From Fuel Pumps to Fighter Jets: How the Iran War Hits Europe Hard! W/Dr. Michal Krupa

Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. 6 weeks, that's all the jet fuel Europe has left. No fuel means no flights. And right now, a war, if probably someone haven't heard about or been following, is about to— probably will force the person to cancel his summer holiday. It will also— this war will spike the energy bills. And of course crack the most powerful military alliance in history. And the scariest part is that Europe didn't even choose this war. That is the scariest part of them all. So this is today what I'm going to be talking with my guest, which, by the way, Dr. Krupa, he's not here yet. So I figured I'd just log in here and we'll wait for his arrival. And just for those whom I By the way, before I forget, tomorrow I will be doing a live stream in a different time zone. For my European viewers, that will be in the middle of the day, will be about 12 o'clock. For my American viewers, it will be very, very early. So my apologies for this is just because of my travel schedule does not allow me to do the live stream on a regular time that I do. So make sure to join me tomorrow. I will be talking about the new type of missile that Iran just disclosed. So I look forward to that conversation tomorrow. And as I said, I'm waiting for my guests to log in here. He will be here. Hopefully he'll make it unless something came up to him. He's a dear friend of mine, and I'm gonna just go ahead and introduce my friend while we wait in here. So, uh, Dr. Mike Krupa— let me put a picture for you guys to see. And so here he is, he's just logging in. Here is my dear friend, uh, Dr. Mike Krupa. Good to see you, Mike.

Good to see you, Dave. Good to see everybody on this, uh, this evening.

Yeah, for the community, I want you to know Mike is no stranger to me. He's a good friend of mine. But we have a rule. I will call everybody doctor the first time, and after that on a first, first name basis. So anyway, for those who might be here for the first time meeting Dr. Krupa, Dr. Krupa is a historian and political science. He's also an opinion journalist at the Poland largest conservative weekly magazine called Dojecze. I hope I pronounce it correct, Mike. And he's also published in several American outlets. So he is known in American outlets to the media there and so forth. So do you know who Dr. Krupa is? And he is currently working on a book, uh, that once it's published, he gave me his word that he will come over to the show once again to discuss the content of that book, which I can't wait to have, uh, take a read. At it. So, so, Mike, I'm gonna get into it right away. And by the way, guys, I put the full bio in the description, and you can follow, uh, uh, uh, Dr. Krupa on, uh, uh, X. I follow him there. I'm gonna put the link for you in the chat box. You can just go to his account there and follow him there. So, uh, I want to get into it right away, Mike. Your overall assessment about the ongoing US-Israel-Iran war from a historical perspective, but also from what you are observing militarily?

Well, from a historical perspective, it would seem, uh, you know, for over 40 years, uh, numerous American presidents beginning with Jimmy Carter, uh, through Ronald Reagan, the first Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and all of his hawkish and neoconish pedigree. And if you consider the many anti-Iranian advisors he had around him, Then we go into Barack Obama and first administration Donald Trump. None of them, uh, up until Trump wanted to initiate a war with Iran because they were cognizant of the fact that this would lead to a disaster, uh, on a scale that hasn't been seen, uh, in world geopolitics. Donald Trump has taken that route. He's actually proclaiming it as it's something, uh, that people should be proud of, that he was the first president to actually do this. Um, so in terms of history, it's definitely without precedent, uh, and not in a good way, obviously. Uh, from a geopolitical standpoint, obviously, uh, the effects of this, uh, decision without precedent, uh, is, is, is just negative on all fronts, whether in terms of American interests, global interests, uh, in terms of just, uh, you know, simple humanitarian considerations, like the fact that so many— was it over 3,000 people have been killed? I think around 3,000 people have been killed, in Iran, including all the people that have been killed in Israel, in, uh, in the countries of the GCC. Uh, so in every single respect that you can actually take in consideration, this war thus far, uh, has been a disaster. Uh, we're in a situation right now where I think Trump has realized, despite the fact that he's clearly suffering from early dementia, that this war has been going in the wrong direction from the very beginning, despite his initial probable expectations of it being, you know, another walk in the park compared to Venezuela. And if you actually look at the reporting from the New York Times from a couple of days ago, those are, those are his expectations that were actually, you know, inflamed further by the Israelis by making him think that this would be a world historical event that would put him in the pantheon of great leaders, of great American presidents, because it would be so easy to do just by taking out the Supreme Leader of Iran. Well, here we are over a month after, and it seems— well, almost 2 months after now— it seems that this war isn't going— well, it's not going the way that Trump envisioned it. But as I said, I think he is cognizant of the fact that it's not going the way he originally envisioned, otherwise we wouldn't be having these entire shenanigans regarding first the discussions with Iran, the first iteration of which took part in Islamabad, and now the second ceasefire. In a way, it's obviously an extension, but I would call it ceasefire number 2 in many respects. Everybody thought it was another taco move on Trump's part and actually happened on Taco Tuesday, as Jimmy Kimmel pointed out. But, uh, it, it does, uh, show, it does testify to the fact that whatever his current rumblings on Truth Social, and they are many and they are, uh, illogical and even contradictory, uh, in many respects, uh, this war, uh, definitely has not gone the way that, that Trump envisioned from the beginning. And as of today, it does seem that Iran holds the cards. And Iran has escalation dominance in the sense that should Iran decide to escalate, the consequences to the world economy, the consequences to America's allies would be of greater magnitude than anything short of nuclear bombs falling on Iran, would be short of anything that Trump can impose. On Iran. So as I said, it's a disastrous war. It's a war that shouldn't have started in the first place. It's a historical, you know, in many ways I would say historically it's even a bigger disaster than Iraq, although if you look at the casualty count so far, obviously it's lower. But if you look at the rationale, at the preparedness of the United States Armed Forces to go in this conflict, Whatever one can say about George W. Bush, but at least he prepared his troops to go into Iraq, you know, several months before. They had staging areas, it was all planned out. But this, with the people in the Pentagon headed by Pete Hegseth, it's just one big disaster from A to Z.

