How Do Gulf States Navigate Israel, the US and China? Geopolitical Trends

Hello everybody and welcome to Geopolitical Trends, where truth matters. Excited to be with you as always. Uh, I'm going to be doing another analysis for you. This has to do with the Gulf States. I'm not talking about the entire Arab world. I'm going to be focusing specifically on the Gulf States and what it means for the future of their geopolitical trajectory as they try to navigate now between their security commitments with the United States, their major resentments of the public against Israel, and of course their economic ventures with China. So it will be a very, very interesting analysis that I'm going to be sharing with you. But before I'll do this, let me say hi quickly to our wonderful and inquisitive, uh, community. Leanne, good to see you. Willie Holman, as always. Matt Becky, here you are. Good to see you, Matt. Uh, uh, uh, Faran, good to see you. Hello to you as well. Uh, Truth Seeker, Athene Wu, good to see you. Who else is here? Let me see. Jerome Lazarus, good to see you. Al Stalokin, yo yo, good to see you, man. Uh, all right, let's get in into, uh, first of all, as I said, I'm gonna be talking about the Gulf States as they facing now some really serious and complex geopolitical because they are at a geopolitical crossroads right now. Why? Because they have to now to navigate so many, so many, they have to juggle so many tasks and navigate tensions between maintaining, first of all, this strategic alliance with Washington, which by the way, some have called into reevaluating that strategic alliance. So with Washington, the other one has to do with managing an unprecedented public resentments towards Israel within those countries. And the third one, aspiring for better economic ventures with China. So this very, very important topic in my assessment, though, in my, in my opinion, that will help you understand the much bigger picture as to what lies ahead. Some housekeeping items: I'm gonna— I am now working on a particular topic for you, very, very interesting. Uh, once I finalize everything, I will do it for you this week, uh, within the next few days. It might be on Friday, might be sooner. I do not know yet till I confirm certain information. And this one has to do with, believe it or not, Israel and China. Whoever thought? If you only know the background story of how Israel used to share certain military technology with China. You know, behind the, uh, against the, the, the will of the United States. So that was the old time. So now it looks like Israel is going to cross China the wrong way. So I am trying to finalize few things and I'm going to share with you the other two topic I'm working on. I'm going to be providing again an analysis about what is America's weakest a point that threatens its global, fading already, global hegemony. There is something very, very interesting that I would like you to know within the bigger picture of the American decline. So, and the third topic that I'm still working on, it has to do with the expected scenarios regarding, um, Venezuela. Can't forget this. I just got a word this morning that an Admiral within the US Navy has ordered the movement of another frigate into the area. Now, is it posturing? Is it not? We'll see. I'm gonna be doing an analysis about this one. I have one headline for you today, and this one has to do with the global arms sales, which jumped by about almost 9% since last year. Of course, we're talking about $680 billion. That is the current one, which moved up from $623 in 2023. So in 2023, the arms sales were about $623 billion. But in 2024, it moved up to about $680 billion. So of course, who made the benefit? Who benefited? Uh, uh, some specific countries. You're talking about Israel's war on Gaza Strip and of course the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as global and other regional geopolitical tensions and increasingly military spending. So the total arm— arm, uh, the total revenue rather of arm-producing companies reached $1.65 trillion in 2024. So we're looking at weapons and other products also. So, so, and the bulk of this increase, by the way, just to let you know, in global arms revenues came from companies based in Europe and the United States. You know, there were year-on-year increase in all regions of the world listed in the— and I know I'm familiar with this, uh, company— institute rather— it's called the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. So, and those have the top 10 companies in Europe and the United States that benefited. Now you understand why the European, for example, wanted to keep the Ukraine war going on with Russia, and why the United States wants to keep sending weapons to Israel, and of course to the other Gulf states, which I will be talking about today. So, all right, let's get into our analysis here. So Gulf States, very interesting dynamics, and I'm going to do geography and history for you. So Gulf States now are navigating their relationships, and remember, I'm using plural relationships, not relationship just with one country. We're talking about with Israel, we're talking about the US, and we're talking about China. And this They are managing this through some sort of a strategy of balancing competing interests. Because when you think about Gulf states, what do they— what do they produce? Nothing. If it weren't for oil, we won't be talking much about them. But they do have massive amount of oil, and they do have access to funding, money, which means they can buy whatever they want. Now, when you think about those three countries Israel, US, and China. The Gulf states will have to think about maintaining the close security ties with the United States, of course, while at the same time deepening their economic and diplomatic engagement with China. So for Israel is a different matter. Why? Because that relationship shouldn't come up to the public openly, despite, despite having some countries that have established diplomatic ties with Israel. So this is why for the Gulf States, they are using their economic power to foster these relationships with, with, with both sides, meaning with the US and China