all of that is, is going to be difficult for anybody to, in a sense, hold back regardless. The last thing that they'll do, of course, is whilst people still talk about reforming the IMF and reforming the World Bank, BRICS nations have moved forward with its own multilateral banking institutions, the New Economic Development Bank, which is going to play a central role as BRICS unveils its own national currency enabling cross-border payments platform later this year, I think. So, um, the challenge for BRICS, I think, David, is it's reached a level of heft where perhaps it could probably do with now some serious considerations around whether or not a permanent secretariat is established. Um, historically it's been far more decentralized. Each year a different nation takes on the baton of organizing the agenda for the year. And curating that. But perhaps something that looks a little bit more permanent, um, is now called for. And interestingly, out of Kazan last year, there was a lot of work done on the institutionalization of BRICS in all sorts of aspects through the creation of committees, permanent committees, and those sorts of things. So I think BRICS members actually understand that the, the sort of relatively distributed ways in which it organized itself each year in the past served well then, but now in this new period, they will need to think about evolving to new institutional forms.

Very, very, very interesting, very interesting insights. Before I'll give you a last word, Warwick, I want to share something with you. Just for you to know, there are some people staying up 'til 1 o'clock in the morning to listen to you. And here is a proof. Hanging G, one of an avid supporter of the channel, he's in London, it's 1 AM there, staying up to listen to you. So David K, much appreciate your nice comments. Actually has a comment about you, uh, Warick, right here. David K is another avid supporter. So, uh, that just shows the tremendous respect they have for you, Warick. And so do I. Uh, also, I, I have great respect for you. In addition to being my friend, I also learn from you a lot, and I'm very, very grateful. As a matter of fact, I'm gonna ask the community one question. Do you guys would like to see Dr. Warik Pao once a month on this channel? Just answer yes or no. I will greatly appreciate it. And I'm gonna do it with some other specific guests because that's usually how I, I operate, but we'll go from there. So Uh, Warwick, I want to give you a last word, some word of choice, some word of wisdom as to what should, for example, my community, uh, uh, take from what's going on in this chaos created by the United States and how China is responding to it and where this is going to lead us to.

Well, first of all, uh, thank you again for having me, and thank you for the kind words from members of your community. When people say that flattery doesn't work, they've never been flattered. So I can say that flattery works, and I appreciate it very much. This period of change in some ways perhaps marks the end of a chapter, but also the beginning of something else. The chapter that's ending is globalization with Western colonial characteristics. Unipolarity came to an end maybe 5 or 10 years ago, and we don't need to put a precise time on it. We just need to understand that the dynamics of the world have evolved beyond one where there are unipolar hegemon now capable of dictating terms across the world. That's the first thing to understand. The fact that the United States is still clinging and doing whatever it can to, uh, to cope with this transition and perhaps assert primacy where it can is an understandable, if at times unfortunate, consequence of this significant change. The second thing, as I mentioned, is that as one chapter closes, another one opens, and multipolarity has been given birth to from inside the womb of a unipolar world. Now, multipolarity doesn't have a fixed form either. Multipolarity is, um, is something that will continue to evolve probably for at least another two decades, where economic interactions and systems will continue to be in flux. And as capital and technologies deploy across the world empowering countries and communities throughout the world to achieve their own aspirations for a better life. So the thing to be, I think, watching out for is the extent to which the major anchors in this period of destabilisation or instability, um, are able to contain themselves and act in a stabilizing manner. So the test for China as an emerging great power, and one which seeks to be an enabling great power, is the extent which it can deliver the ballast to a multipolar system as it unfolds. A test for Russia as a re-emerging great power is the extent to which it contributes to stabilizing an era of tremendous convulsions and flux. But they're not the only countries, of course, but they play an important role. We're looking also to how in the Middle East the détente that was facilitated between Iran and Saudi Arabia a few years ago by China can play a greater role in bringing stability and peace to that part of the world. We're looking to Latin America, where major economies like Brazil can play a role within that continent to bring stability and economic development opportunities. And we can see some of that happening now with the linkages that are being built between Brazil and Peru that will create a cross-continental linkage. But of course, we have pockets of significant instability as well. So the question is, is how do the major powers, the BRICS powers and the ASEANs, and, and of course ultimately whether or not the United Nations can rise to the occasion again, can bring stability during this period of unstable transition. Now, if we can see our way through that And, you know, I'm, I'm not prone to too much optimism. I'm certainly hopeful without being too optimistic. I think we can pop out the other end with a world which stabilises and where pockets of conflict are progressively worked through and institutions developed to address those. I'm also hopeful that two other things will happen. One is, is that Europe, particularly Western Europe, whether as individual countries or as a collection of countries, will come to peace with itself and with its neighbourhood. It needs to find a way, as does Russia, with coming to peace with each other. They are neighbours. Geography, geography is not going to change that. And for Europe to find its next chapter as a constituent member of Eurasia, as opposed to being a leftover vestige of a transatlantic colonial power. But I'm also hoping that North America will come out of this as a country that is still a very big country and an important country, but rather than being one that sees itself as the exceptional country with grievances to prosecute, actually just sees itself as a normal country that can make a contribution. So they're the things that I'm hoping we can be witness to as we live through this period of tremendous change. And each of us can play a role in that by being engaged and being thoughtful about the world around us and communicating with our friends and colleagues and others about the things that are going on. As you, as you say, and I'll say it again, you know, people might not be interested in geopolitics or geopolitical economy, but these things are very interested in you. So thank you for having me again. Of course, you are most welcome.

Uh, here is the answer to the question I asked. Everybody said yes, they want you here once a month. Uh, we'll, uh, we'll coordinate you and I down the road as we move forward, and, and we just go from there and And, and those are people from different parts of the world, so majority, if not all of them, saying yes. As a matter of fact, I saw someone here from Australia and one from Ghana and Malaysia, of course London and so forth. So yeah, we have a wonderful community here. I'm very, very grateful, uh, to all of them. Uh, they maintain, uh, some sort of civility in the conversation, and they always take an interest when they hear you are coming on the show. As you saw, Warwick, the guy stayed up till 1:00 in the morning. That tells me a lot, and I tip my hat to him. So, well, on behalf of the community, Warwick, I can't say thank you enough. You are a dear friend, and I look forward to having you next time. Please wait for me when I say bye to the community. I want to talk to you privately.

Thank you to everybody.

All right, guys, I hope you all enjoyed listening from Warwick. His is an insightful man. So, and, and very, very knowledgeable. Uh, uh, you, you had now a treat. You had one yesterday from, uh, Ayna Tangan. Now you have Warwick here. So, and I'm gonna be figuring out a way to coordinate and have them here on, on a monthly basis because you need to know, you need to understand the changes that's taking place around the world. Media is not disclosing what we need to know. You know, even for us here, it sends— it saddens me and pains me to see what my country is doing because, you know, but most Americans have no clue. But to me, that's one way of sharing truth with you. So please hit that like button and subscribe to the channel if this is your first time, and I look forward to seeing you next time. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, guys, bye-bye.