Very, very interesting perspective. Before I move into my next question, Mike, just to follow up on this, since you are a historian by training, so Your PhD, it's, it's, it's focuses on that aspect. Will history, let's say, let's say just with your own number there, 30 years from now, 40, 50, will history be judging this period or this war as an illegal and unjustly war?

Oh, there's no doubt about it. I mean, you know, the amount of shenanigans and the amount of word games that even administration officials are playing around to say that this is a justifiable war by any stretch of the imagination is actually pretty hilarious. Congressman Massey, Congressman Ro Khanna are out there pointing out very clearly that this war needed to go through Congress if it should have gone forward in the first place. But in terms of American law, in terms of international law, even in terms of the War Powers Resolution, I mean, there was no imminent threat from Iran, as eloquently Joe Kent pointed out. In his, uh, uh, in his resignation letter. And if you look at all the specialists, including Tulsi Gabbard's, uh, testimony, uh, from last year and the written testimony that she prepared for Congress this year but verbally actually didn't express, which is interesting, uh, Iran was not working on a nuclear weapon. And even if you were to believe, uh, what the president has been saying before the war, that we obliterated Iran's nuclear program, well, if you obliterated Iran's nuclear program, I don't think You know, it takes, it takes some time. I mean, I'm by no means a nuclear specialist, but I would guess it does take some time to recreate that nuclear program if you were to weaponize it, uh, not within, you know, 5, 6, 7 months. Uh, so it's all based on a foundational lie, uh, that Iran was an imminent threat. It wasn't an imminent threat. Um, as, as I said, um, you know, in 2003, I was much younger than I am right now. And even though the case for Iraq, for anybody, uh, for going to war with Iraq, for anybody interested in the region, uh, and in the potential of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and in, in that specific context of the ongoing war on terror and what was happening in Afghanistan, uh, even though people knew that, uh, there was a lot of confabulations going around, the administration was making a much better case, you know, bringing out as much unfounded fake news, if you can call it that, you know, with, you know, the entire presentation that Colin Powell had in the UN based on one guy whose code name was Curveball. He was apparently an Iraqi dissident living in Germany, and he was just making things up on the fly, you know, that he knows where Iraq's weapons are hidden. But at least they had a real person who is lying and pointing out certain directions where American bombs might fall. In other words, he had at least on the face of it some credibility. But here, no witness testimony, no going to the UN, no making the case to the American people. And at the end of the day, when he did make the case to the American people, it was actually after the bombs fell, and he was making it in a baseball cap, which made the entire scene just completely unserious, if you consider the seriousness of the office that Donald Trump occupies. He obviously doesn't seem to think so. But yes, definitely, I think this war will be judged by the way it began, that it was an unjust war. The open question right now is how this war will end and what benefits possibly Iran can take away from this war and possibly even the United States. Now, that's obviously a question that touches on who's going to be doing the negotiating, who's actually going to have the authority to do the negotiating on the part of the United States, and whether, as we saw last time, either President Trump or Bibi Netanyahu won't be making intervention calls and saying, yeah, you can't sign this, despite the fact you're the Vice President of the United States. So that's still an open question. Maybe, hopefully, the deal will be so good that people will actually forget how the war started and why the war started. It'll be a sort of, you know, as we say in the world of Latin Catholicism, a sort of felix culpa, sort of blessed fault, whereby, you know, the effects of something evil actually turned out to be pretty good. But that's still an open question. Right now, I'm still very, very much on the side of that. Unfortunately, this war will probably drag out because Donald Trump, I don't think has it in him, at least at this point, to concede anything because he's very obsessed. And actually, there has been reporting on this, uh, that he doesn't want to look first like Jimmy Carter, to be a sort of, you know, a loser president, or Barack Obama, but giving another deal, uh, to Iran, uh, that isn't in many ways better than the original JCPOA. Plus, if you factor in the dementia that's obviously, uh, setting in Uh, that creates a whole different dynamic on its own. Uh, but as I said, it's American politics. Trump is very unpredictable, and there are very unpredictable variables at this point within the administration that might lead to a surprise outcome in a positive sense, but might lead also, uh, to deeper engagement by the United States, uh, vis-à-vis Iran, obviously in terms of military engagement. Against Iran.

A very, very interesting perspective, and I do share your opinion on this, Mike, because exactly where things are headed and moving forward. Let's move on into Europe because that was one of the key— you are— if there is something I need to learn and know about Europe, you're the guy I will turn to. First of all, I trust you. Second is your knowledge is based on academic. In other words, this is not somebody talking on top of his head. Is Europe, in your opinion, like, is Europe caught now in this crossfire? And if it is, how does it intend to get out of it, given that there are one meeting, to my knowledge, that was taking place yesterday in Cyprus, and about a week and a half ago when I went through London, it was a conversation that the French president Emmanuel Macron was, was reaching out to, uh, the Prime Minister, Stammer, of England, thinking about how can we sort of push the American out and figure out how we're gonna do about this one. How does Europe now intend to handle— because the changes that's coming economically is impacting Europe, especially in the energy field.