on one end. With Israel, it has to do with, for example, the ties on the, uh, uh, working on the intelligence matters and, and, and, and buying or purchasing the gadgets from Israel that can track the citizens inside the Gulf States. Like, for example, Pegasus. So, so this is where you think about where this is going, you know, because the Gulf states sort of cannot be independent. So that is where this complex geopolitical, uh, that exists within this country. So especially while those countries, meaning in the Gulf, maintain ties with Israel through The Abraham Accord, Gulf governments, meaning the Gulf states in, in, in the region, struggle to balance some sort of, uh, this elite-level strategic interest against the widespread public anger over Gaza. So because, because the governments in the Gulf states will not want to sort of, uh, uh, uh, disclose, of course, that information simultaneously. The Gulf states are trying to leverage their financial clout because they do have access to a lot of money, so, uh, to reshape the regional orders. So, and this is where you hear now about the Gulf states saying, oh, we're gonna rebuild Syria, we're gonna rebuild Lebanon. So because they're hedging their bets when they join with China not the US, with China to do this construction. At the same time, at the same time, maintaining their security guarantees with the United States. And of course, with Israel's unpredictable military actions in the region. And of course, they're going to have you believe with the weakening of Iran have created some sort of an unstable tri- pillar regional architecture where Gulf states act as sort of a power broker. Remember, Qatar was kind of working negotiations between, for example, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Also, Qatar was working between Hamas and Israel. You know, you don't see much for Egypt in this context. And that's— and this is where what, what you're going to come up with at the end, you're going to realize we are looking at a fragmented— like I mentioned yesterday, for the whole region, not just the Gulf, for the whole region— a fragmented Middle East where traditional alliances, some sort of, might persist, but lack of coherence, you know, cohesiveness, public opinion constraints, those kind of decision, political decisions And there will be no clear sort of winners who's going to emerge from this. It will be interesting to say, to see where it will lead to. So, so I'm going to do geography for you and I'm going to do a history. Then I'll continue with my analysis about the Gulf States. So first of all, when you think about the Gulf States, and I'm just going to use this map here from the Middle East, but when we think about the Gulf, Gulf States specifically. The Gulf States are the Arab nations bordering the Persian Gulf, which includes the following: Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. L'Emirate, la, uh, l'Emirate. Yeah, this is what I want you to understand about the Gulf. Which you see it right here. Once again, those are nations, Arab nations, that are bordering the Persian Gulf. So that includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Arab, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. So, and since we are mentioning also the Persian Gulf, it makes more sense for us to address the Persian Gulf right here. So when you think about the Persian Gulf, sort of, it is part of the Indian Ocean. So of course the Mediterranean Sea as well, because they are kind of connected. It is located in Western Asia. This is why you hear the term West Asia regarding the whole Middle East part. So it is an extension of the Gulf of Oman and connects to the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Hormuz. In the east. The Persian Gulf on the map you are looking at is also referred to as the, uh, sort of— there's always this confusion and I want to clear this up. Sometimes in certain maps they can refer to it sometimes as Arabian Gulf or Gulf of Iran. However, the common terminology used has always been the Persian Gulf. I just wanted to clear this up. So for me personally, and I speak for myself here, I've always used the term the Persian Gulf, but I did see it in the literature where it was mentioned as the Arabian Gulf, which doesn't make any sense when you know the history of this. But suffice it to, uh, to say, for now we're going to use the term the Persian Gulf. So, and it covers approximately 251 kilometers square, 251,000 kilometers square, with a maximum depth of 90 meters, uh, and an average depth of 50 meters. The Persian Gulf lies between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. This is where that confusion comes in. When you have, you have some literature mentioning Arabian Gulf, it creates confusion. Persian Gulf is Persian Gulf. Then when we talk about the Arabian Peninsula, not the Arabian Gulf— Arabian Peninsula is different story. So the Persian Gulf lies between Arabian Peninsula and Iran to the southwest and northeast respectively. The water body is bound by several countries that includes Iran to the north, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates on the peninsula, and Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait in the northwest. And it has a Persian Gulf, has a, a coastline length of about 5,100 kilometers. So with Iran having the longest coastline of about 1,536 kilometers, 1,536 36 kilometers. So, so I just wanted to make it clear geographically speaking, so it will be no confusion for that. So let's talk about history, and I'm going to keep it brief here. The history of the Gulf Arab states, when you think about it, it also includes some ancient civilizations that passed through that, that, that region. Of course, you have to talk about the rise of Islam, you have to talk about trade, you You have to talk about pearl diving. There's a lot of pearl in that part of the world. So, and of course, you cannot ignore the later influence of the European powers, the likes of Portuguese and the British, especially with the British that created a mess in the entire region. As a matter of fact, most of the kingdoms that are in that part of the world were established because of the Brits. That's what the deal was cut between them. So modern history of the Gulf States, or Gulf Arab States— when I say Gulf States, you know what I'm referring to here. So, uh, modern history is defined by the discovery, of course, of oil back in early, uh, '30s, 1930s of the last century, leading to a rapid modernization and independence with most sort of states gaining sovereignty in the 20th century and becoming prominent in the global economy. One thing I want to make clear, this deal was because the— meaning the, the, the, the gaining of sovereignty was a deal between the British monarchy, the British colonialism at that time, and these monarchies or those tribes, because those were nothing but tribes. The Saudis were tribes, United Arab Emirates were tribes. All of those families that own now the kingdoms, they just came from tribes. So, but they cut a deal with the Brits at that time. Of course, except for Iran, we don't know what happened in 1953 when Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh said, no, we want to nationalize our own, and he didn't want the Brits. And you all know what happened with the coup that took place in, in Iran by replacing Dr. Mossadegh with none other than the puppet Shah Reza Pahlavi. So, so let's talk about the ancient and early history of the Gulf Arab states. So there, the Gulf states, where the Gulf states are located, was home to ancient civilizations and played some sort of a significant role mainly in trade. So I disclosed this, I think, in my both books in my Iran book and my, uh, the, the which, the other book, I couldn't remember which one I— no, I think I did in both the Iran book and of course the Saudi book as well, where I talked about the trade as being important. And of course, like I mentioned, as part of the ancient history, the, the region was the birthplace of the religion of Islam. So, so the early inhabitants of the region were nothing but nomadic tribes. They were just tribes. And that's where— how we became for the monarchies, our families that are now controlling power over there. So, so, and of course, when you think about how those tribes and the settled population back then, they were influenced by empires before them, like Achaemenids, you know, the Parthians, and of course the, the Seleucid Empires. All of them have influenced the life of the early history of this part of the world. Then came the European influence, uh, uh, uh, following around 15— 1500 or so, uh, you move forward from that date all the way to the 19th century. So we'll talk about Portuguese first, and Portuguese were from about 1521 That's when the Portuguese dominated the Persian Gulf, particularly influencing some sort of specific country like Bahrain at that time. But the Portuguese end up facing some sort of resistance from local rulers, and of course later on from none other than the Ottoman Empire. So the first Europeans weren't the Brits, they were the Portuguese. Then came the Brits after that. So the British Empire gained political control over parts of the region, and that including the sort of the, uh, modern-day United Arab Emirates. You're talking about Kuwait, we're talking about Qatar, those in the 18th and the 19th centuries respectively. So, and of course, that is when the pearl diving became some sort of a major commodity for trade and so forth. Pearl diving, because it's known, the region of the Gulf is known for pearls, so was a major economic activity before the discovery of oil. So for instance, the town of Al Zubayr, which is in Qatar, to those who are familiar with Qatar, uh, I never been in Qatar. I think I flew to the airport, but I never been in the country itself. So The city of Zubarah, it's known in Qatar, which grew into a major pearl diving and trade centers. That's how it was back then. So then we move into modern history, and again, I'm just providing you a brief general overview historically speaking. Modern history of the Gulf States— anything you talk— when you talk about modern history, oil comes to mind, because if without oil, we won't be talking about the those countries. Actually, they won't even be mentioned on the world stage, politically speaking. So we're looking at an independence. Some countries start to gain independence right following World War II. Many Gulf states began to gain independence. We're looking at Kuwait. Does anybody know when Kuwait gained its independence? Let me see in the chat box if you happen to know. Does anybody know? To those who are familiar with the region, you will know. Uh, let me see if, uh, I know it takes a while to show up here for Kuwait. And remember, all of them were about the same time when they gained independence after World War II. Uh, okay, I don't see it here, so I'm going to move on. 1961. The, uh, United Arab Emirates, uh, uh, gained its independence in 1971. Remember Kuwait, '61, 1961. United Arab Emirates, 1971, and Qatar in the same year, 1971. So, and that's right, uh, uh, uh, where the oil became one of the, uh, major commodity for survival for them. So the discovery of oil revolutionized the economies, uh, those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, transferred them from nomads— because that's all they were, tribe and nomads and all that stuff— into some sort of, uh, players in the global energy market. Will I call them a global economic power? Not necessarily. So I disagree with those analysts who classify them as a global economic power No, they are global energy powers or global energy players, but not on a global economic level. So then what comes after this one? The key aspects, which is in the '70s, was none other than OPEC, Oil Producing Exporting Countries. So you have Qatar, Kuwait, and other Gulf states joined the organization of the petroleum exporting countries known as OPEC, which controls a significant portion of the, of the world oil's production and reserves. That's usually how, uh, uh, OPEC— again, but now you have OPEC+ with some other key players that are part of this particular, uh, developments economically speaking. Liking this video so far? Don't just be a watcher. Go ahead and hit the like, share, and subscribe button, and don't forget to tap