Yeah, uh, obviously some of the good things of Trump's erratic behavior in Europe has been that a lot of people have finally noticed that the NATO, the transatlantic relationship is very transactional. It's based basically on the lord on the Potomac and the vassal states in Europe. That's basically what NATO and the entire structure of Atlanticism has morphed into. 1989, it wasn't a coincidence that we heard— I think it was one of the American senators, might have been Lugar, in the early '90s, who says NATO will either go out of area or out of business. Obviously, it would have been a preferred approach if it went out of business. We would probably not be having a lot of the trouble that we have today. But it went out of area and it became an instrument of American power projection with the appendage of Europe lagging behind and helping out whenever it can, whether it was in Libya, Afghanistan, or Iraq. But I think, so on the one hand, Europe is opening up its eyes and even very Atlanticist politicians up until now, like Starmer, like Macron, Mertz to some degree, to some degree, and Spain, for example, which has taken a very independent and autonomous route in foreign policy in the last couple of weeks, to the surprise, positive surprise of many, including me, are finally waking up to this reality and seem to acknowledge that being a vassal of Uncle Sam is not the way to go. However, I believe the only way that Europe secures its future as an— I wouldn't call it an entity, but as an organism set up still of sovereign nation-states, despite the centralizing tendencies of the European Union— is if the European Union, if Europe in general, makes a grand bargain with Russia, a strategic, you know, détente with Russia. I'm not saying there has to be automatically an alliance with Russia, but you definitely have to move into East-West accord territory, basically. So in other words, it's what I always go back to. It's a very simple vision, what the late Charles de Gaulle, President Charles de Gaulle, always proposed for a Europe a Europe that was free, a Europe that was strong within its own capacities, and a Europe that was at peace with even the then totalitarian Soviet Union. You know, what would de Gaulle say today if he saw a non-totalitarian, non-communist Russia? I think he would be even more inclined to have a stable relationship with Moscow. No, no, I think de Gaulle's grandson actually has been keeping that flame alive. In his media appearances. So I think that's only a piece of the equation, that people are opening up their eyes, that Europe has basically been a vassal of the United States, especially after 1989. And the question is, where do we go from here? Now, if the European Union is as it currently is, because we know that the 90 billion went to Kiev, I think it was yesterday, due to the to the lack of opposition now from Slovakia and Hungary, they're still doubling down on stupid when it comes down to Ukraine. So in one sense, they're seeing that Uncle Sam has lit the world on fire with Iran, but on the other hand, they themselves are still, you know, burning the world down with their irrational approach, to Ukraine and ultimately, uh, to Russia. So, uh, we're sort of divided in this regard, uh, in Europe. As I said, we got one half of the equation right. There is positive— I wouldn't say anti-Americanism, uh, in Europe, uh, I would say, uh, a tearing down of a lot of the facade, uh, of so-called Atlanticism. That Atlanticism, at the end of the day, is only a one-way street whereby you buy our weapons, we set up bases and intelligence operations on your territories for our purposes, whether it be containment of Russia, whether it be projection of power into Eurasia, for example, or into the Middle East, or to protect Israel. And you basically have to help us out whenever we, you know, we start the flame somewhere, we start a fire. We're going to call you to help us. That's all you're good for, because at the end of the day, I mean, the United States doesn't really need Europe in military terms. Although if you look at the degradation of the United States Armed Forces in recent years and the fact that, you know, defense product— excuse me, defense production and defense capacity has gone down so low, it's incumbent on the United States to search for people who could make up for that. So in this regard, Europe, uh, is a very good place to look for help. Uh, and you know, Trump has been going, uh, you know, nuts on Truth Social. On one day saying, you're not helping us with the Strait of Hormuz, you're useless. On the other, the other day he's saying, actually, we don't really need the Strait of Hormuz. Then he goes back to, you're not helping us. Now he's implemented a blockade. So the more Trump uh, truth socialize, or truth, so to say, uh, the more people in Europe, uh, open up their eyes. Actually, there's been an— I saw an interesting poll the other day. I was preparing an article for next week's edition of, of Dożecze, where, uh, in a recent poll, 72% of Poles right now, Polish people, are actually convinced that the United— that we should be prepared for a scenario where the United States, uh, moves out of NATO, uh, and we should rely more and more on our own defense capacities, or brought in a broader sense on common European defense capacity. So there is that realization that is being compounded by every time Donald Trump writes something on Truth Social, that people are opening up their eyes that, uh, this wasn't so much an alliance as it was, you know, a one-way street with the, uh, with a lord and vassal relationship for all to see.

Well, actually, that's a good point, Mike. I want just to follow up on one, then we'll follow up on the NATO aspect. What you talked about with the European regarding vis-à-vis the Ukraine, I think it was a meeting yesterday in Cyprus in which one of the key points on the agenda was to continue the support for Ukraine. Regarding, even though, like you stated, where things are headed, it doesn't show any signs of a positive outcome for that. But to go back to the NATO aspects of it, which I found very, very interesting within the context of what we're talking about vis-à-vis the US-Israel-Iran war. In your opinion, Mike, what was the message that Europe and NATO, for this matter, sent to Trump by refusing to participate in the unjustly war against Iran?