the bell so you will not miss any of my videos or live streams. This way, you will be supporting a channel that stands for the truth and objective reporting. The choice is yours. Thanks for your support. All right, let's get in into the analysis aspects of it. Right off the bat, will the Gulf States— if you are to think about it, you're going to say to yourself, will the Gulf States reconsider their strategic alliance with Washington? Because why we might not hear about it openly or publicly, there are voices inside those countries that are considering the possibility. Will it be, once again, public? No, it won't. And once again, that was the reason why I wanted to do this analysis for you, to prepare you to understand the upcoming shift that is going to be happening as we move into the new year. So, so the current developments based on what's going on right now in the region— Gulf states appear to be actively recalibrating rather than sort of fundamentally abandoning their relationship with Washington. They won't. I'm telling you this upfront because their survival depends on the US. Second, if they ever do that, all we need to do— meaning we, the Washington, you know, to me it's not a good way of dealing with countries— all we're gonna do is destabilize And there are ways of doing that. So this is why you are thinking, you are looking at sort of, though there is significant pressures are being created because of this recalibration. So, so the Trump administration, we're talking about the current one, has positioned itself as sort of focusing more on a regional return on investments and less on this so-called democracy. You all remember. So, and all this resonates with the Gulf states, a sort of preference, and acknowledges the agency in shaping the region's future. This is what's going on where you see this recalibration. So, and this basically will translate into what? It will translate into some high profile engagements like what you witnessed about 3 weeks ago or 2 weeks ago when the, the prince of Saudi Arabia was here, when Qatar, uh, gifted a plane to Donald Trump, when Donald Trump went over there. This is what you are looking at. You're looking at these high-profile engagements. And, and like I mentioned, Trump's recent visit to the region featuring major AI semiconductor agreements with United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. So however, when you think about this, you think about the Gulf states are pursuing what some other analysts have described as a strategic hedging, meaning they are reconsidering certain aspects of their, uh, uh, uh, strategic interests. So Gulf states have adopted some sort of a diversified a partnership strategy, and for the purpose, or one purpose only, is to sort of diversify and fortify their own stability and economic interest in response to Washington's deeper focus on the Asia-Pacific. And that includes the China Belt and Road Initiative. And of course, you cannot forget about the new trade corridor initiatives, one that's going to go through Central Asia. And of course, we heard about during the G20 summit in India how India is going to connect India to Europe via Middle East and all that with, with the, with this economic corridor, which was nothing but hype, no more, no less. So Yet this relationship of this Persian— of this Gulf states, some sort of face real, real pressure points. You think about, for example, the Israeli Gulf perception of the Iranian threat. Of course, most analysts in the West, even in Tel Aviv, will have you believe that the Iranian threat is also sort of manifesting itself within the Gulf states, which is in reality, I don't see that. Why? Because when you think about the majority of the population within those Gulf states are Shiites. Think even Saudi Arabia. Yeah, majority Sunni, whatever. No, they are majority Shia in the south. And this is why the Shia in the south have been sort of neglected. Because where is the most of the oil? Most of it in the south. The same in Kuwait, the same in United Arab Emirates, the same in Qatar and Bahrain also. So, and this is where you think about, uh, uh, uh, this threat that's been exaggerated from the Iranian towards the Gulf. It's what underpinned the so-called the Abraham Accord, which has increasingly come under some sort of stress. Why? It's because Israel has pursued some policy, uh, that is based on a military approach, not only towards Iran, but look what they're doing right now in Syria, what they're doing in Lebanon, and of course what they try to do in Yemen. And they realized they can't continue that way because Ansarullah responded. So, and this is where you have the Gulf state prioritizing some sort of stability. And that stability, not because of the care for the population, stability for the monarchies. So this is why they are leaning more— yeah, I'm saying this to you, of course media is not going to disclose that— they, meaning those Gulf states, leaning more towards normalizing relations with Iran. So, and at the same time, those Gulf states that have reached out to Iran, sometimes quietly, sometimes openly, like in the case of Saudi Arabia— and thanks to China for brokering that deal— those Gulf states have also expressed disappointments at the United States. Why? Because the United States was unwilling to press Israel more forcefully regarding Gaza. This is where that resentment inside those Gulf states, which the monarchies are concerned about, because it could turn into some demonstrations, and one thing could lead to the next. And I'm going to be talking about the possibility of an— another Arab Spring might be happening. So suffice it to say that the core partnership between the Gulf states and in the case of US, in the case of China, in the case of Israel behind closed doors, remain intact. So, so, because here is one thing the Gulf States leaders, what they are recognizing and realizing is that sort of for now we cannot count on China or Russia to replace the scale the capability and the strategic commitments that Washington brings. For one reason and one reason only, because those countries, mainly China— China doesn't want open-up bases elsewhere, same with Russia, to