Well, I think I would say it was, it was a very humanitarian consideration that we don't want to get sucked into another Iraq. Uh, plus let's not forget that Iran has the capacity, uh, to also harm the interests of Europeans in the Middle East, of which there are many. And if you take things to an extreme, I think, you know, their longest range missile, what is it? I forgot the name right now. It has a range of 3,000+ kilometers. It could actually touch Europe. So I think a lot of these European leaders were getting good and solid intelligence briefings that if we were to engage against Iran on the side of the Americans, not only would we be shut out, in the Strait of Hormuz, which we are right now at the end of the day, also along with the Americans, because we're not as close allies of Iran as China and Russia. And Iran has a very negative attitude towards most European countries because, you know, the European Union, uh, didn't live up to its end of the bargain when Trump left the JCPOA, right? I mean, they just basically went along with whatever Washington wanted in that regard, and they didn't try to build any autonomous approach to Tehran. So they're very cognizant of that. And I think, you know, Europe would be suffering much, much more if its interests in the Middle East were hit or, God forbid, missiles started landing in Europe. I mean, I can only imagine. But, you know, there are also other capabilities. You know, Iran has also very, very robust cybernetic hacking capabilities. I mean, you shut down one or two European airports, for example, or the banking system. I don't think that's something that's out of the reach of, you know, professional Iranian hackers associated, for example, with Iranian intelligence or Iranian IRGC. I can see something like that happening. I think Europeans are less immune to threats of that sort than the United States, for example. So yeah, I think It was those kinds of considerations that factored into European thinking, plus the fact that, you know, I think whatever we can say about the Europeans, I think they still have at least a formal semblance of respect for international law, that you just don't, you know, start dropping bombs on people from day to day. So yeah, there's that European public opinion would definitely— and then across, across the continent, uh, even in the most pro-American countries like in Poland, the tendencies regarding, uh, the war in Iran are decidedly on the side of, uh, if not Iran, then at least sanity, i.e., against Trump. So, um, you know, it's, it's sort of, it's, it's not even a repetition of 2003 where you actually had solid pro-American, uh, not only governments but even some semblance of support support in populations that we should go with the Americans against Saddam Hussein because Al-Qaeda, because 9/11, and so on. This time around, everybody's uniformly against this action of Washington in the, uh, in the Middle East.

Well, because it's become clear that it's the whole, the whole notion for getting involved with Iran, it was not based on solid evidence, for example, that Iran was threatening the US, which it wasn't. We knew where this is going as far as why the US decided to go that route. I want to go back to— you mentioned Poland earlier, and there is something that I've been keeping an eye on, and this one has to do, for example, with the structure of the military setting in Poland. And there are some European countries, specifically Germany, does not want to see a strong Poland, militarily speaking. Why is that? Why Germany is— I don't know if I want to use the term concerned, but I don't know why Germany is sort of putting Poland under the lenses as far as its military strength. Why will that be sort of an issue for Germany?

Well, that's a good question. Uh, maybe it's because the Germans realize that most of the weapons that we're going to be buying are not going to be German weapons but American weapons, so they might be losing money on that. But I think it's an overall question, I think, of how Germany post-1989 has viewed Poland, whereby, you know, in general, Europe after 1989, the core NATO countries have been sort of vassalized by the United States, Poland in particular. But if you look at it closer in a European or Central European context, we've also been vassalized by Germany, especially economically. I mean, the amount of German capital in Poland, uh, is, uh, is, is pretty profound actually, uh, despite the fact that, uh, you know, we've had governments who ostensibly have been very anti-German, uh, more aligning with the policies of the United States, for example. Now we have a government more aligned with, I would say, you know, the, uh, the Brussels, uh, the Brussels-Berlin, uh, Paris axis, so to say. Rather than Washington. But that could very much change because if Kamala Harris won the elections in the United States last year, this current government of Donald Tusk would be very much for Washington. There would even be a sort of symbiosis between European Union policy and the policy of the Democratic administration in Washington. But because it's Donald Trump, Polish liberals obviously hate Donald Trump recently for good reasons, but also earlier for many of the wrong reasons. Um, so I think, uh, these— the, the, the, the German thinking is that the ability of Poland to become a more— a potentially more sovereign player in Central Europe and maybe even further in European policy, especially as it relates, uh, to, to the East, uh, is something that the Germans probably would, would not want to deal with. Should things, uh, you know, um, should things escape their control. Germany always had this attitude that we are sort of the patron of post-Solidarity Poland, uh, you know, they always say that we, we invested so much in Poland and we were Poland's advocate, uh, in entering the European Union, in entering NATO, um, so there is that line of thinking that we owe the Germans something, so we shouldn't become too pesky in that regard. That's actually, I would think, a very profound and deeply rooted German strain of thinking, despite the fact that on many occasions, even though this German, the specific German thinking has a tinge of, you know, sort of anti-Polish bias in it, whereby Poles are still kind of considered the Untermenschen, you know, where the Slavs We're more, you know, we drink more, we're more lazy, but here we the Germans were more proficient. We're going to tell you how to work things out. Uh, despite that, I mean, there were occasions in the last 30 years where that German line of thinking was actually, uh, would have been better for Poland if we had taken the cue. Like for example, in 2003 when, you know, Gerhard Schröder opposed the Iraq War, we sent soldiers, uh, we spilled blood in Iraq for nothing, as it turns out. Uh, I think it's one of the more shameful episodes in Polish history that we actually went to Iraq, uh, with the Americans. But generally speaking, anything that could build up, uh, an autonomous Polish capacity and have the potential in the future to become more independent, I think, uh, irks a lot of people in the German, uh, political establishment from the SPD and from the CDU, which at the end of the day is obviously one unit party. Now, the open question is how the potential opposition forces that are becoming more and more popular right now, like I think the party is Die Linke and Sahra Wagenknecht's more sort of dissident left structures, and obviously the AfD, which is the big, the hotshot on the German political scene. I've cultivated some contacts over in the AfD. Uh, it would seem right now their main focus is actually on deepening or opening up relations again with Russia. And if you look at the German economy, that's a pretty rational approach. You let somebody else blow up your critical infrastructure, nobody has done a thing about it because I think everybody knows who did it. That's why. Um, so, so that's an open question. But yeah, I, I would say there is this the German political establishment does tend to look down on Poland in the sense that, you know, we're the big boy in Europe, we're Germans, uh, and you little Slavs, you know, get in line, uh, whatever we say is policy, and, uh, don't try to try to be too autonomous, and God forbid, don't try to talk to the Russians, uh, without our green light or before us. That's one thing that the Germans, I think, would be very shocked if all of a sudden Poland, on its own accord, without asking permission, uh, began talking to, uh, Moscow. That would be, I think, a historical first in the last 200 years. I think a positive first. But, uh, you know, that's still, that's still something that, that, that needs to happen, and hopefully it will happen.

Well, let's hope it does. If the truth matters to you, hit like, subscribe, and tap that bell. No spin, no agenda, just the stories they don't want you to know. Don't watch from the sideline, be part of the movement. Your support keeps the truth alive. Thank you. I want to get back to, uh, one more time about Poland, but not from the aspects of the political, uh, from the military dimensions. And this one has to do with the United States informally asked Poland to redeploy one of its Patriot missile defense systems. In your opinion, and I'm sure you are aware of it, you and I, we talked, and in your opinion, how did Warsaw, the government in Warsaw, assess this request when it first came in, even though it was informal?

I think they were surprised by it, because if you consider that the elites, the established in Warsaw very seriously takes its role as the eastern flank of NATO. I always hated that characterization. Yeah, we're Poland, we're nobody's flank, you know. I don't know, eastern flank sounds just ridiculous. Everybody calls us— just call ourselves— even if you're going to talk in that context, you say Poland. But anyways, they very much seriously take the role as the eastern flank of NATO, and the fact that all the resources of the Western alliance, especially of the United States, should be concentrated in Poland against obviously Russia. So we're always constantly, for the last 10 to 15 years, one of the main vectors of Polish policy has been acting for more American bases and more American troops. Uh, so this must have come as a shock to them because it was sort of like, but, but wait a minute, you know, you, you, for the last couple of years We've been building this narrative that here Russia is the great threat, uh, and all of a sudden you're starting a war with Iran, plus you want to take equipment from us down there. So does that mean that you no longer consider Russia to be a threat? You know, it brings up a lot of uncomfortable questions. So rather than opening up that whole can of worms, our foreign minister and our defense minister, they both said that, you know, we're not giving up, we're not sending any Patriot batteries, to Iran. It was obviously in that same statement the foreign minister— I'm sorry, the defense minister, Kashinyak Kamysh, had to say that, you know, we have a bigger threat on our border, we need to keep that Russian bear away. So he had to make that allusion to obviously the so-called Russian threat. Um, but yeah, they, uh, I think it was also a lot, a lot having to do with it was the fact that it was Trump's erratic behavior, that nobody was consulted on this whatever we think of the, you know, uh, Iran War, but planning into, you know, putting a Patriot battery here and there, uh, organizing units, uh, overtraining people on it, you know, that's a whole process. You don't just do that, you know, uh, on the, on the fly. And all of a sudden here we get this request, uh, and Poland just said, uh, no, uh, which was, which was interesting in its own right because our government isn't used to saying no to Washington. But I guess they calculated that this wouldn't really cost them anything if you consider, uh, the amount of firepower that the United States still has in the region. Uh, but on the other hand, I amplified this on X a bit, that, you know, when this war began, our former— because he resigned, by the way, today— our former National Security Advisor to the President, uh, Slobomir Čenskević, uh, In the first or second day of this war, he said, uh, you know, he was very happy with the war, and he said, you know, this— the way that the Americans are executing this war, uh, just shows their amazing capabilities that they have, you know, that they're striking Iran so hard and so precisely. Well, that, you know, that turns out to be a hollow statement if you consider that, you know, 3, 4 weeks after, they're asking us for our Patriot batteries to to bring down to the Middle East. So what kind of capabilities are we talking about here? It's more of a paper tiger. And the reporting after that that's been coming out about, for example, I mean, CNN reported just the other day that about half of the THAAD interceptors are gone, basically. 40%, I think, of Tomahawks. So the munitions supply crisis is out there for everyone to see. I'm happy that Polish members of the establishment Some of them, I think, are generally just literally clueless about these issues, are starting to see the reality of the American Empire's capabilities on the global stage. And I think that was one of the reasons why, in this instance, they just told the Americans to pound sand. We're not giving any Patriot batteries to you for your war and Israel's war against Iran.

Iran. And speaking of Israel, Mike, I read yesterday that the European Union is moving to suspend now some agreements with Israel. And that's the debate, it's going on as we speak. It's because the— that's at least from what I understood from the announcements of the foreign policy chief, Kaya Kallas, which confirmed that there was insufficient support from member states to suspend this partnership. I do know for a fact Germany and Italy opposed sort of the suspension of this agreement. Do you think the European Union will move forward in that direction at the end of the day?