my knowledge. The US is different story because we wanted to maintain that. And this is why those Gulf state leaders are kind of thinking about this one, recognizing that Russia and China will not be able to play that role. So the key tension is that the Gulf states must decide whether to maintain a strategic level of this, uh, of their partnership with Washington, while at the same time establishing only some sort of, uh, uh, tactical, if I may use the term, tactical partnership with China and maybe Russia, because Russia has some advanced weapon systems. So, or they're going to be risking the damage to the US relations, uh, uh, if, if they ever— those Gulf states elevate their partnership or relationship with China or Russia to a strategic level. This is why it's always important to understand in bilateral relations, whether this is going to move up to the next level or not. So for now, they still depending on the United States. The next question we ought to ask is, what about the resentments against Israel? Because there is, there is massive resentments among the population, but the governments are suppressing that thanks to Pegasus, which is from the Israeli side for maintaining control of the population and so forth, because they monitor everything, which we have the same here, by the way. So it's nothing different. So, so public resentment against Israel is a major complicating factor for the Gulf States. So why? Because it creates a significant, uh, disconnect between the, the, the population and the government. So, and this is what the governments inside the Gulf states are concerned about. That includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain. It's worse in the case of United Arab Emirates because it established diplomatic ties with the, with Israel. It's, it's, it's getting worse in Saudi Arabia because it is talking behind closed doors with Israel. So the scale, the scale of public anger is substantial. Once again, media won't disclose. This is what I, uh, like to do to provide you the information that is not— of course, is an analysis more so than anything else. So the majority cross not only now in the Gulf States when it comes down to the issue of Gaza and Israel, but from across the Arab world, from Morocco all the way to Kuwait. When you look at the map You know, you go all the way— Morocco is on, on left side here— all the way to Kuwait. So I wish I had a different map here, but I don't. And this has to do with Israel's sort of ongoing atrocities in Gaza. As a matter of fact, there is now a violation of the Blue Line. I just read it this morning. I'm not going to talk about it much because I didn't read enough about it. So I like to talk, uh, when I have the facts and so forth. Uh, there's also, uh, uh, uh, some residents inside those lines been killed by, I think, an attack from Israel and so forth. Suffice it to say that what's going on in inside Gaza, there is the public anger that is substantial within the Arab world writ large. So, and this is why when you look at about certain countries, they were considering normalization with Israel, has collapsed. Saudi Arabia still talking to Israel behind closed doors. And Saudi Arabia will not come openly and recognize because that will be, uh, that will be a suicide for the, uh, Al Saud family. So, so when you look at Kuwait, which Kuwait you don't hear much about, even though— don't think that Kuwait is an angel. Uh-uh. In Kuwait, there is a massive US presence. I remember I stopped there a few years ago. Massive US presence. It's just quiet and all that. In Kuwait specifically, you have about 84% reported boycotting companies supporting Israel, 62% donated to support Gazans, and 40% shared pro-Palestinian messages online. This is why Israel was offering some YouTubers and some whatever, they were offering about $7,000 for a positive post about Israel. Yeah, $7,000. That's why when you see certain type— that's why I'm always saying Be careful what you are listening to in on YouTube and some other stuff. So yeah, $7,000 per post that will put Israel in a light, in a positive light. So, and this is again, uh, uh, and, and when you think about, uh, Israel's recent actions, uh, have sort of intensified the tensions dramatically now, uh, especially inside, uh, those Gulf states. And we're talking about the recent one in September. You all remember what Israel did to Qatar in, on Doha. You know, that's when targeted Hamas leaders, uh, led Arab states to conclude that Israel is now their primary threats. So that's what Netanyahu said. So when you think about, uh, this particular development, you're going to be asking yourself You know where this is going to go. And this is why for the Gulf states, expanding open relations with Israel is unlikely. That's the way I see it. So first of all, we— they have to have some conditions. One of them will be, for example, the real reversal of Israel policy towards Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. Which I don't see Israel doing. And I don't see the US even pressuring Israel because it goes the other way around. It's Israel that pressures the US, not the other way around, as they might have you believe. So when you think about the fundamentals within the Gulf governments is that for them is to maintain this strategic engagements with Israel behind closed doors. While they're at the same time the public is getting a little bit, you know, antsy and upset about these engagements that their governments is engaged. I had a chance to read, uh, I don't know if I get picture of the guy. Oh, I didn't. Let me, let me pull up his picture because I'm aware of him. He's a scholar, uh, I was aware of him. I mean, he was in— and a hotspot sometimes when he praised certain groups in Afghanistan back then. He's from Kuwait. So I had a chance to read some of his recent writing, and one of them has to do exactly with this, literally similar topic that I'm addressing. And this has to do whether it is time for the Gulf states to reconsider their strategic alliance with Washington. Washington. Very, very interesting, and I'm going to put the link for you later on. So his name is, uh, uh, is, uh, Abdullah al-Nafisi. I