I think the agreement itself is going to be intact, but if you look at the actions of the individual, yeah, uh, member states. Spain would probably be the first one to come to mind. Spain has become sort of the, uh, uh, you know, some people call, uh, Israel the Zionist entity in the Middle East. I think I would call Spain right now the anti-Zionist entity in Europe, uh, because they've taken such a hard and proper line, in my opinion, by all means, uh, regarding, uh, this war. Uh, if you look, for example, at the fact that, uh, I think, uh, several countries have already, uh, declared that they're not going to be taking part in Eurovision, uh, the annual Eurovision that takes place in Europe, because Israel is a participant. So, uh, I know there's been also pressure on the European, uh, Soccer Association and leagues to disassociate themselves, uh, from Israel. So I think the big, the only, or the major, I would say, pro-Zionist, pro-Israeli entity right now in the European Union is Germany with Merz. Definitely. Despite the fact that Merz, in a lame kind of way, said that he talked to Netanyahu a couple of days ago and he told him that what Israel is doing in the West Bank, uh, is unacceptable. It has to be done in accordance with international law. Uh, I think, you know, Bibi just hung up that phone and just had a good laugh after that because, okay, well, what can you do, Mr. Mertz? Nobody takes him seriously. Um, but we've seen, for example, Italy, uh, Meloni has done a 180 on Benjamin Netanyahu, which is actually kind of surprising. Uh, but I guess that's the Italian— yeah, the picture sort of shows it in a very, uh, symbolic way. She's, she's She's the standalone in a way in this picture, moving away from the center, so to say. But again, very positive. I don't know how many people saw this, but that depiction of crucified Christ that was turned around upside down, that the IDF soldiers were destroying, that they were smashing his head off, it was actually Italian UNIFIL soldiers that replaced that crucifix. I think they brought in 2 days ago. They stood it up. There's even a picture of United Nations peacekeepers from Italy standing with the cross. So they fixed that, which is very symbolic considering also that Meloni has come out also very strong in defense of Pope Leo vis-à-vis the shenanigans of Trump on Truth Social against the Pope. So even in countries that aren't saying it outright, the majority of public opinion in, you can almost have a context who public opinion in Europe loathes more, Bibi Netanyahu or Donald Trump. It's very hard to determine at this point because Bibi Netanyahu is a war criminal and Trump is threatening Europe, i.e., for example, Greenland is trashing Europe all the time, is starting unneeded wars of which Europe has to bear the brunt in terms of the economy, the energy crisis. So the European Union with its— and Ursula von der Leyen obviously is a Zionist shill. I mean, she's clueless, but I think she'll do anything that sort of falls in line with Atlantis's Zionist priorities and with the priorities, because obviously she's German. She comes from that milieu, from the German political establishment of what Berlin will be doing in this regard. So I'm not expecting any surprises from her despite these weak statements sometimes, Israel has to abide by international law, blah, blah, blah. And the fact that when this war began, it was very hypocritical on the part of the Union. They were calling Iran to stop its defensive action and not talking about who started this war. Who started the war? So Europe is a nonentity in this regard because at least the European Union as a structure, Now, individual member states have taken action that has been noticed both in Israel and in the United States and in Iran. I mean, Spain just opened up its embassy in Tehran. The Pope obviously is an international figure, but he's centered in Europe. The Iranians are very appreciative of not only the Italian government's stance, but also of what the Pope has been saying. I mean, I could tell you an episode from Poland where one of our members of the European Parliament, Grzegorz Braun, he actually made an excursion to the Iranian embassy and he signed, he autographed the book of condolences after the Supreme Leader, excuse me, Ali Khamenei was assassinated. That was noticed in Iran and the Iranian embassy thanked them for it. So in a way, it was sort of the Iranian Foreign Ministry saying thank you. To Poland for this small but nonetheless important gesture at least one of your representatives. So yeah, it's— and even our foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, just to end off, despite the fact that he's married to Anne Applebaum, he got into a spat with the Israeli foreign minister recently and the American ambassador in Poland because he actually called out the IDF on that destruction of the large crucifix there, large statue of Jesus in Lebanon. And he actually pointed out in his tweet that this isn't an isolated incident because it does touch upon the issue of how IDF soldiers are formed. And if you look at other episodes of anti-Christian activity of the IDF in southern Lebanon, you do start seeing a pattern. So Sikorsky, even Sikorsky, uh, pointed that out. He was obviously trashed by the, uh, by the Israeli foreign minister and by Mike Huckabee, by the way. Um, so yeah, it just goes to show how much trust has been lost and sympathy for the Israeli cause and for American action in Europe.

And with that, Mike, there is the important, uh, uh, statement by none other than— you will recognize this individual— none other than Peter Magyar. I hope I pronounced it correctly. And this leads me— this, by the way, guys, that's the new prime minister of Hungary. And I wanted to ask your opinion, Mike, your assessment. How did you see the outcome of the Hungarian elections and the statements of its new prime minister, Peter Magyar, when he stated, and I quote here, or paraphrase that he will, he will arrest Netanyahu if he sets foot in Hungary, which goes in complete opposite of what Mr. Orbán did. And many around the world have kind of lost respect for Mr. Orbán, especially when he couldn't take a stand when it matters. That's to me have always been the rule leadership. Matters when it needs to be sort of a decision needs to be made. How do you see the elections of Hungary, the outcome of it that happened now? And does that tell you anything about where Europe is going when considering, for example, Bulgaria, which will have an election next month? When you consider even within your own country in Poland, when you consider in France, how do you see this going?

Well, I think whatever the moral or non-moral merits of Orbán's stance on Israel was, I think at the end of the day, it was a function. It was the cost of him having a good relationship with the current US administration, which at the end of the day allowed him to do some good things for Hungary, like, for example, getting that exemption from Russian sanctions on Russian gas deliveries. Yes, that was played by Orbán brilliantly. And I think, you know, it's just my opinion, but it looks that way, that the cost of doing that was being Bibi's best friend in Europe. Because I truly don't think that a man of Viktor Orbán's intelligence and I think genuine Christian faith really believes that Benjamin Netanyahu is a guy you should be meeting with instead of rotting in a jail cell. I don't think Orbán is that depraved to not see that in his own heart, obviously, because the public stance was completely different. But because right now with Donald Trump in power, the future prime minister of Hungary he can say that he can arrest Orban because most of the European states are— I mean, arrest Netanyahu because most of the European states are saying that they're going to arrest Netanyahu because the arrest warrant encompasses most, I think most of the European countries that are part of the European Union. So in this regard, because he doesn't have a close relationship with Donald Trump, as a matter of fact, he said he doesn't really care if Trump calls him with congratulations. Uh, there is no need, or there is no pressure coming from Washington that, yeah, and we also need you to be, uh, the biggest pro-Zionist, uh, leader in Europe. Uh, Magyar is just not interested in that. And since the European Union is not demanding that of him, I think what the European Union is going to demand of Magyar, where the pressure is going to be, is probably going to be in the internal policies to move it decidedly more to liberal leftist multicultural, what I would call, you know, rainbow coalition priorities. So basically to continue the advance of the cultural revolution as we've seen in the rest of Europe and a slow possible cutting off of relations with, or at least the, the, the level of good relations that were established by Orbán with Russia. Now we know that's not going to happen, uh, day to day, and Magyar has already said, you know, we respect geography, uh, there's— we're not going to be cutting ourselves off from Russian energy, uh, but I think once he gets rooted more and more into the, uh, premiership, there is going to be pressure from, uh, Brussels, uh, for a serious reevaluation and revision of Budapest's current relations with the Russian Federation. So I think being anti-Bibi doesn't really cost him anything because he's not looking for appreciation from Washington. Magyar is definitely set on getting applause from Brussels and Berlin first and foremost. Now, how he'll play that card is an open question. He might be able to do a sort of triangular diplomatic approach where he'll maintain good relations or deepen relations with the European Union, liberalizing, for example, family law, being more open to LGBTQS and so on and so on, while at the same time maintaining good relations with China, who has huge investments in Hungary. And Russians in terms of energy, but for example, energy only. So, you know, the close relationship that Peter Szijjártó, the Hungarian foreign minister, had, for example, with Lavrov, that's probably, uh, history, uh, that's probably not going to repeat itself. And I think that's where the demands of the European Union are going to be in terms of pushing Hungary to be more, uh, more, uh, amenable to Ukraine and becoming at least formally more hostile to Russia again, but without doing anything that would existentially hit Hungary very quickly, i.e., cutting itself off from cheap Russian energy.

Energy. That is true. As a matter of fact, we were trying— I do remember, I do know when the Vice President, JD Vance, was coming out of Pakistan and made the stop in, uh, in, in Budapest, in Hungary. Let me just share this with the community. Here's the, the, here's the when he was in, uh, to show support. What's interesting about this picture, uh, it's the individual in circle here. And this, the individual in circle, is nobody, no one that, uh, it's Paolo Rampolli. Yes. That is the interesting part. Paolo Rampolli was the former owner of the New York City Kit Kat Club, the Kit Kat Club that was a major supplier of, of, of girls, including Melania Trump, to Epstein. That makes you just wonder which was—

I had no idea about that.

Wow, it's disturbing. It's disturbing, Mike. When I came across, uh, when I came across that, and I kind of— whoa, what is that guy doing with the vice president going into— of course, we wanted to push for the reelection of Orbán, but it became clear he's losing. The same concept can be said about, what's his name, Lindsey Graham, right here in the US, which majority hope that will be the end of him in Congress.

Well, let's hope the people in South Carolina, right, make the right decision this time, because I think we can all agree that Lindsey Graham should just retire.

That is true. 23 years in power, that should be going. So I want to just wrap this up with giving you the last word, Mike, as far as where do you see now the Iran-US-Israel conflict moving forward, given that we already see and know what's going on economically. I am more concerned about what is the geopolitical trajectory that now, because it became sort of— I'm wondering, are we already now seeing that the US, this war has sort of broken the US in a way and shattered its global power forever? Will I be wrong in this assessment?