have a picture of him here, right here. He's a Kuwaiti, he's a scholar. And by the way, just to give you an idea about his academic credentials, you know, he earned his bachelor degree back in 1967 from the American University of Beirut, and he earned a PhD in political science from Churchill College at Cambridge University in Britain in 1972. So he's a scholar, he's a thinker, uh, he's, he's, uh, he has some weight academically speaking inside Kuwait and across the Arab world. Those who understand, uh, or they know about about him as far as his political views and so forth. So, so here is what he believes, and I can see the logic in his reasoning and argument. He believes that sort of the, the, the Gulf States, and, and for that matter, the whole Middle East will witness some sort of another popular uprising due to the accumulation. That's where I agree with him on that. The accumulation of resentments against Israel, and that the people will prevent the United States from creating a new Middle East. I agree with him on some aspect, but regarding the, uh, Arab Spring, I don't see it happening, and I'm going to share with you why. I, I, I, I understand where he's coming from, but I have to disagree with him on that part. But the second one, I agree that the US will not succeed in creating a new Middle East, that is. So, so, uh, uh, Nafisi, also this strategic thinker, thinks that, uh, he doubts the ability for the United States and Israel, because those are the only two countries that are working on implementing the so-called the project to change the Middle East region. So, and why? It's because the people, not the governments, the people will prevent that from being implemented. To what degree, I do not know at this point. And the only way that will work is if you have another Arab Spring at the same scale as it was in 2011. So, and this is why he's calling for which came up to the surface when Doha was attacked by Israel. So where was America? So see what I mean? And, and a lot of prominent individuals inside Qatar start to ask the question, okay, why are we having strategic ties with America if they couldn't come to our defense in time of need? Or did the Americans knew about it and let it happen? Which most likely the case. Israel will not go without letting the Americans know. Mark my word on this. So, so, and this is again where you have to think about this, for example, the resentments against Israel. And that's exactly what this Kuwaiti thinker, uh, argue, that this particular resentment is what's going to be preventing the desired change in the region from being achieved. So by both the US and, and Israel. The people. And that's why always we believe, for us in America here, the power is with the people, not the government. Sadly, my fellow Americans are so oblivious to what's going on anyway. So, uh, they're, they're being so distracted. They just have no clue as the governments keep going in its corruption and its wasteful spending while the Americans continue to struggle to make ends meet. So, and I'm going to be doing a video for you about how unemployment in America is jumping up to the top. So, so they believe that the possibility of people might rise up. So, and again, I don't see it happening on the same scale as it was before. So, and this is where you think about the GCC the Gulf Cooperation Council, okay, which is the countries that they consider, uh, sort of political decisions. Where were they when the atrocities were committed in Gaza? That tells you right there the coordination between Israel and those countries is happening behind closed doors. What in return for one thing, and, and that thing is, has nothing to do with the people, the welfare of people, but for the survival of the regimes or the monarchies. That means the US and Israel will guarantee the— that's why I did what I did yesterday in explaining to you the idea of Israel, NATO, Middle East. That is exactly what it's for. So, so, uh, uh, and, and that's— you start to think about how this is gonna, uh, move forward. So And this brings me to the point of why the narrative about Iran is always at the forefront. All the Gulf states will have to be concerned about Iran because it's easy to sell that narrative to the governments, you know, selling them more weapons. So, but when you think about Iran's sort of future in the region, according to this, uh, Kuwaiti thinker. So, and I couldn't agree more with him when he argued that we have to understand that Iran is an ancient country with a history, people, and geography. So, and of course, Iran has influence in the region. It's supporting other groups, the likes of Hezbollah and Sarullah Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, uh, uh, or Houthis as, uh, for Ansarullah. So in Iraq, so, and when you understand, for example, the ability of Houthis to control Bab el-Mandeb in the Red Sea, it tells you the story right there. But for Washington and Tel Aviv, they have to sell the narrative about Iran differently, more fear, sell it based on fear. That is why, uh, so in the case of Hezbollah, according to this strategic thinker, yes, Hezbollah sort of has been dealt some sort of, uh, a big blow, if I may use the term here. So, but that doesn't mean it cease to exist. It remains strong. So So it's also retaining its weapons. So, and this was evidenced by one particular aspect: when the government in Lebanon, in Beirut, said, well, we're going to have to have Hezbollah disarm, and Hezbollah said forget about it, because the state of Lebanon, meaning the government, was unable to implement this decision to disarm the group which, by the way, the government in Beirut was pressured by the US and Israel to do so. Because it is not, I believe, if I am to think of it long term, it is not to the interest of Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah. Think about the big picture. Think about the big picture. So I'm going to go back to the Arab Spring, uh, uh, question: will there be another Arab Spring? So because here is where I don't see it happening. The conditions that triggered the Arab Spring, uh, back in 2011 are still present, don't get me wrong. So in some way they are even more