No, I don't think you would be wrong. I think, where do we go from here in terms of Iran? Realistically, I think I see a scenario where, or I'm more inclined to believe in a scenario where Trump is just going to be extending the ceasefire because I think it's becoming more and more apparent to him that, or at least I hope it's becoming more and more apparent to him, it does seem that way, that this is a losing gamble. And Joe Kent, made the point a couple of days ago that, you know, given Trump's cognitive decline— well, he didn't say it in those terms, but I'm guessing that's what he wanted to say— given Trump's cognitive decline, it would be just best for Trump to just leave, to just leave right now and let the entire region sort itself out, i.e., the GCC vis-à-vis Iran. Because at the end of the day, right now, the United States has no good options. You know, they tried the air power option It failed. They're trying the blockade option. Uh, it's unsustainable. Uh, plus if you look at data, uh, from some of the, um, the information sites on the ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, uh, ships are actually getting out despite the blockade, uh, which is funny in its own right. Uh, you're not going to send ground troops to Iran despite the fact that Trump, I think, uh, just a few hours ago posted on Truth Social an article, or by somebody recommended to him that he should do a General Sherman on Iran, which would be obviously a massacre. It would actually be the Iranians doing a General Sherman on, in reverse, on Donald Trump, not the other way around. So if those three options are exhausted, the only thing that is left is playing these political games whereby you make Uh, you create a narrative whereby Iran is conceding to you, uh, but in essence, it's you that con— you're the one who's conceding to Iran. Like, for example, this whole narrative that the Iranian leadership is divided, that they don't know what they're doing. But Iran has been very consistent, uh, that they're not going to be forced into any concessions. Uh, they've made their, uh, points of a possible deal very clear. And if you consider, you know, they were discussing, what was it, 21, 22 hours in Islamabad. They almost had a memorandum of understanding. I mean, you don't discuss 21, 22 hours things that can be thrown in the garbage in the first hour. So JD Vance was actually pretty much engaged in listening to the Iranians and taking into consideration their interests. But if you consider that he had to consult the White House every 5 minutes, and apparently he was also reporting to Benjamin Netanyahu. The scenario most likely was that they had— they almost had a deal, but then Trump cut in, either at the behest of Netanyahu or just because of his, you know, stream of consciousness, that, uh, no, you're not going to sign this, uh, no deal. So that must have been pretty frustrating, uh, to the vice president. Um, but at, at this juncture, as I said, Iran holds all the cards, and I'm guessing that what we're going to see is a pattern of Trump making up narratives to make up for the fact that it is he that's losing and Iran that's winning. But that doesn't mean that there isn't an open window still left for Trump to make a good deal with Iran. I mean, that deal was almost made a couple of days, you know, on the two nights before the war erupted. According to the Omani foreign minister. They basically had a deal. The experts were to meet after the weekend in Vienna, and I'm guessing the same sort of, uh, well, obviously with the exception right now that Iran is very insistent that it's going to control the Strait of Hormuz and that's how it's going to rebuild this country. That is a different situation, uh, from what we had at the end of February, uh, but as I said, the Iranians have been very consistent It's Trump that's playing these games, Trump that's making up narratives. Sometimes, uh, you know, people are asking the question, who's actually making the money on this? But it does seem like a lot of insider trading is going on where he's tweeting once, yeah, we almost had a deal, and then I'm gonna bomb you, I'm gonna destroy your civilization, 2 minutes later, but you know, a billion dollars has been made in those 2, uh, in those 2 minutes speculative, uh, realm. So yeah, uh, but obviously Everybody has to remember this caveat that Donald Trump is an erratic, unpredictable figure. As I'm saying this to you right now, bombs might already be falling on Tehran, so who knows? But I think the realization around the people around him, including the ones of a formal neocon disposition like JD Vance and especially people in the Pentagon, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, uh, is that there are no good military options here. Everything that we're doing right now is only for optics and only for internal consumption. Um, but the Iranians and most of the world see this crisis for what it is. It's basically a lost cause. But as I said, that window is still there to make a good deal if Trump decides, uh, to take it.

Yeah, there, just quickly to share it with you on the community, two main events happened today. One is the firing of the Naval Secretary. Secretary of the Navy was, was let go. Still, uh, uh, uh, uh, Hagseth, Secretary of Defense, didn't provide the rationale for why that is. And the second major event that happened is that today was the first deposit in the central bank Tehran from the ships crossing the Strait of Hormuz. And that tells me the story right there. It's Iran that controls it.

Yeah, it tells you basically who controls it and who's winning the war.

So exactly. And that's again where the differences are. Well, my friend, I can't thank you enough for really carving out time for us here to share with our community. As a matter of fact, I was thinking last night, uh, because I have a lot of members of the community from different parts of the world, but I don't talk enough about Europe. And I am thinking maybe once a month I'm gonna reach out to you, if your schedule permits. I know you're busy. And, uh, and, and would like to just discuss stuff about Europe, where Europe is going, because I do see— I have family in Europe, and I do see some changes coming out down the pipe. Whether the transatlantic relations gonna survive, I can't say at this point. That it would be interesting. Before I let you go, please don't sign off, Mike. I want to talk to you privately after I say bye to the community. But I want to show you something. I want to show you something on the screen. One of your students is right here watching, right here.

Ah, okay. So you're welcome, you're welcome.

Just want you to know, uh, it seems your students following to know where you are at and so forth. So, well, we're glad to have you here, student. You know, we look forward to seeing you again. I take this opportunity to say thank you to Joey for, for your Super Sticker. And of course, it's my pleasure to interview my dear friend Dr. Krupa. Mike and I, we talk, and I'd love to always have him here. So thank you very much for your Super Sticker. And to Army with Harmony, I can't thank you enough for supporting the channel. As always, uh, for the community, remember tomorrow I will be doing the live stream about the, uh, specific type of missile. This one is called the 100. That's a type of missiles that can turn into ICBM, basically. So I will be sharing this with you. And to the community, I hope you enjoyed it, and I look forward to seeing you next time. As always, remember geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Until next time, I'll be with you, Mike, in a second here.