intensifying. However, the likelihood of another large-scale is uncertain. I just don't see it for now. I could be wrong. We don't know what could happen between now and the end of the year. Things can happen. Look, whoever thought that Hosni Mubarak will be overthrown? So, but when you think about the triggering conditions, they still persist. As a matter of fact, they have worsened. And I'll give you a quick example. You all remember when I was in Morocco and they were at that time demonstrations by the youth demanding jobs. That's one of the things to think about. And by the way, it wasn't just Morocco. You're looking at Jordan also, you're looking at some other countries. Uh, youth unemployment, we're talking about the region right now in the Gulf, youth unemployment remain the highest in the world. Actually, the whole region. Now, when— let me put the map here so we know what we're talking about. It's all region. Yeah, remain the highest in the world, with more than one-third of young people in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, you name it, want to emigrate because of limited employment prospects at home. This is one of the conditions for that. So young unemployment is predicted to remain above— get this— 24%, which is, in my opinion, a serious problem. That's a ticking bomb because that has a significant driver of unrest. It's been in the past. You always use— learn from the past, you know. When you have a massive chunk of the society, young generations, young people with nothing to do, what's left? You recruit them for whatever. Yeah, tens of millions, tens of millions are now acutely food insecure. With— you have several countries, including Lebanon, including Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, having chronic problems accessing stable milk, stable foods such as basic milk, regular bread, grain, meat, the basics, that the basics that we take for granted. They don't have access to that, and that is a problem in itself. However, there was some— a second wave of this Arab Spring happened between 2018 and 2024. 2024, it's called the Second Arab Spring. So, and that one brought mass demonstrations in Iraq, Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Jordan. And what's interesting about it is that they used the same slogan that was used in the first Arab Spring of 2011, which was— and I put in quote— 'The people want the fall of the regime,' end of quote. However, this, this movement, this demonstrations achieved a little limited outcome compared to 2011. So except for the case of Sudan, of course you all know what happened in Sudan, uh, with Omar al-Bashir was overthrown. So, and most governments successfully contained the unrest. The Gulf States, you know how they contained the Arab Spring, is the threw so much money. I think, to my knowledge, the Saudis used about $10 billion to quiet and keep the people quiet. So that's what the Gulf states did. That's how they survived that one. So when you think about the paradox that exists, the catalyst exists, but mobilization mechanisms are so weak. So the material condition for sort of unrest— you're looking at unemployment, inequality, food insecurity, and among other factors— are present, and they are also severe, severe. But what you have the problem with is the institutional capacity for a large-scale coordination. And that, of course, when you learn about how those countries in the Gulf, uh, are— have learned how to repress, uh, uh, there are repressive tactics, uh, that they use against the, the population. That includes the purchase of Pegasus from Israel. So, so all this That's why I don't see the Arab Spring coming up. My focus now is on understanding at least what is the geopolitical outcome of these dynamics for the region. What I mean by the region, I'm referring to the Gulf States. So the geopolitical of these dynamics are basically to reshaping the entire region order in several crucial ways. This is— we are thinking outside the box, and I'm gonna share with you 2 or 3, uh, how I see scenarios of how I see. First one, what you'll be looking at, possibly a new power architecture that will be emerging. However, that new power architecture will be unstable. So when you look at a tree, a tree pillar regional order emerging around— you're looking at probably 3: Israel, Turkey. I know the term Turkey, it's not quite— so from now on, for me, I will be pronouncing Turkey. Turkey, that's how it's pronounced in English, but in Arabic you pronounce it Turkey. So you have Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf States. When I say Israel forward slash the US, this is what I mean by tri-pillar regional order. So, so, and all this will come at one particular country's expense. Which country is that? You guessed it right, it was Iran, because that's what they have to push the narrative towards. So, because Iran also and has to think about its own strategic purpose in the region. So, so at the same time, Israel leads some sort of militarily and acts decisively and, and unilaterally. Türkiye brings demographic depth into this. They bring— Türkiye brings also strategic reach. At the same time, Gulf monarchies are commercially ambitious, but they are militarily constrained. This is why you saw what happened in Qatar. What did Qatar do? And I remember I was in China, I did a video for you. I said, Mike, my word, Qatar will not respond. Turns out to be the case. So, so when you look at this, what you're going to end up with, you're going to end up with an entire region now that has multiple power centers without some sort of a clear alignment. That's what you're looking at. There are those analysts who are saying— the second point I'm going to be talking about— there are those who are saying, oh, Iran has been strategically weakened but remains tactically dangerous. That is true to that, but I would have to disagree with the strategically weakening aspects of it. Yes, Iran doesn't have access to Syria as it once did. Yes, Iran doesn't have the same level of engagement it did in southern Lebanon. But that doesn't mean it's over for Iran. It is not. No, you know, militarily it, it's, it, it sort of experienced some devastating blows from, from Israel, but it's also Iran reversed that quickly. This is why the next confrontation Israel wants the US to do it, not Israel. And that's one thing I'm going to be talking to you about next time I do the video regarding Israel and China. Because Iran is part of this. So, and this is again, you have to think about, uh, uh, when some think tanks here in Washington, the likes of the RAND Corporation, which RAND Corporation, by the way, it's the back door of the Pentagon, of the Pentagon, and that's the one that provides analysis and so forth, and it pushes for more wars. So, so that's their argument that Iran has weakened militarily will likely restrain itself and its proxies from aggressive actions. Instead, they will act, they will engage in diplomacy. Ah, I don't see that. I just don't see that. So, but when they start to talk about the complete collapse of Iranian influence, that's pushing it beyond limits. I don't buy that. So, so this is why you have now, uh, the Gulf states some sort of reaching out quietly to Iran, but at the same time, they are immediately engaged now with Syria's new regime because they were nervous about Zulani, a former terrorist for, uh, the Islamic State, because what the Islamic State wants is to remove those old leaders and all that. So this is one thing the, the, the Gulf states will do. They will buy those individuals. So, and as a matter of fact, why you have Saudi Arabia and, and Qatar now saying they will pay off Syria's debt to the World Bank. Can you imagine paying off all this while at the same time Gazan people— it shows you where the priorities So, but what Israel is doing in Syria is, is, it's— we're talking about the failure of the US to stabilize now Syria, because that in itself could lead to the creation of a new Lebanon-like borders, border, uh, with Israel. Yeah, as a matter of fact, it won't be just Israel. When you look at the map, let's look at the map here. So, so because this failure once again to stabilize Syria could lead to the creation of a new Lebanon-like state bordering Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Jordan, where jihadist, uh, actors can thrive. And you can see now why the Gulf States will be concerned. So So, and when you think about the, the, uh, uh, military constraint of those Gulf States— Gulf States invested about $14 billion recently, $150 million in Lebanon, $14 billion to rebuild Syria. That's what they committed to. That doesn't mean they're going to do it. So, so using financial clout to pray both countries away from Iran's orbit. That's what they want to do because the US and Israel asked them to do so. So, but during the June 2025 conflicts, the Gulf monarchies proved to be non-player character on the front line. Because they are lacking effective military capabilities despite massive defense spending. That's what I'm saying, you know, no matter what they say, they won't be able to fight, they won't be able to. So, and that's why the Gulf states are pursuing that strategy of hedging rather than choosing right? So when you think about the Gulf States and China, for example, the trade has overtaken the Gulf States' trade with the West, reaching about $257 billion in 2024 versus $256 billion with the West. And this gap, by the way, is expected to widen significantly within 3 years. By 2028. At the same time, the Gulf— we are not denying this— the Gulf states are maintaining their security ties with the US because they depend on the US for everything. So this is again where that's— and I'm going to conclude here, just provide you my conclusion. We are at the top of the hour here. So, so the broader outcome The one thing that I want you keep in mind, it has to do with fragmentation. Fragmentation without a clear winners. When you think about the Gulf States and region for that matter, red large, faces competing threats from the Israeli assertiveness. So Turkey anxieties, okay. The Iran's capabilities. So, and of course, non-state actors, even the organization of the Julani Islamic State in Syria. So this is what I need you to understand on this. This is why I use the term balancing act. That is, remind— it remains extraordinary fragile. And the next few weeks will give us the final answer to all this. My conclusion will be from— I think I did this conclusion from my Saudi book in which I addressed about the Gulf, but I'm going to share it with you. Uh, the West continue to shower— Saudi Arabia is part of this Gulf, uh, uh, states, uh, shower the Saudis with endless praise and admiration which does nothing for the Saudis but inflate their egos and infect them with the ancient Greek disease of hubris. I disagree with those who argue that the regional and global prestige the Saudis enjoyed in the past decade will endure for future decades. To the contrary, that prestige is fading as the sun sets on the desert kingdom, while Iran emerges from the cold and its star is on the ascendant. Saudi Arabia should ask itself if the time has come for self-reflection and reassessment of whether it is headed, uh, uh, where it is headed, or if it should move forward forging new alliances by using new sources of power. This debate occurs within the context of US-Saudi relations as Saudi Arabia witnesses a major shift in protocol over royal successions. The elevation of Crown Prince MBS to the next in line to the throne has already created tensions within the royal family. And we're going to see what inspires this in the next few weeks. So I hope you enjoyed this. Uh, I want to say thank you to the community for being here. Uh, should you decide to support the channel, I'll put the link for you here. There we go. Uh, let me put it in the chat box. Uh, and I want to say thank you to Alan, uh, to Paul, Paul Green, for buying me coffee yesterday. Truly appreciate you, Paul, for your support. Paul is in Europe, so bought me few cups of coffee. So thank you very much, Paul. And to the community, for those who wants to support the channel, you know what kind of information I bring you. So your decision. I look forward to seeing you next time. As always, remember, geopolitics impacts your daily life in more ways than one. Till next time, bye-bye.